Sentencing Law and Policy

SCOTUS limits reach of aggravated identity theft mandatory-minimum statutory add-on sentence

The Supreme Court this morning delivered yet another big win for a federal white-collar criminal defendant with 9-0 ruling limiting the reach of aggravated identity theft federal statute in Dubin v. US, No. 22-10 (S. Ct. June 8, 2023) (available here).  Justice Sotomayor authored the opinion for the Court, which starts this way:

There is no dispute that petitioner David Fox Dubin overbilled Medicaid for psychological testing.  The question is whether, in defrauding Medicaid, he also committed “[a]ggravated identity theft,” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), triggering a mandatory 2-year prison sentence.  The Fifth Circuit found that he did, based on a reading of the statute that covers defendants who fraudulently inflate the price of a service or good they actually provided.  On that sweeping reading, as long as a billing or payment method employs another person’s name or other identifying information, that is enough.  A lawyer who rounds up her hours from 2.9 to 3 and bills her client electronically has committed aggravated identity theft.  The same is true of a waiter who serves flank steak but charges for filet mignon using an electronic payment method.

The text and context of the statute do not support such a boundless interpretation.  Instead, § 1028A(a)(1) is violated when the defendant’s misuse of another person’s means of identification is at the crux of what makes the underlying offense criminal, rather than merely an ancillary feature of a billing method.  Here, the crux of petitioner’s overbilling was inflating the value of services actually provided, while the patient’s means of identification was an ancillary part of the Medicaid billing process.

Justice Gorsuch authored the only separate opinion, which is a notable concurring opinion starting this way:

Whoever among you is not an “aggravated identity thief,” let him cast the first stone.  The United States came to this Court with a view of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) that would affix that unfortunate label on almost every adult American. Every bill splitter who has overcharged a friend using a mobile-payment service like Venmo.  Every contractor who has rounded up his billed time by even a few minutes.  Every college hopeful who has overstated his involvement in the high school glee club.  All of those individuals, the United States says, engage in conduct that can invite a mandatory 2-year stint in federal prison.  The Court today rightly rejects that unserious position.  But in so holding, I worry the Court has stumbled upon a more fundamental problem with § 1028A(a)(1).  That provision is not much better than a Rorschach test. Depending on how you squint your eyes, you can stretch (or shrink) its meaning to convict (or exonerate) just about anyone.  Doubtless, creative prosecutors and receptive judges can do the same.  Truly, the statute fails to provide even rudimentary notice of what it does and does not criminalize.  We have a term for laws like that.  We call them vague.  And “[i]n our constitutional order, a vague law is no law at all.” United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 1).

Top-side SCOTUS briefs in Pulsifer address FIRST STEP Act's expansion of statutory safety valve

Though we still await opinions in a number of criminal justice cases this SCOTUS Term (which all should be decided in the next few weeks, some details here), I am already excited for the fascinating little sentencing case the Justices already have on tap for next Term.  As flagged here, the Justices in late February granted certiorari in Pulsifer v. United States.  Stated in a pithy way, the issue in Pulsifer is whether the word "and" as used in the FRIST STEP Act's expansion of the mandatory minimum statutory safety valve actually means "and" or might instead mean "or." 

As I have noted before, federal criminal justice practitioners and sentencing fans should be following Pulsifer closely because its resolution will impact how thousands of drug defendants are sentenced in federal courts every year.  And statutory construction gurus should also be interested in how Pulsifer addresses statutory issues related to textualism, plain meaning and the rule of lenity.  

Though SCOTUS oral argument in Pulsifer will not be scheduled until October of November, the first set of briefs were filed in the last few weeks.  Specifically, SCOTUSblog has assembled on this Pulsifer case page the merits brief filed by Mark R. Pulsifer as well as four distinct amici briefs (three in support of Pulsifer and one in support of neither party).  The briefs all make for interesting reads and reinforce my sense that Pulsifer will be a fun one at oral argument and beyond.

Lots of sentencing coverage as part of Season 1 of "Drugs on the Docket" podcast

I am extremely pleased to highlight that the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center at The Ohio State University has now officially launched Season One of a new podcast, "Drugs on the Docket."  All six episodes of this season are available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts and YouTube.  My colleagues at DEPC have worked remarkably hard to put this content together, and I hope folks find the curated discussions interesting and informative.

Here is how the podcast subject matter is described via this podcast webpage along with episode titles:

Drugs on the Docket is a production of the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center (DEPC) at The Ohio State University. Each episode explores how U.S. court rulings — primarily those handed down from the Supreme Court — impact drug law and policy and continue to shape the War on Drugs.  Drugs on the Docket unpacks various ways courts have engaged with and responded to the opioid epidemic, police discretion, the sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine, and more.  The series, hosted by Hannah Miller, invites guests with expertise in criminal justice, drug policy, and drug enforcement to help us break down the sometimes complex and always interesting stories behind today’s drug law landscape.

Drugs on the Docket is produced by DEPC’s Service Engagement Project Manager Hannah Miller and Public Engagement Specialist Holly Griffin.  DEPC Executive Director Douglas A. Berman is our editorial advisor.  Music by Joe DeWitt.

Episode 1 – Federal drug sentencing and the evolution of the crack to powder cocaine ratio with Mark Osler

Episode 2 – Ruan v. United States and the intersection of healthcare, criminal law, and the opioid crisis with Jenn Oliva and Kelly Gillespie

Episode 3 – A Special Conversation with former Supreme Court of Ohio Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor

Episode 4 – United States v. Angelos, federal mandatory minimums, and sentencing reform with Weldon Angelos and Paul Cassell

Episode 5 – Data and storytelling in federal drug sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission with Doug Passon and Mark Allenbaugh

Episode 6 – Whren v. United States, Terry v. Ohio, and the Fourth Amendment with Gabriel “Jack” Chin

In helping with this effort, I came to realize fully just how much work is involved in podcast production.  Still, if this first season finds an audience, we may soon begin the hard work of producing another season.  And so recommendations for fitting topics and guests are welcome.

Latest "Relist Watch" flags yet another ACCA issue splitting circuit and likely to get SCOTUS review

In this latest Relist Watch over at SCOTUSblog,John Elwood includes a discussion of yet another issue dividing circuits concerning how to apply the Armer Career Criminal Act's severe 15-year mandatory minimum term for gun possession.  Regular readers know the wide array of technical issues SCOTUS has had to address in the application of ACCA, but this latest issue seems a bit more interesting than most.  Here are John's full descriptions (with links from the original):

[W]e have a group of three relists that raise the same issue. Brown v. United States, Jackson v. United States, and Jones v. United States all concern a single recurring issue involving the Armed Career Criminal Act, a federal sentencing enhancement provision.  The ACCA provides that someone who has been convicted of a felony and possesses a firearm is normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence.  But if that person already has at least three “serious drug offense” convictions, then the minimum sentence — the minimum — is 15 years.  Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as an ACCA “serious drug offense” using a “categorical approach.”  It requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart.  If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense.  But federal drug law often changes — as here, when Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana.  If the state law doesn’t follow suit, sentencing courts face an issue: What if the state and federal offenses matched (and thus the state offense was an ACCA predicate) under an earlier version of federal law, but federal law has since been narrowed? Thus, the court’s choice of which version of federal law to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum.

The question presented in these three cases is: Whether the “serious drug offense” definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense, or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 10th Circuit have gone with federal law at the time of the firearm offense; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit has gone with federal law at the time of the prior state drug offense.

The government has told the Supreme Court that there is a circuit split on the issue and recommends that the court should grant review in Jackson, and hold Brown and Jones for that case.  I also rate Jackson a likely grant.

We should know more after the court releases its order list next Monday.

In addition to having an eye out for these ACCA cases, I am hopeful (though still not quite optimistic) that Monday's SCOTUS order list might also include some action on the long-pending acquitted conduct cases (background here).

"Prosecutors as punishers: A case study of Trump-era practices"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Mona Lynch for the journal Punishment & Society that is now available online. Here is its abstract:

Recent punishment and society scholarship has addressed the limits of policy reforms aimed at reducing mass incarceration in the U.S.  This work has focused in particular on the political dimensions of penal legal reform and policy-making, and the compromises and shortcomings in those processes.  Nearly absent in this scholarship, however, has been empirical and theoretical engagement with the role of front-line prosecutors as facilitators and/or resistors to downsizing efforts.

Using the case of the U.S. federal criminal legal system's modest efforts to decrease the system's racially disparate and punitive outcomes, this paper elucidates the fragile nature of such reforms by delineating the critical role that front-line prosecutors play in maintaining punitive approaches.  Focusing specifically on federal prosecutorial policy and practices in the Trump era, I draw on a subset of data from an interdisciplinary, multi-methodological project set in distinct federal court jurisdictions in the U.S. to examine how front-line prosecutors were able to quickly reverse course on reform through the use of their uniquely powerful charging and plea-bargaining tools.  My findings illustrate how federal prosecutors pursued more low-level defendants, and utilized statutory “hammers,” including mandatory minimums and mandatory enhancements to ensure harsh punishments in a swift return to a war-on-crime.

"Evaluating the (F)utility of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws in Pennsylvania"

The title of this post is the title of this new article recently published in the Justice Evaluation Journal and authored by Nicole Frisch-Scott, Anat Kimchi and Kristofer Bucklen.  Here is its abstract:

In the current criminal justice policy sphere mandatory minimum sentencing serves two important purposes 1) they are used as a punitive response to immediate crime concerns and 2) their removal is viewed as a tool to conserve resources, decarcerate, and promote fairness in sentencing.  Though much research explores how the passage of these laws relates to crime, the literature has not focused on the public safety implications of removing mandatory minimum sentences. Using a comparative interrupted time-series approach, the present work investigates whether a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision that invalidated several mandatory minimum sentencing provisions impacted the state’s crime rate.  We find little to no evidence of a discrete shift in overall or type-disaggregated crime rates, or changes in the slope of any crime trend when the state reduced their use of mandatory minimums.  These findings tentatively suggest that many mandatory minimums can be repealed without risking public safety.

With Prez Biden's blessing, majority of Senate Dems vote to reject DC criminal code reforms

The state of federal politics on crime and punishment came to the fore this week as the US Senate voted last night on whether to reject a proposed new District of Columbia criminal code.  This New York Times piece, headlined "Senate Clears Bill to Block D.C. Crime Law, Sending It to Biden After Reversal."  Here are excerpts:

The Senate on Wednesday voted overwhelmingly to block a new District of Columbia criminal code that reduces mandatory minimum sentences for some violent offenses, with Democrats bowing to Republican pressure to take a hard line on crime in a move that underscored the rising political potency of the issue ahead of the 2024 elections.

The 81-to-14 vote, with one senator voting “present,” cleared the Republican-written measure to undo the District’s law, sending it to President Biden, who after initially opposing it abruptly changed course last week and said he would sign it.

It was a sudden turn of events for the District’s council and its overhaul of local sentencing laws. Just a few weeks ago, Mr. Biden weighed in against congressional action to block the measure, accusing Republicans of meddling in local affairs.

But the high-profile incidence of carjackings and homicides in the capital and growing nationwide evidence that voters were casting their ballots based on candidates’ response to violent crime spurred a rapid retreat.  Dozens of House Democrats joined Republicans in opposing the District’s criminal code, and a growing number of Senate Democrats signaled they were inclined to follow suit, prompting Mr. Biden’s turnabout.

On Wednesday, 31 Democrats and two independents joined Republicans in supporting a resolution of disapproval of the criminal code, sending it to the president for his signature. Senator Raphael Warnock, Democrat of Georgia, voted “present.”

Republicans, using the authority of Congress to review all District laws, forced the showdown in an effort to paint Democrats as weak on law enforcement. They said the outcome demonstrated that any trend toward leniency was at an end. “We need to make certain that we send a strong message that the American public have had it with crime in America,” said Senator Bill Hagerty of Tennessee, the chief Republican author of the resolution. “The crime spree that is happening in our major cities must come to an end.”

But if Democrats were hoping that their opposition to the new criminal code would stop Republican attacks on their party’s image on crime in next year’s elections, they were likely to be disappointed based on comments made by Senator Mitch McConnell, Republican of Kentucky and the minority leader.  “Nobody will confuse Washington Democrats’ last-minute reversal on this one resolution for a road-to-Damascus moment on the crime issue,” Mr. McConnell said. “The American people are a lot smarter than that.”...

Local officials lamented the interference and even tried to pull back the criminal code before it was rejected by the Senate.  But the process to block it had already been set in motion, and Congress ignored the attempt to short-circuit the outcome.

The rewrite of the criminal code, which was years in the making, had split local officials as well.  The law was vetoed by Mayor Muriel E. Bowser, who was overridden by the District council. Her opposition, however, opened the door to Democrats abandoning their usual support of the District and voting in favor of overturning the law.

The White House’s handling of the issue angered House Democrats, who felt they were hung out to dry by the president after he said early last month that he would oppose the resolution of disapproval.  As a result, when the matter came before the House in early February, most Democrats backed the District council and voted against the effort to rescind the sentencing package, believing they were siding with the president, who would veto it.

Instead, Mr. Biden arrived on Capitol Hill last week and told Senate Democrats in a private luncheon that he would sign the measure if it reached his desk, undercutting House Democrats and District officials.  He said the crime legislation had gone too far even though he supported autonomy for the District of Columbia.  White House officials noted that the president had never explicitly pledged to veto the measure, only that the administration opposed it.

Some Senate Democrats stood by the District and argued that its democratically elected officials should be free to write their own laws without being subjugated to Congress. Senator Cory Booker, a New Jersey Democrat who has been active on criminal justice issues, mounted a defense of the District’s law in a party luncheon on Tuesday, according to senators who attended....

But the president’s reversal, the mayor’s veto and rising public unease with violent crime drove most Democrats to rally behind blocking the law, including Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, the majority leader, as well as both senators from neighboring Virginia, Mark Warner and Tim Kaine.  Mr. Kaine is among the senators up for re-election next year.  Both Democrats from Maryland, the other adjoining state, Senators Benjamin L. Cardin and Chris Van Hollen, voted “no.”

I was not familiar enough with all of the particular of the proposed DC Code reform to have a detailed and nuanced view of its pros and cons.  But I am certain that very few member of Congress voted on this matter based on any nuanced particulars of the proposed DC Code reform.  This issue turned into a "tough" versus "soft" on crime vote (with a hint of DC independence), and the political winds — which Prez Biden feels and also impacts — blew this vote a particular way.  It will be interesting to see if and how this vote and these winds shape future policy and politics, not only with respect to the work of Congress but also as campaign 2024 picks up steam.

"Mandatory Sentences as Strict Liability"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by William W. Berry III now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Strict liability crimes — crimes that do not require a criminal intent — are outliers in the world of criminal law. Disregarding criminal intent risks treating the blameworthy the same as the blameless.

In a different galaxy far, far away, mandatory sentences — sentences automatically imposed upon a criminal conviction — are unconstitutional in certain contexts for the exact same reason.  Mandatory death sentences risk treating those who do not deserve death the same as those that might.

Two completely separate contexts, two parallel rules of law.  Yet courts and commentators have failed to see the similarities between these two worlds, leaving an analytical black hole.  Indeed, equity in criminal sentencing may depend upon recognizing the connections between these parallel universes.

This Article aims to fill this analytic gap, proposing a rethinking of mandatory sentences in light of the way criminal law treats strict liability crimes.  Specifically, the Article argues that courts should re-conceptualize mandatory sentences as a type of strict liability.  To that end, it proposes a series of possible statutory and constitutional limits on mandatory sentences.

An interesting (and dubitante) SCOTUS argument in Dubin

I flagged in this post from last November the Supreme Court's cert grant in Dubin v. United States, which concerns the reach of the federal criminal law that adds a mandatory two-year prison term for using another person’s identity in the process of committing another crime.  That statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, is titled "Aggravated identity theft," but the statutory language would seem to cover a whole lot more conduct than what most think of as identify theft.  In fact, the government seem to be claiming that waiter who adds for himself an unauthorized $1 tip when swiping a patron's credit card would be guilty of credit card fraud and an additional two-year mandatory prison term under § 1028A.  

This matter was argued before the Supreme Court yesterday and the lengthy argument had all sorts of interesting elements.  (The transcript, running over 100 pages, is available here; the audio is available here.)  As detailed in the pieces linked below, it seems nearly all the Justices believe there have to be some limiting principles for application of this statute.  But while the Justices seem to generally doubt the government's broad statutory reading, it is unclear what part of the statutory text may provide real limits and on what terms.  Stay tuned:

From Bloomberg Law, "Justices Appear Ready to Limit Breadth of Identity Theft Law"

From the New York Times, "Supreme Court Seems Skeptical of Broad Sweep of Identity Theft Law"

From SCOTUSblog, "Justices lean toward narrow reading of aggravated identity theft"

From Security Boulevard, "Supreme Court: Does BIlling Fraud Violate Federal ID Theft Statutes?"

SCOTUS grants certiorari to review reach of FIRST STEP Act's expansion of statutory safety valve

As predicted in this post a couple days ago, sentencing fans now get to turn their attention to the Supreme Court for the next chapter of a fascinating FIRST STEP Act statutory interpretation issue.  Specifically, in this morning's SCOTUS order list, one of the two cases receiving certiorari grants was Pulsifer v. United States.  Here is the (lengthy) question presented as set forth in the defendant's cert petition:

The “safety valve” provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)–(5).  Congress amended the first set of criteria, in § 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he “does not have — (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).

The question presented is whether the “and” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means “and,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the “and” means “or,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).

Notably, as regular readers know, the circuit split on this issue has deepened to include two more circuits on both sides of the debate.  Federal criminal justice practitioners and sentencing fans certainly will be following this case closely because its resolution will impact thousands of drug defendants sentenced in federal courts every year. But statutory construction gurus (and isn't that everyone) will also surely be interest in the debates this case can present about textualism, plain meaning and the rule of lenity. Stay tuned.

Split over reading of the FIRST-STEP-amended safety valve provision appears ready for SCOTUS review

In this post a couple of days ago, which discussed the latest notable circuit opinion interpreting the language Congress used in the FIRST STEP Act to expand the statutory safety valve enabling more federal drug defendants to be sentenced below mandatory minimum terms, I suggested it was only a matter of time before SCOTUS takes up the statutory interpretation dispute that has deeply divided lower courts.  And this new Relist Watch post by John Elwood at SCOTUSblog suggest it may actually be only a matter of days before cert is granted on this issue:

The Supreme Court will meet this Friday to consider whether to grant review in a group of around 95 petitions and motions. They will be considering eight cases for the second time....

Under the “safety-valve” provision of federal sentencing law, a defendant convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes can obtain relief from statutory mandatory minimum sentences if, among other things, her criminal history satisfies criteria in 18 U.S.C § 3553(f)(1): she “does not have — (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.”

Pulsifer v. United States and Palomares v. United States present the question of how that provision should be read: whether a defendant is ineligible for relief from the mandatory minimum if her criminal history runs afoul of any one of the disqualifying criteria in subsections (A), (B), or (C), or is ineligible only if her criminal history runs afoul of all three disqualifying criteria, subsections (A), (B), and (C).  The government agrees that the circuits are divided and review is warranted, and recommends that the court take Pulsifer, which it says is the better vehicle.  Counsel for Palomares and Pulsifer trade barbs in their reply briefs about which is the better vehicle.  Probably at least one will get the grant.

I share the view that, if the Justice Department is advocating for review, we ought to expect a grant on one of these cases perhaps as early as Monday.  My understanding is that a grant now would set the case up for Fall 2023 argument and likely no decision from SCOTUS until early 2024. 

Fourth Circuit panel joins minority of circuits giving broad reading to FIRST-STEP-amended safety valve provision

I have noted in a handful of prior posts some of the notable circuit rulings concerning the complicated language that Congress used in the FIRST STEP Act to expand the statutory safety valve enabling more federal drug defendants to benefit from its authorization for below mandatory-minimum sentences.  A helpful reader made sure I did not miss the latest opinion on this topic, this one coming from a Fourth Circuit panel in US v. Jones, No. 21-4605 (4th Cir. Feb 21, 2023) (available here).  Here is how the opinion starts and concludes:

The safety valve provision found in the First Step Act allows a district court to impose a sentence without regard to a mandatory minimum if certain criteria are met.  Relevant here, the court must find that the defendant “does not have . . . more than 4 criminal history points, . . . a prior 3-point offense, . . . and a prior 2-point violent offense” (the “criminal history characteristics”). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).  Cassity Jones has more than four criminal history points but does not have a prior three-point offense or two-point violent offense.  The district court concluded that a defendant must have all three criminal history characteristics to be ineligible for relief and applied the safety valve in sentencing Jones.  The sole issue on appeal is whether the word “and” in § 3553(f)(1) connecting the criminal history characteristics applies conjunctively or disjunctively.  We conclude that “and” is conjunctive and affirm the district court’s decision....

Ultimately, whether or not this is a prudent policy choice is not for the judiciary to decide: that determination lies solely with the legislative branch.  And “[t]he [G]overnment’s request that we rewrite § 3553(f)(1)’s ‘and’ into an ‘or’ based on the absurdity canon is simply a request for a swap of policy preferences.” Lopez, 998 F.3d at 440.  We cannot “rewrite Congress’s clear and unambiguous text” simply because the Government believes it is better policy for the safety valve to apply to fewer defendants. Id. “The remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress and not with this Court.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982); see also id. (“Congress may amend the statute; we may not.” (citations omitted)).

Accordingly, we are persuaded that the plain text of § 3553(f)(1) requires a sentencing court to find that a defendant has all three of the listed criminal history characteristics before excluding a defendant from safety valve eligibility.

Helpfully, a footnote early in the opinion details the circuit split over whether "and" means "and" or "and" means "or" in the context of this FIRST STEP Act revision of the application statute:

The circuits are split on this issue.  Compare United States v. Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (concluding that only a defendant with all three criminal history characteristics is ineligible under § 3553(f)(1)), and United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2021) (same), with United States v. Palomares, 52 F.4th 640 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding that having any one of the criminal history characteristics renders a defendant ineligible under § 3553(f)(1)), United States v. Pace, 48 F.4th 741 (7th Cir. 2022) (same), United States v. Pulsifer, 39 F.4th 1018 (8th Cir. 2022) (same), and United States v. Haynes, 55 F.4th 1075 (6th Cir. 2022) (same). We find the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits’ decisions convincing and join those circuits.

This split make plain that it is only a matter of time before SCOTUS takes up this matter. And I would hope that SCOTUS would move quickly: according to US Sentencing Commission data, thousands of federal drug defendants each year are being subject to different laws and treated differently at sentencing based on this statutory conflict.

New CRS explores "When Is a Mandatory Minimum Sentence Not Mandatory Under the First Step Act?"

The Congressional Research Service has this notable new "Legal Sidebar" discussing how the statutory "safety valve" allowing sentences below federal mandatory minimum terms operate.  The four-page document highlights the new legal debates resulting from FIRST STEP Act reforms, and here are excerpts:

Congress created the safety valve for certain drug offenses carrying mandatory minimum penalties after becoming concerned that the mandatory minimums could result in equally severe penalties for both more and less culpable offenders.  The Commission “worked directly with Congress to enact new legislation that would address the impact of mandatory minimum penalties on low-level drug-trafficking offenders.”  These efforts culminated in the first safety valve, which was introduced as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.  Under this statute, to be eligible for the safety valve, a federal judge could impose a sentence below a drug-related mandatory minimum if the federal defendant satisfied five criteria, including not having “more than one criminal history point, as determined under the Sentencing Guidelines.”... The Commission adopted a corresponding Sentencing Guideline provision, allowing for a two-level reduction in the Guidelines offense level based on the same 1994 criteria.

In 2011, the Commission reported to Congress that the safety valve was underinclusive.  The Commission therefore urged Congress to expand the safety valve to encompass “certain non-violent [drug] offenders who receive two, or perhaps three, criminal history points under the [G]uidelines” and “low-level, nonviolent offenders convicted of other offenses carrying mandatory minimum penalties.”...

The First Step Act addressed mandatory minimums in multiple ways.  In addition to reducing the mandatory minimum penalties for certain drug-trafficking offenses, the act expanded eligibility for safety-valve relief to defendants with more significant criminal histories.  Whereas federal defendants with one or zero criminal history points under the Sentencing Guidelines could receive relief under the prior law, the act made drug offenders with minor criminal records eligible for the safety valve provision....

Due to the current judicial divide over the scope of the First Step Act’s safety valve, whether a defendant may receive relief from a mandatory minimum sentence under the act may depend upon the happenstance of geography: a defendant may be disqualified in one circuit when that same defendant might be eligible for relief in a different circuit.  Given that sentencing disparities may appear at odds with the stated statutory policy of promoting consistency and uniformity in federal sentencing outcomes, Congress may wish to consider amending the safety valve to clarify whether the criminal history criteria are disjunctive or conjunctive.

In addition, the Sentencing Commission is exploring revisions to the Sentencing Guideline provision that is analogous to the act’s safety valve: the Commission identified two options under consideration.  One option would not make any change to the Guidelines and thus would permit courts to interpret the Guideline disjunctively or conjunctively.  A second option would adopt the disjunctive approach.  Regardless of which option the Commission approves, Congress always has the opportunity to review and revise any amendments to the Guidelines.

"Circumventing Mandatory Minimum Sentences Through Legal Representation – An Integrated Methods Study of Drunk Driving Violations"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article now available via SSRN authored by Jonathan Hasson and Abraham Tennenbaum.  Here is its abstract:

Most common law nations impose minimum sentences for drunk driving.  Israel introduced a mandatory minimum law in 1995 requiring a two–year license disqualification regardless of intoxication level.  In theory, the new law allows minimal room for deviation. In practice, however, our study demonstrates that the law in action has diverged significantly from “blackletter law.”  Through an integrated historical, quantitative, and qualitative analysis that follows the law from its inception to the present day, we explore the root causes of this deviation and the mechanisms of circumvention.

Based on quantitative data collected on drunk driving cases between 2008 and 2022 and a survey of professionals specializing in traffic law, we highlight how the law’s perceived harshness has contributed to plea bargains becoming the normative means of circumventing the law.  This circumvention undermines the law’s original intention, that is, uniformity, proportionality, and equity in sentencing.  Multiple variables including appearances in court, legal representation, jurisdiction, and the judge’s identity result in comparably guilty defendants receiving different sentences.  Given these disparities, we propose replacing the current minimum sentence with a graduated minimum based on intoxication levels; limiting prosecutorial and judicial discretion; and providing court date reminders and public counsel to minimize harm to vulnerable populations.

"Felony Sentencing in New York City: Mandatory Minimums, Mass Incarceration, and Race"

The title of this post is the title of this new report from the Center for Court Innovation authored by Fred Butcher, Amanda B. Cissner, and Michael Rempel.   The full report runs over 30 pages, but this CCI webpage provides this two-page summary which includes this brief accouting of the report's findings:

Of the more than 65,000 such arrests in 2019, we found a third of people arrested were potentially subject to a mandatory minimum.  That doesn’t mean everyone ultimately received a minimum prison sentence, but the wide eligibility confers outsized power on prosecutors; in plea negotiations, prosecutors can wield the threat of a higher charge with guaranteed, generally lengthy, prison time against someone hesitant to accept a plea.

Arrests, and with them exposure to charges eligible for a mandatory minimum, are the formal entry-point to the criminal legal system.  Our analysis found Black people accounted for 51% of people arrested on a felony in New York City in 2019, more than double their representation in the general population; for white people, the figure was 11%. For arrests with exposure to a mandatory minimum, the disparity was even more striking: Black and Hispanic/Latinx New Yorkers combined to make up 91% of such arrests; for white people, the proportion was only 7%.

Looking at the subgroup of those convicted of a felony, Black people were also more likely to suffer imprisonment and almost six of ten convictions carrying a mandatory minimum sentence went to a Black person.

Indeed, while race was a significant predictor of whether someone convicted of a felony received a prison sentence — 58% of Black versus 43% of white people — an even stronger predictor was a prior felony conviction. Here the overlap — or, for people of color, doublebind — is considerable.  Systemic issues such as underinvestment paired with over-policing of Black and Brown communities increase the likelihood that members of these communities will acquire the kind of criminal history that can trigger, not only a sentence of incarceration, but also exposure to a mandatory minimum (whether actualized or used against them to leverage a less favorable plea).

Looking back and looking forward on federal crack sentencing after new AG Garland memos

As noted in this post, US Attorney General Merrick Garland issued new federal charging guidelines this past Friday.  There are lots of thinkgs to say about a lot of the particulars of these guidelines (including why they took so long to be produced), although the bulk of the media coverage has been about the AG Garland's specific instructions to federal prosecutors to "promote the equivalent treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses."   That intruction alone justifies lots of discussion, but I will start with one "looking back" matter and one "looking forward" matter:

1.  Shouldn't past crack sentences merit "equivalent treatment" via compassionate release?   This US Sentencing Commission data analysis from January 2022 suggests that there may be 8,000 or more current federal prisonsers serving crack sentences that are much longer than they would have received if they had receicved "equivalent treatment" to powder offenders at their initial sentencing.  Though it may be claimed that not all current crack prisoners may be able to demonstrate "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A), certainly some of them are likely to be able to do so.  Presumably, federal prosecutors can and will now be fully supportive of efforts by crack prisoners to seek such reductions to at least the powder sentencing equivalent whenever there are any other bases to claim that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" support a sentence reduction.  Moreover, as I see it, the historic problems and injustices of crack sentencing is alone an "extraordinary and compelling reasons" support a sentence reduction.  I doubt federal prosecutors will agree with this assertion, but federal courts could certainly make such a finding and I would hope DOJ would not appeal such a finding if some district courts so rule.

2.  Isn't future congressional crack sentencing reform tougher now?  Literally hours before seeing the new AG charging guidelines, I blogged news reports that Congress was closing in on a deal to lower crack sentences so as to reduce (but not elimited) the statutory crack/powder disparity.  Thoughthe AG issuing discretionary charging guidelines ought not directly impact how legislators think about statutory reform, everything that happens inside the Beltway can echo through all the work other others inside the Beltway.  And, discouragingly, I have now seen this new report, headlined "U.S. Senate Talks on Cocaine Sentencing Reform Hit Roadblock," suggesting crack sentencing reform is not likely to get done:

Negotiations in the U.S. Senate to narrow sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine have stalled, two sources said on Monday, in what could prove a blow for criminal justice reform advocates....  [I]n the last three days, negotiations to tuck the measure into the year-end spending bill, considered key for its passage, have largely ground to a halt, the sources said.

A Friday decision by Attorney General Merrick Garland to instruct federal prosecutors to end disparities in the way they charge offenses involving crack and powder upset some Republican legislators, who accused the Justice Department of usurping congressional authority.  Separately, bipartisan negotiators have encountered unexpected opposition from top Senate Republican Mitch McConnell, one of the people said.

"A bipartisan group of lawmakers, including myself, just recently came to an agreement on statutory changes that could possibly be included in the year-end funding bill," Senator Chuck Grassley, the top Republican senator on the Judiciary Committee, said in a Friday statement.  "That hard-won compromise has been jeopardized because the attorney general inappropriately took lawmaking into his own hands."

Perhaps AG Garland already knew that Senator McConnell was going to block crack sentencing reform before issuing his bold charging guidelines. But, if there was still a realistic chance at crack sentencing reform that AG Garland disrupted simply by not waiting a few more days to issue these (long-overdue) guidelines, then this was an epic blunder in timing.

UPDATE:  This new Politico article about the omnibus bill to be passsed by Congress indicates that crack sentencing reform is not included AND that AG Garland's charging memo is the reasona why:

A bipartisan deal to narrow the sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine was also booted from the bill after Attorney General Merrick Garland instructed federal prosecutors last week to eliminate the sentencing disparities, sparking frustration from Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), who accused him of blowing up the Senate deal.

Especially for federal drug sentencing statutes, it "turns out that 'and' has more meanings than one might suppose"

A couple of weeks ago in this post, I noted the notable Eleventh Circuit en banc ruling in US v. Garcon giving a broad reading to the FIRST-STEP-amended statutory safety valve to enable more federal drug defendants to benefit from its authorization for below mandatory-minimum sentences.  Thanks to a helpful reader, I see that today a split panel of the Sixth Circuit came out the other way in US v. Haynes, No. 22-5132 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2022) (available here).  Here are some passages from the majority opinion explaining the court's reasoning:

Aaron Haynes argues that the district court misinterpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) when it denied him “safety valve” relief from his mandatory-minimum sentence. We agree with the district court’s interpretation of the statute and affirm....

The question presented is whether — as the government argues and the district court held — this provision requires the defendant to show that he has none of the criminal history described in subsections (A)-(C); or whether instead — as Haynes argues — the defendant must show only that he lacks the criminal history described in any one of those subsections. The answer to that question, everyone agrees, depends on the meaning of the word “and” as used in § 3553(f)(1)(B).

It turns out that “and” has more meanings than one might suppose.  By way of background, grammatical rules are an archetype of rules of conduct with which we often comply without conscious awareness of doing so.  Small children comply with any number of grammatical rules without awareness even of their existence; and adults comply with rules concerning the pluperfect and subjunctive tenses, for example, without consciously knowing what those rules are.  We likewise understand language according to these same grammatical rules, again often without awareness of their existence.  Thus, a particular grammatical rule might strike us as impossibly esoteric, and yet shape our understanding of language every day.  The task of determining the ordinary meaning of a word or phrase, therefore, is sometimes one of excavating — and taking conscious account of — rules as to which our compliance is often unconscious....

Here, the government’s interpretation of § 3553(f)(1) is logically coherent. Again by way of background, when § 3553(f)(1) was first enacted in 1994, it provided that any defendant with “more than one criminal history point” was ineligible for safety-valve relief.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (1994).  Congress amended § 3553(f)(1) in the First Step Act of 2018 to read as it does now. Under the government’s interpretation — for a defendant to obtain relief from an otherwise mandatory-minimum sentence — the defendant must not have any of three disqualifying conditions in his criminal record: first, “more than 4 criminal history points,” itself a fourfold increase over the prior cap; second, a prior offense serious enough to add three points to his criminal record; and third, a prior 2-point “violent offense[.]”  Each of those conditions on its face is quite plausibly an independent ground to deny a defendant the extraordinary relief afforded by the safety valve — which means this reading is logically coherent.

The same is not true of Haynes’s interpretation, which would require that all these conditions be present for a defendant to be ineligible for safety-valve relief. Consider, for example, a defendant with 25 criminal history points, generated in part by six convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and six convictions for domestic assault.  (Both can be two-point violent offenses.  See, e.g., United States v. Delgado-Hernandez, 646 F.3d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 2011).)  Under Haynes’s interpretation, this defendant would qualify for safety-valve relief because of the fortuity that his criminal record lacks “a prior 3-point offense[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)(B).  Or consider an incorrigible recidivist with, say, 24 criminal-history points, comprising a half-dozen convictions for robbery and two convictions for possession of explosives with intent to terrorize. (Both are often three-point offenses.  See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 209 F.3d 614, 616 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Priest, 447 F. App’x 682, 684 (6th Cir. 2011).)  This defendant too would be eligible for safety-valve relief, for want of a prior two-point violent offense. Results like these appear arbitrary enough to be implausible — which makes Haynes’s interpretation akin to an interpretation of beer-and-wine in the joint sense rather than the distributive one.  Haynes does offer a thoughtful response: namely that the district court serves as a gatekeeper in cases where § 3553(f)(1) generates results as bizarre as these.  But an ordinary reader would expect that § 3553(f)(1) itself would serve as a gatekeeper — and not an arbitrary one.  That indeed is the whole point of the provision.  The government’s reading of § 3553(f)(1) is therefore better than Haynes’s reading.

I believe that we now have the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits adopting the government's approach to the new statutory safety valve, and the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits on the defendants' side.  It is now seemingly only a question of when, rather than if, the Supreme Court takes up this issue and tells us which meaning of "and" is to be applied in this context.

New crack sentence reductions (but not equalization or retroactivity) reportedly in Congress's year-end lawmaking

I think I am excited — though I might also be more than a bit disappointed — to see reports from a few press sources that Congress may be getting close to passing a version of crack sentencing reform, though apparently not one that will fully equalize powder and crack sentencing terms or that will make new reforms retroactive.  This Reuters piece, healdined "U.S. Senate set to address cocaine sentencing disparity in funding bill," provides these details:

Negotiators in the U.S. Senate have reached a tentative deal to narrow sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine and plan to tuck the measure into a bill funding the government, according to four people briefed on the matter....

Under a deal reached by bipartisan negotiators, that [crack/powder weight disparity] would be narrowed to 2.5 to 1, said the people, who requested anonymity to discuss private talks. Congress is likely to attach the measure to a year-end spending bill that lawmakers are currently hashing out, they added.

Legislation that would completely eliminate the sentencing disparity between crack and powder passed in the House of Representatives by a wide margin last year, though it has not advanced in the Senate.

Several Senate Republicans, including Chuck Grassley, the party's highest-ranking member on the Judiciary Committee, have publicly supported a 2.5-to-1 proportion instead. Grassley's office did not respond to a request for comment. Senator Dick Durbin, the No. 2 Senate Democrat and a key actor in cocaine sentencing talks, declined to comment.

The tentative deal does not include retroactive relief for people already convicted of crack-related offenses, which sentencing reform groups had been pushing for, the people said.

The disparities between crack and powder date back to war-on-drugs policies of the 1980s. In 1986, Congress passed a law to establish mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking offenses, which treated crack and powder cocaine offenses using a 100-to-1 ratio. Under that formula, a person convicted for selling 5 grams of crack cocaine was treated the same as someone who sold 500 grams of powder cocaine. That proportion was narrowed to 18 to 1 in 2010.

While the people involved in negotiations see the passage of the cocaine sentencing compromise as likely, they warned the deal could still fall apart as Congress races to pass the sweeping, expected $1.7 trillion government funding measure.

I always welcome "half-a-loaf" criminal justice reforms and better than getting nothing done at all.  And I had come to think this Congress was going to get nothing done at all on this front.  So, I am keen to be excited about something seemingly on a path to enactment.

But Senator Grassley's original proposal for a 2.5-1 cocaine sentencing ratio, as detailed here, called for essentially increasing punishment levels for powder cocaine along with loweing punishments for crack cocaine.  Given that US Sentencing Commission data show that there are now nearly three times as many powder cases sentenced in federal courts as crack cases, it is possible that efforts to reduce disparities here (depanding on the particulars) could actually raise sentences overall.  My guess is that any deal being stuck is likely to have a net reduction in expected prison time, but the devil will be in the statutory details.  In addition, how the new US Sentencing Commission responds to any statutory reforms will be most consequential in the long run.

SCOTUS grants cert. on two new criminal cases, including one involving a sentencing issue

The Supreme Court this afternoon granted cert on four new cases in this order.  Two of the new cases to be argued in early 2023 are criminal cases, and here is an account of them from this SCOTUSblog post about the grants:

In United States v. Hansen, the justices agreed to review the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i), a federal law that makes it a crime, punishable by up to 10 years in prison, to encourage or cause unauthorized immigrants to enter or reside in the United States.  Three years ago, the court agreed to take up this question in another case, United States v. Sineneng-Smith, but it did not resolve it.  Instead, a unanimous court ruled that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit had improperly injected the issue into the case.

The question returns to the court in the case of Helaman Hansen, who was convicted under Section 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) for running a program that, in exchange for fees of up to $10,000, promised to help adult unauthorized immigrants become U.S. citizens through adoption.  On appeal, he argued — and a panel of the 9th Circuit agreed — that the statute violates the First Amendment because it is so broad that it would also apply to speech protected by the Constitution — for example, a statement that merely encourages someone to stay in the United States. After the 9th Circuit declined to rehear the case, the federal government came to the Supreme Court, which agreed on Friday to weigh in....

In Lora v. United States, the justices agreed to decide whether federal criminal sentencing laws require a New York man convicted for his role in a drug-trafficking-related murder to be sentenced to consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences.

John Elwood in his most recent "Relist Watch" SCOTUSblog post provided these additional details about the Lora case:

Next up is Lora v. United States, presenting an issue of federal criminal sentencing.  District courts have discretion to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences unless a statute mandates otherwise.  Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) of Title 18, which imposes penalties for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime, specifies that sentences imposed “under this subsection” must run consecutive to other sentences. Efrain Lora was convicted and sentenced for a drug-trafficking-related murder under a different subsection, Section 924(j).  Lora therefore argued that the district court had discretion to impose concurrent sentences because Section 924(j) creates an offense distinct from Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).  But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit ruled that the district court was required to impose consecutive sentences because it concluded that Section 924(j) is essentially an aggravated form of the Section 924(c) offense.

Lora argues that four circuit courts have reached the same conclusion as the 2nd Circuit, and at least two circuits have disagreed.  The government acknowledges what it calls a “narrow conflict in the circuits as to whether [Section] 924(c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate applies to a conviction for the greater-included offense under [Section] 924(j).”  But it argues that the issue “has limited practical importance” and notes that the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied cert on the issue.

So, sentencing fans, we have a new sentencing case on the SCOTUS docket, but it is one of "limited practical importance."  I suppose any water in the desert will have to do.

En banc Eleventh Circuit now gives broad reading to FIRST-STEP-amended mandatory-minimum safety valve provision

Last year in posts here and here, I spotlighted a significant Ninth Circuit ruling in US v. Lopez, No. 19-50305 (9th Cir. May 21, 2021) (available here), which interpreted the FIRST-STEP-amended statutory safety valve to enable more federal drug defendants to benefit from its authorization for below mandatory-minimum sentences.  But, as I noted in this post, days earlier in US v. Garcon, No. 19-14650 (11th Cir. May 18, 2021) (available here), an Eleventh Circuit panel reach an opposite interpretation of this statutory language.  The Garcon ruling went en banc, and today resulted in this set of opinions running 85 pages with an array of opinions from a court split 7-5.  Writing for six judges, Chief Judge (and former USSC Acting Chair) Bill Pryor start the opinion for the Eleventh Circuit this way:

The question presented in this appeal of a grant of safety-valve relief is whether, in the First Step Act, the word “and” means “and.” The Act empowers a court to grant a criminal defendant relief from a mandatory minimum sentence, but that relief is available only if “the defendant does not have” “more than 4 criminal history points,” “a prior 3-point offense[,] . . . and . . . a prior 2-point violent offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). Julian Garcon, who pleaded guilty to attempting to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, has a prior 3-point offense but does not have more than 4 criminal history points or a prior 2-point violent offense. The district court concluded that Garcon remained eligible for relief under the Act because he did not have all three characteristics. We agree. Because the conjunctive “and” joins together the enumerated characteristics, a defendant must have all three before he is ineligible for relief.  We affirm.

Tennessee Supreme Court finds state's uniquely harsh automatic life sentences unconstitutional for juvenile offenders

On Friday of last week, as summarized at this court webpage, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued a set of notable opinions addressing the constitutionality of the state's automatic life sentencing scheme for juveniles.  Here is, from the court website, links to: "the court's opinion in Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker, authored by Justice Sharon G. Lee and joined by Special Justice William C. Koch, Jr., the separate opinion concurring in the judgment authored by Justice Holly Kirby, and the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Jeff Bivins and joined by Chief Justice Roger Page."  Together, all the opinions run more than 50+ dense pages; they are all worth a read and cannot be easily summarized in a blog post.  But I can provide a poor-man's account (and also link to this local press coverage).

As explained in these opinions, Tennessee law requires a minimum term of 51 years in prison before parole consideration for murderers even for juveniles.  As the opinion for the court explains:  "Compared to the other forty-nine states, Tennessee is a clear outlier in its sentencing of juvenile homicide offenders.  So much so that Tennessee’s life sentence when automatically imposed on a juvenile is the harshest of any sentence in the country.  No one, including the dissent, disputes that a juvenile offender serving a life sentence in Tennessee is incarcerated longer than juvenile offenders serving life sentences in other states."

And so, decides the majority:

Tennessee is out of step with the rest of the country in the severity of sentences imposed on juvenile homicide offenders.  Automatically imposing a fifty-one-year-minimum life sentence on a juvenile offender without regard to the juvenile’s age and attendant circumstances can, for some juveniles, offend contemporary standards of decency....

Tennessee’s automatic life sentence when imposed on juvenile homicide offenders is an outlier when compared with the other forty-nine states, it lacks individualized sentencing which serves as a bulwark against disproportionate punishment, and it goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish legitimate penological objectives.  For these reasons, we hold that Tennessee’s automatic life sentence with a minimum of fifty-one years when imposed on juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment.

As for the remedy:

We exercise judicial restraint when remedying the unconstitutionality of the current statutory scheme for sentencing juvenile homicide offenders.  Rather than creating a new sentencing scheme or resentencing Mr. Booker, we apply the sentencing policy adopted by the General Assembly in its previous enactment of section 40-35-501.... Under this unrepealed statute, Mr. Booker remains sentenced to a sixty-year prison term and is eligible for, although not guaranteed, supervised release on parole after serving between twenty-five and thirty-six years.  Thus, at the appropriate time, Mr. Booker will receive an individualized parole hearing in which his age, rehabilitation, and other circumstances will be considered.

The dissenting opinion starts this way:

I respectfully dissent from the result reached by a majority of the Court today.  Quite frankly, I find the policy adopted as a result of the plurality opinion of Justice Lee and the concurring opinion of Justice Kirby to be sound.  However, it is just that.  It is a policy decision by which the majority today has pushed aside appropriate confines of judicial restraint and applied an evolving standards of decency/independent judgment analysis that impermissibly moves the Court into an area reserved to the legislative branch under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.

SCOTUS takes up case to address reach of federal two-year mandatory minimum added prison term for identity theft

I missed late yesterday that the Supreme Court issued a tiny order list on Thursday that granted cert on a single new case.  This news is exciting for those of us interest in seeing a bit more criminal action on the SCOTUS docket, and this SCOTUSblog posting has the details:

The Supreme Court announced on Thursday afternoon that it will weigh in on what it means to commit identity theft. After holding their private conference a day early because Friday is a federal holiday, the justices released a one-sentence order list that added one new case to their merits docket for the 2022-23 term: Dubin v. United States.

The defendant in the case is David Dubin, who was convicted of Medicaid fraud.  As the dispute comes to the Supreme Court, Dubin is challenging a separate conviction under a federal law that makes it a crime to use another person’s identity in the process of committing another crime.  Federal prosecutors contend that Dubin’s use of his patient’s name on a false Medicaid claim violated the statute, adding an extra two years to his one-year sentence for fraud.

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit upheld Dubin’s conviction and sentence, and on rehearing a deeply divided full court affirmed that decision. Dubin appealed to the justices in June, and they agreed on Thursday to take up his case, which will likely be argued sometime early next year.

Here is how the question in the case is presented by the defendant in his cert petition:

The federal aggravated identity theft statute provides: “Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated [elsewhere in the statute], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).

The question presented is whether a person commits aggravated identity theft any time he mentions or otherwise recites someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense.

Notable comments on drug sentencing policies from rival Senate candidates in Pennsylvania

NBC News has recently run a couple of interesting pieces based on interviews with the Pennsylvania US Senate candidates that probed some sentencing issues. Here are links to the pieces and some of the passages:

"Fetterman says his stroke recovery 'changes everything' but that he’s fit to serve as senator"

He also pushed back on Republicans who accuse him of being soft on crime. Though he used his seat on a state parole board to advocate for the early release of some prisoners — including felons convicted of murder and other violent crimes — Fetterman said paroles were only granted in a small fraction of cases and to convicts who had demonstrated remorse through years of good behavior....

He also praised President Joe Biden’s decision last week to pardon thousands of people convicted only on charges of marijuana possession at the federal level; he said earlier this year that he had pressed Biden to decriminalize pot.

At the same time, Fetterman told NBC News that he favors strengthening federal drug laws to make it easier to apply mandatory minimum sentences to fentanyl dealers, an idea incorporated into GOP legislation on Capitol Hill.

Pennsylvania, like many states, has grappled with the abuse of pain-killers such as fentanyl, a powerful synthetic opioid that can be lethal in small doses. Despite his approval for releasing some violent criminals early, and without committing to signing onto a GOP bill in Congress, Fetterman endorsed the basic aim of the legislation.

“I’d have to see what’s in front of me when it’s there. But the bottom is that being an addict, you know, we haven’t been able to arrest our way out of, you know, to the addict,” he said. “But it’s the, actually the pushers and the dealers, that’s a completely different issue. And they deserve to be in prison.”

"Oz says he supports Biden on marijuana pardons and opposes federal mandatory minimum prison sentences":

Mehmet Oz opposes federal mandatory minimum prison sentences and thinks President Joe Biden made a “rational move” by announcing a broad pardon for certain marijuana users, Oz, the Republican Senate nominee in Pennsylvania, said Thursday in an exclusive interview with NBC News.

The remarks represent a slight tack to the center in the final days of a race in which Oz, who trails in public polling, has repeatedly attacked Democratic rival John Fetterman as being too soft on crime.

Oz said he supports Biden’s decision to clear the records of ex-convicts who were in federal prison solely on charges of simple marijuana possession, a rare area of agreement with Biden and Fetterman.

“Going to jail for marijuana is not a wise move for the country. I think folks who have used marijuana and that’s the only reason they’re in jail should not have those criminal — those rulings — held against them,” Oz said, crediting Biden with a “rational move.”

He also said he broadly opposes federal mandatory minimum prison sentences, just days after Fetterman voiced support for applying them in more cases involving fentanyl dealers in an exclusive interview with NBC News.

“I really think judges should be empowered to make the difficult decisions, and they generally do it well,” Oz said. “When we tie their hands by making laws at the federal level, it hinders their ability to do what needs to be done.”

Notable new research on modern operation and impact of Three Strikes law in California

I just came across this notable new report from the California Policy Lab released a couple of months ago titled simply "Three Strikes in California." Here is the 45-page report's listing of "Key Findings" (with bolding in the original):

• Three-Strikes enhancements affect a large share of the currently incarcerated prison population, but a smaller share of admissions to prison.  Less than one-third of prison admissions since 2015 involve a strike enhancement, with most receiving a doubled-sentence enhancement and a smaller percentage receiving a third-strike enhancement. At a given point in time however, individuals with strike enhancements constitute a larger proportion of the incarcerated population because they serve longer sentences

• Nearly 65% of admissions to prison with a doubled-sentence enhancement are for a non-violent, non-serious offense.

• Given the longer sentences imposed for serious or violent offenses, the reverse is true for people currently incarcerated: approximately 71% of those with doubled-sentence enhancements were convicted of a serious or violent offense.

• Black individuals are heavily over-represented among people serving sentences with third-strike enhancements, and to a lesser degree, with doubled-sentence enhancements. Overrepresentation exists relative to the racial/ ethnic composition of the prison population, and overwhelmingly relative to the racial/ethnic composition of the resident population of California.

• Judicial and prosecutorial discretion can mitigate the severity of strike enhancements.  The data suggests that judges and prosecutors may mitigate the severity of doubled-sentence enhancements by choosing (or accepting) lower sentence length options, but the effect of discretion on overall sentence length is modest.

• The use of strike enhancements varies widely across counties.  While third-strike sentences are considerably more rare today than in past years and the ordering across counties has changed over time, high-use and low-use counties documented in the early 2000s are largely similar in terms of rank today.

• The implementation of Three Strikes does not explain statewide declines in crime over time.  Early evaluations claiming large impacts on crime fail to account for national crime trends and also suffer from methodological flaws. More recent research suggests that Three Strikes may have a modest deterrent effect on relatively less serious crime, but likely does not account for the declines in California’s crime rates beginning in the mid-1990s.  Crime fell contemporaneously throughout the nation, and comparisons of crime trends in California to states that did not pass Three-Strikes laws reveal very similar trends over the subsequent two decades.

Prez Biden "Safer America Plan" seeks more cops and fewer (state) mandatory minimums with a federal drug sentencing kicker

Via this new "Fact Sheet," the While House today provides lots and lots more details on the "Safer America Plan" that Prez Biden announced a few weeks ago.  There are far too many particulars to summarize them here, and here are the points emphasized at the outset of this Fact Sheet:

Today, the President is providing greater details regarding the Safer America Plan. President Biden’s fiscal year 2023 budget requests a fully paid-for new investment of approximately $35 billion to support law enforcement and crime prevention -- in addition to the President’s $2 billion discretionary request for these same programs.  The Safer America Plan details how this $37 billion will be used to save lives and make communities safer.

Specifically, the Plan:

1. Funds the police and promotes effective prosecution of crimes affecting families today, including by funding 100,000 additional police officers who will be recruited, trained, hired, and supervised consistent with the standards in the President’s Executive Order to advance effective, accountable community policing in order to enhance trust and public safety;
2. Invests in crime prevention and a fairer criminal justice system, including by investing $20 billion in services that address the causes of crime and reduce the burdens on police so they can focus on violent crime, and by incentivizing the reform of laws that increase incarceration without redressing public safety;
3. Takes additional commonsense steps on guns to keep dangerous firearms out of dangerous hands, including by calling on Congress to require background checks for all gun sales and ban assault weapons and high-capacity magazines.

The request to fund 100,000 additional police officers and to advance various gun control measure will surely garner the most attention, but there are some items that ought to be of particular interest for sentencing fans. For example:

The Plan establishes a new $15 billion over 10 years Accelerating Justice System Reform grant program that jurisdictions can use to advance strategies that will 1) prevent violent crime and/or 2) ease the burden on police officers so they do not have to respond to non-violent situations that may not merit police intervention.  Doing so not only enhances public safety, but also delivers evidence-based criminal justice reform that advances racial equity....

[I]n order to receive these critical grants, jurisdictions must repeal mandatory minimums for non-violent crimes and change other laws that contribute to increased incarceration rates without making our communities safer.  The Plan calls on Congress to appropriate $14.7 billion in mandatory funding for this new program, which will add on to the $300 million request in the President’s FY23 discretionary budget to fully fund this effort.

In addition, this Plan address drug enforcement and sentencing in two ways:

Impose tough penalties on all forms of fentanyl.  Over 100,000 people have died from drug overdoses in the past 12 months, many of them from the synthetic opioid fentanyl. The federal government regulates fentanyl as a Schedule I drug, meaning it is subject to strict regulations and criminal penalties.  But drug suppliers have found a loophole: they can easily alter the chemical structure of fentanyl — creating “fentanyl related substances” — to enhance the drug’s psychoactive properties and try to evade regulation of fentanyl. The Drug Enforcement Administration and Congress temporarily closed this loophole, but it will reopen in January 2023 unless Congress acts.  The Safer America Plan includes the Administration’s 2021 proposal to permanently schedule all fentanyl related substances into Schedule I so traffickers of these deadly substances face the penalties they deserve....

End the crack-powder disparity and make the fix retroactive. The Safer America Plan calls on Congress to end once and for all the racially discriminatory sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses — as President Biden first advocated in 2007 — and make that change fully retroactive.  This step would provide immediate sentencing relief to the 10,000 individuals, more than 90 percent of whom are Black, currently serving time in federal prison pursuant to the crack/powder disparity.

I cannot help but note that federal law includes lots of mandatory minimum provisions for non-violent crimes (such as drug offenses) that contribute to increased incarceration rates without any clear evidence that those provisions make our communities safer.  Notably, when on the campaign trail, candidate Joe Biden stated that he "supports an end to mandatory minimums" and that "as president, he will work for the passage of legislation to repeal mandatory minimums at the federal level."  Though I am pleased to see Prez Biden fulfill a campaign promise to "give states incentives to repeal their mandatory minimums," I hope he might before too long focus needed attention on federal mandatory minimum repeal as well.

With Senate leader now pushing for EQUAL Act, can crack sentencing reform finally get to finish line?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this New York Daily News article headlined "Schumer calls for end to crack cocaine sentencing disparity: ‘Cocaine is cocaine’."  Here are excerpts:

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer on Monday called on lawmakers to end a sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine that has had a disproportionate effect on Black Americans. “We have a moment to balance the scales of justice,” the New York Democrat said at a news conference outside the Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse in lower Manhattan. “It’s common sense: Cocaine is cocaine, and the sentencing should be equal.”

In September, the House overwhelmingly passed legislation to end a sentencing formula that uses an 18-to-1 ratio in treating equal amounts of crack and powder cocaine. The bipartisan vote was 361 to 66. Democrats and Republicans embraced the chance to correct what activists, researchers and law enforcement view as a historical wrong. Pricey powder cocaine has long been seen as the province of the wealthy, while crack is cheaper and generally associated with poorer Americans....

But the bill, called the Eliminating a Quantifiably Unjust Application of the Law Act, has not yet landed on the floor of the Senate this spring, with both parties moving cautiously ahead of the pivotal midterm elections in November.

Schumer, who declined to describe a timeline for passage, appeared to be embarking upon a pressure campaign meant to clear space for the legislation’s approval without a fierce fight on the floor. In the Senate, Sens. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.) are sponsoring the legislation to end the sentencing disparities. “We’re working together — Sens. Booker, Portman and myself — figuring out the right timeframe and the right way to go,” Schumer told reporters Monday. “We want to get this done as soon as we can.”

Booker’s office said Monday that the legislation has picked up 21 cosponsors, including 11 Republicans, since it was introduced in the Senate in January. Booker said in a statement he was “pleased that Leader Schumer has called for a vote on the bill.” “For decades, our nation’s drug laws have been overly punitive and fraught with racial disparities, but perhaps no law has been as fundamentally flawed as the crack and powder cocaine sentencing disparity,” Booker said in the statement. “I look forward to passing the EQUAL Act as soon as possible.”

Beginning in 1986, mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine and powder cocaine crimes were formulated using a staggering 100-to-1 ratio. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, signed into law by President Barack Obama, changed the ratio to 18 to 1. “Some of our colleagues would say, ‘Well, I’ll lower it, but I won’t make it equal,’” said Schumer, who at one point held up sweetener packets as props during the news conference. “100 to 1 was horrible, but 18 to 1 was just as horrible, which it is now. 1 to 1 is fair.”

Senator Schumer is wrong to assert current crack sentencing after the Fair Sentencing Act is "just as horrible" as it was under the 100-1 ratio.  It is a bit better, but still not actually fair.  The EQUAL Act finally presents the prospect of getting to the 1-1 sentencing ratio that the US Sentencing Commission urged way back in 1995.  More than a quarter of a century later, I hope Senator Schumer is right about the fact that now is finally, finally "a moment to balance the scales of justice."

A few of many prior posts on the EQUAL Act:

• GOP Gov and former DEA chief calls for Congress to "finally and fully end the disparity between crack and cocaine offenses" 
• US House votes 361-66 to pass today the EQUAL Act to end disparity between powder and crack cocaine sentences
• After an overwhelming majority of GOP House delegation voted for EQUAL Act, can the Senate move quickly to finally right a 35-year wrong? 
• Shouldn't federal prosecutors already be doing what they can to minimize the unjust crack-powder sentencing disparity? 
• Is it foolish to hope, after now 35 years, that Congress will soon fix the crack-powder federal sentencing disparity? 
• How about passing the EQUAL Act so we can be "free at last" from the crack/powder sentencing disparity?
• Why is getting the EQUAL Act through the US Senate proving so challenging? 
• Is Congress finally on the verge of equalizing crack and powder cocaine sentences?
• GOP Senators introduce competing crack/powder sentencing reform bill tougher than EQUAL Act

GOP Senators introduce competing crack/powder sentencing reform bill tougher than EQUAL Act

Regular readers should be aware from my prior postings that Congress seems poised to pass the EQUAL Act to entirely eliminate the crack and powder cocaine sentencing disparity.  This disparity and its racialized impacts have been an ugly part of the federal sentencing landscape for over 35 years (when Congress first created the 100:1 disparity), and the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 only partially reduced the disparity (down to 18:1).  But after the US House voted overwhelmingly, 361-66, to pass the EQUAL Act to end disparity last year, and after the Senate version had secured 11 GOP sponsors, I was hopeful the powder and crack cocaine disparity could and would finally be ended this year.

But, this press release from Senator Chuck Grassley's office, titled "Senators Introduce Bill To Reduce Crack-Powder Sentencing Disparity, Protect Communities From Criminals Most Likely To Reoffend," now has me concerned that a competing bill might now muck up the works.  Here are the details from the release:

Sens. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Mike Lee (R-Utah), Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) today introduced the SMART Cocaine Sentencing Act, which will reduce the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenders tried in federal courts. The legislation aims to make sentencing fairer while also preserving the ability of courts to keep those most likely to reoffend off the street.

“I’ve worked on this issue for many years. I cosponsored the 2010 legislation led by Senators Durbin and Sessions to reduce the disparity in sentencing from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1.  It’s high time to do more to address this important issue and make our criminal code more just and fair.  Our legislation will significantly reduce this disparity while ensuring those more likely to reoffend face appropriate penalties.  Powder cocaine is being trafficked across the border in historic volumes, so we also need to take precautions that ensure these traffickers also face justice for spreading poison through our communities,” Grassley said....

This sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenders has had a disparate impact on communities of color across the country.  Reducing this disparate impact is critical, but must be thoughtfully enacted to prevent likely reoffenders from returning to communities just to violate the law again.

Separate legislation has been introduced in the Senate to completely flatten the differences between sentences for crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses.  This approach does not account for the differences in recidivism rates associated with the two types of cocaine offenses.  According to a January 2022 analysis from the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC), crack cocaine offenders recidivate at the highest rate of any drug type at 60.8 percent, while powder cocaine offenders recidivate at the lowest rate of any drug type at 43.8 percent.  Raising additional public safety concerns, USSC data reveals that crack cocaine offenders were the most likely among all drug offenders to carry deadly weapons during offenses. These statistics show the need for a close look at all available government data before we consider an approach to flatten sentencing for crack and powder cocaine offenses. 

The SMART [Start Making Adjustments and Require Transparency in] Cocaine Sentencing Act will reduce the current crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing disparity from 18:1 to 2.5:1. It reduces the volume required to trigger 5-year mandatory minimum sentences for powder cocaine from 500 grams to 400 grams, and from 5 kilograms to 4 kilograms for 10-year mandatory minimum sentences.  For crack cocaine, the volume triggering a 5-year mandatory sentence is increased from 28 grams to 160 grams; the volume for the 10-year mandatory sentence is lifted from 280 grams to 1,600 grams.

Critically, the SMART Cocaine Sentencing Act also requires an attorney general review and certification process for any retroactive sentencing adjustments. It provides for new federal research from the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Department of Health and Human Services regarding the lethality and addictiveness of these substances as well as what violence is associated with cocaine-related crimes. The legislation also requires a new report from the USSC on crack and powder cocaine offenses, including data on recidivism rates....

Full legislative text of the SMART Cocaine Sentencing Act can be found HERE.  

Kevin Ring has an effective Twitter thread here criticizing various aspects of this proposal, which he calls the "The Grassley Unequal Act."  I hope that this bill does not impede progress on the EQUAL Act, but the fact that the EQUAL Act has not become law already make me concerned about the fate and future or long-overdue efforts to end the crack/cocaine sentencing disparity.

A few of many prior posts on the EQUAL Act:

• GOP Gov and former DEA chief calls for Congress to "finally and fully end the disparity between crack and cocaine offenses" 
• US House votes 361-66 to pass today the EQUAL Act to end disparity between powder and crack cocaine sentences
• After an overwhelming majority of GOP House delegation voted for EQUAL Act, can the Senate move quickly to finally right a 35-year wrong? 
• Shouldn't federal prosecutors already be doing what they can to minimize the unjust crack-powder sentencing disparity? 
• Is it foolish to hope, after now 35 years, that Congress will soon fix the crack-powder federal sentencing disparity? 
• How about passing the EQUAL Act so we can be "free at last" from the crack/powder sentencing disparity?
• Why is getting the EQUAL Act through the US Senate proving so challenging? 
• Is Congress finally on the verge of equalizing crack and powder cocaine sentences?

UPDATE:  This new New York Times article, headlined "Drug Sentencing Bill Is in Limbo as Midterm Politics Paralyze Congress," details why the EQUAL Act may not get to the finish line in this Congress.  Here are excerpts:

[W]ith control of Congress at stake and Republicans weaponizing a law-and-order message against Democrats in their midterm election campaigns, the fate of the measure is in doubt. Democrats worry that bringing it up would allow Republicans to demand a series of votes that could make them look soft on crime and lax on immigration — risks they are reluctant to take months before they face voters.

Even the measure’s Republican backers concede that bringing it to the floor could lead to an array of difficult votes.  “I assume the topic opens itself pretty wide,” said Senator Roy Blunt, Republican of Missouri, who became the 11th member of his party to sign on to the Equal Act this month, giving its supporters more than the 60 votes needed to overcome procedural obstacles....

Though Mr. Schumer endorsed the legislation in April, he has not laid out a timeline for bringing it to the floor.  Democrats say he is giving backers of the bill a chance to build additional support and find a way to advance the measure without causing a floor fight that could take weeks — time that Democrats do not have if they want to continue to win approval of new judges and take care of other business before the end of the year....

Its supporters say that they recognize the difficulties but believe that it is the single piece of criminal justice legislation with a chance of reaching the president’s desk in the current political environment.  “Of all the criminal justice bills, this is the one that is set up for success right now,” said Inimai Chettiar, the federal director for the Justice Action Network. “It is not going to be easy on the floor, but I think it is doable.”

The problem is that the push comes as top Republicans have made clear that they intend to try to capitalize on public concern about increasing crime in the battle for Senate and House control in November....  Senator Mitch McConnell, the Kentucky Republican and minority leader, this week reprised his criticism of Judge Jackson and attacked Mr. Biden for having issued his first round of pardons and commutations, including for those convicted of drug crimes.  “They never miss an opportunity to send the wrong signal,” he said of Democrats.

Senator Tom Cotton, the Arkansas Republican who led the opposition to the First Step Act, said he was in no mood to let the Equal Act sail through. He has said that if the disparity is to be erased, penalties for powder cocaine should be increased.  “My opposition to the Equal Act will be as strong as my opposition to the First Step Act,” Mr. Cotton said.

The legislation encountered another complication on Thursday, when Senators Charles E. Grassley of Iowa and Mike Lee of Utah, two top Republican supporters of the previous criminal justice overhaul, introduced a competing bill that would reduce — but not eliminate — the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine. They said that research showed that crack traffickers were more likely to return to crime and carry deadly weapons.  “Our legislation will significantly reduce this disparity while ensuring those more likely to reoffend face appropriate penalties,” said Mr. Grassley, the top Republican on the Judiciary Committee.

Sponsors of the Equal Act say they intend to push forward and remain optimistic that they can overcome the difficulties.  “We’ve got an amazing bill, and we’ve got 11 Republicans and people want to get this done,” said Senator Cory Booker, Democrat of New Jersey and the lead sponsor of the legislation. “My hope is that we are going to have a shot to get this done right now.”

With strong advocates of the EQUAL Act now saying that getting this to the floor of the Senate is "doable" or can "have a shot," I cannot help but think it is quite a long shot this Congress.  Sigh.

Is Congress finally on the verge of equalizing crack and powder cocaine sentences?

I asked in this post a few weeks ago, "Why is getting the EQUAL Act through the US Senate proving so challenging?".  Excitingly, as detailed in this new Bloomberg piece, headlined "GOP Support Clears Senate Path for Bill on Cocaine Sentencing," it now looks like a bill to equalize crack and powder sentences now may have a ready path to passage. Here are the exciting details:

Ten Senate Republicans have signed on to a bill that would eliminate the federal sentencing disparity between drug offenses involving crack and powder cocaine, paving the way for likely passage in the evenly divided chamber where 60 votes are needed for most legislation.

“That looks like you’d get to 60, really,” said Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, one of the 10 GOP co-sponsors of the EQUAL Act.  “This is the Democrats’ prerogative, it’d be nice if they would bring it to the floor.”

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer signed onto the bill as a co-sponsor on Monday, but his office did not immediately respond to questions on his plans for floor debate.  The bill passed the House, 361-66, in September and President Joe Biden, who campaigned on criminal justice reform, is expected to sign the measure when it reaches his desk.

The bill, sponsored by Judiciary Chairman Dick Durbin, an Illinois Democrat, and New Jersey Democratic Senator Cory Booker, eliminates the lower quantity thresholds for crack cocaine, which the bill’s proponents have said unjustly targets Black offenders.

In 2020, the U.S. Sentencing Commission found that 77.1% of crack cocaine trafficking offenders were Black and 6.3% were White.  Yet White people are more likely to use cocaine in their lifetime than any other group, according to the 2020 National Survey of Drug Use and Health.

Current laws establish an 18-to-1 ratio on federal penalties for crack and powder cocaine, meaning anyone found with 28 grams of crack cocaine would face the same five-year mandatory prison sentence as a person found with 500 grams of powder cocaine....

Sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine were originally created in 1986 with a 100-to-1 ratio.  The Sentencing Commission issued a special report in 1995 stating the 100-to-1 ratio punished low-level crack dealers “far more severely” than high-level suppliers of powder cocaine, despite there being no pharmacological difference between the two forms of the drug.  Then-President Bill Clinton and Congress rejected the commission’s recommendations to amend the law.

Fifteen years later, Congress reduced the sentencing disparity from to 18-to-1, but advocates have fought to further narrow the sentencing gap....

Senator Jerry Moran, a Kansas Republican, recently signed on as a co-sponsor of the bill after studying the issue with constituents, he said, and determining this would be a step toward “criminal justice fairness.” Moran said it is his “expectation that this bill will be considered by the Senate.”

A few related posts on the EQUAL Act:

• An initial list of federal sentencing reforms to advance greater equity and justice for congressional consideration
• New efforts to fix the ugly old problem of sentencing disparity for federal crack and powder cocaine offenses 
• GOP Gov and former DEA chief calls for Congress to "finally and fully end the disparity between crack and cocaine offenses" 
• Depressing (and abridged) FSR reminder of just how long we have known crack sentences are especially whack 
• US House votes 361-66 to pass today the EQUAL Act to end disparity between powder and crack cocaine sentences
• After an overwhelming majority of GOP House delegation voted for EQUAL Act, can the Senate move quickly to finally right a 35-year wrong? 
• Shouldn't federal prosecutors already be doing what they can to minimize the unjust crack-powder sentencing disparity? 
• Is it foolish to hope, after now 35 years, that Congress will soon fix the crack-powder federal sentencing disparity? 
• How about passing the EQUAL Act so we can be "free at last" from the crack/powder sentencing disparity?
• Why is getting the EQUAL Act through the US Senate proving so challenging? 

Why is getting the EQUAL Act through the US Senate proving so challenging?

In this post six weeks ago on MLK day, I asked "How about passing the EQUAL Act so we can be 'free at last' from the crack/powder sentencing disparity?".  I noted in this prior post that the Senate version of the EQUAL Act has garnered seven notable and diverse GOP Senators as co-sponsors, and that this comes after last Fall the Act was passed by the US House by a vote of 361-66 with a majority of GOP Representative voting in favor.  These matters are on my mind particularly today after seeing this new DOJ press release headed "Readout of Justice Department Leadership Meeting with FAMM."  Here is an excerpt (with my emphasis added):

The meeting focused on the positive real-world impact of the finalization of the First Step Act Time Credit Rule, and the recent memorandum by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) concerning home confinement, as well as the need for Congress to pass the EQUAL Act.  The department has strongly urged Congress to pass the EQUAL ACT, which would reduce the disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentences from 18:1 to 1:1.

The Attorney General emphasized that meetings like these are “vitally important” to help department leadership understand how its “policies on paper affect people and their communities.”    During her remarks, Deputy Attorney General Monaco spoke about the importance of implementing the First Step Act and the Time Credit Rule and praised the work of FAMM. She noted that “as of this month, thousands of people are returning to their communities having put in the work to do so.”  

In Associate Attorney General Gupta’s opening remarks, she reiterated the importance of hearing from individuals directly impacted by the criminal justice system and shared that the department provided written testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of the EQUAL Act in June 2021, saying, “the current sentencing differential between crack and powder cocaine is not based in evidence and yet has caused significant harm in particular to communities of color.  It’s past time to correct this.”

I strongly agree that it is long past time to fix the crack/powder disparity, and every day matters: on average, every single workday, about 5 people — 4 whom are typically black and the other who is most likely Latino — are sentenced based on unjust crack sentencing rules in federal court.  Consequently, I continue to be deeply troubled that, nearly six months after the US House overwhelmingly voted with majorities in both parties in pass a bill to equalize crack and powder penalties, this bipartisan bill remains stuck in neutral in the US Senate.  Sigh.

A few related posts on the EQUAL Act:

• An initial list of federal sentencing reforms to advance greater equity and justice for congressional consideration
• New efforts to fix the ugly old problem of sentencing disparity for federal crack and powder cocaine offenses 
• GOP Gov and former DEA chief calls for Congress to "finally and fully end the disparity between crack and cocaine offenses" 
• Depressing (and abridged) FSR reminder of just how long we have known crack sentences are especially whack 
• US House votes 361-66 to pass today the EQUAL Act to end disparity between powder and crack cocaine sentences
• After an overwhelming majority of GOP House delegation voted for EQUAL Act, can the Senate move quickly to finally right a 35-year wrong? 
• Shouldn't federal prosecutors already be doing what they can to minimize the unjust crack-powder sentencing disparity? 
• Is it foolish to hope, after now 35 years, that Congress will soon fix the crack-powder federal sentencing disparity? 
• How about passing the EQUAL Act so we can be "free at last" from the crack/powder sentencing disparity?

How about passing the EQUAL Act so we can be "free at last" from the crack/powder sentencing disparity?

On MLK day, I have a tradition of making time to listen to the full "I Have A Dream" speech by Dr. King, which always delivers and always has its own unique power each and every listen.  In recent years, I have also used this day to explore Stanford University's awesome collection of MLK Papers; in posts linked below, I have quoted from various renown speeches and writings with an emphasis on the intersection of the civil rights movement and criminal justice reform.  But this recent news item from Wyoming has me today focused on a specific policy ask for advancing freedom and racial justice:

U.S. Sen. Cynthia Lummis, R-Wyo., became the seventh Republican co-sponsor of the EQUAL Act on Friday, which would fully and finally eliminate the federal sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine.

The two substances are virtually identical and equally dangerous, and yet crack carries a penalty that is 18 times that of powder cocaine, according to a news release. The bill passed in the House of Representatives by a margin of 361-66, including 143 Republicans.

Lummis joined Republican Sens. Rob Portman, R-Ohio; Rand Paul, R-Ky.; Thom Tillis, R-N.C.; Lindsey Graham, R-S.C.; Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, and Susan Collins, R-Maine, as co-sponsors. Advocates from across the political spectrum said the addition of Lummis is a clear indication that the EQUAL Act has the momentum needed to pass the Senate....

The EQUAL Act has support from groups across the political spectrum, including the Major Cities Chiefs Association, National District Attorneys Association, Americans for Tax Reform, Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, Prison Fellowship, Due Process Institute, Americans for Prosperity, FAMM, Catholic Prison Ministries Coalition, Faith and Freedom Coalition, ALEC Action, R Street Institute, FreedomWorks and Taxpayers Protection Alliance.

With seven notable and diverse GOP senators serving now serving as co-sponsors for the EQUAL Act, I have to believe this bill could easily overcome any filibuster efforts and secure passage on the floor of the Senate (likely by the 5 to 1 margin that it secured passage in the House).  So why is this not getting done ASAP?  To its credit, the Biden Administration has testified in support of the EQUAL Act in the US Senate, but I have not heard Prez Biden himself (or VP Harris) lean into this issue at all.  (Notably, if they want to focus on voting rights as a focal point for civil rights advocacy, they might also really advance the MLK legacy by taking on felony disenfranchisement.  Moreover, they should try to get bipartisan bills like the EQUAL Act passed into law so that people who care about criminal justice reform can better understand why they should bother to vote at all.)  

In part because US Sentencing Commission data reveal that "only" 1,217 persons were sentenced on crack trafficking offenses in FY 2020, which accounts for "only" 7.5% of all offenders sentenced for drug trafficking offenses, the import and impact of the EQUAL Act would not be as huge now as it might have been in years past.  (In FY 2009, just before the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the crack/powder disparity from 100-1 to 18-1, there were over 5,000 persons sentenced on crack offenses; indeed, more than 5,000 persons were sentenced each year on federal crack offenses through most of the 2000s.)  Still, the USSC 2020 data show that over 93% of those sentenced for federal crack offenses are persons of color (with 77% black), so that there is still a profound inequitable impact from our federal sentencing scheme that still unfairly treats crack offenses as much more serious than functionally comparable powder offenses.

Links to some prior MLK Day posts:

• Should criminal justice reform be the new civil rights movement?
• Honoring MLK by asking hard questions
• Reflecting on race and criminal justice realities to honor MLK's legacy
• Another reminder of race and criminal justice realities to honor MLK's legacy
• NPR's Fresh Air celebrates MLK Day by discussing The New Jim Crow
• Some still timely phrases from MLK's "I Have A Dream" speech for advocates of criminal justice reforms 
• Some new quotes at the end of the latest MLK day
• What might Martin Luther King seek as the next step in federal criminal justice reform? 
• Remembering and honoring the (always timely) poignancy of the great words of Dr. Martin Luther King 

A few related posts on the EQUAL Act:

• An initial list of federal sentencing reforms to advance greater equity and justice for congressional consideration
• New efforts to fix the ugly old problem of sentencing disparity for federal crack and powder cocaine offenses 
• GOP Gov and former DEA chief calls for Congress to "finally and fully end the disparity between crack and cocaine offenses" 
• Depressing (and abridged) FSR reminder of just how long we have known crack sentences are especially whack 
• US House votes 361-66 to pass today the EQUAL Act to end disparity between powder and crack cocaine sentences
• After an overwhelming majority of GOP House delegation voted for EQUAL Act, can the Senate move quickly to finally right a 35-year wrong? 
• Shouldn't federal prosecutors already be doing what they can to minimize the unjust crack-powder sentencing disparity? 
• Is it foolish to hope, after now 35 years, that Congress will soon fix the crack-powder federal sentencing disparity? 

Illinois judge decides to acquit teen in sexual assault case to avoid four-year mandatory minimum term

The New York Times has this interesting new article about a troubling example of how mandatory minimum sentences can (and often do) end up distorting the operation of our justices systems.  The full headline of the article provides the essentials: "Judge Tosses Teen’s Sexual Assault Conviction, Drawing Outrage; Drew Clinton, 18, faced four years in prison under Illinois sentencing guidelines. But the judge, Robert Adrian, overturned his conviction this month, saying the sentence was “not just." Here are the details:

Last October, a judge in western Illinois convicted an 18-year-old man of sexually assaulting a 16-year-old girl while she was unconscious at a graduation party.

The man, Drew Clinton, faced a mandatory minimum sentence of four years in prison, but at a hearing earlier this month, Judge Robert Adrian reversed his own decision and threw out the conviction.  The nearly five months Mr. Clinton had served in jail, the judge said, was “plenty of punishment.”

The decision, which was reported by the Herald-Whig of Quincy, Ill., has dismayed organizations that help survivors of sexual assault, the Adams County state’s attorney’s office and the girl who reported the assault, who told a local television station that she was present when Judge Adrian overturned Mr. Clinton’s conviction. “He made me seem like I fought for nothing and that I put my word out there for no reason,” she told WGEM-TV. “I immediately had to leave the courtroom and go to the bathroom. I was crying.”...

Mr. Clinton was charged with criminal sexual assault on June 1, 2021.  The girl reported that he sexually assaulted her after she became intoxicated at a party on May 30, according to court records.  During the bench trial, she testified that she was unconscious and woke up to find a pillow covering her face and Mr. Clinton assaulting her....

Mr. Schnack [a lawyer for Mr. Clinton] argued that mandatory sentences take away a judge’s discretion. “Every individual should be judged by the court in doing its sentence and not by a legislator years and hundreds of miles removed,” he said, according to the transcript.

He also said that prosecutors had not proved their case against Mr. Clinton and that the girl was able to consent.  Mr. Schnack said that she made many decisions that night, including drinking and stripping down to her underwear to go swimming. “They weren’t the best decisions,” he said. “She did know what was going on.”

Judge Adrian said he knew that, by law, Mr. Clinton was supposed to serve time in prison, but in this case, the sentence was unfair, partly because Mr. Clinton turned 18 just two weeks before the party and, until his arrest, had no criminal record.  “That is not just,” Judge Adrian said during the Jan. 3 hearing, according to the transcript. “There is no way for what happened in this case that this teenager should go to the Department of Corrections. I will not do that.”

He said that if he ruled that the sentence was unconstitutional, his decision would be reversed on appeal.  Instead, he said, what he could do was “find that the people failed to prove their case.” Judge Adrian chastised the parents and other adults who he said provided liquor to the teenagers at the party and failed “to exercise their parental responsibilities.”...

Carrie Ward, the chief executive of the Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault, said the judge’s comments and his decision to throw out Mr. Clinton’s conviction were “a clean and clear example of victim blaming.” By highlighting the girl’s clothing and chastising the hosts of the party, the judge shifted “100 percent of the blame from the perpetrator, from the actual person who committed the sexual assault, to everyone else, including the victim,” Ms. Ward said.

I am troubled that the judge here felt compelled to nullify guilt because he was unable or unwilling to develop an argument that a four-year prison term would be unjust and possibly illegal. I do not know Illinois law well enough to know if state constitutional jurisprudence or other doctrines could have provided a basis for the judge to rule that he had to be able to give effect to the defendant's youth and other mitigating factors. But if the judge made a compelling case for a more just sentence, perhaps prosecutors would not have appealed or perhaps appellate courts would have embraced the analysis. Instead, we have a case in which a judge seems to want to believe that two legal wrongs make a right.

Two of three defendants convicted of murdering Ahmaud Arbery given LWOP, other gets life with parole

This lengthy USA Today piece reports on a high-profile state sentencing that took place down in Georgia.  Here are the basics:

A judge sentenced three men to life in prison Friday for the murder of Ahmaud Arbery and denied the possibility of parole for two of the defendants, father and son Gregory and Travis McMichael.  However Judge Timothy Walmsley granted the possibility of parole to William "Roddie" Bryan, the McMichaels' neighbor who joined the chase and took video of the killing. Bryan must serve at least 30 years in prison before becoming eligible....

Before the sentencing was read, Walmsley held a minute of silence to represent a fraction of the time Arbery was running before he was shot.  He called the image of Travis McMichael aiming a shotgun at Arbery "absolutely chilling." The judge also quoted the defendant's statements, saying their words gave context to the video and guided his sentencing decision. The minimum penalty required by law for the murder charges is a life sentence; Walmsley had to determine whether each defendant would have the possibility of parole....

The three men chased the Arbery, 25, in trucks while he was running through the Satilla Shores neighborhood in Brunswick, Georgia, on Feb. 23, 2020.  The men weren't arrested for more than two months when Bryan's video was released, which fueled nationwide racial justice protests and later became a key piece of evidence in the murder trial. The nearly-all white jury deliberated for almost two days before finding the men guilty.  They were taken to Glynn County jail after the verdict was reached and are expected to appeal....

Walmsley said that while sentencing may not provide closure for the family, the community or the nation, it would hold the defendants accountable for their actions.  Arbery's parents, Marcus Arbery and Wanda Cooper-Jones, cried as the sentence was read.  Earlier Friday, the family asked for all three defendants to get the harshest penalty as they shared memories of him and the toll his death has taken....

The defendants all had the opportunity to speak before sentencing, a time when judges typically expect to hear remorse, but did not....

After being sentenced on the state charges, the three men will face a federal hate crimes trial for killing Arbery.  The three men are white; Arbery was Black. All three are charged with interfering with Arbery's rights and attempted kidnapping.  The McMichaels are also charged with using, carrying and brandishing — and in Travis McMichael’s case, firing — a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence.

The federal charges are punishable by death, life in prison or a shorter prison sentence and a fine, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigations.  There is no parole in the federal system. Attorneys will begin selecting a jury from a wide pool of 43 counties across the Southern District of Georgia for that trial Feb. 7. The proceedings are set to take place in Glynn County.

The McMichaels and Bryan are also facing a civil lawsuit filed by Arbery’s mother. The wrongful death suit seeks $1 million in damages and also names former Brunswick Judicial Circuit District Attorney Jackie Johnson, former Glynn County Police Chief John Powell, Waycross Judicial Circuit District Attorney George Barnhill, and several Glynn County police officers.

Another crazy long sentence resulting from crazy crude mandatory minimums after deadly accident in Colorado

A very sad case turned into a very extreme sentence for a truck driver in Colorado earlier this week.  This lengthy local story, headlined "Driver gets 110 years in fiery I-70 crash that killed 4," provides lots of the details and videos from the sentencing.  Here are the basics:

The man convicted after a crash on Interstate 70 that left four people dead was sentenced to 110 years in prison Monday afternoon.

Rogel Aguilera-Mederos was 23 when his semi-truck slammed into stopped traffic on the interstate near Denver West Parkway on April 25, 2019.  Four people died instantly from the impact: Doyle Harrison, William Bailey, Miguel Angel Lamas Arellano and Stanley Politano. It is believed they all died from injuries and not the resulting fire.

Aguilera-Mederos was found guilty by a jury on 27 counts in total.  The most serious charges were four counts of vehicular manslaughter.  Other counts he was found guilty of included first-degree assault, first-degree attempt to commit assault, vehicular assault, reckless driving and careless driving. He was found not guilty on 15 counts of first-degree attempt to commit assault.

Judge A. Bruce Jones sentenced Aguilera-Mederos to the required 10-year minimum for each of the six counts of first-degree assault with extreme indifference, to be served consecutively.  He was also sentenced to the required minimum of five years for 10 additional counts of attempted first-degree assault with extreme indifference.  Those will be served consecutively as well.

The judge said the legislature required him to order those sentences be served consecutively, which was why, he said, he issued the minimum sentence for those charges.  However, he did say he may have sentenced Aguilera-Mederos to more than the minimum, if not required to issue the sentences consecutively.

"In all victim impact statements I read, I did not glean from them someone saying, 'He should be in prison for the rest of his life, and he should never, ever get out," Jones said.  "Far from it. There was forgiveness reflected in those statements, but also a desire that he be punished and serve time in prison, and I share those sentiments."

In addition to the 110 years stemming from those charges, Aguilera-Mederos was sentenced to 30 years for 11 other charges that will be served concurrently.

Aguilera-Mederos was extremely emotional as he asked for forgiveness before Jones announced the sentence. "I know it has been hard and heartbreaking for everyone involved," he said though tears. "I can't sleep, I think all the time about the victims. A part of me will be missing forever, as well." Aguilera-Mederos said he took responsibility for the crash, and said it was not intentional. "I have never thought about hurting anyone in my entire life," he said....

The judge said his hands were tied when it came to sentencing, because Colorado's violent crime statute is specific. 9NEWS Legal Expert Scott Robinson said certain violent crimes require a minimum sentence for each victim, and they have to run consecutively. But he said there is one way for violent crime sentences to be reduced.

"Colorado's violent crimes statute gives judges some discretion after 180 days have passed," Robinson said. "Here, the sentencing judge, Bruce Jones, will have an opportunity to determine whether there were unusual and extenuating circumstances which would justify a reduction in the sentences imposed." The judge said he could not assure the courtroom this would be the end of this process, giving an indication that he may consider a motion like that.

The jury had to decide whether the crash resulted from a series of bad choices by the driver or a mechanical failure that the driver had no control over. Aguilera-Mederos faced 42 counts in all. He testified for hours and tearfully recounted publicly for the first time his version of what happened on that day.

Both sides agreed that his truck lost brakes at some point, but they disagreed on how or why that happened.... After the brakes were out, prosecutors argued that Aguilera-Mederos made a series of bad choices that resulted in the crash. One of them being his failure to use a runaway truck ramp on the highway.

I do not know the particulars of Colorado sentencing law, but I sure hope there is a mechanism for the reconsideration of this crazy extreme sentence before too long. But the very possibility that an awful accident can lead to an initial mandated sentence of 100+ years suggest to me that some reform of Colorado sentencing law is still needed.

Here is some other notable recent coverage of this case:

"Trucker’s 110-year sentence in fatal I-70 crash spotlights Colorado sentencing laws, prosecutors’ charging decisions"

"He Was Sentenced To 110 Years in Prison for Causing a Fatal Traffic Accident. The Judge Isn't Happy About It."

"Truck Driver Sentenced 110 Years For Deadly Crash Stemming From Brake Failure Even Though Everyone Agrees It's Unreasonable"

"Time For Justice The Urgent Need For Second Chances In Pennsylvania’s Sentencing System"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new report written by Emily Bloomenthal, Director of Research at FAMM.  Here is part of how the report's executive summary gets started:

Too many people in Pennsylvania are serving long prison terms that don’t make communities safer.  People who do not pose a risk to public safety languish in prison for decades because Pennsylvania’s laws don’t give them a second chance.  This report, which focuses on people serving minimum sentences of 20 years or longer, looks at the harms and injustices of extreme sentences in Pennsylvania, as well as opportunities for reform.

Key findings:

Pennsylvania’s prison population has been shaped by some of the harshest sentencing policies in the country.

• In 2019, Pennsylvania imprisoned more than seven times the number of people that it did in 1970.  That growth was driven by punitive policy choices, not increases in crime, and it did not make Pennsylvanians safer.

• Pennsylvania is a national leader in imposing extreme sentences.  This ranking is largely driven by two laws: the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment required for first- and second-degree murder, and the denial of parole eligibility to anyone serving a life sentence. In Pennsylvania prisons, 13.4% of people are serving life without parole (LWOP), compared to only 3.6% nationally.

• The population serving extreme sentences in Pennsylvania has surged over the last few decades. There were more than nine times as many people serving extreme sentences in 2019 than there were in 1980.

• Pennsylvania’s extreme sentencing practices have overwhelmingly impacted people of color, especially Black people, who make up less than 11% of Pennsylvania’s population but 65% of people serving life sentences and 58% of those serving non-life sentences of 20 years or longer.

• Pennsylvania’s extreme sentencing practices have created a large (and growing) elderly prison population, which increased thirtyfold from 1979 to 2019.

Pennsylvania’s extreme sentences are a high-cost, low-value proposition for taxpayers.

• Researchers have found no evidence that severe sentencing policies discourage people from choosing to engage in crime.

• Extreme sentences are not necessary for preventing recidivism, because the vast majority of people who commit crimes — even very serious crimes — naturally grow out of criminal behavior as they age and mature.  For example, of the 174 Philadelphia juvenile lifers — all originally convicted of homicide — who were resentenced and released following landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions, only two (1.1%) had been reconvicted of any offense as of 2020.

• Based on average incarceration costs, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) is spending $220 million per year to incarcerate 3,892 people who have already served at least 20 years.  The true cost is undoubtedly higher, because incarceration costs increase dramatically as people age and need more medical care.

• The average cost for incarcerated individuals in skilled or personal care units is $500 per day (or $182,625 per year), more than three times the cost for the general population.

Another quartet of must-read new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series

I highlighted here back in April the terrific new essay series assembled by the Brennan Center for Justice under the title "Punitive Excess."  I have blogged about sets of new essays repeatedly (as linked below) because each new set of new essays are must reads (like all that come before).  Since my last posting a few months ago, the series has added four awesome new essays, and here are links to the latest quartet:

• By David Alan Sklansky, "Addressing Violent Crime More Effectively: Excessive punishment is the wrong response to rises in homicide rates."

• By Alison Siegler, "End Mandatory Minimums: Inflexible, harsh sentences exacerbate crime and racial disparities alike."

• By Michele Deitch, "Independent Oversight Is Essential for a Safe and Healthy Prison System: Preventive monitoring of conditions in American prisons can help shine a light on what needs to change."

• By Alia Nahra and Hernandez D. Stroud, "There Is No One Answer to Over-Policing and Mass Incarceration — There Are Many: Examples abound for successful alternative methods that can greatly improve the current criminal legal system."

Prior related posts:

• Brennan Center launches notable new essay series titled "Punitive Excess"
• More notable new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series
• Three more great new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series 
• Still more great new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series
• Another rounds of terrific new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series 
• Yet more must-read new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series

Notable new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series focused on responding to violent crime and mandatory minimums

I highlighted here back in April the terrific essay series assembled by the Brennan Center for Justice under the title "Punitive Excess."  I have blogged about sets of new essays repeatedly (as linked below) because each new set of new essays are must reads (like all that come before).  The latest pair of piece ought to be of particular interest to sentencing fans:

• "Addressing Violent Crime More Effectively: Excessive punishment is the wrong response to rises in homicide rates" by David Alan Sklansky

• "End Mandatory Minimums: Inflexible, harsh sentences exacerbate crime and racial disparities alike" by Alison Siegler

Both of these pieces are must reads, and the piece on mandatory minimums has links to research and other materials that might be useful for those litigating against such sentences or seeking reductions therefrom.  Here is a segment (with links) from that piece:

[P]rosecutors’ power over mandatory minimums in turn creates racial disparities, obliterating any pretense of an unbiased system.  A recent study finds that prosecutors’ mandatory minimum charges resulted in Black individuals spending more time in prison than whites for the exact same crimes.  In fact, prosecutors bring mandatory minimums 65 percent more often against Black defendants, all else remaining equal. Another study similarly finds that some federal prosecutors charge Black and Latino individuals more often than white individuals with possession or sale of a quantity of drugs just sufficient to trigger a mandatory minimum; the disparity is highest “in states with higher levels of racial animus.”

Finally, mandatory minimums do not promote community safety.  Rather, any prison time at all increases the risk of future crime because “incarceration is inherently criminogenic”; mandatory minimums only exacerbate this situation.  Florida experienced a 50 percent spike in crime after enacting mandatory minimums.  Long sentences also make it more difficult for people to reintegrate into society.  And our overreliance on prisons makes us less safe by diverting resources from other critical public safety needs.  In contrast, studies show that shorter sentences in drug cases neither diminish public safety nor increase drug abuse.

The dominant paradigm is vulnerable, and instituting a new paradigm is both possible and crucial. President Biden and his attorney general have denounced mandatory minimums, as did former Attorney General Eric Holder.  Even though federal prosecutors — all of whom are subject to supervision by the Department of Justice — have long been the primary proponents of mandatory minimums, Attorney General Merrick Garland affirmed this position during his confirmation hearings: “We should . . . , as President Biden has suggested, seek the elimination of mandatory minimum[s].”

However, despite Garland’s testimony, his Department of Justice has given no sign that it will stop pursuing mandatory minimums. In fact, earlier this year, Garland reinstated a 2010 Holder policy that incorporated a long-standing directive to federal prosecutors: “Where two crimes have the same statutory maximum and the same guideline range, but only one contains a mandatory minimum penalty, the one with the mandatory minimum” should be charged.  To make matters worse, Garland chose not to reinstate a 2013 Holder policy that both directed prosecutors to decline to charge a mandatory minimum in “low-level, non-violent drug offenses” and explicitly acknowledged that such sentences “do not promote public safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation.”  After twenty years defending people charged with federal crimes, I’ve learned that prosecutors are rarely agents of change.  This is unfortunate because Garland has real power to reduce racialized mass incarceration. He can and should instruct federal prosecutors to refrain from charging and seeking mandatory sentences, especially in drug cases, where popular opposition to mandatory minimums is strongest.

Prior related posts:

• Brennan Center launches notable new essay series titled "Punitive Excess"
• More notable new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series
• Three more great new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series 
• Still more great new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series
• Another rounds of terrific new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series 
• Yet more must-read new essays in Brennan Center's "Punitive Excess" series 

"The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons"

The title of this post is the title of this new publication by The Sentencing Project authored by Ashley Nellis.  Here are parts of the report's overview:

This report details our observations of staggering disparities among Black and Latinx people imprisoned in the United States given their overall representation in the general population.  The latest available data regarding people sentenced to state prison reveal that Black Americans are imprisoned at a rate that is roughly five times the rate of white Americans.  During the present era of criminal justice reform, not enough emphasis has been focused on ending racial and ethnic disparities systemwide.

Going to prison is a major life-altering event that creates obstacles to building stable lives in the community, such as gaining employment and finding stable and safe housing after release. Imprisonment also reduces lifetime earnings and negatively affects life outcomes among children of incarcerated parents.

These are individual-level consequences of imprisonment but there are societal level consequences as well: high levels of imprisonment in communities cause high crime rates and neighborhood deterioration, thus fueling greater disparities.  This cycle both individually and societally is felt disproportionately by people who are Black. It is clear that the outcome of mass incarceration today has not occurred by happenstance but has been designed through policies created by a dominant white culture that insists on suppression of others....

Truly meaningful reforms to the criminal justice system cannot be accomplished without acknowledgement of its racist underpinnings. Immediate and focused attention on the causes and consequences of racial disparities is required in order to eliminate them.  True progress towards a racially just system requires an understanding of the variation in racial and ethnic inequities in imprisonment across states and the policies and day-to-day practices that drive these inequities.

KEY FINDINGS

• Black Americans are incarcerated in state prisons at nearly 5 times the rate of white Americans.
• Nationally, one in 81 Black adults per 100,000 in the U.S. is serving time in state prison.  Wisconsin leads the nation in Black imprisonment rates; one of every 36 Black Wisconsinites is in prison.
• In 12 states, more than half the prison population is Black: Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.
• Seven states maintain a Black/white disparity larger than 9 to 1: California, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Wisconsin.
• Latinx individuals are incarcerated in state prisons at a rate that is 1.3 times the incarceration rate of whites.  Ethnic disparities are highest in Massachusetts, which reports an ethnic differential of 4.1:1.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Eliminate mandatory sentences for all crimes.  Mandatory minimum sentences, habitual offender laws, and mandatory transfer of juveniles to the adult criminal system give prosecutors too much authority while limiting the discretion of impartial judges.  These policies contributed to a substantial increase in sentence length and time served in prison, disproportionately imposing unduly harsh sentences on Black and Latinx individuals.

2. Require prospective and retroactive racial impact statements for all criminal statutes.  The Sentencing Project urges states to adopt forecasting estimates that will calculate the impact of proposed crime legislation on different populations in order to minimize or eliminate the racially disparate impacts of certain laws and policies.  Several states have passed “racial impact statement” laws.  To undo the racial and ethnic disparity resulting from decades of tough-on-crime policies, however, states should also repeal existing racially biased laws and policies.  The impact of racial impact laws will be modest at best if they remain only forward looking.

3. Decriminalize low-level drug offenses.  Discontinue arrest and prosecutions for low-level drug offenses which often lead to the accumulation of prior convictions which accumulate disproportionately in communities of color.  These convictions generally drive further and deeper involvement in the criminal legal system.

New California law to end mandatory minimum terms for many non-violent drug offenses

Ironically, I have been so busy this week with this on-going conference about drug sentencing, I am just now getting a chance to blog about the drug sentencing news from California discussed in this local article headlined "Gov. Newsom Signs Bill Ending Mandatory Minimum Sentences For Many Non-Violent Drug Crimes." Here are details:

Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law a bill that ends mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug crimes on Tuesday, giving judges more individual discretion on punishing criminals.

Senate Bill 73, authored by Senator Scott Wiener (D-San Francisco), ends the prohibition against probation and suspended sentencing for drug crimes, including possessing more than 14.25 grams of illegal drugs, agreeing to sell or transport opiates or opium derivatives, planting or cultivating peyote, some forging or altering prescription crimes, and other similar non-violent drug-related crimes.

According to SB 73, the bill would not end the ability of judges to administer mandatory minimum length jail sentences. It would also not end laws that require jail time for many other drug offenses or remove probation ineligibility for those who had previously committed drug felonies.

Senator Wiener wrote the bill earlier this year to better address drug addiction treatment and to stop mass non-violent crime imprisonments. “Our prisons and jails are filled with people, particularly from communities of color, who have committed low-level, nonviolent drug offenses and who would be much better served by non-carceral options like probation, rehabilitation and treatment,” Wiener said in a statement on Tuesday. “It’s an important measure that will help end California’s system of mass incarceration.”...

However, law enforcement groups reiterated on Tuesday and Wednesday that the removal of mandatory minimums would lead to side effects such as an increase of drug use, a rise in drug sales, and a rise in drug-related crimes.  “SB 73 sets a dangerous precedent and would jeopardize the health and safety of the communities we are sworn to protect,” said the California Police Chiefs Association in response to the signing.

Wooden it be remarkable if the Constitution again has something to say about applying ACCA?

For some reason, the Supreme Court's Wooden case concerning proper application of the Armed Career Criminal Act prompts me to make silly post titles.  My prior recent post, "Wooden, SCOTUS on the ACCA, not so free and easy," riffed poorly on song lyrics, while today I am trying a bad pun.  The question within the punny title here is driven by the fact that the Supreme Court has previously blown up part of ACCA based on Fifth Amendment vagueness problems (Johnson from 2015) and has also shaped its application of the statute based on Sixth Amendment jury right worries (Shepard from 2005).  So, perhaps unsurprisingly, during SCOTUS oral argument yesterday in Wooden, a number of Justices raised both Fifth and Sixth Amendment concerns about  courts having to figure out the reach of ACCA's extreme 15-year mandatory minimum for unlawful gun possession based on just whether and when a defendant on a prior crime spree has committed predicate offenses "on occasions different from one another."

I am disinclined to make bold predictions after listening to the oral argument, though I am tempted to predict that the defendant will prevail and the question is going to be on what ground(s). I reach that view because even Justice Alito seemed to be struggling to figure out how to give meaningful content to a key phrase that determines at least five years of federal imprisonment.  Here are a few choice quotes from Justice Alito: "This seems to me to be a nearly impossible question of statutory interpretation because the term 'occasion"' does not have a very precise meaning.";  "I have no idea what an occasion is or what a criminal opportunity is or what a criminal episode is."  If Justice Alito cannot come up with a pro-prosecution reading of the applicable statute, I doubt other Justices will be able to do so -- especially because many of the other Justices who generally tend to favor the government also tend to be fans of the Fifth and/or Sixth Amendment doctrines in play in this case (I am thinking here of the Chief Justice as well as Justices Thomas and Gorsuch).

For some other views on the argument, here is a round up of some of the press coverage I have seen:

From Bloomberg Law, "Justices Parse ‘Occasion’ Meaning in Career-Criminal Appeal"

From Courthouse News Service, "Burglary of many units in one facility poses counting challenge at sentencing"

From Law360, "Justices Dubious About Feds' 'Career Criminal' Interpretation"

From SCOTUSBlog, "A hypothetical-filled argument proves how tricky it is to define an 'occasion'"

Wooden, SCOTUS on the ACCA, not so free and easy

The title of this post is my not-so-clever way of connecting the Supreme Court's new-Term opening case on the Armed Career Criminal Act to a depressing CSN&Y song.  The lyrics of the song "Wooden Ships" are only a bit more opaque than the language that SCOTUS has to sort out in Wooden v. US concerning the proper application of the severe sentencing mandatory minimum of the Armed Career Criminal Act.  Daniel Harawa at SCOTUSblog has a full preview of the case in this new post titled "What’s an “occasion”? Scope of Armed Career Criminal Act depends on the answer."  Here is an excerpt (with links from the original):

If you break into a storage facility and steal from 10 separate storage units, did you commit 10 offenses “on occasions different from one another”? The Supreme Court will answer this question in Wooden v. United States, yet another case concerning the scope of the Armed Career Criminal Act....

The federal government charged Wooden with being a felon in possession of a firearm — a crime for which the maximum punishment is 10 years’ imprisonment. The government also requested that Wooden be designated an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act, in which case Wooden would be subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum.  To qualify as an armed career criminal, a defendant must have three prior “violent felony” or “serious drug offense” convictions.  Here, the government argued that Wooden’s 10 burglary convictions qualified as 10 “violent felonies” for ACCA purposes.  To constitute separate convictions under ACCA, the crimes must be “committed on occasions different from one another.”  Wooden argued that the 10 burglaries all occurred on the same “occasion,” and therefore counted for only one qualifying violent felony under ACCA.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit agreed with the government.  It held that the crimes were committed on separate “occasions” because Wooden “committed ten distinct acts of burglary.”  To the 6th Circuit, it was dispositive that “Wooden could not be in two (let alone ten) of [the storage units] at once.”  Much like the 6th Circuit, other circuits had held that crimes are committed on different “occasions” for ACCA purposes when they are committed “successively rather than simultaneously,” as in United States v. Carter, an 11th Circuit case.  Other circuits, however, looked beyond temporality and instead considered whether the crimes were committed under sufficiently different circumstances.  The 2nd Circuit, for instance, “distinguish[ed] between the defendant who simply commits several offenses in a connected chain of events and the defendant who … commits multiple crimes separated by substantial effort and reflection.” The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this split.

Before the Supreme Court both Wooden and the government argue that ACCA’s structure, history, and purpose support their position.

After an overwhelming majority of GOP House delegation voted for EQUAL Act, can the Senate move quickly to finally right a 35-year wrong?

I was very excited when earlier this week the US House voted 361-66 to pass the EQUAL Act to end the statutory disparity between powder and crack cocaine sentences.  I was also pleased to see this follow-up press release from my GOP senator headlined "Portman, Senate Co-Sponsors Laud House Passage of EQUAL Act."  Here is the text:

U.S. Senators Rob Portman (R-OH), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Rand Paul (R-KY), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Thom Tillis (R-NC), and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the bipartisan Senate sponsors of the EQUAL Act, issued the below statement following the passage of the EQUAL Act in the House of Representatives by a bipartisan vote of 361-66.

“Today, House Republicans and Democrats joined together in passing the EQUAL Act, legislation that will once and for all eliminate the unjust federal crack and powder cocaine sentencing disparity.  Enjoying broad support from faith groups, civil rights organizations, law enforcement, and people of all political backgrounds, this commonsense bill will help reform our criminal justice system so that it better lives up to the ideals of true justice and equality under the law.  We applaud the House for its vote today and we urge our colleagues in the Senate to support this historic legislation.”

Ohio eliminated the crack-powder sentencing disparities back in 2011.

Along with bipartisan support in Congress, this landmark legislation has support from groups across the political spectrum, including the National District Attorneys Association, Americans for Tax Reform, Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, Prison Fellowship, Due Process Institute, Americans for Prosperity, FAMM, Catholic Prison Ministries Coalition, Digital Liberty, Faith and Freedom Coalition, ALEC Action, R Street Institute, National Association for Public Defense, American Civil Liberties Union, Sentencing Project, Fair Trials, FreedomWorks, Center for American Progress, Drug Policy Alliance, Jesuit Conference, Black Public Defender Association, Dream Corps JUSTICE, Federal Public and Community Defenders, Innocence Project, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Legal Aid & Defender Association, Taxpayers Protection Alliance, and Tzedek Association.

So three notable GOP Senators from pretty red states are co-sponsors of the EQUAL Act in the Senate, and a wide array of right-leaning advocacy groups are also eager to see this pass.  And, to highlight again the House vote specifics, roughly twice as many GOP reps voted for the EQUAL Act as voted against it.  If this same breakdown happened on the Senate side, there would be over 80  total votes for passage of the EQUAL Act in the Senate.  Even if only half of GOP Senators support the EQUAL Act, that makes 75 votes in the Senate.  And, of course, only 10 GOP votes would be needed to end any filibuster, which I presume Senator Cotton would launch to gum up the works, to permit a floor vote.

So, if ever there was a federal criminal justice reform bill that should be a relatively easy lift, I would hope this is it.  And yet, I have not seen any advocates talk as if Senate action is imminent or even all that likely.  As I mentioned to a Vice News reporter who wrote here about the House vote, an average of more than four persons are sentenced in federal court for crack offenses every single week day, and many tends of thousands of (disproportionately black) offenders have been sentenced unfairly now for a full 35 years since the crack/powder disparity first became law way back in 1986.  There is no need or value to waiting to finally make all federal cocaine offenses subject to the same sentencing rules, and so I hope the Senate might move swiftly.  But, as is always the case it seems when in comes to Congress, I do not think there is reason to be optimistic.  Sigh.

(Oh, and more more point while I am bemoaning Beltway activities (or lack thereof): even if the EQUAL Act were to move forward quickly in the Senate, I do not think it currently provides emergency authority for the US Sentencing Commission to change the crack guidelines AND the US Sentencing Commission is currently inert until Prez Biden nominates a slate of Commissioners and those folks garner Senate confirmation.  Fortunately, because the guidelines are advisory, district judges could ignore the disparate crack guidelines even while still in place after passage of the EQUAL Act.  But then again, those disparate guidelines can and should be ignored now, and yet they are still followed in many cases and still create a benchmark that shapes and distorts the sentencing process.)

US House votes 361-66 to pass today the EQUAL Act to end disparity between powder and crack cocaine sentences

Based on data showing huge unfair disparities, the US Sentencing Commission in 1995 — more than a quarter century ago! — sent to Congress proposed guidelines changes to fix the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity by adopting a 1:1 quantity ratio at the powder cocaine level.  But Congress passed, and President Bill Clinton signed, legislation rejecting the USSC’s proposed guideline changes (see basics here and here), thereby ushering in decades more disproportionately severe crack sentences and extreme racial inequities in federal cocaine offense punishments.

Barack Obama at Howard University gave a 2007 campaign speech — exactly 14 years ago today — assailing the crack/powder disparity, and in 2009 the Obama Justice Department advocated for "Congress to completely eliminate the crack/powder disparity."   Sadly, despite strong DOJ advocacy for a 1:1 ratio in April 2009, it still took Congress more than a year to enact any reform to the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity, and then it only could muster a partial reduction in crack sentences rather than the parity advocated by the USSC in 1995 and by DOJ in 2009.  Specifically, the Fair Sentencing Act enshrined a new 18:1 crack/powder quantity disparity ratio into federal drug sentencing statutes and guidelines, and even this modest reform did not become fully retroactive until eight years later with the FIRST STEP Act.

But in early fall 2021, and despite the deep divisions on so many political issues, the vast majority of US Representatives spoke together today to say that federal law should no longer sentence crack and powder cocaine offense differently.  This Hill article explains:

The House passed legislation on Tuesday that would eliminate the federal disparity in prison sentences for crack and powder cocaine offenses, in an effort to enact criminal justice reform on a bipartisan basis. The bill, which lawmakers passed 361-66, is meant to address a gap that its proponents say has largely fallen on Black people and other people of color.

The House passed the measure handily, but the vote divided Republicans. A majority of House Republicans voted for the bill with all Democrats, but the 66 votes in opposition all came from the GOP....

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, a law signed by then-President Reagan as part of the “War on Drugs,” established a five-year minimum sentence for possessing at least five grams of crack, while an individual would have to possess at least 500 grams of powder cocaine to receive the same sentence. A 2010 law called the Fair Sentencing Act reduced the cocaine sentencing disparity for pending and future cases, but did not fully eliminate it. And a criminal justice reform bill enacted in 2018 under former President Trump allowed people convicted prior to passage of the 2010 law to seek resentencing.

Under the bill the House passed on Tuesday, defendants who were previously convicted for crack cocaine offenses would also be allowed to petition for sentence reductions.

Rep. Louie Gohmert (R-Texas), a former judge, said the measure was a “a great start toward getting the right thing done” as he recalled dealing with cocaine cases. “Something I thought Texas did right was have a up to 12 months substance abuse felony punishment facility. Some thought it was strange that a strong conservative like myself used that as much as I did. But I saw this is so addictive, it needs a length of time to help people to change their lives for such a time that they've got a better chance of making it out, understanding just how addictive those substances are,” Gohmert said during House floor debate.

The legislation now heads to the Senate, where at least 10 Republicans would have to join with all Democrats to advance it in the evenly divided chamber. A companion bill introduced by Sen. Cory Booker (D-N.J.) currently has five cosponsors, including three Republicans: Sen. Rob Portman (Ohio), Rand Paul (Ky.) and Thom Tillis (N.C.).

I lack knowledge about the ways and means for this kind of bill to get a vote in the Senate soon, but I feel pretty confident that it would get similarly strong support in that cambers if and whenever a vote goes forward. I hope such a vote goes forward soon, since we have all waited more than long enough for more sensible sentencing in this arena.

A few prior recent related posts:

• An initial list of federal sentencing reforms to advance greater equity and justice for congressional consideration
• New efforts to fix the ugly old problem of sentencing disparity for federal crack and powder cocaine offenses 
• Small, and not quite steady, reform progress in a not quite new era for criminal justice reform 
• GOP Gov and former DEA chief calls for Congress to "finally and fully end the disparity between crack and cocaine offenses" 
• US Senate Judiciary Committee hearing set for "Examining Federal Sentencing for Crack and Powder Cocaine" 
• House Judiciary Committee votes 36 to 5 to advance the EQUAL Act to reduce federal crack sentences

"Power to the People: Why the Armed Career Criminal Act is Unconstitutional"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Rachel Paulose and now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

In our constitutional democracy, it is the people who hold ultimate power over every branch of government, including authority over the judiciary through the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment.  However, the traditional view of recidivist statutes, including the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), exempts the fact of a defendant’s prior convictions from the Sixth Amendment jury trial promise.  Specifically, prosecutors and federal judges have removed from juries and given to sentencing judges the power to determine prior crimes that enhance a defendant’s sentence under the ACCA by labeling a recidivist finding a sentencing factor rather than an element of the offense.

In this article, I argue the recidivist statute exemption, primarily exercised in federal law through the vehicle of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, violates the Constitution; defies the Court’s revived focus on the jury trial right through the Apprendi v. New Jersey line of cases requiring any fact that increases a defendant’s sentencing range to be found by the jury or admitted by the defendant at the guilty plea; and disregards the Court’s due process focus in the Taylor v. United States line of cases prohibiting factfinding under the ACCA.

I present my theory by examining the ACCA’s different occasions clause, a lesser known but potent provision that in theory imposes the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years only when recidivist crimes are “committed on occasions different from one another.”  In practice, judges impose the different occasions clause by engaging in complex judicial factfinding at sentencing by a lower preponderance of the evidence standard regarding the who, what, when, where, and why of prior crimes.  Judges who label the different occasions clause a sentencing factor rather than an element of the offense act in disregard of the jury trial right, due process guarantee, and legislative intent of the ACCA.  I argue that the Constitution requires the ACCA different occasions clause to be decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in a bifurcated trial.  Judicial removal of the different occasions clause from jury scrutiny dramatically illustrates why a new approach enforcing the Sixth Amendment jury trial right to the ACCA different occasions clause is long overdue.

Shouldn't federal prosecutors already be doing what they can to minimize the unjust crack-powder sentencing disparity?

At last month's Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on "Examining Federal Sentencing for Crack and Powder Cocaine," the Biden Administration through the testimony of Regina LaBelle rightly stated that the crack-powder sentencing disparity produces "significant injustice":

The Biden-Harris Administration strongly supports eliminating the current disparity in sentencing between crack cocaine and powder cocaine.  The current disparity is not based on evidence yet has caused significant harm for decades, particularly to individuals, families, and communities of color.  The continuation of this sentencing disparity is a significant injustice in our legal system, and it is past time for it to end.  Therefore, the Administration urges the swift passage of the “Eliminating a Quantifiably Unjust Application of the Law Act,” or the “EQUAL Act.”

In addition, the US Department of Justice submitted testimony (linked below) that rightly stated that "it is long past time" to end the crack-powder sentencing disparity:

The Department strongly supports the legislation, for we believe it is long past time to end the disparity in sentencing policy between federal offenses involving crack cocaine and those involving powder cocaine.  The crack/powder sentencing disparity has unquestionably led to unjustified differences in sentences for trafficking in two forms of the same substance, as well as unwarranted racial disparities in its application.  The sentencing disparity was based on misinformation about the pharmacology of cocaine and its effects, and it is unnecessary to address the genuine and critical societal problems associated with trafficking cocaine, including violent crime.

Download DOJ EQUAL Act Testimony- FINAL

In light of these forceful statements, I have been optimistic that the EQUAL Act might move forward in Congress fairly soon even though the pace of congressional action is always uncertain.  At the same time, I hoped that federal prosecutors under the authority of Attorney General Garland might do what they could ASAP, in the exercise of their charging and sentencing authority, to minimize the impact of the crack-powder disparity as Congress works on a permanent legislative fix.  After all, if DOJ really believes that "it is long past time to end the disparity" and that the disparity is based on "misinformation" which produces "unwarranted racial disparities," then a department purportedly committed to justice surely ought not keep charging crack mandatory minimums and advocating for guideline sentences based on this disparity.

But I have heard from defense attorneys in the know that statements about existing crack sentencing provisions creating "significant injustice in our legal system" have seemingly not trickled down to federal prosecutors, who are still generally charging crack mandatory minimums and arguing for within-guideline crack sentences.  And I have be authorized to share this recent statement from the Federal Defenders to DOJ: "We were glad to see the Department’s recent support for legislation to end the crack-powder disparity but reports from the field indicate that line prosecutors continue to indict mandatory-minimum crack cases and seek guideline sentences that rely on the discredited ratio."

Talking the talk to Congress about reform is an important aspect of what the executive branch can do to improve our justice system. But the Justice Department can and should also be expected to walk the walk.  But so far, it seems, federal prosecutors are not really ready to give up the crack-powder disparity, even though DOJ asserts that "it is long past time" to do so. Sigh.

As Eleventh Circuit works though ACCA "occasions different" mess, Judge Newson flags Apprendi "prior conviction" issues

A helpful reader alerted me to an interesting new split Eleventh Circuit panel decision in US v. Dudley, No. 19-10267 (7th Cir. July 22, 2021) (available here), concerning application of the severe mandatory minimum in the federal Armed Career Criminal Act.  As regular readers know, ACCA converts the 10-year maximum prison term for illegal gun possession by a felon into a 15-year mandatory minimum if the defendant has the wrong kind of prior convictions.  The basic issue in Dudley is a topic also to be considered by the Supreme Court this fall in Wooden v. US, namely ACCA's requirement that key prior offenses needed to be "committed on occasions different from one another."  In Wooden, the facts of the prior convictions are not in dispute, and so the Supreme Court will likely just explore the legal meaning of "occasions different from one another."  In Dudley, part of the debate concerns uncertainty about the facts of the prior convictions, and so the Eleventh Circuit panel has to discuss how these facts can be proved.

Working through a variety of complicated ACCA precedents, the majority in Dudley ultimately decides that "the district court did not err in relying on the prosecutor’s factual proffer in Dudley’s plea colloquy to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the three qualifying prior convictions for Alabama assault occurred on three separate, distinct occasions."  For hard-core ACCA fans, the majority's discussion might be interesting.  But hard-core Sixth Amendment fans will especially want to check out Judge Newsom's lengthy partial dissent which flags the significant Apprendi issues raised by prior rulings and this case.  Here is are some passages from the partial dissent to show why the whole opinion is worth checking out:

For starters, why doesn’t judicial factfinding involving ACCA’s different-occasions requirement itself violate the Sixth Amendment?  After all, we’ve described the different-occasions inquiry as a factual one....

Of course, I recognize that we and other circuits have repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to ACCA’s different-occasions inquiry.  See Maj. Op. 18–19 (collecting cases).  We’ve justified ourselves on the ground that the date of an offense is part of the “factual nature” of the conviction — and thus falls under Almendarez-Torres’s exception to Apprendi....

But that explanation, while plausible at first blush, is tough to square with the Court’s characterization of Almendarez-Torres as a “narrow exception” to Apprendi’s general rule.  See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111 n.1.  As interpreted by Apprendi, Almendarez-Torres exempts only “the fact of a prior conviction” from the bar on judicial factfinding.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).  After all, Almendarez-Torres itself involved only the bare fact that the defendant had been convicted of a prior aggravated assault.  523 U.S. at 226.   Although I don’t question Almendarez-Torres’s continuing vitality — above my pay grade — it seems that we do more than just faithfully apply that decision when we extend its “narrow exception” for the mere “fact of a prior conviction” to include other related facts, such as the date or time of the underlying offense.  Indeed, if Almendarez-Torres authorizes factfinding about more than just the fact of a prior conviction, what’s the limiting principle?  What differentiates the timing of the offense from the fact that it was “violent” for ACCA’s predicate-felony inquiry?  Both, it seems to me, are equally part (or not part) of the “factual nature” of the prior conviction.

House Judiciary Committee votes 36 to 5 to advance the EQUAL Act to reduce federal crack sentences

At a time of problematic and often ugly partisanship inside the Beltway, I have continued to believe and hope that a number of federal sentencing reforms could and should still be able to secure significant bipartisan support.  This belief was reinforced yesterday when the House Judiciary Committee voted 36 to 5 to advance the Eliminating a Quantifiably Unjust Application of the Law (EQUAL) Act.  Excitingly, not only does this bill reduce crack statutory sentences to the level of powder cocaine offenses, it also provides for all previously convicted crack offenders to obtain a resentencing.  (Recall that neither the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 nor the FIRST STEP Act of 2018 included full retroactivity for the sentencing reductions in those reform bills.)

I want to believe that the overwhelming vote in support of the EQUAL Act in the House Judiciary Committee means that a vote a passage by the full House will be coming soon.  I also want to believe that the bill, which also has bipartisan Senate support, could move efficiently through the upper chamber and become law this year.  But, because the politics and ways of Congress are always mysterious, I am not assuming passage is a sure thing and I have no idea what the timeline for the bill's potential progress will be going forward.  All I know is that it is now more than a quarter-century since the US Sentencing Commission first explained to Congress why a big crack/powder sentencing difference was unjustified and unjust, so the EQUAL Act cannot become law too soon and is way too late.  But better late than never, I still hope.

Notably, we are already approaching three years since passage of the FIRST STEP Act and there is yet to be a next step.  Though I would like to see many more statutory sentencing reform steps from Congress that go far beyond the EQUAL Act, I still think reforms can and should be happy right now with even baby steps in the right direction from a divided Congress.  And,  critically, the EQUAL Act would be a consequential baby step: USSC data indicate that more than 8000 people are in federal prison for crack offenses now and that more than 100 people are sentenced on crack offenses each month.  So literally thousands of people will be impacted if the EQUAL Act becomes law, and then, if/when this reform is finally achieved, we can work on correcting the next and the next and the next injustice baked into federal sentencing law and practice. 

A few prior related posts:

• An initial list of federal sentencing reforms to advance greater equity and justice for congressional consideration
• New efforts to fix the ugly old problem of sentencing disparity for federal crack and powder cocaine offenses 
• Small, and not quite steady, reform progress in a not quite new era for criminal justice reform 
• GOP Gov and former DEA chief calls for Congress to "finally and fully end the disparity between crack and cocaine offenses" 
• US Senate Judiciary Committee hearing set for "Examining Federal Sentencing for Crack and Powder Cocaine" 

"Prosecutors, court communities, and policy change: The impact of internal DOJ reforms on federal prosecutorial practices"

The title of this post is the title of this important and impressive new empirical federal criminal justice research just published in Criminology and authored by Mona Lynch, Matt Barno and Marisa Omori. Here is the article's abstract:

The current study examines how key internal U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) policy changes have been translated into front-line prosecutorial practices. Extending courts-as-communities scholarship and research on policy implementation practices, we use U.S. Sentencing Commission data from 2004 to 2019 to model outcomes for several measures of prosecutorial discretion in federal drug trafficking cases, including the use of mandatory minimum charges and prosecutor-endorsed departures, to test the impact of the policy changes on case processing outcomes. We contrast prosecutorial measures with measures that are more impervious to discretionary manipulation, such as criminal history, and those that represent judicial and blended discretion, including judicial departures and final sentence lengths. We find a significant effect of the policy reforms on how prosecutorial tools are used across DOJ policy periods, and we find variation across districts as a function of contextual conditions, consistent with the court communities literature. We also find that a powerful driver of changes in prosecutorial practices during our most recent period is the confirmation of individual Trump-appointed U.S. Attorneys at the district level, suggesting an important theoretical place for midlevel actors in policy translation and implementation.

This article includes a data set of over 300,000(!) federal drug cases, and the findings are extremely rich and detailed. I have reprinted one of many interesting charts above, and here is the article's concluding paragraphs (without references):

Recent developments call into question whether the existing workgroup dynamics in the federal system that we have documented here — with prosecutors generally pushing for more punitive outcomes, and judges and defense attorneys acting as a counter to this punitiveness — are likely to persist in the future.  Although there was bipartisan Congressional support for the First Step Act, suggesting that the late twentieth-century punitive policies may continue to wane in appeal, the federal criminal system has also undergone significant change, particularly in the judiciary where lifetime appointments prevail.  The Trump administration was extremely active in appointing new judges to existing vacancies, and as a result, nearly a quarter of active federal judges were appointed during his presidency.  Given the conservative political leanings of many of these judges, it is fair to question whether these judges might in fact oppose a move toward less punitive practices among federal prosecutors.

Even if the Biden administration is successful in scaling back punitive policies and installs U.S. Attorneys who are in ideological alignment with such reforms, prosecutorial power is not limitless in determining case outcomes.  Under advisory guidelines, judges have considerable power to sentence above the guidelines, as long as it is within the generous statutory limits that characterize federal criminal law.  In the face of this possibility, federal prosecutors may opt to exercise their most powerful tool—the discretionary decision to file charges, or not.  Thus, should the dynamics shift to where the current roles are reversed, prosecutors could come to rely on their discretion not to charge in those drug cases where they seek to eliminate the chance that those potential defendants receive long sentences.  In any case, as our results suggest, we should expect that any potential future conflicts among federal prosecutors and judges are likely to play out differently across different court contexts, depending on the conditions and make-up of each local district.

US Senate Judiciary Committee hearing set for "Examining Federal Sentencing for Crack and Powder Cocaine"

On the morning of Tuesday, June 22, 2021, the US Senate Judiciary Committee has a hearing set for 10am titled "Examining Federal Sentencing for Crack and Powder Cocaine." The hearing should be available to watch at this link, where this list of witnesses are set out:

Ms. Regina LaBelle, Acting Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy

The Honorable Asa Hutchinson, Governor, State of Arkansas

Mr. Matthew Charles, Justice Reform Fellow, FAMM

The Honorable Russell Coleman, Member, Frost Brown Todd

Mr. Antonio Garcia, Executive Director, South Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

Mr. Steven Wasserman, Vice President for Policy, National Association of Assistant U.S. Attorneys

Notably, the Washington Post here reports on what Ms. Regina LaBelle will be saying in her testimony as well as some of the political context around this hearing.  Here is part of the story:

The Biden administration plans to endorse legislation that would end the disparity in sentences between crack and powder cocaine offenses that President Biden helped create decades ago, according to people with knowledge of the situation — a step that highlights how Biden’s attitudes on drug laws have shifted over his long tenure in elected office.

At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing Tuesday, Regina LaBelle, the acting director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, plans to express the administration's support for the Eliminating a Quantifiably Unjust Application of the Law Act, or Equal Act. The legislation, which sponsored by Senate Majority Whip Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) and Sens. Cory Booker (D-N.J.) and Rob Portman (R-Ohio), would eliminate the sentencing disparity and give people who were convicted or sentenced for a federal cocaine offense a resentencing.

“The current disparity is not based on evidence yet has caused significant harm for decades, particularly to individuals, families, and communities of color,” LaBelle says in prepared written testimony obtained by The Washington Post in advance of the hearing. “The continuation of this sentencing disparity is a significant injustice in our legal system, and it is past time for it to end. Therefore, the administration urges the swift passage of the ‘Eliminating a Quantifiably Unjust Application of the Law Act.’ ”...

Outside coalitions backing Durbin and Booker’s bill have focused particularly on shoring up conservative support as part of their larger criminal justice overhaul agenda. To that end, one of the witnesses testifying in favor of the bill Tuesday is Gov. Asa Hutchinson of Arkansas, a Republican who led the Drug Enforcement Administration under President George W. Bush.

“Although Congress has taken steps to reduce the disparity and provide some retroactive relief, any sentencing disparity between two substances that are chemically the same weakens the foundation of our system of justice,” Hutchinson says in his prepared remarks, also obtained by The Post.  “Congress now has the opportunity to build on the bipartisan successes of the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act by eliminating the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine once and for all.  The strength of our justice system is dependent on the perception of fundamental fairness.”

Russell Coleman, a former counsel to now-Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and former U. S. attorney for the Western District of Kentucky, will also promote the legislation at the hearing Tuesday morning.

A few prior related posts:

• An initial list of federal sentencing reforms to advance greater equity and justice for congressional consideration
• New efforts to fix the ugly old problem of sentencing disparity for federal crack and powder cocaine offenses 
• Small, and not quite steady, reform progress in a not quite new era for criminal justice reform 
• GOP Gov and former DEA chief calls for Congress to "finally and fully end the disparity between crack and cocaine offenses" 

"Undoing the Damage of the War on Drugs: A Renewed Call for Sentencing Reform"

The title of this post is the title of the scheduled congressional hearing called by the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the U.S. House Committee of the Judiciary. The hearing is to take place on Thursday, June 17, 2021 at 10am and can be streamed here. The witness list, available here, should make this a must-see event:

Rachel E. Barkow, Vice Dean and Charles Seligson Professor of Law, Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, NYU School of Law

William R. Underwood, Senior Fellow, The Sentencing Project

Kyana Givens, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of North Carolina

Kassandra Frederique, Executive Director, Drug Policy Alliance

Marta Nelson, Director, Government Strategy, Advocacy and Partnerships Department, Vera Institute of Justice

Jillian E. Snider, Director, Criminal Justice & Civil Liberties, R Street Institute

John Malcolm, Vice President, Institute for Constitutional Government, Director, Meese Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, and Ed Gilbertson and Sherry Lindberg Gilbertson Senior Legal Fellow, The Heritage Foundation

Some early coverage of big new SCOTUS ruling limiting ACCA in Borden

A busy day on other matters means I have only had a chance to skim Borden v. US, No. 19–5410 (S. Ct. June 10, 2021) (available here), the big win for the defendant today in an ruling limiting the reach of the Armed Career Criminal Act.  I hope in the coming days to have a lot to say about Borden ruling itself and its possible aftermath, but for now I can and will round up some early press and blog coverage:

From Bloomberg Law, "Divided High Court Sides With Defense on Repeat-Offender Law"

From Crime & Consequences, "Fractured Supreme Court Cripples Armed Career Criminal Act"

From The Hill, "Gorsuch, Thomas join liberal justices in siding with criminal defendant"

From Law & Crime, "Kagan Goes After Kavanaugh for Lengthy Footnote: There’s Nothing ‘Unfair’ About This Outcome"

From the New York Times, "Supreme Court Limits Sweep of Law on Mandatory Minimum Sentences"

From SCOTUSblog, "Court limits definition of 'violent felony' in federal gun-possession penalty"

From The Volokh Conspiracy, "Justice Thomas Takes One For The Team in Borden v. U.S."