Sentencing Law and Policy

Bureau of Justice Statistics releases "Federal Prisoner Statistics Collected Under the First Step Act, 2023"

Providing another report for prison data junkies, the Bureau of Justice Statistics today released this 26-page report titled ""Federal Prisoner Statistics Collected Under the First Step Act, 2023." Here the report's introduction and some of the "Key findings" that seemed most interesting:

The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) requires the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), through its National Prisoner Statistics program, to collect data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) on specific topics and to report these data annually. BJS is required to report on selected characteristics of persons in prison, including marital, veteran, citizenship, and English-speaking status; education levels; medical conditions; and participation in treatment programs. In addition, BJS is required to report facility-level statistics, such as the number of assaults on staff by prisoners, prisoners’ violations of rules that resulted in time credit reductions, and selected facility characteristics including accreditation, on-site healthcare, remote learning, video conferencing, and costs of prisoners’ phone calls.

Collected in 2023, the statistics in this report are for calendar year 2022, which represented the fourth full year of reporting under the FSA. Data for calendar year 2023 will be available from the BOP in 2024. Unless otherwise noted, all counts in this report include persons held in federal correctional facilities operated by the BOP (122 institutional facilities).

• The federal prison population increased about 1%, from 156,542 at yearend 2021 to 158,637 at yearend 2022.

• At yearend 2022, there were 8,627 persons with prior military service in BOP facilities, accounting for about 5% of the total federal prison population.

• The number of non-U.S. citizens in federal prison at yearend 2022 was 24,078, virtually unchanged from 2020 and 2021....

• Seventy percent of persons in BOP facilities at yearend 2022 had earned a high school diploma, general equivalency degree (GED), or other equivalent certificate prior to their admission to federal prison (110,531), and an additional 3,543 earned their GED credential or equivalent certificate during 2022.

• In 2022, there were 10,177 instances of persons in special housing units, a 10% increase from 2021 (9,261)....

• In 2022, 20,880 federal prisoners participated in a nonresidential substance use disorder treatment program, while 12,035 participated in a residential program....

• In 2022, there were 80,490 prohibited acts committed by persons incarcerated in federal prisons....

• In 2022, BOP staff were physically assaulted by federal prisoners 965 times, which resulted in serious injuries 19 times and 12 prosecutions of prisoners....

• The BOP partnered with 1,580 external groups to provide recidivism reduction programming in 122 federal prison facilities in 2022.

• Sixty percent (947) of the BOP’s partnerships that were in place in 2022 to provide recidivism reduction programming were with faith-based groups.

• Of the 145,062 persons in federal prison as of December 31, 2022 assessed with the BOP’s recidivism risk tool, the Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs (PATTERN), 54% were classified as minimum or low risk for recidivism, 27% were classified as high risk for recidivism, and 19% as medium risk at yearend 2022.

• In 2022, PATTERN classified a higher percentage of females than males as minimum or low risk for recidivism (81% compared to 52%).

• As of December 31, 2022, PATTERN classified 61% of black and 59% of American Indian or Alaska Native federal prisoners as a medium or high risk of recidivism, compared to 36% of white and 27% of Asian, Native Hawaiian, or Other Pacific Islander prisoners.

• In 2022, PATTERN classified 83% of federal prisoners ages 55 to 64 and 93% of those age 65 or older as having a minimum or low risk of recidivism.

• In 2022, the BOP identified 41 Evidence-Based Recidivism Reduction (EBRR) Programs and 52 Productive Activities (PAs) that persons in federal prison could access for various needs, including antisocial behavior, anger management, substance abuse, parenting skills, and dyslexia.

You be the political operative: should Donald Trump lean into his sentencing reform record?

The New York Times has this notable new piece, headlined "Pardon Recipients Seek to Sell Trump on His Own Sentencing Law," which prompts the question in the title of this post.  The article meanders a good bit, and it does not really get that deep into either modern sentencing policy and politics.  But, with now less than a year until the 2024 election, it serves as a useful reminder that there will be lots of sentencing policy and politics worth discussing in coming months.  Here are excerpts:

In early July, former President Donald J. Trump received a somewhat unlikely visitor at his golf club and estate in Bedminster, N.J.: Michael Harris, the founder of Death Row Records, who had been imprisoned for drug trafficking and attempted murder, came to meet privately with the man who had pardoned him....

Mr. Harris is the type of high-profile Black celebrity that some Trump associates hope will next year highlight the former president’s signature criminal justice reform law, the First Step Act, which was one of Mr. Kushner’s key priorities during his time as an adviser in the White House.

Although Mr. Harris is not a beneficiary of the sentencing law, having received his pardon on Mr. Trump’s last full day in office after serving decades in prison as part of a series of clemency grants, he has nonetheless become an evangelist for it....

Mr. Harris declined to discuss what took place in their meeting, but he expressed gratitude toward the Trump administration in a statement and praised the sentencing law. “The passing of the First Step Act and similar initiatives surrounding” criminal justice reform “has provided much needed relief for so many deserving individuals and families,” he said....

Not everyone around the former president believes that he should highlight the First Step Act, which Mr. Trump himself soured on soon after signing it. Mr. Trump, who is often influenced by what he thinks his core voters want, felt affirmed in that view after a number of hard-core Republicans began to criticize it in 2021 and 2022 amid a rise in crime. Some of his conservative associates, who see the bill as problematic with Republicans, said privately that they were unhappy that he had met with Mr. Harris....

He has also grown increasingly violent in his rhetoric about crime in America, saying that he admires the freedom that despots have to execute drug dealers and that shoplifters should be shot on the spot.

At the same time, he has made clear that he viewed the law, which, among other things, sought to reduce mandatory minimum sentences for some crimes, as something that should have won him support from Black voters.  “Did it for African Americans,” he wrote to this reporter for a book in 2022 when asked about his repeated expressions of regret about the law. “Nobody else could have gotten it done.  Got zero credit.”...

It remains to be seen how willing Mr. Trump will be, if at all, to speak about the criminal justice law, or whether Mr. Harris might be asked to speak publicly.

The same week that Mr. Harris met with Mr. Trump, the former president received a call from Alice Johnson, whose life sentence on charges related to cocaine possession and money laundering was commuted after a meeting between Mr. Trump and the celebrity Kim Kardashian. Ms. Johnson was the person who recommended to Mr. Kushner and Ms. Trump that Mr. Harris be granted clemency.

“My whole conversation was just encouragement” about the criminal justice reform bill, said Ms. Johnson, who spoke at the Republican National Convention in 2020 and was pardoned by Mr. Trump a short time later. She said no one had asked her to call him or engage in politics for him next year. But, she added, “he actually is proud of that piece of legislation.”

The title of this post reflects my sense that former Prez Trump himself seems to approach sentencing issues (like many others) through the lens of a political operative.  Though a variety of his actions and statements reflect a "tough on crime" posture, Trump proved while he was president that he would be willing to support reforms if he thought there could be potential political advantage therein.  What this exactly this might mean for Trump and the GOP going forward on a wide range of criminal justice issues, especially with Trump himself subject to multiple criminal indictments, remains to be seen.

Detailing yet another challenging detail of earned time credits under the FIRST STEP Act

Walter Pavlo has another effective article in Forbes providing another review of yet another accounting challenge in calculating earned time credits under the FIRST STEP Act. This piece is headlined "Bureau Of Prisons’ Dilemma On First Step Act Credits," and here are excerpts:

The First Step Act (FSA) was signed into law in December 2018. The law allowed prisoners, mostly minimum and low security offenders, to earn a reduction in their sentence for being productive while incarcerated. That productivity is measured by the prisoners’ participation in meaningful programs and having a job while incarcerated. However, nearly five years after the law was enacted, the complexities of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) ability to comply with the law is still being revealed....

According to the BOP’s own program statement:... "An eligible inmate begins earning FSA Time Credits after the inmate’s term of imprisonment commences (the date the inmate arrives or voluntarily surrenders at the designated Bureau facility).”  [But a recent] decision in a federal court in New Hampshire has upended this definition of when FSA Earned Time Credits begins ... [by ruling that] "the date established by the plain language of the FSA upon which [a defendant] is entitled to begin earning FSA time credits is [the date of sentencing]."...

The BOP is in a bad position in that it can either follow the law, which is flawed, because it has no mechanism to measure success under FSA (classes and work assignment) for prisoners not in their custody at the final designated facility. The alternative is that the BOP can follow a judgment from a federal court and award credits to prisoners who have not complied with the programming requirements of FSA.

One solution, or compromise, would be to get prisoners to their final destination in less time, but that does little to those who went through lengthy transportation nightmares getting to their designated facility.  However, even that is outside of the BOP’s power as transportation of prisoners falls under US Marshals.  Another is for the BOP to provide some programming, even a manual, to give to prisoners immediately after sentencing to start the FSA programming and to provide some sort of PATTERN assessment soon after the prisoner is sentenced.  All of these solutions are outside the control of the prisoner who must serve the time with no means to correct the situation other than going to court.

The BOP could change its FSA Program Statement right now to comply with this New Hampshire decision but it has not and it is likely trying to assess how it can comply.  However, the BOP did not appeal the Yufenyuy decision, so many prisoners remain in limbo on this issue. The result is that the FSA continues to experience problems in its implementation and the prisoners and their families are the ones paying the price.

A couple of early celebrations as FIRST STEP Act approaches its fifth anniversary

Though we are still a few months from reaching a full five years since the enactment of the FIRST STEP Act, this past week I have seen this pair of notable new pieces marking the coming notable anniversary of this notable federal criminal justice reform: 

From Arnold Ventures, "Historic Bipartisan Justice Reform Turns Five."  It begins:

Five years ago, in 2018, then President Donald Trump signed the bipartisan First Step Act into law, finalizing one of the most significant changes to federal sentencing and corrections policy since the 1970s.  Recognizing the social and personal toll from decades of rising jail and prison populations, the bill sought to stem the tide of mass incarceration in America. ​ “Criminal justice reform was no longer a niche cause, but one that responded to a nationally recognized social problem with a movement that had itself gone national — with all the internal divisions we might expect,” writes Colleen P. Eren in a new book, Reform Nation: The First Step Act and the Movement to End Mass Incarceration.

From The Crime Report, "The First Step Act: A Five-Year Review and the Path Forward."  It begins:

Signed into law in December 2018, the First Step Act (FSA) now allows federal inmates to significantly reduce their actual penal custody time.  That fits into the primary goal of The Act, which is to reduce recidivism among nonviolent offenders through greater emphasis on rehabilitation in the Bureau of Prisons.

Rounding up some accounts of lengthy SCOTUS oral argument in Pulsifer safety valve case

Regular readers know I have been talking up SCOTUS's first case for oral argument this Term, Pulsifer v. United States, a statutory interpretation case dealing with a (too) complicated sentencing provision of the FIRST STEP Act.  Perhaps because it was the only case on the argument calendar yesterday, the Justice spent almost a full two hours debating the meaning of the word "and" with two capable counsel.  The full oral argument recording and transcript are available here at the SCOTUS website. 

Here are some press discussion of the oral argument in Pulsifer and surrounding realities:

From Courthouse News Service, "Courthouse Rock: Justices play conjunction junction on first day of term"

From The Hill, "Supreme Court opens term with case on prison terms for drug offenders"

From Mother Jones, "Does 'And' Mean 'And'? Or 'Or'? The Supreme Court Will Decide."

From Roll Call, “Congressional conjunction turns Supreme Court argument into grammar class; Justices weigh if ‘and’ means ‘and’ in a criminal sentencing law"

From the New York Times, "On First Day of New Term, Supreme Court Hears Debate Over First Step Act" 

From Slate, "The Supreme Court’s Oddest Pairing Comes out Swinging on Behalf of Criminal Defendants"

Based on a too-quick listen to the full oral argument, I am inclined to guess that this case will end up with a 5-4 vote in favor of the government's proposed statutory interpretation that would restrict the reach of the FIRST STEP Act's expansion of the statutory safety valve exception to drug mandatory minimum sentencing terms.  But I would not entirely discount the possibility that the four Justices who seemed most favorable toward the defendant's reading, particularly Justices Gorsuch and Jackson, might find a way to peel off a key fifth vote (especially since the Chief was pretty quiet throughout and Justice Kagan hinted toward the end that she might be less sure than she seemed at the outset).  

I suppose I can say with certainty that this case will not be resolved 9-0 and that the ultimate opinions likely will be of great interest to statutory interpretation fans as well as to sentencing fans.  I also would guess that we will get ruling in early 2024, though this one might take quite a while if lots of Justices decide to write on lots of broader statutory interpretation topics (like the reach of the rule of lenity and/or the use of legislative history and/or corpus linguistics).  Fun times!

On first Monday in October, another round of previews for SCOTUS's starting sentencing case, Pulsifer v. US

After a rough weekend for US pro golfers and Ohio's pro football teams, I am glad that a new season officially kicks off today with the Supreme Court hearing its first oral arguments to start its October Term 2023.  Actually, the Term arguably got rolling Friday with cert grants in a dozen new cases (though only a couple involved criminal law issues), and also with this morning's lengthy new order list denying cert in hundreds of cases. 

But, for SCOTUS, the first oral argument on the first Monday in October is something like the throwing of the first pitch on baseball's opening day. (And, speaking of baseball, the MLB playoffs should keep October exciting even if SCOTUS does not.)  As I have noted recently, I am especially excited that SCOTUS's first case for argument is Pulsifer v. United States, a statutory interpretation case dealing with a sentencing provision of the FIRST STEP Act.  Stated in a pithy way, the issue in Pulsifer is whether the word "and" as used in the FIRST STEP Act's expansion of the mandatory minimum statutory safety valve actually means "and" or might instead mean "or."  

In this post last week, I noted a few preview pieces about the case, but now I have see a few more worth flagging:

From Lisa-Legalinfo, "SCOTUS Hears Argument Over Meaning Of “And” In First Step Act" 

From SCOTUSblog, "Mandatory minimums, payday lending, and voting rights in first session of Supreme Court term"

From Slate, "The Supreme Court’s First Case Is a Brutal Grammatical Test"

LawProf Aaron Tang authored the Slate commentary, and his closing sentiments seek to connect the (little?) Pulsifer case to the (big?) issues swirling around the Supreme Court at the start of a new Term (with links from original):

If the court wants to push back against the partisan trends in recent terms, it can heed the wise advice once offered by Judge Learned Hand, who remarked that “the spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right.”

By humbly admitting uncertainty on the perplexing issue in Pulsifer, the court can apply a more promising approach to hard cases.  It can rule against whichever side would be best able to avoid the harm of a mistaken ruling — an approach I’ve called the “least harm principle” of judicial decision-making.

Indeed, criminal law already has a doctrine well suited to this principle. It is the “rule of lenity,” or the idea that where criminal statutes are susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations, the court should adopt the defendant-friendly reading.

The best reason for this rule is that it is virtually always harder for criminal defendants to avoid the harm of mistakenly harsh criminal punishments than for the government to avoid the harm of lenient sentences.  Indeed, even if it loses this very case, the government would still have discretion to ask a trial judge to impose a harsher sentence on Pulsifer if it believes he is particularly dangerous.

In the end, the Pulsifer case will not be the most high-profile case the court decides this year.  But the case will provide important initial insights into how the justices are planning to respond to a disastrous summer for its public legitimacy — not to mention the costly mass incarceration crisis that is decimating our communities.  Here’s hoping it does so with a dose of humility.

A few prior related posts about SCOTUS Pulsifer case:

• SCOTUS grants certiorari to review reach of FIRST STEP Act's expansion of statutory safety valve 
• Top-side SCOTUS briefs in Pulsifer address FIRST STEP Act's expansion of statutory safety valve 
• Reviewing the big little and/or case, Pulsifer v. US, that will kick off the new Supreme Court Term

Notable debate among Sixth Circuit judges as court turns down en banc review of "resentencing retroactivity" after FIRST STEP Act

Hard-core sentencing fans may want to check out the opinions authored by a trio of Sixth Circuit judges concurring and dissenting from the denial of en banc review US v. Carpenter, in No. 22-1198 (6th Cir. Sept. 18, 2023) (available here) (en banc review denial).  In this case, the circuit panel held earlier this year that the defendant could not benefit at a resentencing from the FIRST STEP Act's reduction in the severity of stacked 924(c) gun mandatory minimums because he original sentencing pre-dated passage of the FSA.   

A petition for rehearing en banc followed (and I noticed SCOTUS advocate of great renown, Jeff Fisher, listed as one of the lawyers on the petiton).  The petition then was circulated to the full court, but less than a majority of the judges voted in favor of rehearing en banc.  Judge Kethledge (joined by a few judges) authored a concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc.  In that opinion, he explains why he thinks the panel reached the right result under applicable law even though "Carpenter’s sentence was extreme by any measure" and even though "the sentence here would never have been imposed" absent the old pre-FSA mandatory minimums.

Judge Griffin (joined by a few judges) authored a substantive dissent which helps explain the particulars in this opening paragraph:

This appeal arises under the First Step Act, which amended several criminal statutes and reduced mandatory-minimum sentences for certain federal crimes.  For defendant Timothy Carpenter, the Act, if applied, “would reduce his mandatory-minimum sentence on his [18 U.S.C.] § 924(c) convictions by 80 years (from 105 years to 25).” United States v. Carpenter, 2023 WL 3200321, at *1 (6th Cir. May 2, 2023).  But despite the Act’s retroactivity provision extending its benefits to defendants awaiting sentencing, and despite the vacatur of Carpenter’s earlier, invalid, pre-Act sentence, the panel here — following circuit precedent — concluded Carpenter must now be resentenced under the old version of the statute with its outdated sentencing scheme. Id. at *2 (citing United States v. Jackson, 995 F.3d 522, 524–25 (6th Cir. 2021)).  In my view, Jackson was wrongly decided, and this case involves a question of exceptional importance.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.

Judge Bloomekatz (joined by a few judges) dissents to add even more context that, perhaps, is an effort to get at least one Justice's attention. Here is her closing substantive paragraph:

The real human costs that this esoteric legal issue presents also should not be overlooked.  Because our circuit has split from every other to reach this issue, defendants in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee will often have to serve decades longer sentences than those in most of the other states.  Carpenter proves this point.  His sentence is eighty years longer than it would be if he had been resentenced in the seventeen states that comprise the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits. See Dissent at 7.   The resulting sentencing disparity, along with the other reasons I have outlined, should give us pause enough to consider the decision as a full court.  Indeed, the circuit split, the federal government’s position, the dissent from then-Judge Barrett in Uriate, and the dueling opinions on this en banc petition underscore that the scope of the retroactivity provision is far from clear.  See United States v. Uriate, 975 F.3d 596, 606–09 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Barrett, J., dissenting).

Couple of final notes of possible interest: (1) I am pretty sure the Timothy Carpenter of this case is the same guy who got the Supreme Court to review his Fourth Amendment claim back in 2018 in Carpenter v. US; (2) I am pretty sure this Timothy Carpenter has already served 10+ year in prisons, and so may soon be eligible for a reduction in sentence under the "unusually long sentences" criteria in the US Sentencing Commission's proposed new “Compassionate Release” policy statement.

Effective coverage of particulars of First Step Act and guideline amendment implementation

I have frequently flagged Walter Pavlo's work at Forbes because he always effectively covers lots of the important nitty-gritty in the implementation of various federal sentencing and corrections rules and policy.  And over the past week, he has two more important pieces in this space, which I will cover with links and full headlines:

"What The US Sentencing Commission’s Decision Means For First Time Offenders: The US Sentencing Commission recently passed a motion to allow a 2 point reduction against the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The effect could mean freedom for many."

"Bureau Of Prisons’ Challenges With First Step Act Release Dates: The Federal Bureau of Prisons has struggled to implement the First Step Act and one big problem still persists ... predicting when someone will leave prison."

Both of these pieces serve as new reminders of the old aphorism, "The devil is in the details."

"Extraordinary Punishment: Conditions of Confinement and Compassionate Release"

The title of of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Meredith Esser and now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

People experience severe forms of harm while incarcerated including medical neglect, prolonged solitary confinement, sexual and physical violence, and a host of other ills.  But civil rights litigation under the Eighth Amendment — the most common vehicle through which people seek to redress these harms — presents significant practical and doctrinal barriers to incarcerated plaintiffs.  Most notably, the Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” standard asks not whether a person has been harmed, but instead requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a criminally reckless mental state on the part of prison officials.  Further, Eighth Amendment remedies are limited to damages or injunctions, which may not adequately redress a specific harm that a person is suffering.  For these reasons, the Eighth Amendment has often fallen far short of providing litigants adequate relief.

At the same time, once a person is sentenced, the original sentencing judge generally has no control over whether a harm suffered in prison is remedied.  However, since the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, people incarcerated in the federal system have a new vehicle for getting these kinds of claims into court: federal compassionate release. Compassionate release motions are heard by the original sentencing judge, who has the authority to reduce a person’s sentence if they can demonstrate, among other things, “extraordinary and compelling” reasons (ECRs) that warrant relief.

In April of 2023, the Federal Sentencing Commission adopted amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that drastically expanded the ECR definition to include claims based on the types of harms have been traditionally litigated under the Eighth Amendment.  These changes represent a radical and potentially paradigm-shifting reform to federal sentencing law and give district courts enormous discretion to reexamine federal sentences.  Given the challenge of redressing harms under the Eighth Amendment, this Article argues that the expansion of compassionate release ECRs to encompass harmful conditions of confinement makes doctrinal sense and allows for a more appropriate remedy to harms done in prison than traditional civil remedies.

The Sentencing Project releases "The First Step Act: Ending Mass Incarceration in Federal Prisons"

I sense that the upcoming GOP Prez candidate debate, which seems likely to include some discussion of some crime and punishment issues, has prompted a number of groups to complete reports on the First Step Act.  Yesterday brought CCJ's short report on "First Step Act: An Early Analysis of Recidivism."  Today, The Sentencing Project is out with this longer report titled "The First Step Act: Ending Mass Incarceration in Federal Prisons."  This report provides some more background and coverage on various aspects of the First Step Act, and here is how it gets started:

In 2018, Congress passed and then-President Donald Trump signed into law the bipartisan First Step Act, a sweeping criminal justice reform bill designed to promote rehabilitation, lower recidivism, and reduce excessive sentences in the federal prison system.  Lawmakers and advocates across both political parties supported the bill as a necessary step to address some of the punitive excesses of the 1980s and 1990s.

The First Step Act includes a range of sentencing reforms which made the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive, enhanced judicial discretion, created earned time credits, increased good time credits, reduced certain mandatory minimum sentences, and expanded the safety valve that allows persons with minor prior convictions to serve less time than previously mandated.

The First Step Act also seeks to expand opportunities for people in federal prisons to participate in rehabilitative programming to support their success after release. The law aims to produce lower odds of recidivism by incentivizing incarcerated individuals to engage in rigorous, evidence-based rehabilitation and education programming.  In exchange and based on a favorable assessment of risk to the community, they may earn an earlier opportunity for release to community corrections.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) reports promising results thus far. The recidivism rate among people who have benefitted from the law is considerably lower than those who were released from prison without benefit of the law. Among the nearly 30,000 individuals whose release has been expedited by the First Step Act, nearly nine in every 10 have not been rearrested or reincarcerated.  This 12% recidivism rate lies in stark contrast to the more typical 45% recidivism rate among people released from federal prison.

CCJ releases encouraging new short report on "First Step Act: An Early Analysis of Recidivism"

This morning I received an email from the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) linking me to this notable new report authored by Avinash Bhati and titled ""First Step Act: An Early Analysis of Recidivism."   This CCJ press release about the short report provides this effective review of its highlights:

Previous comparisons between FSA releases and the overall federal prison population have not accounted for differences in the groups, including levels of risk of reoffending, tracking periods, and other characteristics. The CCJ analysis estimates recidivism rates among individuals released from the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) prior to the FSA who had similar risk profiles and were tracked for similar periods of time (“similarly situated”) as those released under the FSA.

According to data published by the U.S. Department of Justice, 29,946 people were released from BOP facilities under the FSA from 2020 to 2022.  The Council’s analysis of this data finds that, when compared to similarly situated individuals released from the BOP prior to the Act’s implementation, individuals released under the FSA have:

• An estimated 37% lower recidivism rate. According to BOP data, the recidivism rate for FSA releases is 12.4%, compared to an estimated recidivism rate of 19.8% for similarly situated pre-FSA releases.

• An estimated 3,125 fewer arrests incurred. With a recidivism rate of 12.4%, the people released under the FSA over three years could have accounted for between 3,712 and 4,330 arrests. With an estimated recidivism of 19.8%, an equal number of similarly situated pre-FSA releases could have accounted for between 5,918 and 7,455 arrests over the same three-year period.

Split Fourth Circuit panel reverses denial of sentence reduction motion and orders 20-year reduction based on stacked § 924(c)

A helpful reader made sure that I did not miss a notable Fourth Circuit ruling today in US v. Brown, No. 21-7752 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 2023) (available here). The majority opinion for the court begins this way:

On July 30, 2014, a jury convicted Kelvin Brown on seven counts, including two counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At the time of Brown’s sentencing, his two § 924(c) convictions carried a five- and twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence, respectively. The district court thus sentenced Brown to thirty years in prison for his § 924(c) convictions, and, together with his other five convictions, to fifty-seven years’ imprisonment total.

In July 2020, Brown moved for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Brown primarily argued that his release was warranted because he was at risk of serious illness from COVID-19 and because, under the First Step Act’s amendment to § 924(c) sentencing, he would only be subject to a combined ten-year mandatory minimum for his two § 924(c) convictions if sentenced today.  The district court twice denied Brown’s motion, each time without addressing the disparity between his § 924(c) sentence and the much shorter mandatory minimums the First Step Act now prescribes.

We hold that the district court abused its discretion by denying Brown’s motion because his disparate sentence creates an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for his early release, and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors overwhelmingly favor a sentence reduction.  We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to rectify that disparity and reduce Brown’s prison sentence by twenty years.

The majority opinion concludes with some explanation for why it orders a 20-year sentence reduction rather than another remand:

“Ordinarily, we understand that district courts wield broad discretion in deciding compassionate release motions.” Malone, 57 F.4th at 177.  So, in a different case, we might remedy the district court’s error by remanding for the district court to consider Brown’s disparate sentence in the first instance.  Yet the district court here has already had two opportunities to review Brown’s compassionate release motion: its initial denial of Brown’s motion in July 2020, and its second denial in December 2021 after we remanded Brown’s case for further consideration.  Each time, the district court neglected to address Brown’s disparate sentence. That neglect persisted despite our express recognition in our previous remand order that McCoy — and its holding that disparate § 924(c) sentences can constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release — “is relevant to this case.” Brown, 2021 WL 4461607, at *2 n.4.

The dissent, authored by Judge Quattlebaum, starts this way:

In an extraordinary and, in my view, regrettable decision, the majority reverses the district court’s order denying Brown’s motion for compassionate release.  It does so only by imposing a standard for explaining decisions that is more demanding than what the Supreme Court recently established. Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2405 (2022) (“All that is required is for a district court to demonstrate that it has considered the arguments before it.”).  But the majority does not stop there. It then usurps the district court’s assigned responsibility by stepping in to re-weigh the sentencing factors, substitute its judgment for that of the district court and order a 20-year sentence reduction.  The majority may well be troubled by the length of Brown’s original sentence.  But our ordered system of justice requires that appellate courts apply standards set forth by the Supreme Court. And it requires that discretionary sentencing decisions be made by district court judges.  The majority today does neither.  I dissent.

FIRST STEP Act sentence reduction used to address "FBI invented" conspiracy in which feds were "the real lead conspirator"

The FIRST STEP Act's procedural changes to sentencing reduction motions pursuant to 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) continue to provide not only a critical mechanism to address excessive federal prison sentences, but also a fascinating window on a wide array of problematic aspects of the federal criminal justice system.  Many so-called "compassionate release" motions are often efforts to reduce injustices as much they are efforts to increase compassion in our federal sentencing system.  The latest example of this dynamic story comes from New York federal courts as reported in this AP piece headlined "Judge orders release of 3 of ‘Newburgh Four’ and assails FBI’s role in a post-9/11 terror sting."  Here are the basics:

Three men convicted in a post-9/11 terrorism sting have been ordered freed from prison by a judge who deemed their lengthy sentences “unduly harsh and unjust” and decried the FBI’s role in radicalizing them in a plot to blow up New York synagogues and shoot down National Guard planes.

Onta Williams, David Williams and Laguerre Payen — three of the men known as the “Newburgh Four” — were “hapless, easily manipulated and penurious petty criminals” caught up more than a decade ago in a scheme driven by overzealous FBI agents and a dodgy informant, U.S. District Judge Colleen McMahon said in her ruling Thursday.

“The real lead conspirator was the United States,” McMahon wrote in granting the men’s request for compassionate release, effective in three months. She said that it was “heinous” of the men to agree to participate in what she called the government’s “made for TV movie.” But, the judge added, “the sentence was the product of a fictitious plot to do things that these men had never remotely contemplated, and that were never going to happen.”

She excoriated the government for sending “a villain” of an informant “to troll among the poorest and weakest of men for ‘terrorists’ who might prove susceptible to an offer of much-needed cash in exchange for committing a faux crime.” The U.S. attorney’s office declined to comment on the judge’s decision. A message seeking comment was sent to the FBI.

Citing concerns for the men’s health and her own qualms about the case, McMahon cut the 25-year mandatory minimum sentences she imposed on them in 2011 to time served plus 90 days. She said that would allow time for probation officials to prepare and for Payen’s lawyer to line up supportive housing for the man, who has a severe mental illness.

Judge McMahon's full opinion in US v. Williams, N. 09 CR 558 (CM) (SDNY July 27, 2023), is available at this link.  Here is just one notable passage in an opinion filled with notable passages:

For our purposes, suffice it to say the following: non-moving defendant Cromitie, the lead defendant in this case, was the object of a lengthy sting operation conducted by the FBI with the aid of a most unsavory “confidential informant,” Shaheed Hussain....  Over the course of the next few weeks, at Hussain's direction, he recruited David and Onta Williams and Laguerre Payen, to serve as “lookouts” while Cromitie planted “bombs” manufactured by the FBI at a synagogue and community center in Riverdale.  None of these three defendants had any history as terrorists; like Cromitie, they were impoverished small time grifters and drug users/street level dealers who could use some money. Payen in particular was of questionable mental acuity.  The three men were recruited so that Cromitie could conspire with someone; the real lead conspirator was the United States, but Cromitie could not conspire with the Government.

Nothing about the crimes of conviction was defendants' own doing.  The FBI invented the conspiracy; identified the targets; manufactured the ordnance; federalized what would otherwise have been a state crime (the Bronx “bomb” plot) by driving three of the four men (Onta Williams was not available) into Connecticut to view the “bombs” and “stinger missile launchers” that would be used in the operation; and picked the day for the “mission” (which was filmed in real time so it could be shown on television news the night the men were arrested). On May 20, Hussain drove the four men to Riverdale (they had no way to drive themselves); “armed” the “bomb” (because the hapless Cromitie, despite his “training,” could not figure out how to do it); and told Cromitie how to place the device while David Williams, Onta Williams and Payen performed lookout duty. As soon as the fake device was left by the community center door, law enforcement arrested the four men.

"The First Step Act is a conservative, constructive approach to strengthening public safety"

The title of this post is a line from this new Hill commentary authored by Timothy Head and David Safavian. The piece is a response, of sorts, to the various attacks on the FIRST STEP Act by some GOP Prez candidates (discussed here and here), and here are excerpts:

[O]n occasion, Congress comes to its senses to pass impactful legislation.  And those moments of sensibility are often rooted in conservative principles.  Take the First Step Act, for example — a criminal justice bill supported by large majorities in the House and Senate and signed into law by then-President Trump in 2018.  The bill helped nonviolent prisoners earn shorter sentences through education and work, and it lowered certain mandatory minimum sentences that lacked any public safety benefit.  Data shows that the bill is reducing recidivism, which makes our communities safer.

But as the political season swings into full gear, the law has become the target of criticism from those who believe that a harsh criminal justice system is more effective in reducing crime.  Indeed, some have called for repeal of the legislation.  This is not only ill-informed, but it is also a short-sighted mistake.  Now is not the time to shy away from improving the criminal justice system; instead, we should build upon the First Step Act’s success....

The First Step Act is a conservative, constructive approach to strengthening public safety while giving those in prison a pathway to earning back the public’s trust.  Indeed, we helped craft the legislation in collaboration with public safety leaders and agencies, victims’ rights organizations, stakeholders in state legislatures, and everyday Americans impacted by our criminal justice system.

And the legislation has delivered positive results — not the least of which is a far lower recidivism rate for those who benefitted from the bill.  Because every instance of re-offending means another criminal case with another victim, recidivism is a key indicator of the performance of our criminal justice system.  When measured by recidivism, the benefits of the First Step Act are undeniable....

The First Step Act isn’t the only reform of the justice system that has been successful.  Conservatives also delivered smart but tough policies in the passage of the CARES Act in March 2020, near the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.  The CARES Act was known primarily for its economic relief designed for individuals and small businesses affected by the shutting down of the economy.  But the media has virtually ignored another aspect of the CARES Act, which helped almost 12,000 minimum security federal inmates finish their sentences in home confinement instead of in taxpayer-funded prison cells.  Since its implementation, there has been an astonishingly low recidivism rate of only 0.15 percent — just 17 prisoners committed new crimes.

As conservatives, we want the best for our communities, and part of that includes helping prisoners return home as good spouses, parents, and neighbors while reducing taxpayer costs.  For years, Congress has talked about reducing recidivism and restoring lives. But the successes of the First Step Act and the CARES Act underscore the importance of conservative values in shaping effective legislation that can be enacted.

Instead of trying to score cheap political points, politicians should continue working towards a more effective justice system that cuts crime, makes neighborhoods safer, and offers pathways to rehabilitation.  In doing so, conservatives can continue to earn the American people’s trust for years to come.

I find efforts to brand the FIRST STEP Act as "conservative" to be quite interesting, and I am thinking the line serving as the title of this post could provide the foundation for an interesting question in coming GOP candidate debates (the first of which is slated for next month).  Especially given that Prez Biden has, so far, achieved very little in the criminal justice reform space, I really would find interesting whether and how various GOP candidates (including former Prez Trump) might embrace or assail the FIRST STEP Act as a "conservative" legislative development.

Somewhat relatedly, here are a few other recent commentaries discussing federal justice reform issues and broader political dynamics:

From Forbes, "The Unnecessary Risk Of Incarcerating Minimum Security Inmates"

From The Marshall Project, "Why DeSantis Wants to Kill Trump’s Prison Reform Law"

From the Tampa Bay Times, "Here’s how Gov. DeSantis is trashing criminal justice reform"

Prior related posts:

• Florida Gov DeSantis reportedly gearing up to attack former Prez Trump for his support of FIRST STEP Act
• New GOP Prez candidate DeSantis pledges to repeal FIRST STEP Act 
• Interesting criminal justice news and notes from the GOP campaign trail

Spotlighting notable sentence reduction for prisoner sexually abused by multiple BOP guards

This new NPR piece, headlined "Prison sexual assault victims can now petition for compassionate release," highlights a recent grant of a sentence reduction under 3582(c)(1)(A) for a prisoner who was repeatedly sexually abused by federal prison guards.  Here are the particulars and some broader context:

For years, Aimee Chavira suffered sexual abuse in a Dublin, Calif., federal prison by the officers responsible for protecting her. Now, thanks to a program known as compassionate release, she is free. And her freedom could help pave a similar path for other people who experienced physical or sexual assault behind bars.

"We are very hopeful that this can lead to more women who were abused at Dublin getting out," said Erica Zunkel, Chavira's lawyer.

Chavira, 44, has been home for less than two weeks after learning her request for compassionate release had been granted by a federal judge. Those petitions allow people in prison the chance to convince a court they should be freed because of extraordinary and compelling circumstances.

Typically, those cases involve terminal illness or other dire medical conditions. In April, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a federal body that sets advisory guidelines, voted to expand the bases for compassionate release to include sexual and physical assault by prison workers.

Chavira reported her abuse to a psychologist and a warden at the Federal Correctional Institution, Dublin. But they did nothing. The warden later was convicted of sexual abuse and lying to the FBI. Five other officials have been charged with sexually abusing women at the facility, in what became known as a so-called "Rape Club." One of them, John Bellhouse, was convicted this week on charges that include sexual abuse of an incarcerated person.

Chavira said she knows women from the Dublin prison who have been moved to other facilities, where they continue to suffer retaliation and face trauma. "This is just one prison that's coming out to the light," she said. "What's happening in all the rest of the prisons with the rest of the people that don't have any help or a voice?"

Last year, a bipartisan probe by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found widespread sexual abuse by officers in federal prisons with few consequences for those officers....

Zunkel, the associate director of the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School, said it's important that Chavira and other survivors of assault get released as soon as possible. "The experts confirm it doesn't matter if you're moved to a different prison, it doesn't matter if they're offered the very best therapy possible, the Bureau of Prisons is a fundamentally unsafe place for a survivor of sexual violence to recover from," Zunkel said.

In Chavira's case, prosecutors did not object to her request for compassionate release....

Chavira said she's determined to speak out for all the people she met in prison who are still experiencing abuse and poor conditions behind bars. "There is no help, if you went in in one piece, you're coming back out in a million pieces, because you're beyond broken," she said. For now, she said she intends to get stronger emotionally and "show everybody, you know, I went through this, and I got out of it."

The short ruling granting compassionate release is available here and the detailed motion filed by Erica Zunkel on behalf of Aimee Chavira is available here.

A long-form account of one small part of modern stories about compassionate release for dying federal prisoners

Anyone interested at all in the topic of compassionate release should be sure to make time to read this extended account of one federal prisoner's quest to help fellow prisoners secure end-of-life sentence reductions. This piece by Anna Altman for The Atavist Magazine is fully titled "The Quality of Mercy: Gary Settle has helped dozens of federal prisoners get compassionate release. Will it ever be his turn to go home?". Here is one small snippet of very long piece that is worth the time to read in full:

Compassionate release is grounded in the idea that changes to a person’s health may weaken the justification for their incarceration.  What reason is there for imprisoning someone with Alzheimer’s when he no longer understands that he is being punished?  When someone with late-stage liver disease can’t get out of bed and is no longer a threat to society?  When “rehabilitation” is no longer feasible because a person has advanced cancer?  “We’re not doing any social good, if we were in the first place, in keeping them locked up,” [FAMM's Mary] Price said.  “And we can do a great deal of good in terms of helping people repair relationships and comfort each other and say goodbye.”

There is also a financial calculus that works in the BOP’s favor, one noted prominently in a 2013 DOJ report on compassionate release: It’s almost always cheaper to release sick people than to keep them locked up until they die.  One study found that the annual cost of caring for just 21 seriously ill prisoners in California was almost $2 million per person, while the median per capita cost of nursing home care in the state was $73,000 per year.

After a judge allowed [terminal cancer patient R.] Smith to go home, Settle noticed a shift at Butner.  He later wrote an email to FAMM, trying to put into words what he was witnessing.  “In this place of death and dying, among incarcerated men who are holding on to life with nothing but more cells, more keys, more misery in their future, your efforts are having real, tangible results.  Your efforts are giving hope,” he wrote.  “You are giving life back to people, and you are giving them the most precious gift of all, time. Time to heal old wounds, to take a last breath of freedom and to leave this world with peace and dignity.”

FAMM worked closely with Settle through the summer and fall of 2019 to help people at Butner.  “We didn’t appoint him,” Price said. “He appointed himself.”  Settle made copies of FAMM’s newsletter and distributed them to his neighbors.  He kept an eye out for people whose health was worsening and approached those he thought might qualify for compassionate release.  He told them what he knew about the First Step Act, which he had studied, and about the Compassionate Release Clearinghouse.  He spent six to eight hours a day requesting medical records, addressing envelopes, and updating his contacts on the outside about various cases.  Settle read medical records, cross-referencing terms with a diagnostic manual and a medical encyclopedia he’d ordered, so he could send the most pertinent information about sick prisoners to their lawyers.  Before long his cell was covered with piles of paper.

Settle also relayed information from incarcerated individuals to their family members.  He helped people who were too sick to make it to a computer, those who had been transferred off-site for care, and others who had never learned to read or write.  Sometimes he wrote compassionate release requests himself, parroting the language he had seen in other applications.  The ones that went to the BOP were all but certain to be rejected or ignored, but that was part of the process: For a prisoner to file a motion directly with a judge, they first had to “exhaust administrative remedies,” in legal parlance.

Word got around Butner about what Settle was doing.  He would leave his cell after a nap to find four or five guys gathered outside, some of them in wheelchairs with paperwork in their laps.  He was willing to assist just about anyone — he said he only refused people convicted of sex crimes.  “Gary is able to form relationships with all kinds of people,” said Juliana Andonian, an attorney who used to work at FAMM.  “He didn’t want to make himself the center of the story.  That was really notable, the lack of ego.”

It isn’t uncommon for people in prison to help one another with legal matters.  Jailhouse lawyers — some with legal training, some without—review statutes in a prison’s law library, file paperwork, and perform other tasks for fellow prisoners, often for a fee or some other form of compensation.  “Someone less sincere could make a lot of money or do a lot of harm,” Andonian said.  Settle refused payment, even to cover the cost of emails he sent and phone calls he made.  The mother of a man Settle helped go home remembered sending him a thank-you note.  “That’s about all he let me send him,” she said.

One day a thought dawned on Price.  “He is doing this job that the Bureau of Prisons should be doing,” she said.  “They should be moving heaven and earth to be sure that people are connected to family and loved ones when they’re near the end of their lives.”

Top-side SCOTUS briefs in Pulsifer address FIRST STEP Act's expansion of statutory safety valve

Though we still await opinions in a number of criminal justice cases this SCOTUS Term (which all should be decided in the next few weeks, some details here), I am already excited for the fascinating little sentencing case the Justices already have on tap for next Term.  As flagged here, the Justices in late February granted certiorari in Pulsifer v. United States.  Stated in a pithy way, the issue in Pulsifer is whether the word "and" as used in the FRIST STEP Act's expansion of the mandatory minimum statutory safety valve actually means "and" or might instead mean "or." 

As I have noted before, federal criminal justice practitioners and sentencing fans should be following Pulsifer closely because its resolution will impact how thousands of drug defendants are sentenced in federal courts every year.  And statutory construction gurus should also be interested in how Pulsifer addresses statutory issues related to textualism, plain meaning and the rule of lenity.  

Though SCOTUS oral argument in Pulsifer will not be scheduled until October of November, the first set of briefs were filed in the last few weeks.  Specifically, SCOTUSblog has assembled on this Pulsifer case page the merits brief filed by Mark R. Pulsifer as well as four distinct amici briefs (three in support of Pulsifer and one in support of neither party).  The briefs all make for interesting reads and reinforce my sense that Pulsifer will be a fun one at oral argument and beyond.

US Sentencing Commission releases a few updated "Quick Facts" and latest "compassionate release" data

The US Sentencing Commission has recently released some new sentencing data reports.  Long-time readers have long heard me praise the USSC for producing insightful little data documents in the form of its "Quick Facts" publications (which are designed to "give readers basic facts about a single area of federal crime in an easy-to-read, two-page format").  The USSC recent posted these four new entries:

• NEW  Offenders in the Federal Bureau of Prisons (May 2023)
• NEW  Drug Trafficking (May 2023)
• NEW  Fentanyl Trafficking (May 2023)
• NEW  Fentanyl Analogue Trafficking (May 2023)

There are so many notable and interesting little data items in these little documents, and I hope to find time to mine a few data notes in the days ahead.  In addition, the USSC's website promises "more updated Quick Facts coming soon."

In addition, the USSC also recently published this updated "Compassionate Release Data Report." This report, which has information covering from October 2019 through March 2023, includes new data on sentence reduction motions under section 3582(c)(1)(A) filed with the courts and decided during the first two quarters of fiscal year 2023. Not surprisingly, this data report shows continued month-over-month declines in the number of sentence reduction motions filed and granted since the heights of the COVID pandemic. And yet, the USSC data show that there are still more of these motions being filed and being granted in recent times than was being granted before the pandemic.

New GOP Prez candidate DeSantis pledges to repeal FIRST STEP Act

I noted in this post a few month ago a press report that Florida Gov Ron DeSantis was planning to assail former Prez Trump for his support of the FIRST STEP Act back in 2018. And, sure enough, with days of announcing his candidacy for President, Gov DeSantis has attacked Trump's signature criminal justice reform achievement. This Fox News piece, headlined "Ron DeSantis rips Trump over First Step Act, vows to repeal it: 'Basically a jailbreak bill'," provides these details:

Republican presidential candidate and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis vowed Friday to seek a repeal of President Trump's signature First Step Act, a bipartisan criminal justice reform bill that aimed to reduce recidivism, allowed a pathway for non-violent prisoners to shorten their sentences, and reduced mandatory minimum sentences.

"Under the Trump administration — he enacted a bill, basically a jailbreak bill, it's called the First Step Act. It has allowed dangerous people out of prison who have now re-offended, and really, really hurt a number of people," DeSantis said in an interview with the Daily Wire.

"So one of the things I would want to do as president is go to Congress and seek the repeal of the First Step Act. If you are in jail, you should serve your time. And the idea that they're releasing people who have not been rehabilitated early, so that they can prey on people in our society is a huge, huge mistake," he added.

DeSantis voted for the first version of the bill as a member of the House of Representatives in 2018, the same year he was elected as Florida's governor, but had resigned before the final, more moderate version of the bill came to a vote in the chamber.

Trump's campaign responded to DeSantis by pointing to his original vote, and argued he was basically criticizing his own supporters in Congress who also voted for the bill. "Lyin' Ron. He voted for the First Step Act. Would be a shame if there was video of him praising it in an interview with a local FL television station..." Trump campaign spokesperson Stephen Cheung tweeted following the DeSantis' interview.

"DeSantis supporter [Rep. Thomas Massie, R-Ky.] voted for the bill as well. DeSantis is calling out his own Congressional supporters and throwing them under the bus," he later added in a separate tweet.

Justice Department releases latest annual report on FIRST STEP Act implementation

The US Department of Justice recently released this notable report titled simply "First Step Act Annual Report, April 2023." Here is the 50+-page report's simple introduction:

The First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act,” “FSA,” or “Act”) was the culmination of a bipartisan effort to improve criminal justice outcomes and reduce the size of the federal prison population, while maintaining public safety. Under Section 101 of the Act, now codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3634, the Attorney General is required to submit a report beginning two years after the date of enactment, and annually thereafter for a period of five years.  The Department of Justice (the Department) submitted its last such report to Congress in April 2022.  This is the third Annual Report submitted pursuant to Section 3634.

What follows is an extraordinary amount of information and data about FIRST STEP Act implementation on many fronts, and here is just one of a half-dozen items of note that is flagged in the report's executive summary:

Enhance the use of home confinement and prerelease custody.  Consistent with the FSA’s emphasis on transitioning individuals to a community setting, the Department has expanded the use of home confinement for individuals who do not pose a danger to the community.  As of January 28, 2023, 13,501 individuals have been released from Residential Reentry Centers (RRCs), home confinement (HC), and secure facilities pursuant to credits earned under the First Step Act.  On April 4, 2023, the Department also issued a final rule granting discretion to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to allow individuals placed in home confinement under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act to remain in home confinement after the expiration of the covered emergency period.  The final rule provides the Bureau the discretion and flexibility to impose proportional and escalating sanctions for individuals who commit infractions, including returning them to prison.  It also allows the Bureau to move individuals into RRCs when needed, including instances when the home residence is no longer viable or due to either minor accountability issues or non-significant disciplinary issues.  Consistent with the final rule, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons also instructed that any individual placed on home confinement under the CARES Act will remain on home confinement under the CARES Act for the remainder of their sentence, provided that they are compliant with the rules and regulations of community placement.  Since the enactment of the CARES Act on March 26, 2020, the Bureau of Prisons has placed more than 12,000 individuals in home confinement under CARES Act authority.  Of those, only a fraction of one percent has been returned to secure custody due to new criminal conduct.

Eighth Circuit panel seemingly misreads the US Sentencing Commission's sentence reduction guideline amendment

I have previously blogged here and here about the US Sentencing Commission's decision to amend the so-called commpassionate release guideline, formally "§ 1B1.13 - Reduction in Term of Imprionment under 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A) (policy statement)."  There are lots of intricate elemens to this amendment, and one key provision concerned the authority of judges to consider "changes in the law" as a basis to satisfy the statutory requirement of finding "extraordinary and compelling reason" for a sentence reduction. 

This issue was the only one clearly dividing the new Commissioners: four Commissioners voted for a new provision -- § 1B1.13(b)(6) -- that expressly states that, in certain circumstances, "changes in the law ... may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances."  Three other Commissioners voted againt this provision because they did not believe  the USSC should ever allow "changes in the law" to be considered in determining whether a defendant presents and "extraordinary and compelling reason" for a sentence reduction.

A helpful reader sent me an Eighth Circuit opinion, US v. Rodriguez-Mendez, No. 22-2399 (8th Cir. April 25, 2023) (available here), that seems to misread just what the USSC has done with this amendment to the reduction-in-sentence guideline.  In this case, the panel first explains that the Eighth Circuit had pervious "held that a non-retroactive change in law regarding sentencing ...  cannot contribute to a finding of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for a reduction in sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)."  Then the panel rejects the defendant's argument that the Supreme Court's opinion in Concepcion v. US, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), required changing that prior holding.  (I disagree with that reading of Concepcion, as explained here, but a number of courts have adopted it.)  

Then, in the last few paragraphs of this new Rodriguez-Mendez opinion, the Eighth Circuit panel mentions that the Sentencing Commission’s proposed amendment to § 1B1.13.  But after quoting key provisions of the amendment, the panel states (with my emphasis added): "It thus appears that the Commission proposes to adopt (or to express more clearly) that nonretroactive changes in sentencing law may not establish eligibility for a § 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction, as we held in Crandall, but may be considered in exercising a court’s discretion whether to grant compassionate release relief to an eligible defendant, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion."   But this seems flatly wrong because, as noted above, the new language of § 1B1.13(b)(6) expressly states that, in certain circumstances, "changes in the law ... may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason."  In other words, the Commission in this new guideline is providing that nonretroactive changes in sentencing law CAN establish eligibility for a § 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction in some circucumstances.  (And, notably, the defedant in this case, Rodrigo Rodriguez-Mendez, might well meet the circumstances the Commission set forth for "change in the law" to provide the basis for a sentence reduction.)

I have argued in this post that the new amended provision of "§ 1B1.13 - Reduction in Term of Imprionment under 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)" could and should be seen to now overrule prior circuit rulings that changes in law cannot provide a basis for a sentence reduction.  But some may reasonably claim that the amendment to § 1B1.13 only should be given effect after November 1, 2023, which is when all the new guideline amendments will become effective.  But I do not think anyone can reasonably claim, as the Eighth Circuit panel seems to do here, that the new amended guideline serves to codify the claims of some circuits that changes in law can never provide a basis for a sentence reduction.

Notable new Roll Call review of congressional views of US Sentencing Commission's debate over sentence reductions

Roll Call has this notable new piece discussing the debate over the new federal sentencing guidelines for sentence reduction motions.  The article mostly discusses the politics surrounding reform rather than all the particulars of the legal reforms, and I am not sure it breaks any new ground.  But it is still a useful read for those keeping up on these matters, even though the text and even the headline of the piece is a bit off legally.  Here are excerpts:

A federal agency has given judges a new tool to reduce unusually long sentences for some prisoners if there is a change in a law, an approach Republican senators warned will hamper, if not destroy, the possibility of future criminal justice legislation.

The policy approved this month by the low-profile U.S. Sentencing Commission is deep in the legal weeds, giving guidance for federal judges on how to interpret a section of a sweeping bipartisan overhaul of the federal criminal justice system passed in 2018.  But the debate on that approach, which goes into effect in November unless Congress disapproves it, offers an inside look at the negotiations and challenges for lawmakers who want to take more steps to address racial inequality in the criminal justice system through sentencing changes...

In the 2018 criminal justice law, Congress allowed federal inmates to directly ask courts to release them from prison for extraordinary and compelling reasons. Judges released thousands of inmates through that mechanism during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Under the sentencing guidance the commission adopted this month, a change in a law could be potential grounds for reducing a defendant’s sentence. Specifically, judges could consider reducing the sentence of an inmate who has served 10 years of an “unusually long sentence” if there is a “gross disparity” between their sentence and sentences imposed under new law.

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Sen. Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, who was the lead Republican on the push for the 2018 law, warned the commission that the guidance would cause problems for future bills that would reduce prison sentences. McConnell in a February letter to the commission said that no issue was more controversial during the debate on the 2018 law than whether it would be applied retroactively to those already in prison. Congress is extremely careful with use of retroactivity — if lawmakers want something to be retroactive, they typically say so clearly in the law — and so guidance that approves of judges doing so would “poison the well” in Congress, he said....

The guidelines went through changes following the comments from Senate Republicans and Democrats, but the thrust of the provision remained the same and the commission voted for guidelines that approve of judges retroactively considering certain sentences.

I am inclined to dicker with the very first clause of the article — "A federal agency has given judges a new tool to reduce unusually long sentences for some prisoners if there is a change in a law" — because it was Congress who created the tool to reduce sentences under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and Congress did so way back in 1984.  In addition, as this article notes, the FIRST STEP Act of 2018 (another act of Congress) allowed this tool to function more effectively by allowing prisoners to make motions directly in court for sentence reduction without awaiting a filing by the Bureau of Prisons. 

Moreover, since passage of the FIRST STEP Act, many circuits have ruled that a change in law could be potential grounds for reducing a defendant’s sentence in any and every case, whereas the new guidelines promulated by the US Sentencing Commission significantly restricts the circumstances under which a change of law can be the basis for a sentencing reduction.  Thus, I think a more accurate openning line might have been something like: "A federal agency has narrowed the reach of a long-standing tool that Congress provided to judges as a means to reduce sentences which had become far more widely used after passage of the bipartisan FIRST STEP Act."

GAO releases big report concluding "Bureau of Prisons Should Improve Efforts to Implement its Risk and Needs Assessment System"

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has released this big new Report to Congressional Committees fully titled "Federal Prisons: Bureau of Prisons Should Improve Efforts to Implement its Risk and Needs Assessment System."  The full report runs over 100 pages, but it starts with "Highlights" that include this text:

Why GAO Did This Study

Approximately 45 percent of people released from a federal prison are rearrested or return within 3 years of their release.  The First Step Act included certain requirements for DOJ and BOP aimed to reduce recidivism, including requiring the development of a system to assess the recidivism risk and needs of incarcerated people.  It also required BOP to provide incarcerated people with programs and activities to address their needs and if eligible, earn time credits.

The First Step Act required GAO to assess the DOJ and BOP’s implementation of certain requirements.  This report addresses the extent to which DOJ and BOP implemented certain First Step Act requirements related to the (1) risk and needs assessment system, (2) identification and evaluation of programs and activities, and (3) application of time credits.

GAO reviewed legislation and DOJ and BOP documents; analyzed 2022 BOP data; and interviewed DOJ and BOP headquarters officials and BOP’s employee union.  GAO also conducted non-generalizable interviews with officials from four BOP regional offices facilities, selected to ensure a mix of different facility characteristics.

What GAO Found

Since the enactment of the First Step Act of 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) developed a risk assessment tool to measure an incarcerated person’s risk of recidivism.  In addition, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) modified its existing needs assessment system to identify incarcerated people’s needs, that if addressed may reduce their recidivism risk. However, BOP does not have readily-available, complete, and accurate data to determine if assessments were conducted within required First Step Act and internal timeframes. As of October 2022, BOP plans to implement monitoring efforts to assess First Step Act requirements, but has not determined if these efforts will measure whether assessments are completed on time.  Without such data and monitoring, BOP is not in a position to determine if staff complete assessments on time, which are necessary for earning First Step Act time credits.  These time credits may allow incarcerated people to reduce the amount of time they spend in a BOP facility.

BOP created a plan to evaluate its evidence-based programs, as required by the First Step Act.  However, the plan did not include quantifiable goals that align with certain First Step Act requirements, or have clear milestone dates.  By including such elements in its plan, BOP will be better positioned to ensure its evaluations are conducted in a timely manner, and align with the First Step Act.  BOP has some data on who participates in its programs and activities, but does not have a mechanism to monitor if it offers a sufficient amount. Without such a mechanism, BOP cannot ensure it is meeting the incarcerated population’s needs.  Further, while BOP offers unstructured productive activities for which incarcerated people may earn time credits, BOP has not documented a complete list or monitored them.  Without doing so, BOP cannot ensure it provides transparent information.

BOP’s procedure for applying time credits has evolved over time.  Initially, BOP did not have data necessary to track time credits and developed an interim approach in January 2022.  Subsequently, BOP implemented an automated-calculation application for time credits that took into account factors the interim procedure did not.  As a result, some incarcerated people may have had their time credits reduced.  In November 2022, BOP issued its First Step Act Time Credits program statement, with new procedures.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making eight recommendations for BOP to improve its implementation of the First Step Act, including collecting data, ensuring its evaluation plan has goals and milestones, having monitoring mechanisms, and tracking unstructured productive activities. BOP concurred with six recommendations, but did not concur with two.  GAO continues to believe these are valid.

Highlighting the continuing challenges of calculating FIRST STEP Act earned time credits

At Forbes, Walter Pavlo has this new piece, headlined "The Bureau Of Prisons Evolving Calculation Of First Step Act," on the continuing challenges of applying a key aspect of prison reform part of the big federal criminal justice reform bill passed back in 2018.  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

Since January 2022, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has been trying to determine how to calculate how the First Step Act (FSA), a law signed by President Donald Trump in December 2018.  As we enter March 2023, there still is no clear direction on the calculation and the frustration has grown among prisoners and families who are anxiously waiting on a determination of when a federal prison term will end....

The premise of FSA is to reward federal prisoners’ participation in meaningful classes meant to return a better citizen to society and, hopefully, reduce the chances of them returning to prison.... The BOP initially calculated the FSA credits manually beginning in January 2022 when the Federal Register published the Final Rule on FSA. The initial BOP calculations for minimum level offenders with minimum chances of recidivism was that 15 days per month started from the beginning of the prison term, something more generous than what was even stated in the FSA law. Prisoners across the country were released based on this calculation.  This initial and interim manual calculation was used through August 2022 when the BOP rolled out a new auto-calculator.  That auto-calculator had a major interpretation that was not a part of FSA either, which stopped all credits from being earned once the prisoner was 18 months from release. This was particularly hard on those prisoners with shorter sentences.

As December 2022 came to a close, the BOP’s auto-calculator interpretation came under scrutiny from U.S. Senators Dick Durbin and Chuck Grassley, the law’s biggest proponents. Suddenly, the BOP changed course and another calculation was promised and it landed with yet another interpretation that is limiting the amount of credits prisoners can earn.

The BOP is now in its third iteration of FSA calculation and this is just as confusing as its first.  Now the BOP is stating that prisoners can only earn 10 credits per month for the first year of incarceration....

Prisoners across the country are taking their cases to federal court asking for relief and for federal judges to get involved in determining the duration of the prison sentence.  In a case in the District of Maryland (Sreedhar Potarazu v BOP, Case No. 1:22-cv-01334) the case manager for the plaintiff gave his own interpretation of how credits were applied by the BOP, giving Mr. Potarazu 10 credits per month for nearly 3 years of his sentence.  There was no basis for the calculation which did not cite specific policy on which the calculation was based, providing even more confusion among both prisoners and staff across the BOP.  Previously, the BOP has used declarations, which were similarly not based on a specific policy, from executives at its Central Office.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the FSA will be finally determined by a federal court decision and not by what should be a simple interpretation of the law by the BOP. However, many prisoners who await the outcome from court decisions will have spent weeks or months in prison unnecessarily.

Former BOP director talks up need for second step to follow up FIRST STEP Act

Hugh Hurwitz, who served as Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons from May 2018 to August 2019, has this notable new Hill commentary headlined "First Step Act was only half the job; now a ‘Second Step’ is needed." It is worth reading in full, and here are  excerpts:

The First Step Act (FSA) was a landmark achievement in the area of criminal justice reform.  It came at a time of partisan politics and a divided Congress and was the only significant bi-partisan legislation passed during the Trump administration....  I had a unique viewpoint at this time: I was Acting Director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) during the negotiations and ultimate passage of the FSA....  But how successful is it?  I argue it was a small start, hopefully, on the way to something bigger.

The FSA had two primary goals: 1) to reduce the overcrowded prison population in the BOP and 2) to provide incentives for people in prison to take recidivism reducing programs which will increase the likelihood that they will succeed upon their release and not return to prison.  In my opinion, the FSA succeeded wildly in number 1, and failed miserably in number 2.  So, in short, yes, we definitely need something bigger: a second step.

While up-to-date data has not been made available, it appears that somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 people have already been released early under the FSA, with thousands more in the queue.  BOP is still calculating how people earn time credits, and they continue to release more in batches.  Based on those numbers alone, it is hard to argue that the FSA was not successful in reducing the prison population.

The primary incentive offered under the FSA is time credits for completion of recidivation reducing programs. Application of these time credits will allow some people to complete their sentence early and transfer to supervised release, and others to transfer early to halfway houses or home confinement.  The problem with the FSA is that while it incentivizes people to take recidivism reducing programs, the only people eligible for the coveted time credits are those already deemed to be minimum- or low-risk for recidivating.  Said another way, only people assessed as minimum- and low-risk for recidivism are eligible to earn time credits leading to early release. But those are not the people we should be incentivizing to take recidivism reducing programs.  The ones who truly need these programs are those deemed to be of medium or high risk of recidivating.  Aren’t those the people we should be focusing on?  But the FSA does not allow these people to earn time credits....

Let me be clear: I am not saying the FSA is a bad law.  On the contrary, it has resulted in increased program opportunities and other changes to our federal prison system, and it has reduced the number of people in federal prisons.  What I am saying is that the need for a Second Step is great, as people deemed medium or high risk of recidivating are released without the benefit of critical recidivism reducing programs.

About 95 percent of the people currently in our nation’s prisons will be released to our communities. They will be our neighbors.  Isn’t it imperative that we do all we can to ensure that upon release they have the skills, tools, and resources to be productive, law-abiding members of society?  We need Congress to act now, in another bi-partisan effort, to pass laws that will ensure everyone incarcerated today is incentivized and given access to programs that will help reduce their recidivism risk.

SCOTUS grants certiorari to review reach of FIRST STEP Act's expansion of statutory safety valve

As predicted in this post a couple days ago, sentencing fans now get to turn their attention to the Supreme Court for the next chapter of a fascinating FIRST STEP Act statutory interpretation issue.  Specifically, in this morning's SCOTUS order list, one of the two cases receiving certiorari grants was Pulsifer v. United States.  Here is the (lengthy) question presented as set forth in the defendant's cert petition:

The “safety valve” provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)–(5).  Congress amended the first set of criteria, in § 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he “does not have — (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).

The question presented is whether the “and” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means “and,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the “and” means “or,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).

Notably, as regular readers know, the circuit split on this issue has deepened to include two more circuits on both sides of the debate.  Federal criminal justice practitioners and sentencing fans certainly will be following this case closely because its resolution will impact thousands of drug defendants sentenced in federal courts every year. But statutory construction gurus (and isn't that everyone) will also surely be interest in the debates this case can present about textualism, plain meaning and the rule of lenity. Stay tuned.

Split over reading of the FIRST-STEP-amended safety valve provision appears ready for SCOTUS review

In this post a couple of days ago, which discussed the latest notable circuit opinion interpreting the language Congress used in the FIRST STEP Act to expand the statutory safety valve enabling more federal drug defendants to be sentenced below mandatory minimum terms, I suggested it was only a matter of time before SCOTUS takes up the statutory interpretation dispute that has deeply divided lower courts.  And this new Relist Watch post by John Elwood at SCOTUSblog suggest it may actually be only a matter of days before cert is granted on this issue:

The Supreme Court will meet this Friday to consider whether to grant review in a group of around 95 petitions and motions. They will be considering eight cases for the second time....

Under the “safety-valve” provision of federal sentencing law, a defendant convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes can obtain relief from statutory mandatory minimum sentences if, among other things, her criminal history satisfies criteria in 18 U.S.C § 3553(f)(1): she “does not have — (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.”

Pulsifer v. United States and Palomares v. United States present the question of how that provision should be read: whether a defendant is ineligible for relief from the mandatory minimum if her criminal history runs afoul of any one of the disqualifying criteria in subsections (A), (B), or (C), or is ineligible only if her criminal history runs afoul of all three disqualifying criteria, subsections (A), (B), and (C).  The government agrees that the circuits are divided and review is warranted, and recommends that the court take Pulsifer, which it says is the better vehicle.  Counsel for Palomares and Pulsifer trade barbs in their reply briefs about which is the better vehicle.  Probably at least one will get the grant.

I share the view that, if the Justice Department is advocating for review, we ought to expect a grant on one of these cases perhaps as early as Monday.  My understanding is that a grant now would set the case up for Fall 2023 argument and likely no decision from SCOTUS until early 2024. 

Fourth Circuit panel joins minority of circuits giving broad reading to FIRST-STEP-amended safety valve provision

I have noted in a handful of prior posts some of the notable circuit rulings concerning the complicated language that Congress used in the FIRST STEP Act to expand the statutory safety valve enabling more federal drug defendants to benefit from its authorization for below mandatory-minimum sentences.  A helpful reader made sure I did not miss the latest opinion on this topic, this one coming from a Fourth Circuit panel in US v. Jones, No. 21-4605 (4th Cir. Feb 21, 2023) (available here).  Here is how the opinion starts and concludes:

The safety valve provision found in the First Step Act allows a district court to impose a sentence without regard to a mandatory minimum if certain criteria are met.  Relevant here, the court must find that the defendant “does not have . . . more than 4 criminal history points, . . . a prior 3-point offense, . . . and a prior 2-point violent offense” (the “criminal history characteristics”). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).  Cassity Jones has more than four criminal history points but does not have a prior three-point offense or two-point violent offense.  The district court concluded that a defendant must have all three criminal history characteristics to be ineligible for relief and applied the safety valve in sentencing Jones.  The sole issue on appeal is whether the word “and” in § 3553(f)(1) connecting the criminal history characteristics applies conjunctively or disjunctively.  We conclude that “and” is conjunctive and affirm the district court’s decision....

Ultimately, whether or not this is a prudent policy choice is not for the judiciary to decide: that determination lies solely with the legislative branch.  And “[t]he [G]overnment’s request that we rewrite § 3553(f)(1)’s ‘and’ into an ‘or’ based on the absurdity canon is simply a request for a swap of policy preferences.” Lopez, 998 F.3d at 440.  We cannot “rewrite Congress’s clear and unambiguous text” simply because the Government believes it is better policy for the safety valve to apply to fewer defendants. Id. “The remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress and not with this Court.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982); see also id. (“Congress may amend the statute; we may not.” (citations omitted)).

Accordingly, we are persuaded that the plain text of § 3553(f)(1) requires a sentencing court to find that a defendant has all three of the listed criminal history characteristics before excluding a defendant from safety valve eligibility.

Helpfully, a footnote early in the opinion details the circuit split over whether "and" means "and" or "and" means "or" in the context of this FIRST STEP Act revision of the application statute:

The circuits are split on this issue.  Compare United States v. Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (concluding that only a defendant with all three criminal history characteristics is ineligible under § 3553(f)(1)), and United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2021) (same), with United States v. Palomares, 52 F.4th 640 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding that having any one of the criminal history characteristics renders a defendant ineligible under § 3553(f)(1)), United States v. Pace, 48 F.4th 741 (7th Cir. 2022) (same), United States v. Pulsifer, 39 F.4th 1018 (8th Cir. 2022) (same), and United States v. Haynes, 55 F.4th 1075 (6th Cir. 2022) (same). We find the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits’ decisions convincing and join those circuits.

This split make plain that it is only a matter of time before SCOTUS takes up this matter. And I would hope that SCOTUS would move quickly: according to US Sentencing Commission data, thousands of federal drug defendants each year are being subject to different laws and treated differently at sentencing based on this statutory conflict.

A glass-half-empty look at federal compassionate release data since FIRST STEP Act

Extrapolating based on the latest data from the US Sentencing Commission, since passage of the FIRST STEP Act in December 2018, nearly 5000 persons have secured a reduced term of imprisonment for "extraordinary and compelling reasons" pursuant to so-called "compassionate release" motions under 3582(c)(1)(A).  This number, which amounts to an average of roughly 100 sentence reduction grants per month, is a 50-times increase from the average of two such reductions per month in the year before the FIRST STEP Act made it possible for prisoners to get their motions directly to courts.  (COVID is a big part of this story: USSC data show many hundreds of grants each month during the second half of 2020 and first part of 2021; grants have average closer to 50 per month through 2022.)

But while sentence reductions grants are much more common since passage of the FIRST STEP Act, they are still not common.  After all, roughly 400,000 persons have served federal prison sentences over the last five years, so only just over 1% of all federal prisoners have secured relief under 3582(c)(1)(A).  And this new NPR piece, headlined "Frail people are left to die in prison as judges fail to act on a law to free them," stresses data detailing how many are not securing relief.  Here are excerpts:

[D]ata from the U.S. Sentencing Commission shows judges rejected more than 80% of compassionate release requests filed from October 2019 through September 2022. Judges made rulings without guidance from the sentencing commission, an independent agency that develops sentencing policies for the courts.

The commission was delayed for more than three years because Congress did not confirm Trump's nominees and President Joe Biden's appointees were not confirmed until August.  As a result, academic researchers, attorneys, and advocates for prison reform said the law has been applied unevenly across the country. 

Later this week, the federal sentencing commission is poised to hold an open meeting in Washington, D.C. to discuss the problem. They'll be reviewing newly proposed guidelines that include, among other things, a provision that would give consideration to people housed in a correctional facility who are at risk from an infectious disease or public health emergency....

The First Step Act brought fresh attention to compassionate release, which had rarely been used in the decades after it was authorized by Congress in the 1980s.  The new law allowed people in prison to file motions for compassionate release directly with federal courts.  Before, only the director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons could petition the court on behalf of a sick prisoner, which rarely happened....

The number of applications for compassionate release began soaring in March 2020, when the World Health Organization declared a pandemic emergency.  Even as COVID devastated prisons, judges repeatedly denied most requests....  Data suggests decisions in federal courts varied widely by geography.  For example, the 2nd Circuit (Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) granted 27% of requests, compared with about 16% nationally.  The 5th Circuit (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) approved about 10 %. Judges in the 11th Circuit (Alabama, Florida, and Georgia) approved roughly 11% of requests. In one Alabama district, only six of 141 motions were granted — or about 4% — the sentencing commission data shows....

Sentencing commission officials did not make leaders available to answer questions about whether a lack of guidance from the panel kept sick and dying people behind bars.  The new sentencing commission chair, Carlton Reeves, said during a public hearing in October that setting new guidelines for compassionate release is a top priority.

Interestingly this NPR piece, though seemingly about denials of sentence reductions, focuses on a drug offender with stage 4 cancer who did secure compassionate release last year.  I cannot help but wonder if the reporter was not quite able to find a compelling case in which a sentence reduction was denied for a "frail [person] left to die in prison," though I am sure there are such cases.

New CRS explores "When Is a Mandatory Minimum Sentence Not Mandatory Under the First Step Act?"

The Congressional Research Service has this notable new "Legal Sidebar" discussing how the statutory "safety valve" allowing sentences below federal mandatory minimum terms operate.  The four-page document highlights the new legal debates resulting from FIRST STEP Act reforms, and here are excerpts:

Congress created the safety valve for certain drug offenses carrying mandatory minimum penalties after becoming concerned that the mandatory minimums could result in equally severe penalties for both more and less culpable offenders.  The Commission “worked directly with Congress to enact new legislation that would address the impact of mandatory minimum penalties on low-level drug-trafficking offenders.”  These efforts culminated in the first safety valve, which was introduced as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.  Under this statute, to be eligible for the safety valve, a federal judge could impose a sentence below a drug-related mandatory minimum if the federal defendant satisfied five criteria, including not having “more than one criminal history point, as determined under the Sentencing Guidelines.”... The Commission adopted a corresponding Sentencing Guideline provision, allowing for a two-level reduction in the Guidelines offense level based on the same 1994 criteria.

In 2011, the Commission reported to Congress that the safety valve was underinclusive.  The Commission therefore urged Congress to expand the safety valve to encompass “certain non-violent [drug] offenders who receive two, or perhaps three, criminal history points under the [G]uidelines” and “low-level, nonviolent offenders convicted of other offenses carrying mandatory minimum penalties.”...

The First Step Act addressed mandatory minimums in multiple ways.  In addition to reducing the mandatory minimum penalties for certain drug-trafficking offenses, the act expanded eligibility for safety-valve relief to defendants with more significant criminal histories.  Whereas federal defendants with one or zero criminal history points under the Sentencing Guidelines could receive relief under the prior law, the act made drug offenders with minor criminal records eligible for the safety valve provision....

Due to the current judicial divide over the scope of the First Step Act’s safety valve, whether a defendant may receive relief from a mandatory minimum sentence under the act may depend upon the happenstance of geography: a defendant may be disqualified in one circuit when that same defendant might be eligible for relief in a different circuit.  Given that sentencing disparities may appear at odds with the stated statutory policy of promoting consistency and uniformity in federal sentencing outcomes, Congress may wish to consider amending the safety valve to clarify whether the criminal history criteria are disjunctive or conjunctive.

In addition, the Sentencing Commission is exploring revisions to the Sentencing Guideline provision that is analogous to the act’s safety valve: the Commission identified two options under consideration.  One option would not make any change to the Guidelines and thus would permit courts to interpret the Guideline disjunctively or conjunctively.  A second option would adopt the disjunctive approach.  Regardless of which option the Commission approves, Congress always has the opportunity to review and revise any amendments to the Guidelines.

Notable new grant of sentence reduction for California medical marijuana operator given nearly 22 years in federal prison back in 2008

I was pleased to learn late last night about a notable new ruling out of a federal district court in US  v. Scarmazzo, No. 1:06-cr-000342 DAD (E.D. Ca. Feb 2, 2023) (available for download below).  The case involves Luke Scarmazzo, a California medical marijuana dispensary operator who was federally prosecuted in the mid-2000s and was sentenced to 262 months in federal prison back in 2008.  As detailed in the 29-page opinion posted below, the federal district judge decision to reduce his sentence to time served (already more than 14 years).  The who sentence merits a full read for a host of reasons, and here are just a few key concluding passages: 

Having considered the parties’ briefing and reviewed the relevant case law, the undersigned’s current view is as follows.  This court clearly has the authority to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence in granting compassionate release.  Halvon 26 F.4th at 570. However, where, as here, the minimum mandatory sentence is still authorized by Congressionally enacted federal law that has not been subsequently subject to even non-retroactive amendment, the district court should not grant compassionate release based solely upon its conclusion that the originally imposed mandatory minimum sentence was unduly harsh.  See Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 574. Nonetheless, this court has broad discretion to consider the harshness of the sentence in light of the current landscape in combination with other factors in determining whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances warrant the granting of compassionate release in a given case. Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2396; Chen, 48 F.4th at 1095; Aruda, 993 F.3d at 802; Jones, 980 F.3d at 1111....

When considering the unique confluence of all of these circumstances — changes in the legal landscape with respect to federal enforcement of laws relating to distribution of marijuana in California; the significant disparity in the sentence actually served by co-defendant Montes and the 14+ years already served in prison by defendant Scarmazzo; defendant’s good behavior, meaningful employment, volunteer work, pursuit of educational opportunities during his imprisonment; defendant’s solid release plans including job offers and family support; the lack of danger posed to the community were he to be released; and defendant Scarmazzo’s difficult family circumstances that have developed during his imprisonment — the court is persuaded that the granting of the requested relief is appropriate at this point and is supported by both extraordinary and compelling circumstances and consideration of the sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Download CR opinion in Scarmazzo case

Gearing up for a new federal sentencing year that might finally bring some new guideline amendments

Branch by branch, there are a lot of federal sentencing stories to watch as we start a new year.  The last Congress made (halting) progress on some statutory sentencing reforms, but nothing major made it all the way to the President's desk.  With the House of Representatives in GOP control in the new Congress, legislative dynamics have changed in ways that might diminish the prospects for any big reforms in 2023.  But with murder rates ticking down a bit in 2022 and crime narratives seemingly not having a huge midterm poitical impact, perhaps some modest consgressional reform could still happen in the coming year.

On the executive front, I will be watching closely for early impacts of Attorney General Garland's new charging and sentencing memos (basics here).  It will be particular interesting to see the effect of AG Garland's instructions to federal prosecutors to "promote the equivalent treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses."  And, with Prez Biden having used his clemency powers a few times in 2022 (with grants in April, October and December), maybe executive grace as well as prosecutorial discretion will continue to impact federal sentencing realities in the coming year.

The judicial branch is the arena in which I am expecting the most action in this new year.  Focusing the courts, we may see in the coming weeks if the Supreme Court is finally ready to address acquitted conduct sentencing enhancments (details here).  Other notable sentencing issues may also make their way to the SCOTUS docket because circuits are split on important topics like deference to the guidelines and application of a key part of the FIRST STEP Act.  Other notable sentencing issues are sure to keep gurgling in district and circuit courts in the year ahead.

But I can most confidently predict judicial branch sentencing action in 2023 because the US Sentencing Commission, which is located in that branch, is finally now fully loaded and is hard at work on potential guidelines reforms.  The Commission has now officially announced that it will have a public meeting on January 12, 2023 with an agenda to include "Possible Vote to Publish Proposed Guideline Amendments and Issues for Comment."  Though we should not expect the USSC to advance amendments on all the topics mentioned in its ambitious list of priorities, we are sure to get some notable and impactful proposals to start the year from the Commission.

Notably, though the USSC's work is primarily focused on the sentencing guidelines, the agency can have real impact on other aspects of the justice system.  This new Forbes article by Walter Palvo, headlined "A Federal Public Defender Challenges U.S. Sentencing Commission To Help Fix The Bureau Of Prisons," highlights Steve Sady's new article in the Federal Sentencing Reporter urging the USSC to "make recommendations regarding the Bureau of Prisons’ execution of Guidelines sentences."  Here is an excerpt from the Forbes piece:

I recently spoke to Stephen Sady, Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender for the District of Oregon about a paper he wrote that was critical of the BOP but stated that the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) could encourage the BOP to balance long guideline sentences by implementing ameliorative statutes that reduce actual prison time. As Sady told me, “The BOP has failed to adequately implement critical legislation to improve the conditions of people in prison.”

As Sady points out, even as Congress has repeatedly provided options and directives that would reduce the time defendants spend in prison, the BOP has failed to implement the full scope of the available authority, resulting in expensive and pointless over-incarceration. The most important of these can be put into six categories, 1) Increase the availability of community corrections commensurate with repeated statutory directives for greater use of residential reentry centers and home confinement (18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)), 2) Expand eligibility and availability of sentence reductions under Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP), 3) Eliminate computation rules that create longer sentences, 4) Implement broader statutory and guideline standards to file compassionate release motions any time extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, 5) Revive the boot camp program to provide nonviolent offenders sentence reductions and expanded community corrections and 6) Fully implement the First Step Act’s earned time credit program (18 U.S.C. §§ 3632(d) and 3624(g)). No new legislation would be required for any of these reforms. “It’s a pragmatic approach,” Sady said, “that uses the laws already in place to do what the BOP should already be doing. This is not a stretch.”

Interesting times as we start a new year.

Some early commentary on notable end-of-year federal criminal justice reform developments

I hope and expect that the new charging and sentencing memos issued by AG Garland (basics here), as well as the failure of the out-going Congress to pass any significant criminal justice reforms, will garner extended attention and analysis in the weeks and months ahead.  Usefully, I have already seen some first-cut accountings from a variety of sources:

From Filter, "The Limits of AG’s Guidelines Against Crack-Powder Sentencing Disparity"

From LISA-Legalinfo, "Blue Christmas for Criminal Justice Reforms"

From MSNBC, "Racist war on drugs is the real winner of Congress’s massive spending bill"

From Reason, "The Failure To Enact Marijuana Banking and Crack Sentencing Reforms Is a Window on Congressional Dysfunction"

From San Diego Union-Tribune, "Creating different punishments for crack and powder cocaine never made sense, unscientific"

Looking forward, the practical impact of AG Garland's charging and sentencing memos, the continued implementation of the FIRST STEP Act, and especially the coming work of the newly, fully-staffed U.S. Sentencing Commission will be topics to watch closely in the weeks and months ahead.  So, I am tentatively hopeful that the lack of much lasting federal criminal justice reform in 2022 is just a precursor to a big 2023 ahead.

En banc Sixth Circuit clings to anti-textual limits on what factors can be consider in § 3582(c)(1)(a) motions

The Supreme Court's ruling in Concepcion v. US, No. 20-1650 (S. Ct. June 27, 2022) (available here), seemed to be a fairly clear direction to circuit court that it was not their job to make up non-textual limits to how district courts exercised sentencing discretion.  Here are just some of the key quotes, first discussed in this post, from the Supreme Court's opinion in Concepcion: 

It is only when Congress or the Constitution limits the scope of information that a district court may consider in deciding whether, and to what extent, to modify a sentence, that a district court’s discretion to consider information is restrained....

Federal courts historically have exercised this broad discretion to consider all relevant information at an initial sentencing hearing, consistent with their responsibility to sentence the whole person before them.  That discretion also carries forward to later proceedings that may modify an original sentence.  Such discretion is bounded only when Congress or the Constitution expressly limits the type of information a district court may consider in modifying a sentence....

The only limitations on a court’s discretion to consider any relevant materials at an initial sentencing or in modifying that sentence are those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution....

Because Concepcion seemingly makes plain that the "only limitation" on "the type of information a district court may consider in modifying a sentence" are those limits in the Constitution or that Congress has expressly set forth, motions for sentence reductions pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(a) -- so-called compassionate release motions -- could certainly include consideration as a general matter all sorts of information about changes in laws and well as changes in fact that might justify a sentence reduction.  After all, Congress has only expressly provided in statutory text that one factor could not alone serve as the basis for sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(a):  "Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." 28 USC § 994(t).

But, today the en banc Sixth Circuit has decided to double-down on its anti-textual approach to § 3582(c)(1)(a) by stating another categorical limit on what can be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason under 3582 in US v. McCall, No. 21-3400 (6th Cir. Dec 22, 2022) (available here).  The majority opinion in the split en banc ruling start and ends this way: 

David McCall, a federal prisoner with a long drug-dealing career, pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015.  Five years into his 235-month sentence, McCall moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1).  Although he cited several “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction under that statute, the heart of his motion rested on our opinion in Havis.  Invoking that opinion, McCall argued that if he were sentenced today, he would receive a shorter sentence than he received in 2015.  The district court denied his motion, reasoning that a nonretroactive change in sentencing law could not amount to an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction. We agree and affirm....

Nonretroactive legal developments do not factor into the extraordinary and compelling analysis. Full stop.

As I noted when discussing a prior Sixth Circuit panel ruling to this effect, there is absolutely nothing in the text of § 3582(c)(1)(a) that supports the contention that nonretroactive legal developments cannot ever factor into or generally constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to allow a sentence reduction, either alone or in combination with other factors.  The majority here, presumably based on its own sense of policy, is seemingly eager to invent an extra-textual categorical limitation on the authority Congress gave to district courts to reduce sentences.  In other words, this is judicial lawmaking that is flagrantly disregarding both the statutory text enacted by Congress and the instructions of the Supreme Court in Concepcion.  Full Stop.

A notable call for next steps on federal sentencing reform (with a too modest accounting of FIRST STEP's impact)

Doug Collins has this notable new commentary at Fox News under the headline "First Step Act showed Republicans and Democrats can work together to make justice system more just."  I would recommend the full piece, and here are excerpts:

Four years ago this week, just before Christmas, both parties came together for a holiday miracle: passing the First Step Act, the most significant change to our justice system in decades.  It was a win for Republicans and Democrats in Congress; a win for then-President Donald Trump; and, more importantly, a win for thousands of American families whose lives were changed for the better through a series of prison and sentencing reforms that were fair, safe, and spoke to American values.

To date, over 7,500 folks have been able to regain their lives after the passage of the First Step Act.  These are Americans who made mistakes years ago, received unduly harsh penalties that sent them to prison for decades, and have now regained their freedom.  This year, they get to spend Christmas at home with their families thanks to this legislation.

It goes to show that when it comes to criminal justice reform, major progress is more than possible; I’ve witnessed it firsthand.  One of my proudest moments in Congress was seeing that bipartisan bill, which I worked across the aisle to put together with now-Minority Leader-elect Rep. Hakeem Jeffries, get signed into law at Trump’s desk.  It was a reminder of how much we can get done, regardless of party, on the biggest issues of the day....

As a Christian, I firmly believe that we must support redemption for those who have atoned.  The incredible, redemptive effect that passing bills like the First Step Act have across our country cannot be ignored.  And as a conservative, I believe in cutting unnecessary government waste and trimming out-of-control spending, including within our justice system.  It all comes down to what I call "M&M" — money and morals — and smart criminal justice legislation speaks to both....

As its name suggested, the First Step Act was just the first step, and there are many more steps that be taken to make our federal justice system fairer and more effective.  Even while there is so much we are divided on as a country, when it comes to reforming our broken criminal justice system, there are plenty of promising paths forward.  One of those next steps is ending one of the most unjust laws we have on the books: the cocaine and crack sentencing disparity....

Unfortunately, Congress missed its chance to build on the First Step Act.  This week, the EQUAL Act — the bipartisan bill to eliminate the sentencing disparity — was left out of end-of-year Senate negotiations.  And while the Department of Justice did recently issue sentencing guidance to fix the disparity for future cases, it is still not a permanent solution and will not retroactively help the thousands of folks still in prison serving long sentences that don’t fit the crime....

Yet despite not making it over the finish line this year, I am extremely hopeful for the future: both for this legislation, and for more paradigm-shifting criminal justice reform.  Before its untimely demise in the Senate, the EQUAL Act was approved with massive support from both the most conservative and liberal wings of the House, proving that bipartisan agreement on effective criminal justice policy is ripe for consideration in the coming Congress....  Let’s hope and pray that this time next year, our country will have taken the next step forward on criminal justice reform, and continue the great work we started with the First Step Act.  

I am quite pleased to see former Rep Collins continue to advocate for the EQUAL Act both "as a Christian" and "as a conservative."  But I think he undersells the achievements of the FIRST STEP Act when he speaks only of "over 7,500 folks have been able to regain their lives after the passage of the First Step Act."  This (somewhat unclear) BOP page, indicates as of this writing that there have been 11,421 "First Step Act releases," and I suspect that number reflects only those who have gotten out a bit earlier thanks to the "earned time" credits of the FSA. 

In addition, the BOP page reports nearly 4000 persons have benefitted from retroactive crack sentence reductions and andother nearly 4400 have benefitted from compassionate release thanks to new FSA processes.   And these BOP numbers would seem to be undercounts, as the US Sentencing Commission has reported here over 4200 retroactive sentence reductions and has reported here over 4500 grants of compassionte release.  (Of course, not everyone getting sentence reductions is getting immediately released from prison, but likely most are.)  The BOP page also reports that over 1200 persons have benefitted from expanded elderly home confinement provided by the FSA.

Though a precise accounting the the exact number of federal prisonsers who have been released somewhat earlier thanks to the First Step Act is hard to pin down, I do think it is probably twice and maybe three times as large as the 7,500 number stated by Collins.  And, assuming the newly filled US Sentencing Commission makes a variety of guideline amendments consistent with the FSA, the impacts of the First Step Act will continue to echo through the federal prison population.

Lots of new data and a notable date from the US Sentencing Commission

The US Sentencing Commission yesterday published two new data reports: (1) this updated compassionate release data report and (2) this FY 2022 fourth quarter sentencing data.  There are lots of stories within all these data, though I still see the top stories to be those discussed here before: there are dramatic district variations in compassionate release grant rates and there are still relatively few "within guideline" sentences" being imposed by judges.

Specifically, on compassionate release, the three districts of Georgia show one notable example of variation: the Southern District of Georgia has granted only 8 out of 296 sentence reduction motions for a 2.7% grant rate; the Middle District of Georgia has granted only 4 out of 265 sentence reduction motions for a 1.5% grant rate; but the Northern District of Georgia has granted 80 out of 174 sentence reduction motions for a 46% grant rate.  On original sentencing more generally, this most recent USSC data show that, for all of FY 22, only 42% of all federal sentences have been imposed "Within Guideline Range" (and the number is under 28% for "Drug Trafficking" cases).

For various reasons and in various ways, all these data in some sense reflect the consequences of the US Sentencing Commission having to function without a quorum and being unable to amend any guidelines for nearly five years.  But, of course, we now have a fully loaded Commission, and the Commissions are clearly hard at work on guidelines reforms.  We know that because the Commission has now officially announced that it will have a public meeting on January 12, 2023, and that announcement notes the meeting agenda is to include "Possible Vote to Publish Proposed Guideline Amendments and Issues for Comment."

Especially for federal drug sentencing statutes, it "turns out that 'and' has more meanings than one might suppose"

A couple of weeks ago in this post, I noted the notable Eleventh Circuit en banc ruling in US v. Garcon giving a broad reading to the FIRST-STEP-amended statutory safety valve to enable more federal drug defendants to benefit from its authorization for below mandatory-minimum sentences.  Thanks to a helpful reader, I see that today a split panel of the Sixth Circuit came out the other way in US v. Haynes, No. 22-5132 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2022) (available here).  Here are some passages from the majority opinion explaining the court's reasoning:

Aaron Haynes argues that the district court misinterpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) when it denied him “safety valve” relief from his mandatory-minimum sentence. We agree with the district court’s interpretation of the statute and affirm....

The question presented is whether — as the government argues and the district court held — this provision requires the defendant to show that he has none of the criminal history described in subsections (A)-(C); or whether instead — as Haynes argues — the defendant must show only that he lacks the criminal history described in any one of those subsections. The answer to that question, everyone agrees, depends on the meaning of the word “and” as used in § 3553(f)(1)(B).

It turns out that “and” has more meanings than one might suppose.  By way of background, grammatical rules are an archetype of rules of conduct with which we often comply without conscious awareness of doing so.  Small children comply with any number of grammatical rules without awareness even of their existence; and adults comply with rules concerning the pluperfect and subjunctive tenses, for example, without consciously knowing what those rules are.  We likewise understand language according to these same grammatical rules, again often without awareness of their existence.  Thus, a particular grammatical rule might strike us as impossibly esoteric, and yet shape our understanding of language every day.  The task of determining the ordinary meaning of a word or phrase, therefore, is sometimes one of excavating — and taking conscious account of — rules as to which our compliance is often unconscious....

Here, the government’s interpretation of § 3553(f)(1) is logically coherent. Again by way of background, when § 3553(f)(1) was first enacted in 1994, it provided that any defendant with “more than one criminal history point” was ineligible for safety-valve relief.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (1994).  Congress amended § 3553(f)(1) in the First Step Act of 2018 to read as it does now. Under the government’s interpretation — for a defendant to obtain relief from an otherwise mandatory-minimum sentence — the defendant must not have any of three disqualifying conditions in his criminal record: first, “more than 4 criminal history points,” itself a fourfold increase over the prior cap; second, a prior offense serious enough to add three points to his criminal record; and third, a prior 2-point “violent offense[.]”  Each of those conditions on its face is quite plausibly an independent ground to deny a defendant the extraordinary relief afforded by the safety valve — which means this reading is logically coherent.

The same is not true of Haynes’s interpretation, which would require that all these conditions be present for a defendant to be ineligible for safety-valve relief. Consider, for example, a defendant with 25 criminal history points, generated in part by six convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and six convictions for domestic assault.  (Both can be two-point violent offenses.  See, e.g., United States v. Delgado-Hernandez, 646 F.3d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 2011).)  Under Haynes’s interpretation, this defendant would qualify for safety-valve relief because of the fortuity that his criminal record lacks “a prior 3-point offense[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)(B).  Or consider an incorrigible recidivist with, say, 24 criminal-history points, comprising a half-dozen convictions for robbery and two convictions for possession of explosives with intent to terrorize. (Both are often three-point offenses.  See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 209 F.3d 614, 616 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Priest, 447 F. App’x 682, 684 (6th Cir. 2011).)  This defendant too would be eligible for safety-valve relief, for want of a prior two-point violent offense. Results like these appear arbitrary enough to be implausible — which makes Haynes’s interpretation akin to an interpretation of beer-and-wine in the joint sense rather than the distributive one.  Haynes does offer a thoughtful response: namely that the district court serves as a gatekeeper in cases where § 3553(f)(1) generates results as bizarre as these.  But an ordinary reader would expect that § 3553(f)(1) itself would serve as a gatekeeper — and not an arbitrary one.  That indeed is the whole point of the provision.  The government’s reading of § 3553(f)(1) is therefore better than Haynes’s reading.

I believe that we now have the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits adopting the government's approach to the new statutory safety valve, and the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits on the defendants' side.  It is now seemingly only a question of when, rather than if, the Supreme Court takes up this issue and tells us which meaning of "and" is to be applied in this context.

District Court finds sexual assault by guard and assistance prosecuting perpetrator provide basis for sentence reduction under 3582(c)(1)(A)

A helpful reader alerted me to a notable new opinion from a federal district court in US v. Brice, No. 13-cr-206-2 (ED Pa. Dec. 15, 2022) (available fore download below), which finds “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warranting a sentence reduction in the defendant's sexual assault by a federal corrections officer and her assistance to prosecutors in bringing that officer to justice.  Here is hope the Brice opinion gets started as a key passage: 

This case presents a difficult question under the First Step Act for compassionate release and involves balancing the disturbing conduct underlying Defendant Rashidah Brice’s conviction with the extraordinary and compelling events that occurred after sentence was imposed.  For reasons explained below, I will partially grant Brice’s motion and reduce her sentence by 30 months but will not order her release as she has requested.  Although Brice’s circumstances are extraordinary and compelling and warrant a reduction from her original sentence, due to the serious and violent nature of her crimes and their effect on the victims, I find that releasing Brice now would not be consistent with the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)....

It is entirely appropriate for me to consider how Brice responded to suffering abuse at the hands of her prison guards. The “broad discretion” federal courts have “to consider all relevant information” at a “proceeding[] that may modify an original sentence” is “bounded only when Congress or the Constitution expressly limits the type of information a district court may consider in modifying a sentence.”  Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2398 (2022). That Brice reacted to her trauma by agreeing to assist in the prosecution of her assailant supports a finding that Brice’s disproportionate suffering while in custody “warrant[s] . . . a reduction” in her sentence and that these circumstances are extraordinary and compelling.  Despite facing tremendous adversity both in her personal life before prison and at the hands of a prison guard, Brice responded by preventing more inmates from being abused, including cooperating in an investigation regarding individuals who had authority over her and could have retaliated against her.  I also note that Congress and the Department of Justice have determined that “[p]rison rape often goes unreported,” 34 U.S.C. § 30301(6), and “retaliation for reporting instances of sexual abuse and for cooperating with sexual abuse investigations is a serious concern in correctional facilities.” Department of Justice, National Standards To Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 F.R. 37106-01 (June 20, 2012).

Download BRICE sentence reduction opinion

The helpful reader who brought this ruling to my attention indicated this may be "the first time a federal court has concluded that either of these circumstances warrants compassionate release." The reader also rightly stated that this decision "is particularly timely, as Congress and Department of Justice leadership have been pressing the Bureau of Prisons to seek compassionate release for women abused behind bars."

"Do Prison Conditions Change How Much Punishment A Sentence Carries Out? Lessons From Federal Sentence Reduction Rulings During the COVID-19 Pandemic"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now available via SSRN authored by Skylar Albertson. Here is its abstract:

A set of motions filed during the COVID-19 pandemic challenged federal judges to consider whether they should always view the duration of imprisonment — as contrasted with prison conditions — as the sole determinant of how much punishment a sentence carries out.  Under 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), federal judges may “reduce” already imposed terms of imprisonment upon finding that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant reductions.  Prior to 2019, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) effectively controlled the scope of a catch-all subcategory of “Other Reasons” justifying sentence reductions.  The BOP used this authority almost exclusively for people who were in the final stages of terminal illness.  The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) amended § 3582(c) in a manner that freed federal judges to decide for themselves what types of circumstances meet the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard.  The FSA also authorized people in federal custody to file motions on their own behalf, instead of permitting only the Director of the BOP to do so.

Roughly a year later, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted the increased use of lockdowns and other restrictions inside U.S. prisons.  Among the many thousands of people who moved for sentence reductions, several hundred argued that imprisonment with these new restrictions amounted to a greater punishment than pre-pandemic imprisonment.  This Article explores the lessons that the decisions adjudicating these motions offer for the design of sentencing laws — including second looks — as well as efforts to increase transparency surrounding life inside prisons.

En banc Eleventh Circuit now gives broad reading to FIRST-STEP-amended mandatory-minimum safety valve provision

Last year in posts here and here, I spotlighted a significant Ninth Circuit ruling in US v. Lopez, No. 19-50305 (9th Cir. May 21, 2021) (available here), which interpreted the FIRST-STEP-amended statutory safety valve to enable more federal drug defendants to benefit from its authorization for below mandatory-minimum sentences.  But, as I noted in this post, days earlier in US v. Garcon, No. 19-14650 (11th Cir. May 18, 2021) (available here), an Eleventh Circuit panel reach an opposite interpretation of this statutory language.  The Garcon ruling went en banc, and today resulted in this set of opinions running 85 pages with an array of opinions from a court split 7-5.  Writing for six judges, Chief Judge (and former USSC Acting Chair) Bill Pryor start the opinion for the Eleventh Circuit this way:

The question presented in this appeal of a grant of safety-valve relief is whether, in the First Step Act, the word “and” means “and.” The Act empowers a court to grant a criminal defendant relief from a mandatory minimum sentence, but that relief is available only if “the defendant does not have” “more than 4 criminal history points,” “a prior 3-point offense[,] . . . and . . . a prior 2-point violent offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). Julian Garcon, who pleaded guilty to attempting to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, has a prior 3-point offense but does not have more than 4 criminal history points or a prior 2-point violent offense. The district court concluded that Garcon remained eligible for relief under the Act because he did not have all three characteristics. We agree. Because the conjunctive “and” joins together the enumerated characteristics, a defendant must have all three before he is ineligible for relief.  We affirm.

Bureau of Justice Statistics releases "Federal Prisoner Statistics Collected Under the First Step Act, 2022"

Via email this morning, I learned of this 25-page report produced by DOJ's Bureau of Justice Statistics. This BJS webpage provides this discriptive overview and these "highlights":

This is the fourth report as required under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA; P.L. 115-391). It includes data on federal prisoners provided to BJS by the Federal Bureau of Prisons for calendar year 2021.  Under the FSA, BJS is required to report on selected characteristics of persons in prison, including marital, veteran, citizenship, and English-speaking status; education levels; medical conditions; and participation in treatment programs.  Also, BJS is required to report facility-level statistics, such as the number of assaults on staff by prisoners, prisoners’ violations of rules that resulted in time credit reductions, and selected facility characteristics related to accreditation, on-site healthcare, remote learning, video conferencing, and costs of prisoners’ phone calls.

Highlights

• The federal prison population increased more than 3%, from 151,283 at yearend 2020 to 156,542 at yearend 2021.
• In 2021, a total of 74 pregnant females were held in BOP-operated prison facilities, a 19% decrease from 2020 (91).
• During 2021, a total of 378 prisoners were receiving medication-assisted treatment (MAT) approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to treat a substance use disorder prior to their admission to federal prison, and 1,127 prisoners received MAT while in custody.
• In 2021, a total of 17,252 federal prisoners participated in a nonresidential substance use disorder treatment program, while 10,919 participated in a residential program.

How many federal LWOP sentences have been reduced via 3582(c)(1)(A) and on what grounds?

The question in the title of this post was prompted by a notable new ruling sent my way, US v. West, No. 06-21185 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2022), which grants a sentenced reduction motion for a prisoner serving a federal LWOP sentence.  Before discussing that opinion (which can be dowloaded below), I will note that Figure 2 of the USSC's latest Compassionate Release Data Report from September 2022 reports that 27.9% of the over 4000 prisoners who have had their 3582(c)(1)(A) motions granted were serving original sentences of "20 years or more."  In other words, since the First Step Act became law in December 2018, well over 1000 persons serving sentences of 20 or more years have received sentence reductions.  But, to my knowledge, the USSC has not provided further details with any data specifically regarding prisoners serving LWOP securing compassionate release or regarding the reasons judges commonly give when reducing LWOP sentences.

General numbers and broader trends aside, the ruling in West makes for an interesting read because the judge here decides that Apprendi error as well as unwarranted sentencing dispartity provided extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.  Here is how the West opinion gets started:

Roy West is in year 17 of a life without parole sentence.  The indictment and case submitted to the jury should have netted West not more than ten years in prison.

Errors on the part of competent people — prosecutors, defense counsel, probation officers and, ultimately, this judge at the time of sentencing — resulted in the imposition of a sentence in violation of the law on West.  Even skilled appellate counsel failed to raise the sentencing error.

West has no way to correct this extraordinary and compelling error — and end his days in prison — but through his now pending motion for sentence reduction (compassionate release).

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, opens an avenue for this Judge to correct a fundamentally unfair sentence that did not exist before.  Justice and faith in our judicial system demand correction for the benefit of Roy West.

This human error on multiple levels, the resulting sentencing disparity, the absence of any other avenue for relief, and West’s extraordinary rehabilitation constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction.  The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors support a sentence reduction as well.

Download West CR opinion

Another discouraging dispatch about BOP's shaky First Step Act steps

Walter Palvo continues to provide terrific coverage of difficulties in the implementation of the First Step Act's earned time credits, and this latest piece in Forbes is titled "Bureau Of Prisons’ Failure To Communicate First Step Act."  Here are excerpts from this lengthy piece that merits a full read:

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is under new leadership but it is still suffering from decades of mismanagement. BOP Director Colette Peters began work on August 2nd of this year ... [and] testified on September 29, 2022 in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee.... Senator Dick Durbin was frustrated in Peters’ testimony stating that the full effects of FSA had not been implemented nearly 4 years after it being signed into law.  Peters assured the Senators that an auto-calculator was completed in August 2022 that provided FSA credits to prisoners which had the effect of reducing many sentences.  However, that auto-calculator was not in place at the time of the hearing, or at least it was not communicated to prisoners or the public. 

According to dozens of prisoners I interviewed for this piece, calculations were not communicated to them nor reflected on BOP.gov, which tracks release dates for federal prisoners.  Anticipating this computer program’s rollout that would reduce many prisoner release dates, prisoners and their families eagerly awaited the news of when they would be going home.  As the weeks passed after after August, prisoners still had no news.  It was not until the week of October 3rd that FSA credits started to be applied.  As one prisoner told me, “I was expecting a year of credits and I got 4 months. I have no idea what happened.”

What happened is that the calculator still has errors in it.  Prisoners who were transferred to a halfway house after receiving an interim calculation of their sentence, were called in and told they would be returning to prison after the new calculation took away their year....

Prisoners have worked for years to take programming that the FSA law stated would earn them credits.  Now, as implemented, those credits are fewer than many thought and they still do not have answers.  They also have no realistic remedy to correct it in a timely manner.  Millions of dollars will now be spent on litigation that will last years while prisoners who should be released stay in prison.

Some prior related posts:

• Thousands of federal prisoners finally to get FIRST STEP Act credits as DOJ implements earned time rules
• Articulating concerns while celebrating implementation of FIRST STEP earned-time credits
• Highlighting the challenging issues of implementing the FIRST STEP Act's earned time credits
• Highlighting continuing struggles with implementing the FIRST STEP Act's earned time credits
• Another account of continuing struggles with FIRST STEP Act implementation 
• Another ugly report on the ugly implementation of the FIRST STEP Act

Brennan Center publishes new report on "The First Step Act’s Prison Reforms: Uneven Implementation and the Path Forward"

I was alerted via email this morning about this notable new Brennan Center report titled “The First Step Act’s Prison Reforms: Uneven Implementation and the Path Forward.”  I recommend the report in full, but the email I received usefully summarized the reports "recommendations to Congress and to the Department of Justice and its Bureau of Prisons to fulfill the First Step Act’s potential":

• Broaden eligibility for earned time credits so more people can get released earlier. (Congress)

• Revise PATTERN (Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risks and Needs): Focus on predicting the risk of reconviction or re-incarceration, rather than rearrest, to reduce racial disparities in PATTERN’s risk predictions. (Department of Justice)

• Decouple PATTERN from earned time credit eligibility so that all people incarcerated by the Bureau of Prisons are incentivized to participate in programming and productive activities. (Department of Justice)

• Expand prison program offerings (e.g., drug treatment or literacy programs, work or vocational training) and interpret rules expansively to ensure that people can earn credits where programs are inaccessible or booked. (Department of Justice)

• Increase funding for prison reforms so the Bureau of Prisons has the resources it needs to deploy high-quality prison programming. (Congress)

Ninth Circuit panel holds non-retroactive sentencing changes can be considered in compassionate release motions

Weighing in on an issue that has split circuits, a Ninth Circuit panel today in US v. Chen, No. 20-50333 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2022) (available here), held that "a district court may consider the First Step Act’s non-retroactive changes to sentencing law, in combination with other factors particular to the individual defendant, when determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)."  The Chen opinion explains how "other circuits are split concerning this issue," but ultimately decides to "join the First, Fourth, and Tenth circuits and conclude that district courts may consider non-retroactive changes in sentencing law, in combination with other factors particular to the individual defendant, when analyzing extraordinary and compelling reasons for purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A)."  Here is a portion of the panel's explanation for its ruling:

Congress has only placed two limitations directly on extraordinary and compelling reasons: the requirement that district courts are bound by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement, which does not apply here, and the requirement that “[r]ehabilitation . . . alone” is not extraordinary and compelling.... To hold that district courts cannot consider nonretroactive changes in sentencing law would be to create a categorical bar against a particular factor, which Congress itself has not done. In fact, such a categorical bar would seemingly contravene the original intent behind the compassionate release statute, which was created to provide the “need for a ‘safety valve’ with respect to situations in which a defendant’s circumstances had changed such that the length of continued incarceration no longer remained equitable.” Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 26 (citing S. Rep. No. 98225, 55–56, 121 (1983)....

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Concepcion confirms that, in the context of modifying a sentence under the First Step Act, “[i]t is only when Congress or the Constitution limits the scope of information that a district court may consider in deciding whether, and to what extent, to modify a sentence, that a district court’s discretion to consider information is restrained.” 142 S. Ct. at 2396.  Since Congress has not legislated to create a third limitation on extraordinary and compelling reasons prohibiting district courts from considering non-retroactive changes in sentencing law, we decline to create one now....

Through § 3582(c)(1)(A) and § 994(t), Congress has demonstrated that it can, and will, directly limit what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons.  It is therefore hard to reconcile the argument that we should infer a categorical bar on extraordinary and compelling reasons with Congress’s prior decisions not to create such stark limitations on a district court’s discretion.

Formerly incarcerated and advocacy groups write to new head of federal BOP

This webpage at the Sentencing Project has the full text of this letter from formerly incarcerated individuals and advocacy organizations to new Federal Bureau of Prisons Director Colette Peters advocating for various reforms.  The full letter is worth a full read, and here are a few excerpts:

As people formerly incarcerated in US Bureau of Prisons facilities and organizations dedicated to civil rights and justice, we know well the challenges that await you and hope to share with you our concerns and advice for advancing the systemic reform you have pledged to achieve.  We have all witnessed the Bureau’s failure to provide adequate medical care, safe conditions, and rehabilitative programs.  We ask you to bring the Bureau into compliance with federal law and to lead the Bureau toward a more humane future grounded in transparency and accountability....

Federal prisons are plagued by inadequate medical care, overcrowding, staff shortages, unsanitary conditions, violence, and abuse.  These conditions are well-documented in media coverage, Office of Inspector General and Bureau reports, and congressional testimony.  Following a recent oversight hearing on July 26, Senator Ossoff observed within FCI Atlanta that “conditions for inmates were abusive and inhumane” and that “stunning failures of federal prison administration” “likely contributed to the loss of life.”5) FCI Atlanta is not unique; all federal prisons urgently need reform....

Compassionate release can save the lives of medically vulnerable people, ease staff shortages by reducing the prison population, and provide mercy.  Yet the Bureau rarely uses its power to file motions for compassionate release in extraordinary or compelling circumstances.... [O]ver the first 13 months of the pandemic, the Bureau only ultimately approved 36 compassionate release requests, fewer than in 2019.  You have the power to change that.  We urge you to normalize the use of compassionate release to save lives, reunite families, and make federal prisons safer....

In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, a vital piece of legislation that gave many people hope.  Congress recognized that people grow and change, and that it was in the interest of the American people and public safety to allow individuals to earn the ability to come home sooner by completing rehabilitative programs.  But today, almost five years later, the Bureau has still failed to fully implement the First Step Act....

Abuse, corruption, and misconduct have been apparent within the Bureau for decades, but leadership has too often failed to act. In 2019, the House Subcommittee on National Security found that misconduct in the federal prison system is widespread and routinely covered up or ignored, including by senior officials.  The recent oversight hearing on FCI Atlanta highlighted decades of corruption and abuse and inaction by the Bureau Director.  We urge you to set a new standard and lead the Bureau towards transparency and accountability.

First Circuit panel reiterates district courts' "broad discretion" and "holistic review" when resolving compassionate release motions

Today seems to be my day for catching up with circuit rulings regarding federal compassionate release decision-making.  My prior post today here about the Second Circuit's panel rulings limiting the consideration of certain arguments prompted a helpful reader to make sure I saw the recent First Circuit panel ruling running the other way.  In US v. Trenkler,  No. 21-1441 (1st Cir. Aug. 29, 2022) (available here), the panel stressed and reiterated a prior ruling setting out compassionate release rules:

Ruvalcaba convincingly set the standard for a district court reviewing a prisoner's proposed reasons for compassionate release, making it clear that district courts have the discretion to review prisoner-initiated motions by taking the holistic, any complex-of-circumstances approach we discussed earlier.  Indeed, this approach makes sense.  After all, it is possible that the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts, and reasons that might not do the trick on their own may combine to constitute circumstances that warrant a finding that the reasons proposed are, in the aggregate, extraordinary and compelling.  This is not to say that a district court must find a certain number of extraordinary and compelling reasons.  Rather, in conducting their reviews, district courts should be mindful of the holistic context of a defendant's individual case when deciding whether the defendant's circumstances satisfy the "extraordinary and compelling" standard -- "any complex of circumstances" contemplates that any number of reasons may suffice on a case-by-case basis, whether it's one, two, or ten.

I noted here the remarkable district court opinion last year in Trexler, and this case and so many others serve as a remarkable reminder of just how many different federal prisoners can cite to so many different circumstances when seeking a sentence modification.  A huge federal prison system necessarily creates a huge number of questions in the wake of the First Step Act's change to the compassionate release rules. 

Second Circuit panel rules evidence attacking underlying conviction "cannot be raised in a § 3582 motion" for compassionate release ... and reiterates point after Concepcion

UPDATE/Clarification:  A helpful reader flagged for me that on Aug 31, the Second Circuit actually reissued its Orena opinion after having issued its original opinion on June 15.  I have now corrected/amended this post accordingly.

---- 

Just today I saw a second version of a panel opinion from the Second Circuit issued which expressly invents another non-textual limit on what factors can be considered by district courts when deciding whether to grant a motion for compassionate release.  The per curiam opinion in US v. Orena, No. 21-2747 (2d Cir. June 15, amended Aug. 31, 2022) (original available here), get started this way:

As part of the First Step Act of 2018, Congress authorized courts to reduce a term of imprisonment upon motion by a defendant. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).  Section 3582(c)(1), colloquially known as the “compassionate release” provision, permits a district court to reduce a previously imposed sentence “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”  Appellant Victor Orena contends primarily that the district court erred in denying his motion pursuant to § 3582 by refusing to consider new evidence that he says calls into question the validity of his conviction.

We conclude that when considering a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court does not have discretion to consider new evidence proffered for the purpose of attacking the validity of the underlying conviction in its balancing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Facts and arguments that purport to undermine the validity of a federal conviction must be brought on direct appeal or pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2241. Because the district court properly refused to consider such evidence here as to the § 3553(a) factors and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in denying Orena’s motion for compassionate release, we affirm.

Here is a key paragraph from the opinion:

Orena primarily contends that the district court erred by assuming the PSR’s accuracy and refusing to weigh his new evidence as part of the § 3553(a) factors.  We disagree. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) directs courts to “consider[] the factors set forth in section 3553(a).”  Section 3553 in turn provides “[f]actors to be considered in imposing a sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (emphasis added).  To impose a sentence, there must necessarily be a valid conviction.  If a defendant contends his conviction by a federal court is invalid, Congress has provided a vehicle to raise such a challenge through a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which imposes particular procedural limitations.  A defendant cannot evade this collateral review structure by attacking the validity of his conviction through § 3582.  Accordingly, we conclude, arguments challenging the validity of an underlying conviction cannot be raised in a § 3582 motion as part of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  Rather, such arguments are properly raised on direct appeal or collateral review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See e.g., United States v. Bard, No. 21-3265, 2022 WL 843485, at *2 (3d Cir. March 22, 2022) (unpublished per curiam); United States v. Miller, 855 F. App’x 949, 950 (5th Cir. 2021) (unpublished per curiam)

I get the logic of courts wanting to channel efforts to invalidate a conviction into 2255 or 2241 motions. But in some cases prisoners may be eager to highlight problems with the validity of an underlying conviction to bolster their arguments under § 3553(a) that a sentence reduction would produce a sentence that better "promote[s} respect for the law" or would help "avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct."  Because there is no express text in § 3582(c)(1)(A) that would seem clearly to bar this kind of evidence and argument, and because there is text in § 3553(a) that would seem potentially to invite this kind of evidence and argument, I think it problematic — at least for those of us concerned about textualist limits of judicial policy-making — to see another circuit court inventing another non-textual limit on what factors can be considered by district courts when deciding whether to grant a motion for compassionate release.

As I blogged here back in June, the Supreme Court's ruling in Concepcion seem to clearly indicated that circuit courts should not be creating extra-textual limits on the discretion that Congress has given to sentencing judges.  And the defendant in this Second Circuit cases sought reconsideration based on Concepcion, which led to the reissued opinion linked below.  Here is a key added footnote in the amended opinion:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion does not conflict with our decision in this case.  In Concepcion, the Court emphasized a “longstanding tradition” of discretion afforded to courts consider changes in law or fact when sentencing or resentencing a defendant. 142 S. Ct. at 2395.  However, the Court acknowledged that that discretion is subject to constraints imposed by Congress and the Constitution. Id. at 2400–01.  One such constraint is 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which provides the procedural mechanism for Orena’s arguments regarding actual innocence and the legality of his conviction.

Download Orena Aug 31 2022

This footnote makes my head hurt, because there is absolutely no language in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 which can be fairly read as a "constraint" on what may be valid considerations in the exercise of § 3582/3553(a) discretion.  There is language in § 2255 which limits when and how § 2255 motions are to be resolved, but nothing in that provision places any express or implicit "constraint" on what should be part of compassionate release considerations.  Sigh... Cf. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (1871) ("'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less'.")

Ninth Circuit panel finds no improper enhancement when safety-valve-proffer information is considered with other information in setting below-guideline sentence

Addressing an issue of first impression, a Ninth Circuit panel today issued an interesting opinion addressing the application of a small provision of the FIRST STEP Act in US v. Brown, No. 20-5313 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2022) (available here).  Here are excerpts from part of the opinion providing background and the heart of the ruling:

In this case, Appellant Marquis Brown was arrested for smuggling drugs across the border. He pleaded guilty to the charge and faced a statutory ten-year mandatory minimum sentence.  He subsequently took advantage of a safety valve proffer and became safety valve eligible for a sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence. The district court imposed a 78-month sentence. That sentence was below Brown’s guidelines range of 108–135 months, but above the 71 months requested by the government, and the 42 months recommended by his attorney and the Probation Department.

Brown now appeals, arguing that his sentence was procedurally defective because the district court improperly relied on information he disclosed in his safety valve proffer to “enhance” his sentence....

Brown contends that the district court committed a procedural error because it improperly enhanced his sentence in violation of the First Step Act of 2018.  The First Step Act, which in part amended 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), proscribes, inter alia, district courts judges from using information “disclosed by a defendant” in a safety valve proffer “to enhance the sentence of the defendant unless the information relates to a violent offense.” Pub. L. No. 115391, 132 Stat. 5194 (Dec 21, 2018). Despite the district court imposing a sentence that is below his guidelines range, Brown argues that the court ran afoul of this proscription when it relied on information from the safety valve proffer to deny him a further sentence reduction....

We have regularly held that the denial of a sentencing benefit or reduction is not an “increase in punishment.”  See, e.g. United States v. Waters, 771 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing whether amendments to a statute violated a constitutional prohibition on when States can increase the punishment for a defendant’s crime).  In Waters, the appellant argued that a statute the district court relied on to deny his request for sentence reduction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 680.  We held that the amendments merely limited the appellant’s ability to reduce his sentence and “[did] not increase the punishment for his crime[.]” Id. at 681....

We hold that the district court did not impose an improper sentence enhancement here.  Brown contends that because the district court used information from the proffer in determining his final sentence, it was an improper enhancement.  It is clear that the district court considered information disclosed in the safety valve proffer to impose a sentence, such as Brown’s previous drug smuggling trips.  This is not prohibited.  The district court noted the previous drug smuggling trips, but also mentioned various other aggravating factors, including the nine-year-old being in the car, the amount and type of drug involved, and the impact on the community.  The sentencing court considered the safety valve information in conjunction with other mitigating and aggravating factors in its determination of a downward sentence variance.  The district court imposed a sentence of 78 months — a sentence not just below the mandatory minimum, but also 30 months below the low end of Brown’s guidelines range.  This does not constitute an enhancement.

Brown takes issue with the fact that the sentence was not as low as he had requested.  But the failure to reduce a sentence is not an enhancement.  Moreover, we do not take the First Step Act’s proscription as Congress stripping away a district court’s discretion.  All that § 3553(f)(5) prohibits is using information from a safety valve proffer “to enhance the sentence[.]” § 3553(f)(5).  Here, Brown got the benefit of the safety valve reduction, resulting in a sentence below both the mandatory minimum and his guidelines range. This is not an improper “enhancement” of a sentence under § 3553(f)(5).

Another ugly report on the ugly implementation of the FIRST STEP Act

NBC News has another notable and depressing report on the implementation (or lack thereof) of the prison reform aspects of the FIRST STEP Act.  The full headline provides a summary: "Staffing shortages and deficient training leave First Step Act floundering, federal prison employees say: 'This is the biggest failure I've seen of something that's a law. It's pathetic,' one prison counselor said."  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

Chronic staffing shortages in federal prisons and a lack of training have impeded implementation of a Trump-era law designed to give nonviolent inmates the opportunity for early release, locking some up longer and contributing to eroding morale, union leaders and rank-and-file staff members said in interviews....

Staff members at some of the country's largest federal prisons said carrying out the First Step Act, a bipartisan law signed in 2018 by then-President Donald Trump, has been taxing, if not impossible. "It's not going at all," Joe Rojas, the literacy coordinator at the Coleman Federal Corrections Complex in Florida, said of the First Step Act's implementation. "I'm the education department, and we're never open, and if we are, it's barely," said Rojas, who is also the president of the American Federation of Government Employees' Local 506 at Coleman....

Bureau officials say they have worked to identify inmates who qualify for early release and "have no data which suggests inmates had their release dates delayed."

Rojas said employees like him who should be operating programs that can help inmates earn time credits aren't able to do so because they're being diverted to other correctional officer-type duties during the staffing shortage — a practice known as augmentation. "Most of us are augmented," Rojas said. "There's no programming. If there's no programming, you can't do the First Step Act."

Some prior related posts:

• Thousands of federal prisoners finally to get FIRST STEP Act credits as DOJ implements earned time rules
• Articulating concerns while celebrating implementation of FIRST STEP earned-time credits
• Highlighting continuing struggles with implementing the FIRST STEP Act's earned time credits
• Highlighting the challenging issues of implementing the FIRST STEP Act's earned time credits
• Another account of continuing struggles with FIRST STEP Act implementation