Monday, December 26, 2011
"Mom of 4 reflects on first year in prison for $31 pot sale"
The title of this post is the headline of this new article in the Tusla World, which provides an update on a state drug sentencing story that I have previously covered. Here are excerpts from the interesting piece:
[Patricia] Spottedcrow, 26, was arrested and charged for selling $31 in marijuana to a police informant in December 2009 and January 2010. [Her mother, Delita] Starr, 51, was also charged. Because children were in the home, a charge of possession of a dangerous substance in the presence of a minor was added.
In blind pleas before a judge, Spottedcrow received a 12-year sentence and her mother received a 30-year suspended sentence. Neither had prior criminal convictions. The judge sentencing the two said she allowed Starr to avoid prison so she could care for Spottedcrow's children.
When Spottedcrow was booked, after her sentence was handed down, marijuana was found in the jacket she was wearing. She pleaded guilty to that additional charge and was sentenced to two years running concurrent with the previous sentence.
After her story was published in the Tulsa World, a groundswell of support grew. Supporters expressed concern with possible racial bias, unequal punishment among crimes, women in prison, effects on children of incarcerated parents and extreme sentences for drug offenses.
Oklahoma City attorney Josh Welch has been donating his services to fight what he calls an inequitable punishment. In October, a Kingfisher County judge took four years off her sentence. The judge issued an order rather than allow her an appearance in court. Her attorney and supporters believe it was to avoid the crowd expected to be at the courthouse that day.
Welch said he plans to file for post-conviction relief, alleging the original attorney was ineffective and had a conflict in representing Spottedcrow and her mother. He plans to make the filing in early January and submit an early parole packet at the same time. "We are grateful to get four years taken off her sentence but still believe the sentence is unjust and excessive," Welch said....
"The first eight months were a blur," Spottedcrow said. "I just cried a lot. It's like I woke up a couple of months ago." Her daily schedule starts with breakfast at 5:30 a.m., followed by her job in the laundry. At 4:30 p.m., she is released and goes to the gym, followed by dinner and then church at 7 p.m. "You have to try and keep your mind busy," she said. "It's easy to get sad, depressed and stuck in your own head in here."
Prison is no picnic, even at a minimum-security campus like Eddie Warrior, she said. "I took for granted using the bathroom by myself, what clothes you can wear and being able to pick up and go to the store when you want," Spottedcrow said. "I hate not being able to use your own shampoo and you are limited to spending $10 a month (in the commissary)."
But it's her kids taking up most of her thoughts. "I was there every day taking of care of them before this," she said. "I did everything from going to football games and PTA."
While in prison, Spottedcrow has taken parenting classes, finished her GED and participates in a grief/loss recovery program, a behavior course, Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous and a faith-based program. She is on a waiting list to begin higher education and Career Tech classes. "The life I was living before, that's over," Spottedcrow said. "I'm not playing with my life anymore. I would never chance this again for my children."
Spottedcrow never denied she smoked pot but said she was never a drug dealer or ever used or sold marijuana in front of her children. "I got myself in this situation, and I'm not saying I shouldn't be punished," she said. "But I think this is a little excessive, especially looking at other cases from my county. And I'm sleeping next to people who have killed people, and they have less time than me. There are days I really can't believe I'm in prison."
In prison, she has had three misconducts: one for bartering when she gave an inmate cigarettes, one for having contraband when cookies were found in her locker without a receipt and another for aiding and abetting when she did not tell authorities a woman put bleach in the laundry area. "I have a big heart," she said. "When I see someone in need, like for food, I want to help if I can. But you can get a misconduct in here for the littlest things."...
At the Kingfisher home, it's been a tough existence and one that is relying on the generosity and help of others. Spottedcrow's oldest child has been acting out since her incarceration.
"He's in trouble for stealing, and his mouth is real swift and sharp," Starr said. "He blames me a lot for what happened to his mother. The girls want to cry a lot. They don't like to listen to me, saying, 'You're not my mother.' We struggle every day."
Related prior posts on Spottedcrow's crime and punishment:
- "How $31 of pot gave mom a 10-year-prison sentence"
- "Mom who sold $31 in pot seeks reduction to 12-year sentence"
December 26, 2011 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (17) | TrackBack
Friday, September 16, 2011
Eighth Circuit panel unanimously affirms Rubashkin federal convictions and lengthy prison sentence
The Eighth Circuit has handed down an opinion today in US v. Rubashkin, No. 10-2487 (8th Cir. Sept. 16, 2011) (available here), a high-profile white-collar case out of the heartland involving financial frauds at a kosher meat-packing plant. The panel has unanimously affirmed the Sholom Rubashkin's conviction and sentence; I have followed this case closely, in part because I helped file an amicus brief complaining about what I considered to be an unreasonable of 27-year (within-guideline) federal prison sentence for the defendant's offense conduct.
Though disappointed with the ruling here, I am not especially surprised given the Eighth Circuit's history in sentencing appeals. (That history, along with the frequency with which the Supreme Court has reviewed and reversed the Eighth Circuit's work since Booker, might well mean this case will get more appellate attention in the future). Here is an excerpt of the Rubashkin panel's sentencing discussion:
Rubashkin argues that his 324 month sentence was substantively unreasonable given his age, nonviolence, lack of criminal history, unlikelihood of recidivism, family obligations, and the principal motives for his acts,. We review the imposition of a sentence under "a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." United States v. Hayes, 518 F.3d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 41). Sentences within the guideline range are presumed to be substantively reasonable. United States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2008).
Not only was Rubashkin's sentence of 324 months within the guideline range, it was at the low end of it. Rubashkin argues that because of his past charitable acts and his family obligations he should have been granted a downward departure. These are the very characteristics that the district court properly took into account when considering the § 3353(a) factors. The court weighed Rubashkin's past charitable acts, nonviolence, and the needs of his family against his involvement in multiple fraudulent schemes and the millions of dollars in damage they caused. The cases Rubashkin cites in favor of his unreasonableness argument illustrate instances where downward departures based on charity or family needs have been affirmed. Nothing requires a sentencing court to depart on such grounds. Under all the circumstances the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in imposing a 324 month sentence.
Related posts on the Rubashkin case:
- "More Former AGs Question Sentence Sought in Bank Fraud Case"
- Can and should religious considerations influence bail decisions?
- Federal sentencing hearing starting in high-profile Rubashkin white-collar case
- Federal prosecutors now seeking 25-year prison term for Rubashkin
- Kosher plant chief Sholom Rubashkin sentenced to 27 years imprisonment
- An appellate amicus brief in the Rubashkin case on sentencing issues
September 16, 2011 in Booker in the Circuits, Examples of "over-punishment", White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Thursday, December 02, 2010
"'Perfect Storm of Injustice'? N.J. Man Serving 7 Years for Guns He Legally Owned"
The title of this post is the headline of this notable story via ABC News. Here are some of the details, which appears to involve yet another example of mandatory minimum sentencing terms producing another example of excessive over-punishment:
Brian Aitken, 25, a successful media consultant, had been in the process of selling his home in Colorado and moving to a suburban New Jersey apartment to be closer to his son, 2. But on the afternoon of Jan. 3, 2009, the stress of a recent divorce and messy cross-country move caused him to crack. Aitken stormed out of his parent's suburban home in Mount Laurel, N.J., hopped into his car filled with belongings and set out on a drive to cool off.
Aitken's mother, a social worker trained to be sensitive to suicidal indicators, instinctively dialed 911 but abruptly hung up, second-guessing her reaction. But police tracked the call, came to the Aitken's home and greeted Brian when he returned to make sure he was OK. Then, they asked to search his car.
Buried in the trunk, beneath piles of clothes and boxes of dishes, was a black duffle bag holding a boot box containing two handguns; "unloaded, disassembled, cleaned and wrapped in a cloth," his father said. There were also several large-capacity magazines and cartons of hollow-point bullets.
Aitken had legally purchased the guns at a Denver sporting goods store two years earlier, he said. But transporting a gun without a special permit or in a handful of exempt situations is illegal in New Jersey, giving officers no choice but to arrest Aitken and charge him with a crime. The magazines and bullets are also illegal in the state, experts said....
"For quite some time I was pretty confident as soon as intelligent people with logical minds took a look at what happened they might slap him with a fine or something," Aitken's father Larry said. "When the prosecutor came down with an indictment, I was dumbfounded."
But after a two and a half day trial in August, a jury convicted Aitken of the charges and a judge sentenced him to 7 years in prison. So family and friends have launched a grassroots campaign to set him free, even appealing to New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie for a pardon or reprieve....
[T]he judge in the case did not allow the jury to consider the moving exemption during the trail, ruling that no evidence was presented that Aitken was actually moving at the time the guns were found. Aitken did not testify in the trial.
"The defendant's attorneys presented evidence that his house was for sale and that at the time of arrest he was travelling from one residence in New Jersey to another," Joel Bewley, a spokesman for the Burlington County Prosecutor's Office, told ABC News.... "This sentence was entirely and statutorily mandated upon this conviction," Bewley said.
December 2, 2010 in Examples of "over-punishment", Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
NY Times op-ed spotlights extreme jury sentences in Mississippi
Today's New York Times includes this remarkable op-ed by Bob Herbert concerning a pair of extreme sentences in Mississippi. The piece is headlined "So Utterly Inhumane, and here are excerpts:
You have to believe that somebody really had it in for the Scott sisters, Jamie and Gladys. They have always insisted that they had nothing to do with a robbery that occurred near the small town of Forest, Miss., on Christmas Eve in 1993. It was not the kind of crime to cause a stir. No one was hurt and perhaps $11 was taken.
Jamie was 21 at the time and Gladys just 19. But what has happened to them takes your breath away. They were convicted by a jury and handed the most draconian sentences imaginable — short of the death penalty. Each was sentenced to two consecutive life terms in state prison, and they have been imprisoned ever since. Jamie is now 38 and seriously ill. Both of her kidneys have failed. Gladys is 36....
The authorities did not even argue that the Scott sisters had committed the robbery. They were accused of luring two men into a trap, in which the men had their wallets taken by acquaintances of the sisters, one of whom had a shotgun.
It was a serious crime. But the case against the sisters was extremely shaky. In any event, even if they were guilty, the punishment is so wildly out of proportion to the offense that it should not be allowed to stand.
Three teenagers pleaded guilty to robbing the men. They ranged in age from 14 to 18. And in their initial statements to investigators, they did not implicate the Scott sisters. But a plea deal was arranged in which the teens were required to swear that the women were involved, and two of the teens were obliged, as part of the deal, to testify against the sisters in court.... The teens were sentenced to eight years in prison each, and they were released after serving just two years.
This is a case that should be repugnant to anyone with the slightest interest in justice. The right thing to do at this point is to get the sisters out of prison as quickly as possible and ensure that Jamie gets proper medical treatment.
A number of people have taken up the sisters’ cause, including Ben Jealous, the president of the N.A.A.C.P., who is trying to help secure a pardon from Gov. Haley Barbour of Mississippi. “It makes you sick to think that this sort of thing can happen,” he said. “That these women should be kept in prison until they die — well, that’s just so utterly inhumane.”
I have no idea why the authorities were so dead set on implicating the Scott sisters in the crime and sending them away for life, while letting the teens who unquestionably committed the robbery get off with much lighter sentences.
Life sentences for robbery can only be imposed by juries in Mississippi, but it is extremely rare for that sentencing option to even be included in the instructions given to jurors. It’s fair to think, in other words, that there would have to be some extraordinary reason for prosecutors and the court to offer such a draconian possibility to a jury....
The reason for giving the jury the option of imposing life sentences in this case escapes me. Even the original prosecutor, Ken Turner, who is now retired and who believes the sisters were guilty, has said that he thinks it would be “appropriate” to offer them relief from their extreme sentences. He told The Clarion-Ledger in Jackson, Miss., “It was not a particularly egregious case.”
The appeals process for the women has long since been exhausted. It is up to Governor Barbour, who is considering petitions on the sisters’ behalf, to do the humane thing. A pardon or commutation of sentence — some form of relief that would release Jamie and Gladys Scott from the hideous shackles of a lifetime in prison — is not just desirable, it’s absolutely essential.
October 12, 2010 in Clemency and Pardons, Examples of "over-punishment", Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack
Sunday, May 23, 2010
Terrific examination of prosecutorial discretion, politics and other three-strikes realities in California
Today's New York Times magazine has this must-read article by Emily Bazelon headlined "Arguing Three Strikes." Here are just a few extended excerpts that make the piece so very interesting and effective and telling:In 2000, ... Steve Cooley became the district attorney for Los Angeles County. Cooley is a Republican career prosecutor, but he campaigned against the excesses of three strikes. “Fix it or lose it,” he says of the law. In 2005, Cooley ordered a review of cases, to identify three-strikes inmates who had not committed violent crimes and whose life sentences a judge might deem worthy of second looks. His staff came up with a list of more than 60 names....
Twenty-five other states have passed three-strikes laws, but only California punishes minor crimes with the penalty of a life sentence. About 3,700 prisoners in the state are serving life for a third strike that was neither violent nor serious, according to the legal definition. That’s more than 40 percent of the total third-strike population of about 8,500. Technically, these offenders are eligible for parole after 20 years, but at the moment, the state parole board rarely releases any prisoner early....
Now California is in the midst of fiscal calamity. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, who had been a judge in California, recently bemoaned state sentencing and spending on prisons. In an address at Pepperdine University, he said that “the three-strikes law sponsor is the correctional officers’ union, and that is sick!” And yet Schwarzenegger has vowed not to touch the law. Meg Whitman and Jerry Brown, the leading Republican and Democratic contenders to succeed him in November, are just as unbending....
Cooley ran for D.A. on a platform of restrained three-strikes enforcement, calling the law “a necessary weapon, one that must be used with precision and not in a scatter-gun fashion.” In office, he turned his critique into policy.... The presumption is that prosecutors ask for a life sentence only if a third-strike crime is violent or serious. Petty thieves and most drug offenders are presumed to merit a double sentence, the penalty for a second strike, unless their previous record includes a hard-core crime like murder, armed robbery, sexual assault or possession of large quantities of drugs. During Cooley’s first year in office, three-strikes convictions in Los Angeles County triggering life sentences dropped 39 percent. No other prosecutor’s office in California has a written policy like Cooley’s, though a couple of D.A.’s informally exercise similar discretion....
[I]n 2006, he offered up his own bill, which tracked his policy as D.A., taking minor drug crimes and petty theft off the list of three-strikes offenses unless one of the first two strikes involved a crime that Cooley considers hard-core. For staking out even this middle ground, Cooley became prosecutor non grata among his fellow D.A.’s. No district attorney, not even the most liberal, supported his bill, and it died in Senate committee.
Cooley could once again pay a price for his three-strikes record. This spring, he announced his candidacy for California attorney general. His Republican rivals have hammered him for his moderate stance. “He’s acting as an enabler for habitual offenders,” State Senator Tom Harman told me. “I think that’s wrong. I want to put them in prison.” The race has developed into a litmus test: for 15 years, no serious candidate for major statewide office has dared to criticize three strikes. If Cooley makes it through his party’s primary on June 8 — and especially if he goes on to win in November — the law will no longer seem untouchable. If he loses, three strikes will be all the more difficult to dislodge....
While 694 convicted murderers sit on the state’s death row, only 13 have been executed since the Supreme Court allowed for reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976. The 3,700 nonviolent, nonserious three-strikers serving life in California outnumber the 3,263 death-row inmates nationwide.
By working with three-strikers, [lawyer Michael] Romano is trying to highlight the plight of criminals he sees as more pathetic than heinous. “I think about explaining to my kids what I do, and I see no moral ambiguity,” Romano says about his work. Capital defendants, of course, deserve representation, he explains. “But there are other lives to be saved, of people who haven’t done horrible things, who haven’t actually hurt anyone.”
In practical terms, Romano points out, the difference between being convicted of capital murder and a small-time third strike is this: a murderer is entitled to a far greater share of legal resources. California spends at least $300,000 on the defense side of a capital murder trial. The courts give extra scrutiny to each capital appeal that comes before them. And it’s only in death-penalty cases that the state pays lawyers to file a writ of habeas corpus, the route to challenging a conviction once direct appeal has been exhausted.
A three-strikes case, by contrast, is just one more file in the stack on a public defender’s desk and a judge’s docket. Romano has a client whose appellate lawyer cut and pasted into her brief for him the more serious criminal history of another man — incorrectly telling the judges that her client was far more violent when he actually was.
If Steve Cooley wins the Republican primary for attorney general, on almost every issue — most visibly the death penalty — he’ll run to the right of his probable Democratic opponent, the San Francisco district attorney Kamala Harris. But on three strikes, Cooley will run to Harris’s left. (She didn’t support his 2006 proposal, though she is one of the prosecutors who, on a case-by-case basis, refrains from seeking a life sentence for some nonviolent three-strikers.)...
Cooley is couching his support for amending three strikes statewide more carefully during campaign season. “Any changes to the three-strikes law will have to be in the context of overall prison reform,” he told me in March. At the same time, Romano and Families to Amend California’s Three Strikes, the group that fought for Proposition 66, are increasingly interested in using Cooley’s Los Angeles policy as the basis for a new statewide reform effort in 2012, because it suggests a way to reserve life sentences for the three-strikers who have committed crimes of violence.
The statistic I have highlighted above, and the astute subsequent discussion of how many more legal resources are devoted to the most heinous murderers in California and elsewhere, reinforces my own strong belief (which I have expressed in this Harvard Law & Policy Review article and elsewhere) that progressives seriously interested in serious sentencing reforms must stop obsessing about the death penalty and should start obsessing about life sentences.
Put simply, in California and throughout the nation, there are lots of legal and social and political forces that now help ensure that few "lesser" murderers ever end up on death row. Indeed, as the plea deals for the Green River Killer and repeat sex offender killer John Allen Gardner highlight, all but the most ardent death penalty abolitionists should probably be most concerned about the worst murderers often being able to avoid ending up on death row.
In sharp contrast, there are lots of legal and social and political forces that now help ensure that many "lesser" offenders end up facing actual or functional life sentences. Consider these examples from just the last few weeks: Michelle Lyn Taylor recently got a life sentence in Nevada for forcing a teenage boy to touch her breasts; Sholom Rubashkin had federal prosecutors urging a life sentence for various fraud offenses; Enrique Prieto got a life sentence in Texas for assaulting an elderly man.
As this great NYTimes article spotlights, prosecutors always can and often will mitigate the harshest realities of life sentencing statutes through the exercise of their charging and bargaining discretion. But, for many reasons, I do not think the Framers of our Constitution would have been too pleased with the notion that the only protection that many lesser offenders may have from a lifetime loss of human liberty is merely the unregulated and unexplained discretionary judgment of an executive branch prosecutor.
May 23, 2010 in Death Penalty Reforms, Examples of "over-punishment", Offense Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
"FAMM Condemns Mandatory Life Sentence for NV Woman"
The title of this post is the heading of this new press release from the folks at Families Against Mandatory Minimums in response the the remarkable Nevada sentencing story discussed in this prior post. Here is an excerpt from the press release:According to published news reports, a jury convicted Ms. Taylor, 34, of lewdness with a minor under 14 for forcing a 13-year-old boy to touch her breast through her clothing and soliciting him for sex. Conviction for lewdness with a minor under 14 carries a mandatory life sentence in Nevada with parole eligibility after 10 years.
"Based on what we've learned so far, we believe the life sentence handed to Ms. Taylor is a total travesty of justice," said Julie Stewart, FAMM founder and president. "FAMM does not condone criminal behavior, especially where a minor is the victim, but no reasonable person can believe that the punishment fits the crime in this case. Life sentences are usually reserved for murderers and repeat violent offenders."
"FAMM opposes mandatory minimum sentencing laws that carry disproportionate one-size-fits-all sentences and enormously expensive penalties. Keeping Ms. Taylor in jail for the rest of her life could cost Nevada taxpayers well over $1 million. This seems like a terrible waste of a life, and limited taxpayer resources," concluded Stewart.
April 27, 2010 in Examples of "over-punishment", Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack
Thursday, April 15, 2010
A life sentence for a woman who forces a teenage boy to touch her breasts!?!?!
The exclamation/question that titles this post is my initial response to this remarkable local press story that a helpful student sent my way. This press report discussed a remarkable local sentence handed down earlier this week in Nevada under the headline "T.F. woman sentenced to life for lewdness charge." Here are the remarkable details:A Twin Falls woman convicted of forcing a 13-year-old boy to touch her breasts was sentenced Monday to life in prison. Michelle Lyn Taylor, 34, was convicted of lewdness with a minor under 14 in November after a week-long trial in Elko County, Nev., District Judge Mike Memeo’s courtroom.
With the conviction, Taylor faced a mandatory life sentence, and Memeo set parole eligibility after 10 years, the minimum sentence. If released on parole she must register as a sex offender and will be under lifetime supervision.
The district attorney’s office did not offer a plea agreement in the case, said public defender Alina Kilpatrick, who argued the sentence is unconstitutional and doesn’t fit the crime. “The jury was not allowed to know the potential sentence in this case and the Legislature doesn’t know the facts,” she said, alluding to the minimum sentence set by the Legislature in Nevada Revised Statute.
Kilpatrick said despite the parole eligibility after 10 years, there should be no mistake that it’s a life sentence for Taylor. “She is getting a greater penalty for having a boy touch her breast than if she killed him,” she said.
After he sentenced her, Memeo said he was bound by state statute to impose the life sentence, but said he isn’t sure why the prosecution chose to charge her under that statute. District Attorney Gary Woodbury could not be reached for comment.
Taylor, who lived in Jackpot, Nev., at the time of the crime, kissed a friend’s child, forced him to touch her breast and asked him to have sex with her in February 2008. Taylor claimed she was intoxicated and doesn’t remember what happened that night. She told jurors she roughhoused with the boy, but didn’t force him to touch her inappropriately.
Based on the facts stated here, this case sounds like a remarkable test case for the reach and limits of the Eighth Amendment in non-capital punishment settings. But I cannot help but think there must be more, perhaps a lot more, to this story.
April 15, 2010 in Examples of "over-punishment", Graham and Sullivan Eighth Amendment cases, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (53) | TrackBack
Monday, March 08, 2010
New ACS issue brief making the case against juve LWOP
I just got word of this new issue brief from the folks at the American Constitution Society, which is titled "A Just Alternative to Sentencing Youth to Life in Prison Without the Possibility of Parole." This piece is authored by Jody Kent and Beth Colgan, and here is how ACS summarizes the work:
This Issue Brief is particularly timely in light of the Supreme Court’s consideration of the constitutionality of juvenile life sentences without the possibility of parole in two cases, Sullivan v. Florida and Graham v. Florida. Ms. Kent and Ms. Colgan examine why, in their opinion, such sentencing practices represent deeply flawed public policy. As the authors explain:
"Regardless of whether the Court extends [its precedent acknowledging that juveniles are different from adults] to find the sentencing of youth to life in prison without the possibility of parole unconstitutional, advocates for youth have called for reform of extreme sentencing policies, on the basis that they grossly undermine rational, fair, and age-appropriate treatment of youth."
Ms. Kent and Ms. Colgan discuss the well-established principle that youth are different from adults, and explain how this principle is reinforced by adolescent brain development research. The authors address and dismiss arguments that harsh sentencing is necessary to protect public safety, as well as highlight troubling racial disparities and inconsistent sentencing application. In addition, they describe how such sentencing functions to undermine the United States’s moral standing, given that the United States is the only country in the world to sentence offenders under the age of eighteen to life without parole. Finally, the Issue Brief concludes with Ms. Kent and Ms. Colgan proposing an alternative to the practice of sentencing youth to life in prison without the possibility of parole --- creation of a system allowing periodic review of sentences to determine whether individuals continue to pose a threat to society or may be returned to communities as productive citizens. In the view of the authors, this approach balances the need to hold young offenders accountable, while still recognizing their inherent capacity for change and growth.
March 8, 2010 in Examples of "over-punishment", Graham and Sullivan Eighth Amendment cases, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Wednesday, December 17, 2008
EJI files seeks cert on claim that juve LWOP is unconstitutional for 13-year-old offender
I just received a helpful e-mail from the folks at Equal Justice Initiative informing me of a recently filed cert petition challenging under the Eighth Amendment a sentence of life without parole given to an offender who was only 13 years old(!) at the time of his crime. The full petition can be downloaded below, and here is additional information from this EJI link about this stunning case:
Joe Sullivan is one of only two 13-year-olds in the United States to be sentenced to die in prison for an offense in which no one was killed. Both of these sentences were imposed in Florida, making Florida the only state in the country to have sentenced a 13-year-old to die in prison for a non-homicide.
A severely mentally disabled boy, Joe was blamed by an older boy for a sexual battery that was allegedly committed when they broke into a home together. The older boy received a short sentence in juvenile detention, but Joe was tried as an adult, convicted of sexual battery, and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Only eight people in the country are sentenced to die in prison for any offense committed at age 13.
The lawyer who represented Joe in his one-day trial has since been suspended from the practice of law, and the biological evidence that could have exonerated Joe was destroyed in 1993. The lawyer appointed to represent Joe on appeal informed the court that there were no issues in his case worth appealing. Joe was unable to challenge his conviction and sentence earlier because he could not afford legal assistance.
Joe has spent 19 years in a Florida prison, where he has been assaulted and suffered deteriorating health. He is now confined to a wheelchair.
When I learn about cases like this, I have a hard time believing that a country founded on the principles of liberty has become so willing to be so repressive through our criminal justice systems. Regular readers will not be surprised to hear that I hope the US Supreme Court will take up this case. And I am discouraged that this kind of case even exists and that officials in other branches of our government cannot bring themselves to address these kinds of sad cases and instead only will react if and when courts order them to be more just and sensible in their sentencing policies.
Download Sullivan cert petition from EJI
December 17, 2008 in Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack
Wednesday, November 26, 2008
Georgia high court finds mandatory life term for failure to register unconstitutionally excessive
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution has this article reporting on an important ruling yesterday in Georgia. The article is headlined "State Supreme Court: Sentence for sex offenders overruled; Life in prison breaks Eighth Amendment," and its provides an effective and detailed summary of the court's work:
The Georgia Supreme Court on Tuesday struck down another provision of the state’s tough sex-offender law, calling mandatory life sentences for offenders who fail to register a second time “grossly disproportionate” punishment.
In a 6-1 decision, written by Justice Robert Benham, the court said the life sentence imposed upon 26-year-old Cedric Bradshaw of Statesboro violates the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. “We conclude the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment is so harsh in comparison to the crime for which it was imposed that it is unconstitutional,” Benham wrote....
On Tuesday, the court ordered Bradshaw, who tried repeatedly to find a place to live without breaking the law, to be re-sentenced. His lawyer, circuit public defender Robert Persse, applauded the ruling. “The state’s penalty provision was excessive and clearly disproportionate to the offense in question,” he said....
In his ruling, Benham noted that someone convicted of voluntary manslaughter or aggravated assault with the intent to murder, rob or rape can receive a sentence as lenient as one year.
Benham also compared Georgia’s mandatory life term with punishment called for in 23 other states. Of the others, three states call for a maximum punishment of two years; 12 call for sentences of up to five years; six provide maximum terms of 10 years; two allow up to 20 years; and New Hampshire calls for a minimum seven-year sentence, Benham wrote. “Georgia’s mandatory punishment of life imprisonment is the clear outlier, providing the harshest penalty and providing no sentencing discretion,” Benham wrote. “This gross disparity between Georgia’s sentencing scheme and those of the other states reinforces the inference that [Bradshaw’s] crime and sentence are grossly disproportionate.”
Chief Justice Leah Ward Sears, in a concurring opinion, said life sentences “should be reserved for society’s most serious criminal offenders … Bradshaw’s failure to register as a sex offender, when his underlying crime only landed him in jail for five years, is not the kind of crime a civilized society ought to require him to pay for with his life.”
Justice George Carley issued the lone dissent, calling the decision a “monumental abuse of this court’s authority to determine the constitutionality of legislation.” The Legislature’s amendment in 2006 calling for the mandatory life term “constitutes the clearest and most objective evidence of how society views a punishment,” he wrote.
The Supreme Court of Georgia's ruling in Bradshaw v. State is available at this link. Writing at Sex Crimes, Corey Yung here asserts that "the majority is exactly right on this one." I concur and I hope this ruling will embolden other courts to be more deliberative in discharging the constitutional duty to assess whether and when extreme terms of imprisonment are constitutionally excessive.
November 26, 2008 in Examples of "over-punishment", Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Friday, November 21, 2008
Members of Congress push for commutation of Border Agent sentences
This AP article details the latest effort to encourage President Bush to use his clemency power to do some sentencing justice for two notable federal defendants. Here are the specifics:
A handful of lawmakers want President George W. Bush to commute the sentences of two Border Patrol agents convicted of shooting a now-convicted drug smuggler and covering it up. The House members said Thursday that Bush should commute the sentence of the two men before he leaves office to show his concern for law enforcement officers and the danger of their jobs. They asked the Justice Department to recommend the agents' cases to Bush....
The lawmakers pushing for the pardon attorney to at least commute the sentence of the Border Patrol agents or possibly pardon them say his action on their plea will be a barometer for other pardons. Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean were sentenced to 11 years and 12 years, respectively, after being convicted in 2006 of shooting now-convicted drug smuggler Osvaldo Aldrete Davila of Mexico and trying to cover up the incident.... "If you can't do it for Ramos and Compean, how can you do it for anyone on that list?" said Rep. Steve King, R-Iowa....
Rep. John Culberson, R-Houston, said lawmakers will pressure President-elect Barack Obama to show leniency to the agents if Bush does not. Other lawmakers who had signed a letter to the Justice Department's pardon attorney by Thursday morning are Rep. William Delahunt, D-Mass. and Republican Reps. Ted Poe of Texas, Dana Rohrabacher, Howard McKeon and Ed Royce of California and Walter Jones and Sue Myrick of North Carolina.
Some prior posts about the Border Agents case:
November 21, 2008 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Sunday, November 09, 2008
A challenge to severe Oregon sex offense sentences worth watching
Late last year, I blogged here and here about a fascinating and sad Oregon case involving a long mandatory prison term imposed on an adult female counselor convicted of unlawful heavy petting of her underage ward. A helpful reader sent me this local news report on the oral argument in this case that took place last week before the Oregon Supreme Court. Here are some details:
An attorney for a former employee of the Hillsboro Boy's and Girl's Club told the Oregon Supreme Court Tuesday that six-plus years in prison for touching her clothed breasts to the back of a 12-year-old boy's head amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.
A Washington County jury found Veronica Rodriguez, now 28, guilty of sex abuse in the first degree after Hillsboro investigators saw her breasts touch the boy's head while she ran her fingers through his hair at the club in 2005.
At sentencing, now-retired Judge Nancy Campbell said the circumstances only merited one year and four months in prison instead of the prescribed sentence of six years and three months required by 1994's voter-approved Measure 11.
Rodriguez and attorney Peter Garlan concede that Measure 11 is constitutional, but claim its application against Rodriguez violates Article 1, Section 16 — the proportionality clause of the Oregon Constitution.
Rodriguez's case is combined with another appeal from Linn County, where 36-year-old Darryl Buck was convicted of first-degree sex abuse for touching a 13-year-old girl's clothed buttocks several times during a fishing trip. Garlan said the girl overreacted to Buck's using his hands to help her remain upright, and her "histrionics" had an effect on the jury.The judge agreed, and handed down a 17-month sentence, appropriate for the action, Garlan said.
The state's Court of Appeals rejected both judge's decisions, and said both defendants should serve another five years....
Department of Justice spokesperson Jake Weigler said Wednesday voters passed the measure to eliminate judges' discretion in a range of crimes. Clearly, Rodriguez and Buck fell within that range, he said. If Measure 11 is to be changed, it should be by the will of the voters or the legislature, he said....
Justice Robert D. Durham asked both attorneys if it was the role of the court to make an evaluation of offenders, when the law only mentions "the offense." Should the court treat each offense as if it were a videotape of the act that turns on when the abuse begins and turns off when it ends? "Does that imply there should be no investigation into the actor?" Durham asked. And did that also imply there should be no consideration of whether a defendant lied on the stand, or lied to the police?
Though this article does not make clear whether the defendants in this case have also presented a federal constitutional challenges as well as the state constitutional challenge. If they have and if the defendants do not get any relief from the state supreme court, these cases could possibly present interesting and important vehicles for raising an array of constitutional issues in the Supreme Court.
Some related posts:
- Fascinating proportionality opinion from Oregon court
- More details and insights on Rodriguez case from Oregon
UPDATE: I found the defendant's brief to the Oregon Supreme Court at this link. It is hard to tell from a quick scan of the brief whether a formal Eighth Amendment claim is pressed by the brief. But one aspect of the brief that jumped out was this notable paragraph under the argument summary:
Victim’s Position at Sentencing. Several statutory and constitutional enactments over the past several decades guarantee the victim a voice at sentencing proceedings. The victim’s mother accepts defendant as a member of the family and supported defendant throughout the course of the prosecution, through and including the sentencing hearing.
This paragraphs confirms my long-held belief that giving all victims a more formal voice and role at sentencing could and would often prove to be catalyst for more sensible sentencing outcomes and reforms. In extreme cases, extreme victims will sometimes be eager for extreme sentences. But I think in most cases, many victims are often eager for moderate sentences.
November 9, 2008 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Friday, September 19, 2008
Friday follies: "Woman Faces Federal Jail Time Over Spilled Soda"
Thanks to this story from FOXNews, we apparently need to thank federal prosecutors for trying to keep our country safe from radical soda-pop terrorists that have started to infiltrate parts of our military establishment:
An Idaho woman is facing federal charges and possible jail time after refusing to pay for a soda and then spilling it on a counter in a case she calls a waste of taxpayer's money.
U.S. Attorney Tom Moss plans to bring two charges against Natalie Walters, 39, stemming from an Aug. 20 incident at the Boise Veterans Affairs Medical Center, the Idaho Statesman reports. If convicted, she could face up to six months in federal prison.
Walters, who routinely takes her father to the Boise hospital for treatment, said there is no posted price for soda refills at the center's cafeteria, and she's typically charged between $1 and $1.50 for filling her mug, according to the paper. On Aug. 20, she was charged $3.80, which lead to the dispute and Walters dumping the soda on the cafeteria counter.
Moss' office refused to speak to the Statesman about the case until after Walters' Oct. 8 arraignment. Walters didn't learn of the charges until she was contacted by a reporter for the story. "My father is a veteran. It is a federal facility for veterans. This should have been handled differently," she told the paper. "This is extreme. This is totally extreme. Well, if they have that much time on their hands, go for it."
The full story from the Idaho Statesman, which is headlined "Dumped diet pop lands Idaho woman in federal court," can be found at this link.
September 19, 2008 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack
Sunday, June 29, 2008
Doesn't Kennedy suggest life in prison for failing to register is unconstitutional?
This new Atlanta Journal-Constitution article highlights an appeal of an extreme state sentence that is another reflection of the modern sex offender panic. The piece is entitled "Fairness of law to be judged -- Mandatory sentences: Georgia's Supreme Court will consider proportion." Here are excerpts:
The judge had only one option when he sentenced Cedric Bradshaw: life in prison. Bradshaw had not committed murder, rape or armed robbery. His offense was failing to properly register as a convicted sex offender for a second time — even though he had repeatedly tried to follow the law....
On Monday, the state's highest court will consider whether the law is unconstitutional on grounds it is cruel and unusual punishment.
No other state calls for a life sentence for failing to register as a sex offender the second time, and even rape and armed robbery convictions in Georgia do not carry mandatory life terms, said Bradshaw's lawyer, Robert L. Persse, the circuit public defender in Statesboro. "The punishment for a second violation is grossly disproportionate to the offense," Persse said. "That is particularly true when this is essentially a paperwork offense not accompanied by aggravating circumstances like violence, sexual deviance or being out in a schoolyard hunting for children."
The Bulloch DA's office is urging the state Supreme Court to uphold the life term. "The courts look at the Legislature's intent in determining the best evidence for the appropriateness of the sentence," Assistant District Attorney W. Scott Brannen said. "When they increase it [to a life term], that too is evidence of the intent and the will of the people."...
Brannen, the prosecutor, said the law is on the books and "it's not my place or the court's place to decide what we like and don't like and what we want to enforce or not enforce." Bradshaw, Brannen said, broke the law by failing to give a valid address within the 72-hour reporting deadline. "There are no exceptions in the law," he said.
I am not sure what I find more remarkable: the fact that Georgia punishes this regulatory offense with a mandatory life term, or the fact that in the wake of the Supreme Court's Kennedy ruling the defendant here could have sexually molested and beaten a dozen children without facing a harsher sentence.
As regular readers know, I have long been troubled that the U.S. Supreme Court's eagerness to hyper-regulate the reach of the death penalty through the Eighth Amendment has not extended to regulating extreme prison terms for relatively minor crimes. The Georgia high court has previously shown the courage and wisdom to do something about a seemingly crazy prison sentence, and this would seem to be another case calling out for some remedy.
Further, as my post heading suggests, I think the recent Kennedy ruling from the Supreme Court provides some significant support for Bradshaw's constitutional challenge. If life in prison is the harshest permissible sentence for the worst child rape, can the proportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment permit a regulatory offense to be subject to the same punishment?
June 29, 2008 in Examples of "over-punishment", Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Friday, May 02, 2008
Ohio getting tough on no-snack-sharing rules
I can sleep a little sounder after reading this local article about how tough my state is on its miscreants:
He slept through a fire drill, had loose tobacco in his possession and didn't show up for kitchen duty. Then Timothy E. Caudill shared a Little Debbie snack cake with another inmate at a correctional facility in southeastern Ohio. That was the last straw.
The 21-year-old was kicked out of the residential community corrections program that was a requirement of his probation. And he could go to prison. That is absurd, said Caudill's attorney, Claire "Buzz" Ball. "Everybody talks about prison overcrowding. My God, you have to send some guy to prison for sharing a snack?" Ball said.
Vinton County Prosecutor Timothy P. Gleeson has asked Common Pleas Judge Jeffrey Simmons to revoke Caudill's probation and put him in prison. Simmons is expected to rule soon on the request, which he considered at a hearing April 16. The prosecutor wants Caudill put in prison for nine months.
With credit for 105 days served at the SEPTA Correctional Facility, he would serve nearly six more months. Caudill's attorney has asked the judge to keep Caudill on probation or send him to the jail in Athens County, which costs $20 a day less than a state prison. Keeping Caudill out of prison would leave cell space for a more serious offender, Ball said. "My God, over a 50-cent cake, the state would spend $12,600 for six months," Ball said.
Caudill received a sentence of three years' probation Oct. 1, convicted last year of breaking and entering Krazy Katie's, a bar along Rt. 93 just south of McArthur, the Vinton County seat. He was placed in SEPTA, a community corrections residential program in Nelsonville, on Oct. 10. The 64-bed program, which offers drug treatment, work training and counseling, imposes strict rules.
Caudill bought the Little Debbie from the vending machine and then knowingly shared it with a fellow inmate who was on restriction and wasn't allowed access to the vending-machine snacks, said Bob Eaton, operations manager at SEPTA.
I wonder if Ohio parents and teachers realize that, when they encourage children to share at home and at school, they are preparing the kids for a life of crime.
May 2, 2008 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (26) | TrackBack
Monday, January 14, 2008
New HRW report assailing juve LWOP in California
As detailed in this press statement, today a new report was released by Human Rights Watch calling upon the California legislature to "pass a law this month to end the sentencing of children to prison for life with no possibility of parole." The report is entitled "When I Die, They'll Send Me Home: Youth Sentenced to Life without Parole in California," and it can be accessed in various ways from this link. Here is the start of the report's summary:
Approximately 227 youth have been sentenced to die in California's prisons. They have not been sentenced to death: the death penalty was found unconstitutional for juveniles by the United States Supreme Court in 2005. Instead, these young people have been sentenced to prison for the rest of their lives, with no opportunity for parole and no chance for release. Their crimes were committed when they were teenagers, yet they will die in prison. Remarkably, many of the adults who were codefendants and took part in their crimes received lower sentences and will one day be released from prison.
In the United States at least 2,380 people are serving life without parole for crimes they committed when they were under the age of 18. In the rest of the world, just seven people are known to be serving this sentence for crimes committed when they were juveniles. Although ten other countries have laws permitting life without parole, in practice most do not use the sentence for those under age 18. International law prohibits the use of life without parole for those who are not yet 18 years old. The United States is in violation of those laws and out of step with the rest of the world.
Some recent related posts on juve life sentences:
January 14, 2008 in Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack
Saturday, January 12, 2008
Genarlow Wilson headed to college
I was pleased to see this news report from Atlanta providing an update on the state and fate of Genarlow Wilson. Here are highlights:
In his two years in prison, Genarlow Wilson did a lot of reading. One of his favorite books: Rick Warren's "The Purpose Driven Life." The title could not be more appropriate for the next chapter in Wilson's highly publicized young life.
Nearly three months out of prison for committing a sex act with a teenager, Wilson, 21, plans to move into a dormitory at Morehouse College this weekend. He will live and study for free, thanks to the Tom Joyner Foundation, an educational nonprofit founded by the nationally syndicated radio personality. The foundation announced Thursday that it will cover the cost of tuition, room and board and books....
"I've been wanting to go to college for so long," said Wilson, who wants to major in sociology or education, with a minor in history. "I want to study and learn so I can be a mentor for others. It was very generous for [Joyner] to do that for me. I won't let him down."...
Wilson was released from prison Oct. 26 after the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that his 10-year sentence for having consensual oral sex with a 15-year-old girl was "cruel and unusual punishment." Wilson, who was 17 at the time of the incident, was convicted of felony aggravated child molestation. At the time, state law mandated a minimum 10-year sentence for the crime. The Legislature eventually changed the law to make such cases misdemeanors when they involved teenagers close in age....
Despite his ordeal, Wilson said he has no regrets. "I'm not mad about anything that happened, really," said Wilson, who now lives in Cobb County. "It helped me grow as a person, made me stronger, made me more ambitious. "I was at my lowest point in life. Now everything I wanted to do can finally happen."
I could not be happier that the Wilson story now has this happy ending; of course, there can be a lot more to the story in the years ahead. I hope that Wilson might get seriously involved in sentencing reform movements because his name and his story alone can help a lot of politicians and voters understand the harms of — and the challenges to undo — extreme mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.
January 12, 2008 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (25) | TrackBack
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
Fascinating proportionality opinion from Oregon court
A helpful reader alerted me to a fascinating opinion from the Oregon Court of Appeals in Oregon v. Rodriguez, No. A131050 (Or. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2007) (available here). Both the underlying facts and the legal discussion in this case are noteworthy, and these lengthy excerpts provide only a small flavor of an opinion worth reading in full:
In early 2004, defendant [Victoria Rodriguez] was employed by the Hillsboro Boys and Girls Club to work with at-risk youths.... The victim was a member of the club.... On February 14, 2005, a staff member ... saw defendant and the victim in the game room at the club. There were approximately 30 to 50 youths and at least one other staff member in the room. The victim, who had since turned 13, was sitting on a chair. Defendant, who had since turned 25, was standing behind him, caressing his face and pulling his head back; the back of his head was pressed against her breasts.... The contact lasted approximately one minute....
Defendant was eventually charged with first-degree sexual abuse based on the incident. A jury found defendant guilty.... At sentencing, the prosecutor asked the court to impose the 75-month sentence prescribed by ORS 137.700 (commonly referred to as "Measure 11"). Defendant objected, arguing that the Measure 11 sentence would be unconstitutionally excessive. Numerous family members, friends, and coworkers testified in support of defendant. The court agreed with defendant that a 75-month sentence would be cruel and unusual. The court observed that defendant had no prior criminal record and that she had "lived an exemplary life" and had "really made a very positive impact into the lives of apparently many children * * *." It further noted that the touching occurred "in a crowded room, over clothing, [and was] not prolonged." The court concluded that a 75-month sentence "just cries out" as being shocking to any reasonable person. It imposed a 16-month sentence. This appeal followed....
The state contends, among other things, that, given the nature of the relationship between defendant and the victim, the 75-month sentence mandated by Measure 11 would not shock the moral sense of all reasonable people.... We agree with the state that, given the nature of the relationship between defendant and the victim, there can be no doubt that the Measure 11 sentence would not shock the moral sense of all reasonable people. It is undisputed that the victim was young and vulnerable, a prototypical "at-risk" youth. Defendant was in a position of trust and responsibility, akin to that of a teacher or youth counselor, charged with helping children make appropriate behavioral choices. By engaging in sexual conduct with the victim, defendant seriously abused that trust.
In short, we cannot say that the 75-month sentence required under Measure 11 would shock the moral sense of all reasonable people as to what is right and proper under the circumstances. It follows that the trial court erred in refusing to impose that sentence.
December 26, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment", Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (10) | TrackBack
Monday, December 03, 2007
Weldon Angelos files 2255 motion
Regular readers will recall the name Weldon Angelos; Angelos faced a mandatory minimum sentencing term of 55 years following three small hand-to-hand marijuana sales. Some months ago, Weldon's sister asked if I would help with his 2255 motion. Aided by a great legal team working pro bono, this motion was completed and filed in federal district court today. The full 50-page motion, which makes an array of constitutional arguments, can be downloaded here:
Download angelos_2255_motion.pdf
Because I am essentially counsel of record, I do not plan to discuss or debate the merits of the motion on this blog. But I cannot help but use this forum to try to solicit amici support. Persons concerned with any number of criminal justice issues — ranging from extreme mandatory minimum sentences, prosecutorial charging and bargaining practices, convictions based solely on informant testimony, the reach of the Second, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments and principles of equal justice — should find the Angelos case interesting and perhaps worthy of some "friendly" brief writing.
UPDATE: The Salt Lake Tribune reports on the filing in this article.
December 3, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (10) | TrackBack
Former border agents Ramos and Compean having appeal heard today
As highlighted in media coverage linked here by How Appealing, a Fifth Circuit panel will hear today the appeal of former U.S. Border Patrol agents Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean, who were sentenced to terms of 11 and 12 years of imprisonment for shooting an illegal alien drug smuggler. As detailed in a series of prior posts, this case has generated lots of political controversy and the severity of the sentences are part of the reason for the case garnering so much attention. I do not think the appeal is focused on the sentencing terms, but prominent Senators from both parties (Diane Feinstein and Jon Cornyn) have already formally requested that President Bush commute the sentences of Ramos and Compean.
Some prior posts about the Border Agents case:
December 3, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack
Friday, November 23, 2007
Judge Professor Paul Cassell still speaking out about unfair sentencing
This article from the Deseret Morning News, headlined "Former federal judge is striving for balance," catches up with former federal judge Paul Cassell now that he has been off the bench and back in the academy for a few weeks. Here are some snippets with a sentencing focus:
Sitting in his temporary office at the S.J. Quinney College of Law, Cassell told the Deseret Morning News that, as a federal judge, he felt there were several areas in federal law that were out of balance, particularly in the areas of minimum-mandatory sentencing and prosecution of some illegal immigrants. He saw some aspects of federal law caught in a vortex of political competitiveness for tougher sentences pushed by members of Congress....
"There's a kind of ratchet effect where the Republicans will say, 'We want a five-year mandatory minimum sentence,' and Democrats will say, 'We'll up you, we want a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence,' and you have people ratcheting up sentences to the point where any reasonable observer would think we've gone too high, but there's no political incentive to undo the mischief." Cassell said, in his mind, it takes political courage to step up and say the punishment does not fit the crime....
Cassell said he found himself questioning some laws at each turn. "I felt like it was proper judicial role to ask questions, even if we weren't necessarily charged with fixing the problem," he said. But he wanted to do more — he wanted to make a change. Being a federal judge, he couldn't do that. "One of the frustrations about being a trial court judge is that you never set broad principles of law; of course, that's reserved for the appellate courts. ... When I was there for 5 1/2 years, I began to think that maybe I would have more effect in moving the law in a way that I think is desirable by doing appellate litigation." Becoming a legal advocate is a better fit, he said. "I felt like for the rest of my life, I wasn't sure I could stay in one place doing one kind of thing. There were some issues I wanted to pursue, particularly working on crime victims' rights, which is an area that I felt very passionately about."
Traditionally, criminal cases involve two parties: the state and the defendant. But a growing trend in courts is to give the victims of crimes more of a voice in cases. In addition to teaching at the U., Cassell plans to work with a Washington, D.C., group that deals with crime victims' rights. It seems being a voice for balance is innate in Cassell.
One of the last things he did as a federal judge is speak out on the issue of sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine. As chairman of the Judicial Conference's Criminal Law Committee, Cassell said he spoke for the judiciary when he sent a letter to the president and Congress supporting the Federal Sentencing Commission's recommendation to reduce sentences for crack cocaine possession versus powder. Such sentences bear a 100-to-1 ratio to sentences for powder cocaine. "The differences between crack and powder cocaine penalties have been hurting the federal judiciary's credibility in minority communities, particularly in the African-American communities, who view the differences as racially motivated," Cassell said.
November 23, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Friday, October 26, 2007
Why so much fear about a robust Eighth Amendment doctrine?
I am surprised and disappointed to see a few academic bloggers I respect expressing reservations about the Georgia Supreme Court's application of the cruel and unusual punishments clause in the Wilson case. Specifically, Eugene Volokh has this to say:
I think there are institutional problems with courts’ evaluating the length of confinement under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause; it’s hard to see a good legal rule that courts can sensibly apply in a wide range of cases, and to my knowledge there isn’t the sort of textual or original meaning evidence that strongly points to requiring courts to engage in such a mushy judgment.
And Laura Appleman adds this:
If the claim of cruel and unusual punishment is used more frequently, and in less dire cases than it has traditionally been used (i.e., death penalty cases), are we weakening the doctrine? I'm not arguing that Genarlow Wilson deserved to remain in jail -- his 10 year sentence was ridiculous on its face. But I'm a little nervous about using the 8th Amendment as a tool to free him. Wilson's case was arguably a problem of proportionality -- isn't using the 8th Amendment to free him like using a battering ram when a kick or two would do?
I just do not get these sorts of concerns. Let's start with Eugene's points. Why does he or others think the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" is any more "mushy" or less subject to sound judicial line-drawing than the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures" or the Fifth Amendments requirements of "due process" and "just compensation." Of course, one might contend that all these vague standards defy effective constitutional line-drawing. But, if one excepts the appropriateness of courts drawing hard lines when interpreting other vague Amendments, I do not quite understand why the protections of the Eighth Amendment should evaporate once a person gets sentenced to a term of confinement.
Laura raises related issues that also make me scratch my head: for Genarlow Wilson, another 7 years in prison seems pretty dire. I know everyone thinks "death is different," but many defendants on death row bringing Eighth Amendment claims are going to die in prison as old men before appeals are exhausted. But, for Genarlow Wilson, this case essentially concerned whether he was going to get to be a free man in his 20s (which is a probably a decade that few adults would want to have spent locked up in a prison). Though others may disagree, but I am much more eager to use a battering ram for the likes of Genarlow Wilson than for the likes of Ted Bundy.
Finally, Eugene suggests a focus on the text of the Eighth Amendment (which few really do). As the Wilson majority adroitly notes, statistics suggest that 7.5 million teenagers are involed each year in the specific offense behavior that resulted in 10 years in prison. Can anyone argue (without using legalese) that it is not "cruel and unusual punishment" for Genarlow Wilson to be only one of this massive population forced to serve 10 years locked in a small cage for this behavior?
October 26, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (30) | TrackBack
Split justice for Genarlow Wilson from the Georgia Supreme Court
As detailed in breaking news stories from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and from the AP, theGeorgia Supreme Court this morning ordered the release of Genarlow Wilson, the young man who has been serving a 10-year sentence for consensual oral sex. The decision divided the state justices 4-3, but ultimately upholds county judge's ruling that the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The ruling is available at this link, and the court also has this news release summarizing the decision. Here is how the opinion begins:
In Case No. S07A1481, the appellant, Warden Carl Humphrey, appeals from the grant of habeas corpus relief to the appellee, Genarlow Wilson, by the Superior Court of Monroe County (hereinafter referred to as the “habeas court”). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the habeas court properly ruled that Wilson’s sentence of ten years in prison for having consensual oral sex with a fifteen-year-old girl when he was only seventeen years old constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, but erred in convicting and sentencing Wilson for a misdemeanor crime that did not exist when the conduct in question occurred. Because the minimum punishment for the crime for which Wilson was convicted constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, this case must be remanded to the habeas court for it to enter an order reversing Wilson’s conviction and sentence and discharging him from custody. Accordingly, in Case No. S07A1481, we affirm the habeas court’s judgment in part and reverse it in part.
In Case No. S07A1606, Wilson appeals the denial, by the Superior Court of Douglas County (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”), of his motion for release on bail during the pendency of the warden’s appeal in Case No. S07A1481. Because the trial court properly denied Wilson’s motion for bail, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
October 26, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (19) | TrackBack
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
Spotting the many statutory errors in Peltier
Commentors here have done a great job highlighting the practical craziness of the Fifth Circuit's adoption of a "plain error" approach to reasonableness review in US v. Peltier, No. 05-30440 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2007) (available here). But the problems with Peltier run deeper: at the most fundamental level, the Fifth Circuit's approach seems to misunderstand that reasonableness review was embraced in the Booker remedy to "iron out sentencing differences," not simply to protect a defendant's rights. The whole goal of reasonableness review emphasized by the Booker remedial opinion is undermined by affirming unreasonable sentences because errors are not plain enough.
Moreover, spotting the many statutory errors in Peltier would make for a good exam in my sentencing classes. Here are just a few I saw based on a quick read:
1. Peltier asserts in a footnote that "reasonableness has become ... a substantive standard to be applied by the district court," but that claim transgresses the congressional directive in section 3553(a), which states clearly that a sentencing court "shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth" in 3553(a)(2).
2. Peltier affirms a statutory maximum sentence of 10 years for a defendant who pleaded guilty to a not-particularly-serious version of felon-in-possession (the defendant had a shotgun in his shed). Given the requirement in 3553(a)(3) to consider "the kinds of sentences available" and in 3553(a)(6) to "avoid unwarranted sentence disparities," what is reasonable about the district court's determination that the defendant should get the highest legally available sentence for this type of crime (especially given that his guideline range was less than half as long)?
3. Peltier makes much of the "weight given to the proper factor of need for treatment" to justify the district court's extra long prison term. However, 18 USC 3582(a) plainly states that courts must "recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation."
I could go on, but perhaps I need to first re-read Peltier to make sure I'm not overlooking reasons it might not be as bad as it seems.
October 24, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Does Roper suggest young juve LWOP is unconstitutional?
The Baltimore Sun today has this effective editorial, entitled "Too young to die in prison," which builds off the Equal Justice Initiative's recent new report (available here, overviewed here) on life terms for offenses committed by young teenagers. Here are snippets from the editorial:
Teenagers serving life sentences without the possibility of parole have been condemned to die in prison. It's a death sentence without an executioner, it's perilously close to cruel and usual punishment, and it simply shouldn't be allowed.
States, such as Maryland, that let juveniles spend the rest of their lives behind bars ignore what researchers and others have shown to be true: These offenders lack the physical and emotional maturity to make rational decisions. A life sentence, with the appropriate parole eligibility requirements and restrictions, would keep these young criminals behind bars for a lengthy period and prevent their release until an appropriate time.
A report issued last week by the Alabama-based Equal Justice Initiative found that nationally, more than 2,225 juveniles, age 17 and younger, have received life without parole sentences. Of those, 73 were 13 or 14 — children by almost any measure — when they committed their crimes....
Their crimes may have been terrible, but there is a reason we have different systems for juvenile offenders: Society recognizes the differences between teenagers and adults; the key difference is that parts of their brains that control impulses, emotions and reasoning are less developed.
Juveniles are barred from buying cigarettes or beer; they can't enlist in the military and aren't supposed to watch R-rated movies unless accompanied by a parent or guardian. And yet when they commit a serious crime, it's as if they have morphed into adults for purposes of their punishment....
The Supreme Court recognized all these differences when it barred the execution of juveniles, no matter the crime. But a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole is just as fatal in its way, and should be prohibited for the same reasons.
I share the editorial's instinct that a fair reading of Roper supports an argument that life without parole for young teenagers is constitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment. I suspect others may agree. But it is telling (and troubling) that these viable constitutional arguments on behalf of young offenders facing life terms have not gotten nearly the traction and attention — from courts, the media or academics — that has been given to older offenders facing lethal injections.
Some related posts:
- Using Roper's focus on age in post-Booker sentencings
- California considering eliminating LWOP for juveniles
- Forthcoming PBS program "When Kids Get Life"
October 23, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (26) | TrackBack
Monday, July 23, 2007
Commentaries and editorials on border agents case
A new week brings a new set of commentaries and editorials about the border agents case. Interestingly, as the headlines below suggest, not everyone has the same perspective on this case:
Commentary here from Debra Saunders, "Where's George Bush: Free the Border Patrol Two"
Commentary here from Rick Lowry, "Justice demands sentence commutation for border agents"
Editorial here from the Houston Chronicle, "Border incident Inflexible sentencing law — not prosecutor — created long sentence for rogue border agents"
Editorial here from the Sacramento Bee, "Feinstein takes the low road with border agents: With a grandstanding hearing and a letter to Bush, senator stoops to tarnish -- herself"
Some prior posts about the Border Agents case:
- Will former border agents Ramos and Compean get a commutation?
- Equal justice or just the realities of ratting out?
July 23, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Friday, July 20, 2007
Report on Genarlow Wilson argument in Georgia
The AP has this article providing the basics of today's argument before the Georgia Supreme Court in the Genarlow Wilson case. Here are a few snippets:
Attorney General Thurbert Baker argues that the order to free Wilson, if upheld, could be used to help free some 1,300 child molesters from Georgia prison. "We urge you to look beyond the confines of this case," Senior Assistant Attorney General Paula Smith told the court's seven justices Friday.
Wilson's lawyer, B.J. Bernstein, said that Wilson's decade-long mandatory sentence violated the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. "Every day that a defendant spends in jail is a precious day in their life," Bernstein said.
The justices seemed to be wrestling with how to provide Wilson relief under the law. "We have a responsibility to enforce the law," Justice Robert Benham asked. "Should we do that at the expense of fairness?"
How Appealing has more coverage of the argument at this link.
July 20, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Wednesday, July 18, 2007
Bipartisan call for commuting border agent sentences
Especially in these partisan times, it is encouraging to see bipartisanship on any issue. And, as detailed in this Lou Dobbs commentary, the extreme sentences for former border agents Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean has brought leading Senators from both sides of the aisle together:
There was an unusual spectacle in the nation's capital Tuesday, downright rare, in fact: U.S. Senators seeking truth, and justice, and taking action. And they deserve great credit and thanks. The Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, led by Dianne Feinstein, focused on the reasons for the prosecution of two Border Patrol agents now serving long sentences in federal prison. Border Patrol Agents Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean were given terms of 11 and 12 years respectively on their convictions for shooting an illegal alien drug smuggler. Senator Feinstein, and Senators Jeff Sessions, John Cornyn, Jon Kyl and Tom Coburn demanded answers of U.S. Attorney Johnny Sutton, who chose to prosecute Compean and Ramos and give that illegal alien drug smuggler blanket immunity to testify against the men....
Senator Feinstein and Senator Cornyn announced Tuesday night on our broadcast that they have decided to request that President Bush commute the sentences of Ramos and Compean.
Some prior posts about the Border Agents case:
July 18, 2007 in Clemency and Pardons, Examples of "over-punishment", Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (13) | TrackBack
Tuesday, July 17, 2007
Reports on Senate hearing on Border Agent case
Reports from the Houston Chronicle, from the AP, from The Hill and from The Corner at NRO provide some highlights from Tuesday's Senate Judiciary Committee hearing examining the prosecution and sentencing of former border agents Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean. Also available at this official site are links to the witnesses' written testimony and an archived webcast of the hearing.
Some prior posts about the Border Agents case:
July 17, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Sunday, July 15, 2007
Senate hearing on Border Agent prosecutions
As detailed at this official site, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary has scheduled a "Hearing to Examine the Prosecution of Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean" for the morning of Tuesday, July 17, 2007. Notably, Senator Dianne Feinstein is slated to preside.
As I have explained in many prior posts (some of which are linked below), I think the prosecution and sentencing of these former border agents spotlight the many flaws with mandatory sentencing provisions and the severe penalties that some defendants receive largely for exercising their right to go to trial rather than pleading guilty. I am hopeful that these sentencing issues will be a big part of the Senate hearing.
Some prior posts about the Border Agents case:
July 15, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Thursday, July 12, 2007
Prosecutors gone wild
This AP story chronicles the latest saga in the sad tale that is the Genarlow Wilson case (details in this archive) out of Georgia. Here are snippets:
David McDade has handed out some 35 copies of a video of teenagers having sex at a party. McDade is no porno kingpin, but a district attorney. And he says Georgia's open-records law leaves him no choice but to release the footage because it was evidence in one of the state's most turbulent cases — that of Genarlow Wilson, a young man serving 10 years in prison for having oral sex with a girl when they were teenagers. McDade's actions have opened him up to accusations that he is vindictively misusing his authority to keep Wilson behind bars — and worse, distributing child pornography.
UPDATE: I see two remarkable new posts at Above the Law suggesting that Mr. McDade has a track record that should make good prosecutors cringe:
The saddest part of all this, of course, is that McDade continues to wreck havoc on Georgia justice while Genarlow Wilson remains behind bars. It is a sad shame that Georgia's Attorney General and Governor are far less concerned about the unjustifiable activities of rogue prosecutors than about teenagers' consensual sexual activities.
July 12, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
Genarlow Wilson to remain in prison, despite ruling that his sentence is unconstitutional
Howard Bashman notes reports from the AP and from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution that a state judge has now ruled that Genarlow Wilson is not eligible for bond pending the state's appeal of a ruling that his sentence is unconstitutional. As previously detailed here and here, lower court has already ruled that Wilson's original sentence was unconstitutional, although that ruling due to be review by the Georgia Supreme COurt in the fall (details here).
I do not quite understand why executive officials in Georgia believe it is necessary and appropriate — or even lawful — to keep Wilson in prison when the last state judge to review this case has declared Wilson's sentence unconstitutional. I understand that the Georgia Attorney General regards the lower court's ruling as problematic. But given that the AG apparently recognizes that Wilson presents no risk of flight or dangerousness, shouldn't he agree to Wilson's release pending appeal. Indeed, might one argue that it is unconstitutional for the Georgia AG to continued Wilson's imprisonment under these circumstances?
June 27, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack
Tuesday, June 26, 2007
Putting money where the sentencing injustice is
As detailed in articles appearing in USA Today and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, a "New York investment manager and 10 of his friends have pledged $1 million in cash to try to win the release of a Georgia man imprisoned for a consensual sex act." Here are more details from the USA Today article:
Genarlow Wilson, 21, is serving a 10-year sentence for receiving oral sex from a 15-year-old girl when he was 17. He has been behind bars for more than 28 months. Two weeks ago, a Monroe County judge ordered his release. Because Georgia Attorney General Thurbert Baker appealed, however, Wilson remains in prison.
"A miscarriage of justice has occurred here, yet he's still in jail," says Whitney Tilson, a mutual and hedge fund manager who will commit $100,000 of his own money to a bond fund for Wilson. Tilson, who is founder and managing partner of T2 Partners Management LP and Tilson Mutual Funds, read about Wilson's case in December and thought his punishment was excessive.
Related posts will background on the Genarlow Wilson case:
- Genarlow Wilson prevails in state habeas appeal
- Snippets from the Wilson ruling from Georgia
- Georgia AG appeals to keep Genarlow Wilson locked up
- Genarlow Wilson faces at least another month in prison
- ESPN effectively covers Genarlow Wilson's sad saga
- Why isn't the severe Georgia sentence constitutionally problematic?
June 26, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Thursday, June 14, 2007
Notable coverage of Genarlow Wilson saga
Coverage of the Genarlow Wilson case continues to provide interesting food-for-thought. Anyone following the Wilson case closely will definitely want to check out these two interesting articles:
- From the Fulton County Daily Report here, "Contrasting Cases Show Murkiness of Sex Law: Genarlow Wilson's win made the news, but another teen sex case looms."
- From the Atlanta Journal-Constitution here, "Girl's mother defends Wilson: Penalty too severe, and sex was consensual, she says; prosecutors suspect that defendants' supporters have been pressuring her."
Following up the AJC article, this AP article has now hit the wires, headlined "Prosecutor meddling in teen sex case? Mother of girl changed statement to newspaper after visit by assistant DA."
UPDATE: This AP story reports that "Georgia's Supreme Court agreed Thursday to hear the state's arguments for keeping in prison a man who had consensual sex with a 15-year-old girl when he was 17. The story also provides more details about reactions to the case and the decision by the Georgia AG to appeal.
June 14, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack
Parents start serving 27 months for serving alcohol at son's 16th birthday party
The Washington Post in this editorial, and David Bernstein here at The Volokh Conpirary, are justifiably spotlighting the apparent injustice in this story of two parents given 27-month(!) jail terms for having provided beer and wine at a backyard birthday party for their son when he turned 16.
According to the Post editorial, the prosecutors "originally sought a three-month sentence," but apparently a juvenile court judge "originally imposed eight-year sentences" only an appeals court cut the sentence to the 27 months now to be served.
Commentors at Volokh indicate that the parents' wrongdoing went beyond just serving alcohol. But, geez, wouldn't the three-month sentence (or even six months or nine months) sought by prosecutors have been sufficient? I have long thought that any sentence more than twice what a prosecutor requests should be considered presumptively (though not per se) unreasonable.
More details about this case and related matters are available in this cover article from a publication called "The Hook." The article spotlights that the long sentence given to the parents should have a profound deterrence effect, though I'd think a shorter sentence could do the trick. Can anyone suggest reasons why such a long jail sentence is necessary under these circumstances?
June 14, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack
Wednesday, June 13, 2007
Genarlow Wilson faces at least another month in prison
As detailed in this Atlanta Journal-Constitution article, despite a big win in his state habeas action overturning his initial sentence, "Genarlow Wilson will remain behind bars at least until next month, when a judge will decide whether he should be released from prison pending an appeal." Here are some more details:
Wilson, now 21, moved a step closer to freedom Monday when Monroe County Superior Court Judge Thomas H. Wilson granted his petition to throw out his 10-year prison sentence. The judge agreed the sentence "would be viewed by society as 'cruel and unusual' in the constitutional sense of disproportionality." The judge also ordered him freed from prison and changed his felony conviction to a misdemeanor without the requirement that he register as a sex offender.
Within hours, however, state Attorney General Thurbert Baker filed notice that he would appeal the ruling to the Georgia Supreme Court. Baker is arguing the judge overstepped his authority. Several civil rights activists demonstrated outside Baker's office Monday, calling on him to back off his appeal or resign. "I think he should be admired for standing up in the face of all that and doing his job," [Douglas County District Attorney David] McDade said. "His sworn duty is to protect all Georgians."
Related posts will background on the Wilson case:
- ESPN effectively covers Genarlow Wilson's sad saga
- Why isn't the severe Georgia sentence constitutionally problematic?
- Genarlow Wilson prevails in state habeas appeal
- Snippets from the Wilson ruling from Georgia
- Georgia AG appeals to keep Genarlow Wilson locked up
June 13, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack
Monday, June 11, 2007
Georgia AG appeals to keep Genarlow Wilson locked up
This new CNN article disappointingly reports that the Attorney General of Georgia "quickly filed a notice of appeal, keeping Genarlow Wilson in prison for the time being" in the wake of the state court ruling earlier today reducing his crime and sentence (basics here and here). Here are more details:
The prosecutor's move brought an abrupt halt to the jubilation Wilson's mother, Juannessa Bennett, and his attorney, B.J. Bernstein, were feeling, and the plans they were making for Bennett to be reunited with her son. "It is extremely, extremely disturbing that the attorney general would take this action now," Bernstein said, adding that she did not know what message "he's trying to send" or "who he's representing."
In a written statement, Georgia Attorney General Thurbert Baker said he filed the appeal to resolve "clearly erroneous legal issues," saying that while the judge did have the authority to grant habeas relief, he did not have the authority "to reduce or modify the judgment of the trial court." Separately, Baker noted that Douglas County recently had offered a plea deal "that would have allowed Genarlow Wilson to plead to First Offender Treatment, which would mean that he would not have a criminal record nor would he be subject to registering on the sex offender registry once his sentence had been completed."
I would be interested to hear reactions from current and former prosecutors about the Georgia AG's decision to so swiftly seek an appeal. I also wonder, if Baker is comfortable with a plea deal that gets close to the same result as the court ruling, why the rush to appeal?
June 11, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (21) | TrackBack
Snippets from the Wilson ruling from Georgia
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution now has this coverage of the state court ruling reducing the crime and sentence of Genarlow Wilson (basics here). There is a written opinion supporting the rule, and here are inspiring snippets:
In the Petitioner's case, the imposition of the rnandatory minimum 10-year prison sentence without parole and sex offender registration for consensual oral sex between teenagers would be viewed by society as "cruel and unusual" in the constitutional sense of disproportionality, especially in light of Petitioner's having never been convicted of a prior crime....
If this Court, or any Court, cannot recognize the injustice of what has occurred here, then our court system has lost sight of the goal our judicial system has always strived to accomplish — Justice being served in a fair and equal manner.
When I first heard about the Wilson case last December, I explained here and here why I thought Genarlow had a viable Eighth Amendment claim. I am glad a state judge in this case agreed. Now if the state prosecutors could have the good sense not to bother with an appeal.
June 11, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack
Genarlow Wilson prevails in state habeas appeal
Good news for folks like me hoping that justice would prevail in the Genarlow Wilson case. Here is the early report from the AP of today's major development in the case:
A judge on Monday voided a 10-year sentence for a man accused of having consensual oral sex with a 15-year-old girl when he was 17. He instead gave Genarlow Wilson a 12-month misdemeanor sentence with credit for time already served. The state is likely to appeal the ruling.
Wilson's original sentence, for aggravated child molestation, was widely criticized on the grounds it was grossly disproportionate to the crime, and state lawmakers later passed a law to close the loophole that led to the 10-year sentence.
Wilson, now 21, has already served more than 27 months. He could remain behind bars while the appeal proceeds.
I am not quite sure why (or even how) Wilson can remain incarcerated if he has now been given a sentence that has been fully served. I suppose there may be a mechanism under state law for prosecutors to stay the sentence change ordered today, but I sure hope Wilson gets his release very soon. He certainly does not seem like a flight risk or a danger to the community.
Related posts will background on the Wilson case:
- ESPN effectively covers Genarlow Wilson's sad saga
- Why isn't the severe Georgia sentence constitutionally problematic?
- Another editorial urging release of Genarlow Wilson
- NYT adds to chorus calling for Genarlow Wilson to be freed
- Genarlow Wilson seeking state habeas relief
- Genarlow Wilson state habeas appeal update
June 11, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack
Friday, June 08, 2007
More strong calls for justice for Genarlow Wilson
Because I was in Atlanta this morning for an Eleventh Circuit argument (reported by the media here and here), I saw the print copy of this extended editorial in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution entitled, "Teen's search for justice: Genarlow Wilson's 10-year sentence for consensual sex ought to be thrown out by judge." TChris at TalkLeft here discusses the editorial and the fact that former President Jimmy Carter has spoken out in favor of justice for Genarlow. A ruling on Wilson's state habeas action is expected on Monday.
Recent related posts:
- ESPN effectively covers Genarlow Wilson's sad saga
- Why isn't the severe Georgia sentence constitutionally problematic?
- Another editorial urging release of Genarlow Wilson
- NYT adds to chorus calling for Genarlow Wilson to be freed
- Genarlow Wilson seeking state habeas relief
- Genarlow Wilson state habeas appeal update
June 8, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Wednesday, June 06, 2007
Genarlow Wilson state habeas appeal update
A scheduled hearing on Genarlow Wilson's state habeas action has the Atlanta Journal-Constitution again discussing this remarkable case with this article, entitled "Sex landed him in prison; will petition bail him out?", and this op-ed by columnist Cynthia Tucker, entitled "Genarlow Wilson should be free." For a lot more background, check out these prior posts about the case:
- ESPN effectively covers Genarlow Wilson's sad saga
- Why isn't the severe Georgia sentence constitutionally problematic?
- Another editorial urging release of Genarlow Wilson
- NYT adds to chorus calling for Genarlow Wilson to be freed
- Genarlow Wilson seeking state habeas relief
UPDATE: This AP story provides a brief account of the argument in the Wilson case today, but it has no information about whether and when a ruling on the merits might be forthcoming.
MORE: This updated AP piece indicates that the state judge "says he'll make a decision by Monday in the case of a Georgia man who was sentenced to 10 years in prison for having consensual oral sex with a 15-year-old when he was two years older than she was."
June 6, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Wednesday, April 18, 2007
Will Genarlow Wilson get Duke justice?
The sad Genarlow Wilson case from Georgia (background here and here and here) is generating more press in the wake of the upstanding way in which North Carolina's Attorney General admitted mistakes in the Duke case. Here is some of the latest coverage and commentary:
- From the New York Times, "Dropped Duke Charges Renew Hope in Georgia"
- From the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, "Break legal ranks to right a wrong"
Some recent related posts:
- ESPN effectively covers Genarlow Wilson's sad saga
- Why isn't the severe Georgia sentence constitutionally problematic?
- Another editorial urging release of Genarlow Wilson
- NYT adds to chorus calling for Genarlow Wilson to be freed
- Genarlow Wilson seeking state habeas relief
April 18, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Friday, April 13, 2007
Genarlow Wilson seeking state habeas relief
The sad Genarlow Wilson case from Georgia (background here and here) is back in the news because, as detailed in this news story, Wilson's lawyer, BJ Bernstein "filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus Thursday with the Superior Court of Monroe County." In addition, as detailed on this website, advocates for Wilson are hoping to leverage the events in the Duke rape case to get justice for Wilson. Here's what the website says:
Yesterday we saw the Attorney General of North Carolina step forward as the chief law enforcement officer to correct an injustice by a district attorney in the Duke rape case. Genarlow Wilson now appeals to the Attorney General of Georgia, Thurbert Baker to use his power to act justly, and review and consent to Wilson's habeas petition. As the guardian of justice in this State, we appeal to him to correct this grave injustice.
Makes sense to me.
Some recent related posts:
- ESPN effectively covers Genarlow Wilson's sad saga
- CNN covers Genarlow Wilson case, who's next?
- Why isn't the severe Georgia sentence constitutionally problematic?
- Provocative questions about Georgia sentencing injustice
- The nuance in my provocation
- Another editorial urging release of Genarlow Wilson
- NYT adds to chorus calling for Genarlow Wilson to be freed
- More attention for Genarlow Wilson
April 13, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Tuesday, April 03, 2007
More attention for Genarlow Wilson
I am pleased to see continued major media coverage of Genarlow Wilson's case (prior examples here and here). Here are too more pieces complaining about the extreme sentence Wilson is serving for a consentual sexual encounter with another teenager:
- This item at the Washington Post entitled "Perverted Justice: Updating the Genarlow Wilson Tragedy; Georgia Legislature Snoozes and a Promising Teen Loses."
- This piece from syndicated columnist Leonard Pitts entitled "Still waiting for common sense in Georgia."
April 3, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Thursday, March 29, 2007
A new website inspired by Genarlow Wilson
I have not blogged about the Genarlow Wilson case much lately because there has not been much to report. Despite a flurry of media coverage calling for Wilson's release (details here and here), Georgia officials have not responded and Wilson is now deep into his third year in prison serving a 10-year sentence for a crime that Georgia law now classifies as a misdemeanor subject to only 12 months imprisonment.
Meanwhile, Wilson's case has inspired the creation of a new non-profit organizarion called "My 5th," which has this intriguing new website. The website's home page states, "With this website, blog and workshops, MY 5th wants to prevent you from paying the price for not knowing the law!!!! Use the law, don't let it use you!!!". An intriguing and diverse set of individuals are on My 5th's board, and Wilson's lawyer is listed as the president and founder of the organization. Not suprisingly, Wilson's case is featured here on the My 5th site.
Some related Genarlow Wilson posts:
- Will the Georgia legislature help Genarlow Wilson get justice?
- CNN covers Genarlow Wilson case, who's next?
- ESPN effectively covers Genarlow Wilson's sad saga
- Why isn't the severe Georgia sentence constitutionally problematic?
- CNN with additional coverage of Genarlow Wilson case
- Ugly debate in Wilson case
March 29, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Wednesday, March 28, 2007
A Texas juve case creating controversy
Thanks to posts at TalkLeft and Grits for Breakfast, I have become away of a controversial case of seemingly unduly severe juvenile punishment coming out of Texas. This AP story has these highlights:
A teenager has been jailed for more than a year for shoving a teacher's aide at her high school, sparking anger and heightening racial tensions in rural East Texas. Shaquandra Cotton, now 15, claims the teacher's aide pushed her first and would not let her enter school before the morning bell in 2005.
A jury convicted her in March 2006 on a felony count of shoving a public servant, who was not seriously injured. The girl is in the Ron Jackson Correctional Complex in Brownwood, about 300 miles from her home in Paris.... Under the sentence handed down by Lamar County Judge Chuck Superville, she will remain at the facility until she meets state rehabilitation standards or reaches her 21st birthday.
But her family and civil rights activists say they want her home now. They are condemning the sentence as unusually harsh and say it shows a justice system that punishes young offenders differently, depending on their race. Creola Cotton, Shaquandra's mother, and activists argue that while Superville sent Shaquandra to the state's juvenile prison system, he gave a white 14-year-old arsonist probation. As many as 400 people marched and rallied in Paris on Tuesday, the second such protest in as many weeks by civil rights groups.
Meanwhile, the Paris school district fiercely denied claims of racism and chided the girl's mother for "playing a game" to start controversy.... Creola Cotton is preventing the district from fairly defending itself by refusing to let the school district make her daughter's entire record public, [Paris school district attorney Dennis] Eichelbaum said. "Mrs. Cotton has been wrongfully attacking the character of the district," Eichelbaum said. "She's being disingenuous with regard to her daughter being an innocent child."...
Prosecutors say they offered Shaquandra a plea agreement that would have reduced the felony charge to a misdemeanor and given her two years' probation. But Creola Cotton rejected the plea behalf of her daughter, prosecutors said.
The Dallas South Blog, whose author Shawn Williams comes from Paris, Texas, offers lots of comments on the case here and here and here. Also, there is a blog, Free Shaquanda Cotton, which pleads "Please help me, Shaquanda Cotton, receive proper justice. Leave me notes of encouragement, donate to my trust fund, and spread the word!" That blog has links to other media coverage of this case.
March 28, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment", Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (18) | TrackBack
Thursday, March 01, 2007
Request for hearings on the border agent case
According to this (partisan?) news report, "[t]hirty-eight Republican congressmen have written to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi asking for hearings to investigate the prosecution of Border Patrol agents Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean, who are in prison for their actions in the shooting of a drug smuggler given immunity to testify against them." Here are more details:
The sharply worded letter, sent Tuesday, is critical of the prosecutor, U.S. Attorney Johnny Sutton, and federal investigators. The congressmen say "serious questions remain unanswered by our federal government over the apparently misguided prosecution of two distinguished U.S. Border Patrol Agents, Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean." The letter further charges that relevant federal agencies have "delayed or denied" congressional requests for information and that "certain federal investigators have even misled us about the case."...
The letter also was addressed to Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich., chairman of the House Judiciary Committee; Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee; and Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., chairman of the House Oversight & Government Reform Committee. Among the Republican signatories are Reps. Ted Poe and John Culberson of Texas; Duncan Hunter, Dana Rohrabacher and Mary Bono of California; Dan Burton of Indiana; Frank Wolf of Virginia; and Tom Tancredo of Colorado.
As WND reported, Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., has given Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., permission to investigate the prosecution and sentencing of Compean and Ramos. Feinstein, who said she believes the sentences were "extreme," has postponed the Senate hearings, originally scheduled for Feb. 27.
Some recent related posts:
March 1, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Tuesday, February 27, 2007
Perhaps if Justices Kennedy and Breyer realized the world cares a lot...
about the cert denial in Berger (details here and here), the outcome might have been different. Of course, notwithstanding Justice Kennedy's opinion in Roper and Justice Breyer's willingness to defend reliance on foreign precedents, it is unfair to assert that they would have voted for cert if they knew the cert denied would garner international attention. (Moreover, it is possible that both Justices voted for cert but that there weren't enough other votes.)
Nevertheless, I think it is notable that this afternoon I have been contacted by two members of the foreign press to talk about the Berger case. Specifically, I just finished a long interview with a reporter from Brazil's Vision magazine, and in a few hours I will have the honor of doing an interview with BBC Radio 5Live, which is part of national talk radio in the UK. (Perhaps this is a variation on the Greenhouse effect, since I believe Linda Greenhouse's kind use of my quote in her Berger story has led to my 15 seconds of international fame.)
Some related posts on the Berger case:
- Notable cert news from SCOTUS
- More on the cert denied in Berger
- CJ Roberts and sentencing law: fixing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence?
- Analogizing extreme punitive damages and extreme punitive sentences
- Arizona Supreme Court upholds 200-year sentence for possessing child porn
February 27, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack
Monday, February 26, 2007
More on the cert denied in Berger
Thanks to How Appealing, I see that the AP has a short piece and Reuters has a longer piece on the Berger cert denial. (The case involves first-offender Morton Berger challenging his 200-year prison sentence for possessing child pornography (basics here, commentary here).)
In this earlier post I suggested that, though cert was denied today in the Berger case (recently discussed here), some Ninth Circuit precedents should perhaps give Morton Berger some hope for a federal habeas action. But Orin and Kent in the comments rightly note that Morton Berger's case faces additional hurdle in habeas: the statutory limits on granting relief set out in the AEDPA. (Of course, the Ninth Circuit has been know to find ways around AEDPA. But it was because of habeas headaches that I believed SCOTUS should take up Berger's case on direct review.)
So here is my question to Orin and Kent and anyone else interested in playing along:
What should Berger and his lawyer do now?
Since Berger has already lost in the Arizona Supreme Court, I doubt state collateral review is likely to be successful. I suppose Berger could and should seek a commutation from the Arizona governor or a retroactive change in the law from the Arizona legislature, but the Genarlow Wilson saga highlights that other branches are not so good at doing justice in cases of extreme sentencing. So, is the cert denial the end of the line for Berger?
February 26, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (22) | TrackBack
Friday, February 23, 2007
Another chance for cert in Berger
In my punitive damages commentary here and here after the SCOTUS Philip Morris decision, I have suggested that Justices eager to constitutionally second-guess some harsh corporate punishments should also be willing to constitutionally second-guess some harsh individual punishments. And a case now being reviewed by the Court — in which first-offender Morton Berger challenges his 200-year prison sentence for possessing child pornography (basics here, commentary here) — presents a unique opportunity for the Court (and its new Justices) to grapple with its confusing non-capital Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
As detailed in this docket sheet, the Berger case was discussed by the Justices at conference last week and is now slated to be discussed again today. For various reasons developed in prior posts, the Berger case seems like a great vehicle for the Court to explore its doctrines on what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment:
- What are the odds of a cert grant in Berger?
- CJ Roberts and sentencing law: fixing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence?
- Analogizing extreme punitive damages and extreme punitive sentences
- Might Berger get SCOTUS attention?
- Arizona Supreme Court upholds 200-year sentence for possessing child porn
- What ever happened to state constitutional law, textualism, and libertarianism?
- Liberty versus security in the war on ... sex offenders
February 23, 2007 in Examples of "over-punishment" | Permalink | Comments (9) | TrackBack