Tuesday, March 26, 2019

Suffolk County DA produces remarkable new prosecutorial polices memo

Around this time last year, as discussed in this post, Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner made public a remarkable five-page memo setting forth an array of remarkable progressive prosecutorial policies.  This week, Suffolk County DA has produced an even more remarkable statement of policies via this remarkable 66-page document titled simply "The Rachel Rollins Policy Memo." The document is not easily summarized, and is worth a complete read. These excerpts from the first section, titled "A New Lens," provides a feel for some of the particulars that follow:

A dramatic shift in thinking around criminal justice is occurring in the United States. Sweeping advances in data science and public health have revealed that decades of punitive incarceration are not effectively preventing recidivism and promoting public safety. A large number of criminal convictions secured by prosecutors nationally are for drug, property, and public order offenses, which are often driven by economic, mental health, and social needs....

Data show that a carceral approach to low-level, non-violent offenses can do more harm than good. A criminal record often presents barriers to education, future income, housing, and many other necessary assets and supports proven to help people thrive and succeed in society.

As a result, jurisdictions across the country are taking a smarter approach to punishment and accountability. Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices are collecting and analyzing new and varied sources of data, and they are safely beginning to move all but the most serious offenses away from carceral punishment and its downstream collateral harms.

In place of traditional criminal justice system outcomes such as arrest, detention, prosecution, probation, and incarceration, criminal justice practitioners and policymakers are working in collaboration with community partners to develop and implement innovative, evidence-driven diversionary alternatives that data show are more likely to promote safer and healthier communities....

[Recent data] shows that the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office can file fewer criminal charges, divert more people who need help into services and treatment, send fewer people to jail and prison, all while improving the health and public safety of Suffolk County residents.  I am pleased to announce, effective immediately, the following official guidelines and policies of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office.  These guidelines and policies, as with all of our office’s policies and decisions going forward, will be grounded in science and data, modeled after the best known local and national practices, and will build upon and expand the important work and relationships begun under the leadership of my predecessors

Prior related post:

March 26, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 05, 2019

Georgia Supreme Court unanimously declares state's approach to lifetime GPS monitoring for sex offenders violates Fourth Amendment

The Supreme Court of Georgia issued a notable unanimous opinion yesterday in Park v. Georgia, No. S18A1211 (Ga. March 4, 2019) (available here), declaring unconstitutional the state's lifetime GPS monitoring requirement for certain sex offenders. The opinion for the court authored by Chief Justice Melton starts this way:

We granted an interlocutory appeal in this case to address Joseph Park’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 42-1-14, which requires, among other things, that a person who is classified as a sexually dangerous predator – but who is no longer in State custody or on probation or parole – wear and pay for an electronic monitoring device linked to a global positioning satellite system (“GPS monitoring device”) that allows the State to monitor that individual’s location “for the remainder of his or her natural life.” Id. at (e). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that OCGA § 42-1-14(e), on its face, authorizes a patently unreasonable search that runs afoul of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and, as a result, subsection (e) of the statute is unconstitutional to the extent that it does so.

Notably, a concurring opinion by Justice Blackwell seems interested in helping the state legislature find a work around to this ruling. His opinion starts this way:

The General Assembly has determined as a matter of public policy that requiring some sexual offenders to wear electronic monitoring devices linked to a global positioning satellite system promotes public safety, and it enacted OCGA § 42-1-14(e) to put that policy into practice. The Court today decides that subsection (e) is unconstitutional, and I concur fully in that decision, which is driven largely by our obligation to faithfully apply the principles of law set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Grady v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___ (135 SCt 1368, 191 LE2d 459) (2015).  I write separately, however, to emphasize that our decision today does not foreclose other means by which the General Assembly might put the same policy into practice.

Our decision rests in significant part on the fact that subsection (e) requires some sexual offenders to submit to electronic monitoring even after they have completed the service of their sentences.  But nothing in our decision today precludes the General Assembly from authorizing life sentences for the worst sexual offenders, and nothing in our decision prevents the General Assembly from requiring a sentencing court in the worst cases to require GPS monitoring as a condition of permitting a sexual offender to serve part of a life sentence on probation.

March 5, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 04, 2019

Third Circuit panel rules sex offenders subject to registration laws in Pennsylvania are "in custody" for habeas purposes

Last week, a unanimous panel of the Third Circuit issued what seems to be a groundbreaking ruling about habeas jurisdiction. In Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 16-4175 (3d Cir. Feb 27, 2019) (available here), the Third Circuit distinguished a variety of contrary rulings from other circuits to hold that a registered sex offender in Pennsylvania is “in custody” for purposes of having jurisdiction to bring a habeas corpus challenge. Here is how the opinion starts and ends:

We are asked to decide whether a habeas corpus petitioner who was subject only to registration requirements under Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) when he filed his petition was “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court,” as required for jurisdiction.  We hold that the registration requirements were sufficiently restrictive to constitute custody and that they were imposed pursuant to the state court judgment of sentence.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court and remand for further proceedings.....

The writ of habeas corpus “is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy.”  The scope of the writ has grown in accordance with its purpose — to protect individuals against the erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.  SORNA’s registration requirements clearly constitute a restraint upon liberty, a physical restraint not shared by the public generally.  The restraint imposed on Piasecki is a direct consequence of a state court judgment of sentence, and it therefore can support habeas corpus jurisdiction.  For all of the reasons set forth above, the order of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

March 4, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, February 26, 2019

Haymond seemingly to become major Apprendi progeny altering federal supervised release revocations

Though I have not yet had time to read the full transcript of oral argument in United States v. Haymond, which is now available here, reading Amy Howe's argument analysis at SCOTUSblog suggests the tea-leaves are easy to read after the oral argument. The posting is titled "Court poised to rule for challenger in dispute over constitutionality of sex-offender law," and here are snippets:

This morning the Supreme Court heard oral argument in a dispute over the constitutionality of a federal law that requires convicted sex offenders to return to prison for at least five years – and possibly for the rest of their lives – if a judge finds that they have committed certain crimes. The defendant in the case, an Oklahoma man who served time for possessing child pornography and was then sent back to prison after he violated the terms of his supervised release, argues that the law violates his right to have his sentence determined by a jury, rather than a judge, beyond a reasonable doubt. Today the justices seemed overwhelmingly likely to agree with him, even if it was not entirely clear how they will remedy the constitutional violation....

Eric Feigin, an assistant to the U.S. solicitor general, defended the law on behalf of the federal government. But he was quickly interrupted by a skeptical Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who asked him whether there was any other area of the law in which the United States allows a defendant to be sent to prison based on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

Feigin responded that both parole and probation operate in a similar way, but Sotomayor dismissed that analogy as comparing “apples and oranges.” With parole, she stressed, the state gives a benefit by cutting a sentence short. Where do we allow more prison time based on the preponderance of the evidence, she repeated?

Justice Brett Kavanaugh echoed Sotomayor’s thinking toward the end of Feigin’s initial stint at the lectern. When the government revokes an inmate’s parole, Kavanaugh suggested, it is simply denying a benefit. But when the government revokes an individual’s supervised release, he continued, that’s more like a penalty: The government is “adding a chunk of time on.”

Several justices also questioned the government’s contention that a jury was not required to find the facts leading to the conclusion that Haymond had violated the terms of his supervised release and the imposition of the new five-year sentence....

Only Justice Samuel Alito seemed to be squarely on the government’s side, warning that a ruling for Haymond could potentially “bring down the entire supervised release system.” As a result, much of the second half of the oral argument focused less on whether the law was unconstitutional and more on what should happen next.

I am not surprised, but I am still pleased, to learn that there may now be eight Justices prepared to extended Apprendi/Blakely rights to supervised release revocation. Now we wiat to see just how big the ultimate opinion will be (and how loudly Justice Alito will complain about more procedural rights for criminal defendants).

Some prior related posts:

February 26, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 25, 2019

Will Haymond argument generate any haymaker questions as SCOTUS takes up supervised release?

Tomorrow the Supreme Court has a day of sentencing arguments scheduled, as the Justices will from counsel in United States v. Haymond and Mont v. United States.  Here are the questions presented and argument previews via SCOTUSblog:

United States v. Haymond Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit erred in holding “unconstitutional and unenforceable” the portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) that required the district court to revoke the respondent’s 10-year term of supervised release, and to impose five years of reimprisonment, following its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent violated the conditions of his release by knowingly possessing child pornography.

Mont v. United States Issue: Whether a period of supervised release for one offense is tolled under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) during a period of pretrial confinement that upon conviction is credited toward a defendant’s term of imprisonment for another offense.

For hard-core sentencing fans, the Haymond case could be the sleeper of the Term because a major ruling on constitutionally required procedures for revocation of supervised release could have profound implications not only for the federal system, but also potentially for some state systems. 

I doubt that oral argument will provide any big indication of just how big a ruling Haymond could produce, but I will be particular eager to see what the newer Justices might have to say about the kind of judicial factfinding that landed Andre Haymond back in prison for a (mandatory) five years after a judge found by only a "preponderance of the evidence" that he had violated the terms of his supervised release.  I think serious originalists should be troubled by the kinds of procedures used to deprive Haymond of his liberty, but the modern tradition of lax procedures at the "back-end" of sentencing systems is considerable.  I am hoping a number of Justices might take big swings with their questions in Haymond, but lately I am thinking I should not be expecting too much from the Justices.

Some prior related posts:

February 25, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, February 17, 2019

"On probation until 2053? Sentencing disparities, lack of guidelines get long look at Minnesota Legislature"

The title of this post is the headline of this interesting newspaper article from the North Star State focusing on a part of modern sentencing systems that merit a lot more attention than it usually gets.  Here is how the piece gets started:

Since getting clean, Jennifer Schroeder went on to manage the sober living house that nurtured her after a year in jail.  She became the first in her family to graduate from college and, as an addiction counselor, now helps others struggling with the same demons she had to overcome.

Yet Schroeder’s own past will loom large into her 70s.  The 36-year-old St. Paul resident is on probation until 2053 after being caught with 21 grams of meth during a traffic stop one summer in Wright County.  “It’s hard to transform yourself into a new person when you are still labeled as your old self,” Schroeder said.

The same crime would net a fraction of that sentence in Minneapolis or Duluth, a chasm that underscores the disparate nature of punishment in a state with one of the nation’s highest rates of probation but with no clear guidelines for judges to rely on.

With the backing from top officials at the Department of Corrections, state lawmakers from both parties are now pushing new measures to cap probation sentences in Minnesota at five years.  They are also calling on the state’s Sentencing Guidelines Commission to start issuing recommendations for probation like it has for prison sentencing for nearly 30 years. “We are failing the basic test that those convicted of the same crime should receive similar punishment,” said Rep. Jamie Long, D-Minneapolis, who is sponsoring both bills.

Support for changing the state’s probation laws mirrors the national conversation surrounding criminal justice reform, like the recent First Step Act that focused on federal prison sentencing and earned broad bipartisan support. Those testifying at the State Capitol this week included local representatives from both the liberal American Civil Liberties Union and the conservative Americans for Prosperity.

February 17, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, February 07, 2019

"The New Amy, Vicky, and Andy Act: A Positive Step Towards Full Restitution for Child Pornography Victims"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Paul Cassell and James Marsh, which is forthcoming in the February 2019 issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter.  Here is its abstract:

Providing restitution to victims of child pornography crimes has proven to be a challenge for courts across the country.  Child pornography is often widely disseminated to countless thousands of criminals who have a prurient interest in such materials. While the victims of child pornography crimes often have significant financial losses from the crimes (such as the need for long term psychological counseling), allocating a victim’s losses to any particular criminal defendant is problematic.

Five years ago, the Supreme Court gave its answer on how to resolve this issue with its ruling in Paroline v. United States.  Interpreting a restitution statute enacted by Congress, the Court concluded that in a child pornography prosecution, a restitution award from a particular defendant is only appropriate to the extent that it reflects “the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses.”

In the ensuing years, lower courts have struggled to implement this holding.  Just recently, Congress stepped in to ensure that victims will receive appropriate restitution. In November 2018, the Senate and House resolved their differences in how to handle the issue, passing the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018 (or “AVAA” for short).  President Trump signed the legislation into law on December 7, 2018.

In this article, we describe the impact of this important new legislation. We set the stage by describing the need for restitution for child pornography victims, using the story of the lead victim in the Act (“Amy”) as an illustration of why restitution is needed.  We then turn to the problematic legal regime that was created by the Supreme Court’s Paroline decision, noting some of the confusion in the lower courts following the ruling.  Against this backdrop, we then discuss the AVAA, explaining how it will be a useful step forward for victims of these crimes.  One even more important possibility is that the Act could set a precedent for expanding restitution for victims in the future.

February 7, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (8)

Monday, January 28, 2019

"Are Collateral Consequences Deserved?"

The question in the title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Brian Murray now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

While bipartisan passage of the First Step Act and state reforms like it will lead to changes in sentencing and release practices, they do little to combat the collateral consequences that ex-offenders face upon release.  Because collateral consequences involve the state infliction of serious harm on those who have been convicted or simply arrested, their existence requires justification.  Many scholars classify them as punishment, but modern courts generally diverge, deferring to legislative labels that classify them as civil, regulatory measures.  This label avoids having to address existing constitutional and legal constraints on punishment.  This Article argues that although collateral consequences occur outside of the formal boundaries of the criminal system, their roots stem from utilitarian justifications for criminal punishment, such as incapacitation.  Legislative justifications relating to creating and reforming collateral consequences and judicial doctrine confirms that decision-makers are operating on utilitarian terrain while cognizant of functional concerns in the criminal system.  Unfortunately, these philosophical roots inhibit broad reform efforts relating to collateral consequences because public-safety and risk prevention rationales chase utility.  The result is extra punishment run amok and in desperate need of constraints.

This Article pivots to a novel, but perhaps counterintuitive, approach to reforming collateral consequences: subjecting them to the constraints of retributivism by first asking whether they are deserved.  Retributivist constraints, emphasizing dignity and autonomy, blameworthiness, proportionality, a concern for restoration, and the obligations and duties of the authority tasked with inflicting punishment, suggest many collateral consequences are overly punitive and disruptive of social order.  Viewing collateral disabilities in this fashion aligns with earlier Supreme Court precedent and accounts for retributivist constraints that already exist in present day sentencing codes.  Proponents of rolling back collateral consequences should consider how utilizing desert principles as a constraint on punishment can alleviate the effects of collateral consequences on ex-offenders.

January 28, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 25, 2019

Timely questions on enduringly important topics via The Crime Report

I have praised and promoted work done over at The Crime Report for many years, and the site remains a daily must-read for criminal justice fans.  And in the last few days, TCR has had two new pieces headlined with two questions that are timely and enduring.  Here are the headlines, links and brief excerpts:

"Can the U.S. Abolish Life Sentences?" (Q&A with Ashley Nellis)

TCR: You write, “Perhaps the most glaring omission of relevant data was the failure of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), the well-regarded research arm of the Department of Justice, to document the scale of life imprisonment.” Do you think this omission was on purpose or by accident?  And why?

Nellis: I think it’s not on purpose, there just a lack of resources in the research arms.  There’s also a lack of general interest from the public, so there was no incentive to document the expansion of life sentences. We shouldn’t be surprised that there hasn’t been data on the expansion because it goes along with laws and policies of the 1990s.

[The BJS] is not a political entity, but it seems to be. If you pass legislation at federal level that is bound to increase your incarcerated population… you should probably document the impact of those policies.  If you pass mandatory minimums with the elimination of parole, it seems wise to document how many people go to prison because you did that. Once a lot of the public sees the dramatic growth of life sentences— nearly five-fold increase over time — then they ask “why did nobody notice this before?” The answer is because nobody was recording it.

"Do We Really Need Probation and Parole?" (commentary by Vincent Schiraldi): 

Although “mass supervision” on probation or parole has not yet garnered the attention of “mass incarceration,” its impact is no small matter.  There are 4.5 million people under community supervision in America, twice as many as are incarcerated, a figure that amounts to more than the population in half of all U.S. states.  About four in ten people entering America’s prisons and jails each year are under supervision.  Many of those are incarcerated, not for committing new crimes, but for breaking a wide array of supervision rules.

January 25, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Data on sentencing, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, January 23, 2019

Parole and probation reforms now the focus for powerful players

A couple of days ago, Amy Solomon of the Laura and John Arnold Foundation and Jake Horowitz of The Pew Charitable Trusts’ public safety performance project together penned this notable Hill commentary headlined "US needs bold reforms to transform probation and parole." Here are excerpts:

The scale of American incarceration has been in the news recently, with growing bipartisan agreement that this challenge needs to be addressed. Yet a related issue continues to operate below the radar: The number of people on probation or parole supervision in the United States, which has tripled in the past three decades.

Although it might seem counterintuitive, this rapid growth in supervision can serve to increase jail and prison populations — an outcome that should concern policymakers and taxpayers alike. While about half of the nearly 4.5 million people on probation or parole will successfully complete their sentences, onerous supervision requirements can become a tripwire, resulting in incarceration. In 2016, for example, 350,000 people exited supervision by entering a jail or prison — often for violating rules such as failing a drug test or missing a required meeting, rather than for a new criminal offense.

In an effort to transform community supervision and shift the focus from punishing failure to promoting success, the Laura and John Arnold Foundation and The Pew Charitable Trusts recently announced an initiative to work with leading experts on community supervision policy, practitioners at the state and local levels, and advocates and stakeholders such as victims’ family members, to adopt evidence-backed reforms.

Over the past two decades, research has shown that current probation and parole practices often deliver less-than-optimal results. We know, for example, that supervision with a large number of conditions can interfere with an individual’s progress of reintegrating into the community. Some jurisdictions have responded to this research. Since the community supervision population reached its peak in 2007, both the crime rate and the rate of community supervision have gone down in 37 states. Texas and South Carolina, among other states, have had declines in crime and supervision of 20 percent or more.

Yet despite the growing body of evidence that supervision can be counterproductive, too many jurisdictions continue to emphasize surveillance and impose standard, one-size-fits-all rules, rather than utilizing an integrated approach with treatment and conditions tailored to the individual. These rules include frequent in-person reporting requirements, which often conflict with job or family responsibilities, and costly fines and fees that disproportionately affect poor people, impeding their ability to rebuild their lives....

The good news is that many states have adopted policy changes aimed at shrinking the number of people on supervision, reducing revocations for technical violations, and investing in community-based treatment. But there’s a long way to go, and we must help states and supervision agencies adopt even bolder reforms.

A new report by our two organizations shows that a smaller correctional footprint and less crime can go hand-in-hand. Supervision for the 21st century will require that probation and parole agencies boost the public safety value of community corrections. That means addressing areas that support reintegration such as strengthening family ties and connections to the community, improving workforce development, and increasing access to drug treatment, as well as repairing the harm inflicted on victims.

On theme, today come the news that a group of celebrities and business leaders have formed a new organization, the REFORM Alliance, to work on these issues. This NBC News piece, headlined "Meek Mill, Jay-Z headline alliance to reform U.S. parole, probation laws," provides these details:

Sports, entertainment and business leaders announced the launch of an organization aimed at reforming the United States’ criminal justice system. Meek Mill and Jay-Z are among the group of leaders who pledged approximately $50 million to create the Reform Alliance.  Its mission is to drastically reduce the number of people living under unjust parole and probation sentences, “while keeping communities safe by changing laws and public opinion.”

Other founding partners include Philadelphia 76ers co-owner Michael Rubin; Kraft CEO and New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft; Brooklyn Nets co-owner Clara Wu Tsai; Vista Equity Partners founder Robert F. Smith; Galaxy Digital founder Michael E. Novogratz; and Third Point LLC founder Daniel S. Loeb. CNN host and activist Van Jones will serve as CEO.

In an interview with NBC News’ Lester Holt, Mill said he hopes the Reform Alliance will shed light on the issues within the criminal justice system. “This is not us going against the system, this is us trying to fix the system,” the rapper said. “These problems affect America, they affect families, they affect taxpayers. ... I hope we bring real change to help fix the problem.”

January 23, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, January 08, 2019

Spotlighting criminal-justice debt and its profound impact on the poorest Americans

The New York Times magazine has this lengthy new article about criminal justice debt under this full headline: "How Cities Make Money by Fining the Poor: In many parts of America, like Corinth, Miss., judges are locking up defendants who can’t pay — sometimes for months at a time." I recommend the piece in full, and here is a snippet:

No government agency comprehensively tracks the extent of criminal-justice debt owed by poor defendants, but experts estimate that those fines and fees total tens of billions of dollars.  That number is likely to grow in coming years, and significantly: National Public Radio, in a survey conducted with the Brennan Center for Justice and the National Center for State Courts, found that 48 states increased their civil and criminal court fees from 2010 to 2014.  And because wealthy and middle-class Americans can typically afford either the initial fee or the services of an attorney, it will be the poor who shoulder the bulk of the burden....

In areas hit by recession or falling tax revenue, fines and fees help pay the bills.  (The costs of housing and feeding inmates can be subsidized by the state.)  As the Fines and Fees Justice Center, an advocacy organization based in New York, has documented, financial penalties on the poor are now a leading source of revenue for municipalities around the country.  In Alabama, for example, the Southern Poverty Law Center took up the case of a woman who was jailed for missing a court date related to an unpaid utility bill.  In Oregon, courts have issued hefty fines to the parents of truant schoolchildren. Many counties around the country engage in civil forfeiture, the seizure of vehicles and cash from people suspected (but not necessarily proven in court) of having broken the law.  In Louisiana, pretrial diversion laws empower the police to offer traffic offenders a choice: Pay up quickly, and the ticket won’t go on your record; fight the ticket in court, and you’ll face additional fees.

“What we’ve seen in our research is that the mechanisms vary, depending on the region,” says Joanna Weiss, co-director of the Fines and Fees Justice Center.  “But they have one thing in common: They use the justice system to wring revenue out of the poorest Americans — the people who can afford it the least.”  Aside from taxes, she says, “criminal-justice debt is now a de facto way of funding a lot of American cities.”

The jailing of poor defendants who cannot pay fines — a particularly insidious version of this revenue machine — has been ruled unconstitutional since a trio of Supreme Court cases spanning the 1970s and early 1980s....  Still, decades after those cases were decided, the practice of jailing people who cannot pay persists, not least because Supreme Court decisions do not always make their way to local courts.  “Precedent is one thing,” says Alec Karakatsanis, executive director of Civil Rights Corps, a Washington-based nonprofit.  “The way a law is written is one thing. The way a law is actually experienced by poor people and people of color is another.”...

In 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union detailed evidence of what it calls “modern-day ‘debtors’ prisons’ ” — essentially, courts operating in the same way as Judge Ross’s in Corinth — in Georgia, Michigan, Louisiana, Ohio and Washington State.  “If you spent a few weeks driving from coast to coast, you might not find similar policies in place in every single county,” Sam Brooke, the deputy legal director of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s economic-justice program, told me.  “But every other county? Probably.  This is a massive problem, and it’s not confined to the South.  It’s national.”...

In recent years, the Southern Poverty Law Center and other organizations, including the A.C.L.U. and Karakatsanis’s Civil Rights Corps, have been filing class-action lawsuits against dozens of courts across the South and Midwest and West, arguing that local courts, in jailing indigent defendants, are violating the Supreme Court rulings laid down in Williams, Tate and Bearden.  The lawsuits work: As a settlement is negotiated, a judge typically agrees to stop jailing new inmates for unpaid fines or fees.  “No one wants to admit they’ve knowingly acted in this manner,” says Brooke, who partnered with Karakatsanis on lawsuits in Alabama and filed several elsewhere in the South. “So they tend to settle quickly.” The trouble is locating the offending courts.

January 8, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, December 30, 2018

Highlighting continued work (and optimism) on alternatives to incarceration

I have had the great honor and pleasure for many years now of working with folks at the Aleph Institute, a national nonprofit that works on various criminal justice reform and recidivism reduction efforts. Hanna Liebman Dershowitz, who is director of special projects for the alternative sentencing division of the Aleph Institute, has this new New York Law Journal piece headlined "Our Country Grapples With Deepest Challenges Around Sentencing," discussing work on alternatives to incarceration and an event on the topic in the works for summer 2019.  Here is an excerpt:

The nonprofit I work with, the Aleph Institute, harbors a vision we call “Rewriting the Sentence,” wherein the cultural and political shift that has already taken hold in this country produces a complete reordering of our punishment priorities.  Once this shift is complete, we would view incarceration and other separation from community only as an option among many to be used sparingly, only when needed.

At present, we are such an outlying world incarcerator that we rank with the most heartless regimes on the planet.  It always bears repeating that we are not 5% of the world population and yet are responsible for almost a quarter of the world’s imprisoned population.  Across history, incarceration has not always dominated the punishment landscape — indeed, in Biblical law there is no such punishment as incarceration because of the inhumane collateral damage it wreaks.

We at Aleph think there are often legal and humanitarian reasons for the avoidance of custodial methods of correction at every stage of our system — from bail reform and law enforcement assisted diversion upfront to diversion programs, specialty courts and sentencing advocacy at the disposition stage to clemency, reentry support and compassionate release toward the back.

A system that uses evidence-based tools at each stage can deliver the optimal levels of supervision and services to allow each person to thrive and stay out of trouble.  Ideally — and I truly get that all of this sounds idealistic — we can use freed-up incarceration resources to support healthy communities, understanding that equity and thriving neighborhoods are the best prevention tools for crime.

What Aleph has learned from delivering care and support to thousands of individuals and families in prisons and jails all over the country for decades is that helping people function better is superior to an outmoded and misguided approach that inexorably leads to negative results, especially for the children left behind.

Here’s why I am not idealistic, but actually a pragmatist. If we don’t envision how we want the system to work, we will continue to incarcerate people none of us ever intended to incarcerate and to not know who we are incarcerating in a meaningful way.....

Why do I think I will see a true culture change in my lifetime on alternatives to incarceration too? Because we are already seeing the seeds of the change, to wit: in a recent meeting with the chief of alternatives for a major metropolitan district attorney, I was told that in recent years incoming prosecutors ask whether there are alternatives they can offer to defendants. In a decade, perhaps they will expect them.

So policy wonks and idealists alike, please stay tuned as we seek to rewrite a legacy of sentencing myopia. Aleph is convening criminal justice stakeholders next June at Columbia Law School for the Rewriting the Sentence 2019 Summit, and we will announce significant new initiatives thereafter. For more information, please visit askssummit.com.

December 30, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 18, 2018

Convicted poacher sentenced to watch Bambi (really) ... and imagining other crime and Disney movie pairings

Bambi-860x726A couple of helpful colleagues have already made sure I did not miss this local story of a Missouri sentencing.  The press account is headlined "'Bambi' as punishment?  Sentence in SW Missouri poaching case includes mandated viewings," and here are the details:

Four members of a southwest Missouri family have been caught in a multi-year poaching case where authorities say hundreds of deer were killed illegally. “The deer were trophy bucks taken illegally, mostly at night, for their heads, leaving the bodies of the deer to waste," said Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney Don Trotter.

Conservation agents are calling it one of Missouri's largest cases of deer poaching. The case was so egregious that Lawrence County Judge Robert George ordered a special addition to the jail time one of the poachers received.

Court records show the defendant "is to view the Walt Disney movie Bambi, with the first viewing being on or before December 23, 2018, and at least one such viewing each month thereafter, during Defendants incarceration in the Lawrence County Jail."

The southwest Missouri case involves David Berry Sr. of Springfield, David Berry Jr. of Brookline, and Kyle Berry of Everton. The trio were involved in a multi-year investigation by state, federal and Canadian law enforcement agencies and conservation officers involving suspects in Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska and Canada. David Berry Jr. is the defendant who was ordered to watch Bambi....

On Thursday, Dec. 13, David Berry Jr. received a 120-day sentence in Barton County Circuit Court for a felony firearms probation violation. On Dec. 6, he received a one-year jail sentence in Lawrence County Associate Court after pleading guilty to taking wildlife illegally on Oct. 11. The 120-day sentence Berry Jr. received in Barton County Circuit Court will be served in addition to the one-year sentence he received in Lawrence County.

These convictions were made with information obtained from Operation Game Thief, a hotline sponsored by the Missouri Department of Conservation and the Conservation Federation of Missouri. “It is unknown how many deer the main group of suspects has taken illegally over the past several years,” Lawrence County Conservation Agent Andy Barnes said. “It would be safe to say that several hundred deer were taken illegally.”

Prior to the July 2016 interviews, David Berry Sr. and Eric Berry, 20, Everton, were convicted of taking gamefish by hand in Dade County. During the 2017 firearms deer season, while awaiting his court appearance for violations from the 2016 investigation, Eric Berry and an accomplice were caught spotlighting in Lawrence County. To date, this group of poachers has paid $151,000 in bonds and $51,000 in fines and court costs and collectively served 33 days in jail.

David Berry Sr. and David Berry Jr. had their hunting, fishing and trapping privileges revoked for life by the Missouri Conservation Commission. Eric Berry and Kyle Berry had hunting and fishing privileges revoked for 18 years and 8 years, respectively. Jerimiah Cline, of Republic, who took wildlife illegally and assisted the Berrys, had hunting privileges revoked for five years....

Why take just the deer heads and leave the rest to rot? "In situations like this, with serial poachers who have no regard for the animals, rules of fair chase, or aren’t bothered by the fact that they’re stealing from others, it’s all about greed and ego," said Randy Doman, MDC Protection Division Chief. "Taking just the heads is their version of obtaining a 'trophy' and leaving the carcass behind is merely an afterthought. While there are some cases where poachers go after the antlers for profit, with this bunch it was more about the thrill of the kill itself."

The report that some of these defendants had previously gotten in trouble for "taking gamefish by hand" has me thinking (only half-jokingly) that they should have been ordered to watch Disney's Little Mermaid. And, of course, Disney's Lion King should be a must-watch for that infamous guy who went hunting illegally for Cecil the Lion.  

Especially when we all could use an extra bit of levity in our lives, I have in the title of this post sought to encourage everyone to come up with clever crime and Disney movie pairings.   Would it be so wrong to suggest that Michael Cohen should have been ordered to watch Disney's Robin Hood?  Or that anyone convicted of conducting illegal experiments has to watch Disney's Lilo & Stitch?  (I know that last one is really a stretch, but I wanted to suggest I will no judge silly efforts to spotlight a lesser-known Disney movie in this parlor game).

So, dear readers, what crime and Disney movie sentencing would you find fitting and amusing?

December 18, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, December 12, 2018

Prison Policy Initiative produces "Correctional Control 2018: Incarceration and supervision by state"

National_correctional_control2018The fine folks at the Prison Policy Initiative a few years ago produced this first version of a report that sought to aggregate "data on all of the kinds of correctional control: federal prisons, state prisons, local jails, juvenile incarceration, civil commitment, Indian Country jails, parole and, lastly but importantly, probation."  PPI's latest version of this report, now called "Correctional Control 2018: Incarceration and supervision by state," gets started this way:

The U.S. has a staggering 2.3 million people behind bars, but even this number doesn’t capture the true scale of our correctional system.  For a complete picture of our criminal justice system, it’s more accurate to look at the 6.7 million people under correctional control, which includes not only incarceration but also probation and parole.

The vast majority of people under correctional control are on probation and parole, collectively known as community supervision (or community corrections).  An estimated 4.5 million adults are under community supervision, nearly twice the number of people who are incarcerated in jails and prisons combined. Yet despite the massive number of people under their control, parole and probation have not received nearly as much attention as incarceration.  Only with recent high-profile cases (such as rapper Meek Mill’s probation revocation) has the public begun to recognize the injustices plaguing probation and parole systems, which set people up to fail with long supervision terms, onerous restrictions, and constant scrutiny.  Touted as alternatives to incarceration, these systems often impose conditions that make it difficult for people to succeed, and therefore end up channeling people into prisons and jails.

Understanding correctional control beyond incarceration gives us a more accurate and complete picture of punishment in the United States, showing the expansive reach of our criminal justice system.  This is especially true at the state level, as some of the states that are the least likely to send someone to prison are the most likely to put them under community supervision.  Given that most criminal justice reform will need to happen at the state and local levels, it is crucial for states to assess not only their incarceration rates, but whether their “alternatives” to incarceration are working as intended.

For this report, we compiled data on each state’s various systems of correctional control to help advocates and policymakers prioritize targets for reform.  This report includes data on federal prisons, state prisons, local jails, juvenile confinement, involuntary commitment, Indian Country jails, parole, and probation. We make the data accessible in one nationwide chart and 100 state-specific pie charts.  In this update to our original 2016 report, we pay particular attention to the harms of probation and parole, and discuss how these systems might be reworked into more meaningful alternatives to incarceration.

December 12, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, December 11, 2018

Michael Flynn in sentencing memo requests probation "not to exceed one year ... along with 200 hours of community service."

As reported in this Politico article, headlined "Flynn pleads with judge for no jail time," a high-profile defendant is asking for a low-impact sentencing outcome. Here are the basics:

Michael Flynn’s attorneys asked a federal judge on Tuesday to spare the former Trump national security adviser any jail time because of his “extensive cooperation” with special counsel Robert Mueller.

In a 178-page sentencing memo, Flynn’s attorneys pleaded for leniency by citing their client’s “exceptional record of military service” and “his genuine contrition for the uncharacteristic error in judgment that brought him before this court.”

Flynn, who pleaded guilty last December to lying to the FBI during the early stages of its counterintelligence investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 election, should instead be sentenced to one year of probation with minimal supervision conditions and 200 hours of community service, his lawyers said.

The retired Army general, his lawyers added, has shown he has a “deep respect for the law, as reflected in his extensive cooperation with the government’s efforts to get to the truth and to enforce the laws.”

U.S. District Court Judge Emmet Sullivan is scheduled to sentence Flynn on Dec. 18 for his guilty plea for making false statements to the FBI. Mueller’s office last week highlighted Flynn’s cooperation — including 19 interviews with the special counsel and other Justice Department prosecutors — in their own memo suggesting that Flynn get little or no jail time for his behavior.

The full filing is available at this link, and it runs 178 pages due to dozens of exhibits mostly in the form of letters in his support. The memo itself runs only just over a dozen pages and it starts with this "Preliminary Statement":

The defendant, through his attorneys, submits this Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing and respectfully requests that the Court grant the Government’s Motion for Downward Departure pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and sentence him to a term of probation not to exceed one year, with minimal conditions of supervision, along with 200 hours of community service.  General Flynn has accepted responsibility for his conduct.  He has cooperated extensively with several Department of Justice investigations, as detailed in the addendum to the Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing.  As the Government has made clear, his cooperation was not grudging or delayed.  Rather, it preceded his guilty plea or any threatened indictment and began very shortly after he was first contacted for assistance by the Special Counsel’s Office. Following extraordinary public service in the United States Army, during which his innovations as a highly decorated intelligence officer saved countless American lives, and a lifetime of faithful devotion to his family and fellow service members and veterans, as described in the powerful letters of support that accompany this submission, a sentence of non-incarceration is both appropriate and warranted.

Prior related posts:

December 11, 2018 in Booker in district courts, Celebrity sentencings, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Federal Sentencing Guidelines | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, December 10, 2018

Congress finally enacts "Paroline fix" that should improve victim restitution in federal child porn cases

Long-time readers may recall regularly blogging here about federal district and circuit opinions struggling to figure out whether and how courts could impose restitution awards/punishments on federal offenders convicted only of downloading child pornography images.  Because the child porn restitution questions produced various splits in the lower courts, the Supreme Court took up and "resolved" these issues in Paroline v. US, No. 12-8561 (Apr. 23, 2014) (available here).  But because Paroline required federal judges, in the words of one district court, to make "essentially a wild-ass guess" when trying to determine the appropriate level of restitution for a victim in a child porn downloading case, this issue continued to cry out for a legislative fix in the wake of the Paroline ruling.

A few days after the Supreme Court ruled in Paroline, I asked in a post "Will Congress fix (quickly? ever? wisely?) the "puzzle of paying Amy" after Paroline?".  And a few years after the Supreme Court ruled in Paroline, victim advocates Paul Cassell and James Marsh talking through these issues in a law review article "Full Restitution for Child Pornography Victims: The Supreme Court's Paroline Decision and the Need for a Congressional Response".  Now, a little more than 55 months after the Supreme Court ruled in Paroline, Congress managed to get a Paroline fix done in a bipartisan fashion. 

Specifically, Congress used its lame duck session to finalize a long-discussed Paroline fix in the form of an amendment to federal restitution statutes called the "Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018."   President Trump, as reported in this press release, on Friday signed this legislation into law.  Senator Orrin Hatch, who played a leading role in getting this enacted, released this press statement celebrating and explaining this new legislation:

Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), the senior Republican and President Pro Tempore of the US Senate, released the following statement after the President signed the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act into law. Senator Hatch introduced the legislation alongside Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), John Cornyn (R-TX), and Pat Toomey (R-PA). This bill recognizes the unique kind of harm caused by child pornography and requires restitution in a manner that will support victims.

“I’m thrilled the President has signed the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Act into law. This is a momentous day and many years in the making.” Hatch said. “This bipartisan legislation will provide meaningful assistance for child pornography victims to support their recovery and allow them to reclaim their lives. I am proud of this legislation and look forward to seeing it change the world for good.” The legislation establishes more relevant standards for child pornography victims who seek restitution from defendants and gives victims the alternative of a one-time fixed compensation payment from the existing Crime Victims Fund. The bill also allows victims access to the images depicting them, which can be important for victim identification, expert testimony, forensic review, and treatment.

The bill passed in the Senate by unanimous consent in January. With the help of Congressman Trey Gowdy (R-SC), the House sponsor of the bill, and House Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), the House of Representatives passed an amended version of the bill by unanimous consent. In November, the Senate passed the amended bill by unanimous consent, and ... was signed by the President into law.

The bill is named after victims depicted in some of the most widely circulated child pornography series in the world. “Amy,” “Vicky,” and “Andy” all strongly support the bill.

The Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act includes the following provisions:

  • Findings that focus on the unique nature of child pornography crime and how it harms victims
  • A more relevant and predictable definition of “full amount of a victim’s losses”
  • Restitution: --- Child pornography production: victims receive full amount of their total losses; ----Child pornography trafficking: victims receive from each defendant a minimum of $3,000
  • Compensation: --- Victims of child pornography trafficking are entitled to receive a one-time payment of $35,000 in defined monetary assistance (which is indexed to inflation) from a Child Pornography Victims Reserve (CPVR) within the federal Crime Victims Fund (CVF); --- Caps fees for attorneys representing a victim seeking defined monetary assistance at 15%; --- The court must assess defendants in child pornography cases to contribute to the CPVR: up to $17,000 for possession, up to $35,000 for distribution, and up to $50,000 for production crimes; --- The CPVR will be capped at $10 million
  • Victims of child pornography trafficking will enjoy the same priority in restitution payments as victims in other restitution statutes
  • Child pornography victims have equal rights with criminal defendants to review the child pornography depicting them at a government facility or court for the purposes of furnishing expert testimony
  • The Department of Justice must deliver a report to Congress within two years after passage about the Act’s implementation including an assessment of the funding levels for the Child Pornography Victims Reserve

I have long been a support of more effective and predictable restitution mechanisms in these  kinds of cases and others, so I welcome this overdue development.  Because few have been reporting consistently on the impact of the Paroline ruling in federal cases, I am especially glad this legislation give the Justice Department a responsibility to report on this new legislation's effectiveness.

A few (of many) prior posts on Paroline and child porn restitution issues mostly from some years ago:

December 10, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, November 27, 2018

New York Court of Appeals rules noncitizen defendants have Sixth Amendment jury trial right when charges carry potential penalty of deportation

The top court in New York issued an interesting opinion today concerning the application of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right, as reported here via Courthouse News Service: 

Since noncitizens can be deported after convictions on mere misdemeanors, they are entitled to have those charges decided in jury trials, New York’s highest court ruled 5-2 Tuesday.

The ruling stems from the 2012 prosecution of Saylor Suazo with numerous assault and harassment crimes.  Suazo, who remained in the United States illegally after his visa expired, was accused of throwing the mother of his children to the floor, and then choking and beating her.  A month later he was charged with criminal contempt after he violated a restraining order.

Before trial, prosecutors had the charges reduced to class-B misdemeanors, which are usually punishable by 90-day maximum sentences and qualify as petty crimes that can be tried summarily without a jury.  Suazo nevertheless could face deportation proceedings if convicted, but the trial judge disagreed that this entitled him to a jury trial.

After the bench trial concluded in 2012, Suazo was found guilty of the assault charge, as well as menacing, obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, and attempted criminal contempt.  A three-judge appellate panel affirmed the judgment, finding that deportation is a collateral consequence of conviction, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed 5-2 on Tuesday.

Writing for the majority, Judge Leslie Stein called it technically correct that deportation is a civil collateral consequence of a state conviction.  She also noted, however, that deportation is practically inevitable when noncitizens face even class-B misdemeanors.  “Detention — which closely resembles criminal incarceration — may last several days, or it may last months or years,” Stein wrote.  “A noncitizen who is adjudicated deportable may first face additional detention, followed by the often-greater toll of separation from friends, family, home, and livelihood by actual forced removal from the country and return to a land to which that person may have no significant ties,” the 22-page opinion continues....

Judges Michael Garcia and Rowan Wilson dissented separately from the majority.  In his dissent, Garcia wrote that the threat of deportation does not automatically transport petty crimes into serious ones covered by the Sixth Amendment, and that the U.S. Supreme Court must weigh in on the issue.  Garcia also noted the majority’s ruling carves out special treatment for deportation and could also lead to a right to jury trials in other class-B misdemeanor cases, such as those that result in the loss of public housing....

Attorney Mark Zeno of the Center for Appellate Litigation, who represented Suazo, praised the ruling and noted that the D.C. Circuit also has upheld the right to jury trials for noncitizens facing deportation.

A spokeswoman for the Bronx District Attorney Office meanwhile said that the ruling conflicts with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  “We understand that while the Court of Appeals addresses the harsh realities presented by the possible consequence of deportation for noncitizens, its decision presents conflicts with existing Supreme Court precedent that must be resolved,” the spokeswoman said in a statement.  “This decision creates ramifications, including serious backlogs and disparities in the administration of justice, for the courts of this state.  We are considering taking the case to the Supreme Court to address the crucial questions this decision presents.”

November 27, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, November 01, 2018

Pew reports on persons on probation or parole in US

The folks at Pew have this new posting titled in full "1 in 55 U.S. Adults Is on Probation or Parole: Better strategies can cut that rate while protecting public safety, decreasing drug misuse, and reducing incarceration." Here is how the posting gets started:

More than a decade ago, policymakers around the country seeking to protect public safety, improve accountability, and save taxpayer dollars initiated a wave of bipartisan reforms that has reduced the number of people behind bars in many states. Because of their high costs and visibility, prisons garnered substantial public attention on criminal justice, while relatively little was paid to the largest part of the correctional system: community supervision.

Probation and parole populations grew 239 percent from 1980 to 2016, and with that came a dramatic rise in the per capita rate of community supervision, which was 1 in 55 U.S. adults — nearly 2 percent — in 2016.  Although the community corrections population declined 11 percent since its all-time peak in 2007, it is still twice the size of the population incarcerated in state and federal prisons and local jails, combined. Notably, supervision rates vary considerably by state, from 1 in 18 in Georgia to 1 in 168 in New Hampshire, reflecting the difference in practices and policies across the nation.

This massive scale has too often prevented the community supervision system from effectively delivering on its mission to promote public safety through behavioral change and accountability.  Although about half of the roughly 2.3 million people who complete their probation and parole terms each year do so successfully, nearly a third fail for a range of reasons, and almost 350,000 of those individuals return to jail or prison, often for violating the rules rather than committing new crimes.

November 1, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, October 14, 2018

"Unstitching Scarlet Letters? Prosecutorial Discretion and Expungement"

In this post last week, I noted a New York Times article headlined "Convicts Seeking to Clear Their Records Find More Prosecutors Willing to Help." A helpful reader made sure I also posted about this article on SSRN with the title of this post authored by Brian Murray. Here is its abstract:

Criminal record history information pejoratively brands those who contact the criminal justice system, whether they were guilty or not.  In theory, the remedy of expungement is designed to mitigate the unanticipated, negative effects of a criminal record.  But the reality is that prosecutors — driven by a set of incentives that are fundamentally antithetical to expungement — control many of the levers that determine who is able to obtain expungement.  The disjunction between the prosecutorial mindset and the minister of justice ideal could not be starker and the consequences can be significant. 

Prosecutors, as agents of the state, can either argue forcefully for the retention or deletion of such information, dramatically affecting the situation of an arrestee or ex-offender given the pervasive web of collateral consequences associated with a criminal record.  This discretion, as it relates to theories of punishment, prosecutorial discretion overall, the ethical responsibilities of prosecutors to do justice, and public policy interests, has been grossly under-analyzed despite the serious implications it has for the prosecutorial role within the criminal justice system and for reentry efforts. 

While many scholars have paid attention to how prosecutorial incentives conflict with the theoretical responsibilities of prosecutors in charging, plea-bargaining, and post-conviction situations involving innocence, none have provided a theoretical framework focused on the role of the prosecutor during expungement.  Many of the complicated incentives that undermine holistic prosecution during those earlier phases exist during the expungement process as well.  But scholarly responses to those incentives are not adequate given the range of considerations during the expungement phase.  As such, this Article argues that scholarly discussions related to prosecutorial discretion need to extend their focus beyond the exercise of prosecutorial judgment pre-trial or the questions of factual and legal guilt.

Given that the primary role of the prosecutor is to do “justice,” this Article calls for increased attention to the exercise of discretion after the guilt phase is complete, specifically in the context of expungement of non-conviction and conviction information.  In doing so, it hopes to provide a framework for exercising such discretion, and to initiate additional conversation about the role of prosecutors during the phases following arrest and prosecution.

October 14, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, October 10, 2018

"Reconceptualizing Criminal Justice Reform For Offenders With Serious Mental Illness"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by E. Lea Johnston and available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Roughly 14% of male inmates and 31% of female inmates suffer from one or more serious mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder. Policymakers and the public widely ascribe the overrepresentation of offenders with serious mental illness in the justice system to the “criminalization” of the symptoms of this afflicted population.  The criminalization theory posits that the criminal justice system has served as the primary agent of social control over symptomatic individuals since the closure of state psychiatric hospitals in the 1950s and the tightening of civil commitment laws.  The theory identifies untreated mental illness as the origin of individuals’ criminal justice involvement and mental health treatment as the clear solution to breaking their cycle of recidivism.  This article evaluates the three main bodies of evidence offered in support of the criminalization theory: individuals’ movement from psychiatric hospitals to jails and prisons (“transinstitutionalization”), the heightened policing of individuals with serious mental illness, and the science linking mental illness and crime. This evaluation reveals that the criminalization theory — the understanding that animates most current policies aimed at offenders with serious mental illness—largely rests on intuitive assumptions that are often unverified and sometimes false.

A growing body of behavioral sciences literature constructs an alternative account of the relationship between mental illness and crime.  Coined the “normalization theory,” it relies upon decades of research that demonstrate that clinical factors, such as diagnosis and treatment history, are not predictive of criminal activity.  Instead, the same risks and needs that motivate individuals without mental illness also drive those with mental disorders to commit crimes.  These “criminogenic risks” include, among others, substance abuse, employment instability, family problems, and poorly structured leisure time. Behavioral science researchers reject the premise that individuals with serious mental illness are overrepresented in the justice system because these individuals’ illnesses directly lead to criminal behavior. Instead, they theorize that serious mental illnesses fuel the greater accumulation and concentration of typical criminogenic risk factors.  This recognition holds dramatic potential for the redesign of criminal justice programs.  Programs that target the criminal behavior of offenders with mental illness should principally focus on addressing criminogenic risk factors that can be mitigated.  Officials should also address mental health needs, but only to the extent necessary to facilitate a better criminogenic risk profile and fulfill constitutional obligations.  Moreover, correctional experience suggests that institutions should allocate scarce programmatic resources according to offenders’ risk of reoffending and potential to achieve programmatic goals. These insights, which federal agencies are beginning to recognize, hold radical implications for the redesign — and possibly the existence — of jail diversion, mental health courts, specialized probation and parole, and reentry programs for offenders with serious mental illness. 

October 10, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, September 25, 2018

New Pew issue brief reviews probation and parole in the US

The folks at Pew have this interesting new Issue Brief titled "Probation and Parole Systems Marked by High Stakes, Missed Opportunities: 1 in 55 adults is under community supervision." Here are excerpts from its "Overview":

Incarceration has long dominated the national conversation on criminal justice, because the U.S. prison population skyrocketed between the 1980s and late 2000s.  Starting in 2007, policymakers seeking to protect public safety, improve accountability, and save taxpayer dollars initiated a wave of bipartisan reforms that has reduced the number of people behind bars in many states.  Yet this movement has largely overlooked the largest part of the correctional system: community supervision.

Nationwide, 4.5 million people are on probation or parole—twice the incarcerated population, including those in state and federal prisons and local jails.  The growth and size of the supervised population has undermined the ability of local and state community corrections agencies to carry out their basic responsibilities to provide the best public safety return on investment as well as a measure of accountability.  Although research has identified effective supervision and treatment strategies, the system is too overloaded to implement them, so it sends large numbers of probationers and parolees back to prison for new crimes or for failure to follow the rules.

As part of a collaborative effort to improve the nation’s community corrections system, The Pew Charitable Trusts and the Laura and John Arnold Foundation analyzed the leading research and identified the most pressing problems and some promising solutions.  The available data leave many questions unanswered, but this review reveals key insights and challenges many assumptions about supervision.  Among the findings:

Community corrections is marked by considerable growth and scale, disproportionate representation of men and people of color, and a majority of people who committed nonviolent offenses....

Improvements in supervision offer opportunities to enhance public safety, decrease drug misuse, and reduce incarceration....

Policy changes can reduce correctional control and improve public safety.

These findings demonstrate the need for greater scrutiny of the community corrections system by policymakers and the public.  They also reinforce an emerging consensus among leading practitioners for a fundamental change in the vision and mission of supervision: from punishing failure to promoting success.

September 25, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Data on sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 11, 2018

"Digital Expungement"

The title of this post is the title of this paper I just saw on SSRN authored by Eldar Haber.  Here is its abstract:

Digital technology might lead to the extinction of criminal rehabilitation.  In the digital era, criminal history records that were expunged by the state remain widely available through commercial vendors (data brokers) who sell this information to interested parties, or simply through a basic search of the Internet.  The wide availability of information on expunged criminal history records increases the collateral consequences a criminal record entails, thereby eliminating the possibility of reintegration into society. Acknowledging the social importance of rehabilitation, policymakers attempted to regulate the practices of data brokers by imposing various legal obligations and restrictions, usually relating to the nature and accuracy of criminal records and the purposes for which they may be used.  These regulations have been proven insufficient to ensure rehabilitation. But regardless of future outcomes of such regulatory attempts, policymakers have largely overlooked the risks of the Internet to expungement.  Many online service providers and hosting services enable the wide dissemination and accessibility of criminal history records that were expunged.  Legal research websites, websites that publish booking photographs taken during an investigation (mugshots), social media platforms, and media archives all offer access to expunged criminal histories, many times without charge, and all with the simple use of a search engine. Without legal intervention, rehabilitation in the digital age in the U.S. has become nearly impossible.

This Article offers a legal framework for reducing the collateral consequences of expunged criminal records by offering to re-conceptualize the public nature of criminal records. It proceeds as follows.  After an introduction, Part II examines rehabilitation and expungement as facets of criminal law.  Part III explores the challenges of digital technology to rehabilitation measures.  Part IV evaluates and discusses potential ex-ante and ex-post measures that could potentially enable rehabilitation in the digital age.  It argues that while ex-post measures are both unconstitutional and unrealistic for enabling digital expungement, ex-ante measures could be a viable solution.  Accordingly, this Article suggests implanting a graduated approach towards the public nature of criminal history records, which would be narrowly tailored to serve the interests of rehabilitation-by-expungement. Finally, the last Part concludes the discussion and warns against reluctance in regulating expunged criminal histories.

September 11, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 10, 2018

Events and resources covering Ohio sentencing and prison reform ballot initiative known now as Issue 1

Depc_testA few months ago, I flagged here the interesting and intricate drug sentencing and prison reform initiative headed for the November 2018 ballot here in Ohio.  Originally called the "Neighborhood Safety, Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation Amendment," the initiative now is just known within Ohio as Issue 1.   With early voting in Ohio now just a month away and Election Day 2018 not much more than 50 days away, the new Drug Enforcement and Policy Center (DEPC) at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law has a lot of Issue 1 programming about to begin and has a lot of resources already assembled on its website.

This Thursday, September 13 at 12noon, starts a series five public panels under the title Ballot Insights.  Registration for these panels is available at this link, where you can also find more details on scheduled speakers and on which aspects of the Issue 1 will be the focus for particular panels (e.g., a first panel in October is focused on the Issue 1 provisions expanding "earned time credit" for Ohio prisoners to reduce their sentences through rehabilitative programming; a second panel in October looks at how to ensure any increased funding for drug treatment is utilized effectively). 

I have the pleasure of moderating the first Issue 1 panel this coming Thursday, which is titled simply "Neighborhood Safety, Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation Amendment: Step in the Right Direction."  This panel will include a leading proponent of Issue 1 (Steven JohnsonGrove of the Ohio Justice & Policy Center), a leading opponent of Issue 1 (Louis Tobin of the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association), and a leading Ohio criminal justice reform expert (Daniel Dew of The Buckeye Institute).  The bios of the presenters are detailed at this link.

In addition to all the panels, DEPC has also created a Resources Page for Issue 1, which includes links to the ballot language, position statements from various groups and select media coverage.  DEPC is also building out a Commentary Page on Issue 1 for publishing original commentary that the Center has solicited. (A pair of public health scholars submitted this first commentary for publication on the DEPC site.)

 Prior related posts:

September 10, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 18, 2018

Discussions of criminal justice supervision and collateral consequences that merit extended conversations

This past week I saw two notable commentaries over at The Conversation. Here are links and brief excerpts:

Vincent Schiraldi, "Parole and probation have grown far beyond resources allocated to support them"

Today, there are twice as many people supervised on parole or probation as are incarcerated in the U.S....

Thousands of probation and parole officers supervise nearly 5 million people across the U.S. However, as the number of people under community corrections has swelled, resources for officers have lagged. While twice as many people are supervised in the community as are incarcerated, 9 out of 10 correctional dollars is funneled to prisons according to a report from 2009, the most recent year with available data....

In 2017, every major community corrections association in the U.S., along with 45 elected or appointed prosecutors and 35 probation and parole officials as well as myself wrote in a statement: “Designed originally as an alternative to incarceration, community corrections has become a significant contributor to mass incarceration” that should be downsized while reinvesting the savings in “improving community based services and supports for people under supervision.”

Stanley Andrisse, "I went from prison to professor — here’s why criminal records should not be used to keep people out of college"

Beginning next year, the Common Application – an online form that enables students to apply to the 800 or so colleges that use it – will no longer ask students about their criminal pasts.

As a formerly incarcerated person who now is now an endocrinologist and professor at two world-renowned medical institutions — Johns Hopkins Medicine and Howard University College of Medicine — I believe this move is a positive one.  People’s prior convictions should not be held against them in their pursuit of higher learning.

While I am enthusiastic about the decision to remove the criminal history question from the Common Application, I also believe more must be done to remove the various barriers that exist between formerly incarcerated individuals such as myself and higher education.

August 18, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Divided We Fall: Parole Supervision Conditions Prohibiting Inter-Offender Associations"

The title of this post is the title of this new article recently posted on SSRN and authored by James Binnall. Here is the abstract:

In the United States, almost all criminal offenders who serve a term of imprisonment are subject to a period of post-incarceration supervision.  Commonly known as parole, this form of supervision requires former inmates to comply with a variety of conditions.  A nationwide survey of standard parole conditions reveals that a vast majority of jurisdictions categorically restrict parolees’ associations with other parolees, convicted criminals, and/or convicted felons.  These blanket offender no-association conditions ostensibly presume that former offenders are irreparably flawed, homogenous, and that inter-offender relationships are uniformly criminogenic.

This article questions those presumptions, suggesting that offender no-association conditions endorse an untenable conceptualization of former offenders, a rejection of evidence-based parole practices, an uninformed view of inter-offender associations, and a superficial application of criminological theory.  This article further argues that by categorically prohibiting all inter-offender associations, offender no-association conditions foreclose strengths-based approaches to reentry and inhibit mechanisms that can foster criminal desistance. In this way, such conditions unnecessarily subvert the rehabilitative goal of parole, likely making them impermissibly overbroad in their current form.

August 18, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 17, 2018

New research finds racial bias infects sex-offender classification system under SORNA

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss this Crime Report piece headlined "Sex Offender Registration Influenced by Racial Bias, Ohio Study Claims." Here are excerpts:

The classification of sex offenders based on the risks they pose to the community following their release from prison is subject to racial bias, according to a study published in the Criminal Justice Policy Review.  African-American sex offenders were found to be two-and a half times likelier to be inaccurately designated as high-risk than their Caucasian counterparts by a state-sponsored risk-assessment instrument, said the study, which was based on a sample of 673 sex offenders in the state of Ohio who were convicted of a sex crime and released between 2009 and 2011.

Risk assessments that were overly weighted towards prior criminal records led to the skewed assessments, argued the authors, Bobbie Ticknor of Valdosta State University, and Jessica J. Warner of Miami University Regionals.  “Approximately 85 percent of the individuals classified in the highest tier, who theoretically posed the greatest danger, did not have a conviction for a new sex offense after the five-year follow up period,” the study found, adding that 15 percent of “Tier 1” offenders were under-classified, meaning their threat-level was underestimated.

The sample was limited to offenders who had received a classification under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) system established by the 2006 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.  The law established guidelines aimed at protecing communities from convicted sex offenders who might pose continued threats to their community following release. SORNA is an offense-based classification system where offenders are assigned to one of three tiers according to “dangerousness.”  Tier designation is determined by prior offenses and the severity of the charge and conviction.... 

The reason why racial bias may influence the accuracy of SORNA designations lies in the fact that SORNA relies heavily on the criminal history of an individual, said the authors. The study cites prior research which produced evidence that “black defendants are less likely to accept a plea deal due to mistrust in the system…”  Going to trial increases the chances of being found guilty of more severe charges and receiving lengthier sentences, especially for minority defendants, according to the authors.

The study being discussed here is available at this link and is published under the title "Evaluating the Accuracy of SORNA: Testing for Classification Errors and Racial Bias." Here is its abstract:

Since its enactment in 2006, several researchers have explored whether the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) classification system under the Adam Walsh Act improves outcomes such as increasing public safety and lowering recidivism of sexual offenders.  This study adds to the growing body of literature by exploring how accurate this offense-based classification system is in terms of recidivism and if there is any racial bias in tier designation.

Specifically, results from contingency analyses suggest that several sex offenders are overclassified, meaning that they were given a classification status that included more supervision and oversight although they did not commit another offense. Furthermore, African Americans were two-and-a-half times more likely to be overclassified than Caucasians which suggests racial bias may exist in this government-sponsored classification system.  Implications for communities and the continued use of the SORNA are presented.

August 17, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Race, Class, and Gender, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 02, 2018

"The Digital Wilderness: A Decade of Exile & the False Hopes of Lester Packingham"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Packingham v. North Carolina announced that people who have been convicted of sex offenses have a First Amendment right to access social media platforms.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that the public square — and the communicative activity that the First Amendment protects — now exists on these platforms “in particular.”

Despite Packingham’s promise of free speech for arguably the most despised, feared, and misunderstood group of people in America, it did not directly address ways in which both the state and private actors keep Packingham’s beneficiaries in digital darkness.  As the rolls of America’s sex offense registries swell to near one million people in 2018, sustained exclusion from platforms that society increasingly relies on for civic engagement functionally cripples the ability of an enormous population of people to reintegrate, participate, and effectively challenge laws and policies that target them long after they have exited the criminal justice system.  Far from being dangerous or illicit, the voices of people directly impacted are necessary to properly balance a system which has all but foreclosed redemption, and thus their inclusion gives life not only to the values at the heart of Packingham, but to our conception of justice as well.

August 2, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, August 01, 2018

Prez Trump says he thinks "we’ll be able to" get the FIRST STEP Act passed into law

President Donald Trump had a White House meeting with inner-city pastors today, and the even made headlined because on pastor said, as reported here, that Prez Trump may go down as the "most pro-black president" in recent history. Rather than engage with that comment, I am eager to note some of Prez Trump's comments about prison reform at the event. This link provides a transcript, and here are statements by Prez Trump that caught my eye:

Our focus on opportunity for every citizen includes helping former prisoners.  These citizens reentering society have had a tough time.  We want them to get jobs so they don’t have to return to a life of crime and go back into the same prison where they just got out....

We passed the First Step Act through the House, and we’re working with the Senate to pass that into law.  And I think we’ll be able to do it. When we say “hire American,” we mean all Americans — every American, everybody.

And, you know, it’s something that should have been done a long time ago — prison reform....  But a lot of people are saying, “You mean it’s the Trump administration that’s doing this?”  You understand.  They don’t believe it.  But we’re really making a tremendous amount of progress, and it’s a beautiful thing to watch.

I am not prepared to praise the Trump Administration for "making a tremendous amount of progress" unless and until I see laws enacted and real reforms implemented. But as Prez Trump continues to talk the talk on prison reform, I want to remain hopeful that real action will follow.

August 1, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

"What Is Prison Abolition?"

The title of this post is the headline of this article in The Nation, which carries the subtitle "The movement that is trying to think beyond prisons as a tool to solve society’s problems." Here is an excerpt:

The prison-abolition movement is a loose collection of people and groups who, in many different ways, are calling for deep, structural reforms to how we handle and even think about crime in our country.  There are de facto figureheads (such as Angela Davis and Ruth Wilson Gilmore, the most famous contemporary abolitionists) and organizations (such as Critical Resistance, INCITE!, the Movement for Black Lives, the National Lawyers Guild, and Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee — all of which, if not explicitly abolitionist, at least engage in abolitionist ethics), and there are converging or at least overlapping political ideologies (anarchist, socialist, libertarian), but there is no structured organizing group or coalition.  Masai Ehehosi, a co-founder of Critical Resistance and longtime member of the New Afrikan Independence Movement, pointed me to the overlap between organizations promoting civil rights and abolitionists: “We want freedom” can just as easily be applied to ending Jim Crow or the New Jim Crow, to unlocking iron shackles or swinging open prison doors.

The “movement” thus operates with affinity groups, with various organizations working in prisoner support, prisoner advocacy, political advocacy, or community education. “And when something big happens,” as Azzurra Crispino, prison labor activist and philosopher, explained to me, “we all show up as a coalition, and we don’t interfere” with each other’s work.

Abolitionists believe that incarceration, in any form, harms society more than it helps.  As Angela Davis argues, prisons are an obsolete institution because they exacerbate societal harms instead of fixing them.  “Are we willing to relegate ever larger numbers of people from racially oppressed communities to an isolated existence marked by authoritarian regimes, violence, disease, and technologies of seclusion that produce severe mental instability?” Davis has written.  Even if we were to greatly diminish the current prison population, even if we were to cut it in half but keep the prison complex intact, we would still be consigning millions of people to isolation and violenc e— and that’s a form of inhumanity that abolitionists can’t abide.  Moreover, Davis contends, mass imprisonment “reproduce[s] the very conditions that lead people to prison.”

August 1, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, July 23, 2018

"Beyond Strict Scrutiny: Forbidden Purpose and the 'Civil Commitment' Power"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper that I just noticed on SSRN that was authored by Eric Janus. Here is the abstract:

Sex offender civil commitment (SOCC) is a massive deprivation of liberty as severe as penal incarceration.  Because it eschews most of the "great safeguards" constraining the criminal power, SOCC demands careful constitutional scrutiny.  Although the Supreme Court has clearly applied heightened scrutiny in judging civil commitment schemes, it has never actually specified where on the scrutiny spectrum its analysis falls.

This article argues that standard three-tier scrutiny analysis is not the most coherent way to understand the Supreme Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence.  Rather than a harm-balancing judgment typical of three-tier scrutiny, the Court’s civil commitment cases are best understood as forbidden purpose cases, a construct that is familiar in many areas of the Court’s constitutional analysis.  But the Court’s civil commitment cases tie the search for punitive purpose to another genre of constitutional analysis, the application of the substantive boundaries on governmental power most commonly associated with the specific grants of federal power.  In contrast to the normal conception of state power as plenary, limited only by the specific constraints of the bill or rights and the amorphous limits of "substantive due process," the Court has posited a narrowly limited "civil commitment" power. The search for the forbidden purpose maps directly onto the inquiry into the limits of this discrete and special state power.  Finally, the article argues that the forbidden purpose/discrete power analysis provides clarity on another vexing issue, the facial/as-applied distinction.

July 23, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, July 22, 2018

"Can a criminal be sentenced to run a 'help desk'?"

The question in the title of this post is the first line of this New York Times article about a high-profile upcoming federal (re)sentencing.  The piece is headlined "What Sentence Should Sheldon Silver Get? His Lawyers Get Creative," and here are excerpts:

Sheldon Silver, the former powerful speaker of the New York State Assembly who was convicted of public corruption charges in May, hopes [he can be sentenced to help-desk duty].

Mr. Silver, 74, is to be sentenced on July 27 in Manhattan, and federal prosecutors asked the judge on Friday to impose a sentence “substantially in excess” of 10 years. But Mr. Silver’s lawyers had a more creative proposal for how he could pay his debt to society.

After a “meaningful custodial sentence,” they suggested, he should be ordered to perform “rigorous” community service, like running a special help desk. In that role, they said, he would be helping New Yorkers “navigate their way through the state bureaucracy to answer their questions, and maximize their chances of receiving benefits to which they may be entitled.” He would be expressing his remorse, they said, and using “his unique skills to assist his fellow New Yorkers.”...

Evidence at the trial showed Mr. Silver obtained nearly $4 million in illicit payments in exchange for taking actions that helped a prominent cancer researcher at Columbia University and two real estate developers.... Mr. Silver, a Democrat, was originally convicted in 2015 and sentenced to 12 years by the judge, Valerie E. Caproni of Federal District Court. After his conviction was overturned on appeal, he was retried this year and found guilty.

“Mr. Silver is a broken man,” his lawyers wrote. “He has been humiliated and disgraced. Most of his assets are gone, either to forfeiture or fine.” But he “is also an intelligent man, with virtually unparalleled knowledge of New York State government,” they noted. Their proposal would allow the judge to exercise discretion “in a way that punishes Mr. Silver, but takes advantage of his unique talents and still affords the possibility of his living the end of his life in freedom.”

To provide a direct answer to the question in the title of this post, I would look to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(12) which states that the court may provide that the defendant work "in community service as directed by the court” as a condition of supervised release. In other words, I think a federal defendant can be sentenced by a federal judge to run a help desk as a form of community service during a period of supervised release. Whether a federal judge will be inclined to do so for Sheldon Silver is another question.

Prior related posts prior to Sheldon Silver's initial sentencing:

July 22, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, July 16, 2018

Big Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upholds "drug free" condition of probation

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court handed down this morning a decision in the closely-watched case of Massachusetts v. Eldred, No. SJC--12279 (Mass. July 16, 2018) (available here). The opinion starts this way:

Following a probation violation hearing, a judge in the District Court found that the defendant, Julie A. Eldred, had tested positive for fentanyl, in violation of a condition of her probation requiring her to abstain from using illegal drugs. The judge ordered that the conditions of her probation be modified to require her to submit to inpatient treatment for drug addiction. The defendant appeals from that finding and disposition.  The judge also reported a question drafted by the defendant concerning whether the imposition of a "drug free" condition of probation, such as appeared in the original terms of defendant's probation, is permissible for an individual who is addicted to drugs and whether that person can be subject to probation violation proceedings for subsequently testing positive for illegal drugs.

We conclude that, in appropriate circumstances, a judge may order a defendant who is addicted to drugs to remain drug free as a condition of probation, and that a defendant may be found to be in violation of his or her probation by subsequently testing positive for an illegal drug. Accordingly, we affirm the finding that the defendant violated her probation and the order requiring her to submit to inpatient treatment for her addiction.

July 16, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, July 07, 2018

Judge Jack Weinstein laments overuse of federal supervised release (and especially its revocation for marijuana use)

As regular readers know, US District Judge Jack Weinstein regularly produces interesting and important sentencing opinions, and his latest effort focuses on supervised release as well as marijuana reform. This New York Times article about this opinion, headlined "Brooklyn Judge Vows Not to Send People Back to Prison for Smoking Marijuana," starts with this accounting of the effort:

Noting that marijuana has become increasingly accepted by society, a federal judge in Brooklyn made an unusual promise on Thursday: He pledged he would no longer reimprison people simply for smoking pot.

In a written opinion that was part legal document, part mea culpa, the judge, Jack B. Weinstein, 96, acknowledged that for too long, he had been sending people sentenced to supervised release back into custody for smoking pot even though the drug has been legalized by many states and some cities, like New York, have recently decided not to arrest those who use it. Under supervised release, inmates are freed after finishing their prison time, but are monitored by probation officers.

“Like many federal trial judges, I have been terminating supervision for ‘violations’ by individuals with long-term marijuana habits who are otherwise rehabilitated,” Judge Weinstein wrote. “No useful purpose is served through the continuation of supervised release for many defendants whose only illegal conduct is following the now largely socially acceptable habit of marijuana use.”

The full 42-page opinion in US v. Trotter, No. 15-CR-382 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2018) (available here), is an interesting read and important for lot of reasons beyond the connections of criminal justice supervision and marijuana reform.  This first part of the introduction provides a taste for all the full opinion covers:

This case raises serious issues about sentencing generally, and supervised release for marijuana users specifically: Are we imposing longer terms than are needed for effective supervised release?  Should we stop punishing supervisees for a marijuana addiction or habit?

After revisiting and reconsidering these issues, I conclude: (1) I, like other trial judges, have in many cases imposed longer periods of supervised release than needed, and I, like other trial judges, have failed to terminate supervised release early in many cases where continuing supervision presents such a burden as to reduce the probability of rehabilitation; and (2) I, like other trial judges, have provided unnecessary conditions of supervised release and unjustifiably punished supervisees for their marijuana addiction, even though marijuana is widely used in the community and is an almost unbreakable addiction or habit for some.  As a result of these errors in our sentencing practice, money and the time of our probation officers are wasted, and supervisees are unnecessarily burdened.

In summary, in this and my future cases I will: (1) impose shorter terms of supervised release as needed; (2) give greater consideration to the appropriateness of conditions; (3) provide for earlier termination where indicated; and (4) avoid violations of supervised release and punishment by incarceration merely for habitual marijuana use.

July 7, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, July 03, 2018

"Study after study shows ex-prisoners would be better off without intense supervision"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new Brookings commentary authored by Jennifer Doleac.  I recommend the piece in full, and here is how it starts and concludes:

Two-thirds of those released from prison are re-arrested within three years.  This incarceration cycle hurts families and communities — and also costs a lot of money. Governments and nonprofits have tried many programs to reduce recidivism, but most are not successful.  In a recent review of the literature on prisoner reentry, I summarized the best evidence on how to improve the lives of the formerly incarcerated.  One of the most striking findings was that reducing the intensity of community supervision for those on probation or parole is a highly cost-effective strategy.  Several studies of excellent quality and using a variety of interventions and methods all found that we could maintain public safety and possibly even improve it with less supervision — that is, fewer rules about how individuals must spend their time and less enforcement of those rules.  Less supervision is less expensive, so we could achieve the same or better outcomes for less money.

For instance, Hennigan, et al. (2010), measured the effects of intensive supervision using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in Los Angeles.  Juveniles sentenced to probation were randomly assigned to intensive supervision—in the form of a community-based after-school program—or standard probation.  Five years later, there were no significant differences in outcomes between the treatment and control groups, with one exception: Low-risk boys (ages 15 or younger) who were randomized to intensive supervision were worse off. Intensive supervision for that group led to more incarceration and a higher likelihood of continued criminal justice involvement in the years ahead.  That is, intensive supervision increased criminal activity by this group, without reducing criminal activity by other groups.

Barnes, et al. (2012) used an RCT to study supervision levels in Philadelphia.  Low-risk probationers were randomized to probation as usual or low-intensity supervision by parole officers with high caseloads (which forced them to pay less attention to each individual case).  Less supervision means probationers may be less likely to get caught for technical violations, such as using drugs or breaking curfew.  But these requirements of probation are a means to an end: what really matters for public safety is the number of new offenses committed.  Eighteen months after randomization, there were no significant differences between the treatment and control groups in the likelihood of being charged for a new offense.  In other words, low-intensity supervision did not result in more recidivism....

These studies show that current efforts to reduce recidivism through intensive supervision are not working.  Why is intensive supervision so ineffective?  Requiring lots of meetings, drug tests, and so on can complicate a client’s life, making it more difficult to get to work or school or care for family members (meetings are often scheduled at inconvenient times and may be far away).  A heavy tether to the criminal justice system can also make it difficult for individuals to move on, psychologically.  Knowing that society still considers you a criminal may make it harder to move past that phase of your life.  These difficulties may negate the valuable support that probation and parole officers can provide by connecting clients to services and stepping in to help at the first sign of trouble.

It is unclear what the optimal level of supervision is for those on parole or probation, but these studies demonstrate that current supervision levels are too high.  We could reduce the requirements of community supervision — for low-risk and high-risk offenders alike — and spend those taxpayer dollars on more valuable services, such as substance abuse treatment or cognitive behavioral therapy.  This would be a good first step toward breaking the vicious incarceration cycle.

July 3, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, June 20, 2018

"Fourth Amendment Constraints on the Technological Monitoring of Convicted Sex Offenders"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper available via SSRN authored by Ben McJunkin and J.J. Prescott.  Here is its abstract:

More than forty U.S. states currently track at least some of their convicted sex offenders using GPS devices.  Many offenders will be monitored for life.  The burdens and expense of living indefinitely under constant technological monitoring have been well documented, but most commentators have assumed that these burdens were of no constitutional moment because states have characterized such surveillance as “civil” in character — and courts have seemed to agree.

In 2015, however, the Supreme Court decided in Grady v. North Carolina that attaching a GPS monitoring device to a person was a Fourth Amendment search, notwithstanding the ostensibly civil character of the surveillance.  Grady left open the question whether the search — and the state’s technological monitoring program more generally — was constitutionally reasonable.  This Essay considers the doctrine and theory of Fourth Amendment reasonableness as it applies to both current and envisioned sex offender monitoring technologies to evaluate whether the Fourth Amendment may serve as an effective check on post-release monitoring regimes.

June 20, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, June 19, 2018

Georgia Supreme Court rules individual has essentially no procedural rights before being placed on state's child abuse registry

I saw yesterday a notable ruling by the Georgia Supreme Court in Georgia Department of Human Services v. Steiner, No. S18A0281 (Ga. June 18, 2018)(available here).  As I read the case, a 13-year-old's written statement that an older individual (age 52) hugged her and twice "started to hump me a way a dog would" led to his placement on the Georgia child abuse registry.  Upon getting a subsequent notice of his placement on the registry, Steiner challenged the (lack of) procedures on various grounds, and prevailed in lower courts. But on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, Steiner loses and the majority opinion gets started this way:

The Georgia Department of Human Services, Division of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) appeals from the decision of the Lamar County Superior Court finding that Georgia’s central child abuse registry is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied to appellee Christopher Steiner.  The trial court also found that DFCS failed to prove that Steiner committed an act of child abuse by a preponderance of the evidence as required to maintain Steiner’s listing in the registry.  This Court granted DFCS’s application for discretionary review. 

We hold that Steiner failed to demonstrate a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest sufficient to trigger the due process protections that he claims were violated by operation of the registry, and because the Act was constitutionally applied to Steiner, he lacks standing to bring his facial challenge on that ground.  We further hold that the child abuse registry is not criminal in nature, and that the superior court therefore erred in finding it to be so.  And because an abuse investigator’s determination about whether a report of child abuse is supported by the evidence is not a judicial function, the superior court erred in finding that the statute requiring the investigator to report such cases to DFCS for inclusion in the child abuse registry violates the separation of powers provision of the Georgia Constitution.  Finally, because at least “some evidence” supported the administrative hearing officer’s conclusion that DFCS had proved an act of child abuse as defined for purposes of the child abuse registry, the superior court erred in reversing the administrative law court.  We reverse.

June 19, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (7)

Wednesday, June 13, 2018

"When Tribal Disenrollment Becomes Cruel and Unusual"

The title of this post is the title of this new article available on SSRN authored by Judith Stinson. Here is the abstract:

In the past two decades, Native American tribes have disenrolled — permanently removed from tribal citizenship — thousands of tribal members, mainly because of lineage concerns or for political reasons.  In these instances, scholars generally decry disenrollment.  But there is a growing trend to disenroll tribal citizens for criminal conduct, and scholars (and even tribal members themselves) assume this is proper.  This paper argues that tribal disenrollment for criminal conduct violates the Indian Civil Rights Act’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

The Supreme Court held that denationalization as a result of criminal conduct is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Congress applied that same prohibition to Native American tribes in the Indian Civil Rights Act.  And traditionally, tribes, who had the inherent power to impose any sanction necessary, focused on restoring harmony rather than punishing offenders; permanent expulsion was almost never imposed.  Tribes are nations, and tribal membership is a voluntary compact equivalent in all meaningful respects to United States citizenship — hence, tribes cannot disenroll members for criminal behavior.  Yet Congress also severely limited tribes’ ability to punish criminal defendants by capping incarceration at one year, and crime in Indian country is a significant problem.  To allow tribes to battle crime and yet protect against cruel and unusual punishment, Congress should remove the limit on incarceration and individual tribal members can decide whether they are willing to submit to their tribe’s inherent power — and greater sentences — or voluntarily renounce their tribal citizenship.

June 13, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, June 08, 2018

ACLU brings novel lawsuit against Kansas DA for failing to disclose diversion options to defendants

Late last year, the ACLU of Kansas last year produced this report titled "Choosing Incarceration" lamenting that prosecutors in Kansas often sought incarceration over available diversion programs.  Now, as details in this press release, the ACLU has taken its complaints to court:

The American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Kansas filed a lawsuit today on behalf of a faith-based organization against a county prosecutor for failing to implement diversion programs in accordance with Kansas law and for pursuing the expensive and disproportionately harsh prosecution of individuals posing minimal community risks.

The lawsuit was filed today in the Kansas Supreme Court against Montgomery County Attorney Larry Markle. At a time when Kansas prisons have swelled beyond capacity, costing taxpayers millions of dollars, Markle and Montgomery County drastically underutilize diversion compared to the national and state average, despite the fact that diversion programs that allow defendants to seek incarceration alternatives such as treatment, community service, or restitution have proven financial and social benefits.

“These programs are essential to establish a rehabilitative rather than punitive criminal justice system,” said Somil Trivedi, staff attorney with the ACLU’s Trone Center for Justice. “Ignoring the legal requirements to provide notice to defendants of the existence of these programs, and to not discuss these options with those who qualify, is against the law. We’re taking action in Kansas to send a message to prosecutors that it’s their obligation to uphold the law and serve their community, not just rack up as many convictions as they can.”

Markle’s failure to follow Kansas diversion law negatively impacted the work the Kansas Crossroads Foundation, a faith-based organization that provides drug rehabilitation and economic development services to Wilson and Montgomery County defendants convicted of drug offenses. Since many KCF clients were likely not given the opportunity to apply for diversion, KCF has had to divert critical resources away from rehabilitation programs to conduct jail counseling sessions and help defendants comply with the terms of their probation or parole....

Following efforts in New Orleans and Orange County, California, today’s lawsuit is the third the ACLU has filed against active district attorneys since October as a part of nationwide efforts to reform prosecutorial practices nationwide.

The complain in his matter is available at this link.  

June 8, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 07, 2018

"Treatment of sex offenders depends on whether they've challenged rules"

The title of this post is the headline of this lengthy new Detroit Free Press article. I recommend the piece in full, and here is how it gets started and additional excerpts:

Eight months after the U.S. Supreme Court effectively upheld a decision saying parts of Michigan's sex offender registry law — one of the toughest in the nation — were unconstitutional, thousands of former sex offenders who thought they'd be off the registry by now, or facing less severe restrictions, have seen no changes.

The law remains in place, unchanged, with the state defending it in more than three dozen lawsuits — many of which it has already lost.  The controversy involves a ruling two years ago by the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati that said provisions enacted in 2006 and 2011 and applied to offenders convicted before then violates constitutional protections against increasing punishments after-the-fact.  Last October, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the state's challenge to that ruling, effectively upholding it.

The rules prohibit offenders — many of whom have gone years if not decades without committing any crimes — from legally living, working or even standing within 1,000 feet of a school, a regulation that many say makes it hard for them to work, or to pick up or see their kids at school, and has forced some to give up jobs and homes.  The rules also require offenders to immediately register email addresses or vehicles and report to police as often as four times a year, in some cases, for the rest of their lives.

Because the appeals court decision came in civil cases and not class action lawsuits, the state has maintained those rulings apply only to the specific plaintiffs who brought them. And with the state Legislature failing to change the law, registrants find themselves in a legal morass, with the requirements they must comply with almost wholly contingent on whether the offender has successfully gone to court.  Michigan now has the fourth-largest sex offender registry in the country, with 43,623 registrants on its database, more than the state of New York, which has 40,623.

The disparities can be wide.  One man convicted 17 years ago of eight counts of sexual contact with several girls under the age of 13 sued prosecutors, arguing that the rules keeping him on the registry — with his photo, name, address listed publicly — for life were unconstitutional.  Last November, after the Supreme Court declined to take up the 6th Circuit decision, the state Court of Appeals agreed, saying those rules no longer apply to him.

But it's different for another man convicted of touching two girls under the age of 16 while drunk 24 years ago in another state but who has had a clean record since.  Last September, as a "Tier 2" offender, he was expecting to come off the registry after nearly a quarter century. But he was abruptly told by police that his case had been reviewed and that since one of those girls was under 13, he’d stay on the list — and be listed among the worst offenders on "Tier 3" — for life.  To this day, under Michigan law, he's subject to all those restrictions from which the first man has been freed....

In Michigan, any legal certainty about what is required of thousands of sex offenders is almost nil.

While some local prosecutors — like those in Wayne and Oakland counties — no longer enforce cases involving retroactive applications of the law, it's far from certain that others are following suit. Macomb County prosecutors, for instance, declined to answer the Free Press' questions about whether they are still enforcing those restrictions. And Michigan State Police — which oversees the registry — says, legally, all restrictions remain in place.

The state’s top law enforcement official, Attorney General Bill Schuette — who is running for governor — won’t say whether the 6th Circuit Court decision should be applied statewide, his office refusing comment.

Prior related post:

June 7, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Friday, June 01, 2018

"Challenging the Punitiveness of 'New-Generation' SORN Laws"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Wayne Logan now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Sex offender registration and notification (SORN) laws have been in effect nationwide since the 1990s, and publicly available registries today contain information on hundreds of thousands of individuals.  To date, most courts, including the Supreme Court in 2003, have concluded that the laws are regulatory, not punitive, in nature, allowing them to be applied retroactively consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Recently, however, several state supreme courts, as well as the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, addressing challenges lodged against new-generation SORN laws of a considerably more onerous and expansive character, have granted relief, concluding that the laws are punitive in effect. 

This symposium contribution examines these decisions, which are distinct not only for their results, but also for the courts’ decidedly more critical scrutiny of the justifications, purposes, and efficacy of SORN laws.  The implications of the latter development in particular could well lay the groundwork for a broader challenge against the laws, including one sounding in substantive due process, which unlike ex post facto-based litigation would affect the viability of SORN vis-à-vis current and future potential registrants.

June 1, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, May 29, 2018

SCOTUS limits reach of Mandatory Victims Restitution Act in Lagos ... and talks about Fourth Amendment

The US Supreme Court handed down two opinions and a dismissal this morning, all from the criminal side of its docket.  The one sentencing decision came in Lagos v. United States, No. 16-1519 (S. Ct. May 29, 2018) (available here).  Here is hope the unanimous opinion by Justice Breyer gets started:

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 requires defendants convicted of a listed range of offenses to

“reimburse the victim for lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.” 18 U.S.C. §3663A(b)(4) (emphasis added).

We must decide whether the words “investigation” and “proceedings” are limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings, or whether they include private investigations and civil proceedings.  In our view, they are limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings.

Got that? The short Lagos opinion goes on to provide a mini-primer on federal restitution statutes, but both the issue and the opinion here ensures this ruling will not be too long remembered.

Also not to be too long remembered is a DIG (dismissed as improvidently granted) from SCOTUS today in City of Hays, Kansas v. VogtNo. 16-1495.  The only SCOTUS decision today likely to get any real attention is a Fourth Amendment ruling in Collins v. Virginia, No. 16-1027 (S. Ct. May 29, 2018) (available here).  Justice Sotomayor starts the opinion for the Court off succintly: "This case presents the question whether the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to search a vehicle parked therein. It does not."  Justice Alito dissents alone, starting this way: "The Fourth Amendment prohibits 'unreasonable' searches. What the police did in this case was entirely reasonable. The Court’s decision is not."

The merits aside, the Collins decision will really garner attention because of a lengthy concurrence by Justice Thomas.  Writing alone, he urges the Court to reconsider the reach of the exclusionary rule.  Here is how his opinion starts and ends:

I join the Court’s opinion because it correctly resolves the Fourth Amendment question in this case.  Notably, the only reason that Collins asked us to review this question is because, if he can prove a violation of the Fourth Amendment, our precedents require the Virginia courts to apply the exclusionary rule and potentially suppress the incriminating evidence against him. I write separately because I have serious doubts about this Court’s authority to impose that rule on the States.  The assumption that state courts must apply the federal exclusionary rule is legally dubious, and many jurists have complained that it encourages “distort[ions]” in substantive Fourth Amendment law, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 157 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)....

In sum, I am skeptical of this Court’s authority to impose the exclusionary rule on the States.  We have not yet revisited that question in light of our modern precedents, which reject Mapp’s essential premise that the exclusionary rule is required by the Constitution.  We should do so.

May 29, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, May 26, 2018

"Time to rethink probation and parole"

The title of this post is the headline of this recent commentary authored by Larry Krasner and Miriam Krinsky. (Kranser, as many readers surely know, is the District Attorney of Philadelphia and Krinsky is a former federal prosecutor and Executive Director of Fair and Just Prosecution.) Here are excerpts:

As longtime leaders in criminal justice, we have seen a deeply unsettling trend in the way probation and parole — sometimes called “community corrections” — have become overused and too often serve as a gateway to reincarceration based on the smallest of missteps.  That’s why we recently joined with 45 fellow prosecutors nationwide who believe that community corrections needs to be downsized and made rehabilitative, not only because that will make us safer, but because it will fortify trust in our justice system for millions of Americans.

When community corrections was founded in the 1800s, it was viewed as a highly individualized way to curb the purely punitive sentence of imprisonment with an alternative to incarceration (probation) or a release valve for those who did well during incarceration (parole).  But since 1980, it has grown far beyond what its founders ever could have imagined. The number of people on probation and parole has increased four-fold, peaking at 5 million individuals — or one out of every 53 adults — before declining slightly of late. That is twice as many people as are incarcerated in America, and more people than live in half of all U.S. states.

Often thought of as a grant of mercy or slap on the wrist, parole and probation are a deprivation of liberty and can serve as an unnecessary trip wire back into incarceration. Four out of 10 people entering our prisons and jails were on parole or probation at the time of their reincarceration.  Often that stay behind bars is not for a new arrest, but simply for violating a technical condition of release like missing appointments or drug use....

Pennsylvania has the highest incarceration rate in the Northeast, and the third-highest community corrections rate in the country. The number and rate of people supervised by parole in Pennsylvania is the highest in the nation — three times the national average.  An astonishing one out of 22 Philadelphians is being supervised by probation or parole....

Several states have tried to reduce both the footprint and harmful outcomes of these practices.  When Arizona gave people “earned discharge” time off their probation terms, the state not only reduced probation violations by 29 percent, but achieved a 21 percent decline in arrests of people on probation, realizing $392 million in averted costs.  When Louisiana capped the amount of time someone could receive for technical violations at between 15 and 45 days, there was a 22 percent decline in returns to incarceration for new arrests, saving over 2,000 beds and $17 million.

Pennsylvania State Sen. Anthony Williams and New York Assembly Member Walter Mosely have filed legislation in their respective states to address this issue.  These proposed reforms would shorten probation and parole terms, grant people 30 days of earned discharge time for every 30 days of success under supervision, and cap the amount of time someone could receive for a technical violation.

These are the kinds of sensible policy changes needed to restore faith in our justice system, reduce the overly expansive scope of community corrections, focus assistance on those people most in need, reward people for good performance, and overall, increase public safety and rehabilitation.  We hope that prosecutors around the nation will rally around the need for reform and use their influence to help chart a more positive pathway for all members of our community.

May 26, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, May 21, 2018

"Sex offender registry: More harm than good?"

The title of this post is the headline of this lengthy report appearing in The Connecticut Mirror. The piece is focused mostly on the history of, and debate over, the sex offender registry in The Constitution State, but much of the discussion has a universal quality to it.  Here is how it gets started:

In the 1990s, in response to a number of horrific and highly publicized crimes against children, states and the federal government created stringent penalties for sex offenders, notably registries where offenders’ names and addresses are available to the public.  But now critics across the country are demanding review and revision of these policies, saying they are based on false assumptions, are a waste of money and do more harm than good.

The registries and related policies “are absolutely and fundamentally flawed. They do nothing to support prevention, are not a deterrent and do nothing for people who have survived sexual violence,” said Prof. Alissa Ackerman of California State University Fullerton, a criminologist and national expert on the treatment of sex offenders.

In 2015 the Connecticut Sentencing Commission, at the behest of the General Assembly, began a lengthy examination of Connecticut’s “system of assessment, management, treatment, and sentencing of sex offenders.”  After a two-year study, the commission recommended changing the state’s public registry from one based on the offense — commit most sex-related crimes and you go on the registry — to one based on the risk an offender poses to the community, as determined by a new, eight-member Sex Offender Registration Board.  Individuals found to be low-risk — and some adjudged moderate-risk — would be on a registry only available to law enforcement personnel.

The proposal was crystalized into a bill introduced during the immediate past session of the General Assembly, though it failed to make it out of the Judiciary Committee.

State Sen. Paul Doyle, co-chair of the committee, said the complexity and emotional nature of the issue made it more appropriate for the longer session next year. “We never got to the merits. Leadership was not prepared to deal with it in a short session.” He said he personally would have had to do more research before deciding how to vote.

In a related matter, the nonprofit Connecticut for One Standard of Justice, which advocates for the civil rights of sex offenders, filed a federal lawsuit on April 4 seeking to overturn a Windsor Locks ordinance which bars persons on the sex offender registry from most public places in town. The town’s “child safety zones” include a “park, school, library, playground, recreation center, bathing beach, swimming pool or wading pool, gymnasium, sports field, or sports facility” either owned or leased by the town. The suit claims banning a group of people from these facilities is unconstitutional....

The registry and laws such as child protection zones are based on a set of assumptions that research indicates are highly questionable or outright false. The Sentencing Commission’s 204-page report calls them “myths.”  They include:

  • Nearly all sex offenders reoffend.
  • Treatment does not work.
  • The concept of “stranger danger” — that most sexual assaults are the work of people unknown to the victims.

“Research does not support these myths, but there is research to suggest that such policies may ultimately be counterproductive,” the commission’s report says.

May 21, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Thursday, May 17, 2018

"How should we deal with wrongdoing? And you can’t say ‘prison.’"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new Washington Post commentary authored by Danielle Allen. I recommend the full piece, and here are excerpts:

How should a kid like Michael [involved in multiple armed robberies at age 15] be sentenced? How, more generally, should we respond to wrongdoing? Here’s my challenge to you: In my thought experiment, you can’t answer “prison.”

Given that constraint, what punishment should Michael receive? Here are our goals: We want to respond to wrongdoing so as to ensure that victims are made whole, that society is made whole, and that the wrongdoer, too, becomes whole and, having paid recompense, is prepared to contribute productively to society.

Does your mind draw a blank? If so, you are like most of us, accustomed to a system that thinks incarceration is the only way to respond to wrongdoing.

In the United States, 70 percent of our criminal sanctions consist of incarceration.  That’s why it’s all we can think of. But a world that operates without an extensive reliance on prison is not a utopia; it is only a plane ride away.  In Germany, incarceration is used for 6 percent of sanctions; in the Netherlands, it’s 10 percent, according to a 2013 Vera Institute report comparing our criminal-justice system with theirs.

Germany and the Netherlands rely predominantly on fines, linked to the offender’s ability to pay, and “transactions” or community sanctions — for instance, work orders that benefit the community, or training orders, or a combination. Halfway houses connect residential oversight with supervised work opportunities, which can be connected to paying restitution to victims and the community.  The penal systems are built around the principles of rehabilitation, re-socialization and “association.”  This is the idea that a criminal sanction is more likely to result in a wrongdoer’s successful reentry to society if it works to strengthen, not damage, the wrongdoer’s positive connections to family and community....

Currently, two criminal-justice-reform strategies are moving through Congress. Last fall, Sens. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) and Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) introduced the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act.  The act tackles the problem of mandatory minimums and seeks to “improve fairness in sentencing of low-level, nonviolent offenders,” so as to permit law enforcement to focus on “violent offenders, major drug traffickers and criminal masterminds.” This month, Sens. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), alongside Reps. Douglas A. Collins (R-Ga.) and Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.), introduced a prison reform bill called the First Step Act.  This bill would offer individualized recidivism-reduction plans to all people incarcerated in federal prisons, and increase access to vocational training and educational support, as well as substance-abuse and mental-health resources. The bill would also introduce halfway houses or home confinement for the final phase of incarceration.

These bills have wrongly been cast as competitors.  If we are to undo mass incarceration, we have to envision viable alternatives to incarceration.  By making halfway houses and rehabilitative strategies central to our sanctioning system, the First Step Act would help the American public see new possibilities.  It could thereby lay the foundation for true transformation of sentencing.

Policymakers too often forget that three-quarters of their work should be winning the hearts and minds of the public.  To win sustainable, unwavering, widespread support for meaningful sentencing reform, we have to show that strategies of rehabilitation and restorative justice work.  Lawmakers should embrace the First Step Act as a necessary part of painting that new picture.  The Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act would benefit from our collective ability to imagine alternatives to incarceration.  

May 17, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (15)

Wednesday, May 16, 2018

Encouraging findings from big study of 16 prosecutor-led diversion programs in 11 jurisdictions

I saw today a big report from a big National Institute of Justice study on the topic of diversion programs.  This big report has this full title: "NIJ’s Multisite Evaluation of Prosecutor-Led Diversion Programs Strategies, Impacts, and Cost-Effectiveness."  And here is part of its executive summary:

In recent years, a growing number of prosecutors have established pretrial diversion programs, either pre-filing—before charges are filed with the court—or post-filing—after the court process begins but before a disposition. Participating defendants must complete assigned treatment, services, or other diversion requirements. If they do, the charges are typically dismissed. With funding from the National Institute of Justice, the current study examined 16 prosecutor-led diversion programs in 11 jurisdictions across the country and conducted impact evaluations of five programs and cost evaluations of four programs....

Case Outcomes, Recidivism, and Cost

  • Case Outcomes: All five programs participating in impact evaluations (two in Cook County, two in Milwaukee, and one in Chittenden County, VT) reduced the likelihood of conviction — often by a sizable magnitude.  All five programs also reduced the likelihood of a jail sentence (significant in four and approaching significance in the fifth program).

  • Re-Arrest: Four of five programs reduced the likelihood of re-arrest at two years from program enrollment (with at least one statistically significant finding for three programs and at least one finding approaching significance in the fourth).  The fifth site did not change re-arrest outcomes.

  • Cost: All four programs whose investment costs were examined (two in Cook County and one each in Chittenden and San Francisco) produced sizable cost and resource savings.  Not surprisingly, savings were greatest in the two pre-filing programs examined, which do not entail any court processing for program completers.  All three programs whose output costs were examined (i.e., omitting the San Francisco site) also produced output savings, mainly stemming from less use of probation and jail sentences.

Conclusions

There were a number of important study limitations, including a focus on 16 high-volume diversion programs mainly located in large jurisdictions, a smaller number of study sites for the impact and cost evaluations, and limitations in the scope and quality of quantitative data available in some of the impact sites.  Understanding these limitations, we generally found that today’s prosecutor-led diversion programs pursue a wide range of goals, not limited to rehabilitation and recidivism reduction.  We also found that these programs serve a mix of target populations — including felonies as well as misdemeanors and, in virtually all programs we examined, including defendants with a prior criminal record.  Although it bears noting that we evaluated program impacts in a limited number of sites, meaning that our findings may not be generalizable to other sites and programs that we did not study, our research yielded positive results. Across five programs in three sites, diversion participants benefited from a reduced likelihood of conviction and incarceration; and in four of the five programs, pretrial diversion participation led to reduced re-arrest rates.  In addition, in all four programs where a cost evaluation was conducted, diversion cases involved a lesser resource investment than similar comparison cases.

May 16, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Data on sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, May 05, 2018

Scrutinizing sex offender civil commitment schemes

Investigative reporter Barbara Koeppel has this extensive article in The Washington Spectator under the full headline "Sex Crimes and Criminal Justice: Formerly incarcerated sex offenders say civil commitment programs deny proper rehabilitation."  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts from the start and end of the article:

Since the 1990s, 20 states and the District of Columbia have passed laws that direct the attorneys general in these jurisdictions to appoint professionals to evaluate whether sex offenders who have served their time have a mental abnormality or illness that would make them likely to re-offend.  If the decision is yes, the men are re-incarcerated—not for past crimes but for ones they might yet commit — in prisonlike facilities with barbed wire, cells, guards, and watch towers. While institutionalized, they receive therapy that, theoretically, will help them control their sexual impulses.

The practice is known as civil commitment.... Supporters of the process argue it protects the public.  Critics, however, such as Dr. Richard Wollert, a psychologist at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, disagree. He says the facts simply don’t support it: “I’ve never seen data that show the 20 states with civil commitment laws have lower rates of sex offenses or re-offenses than the 30 states that don’t.”  Similarly, Dr. Fred Berlin, a psychologist who runs sex offender outpatient programs at Johns Hopkins Hospital, says, “They’re really a ruse to not put the men back in society.” The sex offenses range from obscene phone calls, lewd behavior in public, and sex with underage partners, all the way up to rape and murder.

Organizations and professionals familiar with the abuses of civil commitment are its harshest critics.  The American Psychiatric Association told its members to “vigorously oppose” it. Two judges, from Minnesota and Missouri, found the laws “punitive and unconstitutional.”  Tapatha Strickler, a clinical psychologist who worked at the civil commitment facility in Larned, Kansas, calls it “an abomination.”  But the practice persists at huge cost to individuals and taxpayers....

The men I interviewed frankly admitted to their offenses, but they asked to be treated as others who commit crimes and not be re-incarcerated after they serve their prison sentences.  Also, since most state and federal prisons run mental health therapy programs, the men said they’d already participated in them throughout their original sentences — which could be 20 or 25 years — yet were made to start from scratch in the civil commitment facilities.

Today, about 5,400 men are held in civil commitment. [Lawyer Donald] Anderson told me, “It’s hard to wrap my head around it.  I sympathize greatly with the men’s victims and their families because I have two daughters and I understand people’s fears.  But I’ve dealt with these guys for years and I’m very fond of some of them.  Their look of being utterly beaten, knowing they’ll be here until they die, is very sad.  The program is inhumane.”

May 5, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (16)

Monday, April 30, 2018

New York Court of Appeals upholds most serious sex offender registration despite defendant's acquittal on most serious charges

Over at Reason, Jacob Sullum has this effective new review of a notable example of "acquitted conduct" being used to justify a severe collateral consequence.  The posting's full headline provides the basic story: "A Jury Rejected the Charges, but He Still Has to Register As a Sex Offender for Life: New York's highest court says accusations can be considered for registration purposes even when the defendant was acquitted." Here are some of the particulars:

Quinn Britton's 13-year-old niece, identified in court documents as A.B., accused him of raping her during a Thanksgiving Day visit to her grandmother's home in Brooklyn, where her uncle lived, when she was 11. Britton denied any inappropriate behavior, and his mother said A.B. had spent the whole evening watching TV in the living room with her.... The jurors struggled to make sense of these conflicting accounts.  Since there was no physical evidence, the case came down to a question of whether to believe A.B. or Britton. During three days of deliberations, the jurors sent the judge three notes indicating that they were deadlocked. Each time he told them to keep deliberating.

Finally the jurors emerged with a verdict that seemed to split the difference between those inclined to believe Britton and those inclined to believe A.B.  They found Britton guilty of second-degree sexual abuse, a misdemeanor, based on the allegation that he kissed A.B.'s breasts, but not guilty of three felonies: first-degree rape, based on the allegation of penetrative sex, and two counts of a first-degree sexual act, based on allegations that he performed oral sex on the girl and forced her to perform oral sex on him.

During a post-trial hearing, the judge nevertheless assumed that Britton had committed the felonies and therefore assigned him to risk level two under New York's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), which triggers lifetime registration. Had the judge considered just the crime of which Britton was convicted, he would have been assigned to risk level one, which requires registration for 10 years.

In a 6-to-1 ruling last week, the New York Court of Appeals upheld Britton's classification, noting that it was supposed to be based on "clear and convincing evidence," a less demanding standard than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for a criminal conviction.  It is possible, in other words, for an alleged crime to figure in a defendant's risk level even when there is not enough evidence for a guilty verdict.

Writing in dissent, Judge Jenny Rivera charges her colleagues with improperly applying the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, which requires "a high degree of probability" that an allegation is true. A.B.'s testimony should not be treated as reliable under SORA, Rivera argues, because the jury did not find it credible.

April 30, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5)

Wednesday, April 25, 2018

New Jersey Supreme Court finds unconstitutional requiring juveniles to be subject to lifetime sex-offender registration

The Supreme Court of New Jersey yesterday handed down a lengthy unanimous opinion in Interest of C.K., No. A-15-16 (N.J. April 24, 2018) (available here) declaring that the state's sex-offender registry law is unconstitutional as applied to some juvenile offenders. Here is how the opinion begins:

Juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses are barred for life from seeking relief from the registration and community notification provisions of Megan’s Law. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, -19; N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g).  That categorical lifetime bar cannot be lifted, even when the juvenile becomes an adult and poses no public safety risk, is fully rehabilitated, and is a fully productive member of society.  Defendant C.K. was adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses committed more than two decades ago and now challenges the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g)’s permanent lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles.

Subsection (f) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 subjects all sex offenders, including juveniles, to presumptive lifetime registration and notification requirements.  Unlike subsection (g), however, subsection (f) allows a registrant to seek relief from those requirements fifteen years after his juvenile adjudication, provided he has been offense-free and is “not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.”  Subsection (g) imposes an irrebuttable presumption that juveniles, such as defendant, are irredeemable, even when they no longer pose a public safety risk and are fully rehabilitated.

The record in this case reveals what is commonly known about juveniles -- that their emotional, mental, and judgmental capacities are still developing and that their immaturity makes them more susceptible to act impulsively and rashly without consideration of the long-term consequences of their conduct.  See State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017).  The record also supports the conclusion that juveniles adjudicated delinquent of committing sex offenses, such as C.K., who have been offense-free for many years and assessed not likely to reoffend, pose little risk to the public. Indeed, categorical lifetime notification and registration requirements may impede a juvenile’s rehabilitative efforts and stunt his ability to become a healthy and integrated adult member of society.

We conclude that subsection (g)’s lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles violate the substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. Permanently barring juveniles who have committed certain sex offenses from petitioning for relief from the Megan’s Law requirements bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.  In the absence of subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) provides the original safeguard incorporated into Megan’s Law: no juvenile adjudicated delinquent will be released from his registration and notification requirements unless a Superior Court judge is persuaded that he has been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year look-back period.

Defendant may apply for termination from the Megan’s Law requirements fifteen years from the date of his juvenile adjudication, and be relieved of those requirements provided he meets the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).

April 25, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, April 21, 2018

"Techno-Policing"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting new piece authored by I. Bennett Capers now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

In July 2017, the New York Times reported that Three Square Market, a Wisconsin based technology company, was asking its employees to have a microchip injected between their thumb and index finger.  More than half of the employees consented to the implant, which would function as a type of swipe card.  As one employee put it, “In the next five to 10 years, this is going to be something that isn’t scoffed at so much, or is more normal.  So I like to jump on the bandwagon with these kind of things early, just to say that I have it.”

What might the implanting of microchips portend for criminal justice issues?  Might we one day implant chips in convicted felons, or arrestees?  Or if not all arrestees, perhaps those released on bail?  Indeed, at a time when many scholars and legislators are rethinking bail, might the availability of removable chips strengthen the argument against pretrial detention, and against money bail?  And what are the implications for sentencing, especially algorithmic risk-based sentencing?  Or perhaps a closer fit, what are the implications for releasing defendants who have completed their sentences and are eligible for parole? 

At a time when the Court has given its blessing to civil commitment for sex offenders, how might the availability of microchips to monitor the coming and going of individuals — like a wireless fence — change the analysis?  Finally, and perhaps most central to this essay, what are the possibilities when we couple the availability of microchips with access to Big Data?  This short essay, written for the “Big Data and Policing” symposium issue of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, begins a conversation about these and other questions.

April 21, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 18, 2018

SCOTUS examining reach of restitution awards under MVRA in Lagos v. United States 

A somewhat non-traditional sentencing issue is the subject of Supreme Court oral argument this morning.  SCOTUSblog has this argument preview authored by Cortney Lollar which started and ends this way:

Next week, the Supreme Court has another opportunity to consider the scope of criminal restitution. Lagos v. United States raises the question of whether private investigation costs and a victim’s attorney’s fees are considered compensable losses under 18 U.S.C. §3663A, the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act....

In recent years, both Congress and the Supreme Court have taken an increasingly expansive approach toward criminal restitution.  Although the MVRA’s language is undoubtedly distinct from that in other restitution statutes, the court may yet again take this opportunity to interpret the language capaciously, requiring a defendant to reimburse increasingly attenuated costs through restitution.

April 18, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)