Sentencing Law and Policy

A last call for papers: Federal Sentencing Reporter issue on "Booker at 20"

In this prior post a couple of months ago, I set out the full call for papers for a forthcoming (early 2025) issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter in which we will note (and celebrate? criticize?) the federal sentencing system's 20 years of functioning under the rules created by the Supreme Court's ruling in Booker.  As noted there and in subsequent posts, the "soft" deadline for receiving drafts for this FSR issue is this week (though we may have a bit of flexibility).  For full effect, here is a full reprint of the original call:

The US Supreme Court's January 2005 decision in United States v. Booker ushered in a new era for federal sentencing.  Through a dual set of dueling 5-4 opinions, Booker made the guidelines “effectively advisory,” rather than “mandatory,”  after the Court concluded that judicial fact-finding to increase mandatory guideline ranges violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.   The Court’s opinion essentially invited Congress to rework the federal sentencing system in the wake of this ruling, but the Booker advisory guideline system has proved remarkably durable: the mandatory guideline system was operational for 16 years, but we are now approaching the 20th anniversary of Booker and the advisory guideline system it created.

Though constitutionally and functionally a sea change, the Booker ruling has seemingly had a relatively limited effect on sentence severity and reliance on imprisonment in the federal system.  Data from the US Sentencing Commission reveal that in fiscal year 2003, the last full year of data before the disruptions of Booker and its predecessor ruling in Blakely v. Washington, just over 69,000 persons were sentenced in federal courts, with nearly 87% receiving a prison term and with the average prison term being 48 months.  Data from fiscal year 2023, the latest full year of federal sentencing data assembled by the Commission, indicate that just over 64,000 persons were sentenced in federal courts with nearly 93% receiving a prison term and with the average prison term being 52 months.  The relative consistency of federal sentencing outcomes in the Booker era is striking, especially given that Congress enacted two notable sentence-reducing statutes in this period through the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and the First Step Act of 2018.

Still, sentencing below guideline ranges has increased significantly in the Booker era, and lawyers and sentencing judges now place greater emphasis on the statutory sentencing factors of 18 USC § 3553(a) and relatively less emphasis on guideline particulars.  Data from FY 2023 indicate that only 42% of sentences are imposed within the guideline range, though the same Commission data reveal that the guidelines continue to exert a kind of gravitational pull on sentence lengths even though not regularly followed.  And, of course, Booker did not directly impact the force of statutory mandatory minimums, which still shape and cast shadows on plea bargaining and other aspects of the federal sentencing process. 

Nearly 20 years have passed since Booker, and the editors of the Federal Sentencing Reporter are eager to invite judges, lawyers, other sentencing practitioners, legal academics, and sentencing researchers, to share thoughts on “Booker at 20” for publication in an early 2025 FSR issue.  FSR commentaries for this issue could tackle foundational issues (such as the Court’s ruling in Booker and follow-up cases), discrete application issues (such as why certain advisory guidelines are more likely to be followed or ignored), institutional concerns (such as how Congress and the Commission and the Justice Department have responded to Booker), or any other topic of interest or concern to modern federal sentencing policy and practice.  FSR welcomes commentaries from all perspectives, including insights from sentencing experiences (with or without guidelines) in the states and other countries.  Everyone with an informed interest in sentencing law and practice is encouraged to submit a commentary.

FSR articles are typically brief — 2000 to 5000 words, though they can run longer — with relatively light use of citations.  The pieces are designed to be read by busy stakeholders, including lawyers, judges, scholars, and legislators (as well as, of course, members and staff of the US Sentencing Commission).  Priority will be given to drafts submitted by May 28, 2024, and later submissions will be considered as space permits.  Submissions should be sent electronically to [email protected] with a clear indication of the author and the author’s professional affiliation.

Not-quite-last call for papers: Federal Sentencing Reporter issue on "Booker at 20"

In this prior post, I set out the full call for papers for a forthcoming issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter in which we plans to note (and celebrate? criticize?) the federal sentencing system's 20 years of functioning under the rules created by the Supreme Court's ruling in Booker.  As detailed below, the "soft" deadline for receiving drafts for this FSR issue is next week (though we may have a bit of flexibility depending on the number of submissions).  So, though I expect the true last call for submissions will be next week, anyone planning to submit a draft that migth need a little extra time should eb sure to let me know of their plans.  And, for full effect, here are some of the specifics of the call:

Nearly 20 years have passed since Booker, and the editors of the Federal Sentencing Reporter are eager to invite judges, lawyers, other sentencing practitioners, legal academics, and sentencing researchers, to share thoughts on “Booker at 20” for publication in an early 2025 FSR issue.  FSR commentaries for this issue could tackle foundational issues (such as the Court’s ruling in Booker and follow-up cases), discrete application issues (such as why certain advisory guidelines are more likely to be followed or ignored), institutional concerns (such as how Congress and the Commission and the Justice Department have responded to Booker), or any other topic of interest or concern to modern federal sentencing policy and practice.  FSR welcomes commentaries from all perspectives, including insights from sentencing experiences (with or without guidelines) in the states and other countries.  Everyone with an informed interest in sentencing law and practice is encouraged to submit a commentary.

FSR articles are typically brief — 2000 to 5000 words, though they can run longer — with relatively light use of citations.  The pieces are designed to be read by busy stakeholders, including lawyers, judges, scholars, and legislators (as well as, of course, members and staff of the US Sentencing Commission).  Priority will be given to drafts submitted by May 28, 2024, and later submissions will be considered as space permits.  Submissions should be sent electronically to [email protected] with a clear indication of the author and the author’s professional affiliation.

Calling once more for papers: Federal Sentencing Reporter issue on "Booker at 20"

In this prior post, I set out the full call for papers for a forthcoming issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter in which we plans to note (and celebrate? criticize?) the federal sentencing system's 20 years of functioning under the rules created by the Supreme Court's ruling in Booker.  I previously threatened to repost this call every few weeks until the deadline tard the near end of May, so a mid-May re-post on a Monday seems like good timing.  I will forego all the background about Booker in this reminder call and be content with these shortened specifics:

Nearly 20 years have passed since Booker, and the editors of the Federal Sentencing Reporter are eager to invite judges, lawyers, other sentencing practitioners, legal academics, and sentencing researchers, to share thoughts on “Booker at 20” for publication in an early 2025 FSR issue.  FSR commentaries for this issue could tackle foundational issues (such as the Court’s ruling in Booker and follow-up cases), discrete application issues (such as why certain advisory guidelines are more likely to be followed or ignored), institutional concerns (such as how Congress and the Commission and the Justice Department have responded to Booker), or any other topic of interest or concern to modern federal sentencing policy and practice.  FSR welcomes commentaries from all perspectives, including insights from sentencing experiences (with or without guidelines) in the states and other countries.  Everyone with an informed interest in sentencing law and practice is encouraged to submit a commentary.

FSR articles are typically brief — 2000 to 5000 words, though they can run longer — with relatively light use of citations.  The pieces are designed to be read by busy stakeholders, including lawyers, judges, scholars, and legislators (as well as, of course, members and staff of the US Sentencing Commission).  Priority will be given to drafts submitted by May 28, 2024, and later submissions will be considered as space permits.  Submissions should be sent electronically to [email protected] with a clear indication of the author and the author’s professional affiliation.

Federal district judge references selective prosecution concerns in sentencing far-right violent protestor

I just saw this notable and extensive reporting on a notable sentencing from California last week.  The piece is headlined "Judge cites Antifa when rejecting prison for white supremacist’s former associate," and here are excerpts:  

A federal judge who believes the U.S. Department of Justice unconstitutionally prosecuted white supremacists for violence at political rallies said Thursday he knows “the government and others” will disagree with his decision to leniently sentence a man for punching a journalist in 2017.  Prosecutors wanted a year of probation and six months in prison for Tyler Laube, a former associate of Rise Above Movement founder and neo-Nazi Robert Rundo, while his lawyer asked for no prison and no probation. 

During a 24-minute hearing on Thursday in Santa Ana, California, U.S. District Judge Cormac J. Carney credited Laube for 35 days already served in jail, fined him $2,000 and ordered him to be on probation for one year.  Carney’s 22-page memorandum said he has “no doubt” prosecutors’ opposition to a lighter sentence is “focusing entirely on Mr. Laube’s past white-supremacist beliefs and ignoring the violent conduct of Antifa and the similar groups.”

“Viewing Mr. Laube’s actions in context, it does not appear he intended to single out and target a journalist,” Carney wrote.  “Violence erupted at the rally. Mr. Laube did not start the violence. Indeed, he was slapped in the face twice before engaging in any violence,” the judge continued. “Once violence started, Mr. Laube and other RAM members reacted to the Antifa members that were harassing and physically attacking Trump supporters.”

Carney said he “cannot cast aside the Constitution and ignore the mitigating factors and sentencing objectives under Section 3353(a),” referring to the federal law governing sentencings.  “The Constitution and the laws of the United States apply to everyone,” the judge wrote. “We must never forget that if the political winds change in this country, and the new government decides to turn on those not sharing the new government’s views, it will be the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the United States that will protect us.”

The judge quoted Robert Bolt’s 1960 play A Man for All Seasons: “Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.”... The case has a long history: In June 2019, Carney allowed Laube to withdraw his guilty plea for felony conspiracy after he dismissed Rundo and Boman’s charges on First Amendment grounds, but the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the indictment.

Given his previous decisions, Carney likely would have allowed Laube to withdraw his plea to misdemeanor interference with a federally protected right without bodily injury, too. But the U.S. Attorney’s Office also is appealing the judge’s February dismissal order to the 9th Circuit, which already has curtailed the judge’s ability to release Rundo from jail.

If Laube withdrew his plea and Carney dismissed his charges, he could end up in court again should the 9th Circuit reverse the latest dismissal as it did in 2020 with the first dismissal. Carney also is retiring at the end of May, so the case would go to another judge. Because Laube stuck with his plea on Thursday, Carney had no choice but to impose a sentence.

I recommend the full article about these matters, which provides additional backstory and links to sentencing filings. In addition, Judge Carney's lengthy sentencing memo is a fascaniting read (with pictures).  Interestingly, in a footnote toward the close of the sentencing opinion, Judge Carney explains his selective prosecution conclusions are not essential to his sentencing determination: "even ignoring the Court’s selective prosecution finding and the fact that similarly situated individuals did not face prosecution, much less any term of imprisonment, the Court would still conclude that a sentence less than six months is appropriate because the other Section 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a lesser sentence."

Federal district judge references selective prosecution concerns in sentencing far-right violent protestor

I just saw this notable and extensive reporting on a notable sentencing from California last week.  The piece is headlined "Judge cites Antifa when rejecting prison for white supremacist’s former associate," and here are excerpts:  

A federal judge who believes the U.S. Department of Justice unconstitutionally prosecuted white supremacists for violence at political rallies said Thursday he knows “the government and others” will disagree with his decision to leniently sentence a man for punching a journalist in 2017.  Prosecutors wanted a year of probation and six months in prison for Tyler Laube, a former associate of Rise Above Movement founder and neo-Nazi Robert Rundo, while his lawyer asked for no prison and no probation. 

During a 24-minute hearing on Thursday in Santa Ana, California, U.S. District Judge Cormac J. Carney credited Laube for 35 days already served in jail, fined him $2,000 and ordered him to be on probation for one year.  Carney’s 22-page memorandum said he has “no doubt” prosecutors’ opposition to a lighter sentence is “focusing entirely on Mr. Laube’s past white-supremacist beliefs and ignoring the violent conduct of Antifa and the similar groups.”

“Viewing Mr. Laube’s actions in context, it does not appear he intended to single out and target a journalist,” Carney wrote.  “Violence erupted at the rally. Mr. Laube did not start the violence. Indeed, he was slapped in the face twice before engaging in any violence,” the judge continued. “Once violence started, Mr. Laube and other RAM members reacted to the Antifa members that were harassing and physically attacking Trump supporters.”

Carney said he “cannot cast aside the Constitution and ignore the mitigating factors and sentencing objectives under Section 3353(a),” referring to the federal law governing sentencings.  “The Constitution and the laws of the United States apply to everyone,” the judge wrote. “We must never forget that if the political winds change in this country, and the new government decides to turn on those not sharing the new government’s views, it will be the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the United States that will protect us.”

The judge quoted Robert Bolt’s 1960 play A Man for All Seasons: “Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.”... The case has a long history: In June 2019, Carney allowed Laube to withdraw his guilty plea for felony conspiracy after he dismissed Rundo and Boman’s charges on First Amendment grounds, but the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the indictment.

Given his previous decisions, Carney likely would have allowed Laube to withdraw his plea to misdemeanor interference with a federally protected right without bodily injury, too. But the U.S. Attorney’s Office also is appealing the judge’s February dismissal order to the 9th Circuit, which already has curtailed the judge’s ability to release Rundo from jail.

If Laube withdrew his plea and Carney dismissed his charges, he could end up in court again should the 9th Circuit reverse the latest dismissal as it did in 2020 with the first dismissal. Carney also is retiring at the end of May, so the case would go to another judge. Because Laube stuck with his plea on Thursday, Carney had no choice but to impose a sentence.

I recommend the full article about these matters, which provides additional backstory and links to sentencing filings. In addition, Judge Carney's lengthy sentencing memo is a fascaniting read (with pictures).  Interestingly, in a footnote toward the close of the sentencing opinion, Judge Carney explains his selective prosecution conclusions are not essential to his sentencing determination: "even ignoring the Court’s selective prosecution finding and the fact that similarly situated individuals did not face prosecution, much less any term of imprisonment, the Court would still conclude that a sentence less than six months is appropriate because the other Section 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a lesser sentence."

Call for Papers: Federal Sentencing Reporter issue on "Booker at 20"

The US Supreme Court's January 2005 decision in United States v. Booker ushered in a new era for federal sentencing.  Through a dual set of dueling 5-4 opinions, Booker made the guidelines “effectively advisory,” rather than “mandatory,”  after the Court concluded that judicial fact-finding to increase mandatory guideline ranges violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.   The Court’s opinion essentially invited Congress to rework the federal sentencing system in the wake of this ruling, but the Booker advisory guideline system has proved remarkably durable: the mandatory guideline system was operational for 16 years, but we are now approaching the 20th anniversary of Booker and the advisory guideline system it created.

Though constitutionally and functionally a sea change, the Booker ruling has seemingly had a relatively limited effect on sentence severity and reliance on imprisonment in the federal system.  Data from the US Sentencing Commission reveal that in fiscal year 2003, the last full year of data before the disruptions of Booker and its predecessor ruling in Blakely v. Washington, just over 69,000 persons were sentenced in federal courts, with nearly 87% receiving a prison term and with the average prison term being 48 months.  Data from fiscal year 2023, the latest full year of federal sentencing data assembled by the Commission, indicate that just over 64,000 persons were sentenced in federal courts with nearly 93% receiving a prison term and with the average prison term being 52 months.  The relative consistency of federal sentencing outcomes in the Booker era is striking, especially given that Congress enacted two notable sentence-reducing statutes in this period through the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and the First Step Act of 2018.

Still, sentencing below guideline ranges has increased significantly in the Booker era, and lawyers and sentencing judges now place greater emphasis on the statutory sentencing factors of 18 USC § 3553(a) and relatively less emphasis on guideline particulars.  Data from FY 2023 indicate that only 42% of sentences are imposed within the guideline range, though the same Commission data reveal that the guidelines continue to exert a kind of gravitational pull on sentence lengths even though not regularly followed.  And, of course, Booker did not directly impact the force of statutory mandatory minimums, which still shape and cast shadows on plea bargaining and other aspects of the federal sentencing process.  

Nearly 20 years have passed since Booker, and the editors of the Federal Sentencing Reporter are eager to invite judges, lawyers, other sentencing practitioners, legal academics, and sentencing researchers, to share thoughts on “Booker at 20” for publication in an early 2025 FSR issue.  FSR commentaries for this issue could tackle foundational issues (such as the Court’s ruling in Booker and follow-up cases), discrete application issues (such as why certain advisory guidelines are more likely to be followed or ignored), institutional concerns (such as how Congress and the Commission and the Justice Department have responded to Booker), or any other topic of interest or concern to modern federal sentencing policy and practice.  FSR welcomes commentaries from all perspectives, including insights from sentencing experiences (with or without guidelines) in the states and other countries.  Everyone with an informed interest in sentencing law and practice is encouraged to submit a commentary.

FSR articles are typically brief — 2000 to 5000 words, though they can run longer — with light use of citations in the form of endnotes.  The pieces are designed to be read by busy stakeholders, including lawyers, judges, scholars, and legislators (as well as, of course, members and staff of the US Sentencing Commission).  Priority will be given to drafts submitted by May 28, 2024, and later submissions will be considered as space permits.  Submissions should be sent electronically to [email protected] with a clear indication of the author and the author’s professional affiliation.

Federal judge sentences Michigan man who plotted to kidnap Gov to 16 years despite feds seeking LWOP ... and thereafter give other leader 235 months

As reported in this NBC News piece, headlined "Man sentenced to 16 years for plotting to kidnap Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer," a high-profile case reached a sentencing outcome this morning in Michigan federal court. Here are some of the notable details:

A federal judge on Tuesday sentenced a man to 16 years in prison for his role in a plot to kidnap Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer — opting against the prosecution's bid for life behind bars.

Adam Fox, 39, was convicted in August of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and to use a weapon of mass destruction to attack Whitmer, who had drawn the ire of far-right groups for her efforts to curb the spread of Covid-19 in 2020. Jurors in April failed to come to verdicts against Fox and co-defendant Barry Croft, forcing a judge to declare a mistrial before a second trial proved decisive.

U.S. District Judge Robert Jonker questioned whether Fox was a true "natural leader" of the plot, worthy of a life sentence.  "I don't think life is needed to achieve the important public deterrent factors," Jonker said in Grand Rapids, explaining the 192-month sentence.

While a terrorism enhancement set up Fox for a possible life term, Jonker said that harshest sentence isn’t automatic and that he had to carefully consider other factors.  Jonker said he leaned heavily on a 2018-19 Northern California case where U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer, brother of retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, sentenced ISIS sympathizer Amer Alhaggagi to 188 months in prison, more than 15 years short of the 33 years sought by prosecutors.

“You have to calibrate, as judges, the overall seriousness of wrongdoing and the overall seriousness of the defendant’s history," Jonker said. “I see nothing in the record ... nothing that makes me think he’s (Fox) a natural leader and nothing that makes me think he’s the kind of person that anybody involved in this group was naturally going to follow.”

Assistant U.S. Attorney Nils Kessler had said Fox was out to spark an all-out war and needed to be put away for life. “They wanted a second Civil War or a revolution,” Kessler told the court on Tuesday.  "They wanted to ruin everything for everybody."  Kessler warned that Fox will still be a dangerous man when he someday walks free. “The problem is this defendant, he’s going to go into jail and probably emerge more radicalized than when he went in and will remain a danger to the public, your honor," the prosecutor said.

The plot was hatched in response to Whitmer's actions during the start of the pandemic in 2020 when she ordered various lockdowns aimed at curbing the spread of Covid. Far-right groups blasted Whitmer, and then-President Donald Trump appeared to back that opposition in an all-caps tweet.

Defense attorney Christopher Gibbons argued on Tuesday that a life sentence would have been too much.  "That overstates the reality of the conduct that has been alleged and that was actually accomplished by Adam Fox in summer of 2020," Gibbons said.

Based on various press reports, I surmise a terrorism enhancement under the federal sentencing guidelines led to a guildeine-recommended sentencing of life, which is turn served as a key basis for federal prosecutors to advocate for an LWOP term. But it seems Judge Jonker concluded that a 16-year prison term would be "sufficient but not greater than necessary" to serve the purposes set forth by Congress in 18 USC 3553(a)(2).

UPDATE:  On Wednesday (Dec. 28), another kidnapping plot leader was sentenced by the same judge as detailed in this Fox News account:

The other co-leader convicted of conspiracy charges in the foiled plot to kidnap Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer in 2020 was sentenced Wednesday to nearly 20 years in prison.

Barry Croft Jr., who prosecutors recommended a life sentence, learned of his punishment a day after key ally Adam Fox was sentenced to 16 years. Croft was sentenced to 19 years and seven months.

Fox, 39, and Croft, 47, were convicted on two counts of conspiracy at a trial in August. Croft also was found guilty of possessing an unregistered explosive.  The conspirators were furious over tough COVID-19 restrictions that Whitmer and officials in other states had put in place during the early months of the pandemic, as well as perceived threats to gun ownership.

Croft, a Delaware trucker, regularly wore a tri-cornered hat common during the American Revolution and had tattoos on his arms symbolizing resistance -- "Expect Us" -- as he traveled to Ohio, Wisconsin and Michigan to meet with like-minded extremists, according to the Associated Press. "Although he may not have had hierarchical control over all the other participants, he coordinated and pushed the implementation of the conspiracy from its inception to its final stages," Assistant U.S. Attorney Nils Kessler said in a court filing....

"The abduction of the governor was only meant to be the beginning of Croft’s reign of terror," Kessler said. "He called for riots, ‘torching’ government officials in their sleep and setting off a ‘domino’ effect of violence across the country."

A key piece of evidence showed Croft, Fox and others traveled to see Whitmer's vacation home in northern Michigan, with undercover agents and informants inside the cabal. At one point, Croft told allies, "I don’t like seeing anybody get killed either. But you don’t make an omelet without breaking a few eggs, you know what I mean?"

Croft's attorney tried to soften his client's role. In a court filing, Joshua Blanchard said the Bear, Delaware, man did not actually have authority over others and often frustrated them because he "just kept talking." Croft was smoking 2 ounces of marijuana per week, Blanchard said. "Simply put, to the extent that the jury determined he was a participant, as they necessarily did, he was a participant to a lesser degree than others," Blanchard insisted.

Two men who pleaded guilty and testified against Fox and Croft received substantial breaks; Ty Garbin is already free after a 2 1/2-year prison term, while Kaleb Franks was given a four-year sentence.

In state court, three men recently were given lengthy sentences for assisting Fox earlier in the summer of 2020. Five more are awaiting trial in Antrim County, where Whitmer’s vacation home is located.

District judge sentences first Jan 6 rioter convicted at trial to 87 months in federal prison (which was bottom of calculated guideline range)

As reported in this Politico article, after an extended sentencing hearing, a "Texas militia member on Monday received the longest sentence to date of any participant in the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol: seven-and-a-quarter years in prison."  Here are some of the notable details:

Guy Reffitt, 49, was the first Jan. 6 defendant to go before a jury and was convicted in March on five felony charges, including interfering with police during civil disorder, obstructing the tallying of the electoral votes and threatening his children if they reported him to authorities.

However, U.S. District Court Judge Dabney Friedrich declined the Justice Department’s request to treat Reffitt’s crimes as terrorism, which would have substantially increased the recommended sentence under federal guidelines. 

It was federal prosecutors’ first request to draw tougher punishment for a Jan. 6 defendant by classifying his actions as domestic terrorism, but the judge concluded it was not appropriate to apply the more severe sentencing guidelines permitted under federal law in terrorism-related cases. Friedrich said applying the sentencing enhancement to Reffitt would create an “unwarranted sentencing disparity” with other cases involving similar threats or conduct related to the Capitol riot.

“There are a lot of cases where defendants possessed weapons or committed very violent assaults,” Friedrich noted, highlighting that the most severe sentences handed down in Jan. 6 cases thus far were a little more than five years while prosecutors asked for a 15-year sentence against Reffitt. “The government is asking for a sentence that is three times as long as any other defendant and the defendant did not assault an officer.”...

Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Nestler said Reffitt’s discussions before and after Jan. 6 make clear he was intent on carrying out his repeated threats to drag Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell from the Capitol building by force. In discussions caught on video, Reffitt was recorded referring to his desire to listen to the lawmaker’s heads bouncing down the Capitol steps. “He was planning to overtake our government. He wasn’t just trying to stop the certification,” Nestler said. “He wasn’t done. Jan. 6 was just a preface. ... Mr Reffitt is in a class all by himself.”

However, Friedrich said prosecutors had urged much shorter sentences in cases involving people who were directly involved in actual violence against police. “You’re making recommendations that are way different than you’re making in this case — way different,” said the judge, an appointee of President Donald Trump.

Friedrich also said she worried that Reffitt not be unduly punished for deciding to go to trial, rather than enter into a plea bargain with prosecutors. “His decision to exercise his constitutional right to go to trial should not result in a dramatically different sentence,” she said.

Nestler also noted that Reffitt was convicted of having a handgun on his hip while on the Capitol grounds, which Friedrich conceded was an important distinction from the other cases to reach sentencing thus far. “Huge, huge … and does the firearm deserve three times the sentence if it was not brandished or used in any way?” the judge asked.

Another unusual aspect of Reffitt’s case is that he was convicted of threatening to injure his two children if they discussed his actions on Jan. 6 with authorities. One of those children, Peyton Reffitt, spoke briefly during Monday’s hearing to urge leniency for her father. She suggested that Trump was more responsible for the events that day than her father was. “My father’s name was not on all the flags that were there that day that everyone was carrying that day,” Peyton said. “He was not the leader.”

As noted in a prior post, the presentence report had calculated Reffitt's guidelines range to be 108 to 135 months, but Judge Friedrich did not apply all the suggested guideline enhancement and ultimately  sentence him at the bottom of the guideline range calculated by her to be 87 to 108 months.

A few of many prior related posts:

• Federal judges expressing some concern about lenient plea deals for some Capitol riot defendants
• Recent Jan 6 rioter sentencings showcase different judges with different sentencing perspectives
• Accounting for the first 50 sentences imposed on January 6 rioters 
• January 6 riot prosecutions continuing to spotlight realities of federal criminal justice case processing 
• Fascinating new AP accounting of all sentences given to January 6 rioters so far
• Politico provides new review of "Where Jan. 6 prosecutions stand, 18 months after the attack" 
• With first defendant now convicted after trial, how steep might the "trial penalty" be in the Jan 6 riot cases?
• Feds seeking (above-guideline) sentence of 15 years for first Jan 6 defendant to be sentenced after trial convictions

UPDATE: I found notable this Insider article which is headlined "Trump 'deserves life in prison' says daughter of January 6 rioter who was sentenced to 7 years behind bars." Here are excerpts:

The daughter of a man sentenced to 7 years in prison on Monday for taking part in the January 6 insurrection told reporters that the former president, whose supporters stormed the US Capitol, deserves to spend the rest of his life behind bars if her father was going to get his sentence....

After Reffitt was sentenced, his daughters spoke to the media and argued that it was not fair for their father to receive such a long prison term while more powerful people remain free.

"To mark my dad as this horrible person, and then having him prosecuted like this, when somebody is maybe even able to get elected again? Doesn't seem right to me," Sarah Reffitt told reporters.

"Trump deserves life in prison if my father is in prison for this long," Petyon Reffitt added.

Another federal judge gives Michael Avenatti another below-guideline sentence, as he gets now 48 months for defrauding Stormy Daniels

In what is becoming almost a summer tradition, disgraced lawyer Michael Avenatti was sentenced by a federal judge below the federal sentencing guidelines today.  Sentencing fans may recall that last July Avenetti got a way-below-guideline 30-month sentence for extorting Nike (details here).  Today was judgment day for defrauding Stormy Daniels, as Reuters reports and as excerpted here:

Michael Avenatti, the brash California lawyer who took on then-President Donald Trump, was sentenced on Thursday to four years in prison for defrauding his best-known former client, the porn actress Stormy Daniels.  A federal jury convicted Avenatti in February of wire fraud and aggravated identity theft after a two-week trial, agreeing with prosecutors that he embezzled nearly $300,000 in book proceeds intended for Daniels.

U.S. District Judge Jesse Furman imposed the sentence in federal court in Manhattan, calling Avenatti's conduct "brazen and egregious."  But he said guidelines calling for Avenatti, 51, to serve a sentence of five or six years were "unreasonable," in part due to Avenatti's prior successful legal career.

Avenatti, who appeared in court wearing prison garb and ankle shackles, recounted a string of legal victories he had secured for clients he called "underdogs," and disputed prosecutors' assertion that he took on Daniels as a client to gain a national platform for himself.  "No one else had the guts to take her case," Avenatti said before Furman handed down his sentence, speaking from the courtroom lectern with a U.S. marshal standing beside him.  "I believed we could take down a sitting U.S. president who was the biggest threat to our democracy in modern times."

Daniels, whose given name is Stephanie Clifford, is known for receiving $130,000 from Trump's former lawyer Michael Cohen, in exchange for remaining quiet before the 2016 presidential election about sexual encounters she says she had with Trump, which he has denied.

Avenatti vowed to appeal the guilty verdict in the Daniels case.... He had already been serving a 2-1/2-year sentence stemming from his 2020 federal conviction for trying to extort millions of dollars from Nike Inc. He has appealed that conviction.

Eighteen months of the Daniels sentence will run concurrent with the Nike sentence, meaning Avenatti faces a combined five years in prison. He is still charged in California with stealing millions of dollars from other clients.

Prosecutors had recommended that Avenatti receive a "substantial" prison term in the Daniels case, including a mandatory two-year term for identity theft. Avenatti, who represented himself during the trial, proposed a three-year sentence, with one year running concurrent with his Nike sentence.

Helping to spread a federal sentencing "message" for a "corruption superspreader"

I always find it is interesting when judges in relatively low-profile cases talk about "sending a message" at sentencing, and I suppose I should try to make a habit of helping judges spread the messages they hope to be sending.  To that end, here I will flag this recent sentencing story out of Chicago headlined "‘You were a corruption superspreader’: Judge sentences ex-state Rep. Luis Arroyo to 57 months in prison in bribery case involving sweepstakes machine bill."  Here are excerpts:

Saying he needed to send a message on the cost of public corruption, a federal judge on Wednesday sentenced former state Rep. Luis Arroyo to nearly five years in federal prison for trying to bribe a state senator to help with legislation expanding the shadowy world of sweepstakes gambling machines.

Rejecting a defense plea for probation, U.S. District Judge Steven Seeger railed against Arroyo’s “dirty” conduct, saying in a lengthy speech that he sold out an already corruption-weary public and committed a “frontal assault on the very idea of representative government.”

“You were a corruption superspreader,” Seeger said near the end of a nearly four-hour hearing at the Dirksen U.S. Courthouse.  “The public did not get what they deserved.  They voted for an honest representative, and what they got was a corrupt politician.”

Arroyo’s lawyers had maintained that a prison sentence for the longtime Chicago Democrat would do nothing to stop the state’s seemingly intractable corruption problem and would be akin to “draining Lake Michigan with a spoon.”

But the judge took particular umbrage with attempts to downplay what Arroyo did, and at one point asked defense attorney Michael Gillespie specifically about the spoon comment.  “What does that mean?” the judge asked.  ”What am I supposed to do with that?”  As Gillespie fumbled for an answer, Seeger interrupted in a stern voice: “Maybe judges need a bigger spoon.”

Arroyo, 67, entered a blind guilty plea in November to one count of honest services fraud, a move that came without an agreement with prosecutors on what sentencing recommendations should be made to the judge.  The 57-month term imposed by Seeger was above the four years in prison recommended by prosecutors on Wednesday....

Arroyo resigned his seat shortly after he was arrested in 2019 on the bribery charges. A superseding indictment later added new wire and mail fraud charges against Arroyo and also charged James T. Weiss with bribery, wire fraud, mail fraud and lying to the FBI....

The case centers on the largely uncharted world of sweepstakes machines, sometimes called “gray machines,” for which Arroyo was moonlighting as a lobbyist.  The machines allow customers to put in money, receive a coupon to redeem for merchandise online and then play electronic games like slot machines.... According to the 15-page indictment, Weiss paid bribes to Arroyo beginning in November 2018 in exchange for Arroyo’s promotion of legislation beneficial to Weiss’ company, Collage LLC, which specialized in the sweepstakes machines....

In his remarks, Seeger said it was clear that Arroyo was a devoted family man and “a pillar of his community,” but chastised him repeatedly for trying to downplay the severity of his corrupt acts. The judge also noted that while there was no evidence of any other crimes committed in the wiretapped conversations, Arroyo certainly knew the language of corruption and seemed to be “in familiar territory.”

“I need to make sure that the message gets out that public corruption isn’t worth it,” Seeger said. “For whatever reason, that message isn’t getting through.”

You be the judge: what federal sentence for former reality star Josh Duggar after child pornography convictions?

In this post back in December, I asked "How many years and counting might reality TV star Josh Duggar now get after federal jury convictions on two child pornography charges?," and I speculated that he could be looking at a federal guideline range of a decade or longer.   This month, sentencing memos were submitted ahead of Duggar's scheduled sentencing on May 25, and the start of the Government's 32-page Sentencing Memorandum notes the guideline calculation and the statutory ceiling in this matter, as well at the Government's sentencing recommendation:

U.S. Probation’s Case calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) set out in the final PSR reflects an advisory range of imprisonment of 360 months to life, which will be capped by the offense maximum of 240 months set by statute for Count One in the Indictment....

Based on all the facts of the case, including Duggar’s prior sexual exploitation of multiple minors discussed herein, and in consideration of the extraordinary efforts Duggar took to obtain and view child sexual abuse material (CSAM), the nature of the CSAM he obtained and viewed, his efforts to conceal his criminal conduct, and his refusal to take accountability for or acknowledge any of his criminal conduct, the Government recommends the Court impose a guideline term of imprisonment of 240 months.

Defendant Duggar's Sentencing Memorandum and Motion for Downward Variance, which also runs 32 pages, concludes its introduction with a very different recommendation:

[W]hile he maintains his innocence and intends to exercise his right to an appeal, Duggar accepts that the crime for which he is being sentenced is serious and that this Court must impose a punishment.  But in crafting that punishment, Duggar asks that this Court consider this crime within its proper context and consider the person Duggar really is.  It is against this backdrop that Duggar respectfully requests that this Court sentence him to 60 months’ imprisonment as that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  As evidenced by his perfect performance on pretrial bond, no matter what sentence is ultimately imposed, this is a defendant who will never find himself before this, or any other, Court ever again and a defendant who will abide by whatever conditions of supervised release this Court imposes.

This lengthy Law & Crime article, headlined "Federal Prosecutors Urge Judge to Hand Josh Duggar Maximum Punishment for Downloading ‘Depraved’ Child Sexual Abuse Materials," provides some more context for the sentencing advocacy in this celebrity(?) case.

Prior related post:

• How many years and counting might reality TV star Josh Duggar now get after federal jury convictions on two child pornography charges?

"Child Pornography and Criminal Justice Reform"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article now available via SSRN and authored by Dawinder Sidhu and Kelsey Robinson. Here is its abstract:

Drug offenses lie at the heart of the movement for criminal justice reform, and for good reason.  The defining attributes of prevailing drug policy — severe and disproportionate penalties owning to a retributive, factually flawed, and hurried congressional process — apply to the child pornography context as well.  In this Article, we identify the common issues with drug and child pornography sentencing and outline the doctrinal implications of this shared foundation, especially as to district court discretion to vary under Kimbrough v. United States.

Though drug sentencing is problematic enough, child pornography is arguably worse.  The U.S. Sentencing Commission has disavowed these guidelines and invited judges to vary from them.  Judges have done just that, varying in 63% of all cases, more than any other offense type.  Thus, in this Article, we also suggest how the improvements to this uniquely distressed area of law can inform criminal justice reform more generally, especially as to substantive reasonableness review under Gall v. United States, mandatory minimum sentences, and sunset provisions for penalty levels.

Child pornography is not part of the conversation for criminal justice reform.  We take on child pornography sentencing, and in doing so hope to ensure that the movement for criminal justice reform is both correct and complete.

Tenth Circuit panel finds sentence increase for open plea to be procedurally unreasonable

One of many challenges in the world of sentencing policy and practice, especially when it comes to appellate review, is that a sentencing judge who often extensively explains his or her sentencing decision-making at length is often more likely to articulate a legally problematic reason that then provides the basis for a sentence reversal.   This reality is demonstrated in a new Tenth Circuit panel decision in US v. Cozad, No. 20-3233 (10th Cir. Jan. 3, 2022) (available here).  Cozad is a really interesting opinion for lots of reasons, and it starts with the district court at sentencing explaining why the defendant was here getting a sentence a few months above the bottom of the guideline range in this particular way:

[I]t’s always been my practice to say if someone agrees to a plea agreement, the additional conditions that are obtained in that, they’re entitled to additional consideration, which is where I start at a low end guideline range.  But in my calculation, without a plea agreement, I have always started with looking more at the mid-tier of the guideline range, which is where I think the guidelines initially envisioned that courts would operate, and not giving them the additional credit for actually entering into a plea agreement to do that.

Here is how the Tenth Circuit panel framed the issue that this statement of sentencing reasons presented on appeal:

This appeal raises one issue: whether, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it is unreasonable for a district court to impose a harsher sentence based on a defendant’s decision to plead guilty without a plea agreement. For the reasons explained below, we hold that it is.

There are lots of parts to the opinion that follows which serves as an effective overview of various aspects of reasonableness review and plea policies and practices. I highly recommend the full opinion for federal sentencing fans, and here are some notable excerpts (with lots of cites omitted):

[A]lthough the district court stated that its practice was not “a hard-and-fast rule by any means,” the court did not explain why it was applying the rule in Ms. Cozad’s case.  Similarly, although the district court made a passing reference to “the agreements that typically happen in a plea agreement,” the court did not specify what those “agreements” are. On this record, therefore, we cannot but conclude that the district court gave Ms. Cozad a longer sentence than she otherwise would have received simply because she pled guilty without a plea agreement. Whether it was permissible for the district court to do so appears to be a question of first impression in this or any other circuit....

For reasons of history, as well as congressional intent, appellate courts have interpreted § 3553(a) liberally.  Nevertheless, a district court does not enjoy boundless discretion with respect to the facts it relies on at sentencing.... Even when the fact ostensibly relates to the defendant’s conduct or characteristics, its consideration may be grounds for remand when the fact has no bearing on any of the aims of punishment set forth in § 3553(a)(2)....

The government argues that a district court may consider the absence of a plea agreement because such agreements often include certain conditions, such as appellate waivers.... When the parties reach an agreement, a district court can evaluate the terms, including any waivers, in the context of the agreement as a whole to determine the degree to which the waivers may show some additional acceptance of responsibility. By contrast, when the defendant enters an open plea, the court may not know whether any plea agreement was offered, let alone under what terms. Indeed, there is no evidence in this case that an appellate waiver was ever discussed. In these circumstances, without more information, it is unreasonable to penalize the defendant for the absence of an appellate waiver in a nonexistent agreement....

The government further argues that courts may “for uniformity purposes” grant “additional leniency” to defendants who enter into plea agreements and withhold it from those who do not.  The government reasons that, were a court required to sentence a defendant who pleads open “to the same sentence he would have had, had he taken a plea agreement,” there would be “no compelling reason” for a defendant to accept the conditions of a plea bargain.  We are not convinced....

[E]ven in cases where there is only a single viable charge, the government could threaten to recommend a harsher sentence or to pursue an aggressive interpretation of the guidelines.  Consequently, because courts are free to take the government’s recommendation into account, a defendant who refuses to plea bargain would still risk receiving a higher sentence in many cases.

More fundamentally, the government’s argument fails because providing a “compelling reason” for a defendant to enter a plea agreement, whether by granting “additional leniency” or withholding it, is not a valid sentencing rationale.  Section 3553(a) provides that courts are to impose no more punishment than is necessary to comply with the four penological goals enumerated in § 3553(a)(2). When a court imposes a sentence to achieve some other purpose, that sentence is unlawful.

Eighth Circuit panel affirms time-served sentence for enticement of a (fake) minor when guidelines recommended 46-57 months

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss this interesting Eighth Circuit panel ruling today in US v. Davis, No. 21-1283 (8th Cir. Dec. 20, 2021) (available here). Here are portions from the opinion's start and heart:

Fredrick M. Davis pled guilty to attempted coercion or enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a).  The district court sentenced him to time served and 120 months’ supervised release, including one year of home confinement. The United States appeals the below-guidelines sentence....

In 2019 Davis contacted “Addyson” and “Sara” online.  They identified themselves as 14-year-old girls, but were actually personas of undercover law enforcement. Davis asked them to meet with him in a hotel in Dickinson, North Dakota.  He sent them sexually explicit messages and a graphic picture, and asked them to send him explicit pictures.

Davis was arrested at the North Dakota hotel where he intended to meet the girls. Under a pretrial agreement, Davis pled guilty to one charge—attempted coercion or enticement of a minor. His advisory guideline range was 46-57 months.  As required by the pretrial agreement, the parties jointly recommended a 60-month sentence and five years of supervised release.  The district court sentenced Davis to time served (two months) and 120 months of supervised release, including one year of home confinement, participation in sex offender treatment, and registration as a sex offender....

The government objected to the sentence for failing to afford adequate deterrent effect (the district court noted the objection).  But a district court has “wide latitude” to weigh factors, and it “may give some factors less weight than a [party] prefers or more weight to other factors, but that alone does not justify reversal.”  United States v. Brown, 992 F.3d 665, 673–74 (8th Cir. 2021).  In its written statement of reasons, the district court did acknowledge the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. It chose to give other factors more weight than the deterrence factor, which is not a clear error of judgment.

The government also argues that the district court erred in weighing the Post Conviction Risk Assessment.  The record shows the district court considered the PCRA in conjunction with other factors.  In fact, at sentencing, the court asked the prosecutor: “do you agree with the assessment in the PSR that the risk level is very low for this offender to reoffend?”  He replied, “I do agree, yes, Your Honor.”  It is within the district court’s discretion to weigh such factors.

The government contends Davis’s commendable 20-year military career and his exemplary behavior on pretrial release are not “sufficiently compelling” to justify his below-guidelines sentence.  See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.  But, this court “may not require ‘“extraordinary” circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines.’” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 462, quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 47.  The district court’s rationale for granting the variance does not need to be extraordinary, only substantively reasonable.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) instructs the sentencer to consider a defendant’s history and characteristics.  In his meritorious military career — half his adult life — he earned numerous awards and commendations, including the Combat Action Ribbon and recognitions for service in Iraq and Somalia.  Cf. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11 (“Military service may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military service, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.”).  He also did more than simply staying out of trouble while on pretrial release: he acknowledged his conduct, expressed remorse, sought ongoing treatment for his service-related PTSD, and got and maintained a job....

The ten years of supervised release, one year of home confinement, and other restrictions here are a substantial punishment.  “[T]he Guidelines are only one of the factors to consider when imposing a sentence, and § 3553(a)(3) directs the judge to consider sentences other than imprisonment.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 59.  “[C]ustodial sentences are qualitatively more severe than probationary sentences of equivalent terms,” but “[o]ffenders on probation are nonetheless subject to several standard conditions that substantially restrict their liberty.” Id. at 48.  In Gall itself, the Court reversed for not giving due deference to the district court’s “reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justified the sentence” of probation. Id. at 59-60. 

Death threats to Speaker Pelosi leads to 28-month (below guideline, above plea deal) federal sentence

This Politico article reports on a notable federal sentencing today under this full headline: "QAnon follower gets 28-month sentence for death threats to Pelosi: Judge says continuing election-fraud rhetoric from Republican politicians makes defendant an ongoing threat."  Here are some of the details:

A QAnon follower from Georgia who brought an arsenal of weapons to Washington just after the Jan. 6 riot at the Capitol was sentenced Tuesday to 28 months in prison for making crude threats to kill Speaker Nancy Pelosi and D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser.

Cleveland Meredith Jr., 53, missed then-President Donald Trump’s Jan. 6 rally due to trouble with his truck, but was arrested the following day at a hotel near the Capitol after family members alerted the FBI to threatening text messages he’d sent. In a trailer outside the hotel, police found a pistol, an assault rifle and about 2,500 rounds of ammunition, as well as a telescoping gun-sight....

With credit for the more than 11 months he has already served at a D.C. jail facility since his arrest plus good behavior credit, Meredith is likely to spend roughly another 14 months in federal prison before being released....

During a sentencing hearing that spanned more than three hours, Jackson read aloud the series of texts Meredith sent during a drive from Colorado to D.C. and after he arrived in Washington. “Thinking about heading over to Pelosi [expletive]’s speech and putting a bullet in her noggin on Live TV,” Meredith wrote in a message to his uncle on Jan. 7.  “I may wander over to the Mayor’s office and put a 5.56 in her skull,” Meredith added in an earlier message....

In her statement, Jackson railed against an increase in extreme political language, and she noted that many political leaders continue to make false claims about fraud in the 2020 election. “The heated inflammatory rhetoric that brought the defendant to the district has not subsided,” the judge said. “The lie that the election was stolen and illegitimate is still being perpetrated. Indeed, it’s being amplified not only on social media, but on mainstream news outlets and…it’s become heresy for a member of the president’s—the former president’s party to say otherwise.”

During a brief, emotional statement to the court, Meredith insisted that the threats he issued and his talk of “war” in the Capitol were just overheated rhetoric. “I had no intention. It was political hyperbole that was too hyper,” Meredith said. “I was out of control that day.”...

Meredith pleaded guilty in September to a felony threat charge that carries a maximum of five years in prison. The plea deal contemplated a sentence of between six months and two years. However, Jackson found that the non-binding sentencing guidelines actually called for a stiffer sentence of between 37 months and 46 months because the threat to Pelosi targeted a government official.

“The fact that the government didn’t point to this before is odd,” said the judge, an appointee of former President Barack Obama. “It’s hard to suggest that these threats weren’t about or motivated by the victim’s performance of their official duties…The defendant was not incensed at Nancy Pelosi because she was a next-door neighbor who parked in his parking spot or a former romantic or business partner.”

Kiyonaga complained bitterly about the increase in the recommended sentencing range and suggested that the change will discourage other defendants from agreeing to plea deals. “I painstakingly negotiated a plea agreement with the government,” he said. “I think the government has gotten a windfall that it should not take advantage of. I think that will reverberate.”

The judge ultimately sentenced Meredith below the guidelines range, citing in part the harsh pandemic-related conditions at the D.C. Jail, where he is housed with others awaiting trial on charges related to the Jan. 6 Capitol riot.

TRAC releases intriguing new report on "Equal Justice and Sentencing Practices Among Federal District Court Judges"

The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University is a research center that keeps track of a lot of federal criminal case processing data. Today TRAC released this notable short data report under the title "Equal Justice and Sentencing Practices Among Federal District Court Judges." Here are snippets from the start and end of the report:

This report examines very recent data on federal trial judges and their sentencing practices. The existence of judge-to-judge differences in sentences of course is not synonymous with finding unwarranted sentencing disparity....  But a fair court system always seeks to provide equal justice under the law, working to ensure that sentencing patterns of judges not be widely different when they are handling similar kinds of cases.

In reality, sometimes the goal of equal justice under the law is achieved, and other times the actual sentences handed down depart markedly from this goal. Using case-by-case, judge-by-judge, data updated through December 2020, a new analysis by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University identifies federal courthouses where wide judge-to-judge sentencing differences currently occur, and courthouses where there is wide agreement in sentencing among judges.

While special circumstances might account for some of these differences, half of the courthouses in the country had median differences in prison sentences of 16 months or more, and average differences of 21 months or more.

Results further showed that currently seven (7) federal courthouses out of 159 compared had perfect agreement among judges in the typical or median sentences assigned. In an additional thirty (30), judge-to-judge sentences differed by six months or less.... At the other extreme, five (5) courthouses showed more than 60 months difference in the median prison sentence handed out across judges serving on the same bench....

This study largely replicates the findings from TRAC's first national judge-by-judge examination of the differences among federal judges in sentencing practices that appeared in the Federal Sentencing Reporter. That study was published almost a decade ago. While it is true that some specific courthouses show greater agreement today, others show less agreement. Many of these changes appear to reflect changes in the judges currently serving there.

Yet answering the question of whether significant intra-judge differences in sentencing practices exist is not sufficient to establish that such differences are indeed unwarranted sentencing disparities. Much more research and a great deal more time is needed for a thorough examination of the actual details of judge-by-judge sentencing patterns.

Federal prosecutors signal they will be seeking jail time for some Capitol riot misdemeanants

This post from a few months ago, headlined "Federal judges expressing some concern about lenient plea deals for some Capitol riot defendants," spotlighted some comments by some federal judges about whether federal prosecutors we not being sufficiently "tough" in their prosecutorial approach to some January 6 rioters.  This recent Politico article, headlined "Prosecutors: Jan. 6 defendants should expect jail time," suggests that federal prosecutors got the message as they are now talking up the prospect of seeking jail time even in some cases that are resolved through only misdemeanor charges.  Here are the details:

Federal prosecutors indicated Friday that those who breached the Capitol — even those charged only with misdemeanor offenses like parading — should expect to face jail time, not probation, for their role in the assault.  "Misdemeanor breaches of the Capitol on January 6, 2021 were not minor crimes," Assistant U.S. Attorney Kevin Birney wrote in a sentencing memo for Valerie Ehrke, one of more than 600 defendants charged for participating in the Capitol mob.  "A probationary sentence … should not necessarily become the default."

Birney, however, did recommend probation for Ehrke, describing her as "the rare case where a probationary sentence is appropriate."  Ehrke entered the Capitol for just one minute, exiting quickly after police began repelling the crowd. She committed no violence or property destruction, according to surveillance videos, and she voluntarily spoke to law enforcement, expressing remorse and ultimately becoming one of the first to plead guilty. All of those factors, Birney wrote in the filing, should result in a probation-only sentence.

Few of the Jan. 6 defendants have reached sentencing so far, with Paul Hodgkins — the first felony case to get to the sentencing stage — facing an eight-month jail term, the longest doled out by judges to date.  Anna Morgan Lloyd, the first Jan. 6 defendant sentenced, received 36 months of probation for a misdemeanor guilty plea from Judge Royce Lamberth.  Judge Thomas Hogan sentenced Jessica and Joshua Bustle, a couple charged with misdemeanor offenses for entering the Capitol, to home confinement and probation, in part because they are expecting the birth of a child soon.

Like prosecutors, though, Lamberth emphasized that other defendants shouldn't necessarily expect probation for participating in the breach of the Capitol. “I don’t want to create the impression that probation is the automatic outcome here because it’s not going to be," Lamberth said during Morgan-Lloyd's sentencing, a comment that Birney pointed to in his sentence recommendation for Ehrke.

Hogan, too, echoed that sentiment, telling the Bustles, "I think the presumption should be that these offenses were an attack on our democracy and that jail time is usually — should be expected."

None of the Jan. 6 defendants facing the most serious charges, including dozens accused of assaulting police officers and a growing contingent charged with conspiring to block the certification of President Joe Biden's victory in the 2020 election, have been sentenced yet. Prosecutors say misdemeanor defendants bear responsibility for some of the more egregious crimes committed that day, in part because the sheer size of the mob helped provide cover for the most dangerous participants in the attack.

Some of many prior related posts:

• "Many Capitol rioters unlikely to serve jail time" because some facing only misdemeanor convictions
• Noting the importance of charging policies and practices (and consistency?) as federal rioting charges get resolved from coast-to-coast
• Harsh penal treatment of some Capitol rioters being criticized by notable progressive 
• New plea deals sets possible new precedent for resolving low-level Capitol riot prosecutions with single misdemeanor with 6 month jail maximum
• Notable education efforts prior to sentencing of minor participant in Capitol riot (who seems likely to get probation)
• Feds advocate for (mid-guideline) prison term of 18 months for first Jan 6 defendant due to be sentenced on felony charge 
• First Jan 6 rioter to be sentenced on felony charges gets (below-guideline) sentence of eight months in federal prison 
• Federal judges expressing some concern about lenient plea deals for some Capitol riot defendants
• Notable accounting of federal prosecutions and sentences responding to riots both before and during January 6

Notable accounting of federal prosecutions and sentences responding to riots both before and during January 6

This recent AP article, headlined "Records rebut claims of unequal treatment of Jan. 6 rioters," provides a valuable and interesting accounting of some of the federal criminal accountability that has followed various riots in recent times.  Here are excerpts:

An Associated Press review of court documents in more than 300 federal cases stemming from the protests sparked by George Floyd’s death last year shows that dozens of people charged have been convicted of serious crimes and sent to prison.

The AP found that more than 120 defendants across the United States have pleaded guilty or were convicted at trial of federal crimes including rioting, arson and conspiracy. More than 70 defendants who’ve been sentenced so far have gotten an average of about 27 months behind bars. At least 10 received prison terms of five years or more....

To be sure, some defendants have received lenient deals. At least 19 who have been sentenced across the country got no prison time or time served, according to the AP’s review. Many pleaded guilty to lower-level offenses, such as misdemeanor assault, but some were convicted of more serious charges, including civil disorder.

In Portland, Oregon — where demonstrations, many turning violent, occurred nightly for months after a white Minneapolis police officer killed Floyd — about 60 of the roughly 100 cases that were brought have been dismissed, court records show.  Most of those defendants received deferred resolution agreements, under which prosecutors promise to drop charges after a certain amount of time if the defendant stays out of trouble and completes things like community service.  Some Jan. 6 defendants have complained it’s unfair they aren’t getting the same deals.

But President Joe Biden’s Justice Department has continued the vast majority of the racial injustice protest cases brought across the U.S. under Trump and has often pushed for lengthy prison time for people convicted of serious crimes.  Since Biden took office in January, federal prosecutors have brought some new cases stemming from last year’s protests.

Conservatives have sought to equate the attack on the Capitol with the Black Lives Matter protests, accusing Democrats of being hypocrites for not denouncing the violence after Floyd’s death as loudly as the Jan. 6 insurrection.  And some Republicans have seized on the handling of the protest cases in Portland to suggest that the Jan. 6 defendants are being politically persecuted.

That has not been borne out when comparing the sentences that federal judges have given to Jan. 6 defendants and those who are accused of crimes during the protests against police brutality across the country.  Only a handful of the nearly 600 people who’ve been charged in the insurrection have received their punishments so far, and just three people have been sentenced to time behind bars.  The vast majority of the most serious cases — involving those accused of assaulting police officers or conspiring to block the certification of Biden’s victory — remain unresolved.

Some of many prior related posts:

• "Many Capitol rioters unlikely to serve jail time" because some facing only misdemeanor convictions
• Noting the importance of charging policies and practices (and consistency?) as federal rioting charges get resolved from coast-to-coast
• Harsh penal treatment of some Capitol rioters being criticized by notable progressive 
• New plea deals sets possible new precedent for resolving low-level Capitol riot prosecutions with single misdemeanor with 6 month jail maximum
• Notable education efforts prior to sentencing of minor participant in Capitol riot (who seems likely to get probation)
• Feds advocate for (mid-guideline) prison term of 18 months for first Jan 6 defendant due to be sentenced on felony charge 
• First Jan 6 rioter to be sentenced on felony charges gets (below-guideline) sentence of eight months in federal prison 
• Federal judges expressing some concern about lenient plea deals for some Capitol riot defendants

Second Circuit panel reverses 48-month (way-below-guideline) sentence as substantively unreasonable for abused woman who provided material support to ISIS

Regular readers know I do not blog much these days about federal sentence reasonableness review because there are not that many blogworthy opinions.  Out of many thousands of appeals brought by federal defendants each year, typically only a few hundred are successful, and all but a few dozen involve miscalculation of the guideline range.  The government rarely appeals, though it has a much better success rate in the relatively few appeals it brings each year. 

In one particular (and relatively rare) categories of cases, the government has a particularly notable history of appellate success when arguing a sentence in unreasonably lenient (see posts linked below for some historical examples).  This category is terrorism cases, and a Second Circuit panel added another example in this category with its ruling today in US v. Ceasar, No. 19-2881 (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2021) (available here).  Federal sentencing fans will want to review this 53-page opinion in detail, but here is the opinion's introduction:

It is undisputed that beginning in or around January 2016, the defendant-appellee, Sinmyah Amera Ceasar, conspired to provide material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ("ISIS"), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a). Using social media and the encrypted messaging application Telegram, Ceasar expressed her support for ISIS, encouraged others to join ISIS abroad, and helped individuals in the United States contact ISIS members overseas. The overseas ISIS members then facilitated U.S.-based ISIS supporters' travel to ISIS-controlled territory. Ceasar herself intended to travel to ISIS territory by way of Sweden, where she planned to marry another ISIS supporter. In November 2016, Ceasar was arrested at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport on her way to Sweden via Turkey. Following her arrest, Ceasar entered into a cooperation agreement with the government in which she pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. In April 2018, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted her presentence release.

While on presentence release, Ceasar reoffended.  Despite the fact that the conditions of her release explicitly prohibited her from contacting individuals or organizations affiliated with foreign terrorist groups, Ceasar obtained a laptop computer, recreated pseudonymous social media accounts, and resumed contacting or attempting to contact several individuals known to be supporters of ISIS or other extremist groups.  The FBI, investigating Ceasar's conduct, found that she had intentionally deleted incriminating communications and had instructed others with whom she had been in contact to do the same.  The bond underlying her presentence release was revoked, and she was remanded pending sentencing. When the FBI interviewed Ceasar about her conduct while on presentence release, she made a significant number of false and misleading statements....

Mental health professionals who met with and treated Ceasar characterize her conduct as a misguided search for community stemming from a lifetime of sexual, physical, and emotional abuse and neglect.  Beginning in her childhood, Ceasar's father sexually abused her.  At age 13, she entered the foster care system and was abused or neglected in each home in which she was placed.  While Ceasar has never been legally married, she entered into three successive so-called "religious marriages" with older men, beginning when she was 16.  In each of those marriages, her husband physically or emotionally abused her.  Ceasar was diagnosed with complex post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the abuse and trauma she endured.

Ceasar faced a Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 to 600 months' imprisonment.  Prior to sentencing, the district court ordered the government and Ceasar to provide expert witness testimony or other materials to assist in its sentencing determination.  The district court held a multiday sentencing hearing at which two government and three defense experts testified as to Ceasar's involvement with and support of ISIS and whether she would be likely to reoffend. 

The district court concluded that the advisory Guidelines range was "excessively harsh" and varied downward from it dramatically.  The court found that Ceasar was motivated by the abuse and trauma she suffered most of her life, and that she needed educational and mental health support in lieu of a long prison sentence.  On June 26, 2019, despite the Guidelines minimum of 360 months, the court imposed a 46-month sentence on Ceasar for the Material Support Offense, one month for the Obstruction Offense, and one month for committing an offense while on presentence release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147, all to run consecutively for a total term of 48 months' imprisonment.  Because she had been in custody from the time of her arrest in November 2016 until she was granted presentence release in April 2018, and was then remanded to custody on July 19, 2018 (following her violation of the conditions of her presentence release), Ceasar served only 13 additional months from the time of sentencing (June 26, 2019) until she was released from prison on July 28, 2020. 

The government appealed on substantive reasonableness grounds, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by considering Ceasar's need for rehabilitation to the exclusion of other sentencing factors, and that this mitigating sentencing factor could not bear the weight assigned to it. The government further argues that Ceasar's sentence was shockingly low compared with other sentences imposed for similar crimes. 

We are not without sympathy for Ceasar, but we are constrained to agree with the government. We conclude that the district court placed more emphasis on Ceasar's need for rehabilitation than that sentencing factor could bear, and failed adequately to weigh section 3553(a) factors that balance the needs and circumstances of an individual defendant against, among other things, the goals of protecting the public, deterring criminal behavior, and engendering respect for the law. We further conclude that in comparison with sentences for similar terrorism crimes, Ceasar's sentence of 48 months' imprisonment was shockingly low and unsupportable as a matter of law. We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for resentencing.

Prior posts on similar reasonableness ruling:

• Seventh Circuit panel reverses below-guideline 16-year prison sentence as substantively unreasonable in terrorism case (from Nov 2020)
• Split Second Circuit panel finds 17-year (way-below-guideline) prison sentence in terrorism case substantively unreasonable (from Dec 2019)
• En banc Ninth Circuit finds Millennium Bomber sentence substantively unreasonable (from March 2012)
• Split Eleventh Circuit deems Jose Padilla's 17-year terrorism sentence substantively unreasonable (from Sept 2011)
• Second Circuit issues huge opinion (with sentencing stuff) in Lynne Stewart case (from Sept 2009)
• A terror-filled debate over substantive reasonableness (4th Circuit from June 2008)

Feds advocate for (mid-guideline) prison term of 18 months for first Jan 6 defendant due to be sentenced on felony charge

As noted in this Washington Post piece, a notable federal sentencing is scheduled for Monday and federal prosecutors have a notable sentencing recommendation for the judge: "U.S. prosecutors on Wednesday urged a federal judge to impose an 18-month prison term on the first defendant to face sentencing for a felony in the Jan. 6 Capitol breach, citing the need to deter domestic terrorism."  Here is more:

“The need to deter others is especially strong in cases involving domestic terrorism, which the breach of the Capitol certainly was,” Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Mona Sedky said in a government sentencing request for Tampa crane operator Paul Allard Hodgkins, 38, who carried a Trump flag into the well of the Senate....

Hodgkins’s sentencing, scheduled for Monday, could set the bar for what punishment 100 or more defendants might expect to face as they weigh whether to accept plea offers by prosecutors or take their chances at a trial by jury.  About 800 people entered the building, U.S. officials have said, with more than 500 individuals charged to date and charges expected against at least 100 others.  About 20 people have pleaded guilty, and one misdemeanor defendant has been sentenced to probation.

In Hodgkins’s case, Sedky cited FBI Director Christopher A. Wray’s testimony in March to the Senate that the problem of homegrown violent extremism is “metastasizing,” with some actors growing emboldened by the Capitol riot....  Sedky also asked U.S. District Judge Randolph D. Moss of Washington to recognize prior court findings that though individuals convicted of such behavior may have no criminal history, their beliefs make them “unique among criminals in the likelihood of recidivism.”

Hodgkins pleaded guilty on June 2 to one felony count of entering the Capitol to obstruct Congress, a common charge being used by prosecutors.  Unlike other defendants, he was not accused of other wrongdoing or involvement with extremist groups, nor did he enter a cooperation deal with prosecutors.  Under advisory federal guidelines, he could face a prison sentence of 15 to 21 months.

Hodgkins poses an intriguing example for defendants against whom prosecutors have threatened to seek enhanced domestic terrorism penalties, lawyers said.  Such enhancements, if found to apply, could more than double a defendant’s guidelines range or otherwise increase recommended penalties, although judges would have the final say. In Hodgkins’s case, prosecutors did not ask the judge to apply the enhancement, even though they wrote Wednesday that his conduct met the definition of violence “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion.”  Instead, prosecutors said a “midpoint” sentence in Hodgkins’s existing range was appropriate, but still urged Moss to consider the importance of dissuading future acts of domestic terrorism.

Hodgkins has asked for a below-guidelines sentence of probation.  His attorney urged Moss to follow the example of President Abraham Lincoln’s planned approach to the defeated South after the Civil War, before he was assassinated.  “Today, this Court has a chance to make a difference,” Tampa attorney Patrick N. Leduc wrote, asserting that America now is “as divided as it was in the 1850s” on racial and regional lines.  “We have the chance to be as Lincoln had hoped, to exercise grace and charity, and to restore healing for those who seek forgiveness. Alternatively, we can follow the mistakes of our past: to be harsh, seek vengeance, retribution, and revenge, and continue to watch the nation go down its present regrettable path,” Leduc said.

Lawyers familiar with the Capitol probe have said the case illustrates how prosecutors are taking a carrot-and-stick approach in plea talks, threatening to hit some defendants with tougher sentencing guidelines calculations while showing some flexibility for those not accused of any violent conduct in a bid to resolve cases short of trial.

For example, another Jan. 6 defendant pleaded guilty Wednesday to the identical charge as Hodgkins. However, Josiah Colt, 34, of Idaho, faced a sentencing guidelines range three times as high, 51 to 63 months, after admitting that he came armed to Washington and was with others accused of violently interfering with police. Colt, however, entered a cooperation deal, implicating two men he was with in plea papers and agreeing to aid investigators in exchange for a recommendation of leniency.

Several defense attorneys in the probe privately called prosecutors’ tactics draconian in some cases, saying they are threatening years of prison time for individuals not charged with violence and giving them little choice but to face trial.

The Post has also helpfully provided links to Hodgkins' sentencing memo and the Government's sentencing memo.  They both make for interesting reads.  And, as always, I welcome reader views on how they think the 3553(a) factors ought to play out in sentencing in this high-profile case.

Prior related posts:

• "Many Capitol rioters unlikely to serve jail time" because some facing only misdemeanor convictions
• Noting the importance of charging policies and practices (and consistency?) as federal rioting charges get resolved from coast-to-coast
• Harsh penal treatment of some Capitol rioters being criticized by notable progressive 
• Another effective (but still incomplete) look at possible sentencing outcomes for those prosecuted for Capitol riot
• Covering some interesting developments in some Capitol riot prosecutions 
• Noticing a lack of pleas, so far, in Capitol riot prosecutions 
• First public plea deal struck by Capitol rioter, who agrees to cooperate and to reported guideline range of 41 to 51 months in prison
• Second Capitol rioter reaches plea deal with reported guideline range of 15 to 21 months in prison
• New plea deals sets possible new precedent for resolving low-level Capitol riot prosecutions with single misdemeanor 1with 6 month jail maximum
• Notable education efforts prior to sentencing of minor participant in Capitol riot (who seems likely to get probation)

US Sentencing Commission issues big new report on "Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Non-Production Offenses"

Despite only having a single commissioner, the US Sentencing Commissioner is continuing to produce interesting federal sentencing data and reports.  This latest USSC report, running nearly 100 pages, was released today under the titled "Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Non-Production Offenses."   This report drills into data from fiscal year 2019, and this webpage sets out these "key findings" from the report:

• Facilitated by advancements in digital and mobile technology, non-production child pornography offenses increasingly involve voluminous quantities of videos and images that are graphic in nature, often involving the youngest victims.
  • In fiscal year 2019, non-production child pornography offenses involved a median number of 4,265 images, with some offenders possessing and distributing millions of images and videos.
  • Over half (52.2%) of non-production child pornography offenses in fiscal year 2019 included images or videos of infants or toddlers, and nearly every offense (99.4%) included prepubescent victims.

• Constrained by statutory mandatory minimum penalties, congressional directives, and direct guideline amendments by Congress in the PROTECT Act of 2003, § 2G2.2 contains a series of enhancements that have not kept pace with technological advancements.  Four of the six enhancements — accounting for a combined 13 offense levels — cover conduct that has become so ubiquitous that they now apply in the vast majority of cases sentenced under § 2G2.2.
  • For example, in fiscal year 2019, over 95 percent of non-production child pornography offenders received enhancements for use of a computer and for the age of the victim (images depicting victims under the age of 12).
  • The enhancements for images depicting sadistic or masochistic conduct or abuse of an infant or toddler (84.0% of cases) or having 600 or more images (77.2% of cases) were also applied in most cases.

• Because enhancements that initially were intended to target more serious and more culpable offenders apply in most cases, the average guideline minimum and average sentence imposed for nonproduction child pornography offenses have increased since 2005.
  • The average guideline minimum for non-production child pornography offenders increased from 98 months in fiscal year 2005 to 136 months in fiscal year 2019.
  • The average sentence increased more gradually, from 91 months in fiscal year 2005 to 103 months in fiscal year 2019.

• Although sentences imposed remain lengthy, courts increasingly apply downward variances in response to the high guideline ranges that apply to the typical non-production child pornography offender.
  • In fiscal year 2019, less than one-third (30.0%) of non-production child pornography offenders received a sentence within the guideline range.
  • The majority (59.0%) of non-production child pornography offenders received a variance below the guideline range.
  • Non-government sponsored below range variances accounted for 42.2 percent of sentences imposed, and government sponsored below range variances accounted for 16.8 percent.

• Section 2G2.2 does not adequately account for relevant aggravating factors identified in the Commission’s 2012 Child Pornography Report that have become more prevalent.
  • More than forty percent (43.7%) of non-production child pornography offenders participated in an online child pornography community in fiscal year 2019.
  • Nearly half (48.0%) of non-production child pornography offenders engaged in aggravating sexual conduct prior to, or concurrently with, the instant nonproduction child pornography offense in fiscal year 2019.  This represents a 12.9 percentage point increase since fiscal year 2010, when 35.1 percent of offenders engaged in such conduct.

• Consistent with the key aggravating factors identified in the Commission’s 2012 Child Pornography Report, courts appeared to consider participation in an online child pornography community and engaging in aggravating sexual conduct when imposing sentences, both in terms of the length of sentence imposed and the sentence relative to the guideline range.
  • In fiscal year 2019, the average sentence imposed increased from 71 months for offenders who engaged in neither an online child pornography community nor aggravating sexual conduct, to 79 months for offenders who participated in an online child pornography community, to 134 months for offenders who engaged in aggravating sexual conduct.
  • In fiscal year 2019, offenders who engaged in aggravating sexual conduct were sentenced within their guideline ranges at a rate nearly three times higher than offenders who did not participate in online child pornography communities or engage in aggravating sexual conduct (44.3% compared to 15.6%).

• As courts and the government contend with the outdated statutory and guideline structure, sentencing disparities among similarly situated non-production child pornography offenders have become increasingly pervasive. Charging practices, the resulting guideline ranges, and the sentencing practices of judges have all contributed to some degree to these disparities.
  • For example, the sentences for 119 similarly situated possession offenders ranged from probation to 228 months though these 119 possession offenders had the same guideline calculation through the application of the same specific offense characteristics and criminal history category.
  • The sentences for 52 similarly situated receipt offenders ranged from 37 months to 180 months though these 52 receipt offenders had the same guideline calculation through the application of the same specific offense characteristics and criminal history category.
  • The sentences for 190 similarly situated distribution offenders ranged from less than one month to 240 months though these 190 distribution offenders had the same guideline calculation through the application of the same specific offense characteristics and criminal history category.

• When tracking 1,093 nonproduction child pornography offenders released from incarceration or placed on probation in 2015, 27.6 percent were rearrested within three years.
  • Of the 1,093 offenders, 4.3 percent (47 offenders) were rearrested for a sex offense within three years.
  • Eighty-eight offenders (8.1% of the 1,093) failed to register as a sex offender during the three-year period.

Notably split Sixth Circuit panel finds way-above guideline felon-in-possession sentence to be substantively unreasonable

Earlier this week, a Sixth Circuit panel handed down a split (unpublished) opinion finding an above-guideline sentence substantively unreasonable in US v. Stanton, No. 20-5320 (6th Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (available here).  Any and every circuit ruling that finds a sentence substantively unreasonable is quite notable because such opinions are quite rare — for example, USSC data shows only six such reversals in Fiscal Year 2019 and only eight such reversals in Fiscal Year 2020.  (Indeed, with this Sixth Circuit Stanton ruling finding an above-guideline sentence substantively unreasonable handed down on the same day that the Fourth Circuit found a within-guideline sentence substantively unreasonable in Freeman (discussed here, opinion here), one might be tempted to remember March 30, 2021 as an historic day for reasonableness review.)

The majority and dissenting opinions in Stanton are worth full reads, and here is how the majority opinion gets started and wraps up:

Dustin Stanton challenges his 108-month sentence for one count of unlawful possession of a firearm as substantively unreasonable.  Stanton argues that the district court did not provide sufficiently compelling reasons to justify nearly tripling his maximum guideline sentence of 37 months.  We agree.

In sum, based on the reasons it provided at sentencing, the district court “placed too much weight on the § 3553(a) factors concerning criminal history [and] deterrence . . . without properly considering sentencing disparities.”  See Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d at 758. “By ‘relying on a problem common to all’ defendants within the same criminal history category as [Stanton]—that is, that they have an extensive criminal history — the district court did not give a sufficiently compelling reason to justify [its extreme variance].” Warren, 771 F. App’x at 642 (quoting United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 354 (6th Cir. 2007)).  Though Stanton’s continued recidivism and his previous 84-month sentence for the same crime may ultimately warrant an upward variance, they are not — without more — sufficiently compelling justifications for nearly tripling his maximum guideline sentence for a mine-run offense.  See Boucher, 937 F.3d at 714 (vacating sentence as substantively unreasonable and noting that “after the district court reweighs the relevant § 3553(a) factors” the defendant “may or may not be entitled to a” variance).

And here is how Judge Thapar starts and ends his dissent:

District judges are not at liberty to turn a blind eye to reality at sentencing.  Instead, the sentencing factors in the United States Code require judges to consider the real-world consequences of a prison term.  Will the sentence protect the public?  Will it deter the defendant?  What does a defendant’s criminal history tell the court about his likelihood of recidivism?  Are there positive factors that might cut the other way?  The sentencing guidelines help answer these questions.  But district judges understand better than most that the guidelines are not binding for a reason: They don’t fit every case.  Especially one like Dustin Stanton’s.  Here, a conscientious district judge had a violent, repeat offender in front of him.  The last time Stanton was in federal court, Judge Waverly Crenshaw’s colleague sentenced him to 84 months.  Barely a year after his release, Stanton was back — as violent as ever, and for the same offense.  So Judge Crenshaw did what good judges do.  He balanced the sentencing factors and came up with a fair sentence: 108 months.  I respectfully dissent from making him do it again....

Fair sentencing is a key goal of our criminal justice system. The sentencing guidelines help further that goal. Still, district judges must exercise independent judgment when imposing a sentence. Sometimes the reality of a case justifies a variance downward. Sometimes, it justifies the opposite. Here, Judge Crenshaw decided that Stanton’s case called for an upward variance. That decision was reasonable. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

US Sentencing Commission issues big new report on "The Influence of the Guidelines on Federal Sentencing: Federal Sentencing Outcomes, 2005–2017"

I am pleased to see that the United States Sentencing Commission is continuing to release notable data reports despite being an incomplete agency due to the absence of confirmed commissioners for years.  Today brings this notable new publication, clocking in at nearly 100 pages, titled "The Influence of the Guidelines on Federal Sentencing: Federal Sentencing Outcomes, 2005–2017."  Here is this reports "Key Findings": 

In this report, the Commission analyzes the difference between average guideline minimums and average sentences imposed.  These differences, measured in a raw number of months and average percentage difference, are analyzed for all cases in the aggregate and selected individual guidelines across three time periods between 2005 and 2017: the Booker, Gall, and Post-Report Periods.  While the extent of those differences vary depending on the individual guideline, the Commission found several overarching trends indicating that the guidelines generally continue to have a substantial influence on sentences imposed after Booker.

• In the wake of Booker and Gall and continuing into the Post-Report Period, the difference between the average guideline minimum and average sentence imposed widened for the federal caseload overall, indicating that the influence of the guidelines generally decreased after Booker rendered them advisory.  However, this trend has not continued in the most recent years of the Post-Report Period, suggesting that the influence of the guidelines may have stabilized.

• The influence of the guidelines continued to vary substantially depending on the type of offense throughout the Post-Report Period.  As indicated by the difference between the average guideline minimum and average sentence imposed, the guidelines continued to exert a strong influence on sentences imposed in firearms and illegal reentry offenses, a more moderate influence on sentences imposed in fraud and drug offenses, and a weakening influence in non-production child pornography offenses and career offender cases.

• Major amendments by the Commission to the drug trafficking and illegal reentry guidelines appear to have strengthened their influence during the most recent years of the Post-Report Period.  The difference between the average guideline minimum and average sentence imposed for these two guidelines narrowed after the Commission reduced the Drug Quantity Table by two offense levels in 2014 and comprehensively revised the illegal reentry guideline in 2016.

• The guidelines generally exert a greater influence on sentences imposed in cases in which judicial discretion could be meaningfully assessed.  Excluding cases in which judicial discretion could not be meaningfully assessed narrowed the difference between the average guideline minimum and the average sentence imposed for the federal caseload overall, and for all but one individual offense type studied, across every time period studied.  This narrowing was largely attributable to the exclusion of cases with substantial assistance departures, which resulted in an average sentence reduction of 51.8 percent.  Sentence reductions for substantial assistance require a government motion and afford substantial weight to the government’s evaluation.

In short form, and at the risk of being too flip or summary about these findings, I take this all to mean that the USSC has through its data analysis found: (a) federal judges generally follow the less-crazy-severe guidelines somewhat more than the more-crazy-severe guidelines, AND (b) when the USSC finally gets around to amending the guidelines to make some of the more-crazy-severe guidelines a bit less crazy-severe, judges are inclined to follow those guidelines a bit more.  Oh, and (c) we really have no clear idea what the heck may be going on when prosecutors exercise their discretionary sentencing powers through substantial assistance departures (since, I assume, the DOJ shares no information with the USSC about the decision-making of federal prosecutors).

Dispensary owner gets (within-guideline?!) federal prison term of 15+ years for marijuana sales that could be legal under most state laws

The headlined of this local article from Michigan, "Michigan medical marijuana seller gets prison: ‘Federal law has not changed,’ judge says," does not fully capture all the notable elements of a federal sentencing for marijuana sales yesterday.  Here are the details via the press article:

The former owner of medical-marijuana dispensaries in several Michigan cities was sentenced Tuesday, Jan. 28, to nearly 16 years in federal prison.  Danny Trevino, 47, of Lansing, who had Hydroworld dispensaries in Grand Rapids, Flint, Jackson, Lansing and elsewhere, had avoided state criminal and civil penalties over the years but was convicted of multiple federal charges.

“States are changing marijuana laws across the country, certainly that’s true, but federal law has not changed,” U.S. District Judge Paul Maloney said.

Trevino sought the statutory minimum sentence of five years in prison. Maloney instead sentenced Trevino to 15 years, eight months in prison - at the low end of advisory sentencing guidelines, which ranged from 188 to 235 months.

The sentence upset several family members and pro-marijuana activists who attended the sentencing in Grand Rapids. “What you saw is a travesty,” Detroit resident Richard Clement said. His shirt read: “#GETNORML,” “#WARONDRUGS” and “CANNACURES.”

He said it was difficult to reconcile what he called a harsh sentence in a state where marijuana is legal. He and others think Trevino was targeted because he is Hispanic. “This was totally racist,” a woman said, leaving the courthouse. “None of the (other dispensaries) ever get raided.” She was with Trevino’s family but refused to give her name....

Trevino, who has operated dispensaries since 2010, was convicted in an August jury trial of 10 felony charges, including conspiracy to manufacture, distribute and possess marijuana and maintaining a drug-involved premises. He was not allowed to use the state’s medical-marijuana law as a defense to the federal charges.

Nonetheless, the government said, he acted outside of the boundaries of the state medical-marijuana law. Defense attorney Nicholas Bostic called that a “fallacy.” He said that Trevino was successful in challenging state complaints after he had been arrested and the subject of several search warrants. He was arrested in April 2014 in Grand Rapids for delivery or manufacture of marijuana and maintaining a drug house but charges were dropped a month later, court records showed.

He fought forfeitures of funds seized by police that were ultimately returned by state courts. Trevino’s businesses were raided 16 times between 2010 and 2016, the government said. He provided the state with store records and tax records that showed his businesses brought in nearly $3 million.

“He thought he was legal,” Bostic told the judge. He said his client, whose previous drug convictions prevented him from being a caregiver, oversaw the operation. He said that every single sale of medical marijuana at his businesses would have been legal under laws in 33 states and the District of Columbia that allow medical or recreational marijuana. Trevino earlier told MLive: "How could I not have been in compliance if I was acquitted and found not guilty. We were winning and they didn’t charge us, so we kept going.”

Assistant U.S. Attorney Daniel McGraw said Trevino knew he acted illegally under federal law. He called Trevino “defiant, unrepentant and undeterred from committing the current federal crimes.” After federal investigators used a search warrant at one of his locations in 2016, Trevino posted on Facebook: “I guess Hydroworld is illegal. Lol OK.”

McGraw said Trevino acted as though marijuana – legalized in 2018 for recreational use in Michigan – was always legal. Trevino was “told time and time again that it was illegal and your honor, he simply didn’t care. He didn’t care. He kept operating," the prosecutor said.

The judge said his concern was Trevino’s conduct under federal law. “I fully recognize that the landscape has changed in many states in this country,” Maloney said. “The fact is, marijuana is a Schedule 1 controlled substance.” He noted that Congress has eliminated the mandatory minimum prison sentence for crack cocaine but has not acted on marijuana.

He said Trevino “had to know he was on the radar screens of federal authorities.” The judge ordered Trevino to serve four years on supervised release once his prison term ends. He also fined Trevino $11,000.

Without seeing more materials from this case, I am adverse to making too many quick judgments about this outcome. But nearly 16 years for quasi-legal marijuana sales seems pretty severe absent a lot more aggravating facts.  This article suggests that the defendant here was a "problem child" under Michigan state law, and so I suppose I can understand why the feds went after him and why the judge decided he merited a significant sentence. But if the defendant possibly believed that he was complying with state law, it seems misguided to sentence him pursuant to federal sentencing guidelines that are based around the “heartland” of a fully illicit drug dealer.

US Sentencing Commission releases new report on "Inter-District Differences in Federal Sentencing Practices"

As reported via this USSC webpage, the US Sentencing Commission has this morning released this big new report under the full title "Inter-District Differences in Federal Sentencing Practices: Sentencing Practices Across Districts from 2005 - 2017." Here is a summary and key finding from the USSC's webpage:

This report is the third in a series of reports. It examines variations in sentencing practices—and corresponding variations in sentencing outcomes—across federal districts since the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in United States v. Booker.

The Commission’s ongoing analysis in this area directly relates to a key goal of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: reducing unwarranted sentencing disparities that existed in the federal judicial system. In particular, the Act was the result of a widespread bipartisan concern that such disparities existed both regionally (e.g., differences among the districts) and within the same courthouse. Having analyzed the differences within the same courthouse in its Intra-City Report, the Commission now turns in this report to examining regional differences since Booker....

Key Findings

While the extent of differences in sentencing practices vary depending on the specific primary guideline, the overarching trends indicate that, consistent with the findings of the Commission’s 2012 Booker Report, sentencing outcomes continue to depend at least in part upon the district in which the defendant is sentenced. In particular, the Commission finds that:

• Variations in sentencing practices across districts increased in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Booker.  These inter-district sentencing differences have persisted in the 13 years after Booker and six years after the Commission’s 2012 analysis.

• Sentencing differences increased for each of the four major offense types analyzed (fraud, drug trafficking, firearms related offenses, and illegal reentry) during the Gall Period.  This trend continued for some, but not all, of the four offense types in the six years following the last period analyzed in the Commission’s 2012 Booker Report.

• Guideline amendments intended to promote uniformity by addressing judicial concerns regarding severity have had an inconsistent impact on inter-district disparity.  Specifically, despite multiple significant revisions to the drug trafficking guideline, including the two-level reduction of the base offense level for all drugs, districts increasingly diverged in their sentencing practices for drug trafficking offenders.  However, the comprehensive amendment to the illegal reentry guideline contributed to increasing uniformity in sentencing practices in the Post-Report Period.

• Certain districts have consistently sentenced more — or less — severely in relation to the guideline minimums than other districts, both over time and across offense type.

I am already looking forward to finding time to review and assess this latest big report from the USSC. But I cannot help but note at the outset that detailed data work which focuses almost exclusively on sentencing differences without any detailed discussions of sentencing severity or sentencing efficacy seems largely out of sync with the current political and policy criminal justice concerns expressed by both public officials and advocates.

Prior related post:

• Seeking guest postings for "Reflections on Booker at 15" 
• Recalling on-going work of the US Sentencing Commission as I continue to troll for "Reflections on Booker at 15"

Recalling on-going work of the US Sentencing Commission as I continue to troll for "Reflections on Booker at 15"

In this post last weekend, I noted (1) that it is now a full 15 years since the Supreme Court (not-so-)radically transformed the federal sentencing system through its ruling in Booker v. United States, and (2) that it seems I may be one of the few to now note (or even realize) that we have passed another big milestone in the history of the federal sentencing system.  Though I have not yet received any "Reflections on Booker at 15" in response to my prior post, a reliable source reminded me that the US Sentencing Commission has an on-going series of reports that serve to update the system-wide Booker analysis that the USSC completed in its reports to Congress in 2006 and 2012.

To aid review and reflections, here are links to the USSC's 2006 and 2012 Booker reports and to its notable follow-up work from the last few years:

1. Report on the Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing (March 2006).

2. Report on the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing (December 2012)

3. Demographic Differences in Sentencing: An Update of the 2012 Booker Report  (November 2017)

4. Intra-City Differences in Federal Sentencing Practices (January 2019)

The same reliable source told me that the Commission is nearing completion on another post-Booker report to be released shortly (and this report will also outline other on-going USSC work in this arena).  If this new Commission report ends up having some provocative findings, perhaps there will be some notable "Booker at 15" talk in the offing.

Prior related post:

• Seeking guest postings for "Reflections on Booker at 15" 

"Movements in the Discretionary Authority of Federal District Court Judges Over the Last 50 Years"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Susan Klein now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

From my vantage point, judges’ individual control over their courtrooms remains largely stable.  Updated but similar versions of the problems encountered (and created) by Judge Julius Hoffman now confront our newer, younger, and perhaps better qualified judges.  While federal judges may be less likely to encounter radical, overtly political defendants and government officials trying to wrest control (and public opinion) from them in court, they are more likely to see minority defendants along with accompanying “courtwatchers” who want inequities in the criminal justice system noticed in individual cases.  I will first describe the Chicago Eight (soon to become the Chicago Seven) trial and then explain the new courtwatchers in Part I.

I have witnessed federal judges having lost, primarily since the mid-1980s, much of their earlier control over the criminal justice process in general, but in particular over charging and sentencing decisions.  Judicial discretion and control over a criminal trial is obviously less important when 97.2 percent of federal felony sentences are imposed by the district judge pursuant to a guilty plea negotiated between the government and the defendant, and only 2.8 percent of the sentences that judges impose are after a jury or bench trial.  The power players in the criminal justice system are the folks who determine whether to offer a plea and what plea terms to include.  We live in a world of guilty pleas controlled by prosecutors.  Federal prosecutors determine whom to investigate, whom to charge, and how much punishment to impose.  However, the pendulum has begun to swing back, and federal district judge discretion over criminal sentencing is now on the rise.  I will support these observations, as well as offer some good sentencing news post-Booker, in Part II.

Finally, in Part III, I will raise a relatively new phenomenon — federal district court judges imposing nationwide temporary restraining orders against the federal government. Though this last trend is not limited to or primarily about criminal trials, I think it fairly covered by the topic for today — most of these injunctions involve controversial policies that can, like with the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals case, lead to criminal charges.  This legal device allows a single federal judge in a single judicial district to determine federal policy for the entire country, at least until the matter can be resolved by the Supreme Court.  This is one of the few areas where I have seen federal district judicial authority expand over the last few decades.  The Supreme Court has taken very recent notice of this trend, and will likely have something to say about the matter soon.

You be the federal judge: what sentence for Roger Stone after his conviction on all seven counts including obstruction, witness tampering and making false statements to Congress?

The question in the title of this is prompted by this criminal justice news emerging from a federal courthouse in DC today: "Roger Stone, an ally of President Donald Trump, was found guilty Friday of lying to Congress and obstructing an investigation into Russia to protect Trump and his presidential campaign."  Here is some more about the case and convictions:

The jury's verdict came after about eight hours of deliberation.  Stone, a fixture in GOP politics, has worked on campaigns stretching back to Richard Nixon's.  Stone is the latest Trump ally to be found guilty in cases sprouting from a special counsel's investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 election.

The verdict, reached by a jury of nine women and three men, comes amid an impeachment inquiry into allegations that Trump sought to pressure Ukraine into investigating a political rival....  Trump took to Twitter shortly after the verdict was announced. He decried a "double standard" and said law enforcement officials lied, including Robert Mueller, the special counsel who headed the Russia investigation.

Stone's trial ends after a week marked with Nixon quotes, references to the Mafia movie "The Godfather" and a colorful witness who offered to do a Bernie Sanders impression before an unamused federal judge.  The proceedings attracted the attendance of controversial figures, including alt-right firebrands Milo Yiannopoulos and Jacob Wohl.

Michael Caputo, a former Trump campaign adviser who attended the trial, said he was escorted out of the courtroom by a federal marshal for turning his back on the jurors as they walked out.  "Normal Americans don’t stand a chance with an Obama judge and a Washington jury," he tweeted.

U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson allowed Stone to go home as he awaits his sentencing, scheduled for Feb. 6.  A gag order preventing him from talking about the case remains in effect. He and his attorneys did not comment as they left the courthouse....

The proceedings revealed information about the Trump campaign's efforts to seek advance knowledge of emails stolen from the Democratic National Committee, which hurt Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton when Trump was trailing in the polls.  Testimony indicated these efforts involved the candidate himself.

Stone, 67, stood trial on accusations that he repeatedly lied to Congress about his back-channel efforts to push for the release of those emails. He was accused of urging a possible congressional witness to either lie or scuttle his testimony.

"Roger Stone lied … because the truth looked bad for the Trump campaign and the truth looked bad for Donald Trump," Assistant U.S. Attorney Aaron Zelinsky told jurors.

Defense attorneys urged jurors to focus on Stone's state of mind, arguing he did not willfully mislead Congress.  The claim that Stone lied to protect the Trump campaign was "absolutely false," Bruce Rogow told jurors.  "It makes no sense," Rogow said, adding that the campaign was long over and Trump was already president when Stone testified before Congress in 2017. "Why would Stone lie, why would he make stuff up? ... There is no purpose, there is no reason, there is no motive."

Stone was found guilty of seven charges: one count of obstruction of an official proceeding, five counts of false statements and one count of witness tampering. The maximum penalty for all counts totals 50 years in prison, though first-time offenders generally receive significantly lower sentences.

Jurors heard from five government witnesses and saw dozens of emails and text messages that prosecutors said proved Stone lied.  His defense attorneys did not call any witnesses, and Stone, known for his flamboyance and combativeness, did not testify.  The charges stemmed from Stone's interactions with the Trump campaign in the summer of 2016, around the time that WikiLeaks, an anti-secrecy group, began publishing troves of damaging emails about the Democratic National Committee and Clinton.

Prosecutors said Stone lied to the House Intelligence Committee about his efforts to push for the release of those emails.  They said he lied about the identity of the person who tipped him off about WikiLeaks' plans — his so-called intermediary.  They said he falsely denied talking to the Trump campaign about what he learned and falsely told Congress he did not have text messages and emails in which he talked about WikiLeaks.

Prosecutors said Stone sought to silence a witness who could expose these lies by using threatening references from "The Godfather" movie.  Stone urged the witness in multiple emails to follow the steps of Frank Pentangeli, a character in "The Godfather II" who lied to Congress to avoid incriminating Mafia boss Michael Corleone.

In some settings, I would be inclined to predict that an elderly nonviolent first(?) offender is quite unlikely to get a lengthy prison term or even any prison time at all.  But these days and in these kinds of high-profile case, I am never quite sure what to expect or predict.

So, dear readers, what sentence do you think you would be inclined to impose?

Longest prison sentence (six months) imposed in college admission scandal on big-spending dad

As reported in this USA Today piece, today in Boston "Toby MacFarlane, a former real estate and title insurance executive from California, was sentenced to six months in prison Wednesday for paying $450,000 to get his daughter and son admitted into the University of Southern California as fake athletic recruits."  Here is more:

It marks the longest prison sentence so far handed down among 13 parents and one college coach in the nation's college admissions scandal.

U.S. District Judge Nathaniel Gorton stressed that MacFarlane participated in the nationwide admissions scheme led by college consultant Rick Singer "not once, but twice," taking seats at USC away from two deserving students. He told MacFarlane his actions should be tolerated no more than a common thief's actions, "because that's what you are — a thief."...

Gorton also sentenced MacFarlane to two years of supervised release, 200 hours of community service and a $150,000 fine....

Addressing the court, MacFarlane, himself a USC graduate, apologized to his family, friends, former business partners and his alma mater, as well as "all of the students who applied and didn't get in."...

Gorton opted to impose a harsher sentence than called for in sentencing guidelines, citing the “fraudulent, deceitful" nature of MacFarlane's conduct. The judge's decision could be a preview of how he will approach other parents who go before him — including actress Lori Loughlin — who have pleaded not guilty.

MacFarlane, a former senior executive at WFG National Title Insurance Company, made two separate payments of $200,000, one in 2014 and on in 2017, to the sham nonprofit operated by Singer. Singer, in turn, facilitated his children's admissions into USC through bribes to one current and two former USC employees. MacFarlane also made a $50,000 payment to USC athletics.

The first transaction involved the admission of MacFarlane's daughter into USC as a fake soccer recruit. He then paid Singer again to admit his son into USC posing as a basketball recruit. "The defendant knew what he was doing was wrong. He knew it wasn't accepted at the school," Assistant U.S. Attorney Eric Rosen told the judge. "So what does he do? He does it again with his son.”

Rosen said MacFarlane deserved prison because he was the first parent who paid into Singer's "side-door" recruitment scheme twice. He asked the judge to "send a message" as a result.

MacFarlane's defense attorney, Ted Cassman, sought a lighter sentence, arguing his client was less culpable than other parents sentenced in the admissions scheme. Unlike other parents, he said MacFarlane did not seek out Singer for cheating but for his consulting services. He said MacFarlane already suffered "swift and severe" collateral consequences from his conduct. He also pointed to MacFarlane's divorce, which separated his family and pressured him to buckle to Singer's offer....

The toughest prison sentence previously ordered was five months for Agustin Huneeus, a Napa Valley, California winemaker. Huneeus, who agreed to pay Singer $300,000 is the only defendant to take part in both the recruitment scheme and Singer's plot to cheat on college entrance exams. U.S. District Judge Indira Talwani handed down the sentence of Huneeus and 11 other parents while Judge Douglas Woodlock sentenced one other parent.

Twenty-nine defendants, including 19 parents, have either pleaded guilty in court or agreed to plead guilty to charges in the historic admissions case. Igor Dvorsiky, a former administrator for the ACT and SAT, pleaded guilty in court Wednesday to racketeering charges for accepting nearly $200,000 in bribes to opening a private school he operated in Los Angles for cheating in Singer's scheme. He admitted to opening it on 11 occasions, involving 20 students, for cheating.

Prior related Varsity Blues posts:

• Mapping out next possible celebrity sentencings in wake of indictment in college admissions scandal 
• Big batch of federal plea deals (with relatively low sentencing ranges) in college admissions scandal
• Summer sentencing (with notable particulars) for first college admission scandal parents to enter pleas in court
• Federal district judge rejects feds request for significant prison term in first sentencing of college bribery scandal
• Gearing up for the federal sentencing of Felicity Huffman and others involved in college bribery scandal 
• Feds recommending incarceration terms from 1 to 15 months for parents involved college bribery scandal 
• Noticing the interesting (but perhaps not too consequential) guidelines "loss" issue lurking in the college bribery cases
• Gearing up for the next round of sentencings in college admissions scandal
• Next parent sentenced in college admission scandal gets four months in federal prison
• Next parent up in college admission scandal sentencing also gets four months in federal prison
• BigLaw partner gets one month federal time as latest parent sentenced in college admissions scandal 
• Napa Valley winemaker gets five months of imprisonment, the longest sentence so far in college admissions scandal
• US Attorney in college admission scandal makes plain how trial penalty works even for celebrity actresses
• Catching up with another round of sentencings in "Operation Varsity Blues"
• The trial penalty on fine display as parents in college admissions scandal get hit with new federal bribery charges
• Reviewing the sentencing dynamics as more parents get (minimal) prison time in "Operation Varsity Blues" college admissions scandal 

Reviewing the sentencing dynamics as more parents get (minimal) prison time in "Operation Varsity Blues" college admissions scandal

This lengthy USA Today article provides a kind of mid-season review now that 19 parents out of 35 charged have pleaded guilty in "Operation Varsity Blues" college admissions scandal. The piece, which I recommend in full, is headlined "Parents cry desperate times in college admissions scandal.  A judge opts for prison anyway."  Here are excerpts:

One couple, Gregory and Marcia Abbott, told the judge they paid $125,000 to have someone fix their daughter's college entrance exams because she was suffering from chronic Lyme disease and needed a boost.

Attorneys for a father, Robert Flaxman, said he was desperate to help a troubled daughter remain in recovery — so he paid to cheat in hopes of getting her into a college where she would be safe.

Lawyers for another parent, Marjorie Klapper, said she was trying to help her epileptic son who'd suffered a brutal physical assault feel like a "regular" student.

The wealthy parents are among 10 sentenced in the last two months in the nation's college admissions scandal. Each insisted they didn't cheat for the status symbol of their child getting into an elite college or university. Instead they were driven by a feeling people endure regardless of economic class — desperation. They were families in crisis, the parents said, and the scheme's mastermind, the manipulative college consultant Rick Singer, found them at their most vulnerable and seized upon their weakness.

But their stories, each deeply personal with some details sealed from public court documents, have done little to sway the sentences handed down by U.S. District Judge Indira Talwani. Attorneys for the Abbotts, Flaxman and Klapper each asked for no incarceration but got prison anyway. Only one of the 10 sentenced parents has avoided prison altogether.

“Just because you’re a good person in tough circumstances doesn’t mean you can disregard what you know is right," Talwani said last week to Flaxman, a real estate developer from Laguna Beach, California, who specializes in luxury resorts. “Even good people who are doing things for people they love can’t be breaking the law."

Flaxman, who sobbed in court as he apologized to students who "work hard and don’t cheat no matter what,” received one month in prison for paying $75,000 to Singer to have someone change answers on his daughter's ACT exam to improve her score.

The ongoing round of parent sentencing continues today with Jane Buckingham, of Los Angeles, the founder of a marketing firm and author of a self-help book series called, "The Modern Girl's Guide to Life." She's admitted to paying Singer $50,000 to have someone take the ACT exam for her son.

Two more parents will be sentenced in the coming weeks by other Boston federal judges. Four additional parents pleaded guilty in court Monday, bringing the total to 19 parents out of 35 charged who have pleaded guilty in the case. The latest four won't be sentenced until 2020.

Parents sentenced to date pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit fraud charges. Those citing personal crises tend to have paid into the test-cheating plot and are not part of the group who paid Singer significantly more to have their children tagged as college recruits to facilitate their admissions. Talwani, during a hearing last week, said a level of "elitism" was at play with the latter.

Daniel Medwed, professor of law and criminal justice at Northeastern University School of Law, said a fallback defense strategy in any case is to develop "mitigation evidence" — often hardships — to demonstrate extenuating circumstances.  "With clients from impoverished or challenging backgrounds, the argument is to often cite those backgrounds — that this person never had a chance, they grew up without a roof," Medwed said.  "But when your defendants are white privileged folks you can't make a classic hardship argument.  So you have to come up with a different hardship."  Some of their arguments might not resonate with judge, he said, because it's difficult to "connect the dots between the hardships and the behavior."

The theme of this article seems to be that the defendants' various tales of woe are having little impact, that these deeply personal stories "have done little to sway the sentences handed down by U.S. District Judge Indira Talwani."  But, critically, federal prosecutors have generally advocated for longer prison terms for nearly all defendants than have been imposed by Judge Talwani, and it is generally unusual for any federal prison terms to be measured in weeks rather than in months and years.  So I am inclined to believe these arguments are resonating with the sentencing judge, but that she is still eager to impose (minimal) terms of imprisonment to send a message about misbehavior and equal justice.

Prior related Varsity Blues posts:

• Mapping out next possible celebrity sentencings in wake of indictment in college admissions scandal 
• Big batch of federal plea deals (with relatively low sentencing ranges) in college admissions scandal
• Summer sentencing (with notable particulars) for first college admission scandal parents to enter pleas in court
• Federal district judge rejects feds request for significant prison term in first sentencing of college bribery scandal
• Gearing up for the federal sentencing of Felicity Huffman and others involved in college bribery scandal 
• Feds recommending incarceration terms from 1 to 15 months for parents involved college bribery scandal 
• Noticing the interesting (but perhaps not too consequential) guidelines "loss" issue lurking in the college bribery cases
• Gearing up for the next round of sentencings in college admissions scandal
• Next parent sentenced in college admission scandal gets four months in federal prison
• Next parent up in college admission scandal sentencing also gets four months in federal prison
• BigLaw partner gets one month federal time as latest parent sentenced in college admissions scandal 
• Napa Valley winemaker gets five months of imprisonment, the longest sentence so far in college admissions scandal
• US Attorney in college admission scandal makes plain how trial penalty works even for celebrity actresses
• Catching up with another round of sentencings in "Operation Varsity Blues"
• The trial penalty on fine display as parents in college admissions scandal get hit with new federal bribery charges

Catching up with another round of sentencings in "Operation Varsity Blues"

Three more parents were sentencing this past week by US District Court Judge Indira Talwani in the "Operation Varsity Blues" college admissions scandal.  Here are the headlines and essential from press accounts of these latest high-profile federal sentencings:

From NBC News, "NYC man, wife both sentenced to month in prison in college admissions scam: Gregory and Marcia Abbott paid $125,000 to have their daughter's SAT and ACT altered":

A New York man and his wife were each sentenced Tuesday to a month behind bars for paying a college-admission fixer to boost their daughter's SAT and ACT scores.  Gregory and Marcia Abbott will also have to complete a year of supervised release, pay a $45,000 fine and perform 250 hours of community service each, under sentences handed down in Boston by U.S. District Court Judge Indira Talwani.

The couple had already pleaded guilty in May to a single count each of fraud and conspiracy, paying $125,000 to ring leader Rick Singer for someone to correct answers on their daughter’s college board exams....

Prosecutors had asked Talwani to sentence the Abbotts to eight months in prison each.  Defense lawyers had sought probation for the pair.  The couple paid $50,000 to have a test proctor correct their daughter's ACT exam answers in 2018, and then another $75,000 to fix her SAT.

From the Los Angeles Times, "Bay Area entrepreneur is spared prison in college admissions scandal":

If any of the parents waiting to be sentenced in the college admissions scandal stood a chance at avoiding prison, it was Peter Jan Sartorio. He was, by any measurement, a small fish in a case filled with high-profile names and deep pockets: The $15,000 the 54-year-old food entrepreneur from the Bay Area paid to rig his daughter’s college entrance exam matched the lowest amount parents shelled out in the scam.  And with neither fame nor fortune, Sartorio didn’t fit the mold of the rich, entitled parent who prosecutors said needed to be punished with time behind bars.  He also was the first to admit his guilt.

On Friday a judge in Boston decided Sartorio was, in fact, less culpable than the others.  She spared him prison time, sentencing him instead to probation and community service. 

Sartorio is the eighth parent sentenced in the case and, for all up to now, U.S. District Judge Indira Talwani decided some amount of incarceration was needed.  The judge opted to go more lightly on Sartorio than she did on the actress Felicity Huffman, who received two weeks in prison for the same offense.  Sartorio was ordered to spend a year on probation, serve 250 hours of community service and pay a $9.500 fine....

Prosecutors had sought a one-month sentence for Sartorio, saying it was clear the father of two knew at the time that what he was doing was wrong. They underscored in court papers that when it came time to pay Singer, Sartorio avoided leaving a paper trail by paying cash and made multiple withdrawals from different accounts to avoid triggering automatic reviews by banking officials.

Prior related Varsity Blues posts:

• Mapping out next possible celebrity sentencings in wake of indictment in college admissions scandal 
• Big batch of federal plea deals (with relatively low sentencing ranges) in college admissions scandal
• Summer sentencing (with notable particulars) for first college admission scandal parents to enter pleas in court
• Federal district judge rejects feds request for significant prison term in first sentencing of college bribery scandal
• Gearing up for the federal sentencing of Felicity Huffman and others involved in college bribery scandal 
• Feds recommending incarceration terms from 1 to 15 months for parents involved college bribery scandal 
• Noticing the interesting (but perhaps not too consequential) guidelines "loss" issue lurking in the college bribery cases
• Gearing up for the next round of sentencings in college admissions scandal
• Next parent sentenced in college admission scandal gets four months in federal prison
• Next parent up in college admission scandal sentencing also gets four months in federal prison
• BigLaw partner gets one month federal time as latest parent sentenced in college admissions scandal 
• Napa Valley winemaker gets five months of imprisonment, the longest sentence so far in college admissions scandal
• US Attorney in college admission scandal makes plain how trial penalty works even for celebrity actresses

Next parent sentenced in college admission scandal gets four months in federal prison

As reported in this New York Post piece, headlined "Businessman gets 4 months for bribing his son’s way into USC," the second parent sentenced in the college admissions scandal will be spending somewhat longer in prison than Felicity Huffman. Here are details:

A Los Angeles businessman who paid $250,000 in bribes to get his son into USC — lying that the kid was an international water polo star — landed four months behind bars Tuesday.

Devin Sloane, a 53-year-old water treatment company owner, had pleaded guilty in May to conniving with college admissions scamster Rick Singer and crooked University of Southern California officials to get his son into the top college....

The dad had put his son in a Speedo and swim cap and posed him with a water polo ball in the family’s backyard pool for photos to help create a fake athletic profile for the kid in the summer of 2017. With the help of his dad’s accomplices, the teen was then marketed to the university as an acclaimed international player with “the youth junior team in Italy” who participated in tournaments from Greece to Serbia and Portugal, the feds said.... The teen had never played the sport competitively.

Federal prosecutors in Boston said in court papers that Sloane also “bragged about misleading a USC development official to cover up the quid pro quo — using his dead mother as a prop for a fake donation — and even expressed outrage when high school counselors dared to question why a student who did not play water polo was being recruited to play college water polo.”

The feds had sought a year and a day in prison for Sloane, whom they said showed “moral indifference” during the scam. His lawyers argued for no jail time, instead offering that Sloane could do community service by working with kids at a private school.

Before sentencing Sloane, Judge Indira Talwani scoffed, “That’s about as tone-deaf as I’ve heard. The independent school kids are not the victims in this case,” according to WGBH-TV.

In addition to the four-month prison term, Sloane must complete 500 hours of community service and pay a $95,000 fine.

Sloane is the second parent to be sentenced in the scandal. The first, actress Felicity Huffman, received 14 days behind bars for her $15,000 bribe. Assistant US Attorney Eric Rosen said in court before Sloane’s sentencing that the dad was different from Huffman because the actress didn’t tell her daughter about the bribe scheme, thus avoiding directly involving her, while Sloane “literally threw his kid into the family pool,” according to a Law360 newswire reporter.

Rosen also noted the difference in the size of the bribes in each case.... But Sloane’s lawyers argued to Tuesday that their client didn’t completely understand that the money he was paying was a bribe.

Prior related posts:

• Mapping out next possible celebrity sentencings in wake of indictment in college admissions scandal 
• Big batch of federal plea deals (with relatively low sentencing ranges) in college admissions scandal
• Summer sentencing (with notable particulars) for first college admission scandal parents to enter pleas in court
• Federal district judge rejects feds request for significant prison term in first sentencing of college bribery scandal
• Gearing up for the federal sentencing of Felicity Huffman and others involved in college bribery scandal 
• Feds recommending incarceration terms from 1 to 15 months for parents involved college bribery scandal 
• Noticing the interesting (but perhaps not too consequential) guidelines "loss" issue lurking in the college bribery cases
• Gearing up for the next round of sentencings in college admissions scandal

Sixth Circuit finds 30-day sentence given to Senator Rand Paul's attacker "substantively unreasonable"

To my knowledge, a full 15 years after Booker created the reasonableness standard of appellate review for federal sentencing, I believe there are still only a handful of cases in which circuit courts have declared a sentence to be "substantively unreasonable" upon a defendant's appeal claiming it included a prison term that was too long.  But today a Sixth Circuit panel manages to declare yet again, upon an appeal by the government, that a sentence is "substantively unreasonable" because the term of incarceration was too short.  And this ruling in US v. Boucher, No. 18-5683 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (available here), comes in quite the high-profile setting.  Here is how it begins:

Senator Rand Paul was mowing his lawn when he stopped to gather a few limbs in his path.  Without warning, Rene Boucher — Paul’s next-door neighbor, whom he had not spoken with in years — raced toward Paul and attacked him from behind.  The impact broke six of Paul’s ribs, caused long-lasting damage to his lung, and led to several bouts of pneumonia.  Boucher later pleaded guilty to assaulting a member of Congress in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 351(e). Although his Guidelines sentencing range was 21 to 27 months in prison, the district court sentenced him to 30 days’ imprisonment.  On appeal, the Government argues that Boucher’s sentence was substantively unreasonable.  We agree and therefore VACATE his sentence and REMAND for resentencing.

I have largely stopped following circuit reasonableness rulings because they so often seemed void of real content or character.  This Boucher ruling has some considerable content and character, as it runs a full 16 pages and concludes this way:

In a mine-run case like this one, we apply “closer review” to any variance from the Guidelines. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 351).  And our review here reveals no compelling justification for Boucher’s well-below-Guidelines sentence.  Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.  Boucher may or may not be entitled to a downward variance after the district court reweighs the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and it is the district court’s right to make that decision in the first instance.  See United States v. Johnson, 239 F. App’x 986, 993 (6th Cir. 2007) (“This Court takes no position on what an appropriate sentence in this case might be and notes that on remand the district court still retains ample discretion to grant a variance. . . . The narrow reason for remand here is that the extreme nature of the deviation, without a correspondingly compelling justification, resulted in a substantively unreasonable sentence.”).  We therefore VACATE Boucher’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing.

I have long hoped for a mre robust and searching form of reasonableness review, but I continue to find that courts are much more interested in seriously questioning 30-day sentences when prosecutors appeal than in questioning 30-year sentences when defendants appeal.  And so it goes in incarceration nation.

"A Partial Fix of a Broken Guideline: A Proposed Amendment to Section 2G2.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article now available via SSRN and authored by Brent Evan Newton. Here is its abstract:

Except for the federal criminal penalties for crack cocaine offenses, no specific non-capital penalty structure has been more widely criticized than USSG § 2G2.2 and the corresponding federal penal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 & 2252A. Together, those provisions govern penalties for child pornography offenses other than those involving actual production of child pornography.  Indeed, one of the leading sources of criticism has been the United States Sentencing Commission, whose 300-plus-page report to Congress in December 2012 made a compelling case for changing both the guideline and, to a lesser degree, the statutes.

The current sentencing guideline for non-production offenses is fundamentally broken, as evidenced by the fact that only 28.4 percent of defendants sentenced under section 2G2.2 receive within-range sentences and 69.1 percent of defendants receive downward variances or departures (unrelated to their substantial assistance or participation in a fast-track program).  The vast majority of child pornography defendants receive downward variances from their guideline ranges based on sentencing judges’ subjective senses of what appropriate sentences should be.  Because judges have no meaningful national benchmark from which to render sentencing decisions, widespread sentencing disparities exist -- in conflict with the central purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. In addition, because the current guideline fails to offer any meaningful benchmark, federal prosecutors around the country engage in a wide variety of different charging and plea-bargain practices resulting in significant sentencing disparities among similar defendants.

Although the best solution to the problems with the current child pornography sentencing scheme would require congressional intervention, Congress appears unwilling to make any changes in the statutory handcuffs currently on the Commission.  Therefore, I have set forth a detailed proposed amendment to section 2G2.2 that could be adopted by the Commission without congressional authorization.  If the Commission does not amend the guideline, then my proposal provides a detailed roadmap for federal district judges to “vary” from the current, broken guideline pursuant to the authority granted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker and Kimbrough v. United States.

“MAGA Bomber” Cesar Sayoc sentenced to 20 years in prison despite LWOP guideline range

As reported in this CNBC piece, "'MAGA Bomber' Cesar Sayoc was sentenced to 20 years in prison on Monday for sending 16 mail bombs to 13 people around the United States last year, including leading critics of President Donald Trump such as former President Barack Obama, ex-Vice President Joe Biden, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, actor Robert De Niro and financier George Soros." Here is more about this high-profile sentencing:

“I am beyond so very sorry for what I did,” Sayoc said before he was sentenced in U.S. District Court in Manhattan by Judge Jed Rakoff, according to the Courthouse News service.

“Now that I am a sober man, I know that I a very sick man,” Sayoc reportedly said. “I wish more than anything that I could turn back time and take back what I did ... I feel the pain and suffering of these victims.”

But Rakoff said, “The nature and cirumstances of the instant offenses are, by any measure, horrendous.”

“While none of the devices exploded ... at the very least they were intended to strike fear and terror into the minds of their victims and to intimidate those victims, mostly prominent political figures, from exercising their freedom.” Rakoff noted that Sayoc, even if he proves to be a model prison, “will be about 75 years old before he can be released.”

“No one can pretend this is not, in real terms, substantial punishment; but in the Court’s view, it is no more, and no less, than [what] he deserves,” Rakoff said.

Sayoc, a 57-year-old Florida resident whose own lawyers called him “a Donald Trump super-fan,” pleaded guilty on March 21 to 65 criminal counts, which included using weapons of mass destruction and illegal mailing of explosives with intent to kill or injure. Prosecutors said Sayoc’s crimes amounts to a “domestic terrorist attack.”

Prosecutors had asked Rakoff to sentence the former exotic dancer and steroid abuser to life in prison for the mail bombing spree....

None of the home-made bombs exploded, and “would not have functioned as designed,” according to prosecutors. But they noted that Sayoc packed PVC pipes with explosive powder and glass shards, along with pool chemicals to “increase the chances of burning the skin of” his targets....

Sayoc’s lawyers had asked that he be sentenced to just 10 years in prison, the mandatory minimum for his crimes. In their own sentencing submission, defense lawyers wrote that, “a series of traumatic events pushed Cesar Sayoc further and further into the margins of society.”

Valuably, Judge Rakoff authored this nine-page sentencing opinion explaining why he found the sentencing recommendations of the prosecution and defense not quite right and why he settled on a 20-year prison term for these crimes.

The long legacy of drug wars: Eighth Circuit panel affirms LWOP sentence for drug dealer as reasonable

As long-time readers likely realize, I do not blog much these days about how federal circuit courts are conducting reasonableness review of sentences — largely because there are precious few cases in which circuit judges seriously question (or even seriously engage with) the sentencing judgments of district courts.  A helpful reader alerted me to a reasonableness review decision from the Eighth Circuit today which provides another example of how disinclined circuit courts are to question even the most extreme prison sentences.

US v. Duke, No. 18-1371 (8th Cir. July 310, 2019) (available here), involves the appeal after a resentencing of a man originally sentenced three decades ago.  Back then, arguably at the height of the modern drug war, "Ralph Duke was sentenced in 1990 to a term of life imprisonment plus forty years for committing several serious drug trafficking and firearms offenses."   Here is a description of Duke's crimes from this latest opinion:

Duke controlled all phases of a drug trafficking organization in the Minneapolis/St. Paul area from 1984 through June 1989.  He purchased cocaine primarily from a Colombian-affiliated source in Houston or from sources in Los Angeles.  The cocaine was transported to Minnesota in vehicles owned by Duke and driven by younger members of his drug trafficking organization.  Duke then distributed kilograms of cocaine to dealers for resale at the street level in smaller quantities.  Duke laundered the proceeds of drug sales by purchasing homes and cars in the names of others.  All told, Duke and his organization trafficked over fifty kilograms of cocaine before law enforcement interrupted their operations.  When Duke was apprehended in May 1989, officers found two loaded handguns in his bedroom and two assault shotguns and two AR-15 semi-automatic rifles in his residence.  The government charged at least twenty-five people as a result of the investigation of Duke’s organization. 

In other words, Duke was a big-time drug dealer in the 1980s, though it does not appear that he was actively involved in any violent activities or that his case involved other aggravating factors (though I suppose he might be called a drug kingpin).  But back in the 1990s, when the drug war was ranging and the federal sentencing guidelines were mandatory, perhaps it is not surprising that the federal district judge originally imposed an LWOP sentence on Duke.

But fast forward nearly 30 years, and Duke had the chance to benefit from a full resentencing in 2018 due to various legal developments.  Circa 2018, the federal sentencing guidelines were now advisory and, according to Duke, a lower sentence was justified in light of his "exceptional institutional conduct over the last 29 years, lack of criminal history, age, medical history, family ties, rehabilitation, remorse, and low risk of recidivism."  But the same federal district judge was unmoved and decided to give Duke an LWOP sentence yet again.  And the Eighth Circuit panel, in the ruling linked above, decided this LWOP sentence was reasonable.

When Booker was first decided and circuit courts were tasked with reasonableness review based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), I had sincerely hoped appellate judges would come to embrace the task of ensuring sentences were "not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth" by Congress.  But it became all too clear all too quickly that all too few circuit judges were eager to rigorously review long prison sentences, especially if those sentences fell within calculated guideline ranges.  Years later, even with mass incarceration and long sentences for drug offenses subject to considerable criticism, we still see federal judges finding no problem with giving a "death-in-prison" sentence based on drug dealing many decades ago.

Fourteen+ years after inventing reasonableness review in Booker, SCOTUS finally grants cert to address how it works procedurally

The Supreme Court's new order list this morning includes an exciting blast (from the past?) for federal sentencing fans in the form of a cert grant in Holguin-Hernandez v. US, No. 18-7739. The petition for certiorari in this case sets forth this simple question presented: "Whether a formal objection after pronouncement of sentence is necessary to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of a defendant’s sentence."   

Notably, the government has this slightly different accounting of what's at issue in this case in its cert opposition brief: "Whether the court of appeals correctly reviewed for plain error petitioner’s claim that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable term of imprisonment for petitioner’s violation of the terms of his supervised release, when petitioner failed to object in the district court to that term of imprisonment."  (The two-page Fifth Circuit panel ruling in this case is here; SCOTUSblog has the briefing and other documents in this case at this link.)

There is a circuit split on this issue of just how reasonableness review is to operate procedurally, but that split has been pretty well established and entrenched for the better part of a decade.  I suspect that the recent new arrivals to the Supreme Court, particularly Justice Kavanaugh but maybe also Justice Gorsuch, may explain why this long-ignored issue has now gotten taken up by the Justices.

Sadly, it seems the cert grant in this case concerns only a procedural issues surrounding the standards of review rather than the substantive particulars of how circuit courts should judge the reasonableness of a sentence.  But, given that it has been nearly a decade since SCOTUS has said anything significant about reasonableness review (I think of the 2011 Pepper case as the last big ruling in this space), even this Holguin-Hernandez glass of reasonableness water looks like an oasis in the desert of post-Booker SCOTUS jurisprudence.

"Booker Circumvention? Adjudication Strategies in the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines Era"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Mona Lynch and now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

This article addresses the question of policy circumvention in federal courts by examining how legal actors have differentially adapted their adjudicatory practices after U.S. v. Booker (2005) rendered the federal sentencing guidelines advisory rather than mandatory.  By linking two distinct bodies of scholarship — the courts-as-communities scholarship that assesses and explains locale-based variations in criminal court operations and the socio-legal “law and organizations” scholarship that addresses how organizational actors translate and implement top-down legal policy reforms — this article argues that law-as-practiced is always temporally and spatially contingent.

Expanding on prior quantitative research that addresses district-specific adaptations to Booker, this article reports on findings from a qualitative study recently conducted by the author of four federal districts.  Based on these findings, this article examines within-district changes and between-district variations in: (1) legal actors’ perceptions of whether the Booker policy change impacted local practices and outcomes, and if so, the extent of its impact; (2) how legal strategies and practices have changed at three stages of the criminal process: charging, pre-conviction plea negotiations, and formal sentencing; and (3) interviewees’ perceptions about whether Booker contributed to greater racial or other disparities in case out-comes.

Findings indicate that a dynamic, proactive adaptation process is taking place, conditioned by local norms but not fully dictated by those norms.  They also make clear that changes in sentencing outcomes in the post-Booker period are not simply the result of liberated judges exercising their discretion, but rather are jointly produced by courtroom workgroup members through both contestation and cooperation.  This inquiry is especially timely given both ongoing and proposed changes in federal sentencing policy that aim to maintain severity in punishment, re-impose constraints on legal actors, and threaten to exacerbate racial and ethnic inequalities in the federal criminal system.

Interesting new TRAC data on intra-courthouse judge-to-judge differences in sentences

The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University maintains lots of data on the work of federal courts and federal agencies. Seemingly inspired by the recent sentencing(s) of Paul Manafort, TRAC completed a "study of judge sentencing differences at 155 federal courthouses across the country" in which "the judge with the lowest average prison sentence was compared with the judge with the highest average sentence at each courthouse."  At this page, TRAC summarizes its findings this way:

Based upon case-by-case sentencing records, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University found that half of federal judges served at courthouse where the average prison sentence differed by at least 23 months depending upon which judge handled the case.  Sixty-six of these judges served at six courthouses where the average prison sentence length differed by more than 48 months.

The Orlando courthouse in the Middle District of Florida with seven judges had a range of over 80 months between the judge with the shortest versus the longest average prison sentence.  This was followed by the Greenbelt courthouse in Maryland with over 64 months difference among the seven judges serving there....

To examine current sentencing differences at each of the 155 federal courthouses included in the study, read the full report [at this link].

Because TRAC is comparing average sentences for each federal judge directly without controlling for the specific caseloads of these judges, variations in average sentences could reflect caseload differences as much as judicial differences. But in the full report, TRAC reasonably notes that due to "the fairly large number of defendants sentenced by each judge, where there is random assignment of cases to judges then statistically speaking each judge should have closely comparable caseloads so that differences in the nature of the offenses and defendants' histories are roughly comparable."

Ultimately, this TRAC report provides a crude and incomplete account of intra-courthouse judge-to-judge differences because just one or two outlier judges could and would make a courthouse look bad in this TRAC accounting.  Still, it is interesting and useful to be reminded statistically of what all federal criminal justice practitioners know well, namely that most judges have their own distinctive and unique approaches to sentencing decision-making.

Paul Manafort gets additional (consecutive) 43 months in prison at second sentencing, resulting in 7.5 year total term

As reported in this Politico piece, headlined "Paul Manafort’s prison sentence was upped to seven-and-a-half years on Wednesday, bringing an end to Robert Mueller’s most public legal battle and capping a spectacular fall for the globe-trotting GOP consultant and former chairman of the Trump campaign." Here is more:

It's the longest sentence by far for anyone ensnared in Mueller’s nearly two-year-old probe. Manafort’s punishment reached its final length after U.S. District Court Judge Amy Berman Jackson on Wednesday gave Manafort an additional 43 months in prison for a series of lobbying and witness tampering crimes he pleaded guilty to last fall. Manafort also must serve nearly four years for his conviction in a jury trial for financial fraud crimes in Virginia.

Manafort, wearing a dark suit and seated in a wheelchair, issued a full-throated and blunt apology shortly before Jackson handed out his second — and final — prison sentence in the Mueller case. “I am sorry for what I have done and for all the activities that have gotten us here today," said Manafort, contrite and stone-faced.

But Jackson swiftly upbraided Manafort's penitence, insinuating that it was insincere and hinting that she believed Manafort had previously calibrated his statements to appeal to President Donald Trump for a pardon — the only way out of a multi-year prison sentence at this point for the ex-Trump aide, who turns 70 next month.

"Saying I'm sorry I got caught is not an inspiring plea for leniency," Jackson said, exhaustively recounting Manafort's deception and propensity for hiding money in offshore accounts, ducking millions in U.S. taxes, tampering with witnesses and repeatedly failing to come clean when confronted with his behavior.

"Why?" she asked. "Not to support a family but to sustain a lifestyle at the most opulent and extravagant level," she said, a reference to the high-end suits, designer clothes, custom rugs and luxury cars that Manafort collected over the years. "More houses than one man can enjoy, more suits than one man can wear."...

Manafort made his plea to Jackson about charges brought in the D.C. court, which centered on his lobbying work in Ukraine and conspiring with a suspected Moscow-linked business associate to tamper with potential witnesses. But his shorter-than-anticipated Virginia sentence was hanging over the entire court proceedings.

Jackson stressed that she was not there for a "review or revision" of the Virginia sentence, which drew condemnation from some in the legal community who felt the punishment was unfairly brief, given the scope of the crimes and sentencing guidelines that called for Manafort to receive between about 19 and 24 years....

As a result, one major question facing Jackson, an Obama appointee, was whether she would make Manafort serve his D.C. sentence after he completes the punishment from his Virginia case, or whether she would allow him to serve them both concurrently. Manafort has been using a cane and wheelchair in his recent court appearances and has asked for leniency by citing his deteriorating health, as well as the strains of solitary confinement at the Alexandria, Va., detention center.

Ultimately, Jackson split her decision, making some of her sentence — 30 months — concurrent with the Virginia punishment, but ordering that the rest be served consecutively. Manafort’s nine months already spent in jail since his bond was revoked last June for witness tampering will count toward his time served, meaning Manafort is on track to be released from federal custody around the end of 2025.

By my calculations, if Manafort were to get all available good time credit, he might be eligible for release in 2024.  And, thanks to the FIRST STEP Act, Manafort might also eventually be able to earn some additional time off for participating in prison programming (though the particular of "earned" time credits will likely not be fully in place until next year).

Some of many prior related posts:

• Appreciating ugly sentencing realities facing Paul Manafort and Rick Gates after federal indictment 
• Paul Manafort has bail revoked ... and has not (yet) gotten rescued from jail by Prez Trump's clemency pen
• Paul Manafort found guilty of 8 of 18 counts ... and now faces real possibility of spending many years in federal prison
• Paul Manafort seemingly poised to get "senior discount" at upcoming sentencing 
• Paul Manafort facing potentially longer sentence after judge concludes he failed to comply with plea deal
• Paul Manafort given (only?) 47 months in prison at first federal sentencing 
• Rounding up some of many thoughts about Paul Manafort's (first) federal sentence 

Paul Manafort's sentencing memorandum in DC makes pitch for a sentence "significantly below" ten years

As reported in this Politico piece, counsel for "Paul Manafort, the former Trump campaign chairman, pleaded on Monday for a federal judge to spare their 69-year-old client from a sentence that would essentially send him to prison for the rest of his life."  Here is more about the latest sentencing filing:

In a 47-page filing, Manafort’s attorneys described a client who has been “personally, professionally, and financially” broken by special counsel Robert Mueller’s Russia investigation and who deserves a sentence “significantly” below the statutory maximum of 10 years he faces after pleading guilty in Washington to a pair of conspiracy charges.

“Mr. Manafort has been personally and financially devestated [sic] as a result of his conduct and the forfeiture he has agreed to,” his lawyers wrote. “There is no reason to believe that a sentence of years in prison is necessary to prevent him from committing further crimes.”

Manafort’s lawyers added that he “poses no risk to the public, which itself has certainly been generally deterred from engaging in similar conduct based on the widespread negative publicity this case has garnered, as well as his incarceration in solitary confinement.”

Two federal judges are scheduled to sentence Manafort twice next month over criminal charges brought by Mueller’s office, including tax and bank fraud, as well as witness tampering and unregistered lobbying for a foreign government. U.S. District Court Judge T.S. Ellis III is scheduled first in Virginia, on March 8, and U.S. District Court Judge Amy Berman Jackson in Washington goes second, on March 13.

The memo that Manafort’s attorneys submitted Monday aims to rebut Saturday’s filing from Mueller, who told Jackson that the longtime Republican operative “repeatedly and brazenly violated the law” for more than a decade and should be considered for a total sentence in the roughly 17-to-22-year range by stacking her sentence on top of the one Ellis issues.

The full filing is available at this link, and here is an excerpt from its introduction:

Mr. Manafort, who over the decades has served four U.S. presidents and has no prior criminal history, is presented to this Court by the government as a hardened criminal who “brazenly” violated the law and deserves no mercy.  But this case is not about murder, drug cartels, organized crime, the Madoff Ponzi scheme or the collapse of Enron.  Rather, at its core, the charges against the defendant stem from one operable set of facts: Mr. Manafort made a substantial amount of income working as a political consultant in Ukraine, he failed to report to the government the source and total amount of income he made from those activities, and he attempted to conceal his actions from the authorities. He has accepted full responsibility by pleading guilty to this conduct....

Mr. Manafort has been punished substantially, including the forfeiture of most of his assets. In light of his age and health concerns, a significant additional period of incarceration will likely amount to a life sentence for a first time offender.

Some prior related posts:

• Appreciating ugly sentencing realities facing Paul Manafort and Rick Gates after federal indictment 
• Paul Manafort has bail revoked ... and has not (yet) gotten rescued from jail by Prez Trump's clemency pen
• Paul Manafort found guilty of 8 of 18 counts ... and now faces real possibility of spending many years in federal prison
• Reported sentencing details in Paul Manafort's plea deal to wrap up his various federal prosecutions
• Paul Manafort's DC plea agreement has a calculated guideline range of 17.5 to 22 years (though he can only get 10) 
• Paul Manafort seemingly poised to get "senior discount" at upcoming sentencing 
• Special counsel saying Paul Manafort is breaching his plea agreement by lying "on a variety of subject matters"
• Paul Manafort facing potentially longer sentence after judge concludes he failed to comply with plea deal
• Special Counsel's office files sentencing memorandum for Paul Manafort seemingly supporting guideline range of 235 to 293 months' imprisonment
• Latest Manafort sentencing memorandum from Special Counsel pulls few punches 
• "Paul Manafort should not be sentenced to 20 years in prison" 

Latest Manafort sentencing memorandum from Special Counsel pulls few punches

As reported in this Politico article, a "federal judge should consider giving former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort a sentence that would send him to prison for at least 17 and a half years, special counsel Robert Mueller said in a court filing made public Saturday."  Here is more from the article about the filing and the legal context now:

Manafort faces a pair of sentencing hearings in the coming weeks in Virginia and in Washington where judges will determine what punishment he should face in two separate criminal cases brought by Mueller’s office involving tax fraud, bank fraud, unregistered lobbying for a foreign government and witness tampering.

The latest submission from Mueller accuses Manafort of a bold, brazen and wide-ranging series of crimes carried out over decades and continuing while Manafort was managing the Trump campaign in the summer of 2016, although prosecutors seemed to avoid mentioning the president directly in their new filing....

The new court submission in Washington released on Saturday makes no explicit recommendation about how much prison time Manafort should serve, but urges U.S. District Court Judge Amy Berman Jackson to consider making the longtime political consultant and lobbyist serve a total sentence in the roughly 17-to-22-year range by making her sentence consecutive to one a Virginia judge is expected to impose ahead of her early next month.

Jackson has the power in her case to sentence Manafort to up to ten years: the maximum allowed by law for the conspiracy and obstruction of justice crimes he pleaded guilty to before her last year as part of plea deal.

Last week, Mueller’s prosecutors told U.S. District Court Judge T.S. Ellis in Alexandria that sentencing guidelines applicable to Manafort’s case there call for him to serve between 19 and a half and 24 and a half years in prison. The prosecution team also made no explicit recommendation for a sentence in that case, beyond urging that the punishment be “serious” and adequate to deter others from similar conduct.

In theory, Ellis could sentence Manafort to as long as 80 years in prison on the charges of tax fraud, bank fraud and failing to report foreign bank accounts that he was convicted of at a high-profile jury trial last August.

The full 25-page filing (with a few redactions) is available at this link. Here is part of its introduction:

Based on his relevant sentencing conduct, Manafort presents many aggravating sentencing factors and no warranted mitigating factors. Manafort committed an array of felonies for over a decade, up through the fall of 2018.  Manafort chose repeatedly and knowingly to violate the law— whether the laws proscribed garden-variety crimes such as tax fraud, money laundering, obstruction of justice, and bank fraud, or more esoteric laws that he nevertheless was intimately familiar with, such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).  His criminal actions were bold, some of which were committed while under a spotlight due to his work as the campaign chairman and, later, while he was on bail from this Court. And the crimes he engaged in while on bail were not minor; they went to the heart of the criminal justice system, namely, tampering with witnesses so he would not be held accountable for his crimes.  Even after he purportedly agreed to cooperate with the government in September 2018, Manafort, as this court found, lied to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), this office, and the grand jury.  His deceit, which is a fundamental component of the crimes of conviction and relevant conduct, extended to tax preparers, bookkeepers, banks, the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice National Security Division, the FBI, the Special Counsel’s Office, the grand jury, his own legal counsel, Members of Congress, and members of the executive branch of the United States government.  In sum, upon release from jail, Manafort presents a grave risk of recidivism. Specific deterrence is thus at its height, as is general deterrence of those who would engage in comparable concerted criminal conduct.

Some prior related posts:

• Appreciating ugly sentencing realities facing Paul Manafort and Rick Gates after federal indictment 
• Paul Manafort has bail revoked ... and has not (yet) gotten rescued from jail by Prez Trump's clemency pen
• Paul Manafort found guilty of 8 of 18 counts ... and now faces real possibility of spending many years in federal prison
• Reported sentencing details in Paul Manafort's plea deal to wrap up his various federal prosecutions
• Paul Manafort's DC plea agreement has a calculated guideline range of 17.5 to 22 years (though he can only get 10) 
• Paul Manafort seemingly poised to get "senior discount" at upcoming sentencing 
• Special counsel saying Paul Manafort is breaching his plea agreement by lying "on a variety of subject matters"
• Paul Manafort facing potentially longer sentence after judge concludes he failed to comply with plea deal
• Special Counsel's office files sentencing memorandum for Paul Manafort seemingly supporting guideline range of 235 to 293 months' imprisonment

"18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s Undervalued Sentencing Command: Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant with Rehabilitation, Training, and Treatment in 'the Most Effective Manner'"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new (and very timely) article authored by Erica Zunkel now available in the Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law.  Here is its abstract:

The vast majority of federal criminal defendants are sentenced to prison, and non-incarceration sentences have become vanishingly small.  During the sentencing process, federal district court judges are required to consider what sentence will provide the defendant with necessary rehabilitation and treatment in the most effective manner pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(d).  Courts regularly undervalue, ignore, or even violate this statutory command.  Some courts seem to believe that the Bureau of Prisons can provide adequate rehabilitation and treatment and do not explain how this squares with what the statute requires.  Other courts barely engage with the issue.  Only a minority of courts take the statutory command seriously. 

This is problematic because evidence shows that the Bureau of Prisons is ill-equipped to provide defendants with the most effective rehabilitation and treatment, particularly medical care and mental health care.  This Article concludes that the courts should take § 3553(a)(2)(D)’s mandate much more seriously in sentencing federal criminal defendants. Likewise, defense attorneys should engage in vigorous advocacy at sentencing to ensure that courts understand the Bureau of Prisons’ severe limitations in providing effective, let alone adequate, rehabilitation and treatment.

Fourth Circuit affirms officer Michael Slager "conviction" (by a judge at sentencing) of murdering Walter Scott

I noted in posts here and here back in December 2017 that, after the high-profile shooting and then state and federal prosecutions of former South Carolina police officer Michael Slager for killing Walter Scott, the real action in his case became a federal sentencing "trial" after Slager pleaded guilty to a federal civil rights offense.  This "trial" was really a judicial inquisition in which a federal sentencing judge took testimony at a sentencing hearing in order to decide whether Slager's crime was "really" second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter for purposes of calculating the appropriate guideline range.  

Notably, the presentence report in Slager's case suggested a prison term of between 10 and 13 years based on the conclusion that his crime should be viewed as voluntary manslaughter (and his defense attorneys requested an even lower sentence).  But federal prosecutors successfully argued that the district court should, after applying the guidelines for second-degree murder and obstruction of justice, impose a prison sentence for Slager within an enhanced guideline range of roughly 17 to 22 years of imprisonment.  The judge, after a multi-day hearing, "convicted" Slager of second-degree murder and ultimately imposed a 20-year prison term.  Yesterday the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence in US v. Slager, No. 18-4036 (4th Cir. Jan 8, 2019) (available here). Here is how that opinion gets started and a passage from the heart of the opinion:

Defendant Michael Slager (“Defendant”), a former officer with the North Charleston Police Department, admitted that he “willfully” shot and killed Walter Scott (“Scott”), when Scott was unarmed and fleeing arrest.  Defendant further admitted that his decision to shoot Scott was “objectively unreasonable.”  Based on those admissions, Defendant pleaded guilty to depriving Scott of his civil rights under color of law.  The district court sentenced Defendant to a 240-month term of imprisonment.  Before this Court, Defendant argues that the district court reversibly erred in setting his sentence by: (1) using second-degree murder as the sentencing cross-reference for his offense rather than voluntary manslaughter, and (2) applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.  Finding no reversible error, we affirm Defendant’s sentence....

“When sentencing courts engage in fact finding, preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard of proof.” United States v. Span, 789 F.3d 320, 334 (4th Cir. 2015) (citations and alterations omitted). We “will not reverse a lower court’s findings of fact simply because we would have decided the case differently.” Id. (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001)).  Instead, clear error exists only when “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quoting Easley, 532 U.S. at 242)....

Because Santana’s video does not capture the entirety of the disputed period, the court based many of its factual findings on its assessment of the credibility of the two testifying eyewitnesses to the encounter: Defendant and Santana.  Examining at length each of Defendant’s four accounts of the encounter, the court discredited Defendant’s testimony as “contradictory,” “self-serving, evolving, and internally inconsistent.” Slager, 2018 WL 445497, at *4–6.  The record amply supports that credibility determination....

In conclusion, the district court did not reversibly err by inferring Defendant’s malice from the facts it found credible. Moreover, the court did not reversibly err by determining that Defendant’s malice was not negated by “sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” Accordingly, the court properly cross-referenced second-degree murder.

I take no issue with the substantive conclusions of the courts here, but I still always find it jarring when district judges at sentencing are resolving factual disputes and reaching judgments about criminal behavior that have long traditionally been classic jury issues. But, thanks to the remedial opinion in Booker, these matters can still be resolved by judges at sentencing because their findings result in only advisory recommendations rather than sentencing mandates.

Prior related posts:

• After his guilty plea to a civil rights offense, what federal guideline range and ultimate sentence will Michael Slager face for killing Walter Scott?
• Latest trial of Michael Slager for killing Walter Scott taking place during his federal sentencing for civil rights offense
• Judge "convicts" Michael Slager of murdering Walter Scott and gives him 20 years in federal prison

US Sentencing Commission published proposed amendment, including a big change to determining a "crime of violence"

As reported in this press release, the "United States Sentencing Commission voted today to publish for comment proposed amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines, including a proposal concerning how sentencing courts determine if a prior conviction is a “crime of violence” under the guidelines."  Here is more:

At a public meeting, Circuit Judge William H. Pryor Jr., the Acting Chair of the Commission remarked, “The ‘crime of violence’ definition continues to cause extensive litigation with inconsistent sentencing outcomes, often resulting in offenders whose conduct is obviously violent in nature failing to qualify for sentencing enhancements. These results are particularly troublesome given the risk to public safety posed by violent offenders.”

The sentencing guidelines provide increased penalties for offenders with a prior conviction that is a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense” (e.g., the career offender guideline). Under the guidelines, the sentencing court must determine whether a prior conviction falls into either of those categories. Circuit caselaw currently limits the sentencing court’s analysis of the prior conviction to the elements of the statute of conviction (referred to as the “categorical approach”), without any consideration of the defendant’s actual conduct in the offense. Today’s proposed amendment would enable the sentencing courts to consider the conduct that formed the basis of the offense of conviction as well as the elements of the statute of conviction. The Commission is requesting input on this proposal and the appropriate sources of information the courts might use to ensure that clear and reliable evidence of prior violent conduct is accounted for at sentencing.

The Commission also published a proposal to clarify the definition of certain enumerated offenses and provide clearer guidance how to treat inchoate offenses in determining whether an offense is a crime of violence.  The proposed amendment addresses specific application issues and general concerns raised by the Department of Justice in their August 2018 annual letter to the Commission.

The Commission is finalizing a study in which it found that violent federal offenders recidivate much more often, more quickly, and commit more serious offenses than non-violent federal offenders.  The Commission expects to publish its full findings and other reports on revocations and mandatory minimum penalties in early 2019 (view related studies).

Acting Chair Pryor also provided an update at the meeting on the Commission’s top priority this amendment cycle — examining the current federal sentencing system and operation of .... the guidelines.  In the coming weeks, the Commission will release a report comparing federal judges’ sentencing practices within 30 major metropolitan U.S. cities.  “These findings raise important questions about the advisory guidelines system. We need to study and consider new approaches that more adequately achieve the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act—including the goal of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity — within the constitutional parameters set forth by the Supreme Court in Booker,” stated Acting Chair Pryor.

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Koons v. United States and recent circuit conflicts, the Commission also proposed revisions to how retroactive sentence reductions are determined when mandatory minimum penalties are present in the case. The Commission also published several proposed amendments responding to recently enacted legislation.

These proposed amendment could prove to be quite consequential if they become actual amendments, but the press release further explains why the USSC may not have a quorum to start the new year and will need to have new confirmed members quickly to be able to complete  official business (my emphasis added):

Today’s public meeting gave the current commissioners the opportunity to work together for the last time, as the terms of Acting Chair Pryor and Commissioner Rachel E. Barkow expire at the end of the 115th Congress.  “I have had the privilege of working alongside Commissioner Barkow since she was confirmed by the Senate five years ago. Her steadfast commitment to fair sentencing and quick ability to process sentencing data served the Commission and the public well,” said Acting Chair Pryor.  “She has made substantial contributions to the work of the Commission.  I will miss her.”

Acting Chair Pryor also thanked the advisory group members whose terms are expiring, including Ronald Levine, Chair of the Practitioners Advisory Group and T. Michael Andrews, Chair of the Victims Advisory Group.

As the terms of Acting Chair Pryor and Commissioner Barkow expire, two voting commissioners will continue to serve terms (Senior District Judge Charles R. Breyer and District Judge Danny C. Reeves).  The Commission must have at least four voting commissioners for a quorum. At least three of the commissioners must be federal judges and no more than four may belong to the same political party.  Commissioner Patricia K. Cushwa (ex officio, U.S. Parole Commission), and Commissioner David Rybicki (ex officio, U.S. Department of Justice) serve as non-voting members.

Any recommendations or predictions for Michael Cohen's upcoming sentencing?

Prez Trump's former lawyer, Michael Cohen, is scheduled to be sentenced by US District Judge William Pauley in New York City on December 12 after his guilty plea to charges including campaign finance fraud and lying to Congress.  As detailed in prior posts linked below, Cohen is asking for "time served," while federal prosecutors seek a "substantial term of imprisonment" of around 3.5 years.  This lengthy CNN commentary by Elie Honig, headlined "Why sentencing judge may not show Cohen 'mercy'," predicts that prosecutors are more likely to be happy with the outcome than Cohen.  Here are excerpts:

First, what sentence is Judge William Pauley likely to impose? I've appeared in front of Judge Pauley in many cases. He is fair but tough. Lawyers and defendants often find him intimidating. He has administered tongue-lashings to many prosecutors (yes, including me), defense attorneys and litigants. He has a serious, formal demeanor on the bench....

In my experience, Judge Pauley is a stern sentencer, particularly where the defendant has exploited a position of authority and acted out of greed or arrogance. The SDNY prosecutors, clearly aware of this tendency, noted in its sentencing memo last week that Cohen, "an attorney and businessman ... was motivated to do so [commit crimes] by personal greed, and repeatedly used his power and influence for deceptive ends."

Judge Pauley can show mercy to a truly unfortunate or disadvantaged defendant, but he does not usually take kindly to abuse of power. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, the SDNY argues that Cohen faces a sentencing range of 51 to 63 months.  The federal guidelines are based on a chart: one axis reflects the defendant's prior criminal history (for Cohen, none) while the other reflects the seriousness of the offenses (for Cohen, fairly serious -- offense level 24 out of a maximum of 43).  The range is not binding but it is important. Judge Pauley must consider the range, but he can sentence within, above or below it at his discretion....

Judge Pauley likely will give Cohen some credit for providing useful information to Mueller, but almost certainly won't let Cohen walk, given the SDNY's tepid support for only a modest reduction....

The big question then is whether Cohen will continue cooperating after sentencing. Cohen vows in his sentencing memo that he will. However, once he has been sentenced, his incentive to cooperate diminishes.

There is a mechanism in the federal rules -- Rule 35 -- that permits the prosecutor to ask the judge for a reduced sentence if the defendant provides valuable cooperation after his original sentence was imposed. If Cohen receives a sentence that he simply cannot bear, he will be highly motivated to continue providing assistance to Mueller, and perhaps to come clean on previously undisclosed topics, in hopes of earning an eventual Rule 35 motion.  Paradoxically then, the more time Cohen gets on Wednesday, the more likely he may be to cooperate fully with Mueller as the investigation builds to a crescendo.

The stakes on Wednesday undoubtedly will be high for Cohen and for his ability and incentive to cooperate moving forward.  Cohen's future cooperation, in turn, will affect Mueller's ability to penetrate into the heart of corruption in the Trump campaign and the White House.

In a discussion with a member of the media, I predicted that Cohen would get a sentence in the 2.5 to 3 year range. I am incline to stick with that prediction for now, though I would like to hear reader predictions of what they Judge Pauley will do at sentencing or even recommendations as to what they think Judge Pauley should do at sentencing.

Prior related posts:

• Michael Cohen, Prez Trump's fixer, cuts a plea deal to fix his federal sentence between 46 to 63 months in federal prison
• Prez Trump advocating for a whole new kind of sentencing reform: he says cooperation deals "almost ought to be outlawed. It’s not fair." 
• Michael Cohen, former lawyer to Prez trump, pleads guilty to lying to Congress 
• Michael Cohen makes pitch for "time-served and restitution to the IRS" based largely on his continuing cooperation
• Feds request for Michael Cohen a "substantial term of imprisonment" though with a "modest downward variance" from Guideline range of 51-63 months in prison 

Michael Flynn in sentencing memo requests probation "not to exceed one year ... along with 200 hours of community service."

As reported in this Politico article, headlined "Flynn pleads with judge for no jail time," a high-profile defendant is asking for a low-impact sentencing outcome. Here are the basics:

Michael Flynn’s attorneys asked a federal judge on Tuesday to spare the former Trump national security adviser any jail time because of his “extensive cooperation” with special counsel Robert Mueller.

In a 178-page sentencing memo, Flynn’s attorneys pleaded for leniency by citing their client’s “exceptional record of military service” and “his genuine contrition for the uncharacteristic error in judgment that brought him before this court.”

Flynn, who pleaded guilty last December to lying to the FBI during the early stages of its counterintelligence investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 election, should instead be sentenced to one year of probation with minimal supervision conditions and 200 hours of community service, his lawyers said.

The retired Army general, his lawyers added, has shown he has a “deep respect for the law, as reflected in his extensive cooperation with the government’s efforts to get to the truth and to enforce the laws.”

U.S. District Court Judge Emmet Sullivan is scheduled to sentence Flynn on Dec. 18 for his guilty plea for making false statements to the FBI. Mueller’s office last week highlighted Flynn’s cooperation — including 19 interviews with the special counsel and other Justice Department prosecutors — in their own memo suggesting that Flynn get little or no jail time for his behavior.

The full filing is available at this link, and it runs 178 pages due to dozens of exhibits mostly in the form of letters in his support. The memo itself runs only just over a dozen pages and it starts with this "Preliminary Statement":

The defendant, through his attorneys, submits this Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing and respectfully requests that the Court grant the Government’s Motion for Downward Departure pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and sentence him to a term of probation not to exceed one year, with minimal conditions of supervision, along with 200 hours of community service.  General Flynn has accepted responsibility for his conduct.  He has cooperated extensively with several Department of Justice investigations, as detailed in the addendum to the Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing.  As the Government has made clear, his cooperation was not grudging or delayed.  Rather, it preceded his guilty plea or any threatened indictment and began very shortly after he was first contacted for assistance by the Special Counsel’s Office. Following extraordinary public service in the United States Army, during which his innovations as a highly decorated intelligence officer saved countless American lives, and a lifetime of faithful devotion to his family and fellow service members and veterans, as described in the powerful letters of support that accompany this submission, a sentence of non-incarceration is both appropriate and warranted.

Prior related posts:

• With guilty plea entered, former national security director Michael Flynn now faces (easy?) sentencing 
• Special Counsel says non-incarceration sentence for Michael Flynn is "is appropriate and warranted" 

Feds request for Michael Cohen a "substantial term of imprisonment" though with a "modest downward variance" from Guideline range of 51-63 months in prison

Michael Cohen is scheduled to be sentenced by US District Judge William Pauley in New York City on December 12 after his guilty plea to charges including campaign finance fraud and lying to Congress.  As noted in this prior post, late last Friday, Cohen's lawyers filed this 30-page sentencing memorandum making a plea for leniency and a sentence of "time-served and restitution to the IRS."  Today it was time for federal prosecutors to weigh in, and the Acting US Attorney for the Southern District of New York has now delivered this 40-page government sentencing memorandum making a case for a "substantial prison term."  Here is this latest filing's preliminary statement:

Defendant Michael Cohen is scheduled to be sentenced on December 12, 2018. The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (the “Office”) respectfully submits this memorandum in connection with that sentencing and in response to the defendant’s sentencing memorandum dated November 30, 2018 (“Def. Mem.”). 

Cohen, an attorney and businessman, committed four distinct federal crimes over a period of several years.  He was motivated to do so by personal greed, and repeatedly used his power and influence for deceptive ends. Now he seeks extraordinary leniency — a sentence of no jail time — based principally on his rose-colored view of the seriousness of the crimes; his claims to a sympathetic personal history; and his provision of certain information to law enforcement. But the crimes committed by Cohen were more serious than his submission allows and were marked by a pattern of deception that permeated his professional life (and was evidently hidden from the friends and family members who wrote on his behalf).

Cohen did provide information to law enforcement, including information that assisted the Special Counsel’s Office (“SCO”) in ongoing matters, as described in the SCO’s memorandum to the Court, and the Office agrees that this is a factor to be considered by the Court pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a).  But Cohen’s description of those efforts is overstated in some respects and incomplete in others.  To be clear: Cohen does not have a cooperation agreement and is not receiving a Section 5K1.1 letter either from this Office or the SCO, and therefore is not properly described as a “cooperating witness,” as that term is commonly used in this District.

As set forth in the Probation Department’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range is 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment.  This range reflects Cohen’s extensive, deliberate, and serious criminal conduct, and this Office submits that a substantial prison term is required to vindicate the purposes and principles of sentencing as set forth in Section 3553(a).  And while the Office agrees that Cohen should receive credit for his assistance in the SCO investigation, that credit should not approximate the credit a traditional cooperating witness would receive, given, among other reasons, Cohen’s affirmative decision not to become one.  For these reasons, the Office respectfully requests that this Court impose a substantial term of imprisonment, one that reflects a modest downward variance from the applicable Guidelines range.

Prior related posts:

• Michael Cohen, Prez Trump's fixer, cuts a plea deal to fix his federal sentence between 46 to 63 months in federal prison
• Prez Trump advocating for a whole new kind of sentencing reform: he says cooperation deals "almost ought to be outlawed. It’s not fair." 
• Michael Cohen, former lawyer to Prez trump, pleads guilty to lying to Congress 
• Michael Cohen makes pitch for "time-served and restitution to the IRS" based largely on his continuing cooperation

UPDATE:  My posting above initially failed to note that there big sentencing memo linked above came from the Southern District of New York.  I have clarified this above because there was another filing from the Special Counsel's Office to address Cohen's offense of lying to Congress.  This SCO sentencing filing runs only seven pages, and it paints Cohen in a somewhat better light, concluding this way:

The defendant’s crime was serious, both in terms of the underlying conduct and its effect on multiple government investigations.  The sentence imposed should reflect the fact that lying to federal investigators has real consequences, especially where the defendant lied to investigators about critical facts, in an investigation of national importance.

However, the defendant has made substantial and significant efforts to remediate his misconduct, accept responsibility for his actions, and assist the SCO’s investigation. Accordingly, the Government respectfully submits that the Court should give due consideration to the defendant’s efforts set forth above and that it would be appropriate to allow the defendant to serve any sentence imposed in this case concurrently with any sentence imposed in United States v. Cohen, 18-cr-602 (WHP).

Michael Cohen makes pitch for "time-served and restitution to the IRS" based largely on his continuing cooperation

Michael Cohen is scheduled to be sentenced by US District Judge William Pauley in New York City on December 12 after his guilty plea to charges including campaign finance fraud and lying to Congress.  Late Friday, Cohen's lawyers filed this 30-page sentencing memorandum which makes a substantial plea for leniency.  Here are two good accountings of the filing:

From Lawfare, "There's a Lot Going On in Michael Cohen's Sentencing Memo"

From the New York Times, "Michael Cohen, Ex-Trump Lawyer, Asks U.S. Judge for Leniency"

Here are excerpts from the document's notable preliminary statement (with cites removed):

Beginning before the entry of his plea on August 21, 2018, and continuing thereafter through late November, Michael participated in seven voluntary interview meetings with the Special Counsel’s Office of the Department of Justice (“SCO”). He intends to continue to make himself available to the SCO as and when needed for additional questioning. He also agreed to plead guilty to an additional count, namely, making false statements to Congress, based in part on information that he voluntarily provided to the SCO in meetings governed by a limited-use immunity proffer agreement. The SCO is expected to submit a letter to the Court describing its assessment of Michael’s cooperation, and the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York (“Office”) is expected to join with the SCO in presenting Michael’s cooperation to the Court as a mitigating sentencing factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Michael’s decision to cooperate and take full responsibility for his own conduct well reflects his personal resolve, notwithstanding past errors, to re-point his internal compass true north toward a productive, ethical and thoroughly law abiding life.

For what it says about Michael’s fortitude and fundamental character, the significance of his cooperation with the SCO falls outside of the ordinary framework in which courts routinely assess cooperation in criminal cases. It states the obvious to observe that this matter is unique. Michael is cooperating in a setting in which the legitimacy of the SCO’s investigation – and the rationale for its very existence – is regularly questioned publicly and stridently by the President of the United States.... The President routinely denounces the SCO investigation as politically biased and reliant on excessively aggressive prosecutorial tactics....

In the context of this raw, full-bore attack by the most powerful person in the United States, Michael, formerly a confidante and adviser to Mr. Trump, resolved to cooperate, and voluntarily took the first steps toward doing so even before he was charged in this District.  He took these steps, moreover, despite regular public reports referring to the President’s consideration of pardons and pre-pardons in the SCO’s investigation.... And, he acted knowing that the result would be personal attacks on him by the President, a bevy of advisers and public relations specialists, and political supporters of the President, as well as threats to him.  Although it is true that any decision to cooperate in an investigation directly or indirectly touching a sitting President would be weighty and fraught for any former confidante and associate, here, in the circumstances of this case, at this time, in this climate, Michael’s decision to cooperate required and requires singular determination and personal conviction.  He could have fought the government and continued to hold to the party line, positioning himself perhaps for a pardon or clemency, but, instead — for himself, his family, and his country — he took personal responsibility for his own wrongdoing and contributed, and is prepared to continue to contribute, to an investigation that he views as thoroughly legitimate and vital....

For the reasons set forth below, we respectfully request that the Court, based on (1) the cooperation Michael has provided, (2) his commitment to continue to cooperate, and (3) all of the remaining sentencing factors required to be considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), impose a sentence of time-served and restitution to the IRS.

As reported in this prior post, Cohen's plea agreement does not allow him to seek a "departure" from the stipulated guideline range — which the plea agreement set at 46 to 63 months' imprisonment  — but it does allow that " either party may seek a sentence outside of the Stipulated Guidelines Range based upon the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a)."  

Prior related posts:

• Michael Cohen, Prez Trump's fixer, cuts a plea deal to fix his federal sentence between 46 to 63 months in federal prison
• Prez Trump advocating for a whole new kind of sentencing reform: he says cooperation deals "almost ought to be outlawed. It’s not fair." 
• Michael Cohen, former lawyer to Prez trump, pleads guilty to lying to Congress 

UPDATE: A helpful reader downloaded from Pacer and just sent me the full Cohen sentencing submission with all 30+ attachments for posting, and here it is:

Download Cohen- Defendant%27s Sentencing Memorandum (11-30-18)

Notable federal sentencing argument that "nature and circumstances of the offense" includes "rhetorical China shop bull who is now our president"

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss this HuffPost piece concerning a notable federal sentencing filing in a high-profile federal case.  The full headline of the piece sets forth the basics: "Trump Fan Convicted In Anti-Muslim Terror Plot Asks Judge To Consider Trump’s Rhetoric: Patrick Stein’s attorneys also said he learned about the Quran 'from the internet and conservative talk-show hosts such as Sean Hannity and Michael Savage'."  Here are more details from this article (which also include a link to the full filing):

Attorneys for a President Donald Trump supporter who was convicted in a domestic terrorism plot aimed at slaughtering Muslim refugees asked a federal judge to factor in the “backdrop” of Trump’s campaign rhetoric when deciding their client’s sentence.

Patrick Stein was one of three right-wing militiamen found guilty in April of a conspiracy to kill Muslim refugees living in rural Kansas. Ahead of the 2016 election, Stein and two others plotted with an FBI informant and an undercover agent to bomb an apartment complex that housed Muslims in Garden City. Stein went by the handle “Orkin Man” and referred to Muslims as “cockroaches” he wanted exterminated.

His sentence was expected to be announced Friday but has been delayed until Nov. 19.

At trial, defense attorneys referred to the defendants as “knuckleheads” who were engaged in “locker room talk,” and Stein’s attorney argued his client was a victim of a “chaos news” environment that had him thinking a civil war was coming. A jury convicted Stein and his co-defendants, Curtis Allen and Gavin Wright, on weapons of mass destruction and conspiracy against civil rights charges.... The government said it is seeking life sentences for all three defendants.

Stein’s attorneys, James Pratt and Michael Shultz, argued Monday in a sentencing memo that sending Stein to prison for life was unwarranted and that a sentence of 15 years would be appropriate. They said the judge should factor in the “backdrop to this case” when crafting an appropriate sentence.

“2016 was ‘lit.’ The court cannot ignore the circumstances of one of the most rhetorically mold-breaking, violent, awful, hateful and contentious presidential elections in modern history, driven in large measure by the rhetorical China shop bull who is now our president,” they wrote.

“Trump’s brand of rough-and-tumble verbal pummeling heightened the rhetorical stakes for people of all political persuasions,” they added. “A personal normally at a 3 on a scale of political talk might have found themselves at a 7 during the election. A person, like Patrick, who would often be at a 7 during a normal day, might ‘go to 11.’ See SPINAL TAP.  That climate should be taken into account when evaluating the rhetoric that formed the basis of the government’s case.”

Stein’s attorneys, who called their client an “early and avid” Trump supporter, said it was important to keep in mind that “almost no one thought Trump was going to win” when evaluating the likelihood of an attack. The plot was supposed to take place after the election, as the group didn’t want their attack to boost Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign. Stein, in a message to an undercover agent, wrote that if they attacked ahead of the election it would “give a lot of ammunition to the Hillary supporters” and said that Clinton could never be allowed to be president.

“Trump’s win changed everything, and it is reasonable to speculate that it would have changed things among the defendants as well,” the attorneys wrote. “The urgency for action would be gone. The feeling of a losing battle would be gone. The conspiracies, in part, would be disproven as the transition from Obama to Trump took place. It is logical to conclude that the discussed attack would never have happened in the world that existed post-Trump.”

Stein’s attorneys said their client got caught up in the anti-Muslim information he was devouring online. His knowledge of the Quran, his attorneys wrote, “came directly from the internet and conservative talk-show hosts such as Sean Hannity and Michael Savage. Patrick himself had never read the Quran, nor had he participated in a comparative study of any religion.”

Stein, his attorneys wrote, was “the perfect, vulnerable target” for the FBI, and had relapsed into alcoholism and “had used methamphetamine regularly,” including after he met FBI informant Dan Day. They said that Stein’s crimes “demonstrated an extreme level of hatred and fear, but they also demonstrated an utter lack of sophistication.”

Any sentencing document that effectively cites Spinal Tap garners my appreciation, and it obviously deserves to be honored for being willing to take its arguments "one louder."