Tuesday, February 19, 2019

SCOTUS via 6-3 vote rules Texas yet again misapplied its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence prohibiting the execution of those with intellectual disability

In the middle of this lengthy new SCOTUS order list, which has lots of cert denials and individual opinions about cert denials, is one notable Supreme Court opinion on the merits in Moore v. Texas, No. 18–443 (S. Ct. Feb. 19, 2019). The start and last substantive paragraph of the 10-page per curiam opinion for the Court provides the basics:

In 2015, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that petitioner, Bobby James Moore, did not have intellectual disability and consequently was eligible for the death penalty.  Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 527–528 (Ex parte Moore I).  We previously considered the lawfulness of that determination, vacated the appeals court’s decision, and remanded the case for further consideration of the issue.  Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 18).  The appeals court subsequently reconsidered the matter but reached the same conclusion.  Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (Ex parte Moore II).  We again review its decision, and we reverse its determination....

We conclude that the appeals court’s opinion, when taken as a whole and when read in the light both of our prior opinion and the trial court record, rests upon analysis too much of which too closely resembles what we previously found improper.  And extricating that analysis from the opinion leaves too little that might warrant reaching a different conclusion than did the trial court.  We consequently agree with Moore and the prosecutor that, on the basis of the trial court record, Moore has shown he is a person with intellectual disability.

Chief Justice Roberts has this one-paragraph concurrence in the case:

When this case was before us two years ago, I wrote in dissent that the majority’s articulation of how courts should enforce the requirements of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), lacked clarity.  Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 10–11).  It still does.  But putting aside the difficulties of applying Moore in other cases, it is easy to see that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals misapplied it here.  On remand, the court repeated the same errors that this Court previously condemned — if not quite in haec verba, certainly in substance.  The court repeated its improper reliance on the factors articulated in Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), and again emphasized Moore’s adaptive strengths rather than his deficits.  That did not pass muster under this Court’s analysis last time.  It still doesn’t.  For those reasons, I join the Court’s opinion reversing the judgment below.

Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, pens a three-page dissent with concludes this way:

The Court’s foray into factfinding is an unsound departure from our usual practice.  The error in this litigation was not the state court’s decision on remand but our own failure to provide a coherent rule of decision in Moore.  I would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.  I certainly would not summarily reverse and make our own finding of fact without even giving the State the opportunity to brief and argue the question.  I therefore respectfully dissent.

There is a whole lot here to notice, but I think especially important and notable is the fact that the newest Justice, Justice Kavanaugh, is with the majority of the Court and not the dissenters here. Because of the Chief Justice's vote, Justice Kavanaugh is not technically a swing vote in this capital case.  But his vote still reveals that, unlike Justices Alito and Thomas (and even seemingly Justice Gorsuch), Justice Kavanaugh may be more inclined to scrutinize state capital practices than certain of his conservative colleagues.

February 19, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, February 17, 2019

"Paul Manafort should not be sentenced to 20 years in prison"

The title of this post is the headline of this new Hill commentary authored by David Oscar Markus. Here are excerpts:

A jury has spoken on Paul Manafort. He was found guilty, and he should be punished. But his reported sentencing guideline range of 19.5-24.5 years is a good example of how our criminal justice system has lost its way.

Once, when trials were common, our system was the envy of the world. Now, trials almost never occur. (In the 1980s, over 20 percent of cases went to trial while less than 3 percent proceed to trial today). The reason is simple: defendants who go to trial and lose in today’s system now suffer “the trial penalty,” and receive a much more severe — sometimes decades longer — sentence simply for exercising a fundamental Constitutional right to trial.

Even innocent people plead guilty because of the risk/reward analysis that all defendants consider. The risks of going to trial have become way too high. You can plead guilty and get probation or go to jail for a manageable amount of time. But if you go to trial and lose... well, you’ll be crushed.

A jury found Manafort guilty of tax and related offenses, but suggesting that a 20 year sentence is appropriate in this case is just wrong. Twenty years! Manafort is a 69-year old, first-time offender. If the judge sentences him to anywhere in that range, he will most likely leave prison in a box.

Make no mistake, the sentencing range is that high only because Manafort had the audacity to make the government actually prove its case at a trial. Does going to trial warrant a sentence 15 years longer than his co-defendant, Rick Gates? Rick Gates hasn’t been sentenced yet, but his sentencing range is around 5 years. And he will most likely get a sentence much lower than that because of his cooperation. His lawyers will certainly ask for probation as have numerous other cooperators in the Special Counsel’s cases.

Some will respond that Gates should get less time than Manafort because he is less culpable and decided to cooperate. That’s of course true. But that doesn’t mean that Manafort should get 20 years simply because he had the temerity to go to trial.

The truth is that being less culpable becomes a minor factor when the trial penalty comes into play. There are many examples of the least culpable defendant getting the highest sentence solely because of the trial penalty. One such victim of the trial penalty was James Olis, a securities fraud defendant who worked at Dynegy Corporation in Houston, Texas. Olis was sentenced to 24 years in prison after trial, while his boss who testified against him received about a year.

Before trial, Olis had been offered 6 months in exchange for pleading guilty and cooperating. Olis’ lawyer, David Gerger, predicted: “If there’s a 20-year penalty for going to trial, then innocent as well as guilty people will simply decide they have to give up their right to a trial.” He was right. The case was ultimately reversed, and Olis was resentenced to 6 years. Until the reversal, prosecutors in Houston expressly mentioned Olis to any fraud defendant who wouldn’t plead. The line went something like this: “You can plead or risk ending up like Olis.”  Prosecutors in every district have their own “Olis line.”

Some prior related posts:

February 17, 2019 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, February 16, 2019

Round three of sentencing in high-profile New Jersey deadly drunk driving case still provides no closure

Last year, I flagged in this post the notable appellate ups and downs surrounding the sentencing and resentencing of actress Amy Locane following her conviction for killing a 60-year-old woman in a 2010 car crash while driving with a blood-alcohol way over the legal limit.  This local media piece reports on the latest sentencing in the case under the headline "‘Melrose Place’ actress sentenced again for fatal drunk driving crash, but free pending another appeal," and the story seems to just get sadder (and less certain) for everyone at each additional legal proceeding.  Here are some details:

For the second time, actress Amy Locane was sentenced to prison for a 2010 drunk driving accident that killed a 60-year-old woman.  How much time she’ll actually serve behind bars, though, is unclear.

The former Hopewell Township resident who once appeared on Melrose Place was sentenced to five years in prison by Somerset County Superior Court Judge Kevin Shanahan Friday afternoon, nearly nine years after the fatal crash.  The judge said if he were imposing the original sentence, he would have sentenced Locane to six years.

Family members of her victim, Helene Seeman, smiled while walking out of court, but left the Somerset County Courthouse in Somerville without giving a statement to media.

James Wronko, Locane’s lawyer, said it was “an extremely thoughtful decision in all respect,” but will appeal on double jeopardy grounds, which was one of his main arguments why the actress shouldn’t return to prison.

Somerset County Assistant Prosecutor Matt Murphy requested a nine-year sentence from Shanahan, who said he was basing it on “the crime, not the criminal.”  Locane was originally convicted of vehicular homicide and assault by auto, which carries up to 15 years in prison, for the death of Helene Seeman and critical injuries to her husband, Fred Seeman.

Fred Seeman and his son, Ford Seeman, both gave emotional testimony, filled with tears, tissues and aggravation. “My mother should still be here, but she’s not because Amy Locane is a horrible human being driven by ego and pride,” he said, reading the notes off his phone while wiping his tears, at times his voice breaking.

Locane whispered “that’s not true” several times under her breath during Ford Seeman’s testimony, which including him saying Locane has made herself a victim and will not accept responsibility. He also lambasted Judge Robert Reed’s initial, lenient sentence, calling it a “mockery of the justice process” and referred to Locane’s request for a short sentence to care for her two young children, who she called collateral damage as “pathetic.”...

Locane stood to speak after the Seemans concluded their testimony. Ford Seeman left the room. “There is not a day that has gone by that I have no thought of the pain that my actions caused the Seeman family and of course Helene Seeman,” the 47-year-old said. “I made a mistake. I have done everything that I can do to not be that person who does what I did nine years ago.”

She also noted she regularly speaks at schools about the dangers of drinking and driving, and is committed to sobriety through Alcoholics Anonymous.

The actress, who appeared in the movie “Cry-Baby” with Johnny Depp, and other Hollywood pictures, was driving home from a party on June 27, 2010 when she crash into the Seemans, who were turning into their driveway. Locane’s blood alcohol content was three times the legal limit.

He first sentence, three years in prison handed down by Judge Robert Reed in February 2013, drew immediate criticism for its apparent lenience. She served two-and-a-half-years at Edna Mahan Correctional Facility in Clinton Township and was paroled in June 2015. It’s unclear if Locane will receive credit now for the time she was incarcerated.

In 2016, an appeals court ruled the sentence was not harsh enough. Locane returned to court for a second sentencing in January 2017, where Judge Reed said he erred in not sentencing her to six more months. However, he declined to give Locane more prison time.

In March 2018, an appellate court ruled again the sentence was “a hair’s breath away from illegal." The decision criticized Reed’s lack of explanation for the sentence, and asked another judge to decide her Locane’s fate at a third re-sentencing.

Fred Seeman cried and yelled during his testimony. He argued a light sentence would not deter New Jerseyans from drinking and driving, and the trauma still affects his youngest son, who saw his mother dead on their front lawn. “I cry at night, for my son Curtis who is not with us today. It hurts me and pains me,” said the 69-year-old, who suffered broken ribs and a collapsed lung in the crash, and has a hole in his diaphragm as a result of blunt force trauma from the accident....

Locane will serve 85 percent of her new sentence under the No Early Release Act and was released on her own recognizance pending an appeal.

In 2017, the Seemans were awarded a $4.8 million dollar settlement in a civil lawsuit. Locane paid $1.5 million, while Rachel and Carlos Sagebien — hosts of the party where Locane left drunk — paid $3.3 million.

Prior related post:

February 16, 2019 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, February 15, 2019

Sad start to what should become happier compassionate release tales after passage of FIRST STEP Act

Though the (clumsy) increase in good-time credits has received considerable attention since the passage of the FIRST STEP Act (see prior posts here and here and here and here), I find the change to the administration of so-called compassionate release rules to be among the most fascinating elements of the new legislation.  If legislative enactments can have "sleeper provisions," I would call the compassionate release changes the sleeper provisions of FIRST STEP.  This four-page FAMM document, titled "Compassionate Release and the First Step Act: Then and Now,"  reviews some basics of the changes made by the FIRST STEP Act for those eager for a short accounting of before and after.

Today's New York Times covers this issue through one particular sad story under the headline "A New Law Made Him a ‘Free Man on Paper,’ but He Died Behind Bars." This article is worth reading in full, and here are excerpts:

At a federal courthouse in Tennessee, a judge signed an order allowing an ailing inmate to go home. But he died in a prison hospice before he heard the news.

At his wife’s home in Indiana, as she was getting a wheelchair, bedpans and other medical equipment ready for his arrival, the phone rang. “It was the chaplain,” said the wife, Marie Dianne Cheatham. “He said, ‘I’m sorry to have to tell you.’ And my heart fell through the floor. I knew what he was going to say.”

For years, terminally ill federal prisoners like Ms. Cheatham’s husband, Steve, have in theory had the option of what is called compassionate release. But in practice, the Bureau of Prisons would often decline to grant it, allowing hundreds of petitioners to die in custody. One of the provisions of the new criminal justice law, signed by President Trump on Dec. 21, sought to change that, giving inmates the ability to appeal directly to the courts.

Mr. Cheatham, 59, did just that, filing a petition last month so that he could leave prison in North Carolina and go home to die. He became one of the first to be granted release under the new law. But then came the harsh truth that made so many families pin their hopes on the law’s passage in the first place: Days and even hours can mean the difference between dying at home or behind bars.

Created in the 1980s, compassionate release allowed the Bureau of Prisons to recommend that certain inmates who no longer posed a threat be sent home, usually when nearing death. But even as more and more Americans grew old and frail in federal penitentiaries, a multilayered bureaucracy meant that relatively few got out.

A 2013 report by a watchdog agency found that the compassionate release system was cumbersome, poorly managed and impossible to fully track. An analysis of federal data by The New York Times and The Marshall Project found that 266 inmates who had applied between 2013 and 2017 had died, either after being denied or while still waiting for a decision. During the same period the bureau approved only 6 percent of applications.  Many state penal systems, which house the majority of American inmates, have their own medical release programs with similar problems.

“It is a system that is sorely needing compassion,” said Mary Price, the general counsel for Families Against Mandatory Minimums, which advocates criminal justice reform....  The law’s passage has caused a scramble to use the new appeal process for compassionate release, said Ms. Price, whose organization has worked to arrange lawyers for some of those inmates. “There’s a road map now for this, and a way home for people that we’ve never seen before,” Ms. Price said.

Before the First Step Act passed, Ms. Cheatham followed its fortunes closely, hoping it could lead to a shortened sentence for her husband, whose health was deteriorating. Last fall, he was diagnosed with advanced-stage cancer and told he had only a few months to live. In mid-December, he applied for compassionate release, Ms. Cheatham said.

The new law requires that prisoners be told within 72 hours of a terminal diagnosis that they may apply for compassionate release, and that the Bureau of Prisons aid those who wish to apply but cannot do so on their own.  After a few weeks, Ms. Cheatham had heard nothing back.  The Bureau of Prisons declined to answer most questions about Mr. Cheatham’s case, but did say that it had not received his application for compassionate release until Jan. 11.  According to the judge’s order, the request was filed on Dec. 13.

A senator’s office said the government shutdown would make it difficult for them to provide immediate help.  Finally, she called a federal public defender in Tennessee, where her husband had been sentenced, who told her about the new process allowing an appeal after 30 days.  Within a few days, on Jan. 25, they filed a preliminary motion for immediate release.

It was to be a homecoming to a home Steve Cheatham had never seen.  The Cheathams had met and married after he was already in prison, serving a nearly 16-year sentence for a series of bank robberies in 2006.  According to an F.B.I. agent’s account, Mr. Cheatham passed notes to tellers at three banks in Tennessee, making off with about $13,000. The agent made no mention of any weapon....

On Jan. 30, the formal request for compassionate release was filed, and the next day, a judge signed the order to send Mr. Cheatham home.  Ms. Cheatham got the news shortly after 1 p.m.  “My heart just was so full of joy,” she said.  “I called everybody I could think of to tell them,” including the prison chaplain, whom she asked to deliver the good news to her husband.

Later that afternoon, the chaplain called back. Mr. Cheatham had died before he could tell him about the judge’s order.  Ms. Cheatham was devastated, but expressed her hope that on some level, Mr. Cheatham may have sensed the news.  “At least,” she wrote to a supporter, “he died a free man on paper.”

Some of many prior related posts:

February 15, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, February 14, 2019

Ninth Circuit going en banc to reconsider intersection of Eighth Amendment juve jurisprudence and federal sentencing guidelines

In this post back in July, I noted work on an amicus brief in support of a Ninth Circuit en banc petition in US v. Riley Briones.  The panel opinion in Briones is available at this link, where you will find a split decision in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines as the key factor in the course imposing a life without parole federal sentence on a juvenile offender.  The amicus brief, which is available here, argued "It is unreasonable — and unconstitutional — for a court to routinely apply the Sentencing Guidelines when a defendant is subject to a Guideline sentencing range of life without parole for a crime committed as a juvenile."

I am now pleased to be able to report that, as of yesterday, the panel opinion in Briones is technically no longer good law thanks to this Feb 13, 2019 order by the Ninth Circuit:

Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused active judges, it is ordered that this case be reheard en banc pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) and Circuit Rule 35-3. The three-judge panel disposition in this case shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.

Though I am not exactly sure of the timelines for en banc review in the Ninth Circuit, I presume briefing and argument will take a number of months though we might still get a new decision before the end of this year.  Meanwhile, folks who follow this area of jurisprudence closely may recall that the Third Circuit is also in the midst of en banc review of related post-Miller Eighth Amendment application issues US v. Corey Grant, No. 16-3820, as discussed in this post from a few months ago.  A helpful reader reported to me that oral argument in Grant is scheduled for next week.

I have been a bit surprised that we have not yet seen the Supreme Court take up any follow-up Eighth Amendment cases since it decided Graham and Miller in short succession in 2010 and 2012.  It is interesting to speculate if either the Briones or Grant cases might interest the Justices after (inevitable?) big split en banc circuit rulings in these cases.

February 14, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, February 13, 2019

Illinois prosecutors appealing 81-month sentence given to former Chicago cop Jason Van Dyke for murder of Laquan McDonald

In the federal system, sentencing appeals brought by prosecutors are relatively rare but not always exceptional.  My sense is that prosecutorial appeals of sentences are even rarer in most state systems, and a state sentencing appeal brought this week by Illinois prosecutors comes in a case that is exceptional for all sort of reasons.  This extended Chicago Tribune article, headlined "Attorney general, special prosecutor challenge Jason Van Dyke’s sentence in petition to state Supreme Court," provides lots of background details and here are excerpts:

Special prosecutors and the Illinois attorney general’s office want the state’s highest court to order a resentencing for Jason Van Dyke, a move that if granted could result in a much harsher prison term for the former Chicago police officer convicted in the slaying of 17-year-old Laquan McDonald.

Their petition, filed Monday, does not explicitly target the length of the 6¾-year sentence, which many activists criticized as lenient.  But Kane County State’s Attorney Joseph McMahon, appointed to handle the Van Dyke case, and Attorney General Kwame Raoul argue that Judge Vincent Gaughan sentenced Van Dyke under improper legal guidelines, and note that a significantly longer sentence would be justifiable under state law.

“I recognize that a trial judge’s discretion in sentencing is to be given great deference,” Raoul said at a news conference Monday. “However, it is in the interest of justice that we do all within our power to make sure that such exercise in discretion be applied consistent with the mandates of law, no matter who the defendant and no matter who the victim.”

In response, Van Dyke’s attorneys said the prosecutors’ motivations were plainly political. “This case has come to represent all the wrongs, perceived wrongs, of the Chicago Police Department, and it’s fallen upon Jason Van Dyke as a person,” attorney Jennifer Blagg said. “So what he represents politically is why this is happening.”...

Van Dyke, 40, was convicted last year of one count of second-degree murder and 16 counts of aggravated battery in the 2014 on-duty shooting of McDonald.  He was sentenced last month to 6¾ years in prison.  Gaughan sentenced Van Dyke only on the second-degree murder conviction, ruling that it was the more serious offense and that the aggravated battery counts should “merge” into it for purposes of sentencing....

But the prosecutors’ petition argues that Illinois law actually makes aggravated battery with a firearm the more serious offense, and therefore the state Supreme Court should order Gaughan to resentence the ex-patrol officer on those convictions instead.  The court should also direct Gaughan to determine which of the 16 gunshot wounds caused “severe bodily injury” and sentence him to consecutive prison terms for those counts, they state.

Prosecutors have argued that at least two of the wounds caused that kind of injury, which, the petition contends, would mean Van Dyke would face a minimum sentence of 18 years: six years for each of those two wounds, plus six more years for the other 14 counts.  An aggravated battery with a firearm conviction carries a sentence of six to 30 years in prison.  The range for second-degree murder is four to 20 years, but a judge can impose probation instead.

If the state Supreme Court chooses to consider the petition, there are a few potential outcomes, said longtime criminal defense attorney Mark Lyon.  “They will either have to say, ‘Judge Gaughan, you have to resentence this person,’ or they have to say (they) were wrong in the case where they said second-degree murder was always less serious than aggravated battery with a firearm,” Lyon said, referring to a previous ruling.

The court potentially could also order Gaughan to resentence Van Dyke on the aggravated battery but not make him rule on which of the 16 shots caused “severe bodily injury,” Lyon said, which would open the door for Gaughan to impose a prison term the same as the previous sentence, or slightly shorter.

But even in that scenario, Van Dyke would serve slightly more prison time.  Inmates convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm must serve at least 85 percent of their sentences — far higher than the 50 percent required by a second-degree murder conviction.  “It’s quite unlikely that Mr. Van Dyke comes out of this without some kind of upward modification of his sentence,” Lyon said. “How much, who knows.”

Van Dyke’s attorneys plan to file an objection to the prosecutors’ motion. The Supreme Court is not obligated to accept the prosecutors’ petition at all, and there is no time frame in which it must make a decision.

Prior related post:

February 13, 2019 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, February 12, 2019

Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán found guilty on all 10 federal counts now facing LWOP sentence ... but surely could still provide substantial assistance

As reported in this NPR piece, headlined "'El Chapo,' Notorious Drug Kingpin, Found Guilty After Dramatic Trial In New York," the federal government secured high-profile drug convictions today in New York.  Here are some details:

After a long trial held under heightened security at the Brooklyn, N.Y., federal court, a jury has found Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, one of the world's most notorious drug kingpins who led Mexico's Sinaloa cartel, guilty on all ten counts related to drug trafficking. He 61-year-old faces the possibility of life in prison.

Tuesday's verdict ended a dramatic trial that started in November and was filled with explosive testimony from Guzmán's former cartel associates. It included testimony from more than 50 witnesses, many of whom described Guzmán's use of violence against his enemies.

Guzmán faced 10 charges in the indictment, including engaging in a criminal enterprise — which in itself comprised 27 violations, including conspiracy to commit murder. Other charges included using firearms and manufacturing and distributing cocaine, heroin and other drugs.

Last week, Judge Brian Cogan gave jurors about three hours of instructions for their deliberations. He said he was confident that they had followed his instructions not to read or watch news about the case. The entire jury has been anonymous for their protection. At one point, the judge told the foreperson to sign notes using her name but then corrected that instruction and told her to use her juror number instead to keep her identity secret.

The jurors — four men and eight women — deliberated for days, asking for lengthy testimonies and whether ephedrine was considered methamphetamine.

In laying out their case, prosecutors spent 11 weeks calling witnesses, while the defense took 30 minutes and brought just one witness to the stand. The prosecution and defense delivered their final arguments to the jury in January.

Jeffrey Lichtman, one of Guzmán's defense lawyers, gave an animated presentation, banging the podium, pacing before the jurors and patting his client on the shoulder.... The prosecution had produced a "scripted event," he said, with cooperating witnesses who "lie, steal, cheat, deal drugs and kill people." And if Guzmán was convicted, all of those people would be released, he said.

Lichtman cast doubt on whether some of the murders that witnesses described ever happened. He called Guzmán "the rabbit" that Mexican authorities were chasing when the true mastermind behind the Sinaloa cartel was Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada....

Assistant U.S. Attorney Amanda Liskamm led the prosecution's rebuttal, urging jurors not to fall for the defense's smear. "The day cocaine conspiracies are made in heaven is the day we can call angels as witnesses," she said....

Prosecution witnesses offered testimony that swung from the bizarre to the shocking. According to testimony, he had a diamond-encrusted pistol and a gold-plated AK-47; he kicked off a cartel war after a rival refused to shake his hand; he and a mistress once fled naked through a secret tunnel under a bath tub; he escaped from a Mexican prison with the help of his wife, Emma Coronel Aispuro; and, in one of the most controversial allegations, he bought off Enrique Peña Nieto for $100 million — a claim the former Mexican president has denied....

Guzmán's 29-year-old wife attended the trial nearly every day, even as a mistress testified. She told The New York Times, "I don't know my husband as the person they are trying to show him as." The weeks also brought details of the sophisticated methods that the cartel used to move its contraband, from secret landing strips to container ships and submarines. People who stood in the way were allegedly bribed, kidnapped, tortured or killed....

Guzmán already had humiliated Mexico by escaping from prison twice. Once he made a getaway in a laundry cart. And then there was the mile-long tunnel that began under his maximum security prison cell's shower, a passageway that he told Penn had required sending engineers to Germany for training.

The cartel reportedly built some 90 tunnels between Mexico and the United States. After a long manhunt, he was recaptured in 2016 by Mexican authorities on the outskirts of Los Mochis and extradited to the United States the next year. He arrived on U.S. soil and pleaded not guilty to U.S. federal charges.

Guzmán showed in Mexico that he can devise ways to escape from prison, but I am hopeful US authorities will not have similar prison administration difficulties.  But, as the title of this post is meant to suggest, there is another way Guzmán could now try to work his way out of federal prison, namely by providing substantial assistance in the prosecution of others.

Ultimately, I am not sure Guzmán will be eager even at this point to cooperate with the feds, and I would be quite surprised if the feds would be willing to offer any significant sentencing discount for his cooperation.  But here it seems worth flagging the reality that, in a federal sentencing system that rewards defendants who cooperate, the greatest potential sentencing rewards can go to the most guilty of defendants who have the most potential information to offer.  Guzmán, who I believe is now facing a mandatory life sentence, would seem to be the poster child of the most guilty of defendants with the most potential information to offer.

February 12, 2019 in Celebrity sentencings, Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, February 06, 2019

"Neuroscience and Punishment: From Theory to Practice"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper appearing in the journal Neuroethics and authored by Allan McCay and Jeanette Kennett.  Here is its abstract:

In a 2004 paper, Greene and Cohen predicted that neuroscience would revolutionise criminal justice by presenting a mechanistic view of human agency that would change people’s intuitions about retributive punishment.  According to their theory, this change in intuitions would in turn lead to the demise of retributivism within criminal justice systems.  Their influential paper has been challenged, most notably by Morse, who has argued that it is unlikely that there will be major changes to criminal justice systems in response to neuroscience.

In this paper we commence a tentative empirical enquiry into the claims of these theorists, focusing on Australian criminal justice.  Our analysis of Australian cases is not supportive of claims about the demise of retributive justice, and instead suggests the possibility that neuroscience may be used by the courts to calibrate retributive desert.  It is thus more consistent with the predictive claims of Morse than of Greene and Cohen.  We also consider evidence derived from interviews with judges, and this leads us to consider the possibility of a backlash against evidence of brain impairment.  Finally we note that change in penal aims may be occurring that is unrelated to developments in neuroscience. 

February 6, 2019 in Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentencing around the world | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, January 31, 2019

US Sentencing Commission releases new report titled "What Does Federal Economic Crime Really Look Like?"

Cover_2019-econ-crimeContintuing its steady production of research reports to start 2019, the US Sentencing Commission yesterday released this 87-page report under the title ""What Does Federal Economic Crime Really Look Like?". This USSC webpage provides this "Summary" and "Key Findings":

Summary

This publication provides data on the broad variety of economic crime sentenced under §2B1.1.  The Commission undertook a project to systematically identify and classify the myriad of economic crimes sentenced under §2B1.1 using offenders' statutes of conviction and offense conduct.  The Commission used this two-step methodology to assign the 6,068 offenders sentenced under §2B1.1 in fiscal year 2017 to one of 29 specific types of economic crime.

This publication provides, for the first time, data from this new project as well as a brief description of the study's methodology.

Key Findings

  • The economic crime guideline (§2B1.1) accounts for approximately ten percent of the federal caseload and encompasses a wide variety of conduct.

  • Embezzlement and theft offenders consistently accounted for about one-quarter of all economic crime offenders, ranging from 24.6 to 28.3 percent during the five years studied.  Financial institution fraud and government benefits fraud offenders have also been among the top five most prevalent type of economic crime offenders.

  • The offense severity, as measured by several guideline enhancements, varied significantly across the 17 specific types of economic crime that were the focus of this report.  In particular, median loss amounts varied substantially, with four specific offense types involving median losses far exceeding the median loss amount for all economic crime offenders of $131,750: securities and investment fraud ($2,105,620), health care fraud ($1,086,205), mortgage fraud ($999,721), and government procurement fraud ($739,455) and two specific offense types with the lowest median loss amounts: mail related fraud ($1,815) and false statements ($0).  These differences are particularly noteworthy because the loss calculation is the primary driver of the guideline calculation under §2B1.1.

  • The application rates of other guideline provisions measuring offense severity and offender culpability also varied significantly across the specific types of economic crime. For example, the victims enhancement applied in 78.1 percent of securities and investment fraud compared to 2.4 percent of false statements offenses, and the sophisticated means enhancement applied in 37.5 percent of advanced fee fraud compared to 0.6 percent of mail related fraud.

  • The average sentences varied significantly across the specific types of economic crime. Securities and investment fraud offenders received the longest average sentences at 52 months, more than twice as long as the average sentence for all economic crime offenders of 23 months.  False statements offenders received the shortest average sentence at five months.

  • Offender characteristics also differed across economic crime types.  For example, White offenders accounted for a substantial majority of securities and investment fraud (79.9%), computer related fraud (70.5%), and government procurement fraud (62.3%), while Black offenders accounted for the largest proportion of tax fraud (55.0%), identity theft (49.4%), and credit card fraud (45.0%).

January 31, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, January 24, 2019

US Sentencing Commission releases big new report on "Recidivism Among Federal Violent Offenders"

Cover_recidivism-violenceThe US Sentencing Commission has just released its fifth major report in a series reviewing the recidivism rates of federal offenders released back in 2005.  This 74-page report is titled simply "Recidivism Among Federal Violent Offenders.This USSC webpage provides links, and this "Report Summary" and "Key Findings":

Report Summary

Recidivism Among Federal Violent Offenders is the fifth report in a series examining a group of 25,431 federal offenders who were released from federal custody in calendar year 2005. This report analyzes the recidivism rates of federal offenders who engaged in violent criminal activity. The study identifies two groups of violent offenders:

  • "Violent instant offenders" who engaged in violent criminal conduct as part of their instant federal offense; and 
  • "Violent prior offenders" who were not categorized as violent offenders based on their instant federal offense, but who had been arrested for a violent offense in their past.

Taken together, these 10,004 “violent offenders” are analyzed in comparison to the remaining 15,427 “non-violent offenders” released from federal custody in calendar year 2005.  (Published January 24, 2019)

Key Findings

Consistent with the Commission’s previous research, this report shows that offenders who engaged in violent criminal activity — whether during the instant federal offense or as part of prior criminal conduct — generally recidivated at a higher rate, more quickly, and for more serious crimes than non-violent offenders.

Key findings of the Commission’s study of recidivism among violent offenders are: 

  • A substantial number of the 25,431 U.S. offenders released in calendar year 2005 — 39.3 percent — engaged in violent criminal activity as part of their instant federal offense or prior criminal conduct.

  • Violent offenders recidivated at a higher rate than non-violent offenders.  Over 60 percent (63.8%) of violent offenders recidivated by being rearrested for a new crime or for a violation of supervision conditions.  This compares to less than 40 percent (39.8%) of non-violent offenders who were rearrested during the follow-up period.

  • Violent offenders recidivated more quickly than non-violent offenders.  Of those violent offenders who recidivated, the median time from release to the first recidivism event was 18 months.  Comparatively, the median time from release to the first recidivism event for non-violent offenders was 24 months.

  • Violent offenders recidivated for more serious crimes than non-violent offenders. Over one-fourth (28.4%) of the violent offenders who recidivated had assault as their most serious new charge, followed by public order crimes (15.6%) and drug trafficking (11.1%).  Of the non-violent offenders who recidivated, public order crimes were the most common new charge (20.9%), followed by assault (17.9%) and drug trafficking (12.0%).

  • Violent offenders have higher recidivism rates than non-violent offenders in every Criminal History Category, however, the difference in recidivism rates between violent and non-violent offenders is most pronounced in the lower Criminal History Categories and among offenders designated as career offenders or armed career criminals.

  • Recidivism rates for violent offenders in every age group at the time of release from custody were higher than the rates for non-violent offenders.  Violent offenders recidivated at twice the rate of non-violent offenders among those released after age 40.

  • Analyzed separately, violent instant offenders and violent prior offenders both recidivated at a higher rate and for more serious crimes than non-violent offenders.

January 24, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, January 20, 2019

DC Circuit showcases Second Amendment's second-class status by holding very old, non-violent felony eliminates right to keep arms

A few days ago at PrawfsBlawg, Gerard Magliocca touched off a debate over the reach and application of the Second Amendment via this post titled "The Bill of Rights Has First-Class and Coach Tickets."  His post riffs off a recent Third Circuit opinion upholding a New Jersey ammunition limit that prompted lengthy dissent by Judge Bibas.  And, as noted in this post from last year, Justice Thomas has lamented in a cert denial that the Second Amendment has become "constitutional orphan."  Long-time readers likely know that this discussion engages sentencing and collateral consequences in a variety of ways, and I have long noted that the Second Amendment seems to be the only (so-called) fundamental right in the Bill of Rights that can be permanently and categorically lost by a single old prior offenses.

The status of the Second Amendment as a second-class right, at least for those with any felony record, was reinforced just last Friday by the DC Circuit through an unanimous opinion in Medina v. Whitaker, No. 17-5248 (DC Cir. Jan 18, 2019) (available here). Here is how the opinion starts and a key paragraph toward the end of the panel's analysis:

Jorge Medina was convicted of falsifying his income on mortgage applications twenty-seven years ago.  Now, as a convicted felon, he is prohibited from owning firearms by federal law.  He argues that the application of this law to him violates the Second Amendment because he poses no heightened risk of gun violence.  Because we conclude that felons are not among the law-abiding, responsible citizens entitled to the protections of the Second Amendment, we reject his contention and affirm the district court’s dismissal order....

On balance, the historical evidence and the Supreme Court’s discussion of felon disarmament laws leads us to reject the argument that non-dangerous felons have a right to bear arms.  As a practical matter, this makes good sense.  Using an amorphous “dangerousness” standard to delineate the scope of the Second Amendment would require the government to make case-by-case predictive judgments before barring the possession of weapons by convicted criminals, illegal aliens, or perhaps even children.  We do not think the public, in ratifying the Second Amendment, would have understood the right to be so expansive and limitless.  At its core, the Amendment protects the right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.  Whether a certain crime removes one from the category of “law-abiding and responsible,” in some cases, may be a close question.  For example, the crime leading to the firearm prohibition in Schrader — a misdemeanor arising from a fistfight — may be open to debate.  Those who commit felonies however, cannot profit from our recognition of such borderline cases.  For these reasons, we hold that those convicted of felonies are not among those entitled to possess arms.

I do not at all dispute the notion that the Second Amendment was not intended to be limitless.  But I do like to highlight how jarring it would be if a state or the feds were to claim that any persons falsifying income on a mortgage application years ago should never again have a right to go to church or to write a book (First Amendment) or never again have a right to due process or against property takings (Fifth Amendment) or never again have a right to a trial or a to lawyer in a criminal prosecution (Sixth Amendment).  In other words, I see the Second Amendment as so obviously a second-class right because we so readily tolerate and even find "good sense" in dramatic categorical restrictions on this right that we would never contemplate with respect to other prominent rights in the Bill of Rights.

January 20, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, January 19, 2019

Former Chicago cop Jason Van Dyke sentenced in state court to only 81 months for murder of Laquan McDonald

As reported in this lengthy local article, headlined "Jason Van Dyke given relatively lenient sentence of under 7 years in prison for Laquan McDonald shooting," a high-profile killer seems to get a relative low sentence in an Illinois courtroom yesterday. Here are some of the details:

Former Chicago police Officer Jason Van Dyke was sentenced Friday to nearly seven years in prison for the fatal on-duty shooting of Laquan McDonald, bringing to a close one of the most racially fraught and socially significant chapters in recent Chicago history.  Van Dyke remained stoic as Cook County Circuit Judge Vincent Gaughan announced the sentence about 5:30 p.m. after a long day of often emotional testimony. Moments later, Van Dyke’s teenage daughter seated in the gallery burst into tears.

But the relatively lenient six-year, nine-month sentence for second-degree murder counts as a victory for Van Dyke, who could be out of custody in as little as three years, his attorney told reporters.  “He truly felt great,” the attorney, Daniel Herbert, said of Van Dyke. “He was not just relieved, he was happy. It’s the first time I’ve seen the guy — honestly since this whole ordeal started — where he was happy. He’s certainly not happy about going to jail. He’s certainly not happy about missing his family. But he’s happy about the prospect of life ahead of him.”

In October, Van Dyke became the first Chicago police officer in half a century to be convicted of murder in an on-duty shooting.  A jury found him guilty on one count of second-degree murder and 16 counts of aggravated battery — one for each bullet that hit McDonald’s body in October 2014 as the teen walked away from police on Pulaski Road while holding a knife. Graphic police dashboard camera footage of the shooting released more than a year later sparked weeks of chaos and political upheaval, exposing Chicago’s long-standing racial fault lines and exacerbating the already-fraught relationship between police and minority communities.

Though he had sought a sentence about three times lengthier, special prosecutor Joseph McMahon told reporters in the Leighton Criminal Court Building that justice had been served. “I understand the sentence is not exactly what the McDonald and Hunter families wanted,” said McMahon, who requested a prison term of 18 to 20 years.  “But the sentence, like the verdict, does hold the defendant accountable.”...

Gaughan imposed the sentence after a daylong hearing that drew tears from witnesses on the stand and from Van Dyke himself, who sat slouched at the defense table in a bright yellow jail uniform.

While predicting his sentence would disappoint “100 percent” of those in the courtroom, Gaughan made a number of key rulings in favor of the defense. In particular, he sentenced Van Dyke only for the second-degree murder conviction, meaning he will serve just half the sentence if he qualifies for day-for-day good-behavior credit. If instead the judge had sentenced him only on the aggravated battery convictions, Van Dyke could have been subject to a lengthier term behind bars. He also would have had to serve at least 85 percent of that sentence.

In fashioning his decision, Gaughan said the law required him to consider the most serious charge for which Van Dyke was convicted. Common sense, the judge found, dictated that be second-degree murder, not aggravated battery. However, Illinois law considers aggravated battery with a gun the more serious offense of the two, carrying stiffer penalties. “Is it more serious for Laquan McDonald to be shot by a firearm or is it more serious for Laquan McDonald to be murdered by a firearm?” Gaughan said in explaining his reasoning.

Witnesses called by Van Dyke’s legal team at the marathon hearing said the public attention to the case has emotionally shattered his family. “My life has been a nightmare,” Van Dyke’s wife, Tiffany, said in a choked voice, echoing similar testimony from the former officer’s father, sister and 17-year-old daughter. “Life is torture. My heart is broken.”...

Toward the end of the hearing, Van Dyke himself stood and said the day he shot McDonald was the worst of his life. It was the first time he had ever had to fire his weapon in the line of duty, he said, bending his head down to read closely from a handwritten statement. “And I’m very proud of that fact,” he said. “… The last thing I wanted to do was to shoot Laquan McDonald.” Van Dyke said he “tried to make the right decision in a rapidly escalating, dangerous situation.”...

McDonald’s great-uncle, the Rev. Marvin Hunter, read from the witness stand a letter he wrote from the perspective of his grand-nephew, saying McDonald’s death devastated the family. The letter said Hunter used McDonald’s last paycheck from his construction job to buy the suit the teen was buried in.

The killing came just weeks before McDonald was to begin living under the same roof again with his sister and mother, who had overcome drug addiction, he said. “I was so happy for the possibility of that day,” the letter said. “However, Jason Van Dyke … robbed us of this.”

The letter ended with a request to punish Van Dyke for McDonald’s killing, arguing that the former officer had shown no remorse for his actions that night. “What happened to me can never be changed, but other young black men and women will not have to face Jason Van Dyke and his evil and selfish ways,” the letter said. “I’m a real victim of murder and that can never be changed. Please think about me and my life when you sentence this person to prison.”

While the many civilian complaints against Van Dyke were not introduced at trial, prosecutors on Friday called four witnesses — all African-American men — who one after another painted Van Dyke as an abusive, out-of-control officer protected by inept police oversight agencies. One man said Van Dyke choked him to try to get him to spit out a cough drop during a DUI stop. Another said the officer berated him using a racial slur.  A third said Van Dyke deserved prison time simply for the “chaotic” way he handled a traffic stop.

There are so many substantive and procedural elements to this case, one could probably write an entire law review article about the importance and impact of prosecutorial and judicial discretion as it operates within a controversial high-profile case like this one.  For now, I am just inclined to spotlight notable sentencing differences between this case and the arguably comparable case involving former South Carolina police officer Michael Slager who killed Walter Scott on camera.  Van Dyke was convicted by a jury in state court of second-degree murder, and then he was sentenced by a local judge to a prison term of 81 months (with it seems the possibility of released in around 40 months).  Slager, whose sentence was just affirmed on appeal, pleaded guilty to federal civil rights charges after a state jury could not reach a verdict, and then he was sentenced by a federal judge to a prison term of 240 months (with perhaps the possibility of being released in around 200 months).

Notably, I am not the only one noticing how state and federal sentencing justice can play out quite differently.  This notable new local article, headlined "Patti Blagojevich ‘speechless’ Van Dyke sentence is less than half her husband’s," begins this way:

As expected, a slew of political candidates rushed to react to the sentencing of Jason Van Dyke. And then there was Patti Blagojevich, wife of a now-disgraced and imprisoned Illinois governor.

“I am speechless,” Patti Blagojevich tweeted Friday. “A 17 year old is dead and the sentence is less than half of my husbands sentence for discussions with his staff and attorney about political fundraising.”

It could be another attempt to grab the attention of the last person who apparently can get former Gov. Rod Blagojevich out of jail early: President Donald Trump. And it comes after Patti Blagojevich last year made some other moves seemingly tailor-made to catch Trump’s eye, with an appearance on Fox News in which she slammed Obama. She also has tried to connect her husband’s case to Special Counsel Robert Mueller and Former FBI Director James Comey — favorite Trump targets.

Van Dyke’s 81-month sentence means the former Chicago police officer will likely serve a little more than three years in prison after shooting the 17-year-old McDonald 16 times in 2014.

Trump himself may have gotten Patti Blagojevich’s hopes up in December, when he tweeted about another TV interview she had done with Fox News, calling her “the wonderful wife” of the imprisoned governor. Patti retweeted the president, and that was the last tweet she had sent until Friday, more than a month later.

Rod Blagojevich, serving a 14-year sentence on corruption charges, is not due out of prison until May 2024. Though an appellate court tossed five of his convictions in 2015, federal prosecutors say he remains convicted “of the same three charged shakedowns” for which he was first sentenced in 2011.

January 19, 2019 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Friday, January 18, 2019

"Impact of Risk Assessment on Judges’ Fairness in Sentencing Relatively Poor Defendants"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now available via SSRN authored by Jennifer Skeem, Nicholas Scurich and John Monahan.  Here is its abstract:

The increasing use of risk assessment algorithms in the criminal justice system has generated enormous controversy. Advocates emphasize that algorithms are more transparent, consistent, and accurate in predicting re-offending than judges’ unaided intuition, while skeptics worry that algorithms will increase racial and socioeconomic disparities in incarceration.  Ultimately, however, judges make decisions — not algorithms.

In the present study, real judges (n=340) with criminal sentencing experience participated in a controlled experiment to test whether the provision of risk assessment information interacts with a defendant’s socioeconomic class to influence sentencing decisions.  Results revealed that risk assessment information reduced the likelihood of incarceration for relatively affluent defendants, but the same risk assessment information increased the likelihood of incarceration for relatively poor defendants.  This finding held after controlling for the sex, race, political orientation, and jurisdiction of the judge. It appears that under some circumstances, risk assessment information can increase sentencing disparities.

January 18, 2019 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 09, 2019

"The Accuracy, Equity, and Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk Assessment"

The title of this post is the title of this notable and timely new paper on SSRN authored by Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff, Jennifer Skeem and Christopher Slobogin.  Here is its abstract:

Jurisdictions across the country, including the federal government through its recently enacted First Step Act, have begun using statistical algorithms (also called “instruments”) to help determine an arrestee’s or an offender’s risk of reoffending.  These risk assessment instruments (RAIs) might be used at a number of points in the criminal process, including at the front-end by judges to impose a sentence after conviction, at the back-end by parole boards to make decisions about prison release, or in between these two points by correctional authorities determining the optimal security and service arrangements for an offender.  At the pretrial stage, RAIs might come into play at the time of the bail or pretrial detention determination by a judge, which usually takes place shortly after arrest.  The increased use of RAIs in the criminal justice system has given rise to several criticisms.  RAIs are said to be no more accurate than clinical assessments, racially biased, lacking in transparency and, because of their quantitative nature, dehumanizing.  This chapter critically examines a number of these concerns. It also highlights how the law has, and should, respond to these issues.

January 9, 2019 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 08, 2019

Spotlighting criminal-justice debt and its profound impact on the poorest Americans

The New York Times magazine has this lengthy new article about criminal justice debt under this full headline: "How Cities Make Money by Fining the Poor: In many parts of America, like Corinth, Miss., judges are locking up defendants who can’t pay — sometimes for months at a time." I recommend the piece in full, and here is a snippet:

No government agency comprehensively tracks the extent of criminal-justice debt owed by poor defendants, but experts estimate that those fines and fees total tens of billions of dollars.  That number is likely to grow in coming years, and significantly: National Public Radio, in a survey conducted with the Brennan Center for Justice and the National Center for State Courts, found that 48 states increased their civil and criminal court fees from 2010 to 2014.  And because wealthy and middle-class Americans can typically afford either the initial fee or the services of an attorney, it will be the poor who shoulder the bulk of the burden....

In areas hit by recession or falling tax revenue, fines and fees help pay the bills.  (The costs of housing and feeding inmates can be subsidized by the state.)  As the Fines and Fees Justice Center, an advocacy organization based in New York, has documented, financial penalties on the poor are now a leading source of revenue for municipalities around the country.  In Alabama, for example, the Southern Poverty Law Center took up the case of a woman who was jailed for missing a court date related to an unpaid utility bill.  In Oregon, courts have issued hefty fines to the parents of truant schoolchildren. Many counties around the country engage in civil forfeiture, the seizure of vehicles and cash from people suspected (but not necessarily proven in court) of having broken the law.  In Louisiana, pretrial diversion laws empower the police to offer traffic offenders a choice: Pay up quickly, and the ticket won’t go on your record; fight the ticket in court, and you’ll face additional fees.

“What we’ve seen in our research is that the mechanisms vary, depending on the region,” says Joanna Weiss, co-director of the Fines and Fees Justice Center.  “But they have one thing in common: They use the justice system to wring revenue out of the poorest Americans — the people who can afford it the least.”  Aside from taxes, she says, “criminal-justice debt is now a de facto way of funding a lot of American cities.”

The jailing of poor defendants who cannot pay fines — a particularly insidious version of this revenue machine — has been ruled unconstitutional since a trio of Supreme Court cases spanning the 1970s and early 1980s....  Still, decades after those cases were decided, the practice of jailing people who cannot pay persists, not least because Supreme Court decisions do not always make their way to local courts.  “Precedent is one thing,” says Alec Karakatsanis, executive director of Civil Rights Corps, a Washington-based nonprofit.  “The way a law is written is one thing. The way a law is actually experienced by poor people and people of color is another.”...

In 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union detailed evidence of what it calls “modern-day ‘debtors’ prisons’ ” — essentially, courts operating in the same way as Judge Ross’s in Corinth — in Georgia, Michigan, Louisiana, Ohio and Washington State.  “If you spent a few weeks driving from coast to coast, you might not find similar policies in place in every single county,” Sam Brooke, the deputy legal director of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s economic-justice program, told me.  “But every other county? Probably.  This is a massive problem, and it’s not confined to the South.  It’s national.”...

In recent years, the Southern Poverty Law Center and other organizations, including the A.C.L.U. and Karakatsanis’s Civil Rights Corps, have been filing class-action lawsuits against dozens of courts across the South and Midwest and West, arguing that local courts, in jailing indigent defendants, are violating the Supreme Court rulings laid down in Williams, Tate and Bearden.  The lawsuits work: As a settlement is negotiated, a judge typically agrees to stop jailing new inmates for unpaid fines or fees.  “No one wants to admit they’ve knowingly acted in this manner,” says Brooke, who partnered with Karakatsanis on lawsuits in Alabama and filed several elsewhere in the South. “So they tend to settle quickly.” The trouble is locating the offending courts.

January 8, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

US Sentencing Commission releases big new report on "Intra-City Differences in Federal Sentencing Practices"

Cover_intra-city-differencesThe US Sentencing Commission has just released its second big research report of the new year with this 138-page report titled "Intra-City Differences in Federal Sentencing Practices." (The main text of the report is less than 30 pages, with the other 100+ full of detailed appendices.)  This USSC webpage provides links, an overview and conclusions from the report:

Overview

This report examines variations in sentencing practices — and corresponding variations in sentencing outcomes — in the federal courts since the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in United States v. Booker.  The United States Sentencing Commission analyzed the sentencing practices of federal district judges in 30 major cities located throughout the country to determine the extent of the judges’ variations in imposing sentences in relation to the city average.

This report is the second in a series of reports updating the analyses and findings of the Commission’s 2012 Report on the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing.

Conclusions

Although the trend of increasing differences among judges slowed after 2011, the increasing differences in sentencing practices first reported at the district level in the Commission’s 2012 Booker Report generally persist to this day, even within the same courthouse. In particular, the Commission finds that:

  • From the Booker to Gall Periods, 23 of the 30 cities had increases in their total spreads, and 22 of 27 cities (those with at least five judges in all three periods) had increases in their standard deviations.  From the Gall to the Post-Report Periods, 20 of the 30 cities had increases in their total spreads, and 16 of the 27 cities (those with at least five judges in all periods) had increases in their standard deviations, although the magnitude of the increases was less than the magnitude of the increases from the Booker Period to the Gall Period.

  • In terms of the overall changes during the 13 years, from the Booker Period to the Post-Report Period, 25 of the 30 cities saw a net increase in their total spreads and 23 cities of the 27 with reported standard deviations saw a net increase in their standard deviations.

  • Considering all 30 cities together as a representative sample of the country as a whole, the average total spreads for all 30 cities in the three periods increased from 18.2 in the Booker Period to 23.7 in the Gall Period to 27.6 in the Post-Report Period.  The average standard deviations for the 27 cities (those with at least five judges) grew from 5.8 to 7.7 to 8.3 during the same three periods.

  • In most cities, the length of a defendant’s sentence increasingly depends on which judge in the courthouse is assigned to his or her case.

Once I have a chance to review this data a bit more, I may have more to say about its findings and other takeaways.  But it seems already worth noting that any justified concerns about data showing that "the length of a defendant’s sentence increasingly depends on which judge in the courthouse is assigned to his or her case" are at least a bit mitigated by the passage of the FIRST STEP Act.  Those defendants unfairly receiving longer sentences because their cases were assigned to distinctly harsh sentencing judges are now generally going to be able to earn a greater portion of time off their long sentences (and have more opportunities to seek earlier release through other means) thanks to various new provisions of the the FIRST STEP Act.

January 8, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, January 07, 2019

Calling her life sentence "too harsh," Tennessee Gov grants commutation to Cyntoia Brown to be paroled after serving 15 years for juve killing

As reported in this local article, "Gov. Bill Haslam ordered an early release for Cyntoia Brown, a Tennessee woman and alleged sex trafficking victim serving a life sentence in prison for killing a man when she was 16."  Here is more about a high-profile clemency grant in a high-profile case:

Haslam granted Brown a full commutation to parole on Monday. Brown will be eligible for release Aug. 7, 15 years after she fatally shot a man in the back of the head while he was lying in bed beside her. She will stay on parole for 10 years.

“Cyntoia Brown committed, by her own admission, a horrific crime at the age of 16," Haslam said in a statement. "Yet, imposing a life sentence on a juvenile that would require her to serve at least 51 years before even being eligible for parole consideration is too harsh, especially in light of the extraordinary steps Ms. Brown has taken to rebuild her life. "Transformation should be accompanied by hope. So, I am commuting Ms. Brown’s sentence, subject to certain conditions.”

Brown will be required to participate in regular counseling sessions and to perform at least 50 hours of community service, including working with at-risk youth. She also will be required to get a job.

In a statement released by her lawyers, Brown thanked Haslam "for your act of mercy in giving me a second chance. I will do everything I can to justify your faith in me." "With God's help, I am committed to live the rest of my life helping others, especially young people. My hope is to help other young girls avoid ending up where I have been."

The governor's long-awaited decision, handed down during his last days in office, brought a dramatic conclusion to Brown's plea for mercy, which burst onto the national stage as celebrities and criminal justice reform advocates discovered her case. In his commutation, the governor called Brown's case one that "appears to me to be a proper one for the exercise of executive clemency." "Over her more than fourteen years of incarceration, Ms. Brown has demonstrated extraordinary growth and rehabilitation," the commutation said.

It was a remarkable victory for Brown after years of legal setbacks. Brown said she was forced into prostitution and was scared for her life when she shot 43-year-old Johnny Allen in the back of the head while they were in bed together. Allen, a local real estate agent, had picked her up at an East Nashville Sonic restaurant and taken her to his home.

Brown, now 30, was tried as an adult and convicted of first-degree murder in 2006. She was given a life sentence. Had Haslam declined to intervene, Brown would not have been eligible for parole until she was 69. The state parole board, which considered Brown's case in 2018, gave the governor a split recommendation, with some recommending early release and some recommending she stay in prison....

In recent years, celebrities have highlighted her case, fueling intense interest and a renewed legal fight to get her out of prison. Activists, lawmakers and celebrities, including Rihanna and Kim Kardashian West, have cited Brown's case as an illustration of a broken justice system. Brown was a victim herself, they said, and didn't deserve her punishment.

The Gov's official press release on this decision is available at this link.

January 7, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Clemency and Pardons, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (8)

Wednesday, January 02, 2019

US Sentencing Commission releases big new report on "Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Federal Sex Offenses"

The US Sentencing Commission has kicked of the new year with this 81-page report titled ""Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Federal Sex Offenses." This USSC webpage provides this summary and key findings from the report:

Summary

This publication examines the application of mandatory minimum penalties specific to federal sex offenses; it is the sixth and final release in the Commission's series of publications on mandatory minimum penalties.

Using fiscal year 2016 data, this publication includes analyses of the two types of federal sex offenses carrying mandatory minimum penalties, sexual abuse offenses and child pornography offenses, as well their impact on the Federal Bureau of Prisons population. In addition to analyzing child pornography offenses generally, this publication analyzes child pornography offenses by offense type, exploring differences in frequency, offender characteristics, and sentencing outcomes for distribution, receipt, and possession offenses. Where appropriate, the publication highlights changes and trends since the Commission’s 2011 Mandatory Minimum Report.

Key Findings

  • Mandatory minimum penalties for sex offenses are applied less often in the federal system compared to other mandatory minimum penalties.
    • Offenders convicted of a sex offense comprised only 4.2 percent (n=2,633) of federal offenders sentenced in fiscal year 2016.
    • Sex offenses accounted for 19.4 percent of offenses carrying a mandatory minimum penalty in fiscal year 2016.
  • Sex offenses, however, increased in number and as a percentage of the federal docket, and sex offenders were more frequently convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.
    • Offenders convicted of a sex offense increased from 3.2 percent (n=2,317) of federal offenders, in fiscal year 2010, to 4.2 percent (n=2,633) in fiscal year 2016.
    • The number of offenders convicted of sexual abuse offenses has steadily increased since the Commission’s 2011 Mandatory Minimum Report, from 639 offenders in fiscal year 2010 to a high of 1,148 offenders in fiscal year 2016. Additionally, the percentage of sexual abuse offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty also increased substantially, from 21.4 percent in fiscal year 2004, to a high of 63.2 percent in fiscal year 2016.
    • While also increasing over time since 2004, the number of child pornography offenders has remained relatively stable since the Commission’s 2011 Mandatory Minimum Report, decreasing slightly from 1,675 offenders in fiscal year 2010 to 1,565 in fiscal year 2016. The percentage of child pornography offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, however, has generally increased, from 50.2 percent in fiscal year 2010 to a high of 61.2 percent in 2014, before leveling off to 59.6 percent in fiscal 2016.
  • Sex offenders are demographically different than offenders convicted of other offenses carrying mandatory minimum penalties.
    • In fiscal year 2016, Native American offenders comprised a larger percentage of sexual abuse offenders than of any other offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty. They constituted 11.7 percent of sexual abuse offenders overall and represented the largest portion (28.2%) of sexual abuse offenders convicted of an offense not carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.
    • White offenders constituted over 80 percent of offenders convicted of any child pornography offense (80.9%), convicted of a child pornography offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty (83.0%), and those subject to that penalty (83.2%).  In comparison, White offenders comprised 22.7 percent, 27.2 percent, and 31.1 percent of all federal offenders, federal offenders convicted of any offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, and federal offenders subject to any mandatory minimum penalty, respectively.
    • The average age for all child pornography offenders and child pornography offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty was 42, five years older than the average age for federal offenders convicted of an offense carrying any mandatory minimum penalty. Nearly half of all child pornography offenders were 41 or older (48.0%).
    • While the average age for sexual abuse offenders was the same as the average age of federal offenders overall (37), of those convicted of a mandatory minimum penalty, 17.6 percent were older than 50 and 20.5 percent were between 41 and 50.
  • Offenders convicted of sex offenses carrying a mandatory minimum penalty are sentenced to longer terms than those convicted of sex offenses not carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.
    • In fiscal year 2016, the average sentence for offenders convicted of a sexual abuse offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty was nearly three times longer than the average sentence for offenders convicted of a sexual abuse offense not carrying a mandatory minimum penalty (252 months compared to 86 months).
    • The average sentence for child pornography offenders who faced a ten-year mandatory minimum penalty because of a prior sex offense conviction (136 months) was substantially longer than the average sentence for those offenders who were convicted of a possession offense (without a prior sex offense), which does not carry a mandatory minimum penalty (55 months).
    • Child pornography offenders convicted of distribution (140 months) and receipt offenses (93 months), which carry a five-year mandatory minimum penalty, also had a longer average sentence than offenders convicted of possession offenses (55 months), who did not face a mandatory minimum penalty.
  • Although Commission analysis has demonstrated that there is little meaningful distinction between the conduct involved in receipt and possession offenses, the average sentence for offenders convicted of a receipt offense, which carries a five-year mandatory minimum penalty, is substantially longer than the average sentence for offenders convicted of a possession offense, which carries no mandatory minimum penalty.
    • In fiscal year 2016, the average sentence for receipt offenders (without a prior sex offense conviction) was two and a half years longer (85 months) than the average sentence length for possession offenders (without a prior sex offense conviction) (55 months).
  • While still constituting a relatively small percentage of the overall prison population, the number of both sexual abuse offenders and child pornography offenders in Federal Bureau of Prisons custody has steadily increased, with both reaching population highs as of September 30, 2016.
    • Sexual abuse offenders accounted for only 3.5 percent (n=5,764) of the federal prison population as of September 30, 2016, but the number of sexual abuse offenders in a federal prison has steadily increased since fiscal year 2004, from 1,640 offenders to a high of 5,764 in fiscal year 2016. The number of offenders convicted of a sexual abuse offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty in the federal prison population has increased at a similar rate, from 276 to 4,055, during the same time period.
    • Child pornography offenders accounted for only 5.1 percent (n=8,508) of the federal prison population as of September 30, 2016, but the number of child pornography offenders in federal prison has steadily increased since fiscal year 2004, from 1,259 offenders to a high of 8,508 in fiscal year 2016. The number of offenders convicted of a child pornography offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty in the federal prison population has increased at a similar rate, from 118 to 6,303 during the same time period.

January 2, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, December 27, 2018

More than 40 months after death sentencing, lawyers for Boston bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev file their 1000+-page appellate brief with First Circuit

As reported in this local article, headlined "Lawyers: Tsarnaev ‘should not have been tried in Boston’," a very long appellate brief has been filed in a very high-profile federal capital case.  A federal jury handed down Dzhokhar Tsarnaev death sentence way back in May 2015, a full month before Donald Trump had even announced he was running for President.  But now, as Prez Trump heads into the second half of his term, Tsarnaev's team of lawyers has fully briefed his complaints about his trial and sentencing.  Here are the basic details:

Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s appellate team presented their oft-delayed opening argument Thursday, urging sparing him a federal execution and allowing him to be retried for the 2013 Patriots Day terror attack that killed an 8-year-old boy and two women.  Their premise is summed up in the opening line: “This case should not have been tried in Boston.

“Forcing this case to trial in a venue still suffering from the bombings was the District Court’s first fundamental error, and it deprived Tsarnaev of an impartial jury and a reliable verdict, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments,” the brief states.

The partially redacted document filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit spans 1,124 pages, nearly half of which is the 500-page opening brief alone.

Absent a new trial, Tsarnaev’s team is asking the Appeals Court to reverse his death sentence and order a punishment of life imprisonment.

Tsarnaev, 25, has been in solitary confinement at the federal Supermax prison in Florence, Colo., since his 2015 conviction.  Tsarnaev’s trial attorneys made repeated bids for a change of venue.  His appeal focuses on and echoes several familiar protests raised during his trial, chief among them the argument that he was a pawn of his domineering big brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev.

Among other things, the public defenders accuse Tsarnaev’s jury forewoman, a restaurant manager his attorneys tried to get removed, of retweeting a social media post calling the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth sophomore a “piece of garbage”  before she received a juror summons, but that she claimed during questioning for her suitability to serve she had not “commented on this case.”  A second juror, a male municipal worker, outright “disobeyed the Court’s instructions,” the brief asserts, by joining a Facebook discussion about the case before he was seated....

Tsarnaev’s appeal blames his 26-year-old brother for his involvement, calling Tamerlan “a killer, an angry and violent man” who “conceived and led this conspiracy.” And but for his influence, “Jahar would never have been on Boylston Street on Marathon Monday.

“Tsarnaev admitted heinous crimes,” the lawyers acknowledge, “but even so — perhaps especially so — this trial demanded scrupulous adherence to the requirements of the Constitution and federal law. Again and again this trial fell short.”

The Tsarnaevs detonated two homemade pressure-cooker bombs packed with shrapnel near the marathon finish line in Copley Square 12 seconds apart on April 15, 2013.  Three spectators were killed — 8-year-old Martin Richard of Dorchester, Krystle Campbell, 29, a restaurant manager from Medford, and Boston University graduate student Lingzi Lu, 23.  More than 260 other people were injured. Sixteen of them lost limbs in the blasts.  Three days later, the brothers shot and killed MIT Police Officer Sean Collier, 27, in his cruiser during an ambush on campus and failed attempt to steal his service weapon.

UPDATE: Thanks to a helpful tweet, I now see that the 500-page brief is available at this link. And there I noticed the final notable section starts this way:

XV. Under The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, This Court Should Vacate Tsarnaev’s Death Sentences Because He Was Only 19 Years Old At The Time Of The Crimes.

Tsarnaev was just 19 years old when he committed the crimes for which he was sentenced to death. According to now well-established brain science, and increasingly reflected by changing law around the country, the physical development of the brain and related behavioral maturation continues well through the late teens and early 20s. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and a recent resolution adopted by the American Bar Association, this Court should hold that those who commit their crimes as “emerging adults,” when they were under 21 years old, are categorically exempt from the death penalty.

December 27, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (6)

Wednesday, December 26, 2018

Another dive into the choppy waters of Miller and Montgomery implementation

I am sure I have posted any number of articles highlighting that implementation of the Eighth Amendment limit of juvenile life without parole sentences has been choppy at best (see here and here and here for a few more examples). The latest iteration of this depressingly evergreen story comes from Mother Jones here under the headline "The Supreme Court Said No More Life Without Parole for Kids. Why Is Antonio Espree One of the Few to Get Out of Prison?".  I recommend this long piece in full, and here is a taste:

As a result of [the Graham and Miller and Montgomery] decisions, the number of states banning life without parole for children in all cases, not just in mandatory sentencing schemes, has quadrupled since 2012. Of the more than 2,600 juvenile lifers in 2016, about 1,700 have been resentenced.

But although Justice Kennedy stated that all but the “rarest of juvenile offenders” should get a shot at parole, some prosecutors continue to argue that many do not deserve this benefit, or that they should serve years longer in prison before they can get out. So far, only 400 juvenile lifers nationwide have been freed.

In part, that’s because the Supreme Court gave states leeway to decide how to review lifers’ cases, leading to inconsistencies across the country. In Pennsylvania, home to the nation’s second-biggest juvenile lifer population, prosecutors are required to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt” that a defendant can never be rehabilitated if they want to deny the option of parole during resentencing; otherwise, the presumption is he should be given a second chance. So far, the state has released more than 150 juvenile lifers, many under the jurisdiction of Philadelphia’s District Attorney Larry Krasner, who campaigned last year on a platform of reducing mass incarceration.

But in Michigan, where 363 juvenile lifers were serving mandatory sentences in 2016, there is no such requirement, and prosecutors have argued that nearly two-thirds of juvenile lifers are those rarest offenders who should be kept in prison for good. “Justice in this country is largely based on where you live,” says Jody Kent Lavy, director of the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, an advocacy group.

Even Henry Montgomery, who won his Supreme Court case, isn’t free. In February, the Louisiana parole board rejected his request for release, arguing that he had not finished enough classes in prison.  His lawyers countered that he hadn’t been given much of a chance: For his first three decades at Louisiana’s notorious Angola prison, lifers like him were prohibited from taking classes. (About a third of juvenile lifers nationally say they have been denied access to prison educational programs.)  When the courses opened up, he was deemed ineligible to complete his GED.  A judge described him as a model inmate, but family members of the sheriff’s deputy he killed testified against him at the parole hearing.  So Montgomery, now 72 years old, was denied.  He’ll have to wait a year to reapply.

December 26, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 18, 2018

After hinting prison term might be in works, federal judge delays Michael Flynn sentencing to allow further cooperation

Given that both the Special Prosecutor and Michael Flynn were advocating for him to receive a sentence without any incarceration, I thought his sentencing today could have ended up being a staid affair.  But, as reported in this BuzzFeed News account, US District Judge Emmet Sullivan had different ideas: 

Michael Flynn, Trump's former national security adviser, decided to delay his sentencing on Tuesday after a judge harshly criticized him for lying to the FBI and acting as an unregistered agent for Turkey, and warned him that he might get a better sentence if he finished his cooperation with the government first.

It was a stunning turn of events two hours after what was supposed to be Flynn's sentencing hearing began. Throughout the proceedings, US District Judge Emmet Sullivan had repeatedly asked Flynn if he wanted to go ahead with sentencing, given his lawyers' comments about the conduct of the FBI agents who interviewed him and the fact that he might not be completely finished cooperating.

Flynn each time said he wished to proceed. But following a particularly harsh string of criticism from the judge about the crimes he'd committed, Flynn asked for a break to speak with his lawyers. When they returned, Flynn's lawyer Robert Kelner said they wanted to postpone sentencing to give Flynn time to complete his cooperation. The judge agreed. The parties are now due to file a report with the court on the status of his case by March 13.

Flynn's change of heat came after Sullivan warned him that he couldn't guarantee Flynn wouldn't get prison time, given the seriousness of his crimes. Sullivan noted that Flynn had lied to the FBI while serving as a senior official in the White House, and had acted as an unregistered agent for the Turkish government. (The judge initially implied that Flynn did work for Turkey while he was in the White House, but later said he misspoke; the prosecutor said Flynn's work for Turkey ended in November 2017.)

"Arguably, that undermines everything this flag over here stands for," Sullivan said, gesturing to an American flag displayed behind his chair. "Arguably you sold your country out." Sullivan continued: "I'm not hiding my disgust, my disdain for this criminal offense."

Flynn at that point took up the judge's offer of additional time to consult with his lawyers. Before the judge took a break, however, he asked special counsel prosecutor Brandon Van Grack if Flynn could have been charged with treason for his conversations with now-former Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak in December 2016, after then-president Barack Obama had entered sanctions against Russia for interfering in the election.

Van Grack replied that given the evidence prosecutors had, treason was not something that the government was considering charging Flynn with at the time. Sullivan pressed him, asking if they could have charged Flynn with that crime. Van Grack demurred, saying he was hesitant to answer that question because the offense was so serious.

After the recess, Sullivan said that he hadn't meant to imply that Flynn might have committed treason, he said he was just probing the extent of Flynn's offenses and "was just curious." Van Grack said the government had no reason to believe Flynn committed treason.

Flynn pleaded guilty on Dec. 1, 2017, to one count of making false statements. He admitted lying to FBI agents about his communications in December 2016 with Kislyak while he was serving on Trump's presidential transition team. (He was later accused of lying to Vice President Mike Pence about those contacts as well and resigned). Flynn agreed to cooperate with the government as part of his plea deal; over the past year, according to court filings, he's met with special counsel prosecutors and other Justice Department offices 19 times, for a total of nearly 63 hours.

Flynn was set to become the fifth person sentenced in connection with Mueller's investigation.

Earlier this week, President Donald Trump (in)famously called his former lawyer a "RAT" on Twitter based on his cooperation with federal prosecutors. I wonder if Michael Flynn might soon be getting the same moniker from the President of the United States.

Prior related posts:

December 18, 2018 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 17, 2018

Some of Senator Cotton's suspect claims in his latest case for amendments to the FIRST STEP Act

As noted in an update to this prior post, Senator Tom Cotton has this new National Review commentary making the case for his proposed amendments to the latest version of the FIRST STEP Act under the headline "Fix the First Step Act and Keep Violent Criminals behind Bars."  This commentary closes with a passage that troubled me, especially when I looked up the facts of the case he discusses.  Here is how Senator Cotton concludes (with a few details emphasized by me for further commentary):

So far the debate over First Step has been clouded by euphemism and abstraction, which has prevented the public from understanding what the bill actually does. A concrete example will help clarify the stakes. Richard Crawford is a former NASCAR driver who was convicted in August of trying to force a twelve-year-old girl to have sex with him. Crawford was sentenced to nearly 11 years in federal prison, but the statute he was convicted under does not appear in First Step’s “ineligible prisoners” list.  If the bill passes, he will therefore be eligible for time credits that would reduce his time in prison by up to one-third, or nearly four years.  At the end of his prison sentence he would be moved into pre-release custody or supervised release.  He would essentially be a free man.

Crawford’s sex crime was not obscure, low-level, or “victimless.”  Quite the opposite.  His crime had the potential to shatter a child’s life.  It was punished accordingly by a judge and a jury of his peers.  That is how criminal justice ought to work in America.  Now a group of politicians and activists are in a position to overturn that public judgment with the First Step Act.  Conservatives should resist this revolution.

The last few sentences of this passage initially troubled me because nothing in the FIRST STEP Act serves to "overturn" a jury conviction or even a sentencing term.  Rather, the FSA creates additional incentives, through "time credits," for offenders to engage in recidivism-reducing programs.  I think the FSA is popular because the "public judgment" is that it would generally be better for Crawford to be released in 2025 after having successfully engaged in this programming than to be released in 2028 without having made any effort to better himself.

But even more irksome to me is how Senator Cotton portrays his poster child, Richard Crawford, because it seems a bit much to say he tried "to force a twelve-year-old girl to have sex with him" given that he was convicted based on law enforcement posing as a man soliciting people to have sex with a fictitious 12-year-old.  This article about the case explains:

Crawford was accused of agreeing to pay $50-$75 to have sex with a 12-year-old girl, making arrangements with a man named Mike on Craigslist.  Mike and the 12-year-old girl were fictitious and used by law enforcement to catch Crawford in the act.  He responded to an undercover federal agent via e-mail and text between Feb. 10 and Feb. 28. According to the agent, Crawford texted him, “Love for her to be naked and ready,” and asked for photos of the girl.  Crawford was arrested at a location at which he agreed to meet “Mike” on March 1 by the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office and was indicted March 30.

Crawford claimed he agreed to the scenario because he didn’t believe it really involved a child.  His defense was detailed in a recent court filing, arguing against a lengthy sentence.  "Mr. Crawford testified that he thought 'Mike,' the person he was corresponding with, was engaging in a fantasy and that he agreed to participate," the filing read. "Mr. Crawford did not believe there would be a minor present; instead, he thought there would be an adult woman, presumably 'Mike's' wife or girlfriend, and that he and this woman would act the roles in 'Mike's' fantasy."

"Mr. Crawford consistently maintained that he had no intent to have sex with a minor, and if a minor had been present, he would not have had sex with the minor.”

A jury rejected Crawford's claims of innocence and convicted him of "attempted enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity."  But to say he tried to force a 12-year-old to have sex seems off since there never was an actual 12-year-old.  Indeed, I think it fair to call Crawford's crime "victimless," though the case really serves as a great indication of how hard it is to place accurate short-hand labels on various crimes (and how easy it is for Senator Cotton to make a crime sound worse than it was is using short-hand labels).  To allow Crawford, who is 60 years old and appears to have no criminal history, the chance to earn "time credits" by completing evidence-based programming to reduce his risk of recidivism seem to me sensible, not scary.  (And, as I understand matters, if a risk assessment procedure were to classify Crawford as "high-risk" he would not in fact get any sentence reductions.)

We will see in the coming days whether Senator Cotton gets his proposed amendments added to the FIRST STEP Act.  But if Richard Crawford is the worst version of Willie Horton that he can conjure up for the coming debate, I am not at all convinced there is any need to carve out still further exceptions to the prison reform provisions that seem well-conceived to try to reduce the recidivism risk of as many federal prisoners as possible.

Some of the most recent of many prior related posts:

December 17, 2018 in Aspects and impact of Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Friday, December 14, 2018

Federal judge frets about trend to conceal from public view information about cooperation sentencing credits

A helpful reader made sure I saw the work of US District Judge D. Brock Hornby published this week online in the ABA Journal discussing the history and recent trends in the federal system concerning defendants getting sentencing credit for cooperation and the pressure to disguise these realities due to concern about the threat of violence against cooperators in federal custody. My understanding is a longer version of this work with appear in the Spring 2019 print issue of Judicature, but the substance of his commentary can be seen now in these two spots under these headlines:

Here are a few paragraphs from each part of this work:

Defendants want their cooperation secret for their safety; prosecutors want it secret, so that defendants are not afraid to cooperate.  Many judges comply with these requests, and some districts have adopted standing orders to preserve cooperation secrecy.  But nationally, and sometimes even within individual districts, it is a patchwork quilt.

Today’s federal sentencing landscape includes courts where the courtroom is physically closed for any cooperation discussion; courts where the courtroom is not closed but any cooperation discussion occurs out of public hearing in chambers or at a private sidebar (some judges hold a pro forma sidebar even where there is no cooperation so that observers cannot infer cooperation from the sidebar); courts where everything is done in open court without sidebars; courts where the lawyers submit cooperation details under seal but the judge announces the sentencing rationale in open court; courts where transcripts of some or all of the above are sealed; courts where virtually nothing is sealed; courts where docket entries are structured so that outsiders cannot determine whether a defendant has cooperated; and probably other variations....

No federal judge wants to be responsible for the death or assault of a sentenced defendant who cooperated.  The judge has determined the offender’s punishment, and it does not include violence in prison.  But the judge’s role is limited.  The judge cannot determine the facility that the BOP will select for a particular defendant and the resulting risks. The judge cannot disguise the nature of the crime of conviction — for example, a crime such as child molesting that might provoke violence against the offender in prison.  The judge cannot ensure the adequacy of prison medical care.  These and other consequences are all outside the federal judiciary’s role.

What the judge can do — must do — is preserve the American public’s trust in the integrity and transparency of the federal judicial system.  Americans are entitled to know the role that cooperation plays in federal criminal law and sentencing.  If the threat of violence deters some defendants from cooperating, then the Justice Department must deal with that consequence in evaluating how it prosecutes cases, or it must find the resources and the way to help the BOP do its job of making prisoners — including cooperating prisoners — safe.

At the end of the day, encouraging or discouraging cooperation is not the business of federal judges.  That is the executive branch’s role.  Judges constitute an independent branch of government with distinctive responsibilities.  Our charge is to sentence convicted defendants fairly, based on all the facts and circumstances and the law, and to explain as clearly as possible to the public, the defendant and the victims how we reach the sentence we pronounce.

As some of us say, a sentencing proceeding is a community morality play in which society’s values are publicly applied and affirmed.  We should not let the violence of prisoners — even a violence that the BOP apparently cannot control — drive federal sentencing underground.

December 14, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, December 13, 2018

US Sentencing Commission published proposed amendment, including a big change to determining a "crime of violence"

As reported in this press release, the "United States Sentencing Commission voted today to publish for comment proposed amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines, including a proposal concerning how sentencing courts determine if a prior conviction is a “crime of violence” under the guidelines."  Here is more:

At a public meeting, Circuit Judge William H. Pryor Jr., the Acting Chair of the Commission remarked, “The ‘crime of violence’ definition continues to cause extensive litigation with inconsistent sentencing outcomes, often resulting in offenders whose conduct is obviously violent in nature failing to qualify for sentencing enhancements. These results are particularly troublesome given the risk to public safety posed by violent offenders.”

The sentencing guidelines provide increased penalties for offenders with a prior conviction that is a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense” (e.g., the career offender guideline). Under the guidelines, the sentencing court must determine whether a prior conviction falls into either of those categories. Circuit caselaw currently limits the sentencing court’s analysis of the prior conviction to the elements of the statute of conviction (referred to as the “categorical approach”), without any consideration of the defendant’s actual conduct in the offense. Today’s proposed amendment would enable the sentencing courts to consider the conduct that formed the basis of the offense of conviction as well as the elements of the statute of conviction. The Commission is requesting input on this proposal and the appropriate sources of information the courts might use to ensure that clear and reliable evidence of prior violent conduct is accounted for at sentencing.

The Commission also published a proposal to clarify the definition of certain enumerated offenses and provide clearer guidance how to treat inchoate offenses in determining whether an offense is a crime of violence.  The proposed amendment addresses specific application issues and general concerns raised by the Department of Justice in their August 2018 annual letter to the Commission.

The Commission is finalizing a study in which it found that violent federal offenders recidivate much more often, more quickly, and commit more serious offenses than non-violent federal offenders.  The Commission expects to publish its full findings and other reports on revocations and mandatory minimum penalties in early 2019 (view related studies).

Acting Chair Pryor also provided an update at the meeting on the Commission’s top priority this amendment cycle — examining the current federal sentencing system and operation of .... the guidelines.  In the coming weeks, the Commission will release a report comparing federal judges’ sentencing practices within 30 major metropolitan U.S. cities.  “These findings raise important questions about the advisory guidelines system. We need to study and consider new approaches that more adequately achieve the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act—including the goal of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity — within the constitutional parameters set forth by the Supreme Court in Booker,” stated Acting Chair Pryor.

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Koons v. United States and recent circuit conflicts, the Commission also proposed revisions to how retroactive sentence reductions are determined when mandatory minimum penalties are present in the case. The Commission also published several proposed amendments responding to recently enacted legislation.

These proposed amendment could prove to be quite consequential if they become actual amendments, but the press release further explains why the USSC may not have a quorum to start the new year and will need to have new confirmed members quickly to be able to complete  official business (my emphasis added):

Today’s public meeting gave the current commissioners the opportunity to work together for the last time, as the terms of Acting Chair Pryor and Commissioner Rachel E. Barkow expire at the end of the 115th Congress.  “I have had the privilege of working alongside Commissioner Barkow since she was confirmed by the Senate five years ago. Her steadfast commitment to fair sentencing and quick ability to process sentencing data served the Commission and the public well,” said Acting Chair Pryor.  “She has made substantial contributions to the work of the Commission.  I will miss her.”

Acting Chair Pryor also thanked the advisory group members whose terms are expiring, including Ronald Levine, Chair of the Practitioners Advisory Group and T. Michael Andrews, Chair of the Victims Advisory Group.

As the terms of Acting Chair Pryor and Commissioner Barkow expire, two voting commissioners will continue to serve terms (Senior District Judge Charles R. Breyer and District Judge Danny C. Reeves).  The Commission must have at least four voting commissioners for a quorum. At least three of the commissioners must be federal judges and no more than four may belong to the same political party.  Commissioner Patricia K. Cushwa (ex officio, U.S. Parole Commission), and Commissioner David Rybicki (ex officio, U.S. Department of Justice) serve as non-voting members.

December 13, 2018 in Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Booker in district courts, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 11, 2018

Any recommendations or predictions for Michael Cohen's upcoming sentencing?

Prez Trump's former lawyer, Michael Cohen, is scheduled to be sentenced by US District Judge William Pauley in New York City on December 12 after his guilty plea to charges including campaign finance fraud and lying to Congress.  As detailed in prior posts linked below, Cohen is asking for "time served," while federal prosecutors seek a "substantial term of imprisonment" of around 3.5 years.  This lengthy CNN commentary by Elie Honig, headlined "Why sentencing judge may not show Cohen 'mercy'," predicts that prosecutors are more likely to be happy with the outcome than Cohen.  Here are excerpts:

First, what sentence is Judge William Pauley likely to impose? I've appeared in front of Judge Pauley in many cases. He is fair but tough. Lawyers and defendants often find him intimidating. He has administered tongue-lashings to many prosecutors (yes, including me), defense attorneys and litigants. He has a serious, formal demeanor on the bench....

In my experience, Judge Pauley is a stern sentencer, particularly where the defendant has exploited a position of authority and acted out of greed or arrogance. The SDNY prosecutors, clearly aware of this tendency, noted in its sentencing memo last week that Cohen, "an attorney and businessman ... was motivated to do so [commit crimes] by personal greed, and repeatedly used his power and influence for deceptive ends."

Judge Pauley can show mercy to a truly unfortunate or disadvantaged defendant, but he does not usually take kindly to abuse of power. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, the SDNY argues that Cohen faces a sentencing range of 51 to 63 months.  The federal guidelines are based on a chart: one axis reflects the defendant's prior criminal history (for Cohen, none) while the other reflects the seriousness of the offenses (for Cohen, fairly serious -- offense level 24 out of a maximum of 43).  The range is not binding but it is important. Judge Pauley must consider the range, but he can sentence within, above or below it at his discretion....

Judge Pauley likely will give Cohen some credit for providing useful information to Mueller, but almost certainly won't let Cohen walk, given the SDNY's tepid support for only a modest reduction....

The big question then is whether Cohen will continue cooperating after sentencing. Cohen vows in his sentencing memo that he will. However, once he has been sentenced, his incentive to cooperate diminishes.

There is a mechanism in the federal rules -- Rule 35 -- that permits the prosecutor to ask the judge for a reduced sentence if the defendant provides valuable cooperation after his original sentence was imposed. If Cohen receives a sentence that he simply cannot bear, he will be highly motivated to continue providing assistance to Mueller, and perhaps to come clean on previously undisclosed topics, in hopes of earning an eventual Rule 35 motion.  Paradoxically then, the more time Cohen gets on Wednesday, the more likely he may be to cooperate fully with Mueller as the investigation builds to a crescendo.

The stakes on Wednesday undoubtedly will be high for Cohen and for his ability and incentive to cooperate moving forward.  Cohen's future cooperation, in turn, will affect Mueller's ability to penetrate into the heart of corruption in the Trump campaign and the White House.

In a discussion with a member of the media, I predicted that Cohen would get a sentence in the 2.5 to 3 year range. I am incline to stick with that prediction for now, though I would like to hear reader predictions of what they Judge Pauley will do at sentencing or even recommendations as to what they think Judge Pauley should do at sentencing.

Prior related posts:

December 11, 2018 in Booker in district courts, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

"Charlottesville Jury Recommends 419 Years Plus Life For Neo-Nazi Who Killed Protester"

The title of this post is the headline of this NPR piece reporting on a high-profile jury sentencing verdict this afternoon.  Here are the details:

The 21-year-old avowed neo-Nazi who murdered a woman when he plowed his car into a crowd of counterprotesters last year at a white nationalist rally in Charlottesville, Va., will likely spend the rest of his life in prison.

A jury in Charlottesville said Tuesday that James Alex Fields Jr. should be sentenced to life plus 419 years in prison and $480,000 in fines, for killing Heather Heyer and seriously injuring 35 others.

Judge Richard Moore will decide whether to sign off on the recommended sentence at a hearing on March 29.

The life sentence was in response to Fields' first-degree murder conviction. The jury arrived at 419 additional years, The Associated Press reports, by recommending "70 years for each of five malicious wounding charges, 20 for each of three malicious wounding charges, and nine years on one charge of leaving the scene of an accident."

A day earlier, jurors heard emotional testimony from Heyer's mother, Susan Bro, and from several victims struck by Fields on Aug. 12, 2017, during the Unite the Right rally that weekend. "Heather was full of love, justice and fairness," Bro said, according to the Richmond Times-Dispatch. "Mr. Fields tried to silence her. ... I refuse to let him."

Bro also told the jury that she does not hate Fields for killing her daughter, a loss she described as an "explosion" that has blown up her family.

Meanwhile, Fields' attorneys asked the jury to consider their client's mental state on the day of the murder. A psychologist "testified that Fields was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizoid personality disorder at the ages of 6 and 14, respectively," the Times-Dispatch reported....

Fields also faces federal hate crime charges, which allow for the death penalty.

I think it at once silly and telling when defendants are facing or are given sentences that are much longer than the United States has been a country. And here, of course, Fields will have to be in prison until the year 2437 and then face a life sentence!

Jokes aside, the interesting questions now are (1) whether the Virginia judge will adopt the jury's sentencing recommendation, and (2) whether federal prosecutors will still be eager to pursue federal charges to possibly seek a death sentence for Fields.

Prior related post:

December 11, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, December 10, 2018

SCOTUS rules unanimously that ACCA predicates can include all sorts of burglary

The Supreme Court this morning handed down its first full sentencing opinion of the Term, and the opinion in yet another Armed Career Criminal Act dispute over statutory interpretation is not all that interesting or all that surprising.  Justice Breyer wrote a short opinion for a unanimous court in US v. Stitt, No. 17-765 (S. Ct. Dec. 10, 2018) (available here), and it gets started this way:

The Armed Career Criminal Act requires a federal sentencing judge to impose upon certain persons convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm a 15-year minimum prison term.  The judge is to impose that special sentence if the offender also has three prior convictions for certain violent or drug-related crimes.  18 U. S. C. §924(e).  Those prior convictions include convictions for “burglary.” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  And the question here is whether the statutory term “burglary” includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.  We hold that it does.

And here are a few paragraphs from the opinion's substantive discussion:

The word “burglary,” like the word “crime” itself, is ambiguous.  It might refer to a kind of crime, a generic crime, as set forth in a statute (“a burglary consists of behavior that . . . ”), or it might refer to the way in which an individual offender acted on a particular occasion (“on January 25, Jones committed a burglary on Oak Street in South San Francisco”).  We have held that the words in the Armed Career Criminal Act do the first.  Accordingly, we have held that the Act requires us to evaluate a prior state conviction “in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion.”  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008). A prior state conviction, we have said, does not qualify as generic burglary under the Act where “the elements of [the relevant state statute] are broader than those of generic burglary.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 19).  The case in which we first adopted this “categorical approach” is Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575 (1990).  That case, which specifically considered the statutory term “burglary,” governs here and determines the outcome.

In Taylor, we did more than hold that the word “burglary” refers to a kind of generic crime rather than to the defendant’s behavior on a particular occasion.  We also explained, after examining the Act’s history and purpose, that Congress intended a “uniform definition of burglary [to] be applied to all cases in which the Government seeks” an enhanced sentence under the Act.  Id., at 580–592.  We held that this uniform definition includes “at least the ‘classic’ common-law definition,” namely, breaking and entering a dwelling at night with intent to commit a felony.  Id., at 593.  But we added that it must include more.  The classic definition, by excluding all places other than dwellings, we said, has “little relevance to modern law enforcement concerns.” Ibid. Perhaps for that reason, by the time the Act was passed in 1986, most States had expanded the meaning of burglary to include “structures other than dwellings.” Ibid. (citing W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §§8.13(a)–(f) (1986)).

For a small number of federal defendants facing ACCA's long mandatory minimum based on a quirky prior crime, this ruling is very important and consequential.  For others, not much too see here.

December 10, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, December 05, 2018

Sentencing Project launches campaign to "End Life Imprisonment" with new book and other resources

Meaning_of_life_finalThe folks at The Sentencing Project this week officially kicked off what they are calling here a "Campaign to End Life Imprisonment." The website for the campaign has a facts, figures and stories about life imprisonment, and this four-page fact sheet has lots of data and graphs and includes these particulars:

While people of color are over-represented in prisons and jails; this disparity is even more evident among those sentenced to life imprisonment, where one of every five African American prisoners is serving a life sentence.

Over 6,000 women are serving life or virtual life sentences. The number of women serving life sentences has risen at a faster rate than for men in recent years. Between 2008 and 2016, women lifers increased by 20%, compared to a 15% increase for men.

Juveniles serve life sentences at alarming rates as well. In fact, the U.S. is unique in the world in its use of life imprisonment without parole for crimes committed by teenagers.

In addition to the more than 2,000 people serving life without the possibility of parole, there are more than 7,000 juveniles serving life with parole and another 2,000 serving “virtual life” prison terms of 50 years or more.

In conjunction with this launch, the New Press has published this new book authored by Marc Mauer and Ashley Nellis, with contributions by Kerry Myers, titled "The Meaning of Life: The Case for Abolishing Life Sentences." Here is how the publisher's website describes the book:

Most Western democracies have few or no people serving life sentences, yet here in the United States more than 200,000 people are sentenced to such prison terms.

Marc Mauer and Ashley Nellis of The Sentencing Project argue that there is no practical or moral justification for a sentence longer than twenty years.  Harsher sentences have been shown to have little effect on crime rates, since people “age out” of crime — meaning that we’re spending a fortune on geriatric care for older prisoners who pose little threat to public safety.  Extreme punishment for serious crime also has an inflationary effect on sentences across the spectrum, helping to account for severe mandatory minimums and other harsh punishments.

A thoughtful and stirring call to action, The Meaning of Life also features moving profiles of a half dozen people affected by life sentences, written by former “lifer” and award-winning writer Kerry Myers.  The book will tie in to a campaign spearheaded by The Sentencing Project and offers a much-needed road map to a more humane criminal justice system.

December 5, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, December 04, 2018

Special Counsel says non-incarceration sentence for Michael Flynn is "is appropriate and warranted"

As reported in this Politico article, headlined "Mueller: Flynn gave ‘substantial assistance’ to probe, recommends little to no prison," the Special Counsel tonight submitted a memorandum in aid of sentencing defendant Michael Flynn. Here are the basics:

Michael Flynn, President Donald Trump’s former national security adviser, provided “substantial assistance” to the ongoing investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 election and should be sentenced to little if any prison time for making two “series of false statements” to the FBI, special counsel Robert Mueller's team recommended in a court filing on Tuesday.

Flynn participated in 19 interviews with the special counsel and other Justice Department prosecutors and aided multiple investigations, Mueller’s prosecutors said in a heavily redacted filing that offered limited insight into the information Flynn provided.

“The defendant deserves credit for accepting responsibility in a timely fashion and substantially assisting the government,” Mueller’s team wrote in a seven-page memo. MO “The defendant provided firsthand information about the content and context of interactions between the transition team and the Russian government,” prosecutors add later. “Additionally, the defendant’s decision to plead guilty and cooperate likely affected the decisions of related firsthand witnesses to be forthcoming with the [special counsel] and cooperate,” they write.

U.S. District Court Judge Emmet Sullivan, a Bill Clinton appointee, is scheduled to sentence Flynn on Dec. 18. Before that, Flynn’s lawyers have their own Dec. 11 deadline to file a memo describing his cooperation and outlining whatever other factors they think the judge should consider in handing down the sentence.

The full filing is available at this link, and it begins this way:

The United States of America, by and through Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, respectfully submits this memorandum in aid of sentencing defendant Michael T. Flynn.  On December 1, 2017, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of making materially false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).  As calculated by the United States Probation Office, the defendant’s applicable Total Offense Level is 4, Criminal History Category I, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 0-6 months.  That offense level and guideline range, however, do not account for a downward departure pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines reflecting the defendant’s substantial assistance to the government, which the government has moved for contemporaneously.  Given the defendant’s substantial assistance and other considerations set forth below, a sentence at the low end of the guideline range — including a sentence that does not impose a term of incarceration — is appropriate and warranted.

Prior related post (from Dec. 1, 2017):

December 4, 2018 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Tipping Point: A Majority Of States Abandon Life-Without-Parole Sentences For Children"

The title of this post is the title of this new document from the The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth. Here is its executive summary:

A majority of states now ban life without parole for children or have no one serving the sentence.  A combination of judicial decisions and state legislative reforms have reduced the number of individuals serving by 60 percent in just three years, and that number continues to decline.  Today, approximately 1,100 people are serving life without parole for crimes committed as children.

For the approximately 1,700 individuals whose life-without-parole sentences have been altered through legislative reform or judicial resentencing to date, the median sentence nationwide is 25 years before parole or release eligibility.  Nearly 400 people previously sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as children have been released from prison to date.  Despite national momentum rejecting life-without-parole sentences for children, racial disparities continue to worsen; of new cases tried since 2012, approximately 72 percent of children sentenced to life without parole have been Black — as compared to approximately 61 percent before 2012.

December 4, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 03, 2018

Renewed talk in Ohio of exempting those with "serious mental illness" from the death penalty

As reported in this local article, headlined "Should those with serious mental illnesses be exempt from the death penalty in Ohio?," there is renewed discussion in the Buckeye State of a task force proposal to carve out an exception to the death penalty for those with "serious mental illness." Here are the details:

If Ohio is going to execute convicted murderers, it shouldn't execute individuals with serious mental illnesses, a bipartisan group of lawmakers says.

That is the aim of House Bill 81 [available here], which would prohibit capital punishment for anyone with a clinical diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder or delusional disorder.  The proposal has stalled for years in the Ohio House but could advance this week for the first time after gaining support from a handful of Republicans....

If a judge or jury finds the person was impaired at the time of the murder, the defendant could not be sentenced to death.  They could still face life in prison.  The idea came from a 2014 task force of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and academics who recommended several changes to Ohio's death penalty.  It builds on U.S. Supreme Court decisions.

The bill, sponsored by Republican Rep. Bill Seitz of Green Township and Democratic Rep. Nickie J. Antonio of Lakewood, has bipartisan support. Groups such as the National Alliance on Mental Illness of Ohio and Ohio Psychiatric Physicians Association agree that certain people shouldn't face the death penalty. “If we are going to have a death penalty, it should be reserved only for those who are the worst of the worst, not for those who are suffering from impaired judgment due to a severe mental illness," said Richard Cline, chief counsel with Ohio Public Defender's death penalty department, during a Nov. 27 hearing.

Convicted killers could be exempt from the death penalty even if they are found competent to stand trial and don't meet the standards for being found not guilty by reason of insanity.

Prosecutors and some GOP lawmakers aren't convinced that the changes are needed. Under the bill, those already on death row could ask a judge to take another look at their mental state at the time of the offense and possibly have their death sentence vacated.

Some worry that every inmate on death row would claim some mental illness to escape execution. “It would be a substantial miscarriage of justice for someone convicted and sentenced to death years ago to be able to now claim that they had a serious mental illness at the time and should, therefore, be excluded from the death penalty,” said Lou Tobin, executive director of the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

Opposition from prosecutors has stalled the proposal once before. Still, the bill could get a vote in committee Tuesday. From there, the proposed law would need approval from the Ohio House and Ohio Senate before heading to Gov. John Kasich. The Legislature has only a handful of sessions remaining.

December 3, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, December 02, 2018

En banc Fifth Circuit overrules multiple precedents to clean up (and expand) its "crime of violence" jurisprudence

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss a remarkable en banc opinion handed down by the Fifth Circuit on Friday in US v. Reyes-Contreras, No. 16-41218 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2018) (available here).  Regular readers may recall that I suggested in this post that it might feel like dropping through Dante's various levels of hell when seeking to sort through intricate precedents to figure out what is and what is not a "violent felony" or a "crime of violence" for federal sentencing purposes.  There is a hellish-landscape quality to the 30+ pages of Reyes-Contreras, but the start and close of the opinion hints at how the en banc Fifth Circuit is doing its level best to escape (with footnotes omitted):

Fredis Reyes-Contreras pleaded guilty of illegal reentry.  Because he had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter in Missouri, the district court applied a sentencing enhancement for a crime of violence (“COV”).  Well represented by the Federal Public Defender, Reyes-Contreras appealed to challenge the enhancement.  Burdened by binding caselaw that required us to declare that killing a person with a baseball bat is not a COV, the panel vacated for resentencing.  The court granted the government’s petition for rehearing en banc, thus vacating the panel opinion.  Finding it necessary to overrule several of our precedents, we now affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence....

It is high time for this court to take a mulligan on COVs.  The well-intentioned experiment that launched fifteen years ago has crashed and burned.  By requiring sentencing courts and this court to ignore the specifics of prior convictions well beyond what the categorical approach and Supreme Court precedent instruct, our jurisprudence has proven unworkable and unwise.  By employing the term “crime of violence,” Congress and the U.S. Sentencing Commission obviously meant to implement a policy of penalizing felons for past crimes that are, by any reasonable reckoning, “violent,” hence the term.

As with many legal standards, decisions are difficult at the margins.  But this case is nowhere near the margin.  Except as otherwise directed by the Supreme Court, sentencing should not turn on “reality-defying distinctions.” United States v. Verwiebe, 874 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 63 (2018).  The interests of justice and Congress’s commands are not served by the absurd conclusion that intentionally killing with a baseball bat, and intentionally ramming a vehicle into a car containing a child, are not COVs.  A more realistic approach comports with reason and common sense. 

In sum, we hold that MISSOURI REVISED STATUTES § 565.023.1 is divisible. Using the modified categorical approach, Reyes-Contreras was convicted under Subdivision (1), which is generic manslaughter, a COV.  In the alternative, even if Section 565.023.1 were not divisible, we hold that the statute as a whole is a COV because Subdivision (2) satisfies the use-of-force requirement and thus is independently a COV.

In finding “use of force” for purposes of identifying COVs, the distinction between direct and indirect force is abolished.  Likewise for the now-repudiated distinction between causing injury and using direct force. We show that the Missouri assisted-suicide statute satisfies the use-of-force requirement.  And we hold that, even if it did not, there is not the realistic probability of enforcement.

The holdings just announced, true to Supreme Court precedent, are in conflict with numerous panel and en banc decisions of this court. We therefore overrule, in whole or in part, as explained herein, the following [18] decisions and their progeny....  Reyes-Contreras’s conviction of voluntary manslaughter under MISSOURI REVISED STATUTES § 565.023.1 is a crime of violence that calls for a sixteen-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).  The judgment of conviction and sentence is AFFIRMED.

December 2, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, November 27, 2018

New York Court of Appeals rules noncitizen defendants have Sixth Amendment jury trial right when charges carry potential penalty of deportation

The top court in New York issued an interesting opinion today concerning the application of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right, as reported here via Courthouse News Service: 

Since noncitizens can be deported after convictions on mere misdemeanors, they are entitled to have those charges decided in jury trials, New York’s highest court ruled 5-2 Tuesday.

The ruling stems from the 2012 prosecution of Saylor Suazo with numerous assault and harassment crimes.  Suazo, who remained in the United States illegally after his visa expired, was accused of throwing the mother of his children to the floor, and then choking and beating her.  A month later he was charged with criminal contempt after he violated a restraining order.

Before trial, prosecutors had the charges reduced to class-B misdemeanors, which are usually punishable by 90-day maximum sentences and qualify as petty crimes that can be tried summarily without a jury.  Suazo nevertheless could face deportation proceedings if convicted, but the trial judge disagreed that this entitled him to a jury trial.

After the bench trial concluded in 2012, Suazo was found guilty of the assault charge, as well as menacing, obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, and attempted criminal contempt.  A three-judge appellate panel affirmed the judgment, finding that deportation is a collateral consequence of conviction, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed 5-2 on Tuesday.

Writing for the majority, Judge Leslie Stein called it technically correct that deportation is a civil collateral consequence of a state conviction.  She also noted, however, that deportation is practically inevitable when noncitizens face even class-B misdemeanors.  “Detention — which closely resembles criminal incarceration — may last several days, or it may last months or years,” Stein wrote.  “A noncitizen who is adjudicated deportable may first face additional detention, followed by the often-greater toll of separation from friends, family, home, and livelihood by actual forced removal from the country and return to a land to which that person may have no significant ties,” the 22-page opinion continues....

Judges Michael Garcia and Rowan Wilson dissented separately from the majority.  In his dissent, Garcia wrote that the threat of deportation does not automatically transport petty crimes into serious ones covered by the Sixth Amendment, and that the U.S. Supreme Court must weigh in on the issue.  Garcia also noted the majority’s ruling carves out special treatment for deportation and could also lead to a right to jury trials in other class-B misdemeanor cases, such as those that result in the loss of public housing....

Attorney Mark Zeno of the Center for Appellate Litigation, who represented Suazo, praised the ruling and noted that the D.C. Circuit also has upheld the right to jury trials for noncitizens facing deportation.

A spokeswoman for the Bronx District Attorney Office meanwhile said that the ruling conflicts with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  “We understand that while the Court of Appeals addresses the harsh realities presented by the possible consequence of deportation for noncitizens, its decision presents conflicts with existing Supreme Court precedent that must be resolved,” the spokeswoman said in a statement.  “This decision creates ramifications, including serious backlogs and disparities in the administration of justice, for the courts of this state.  We are considering taking the case to the Supreme Court to address the crucial questions this decision presents.”

November 27, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 26, 2018

Special counsel saying Paul Manafort is breaching his plea agreement by lying "on a variety of subject matters"

As reported in this ABC News piece, "Prosecutors with special counsel Robert Mueller’s legal team told a judge Monday night that President Donald Trump’s one-time campaign chairman Paul Manafort has breached his cooperation agreement and lied to investigators." Here is more about the latest trouble for Manafort, which became public via this filing:

“After signing the plea agreement, Manafort committed federal crimes by lying to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Special Counsel’s Office on a variety of subject matters, which constitute breaches of the agreement,” the filings says.

Manafort’s legal team has disputed that charge, telling a federal judge that the embattled former Trump adviser “believes he has provided truthful information and does not agree with the government’s characterization or that he has breached the agreement.”

The DC court filing brings to a head weeks of speculation that Manafort’ s cooperation with the special counsel could be breaking down. Earlier this month, there were mounting tensions between Mueller and Manafort over Manafort’ s apparent lack of cooperation with the investigation, multiple sources familiar with the matter told ABC News. 

Manafort had been fielding questions about a wide range of topics since September when he initially agreed to cooperate, the sources said. But special counsel prosecutors were “not getting what they want,” one source with knowledge of the discussions said.

As noted in this post from September, Manafort's plea deal seemed to cap his sentencing exposure at 10 years despite a calculated guideline sentencing range much higher. This latest filing does not ensure that the feds will now seek or secure a sentence higher than 10 years for Manafort, but it certainly suggests that the special counsel office will object strongly to Manafort's likely arguments for a much lower sentence.

Some prior related posts:

November 26, 2018 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, November 25, 2018

"Paroling elderly inmates is humane solution to costly mass incarceration"

The title of this post is the headline of this new Hill commentary authored by Marc Schindler. Here are excerpts:

[G]rowth in long prison sentences has done little to improve public safety, with states that have reduced incarceration levels experiencing larger drops in crime than states that continue to incarcerate people at very high rates.  But it has contributed to a rapidly expanding population of incarcerated elderly people, so that our prisons now essentially function as expensive yet inhumane nursing homes.  In 1993, there were 45,000 incarcerated individuals over 50 years old; with the continuous growth, it is estimated that number will reach 400,000 by 2030.

For policymakers to significantly reduce the growing and costly prison population, strategies must include reform to long sentences for violent crimes.  Focusing reforms on reducing incarceration of geriatric people is an effective way to safely reduce the prison population.  Research indicates they are the least likely to pose a risk to public safety; criminal behavior typically peaks at 17 years old and then drops as an individual develops into adulthood.  While many states, such as California, Texas and New York, have expanded geriatric parole eligibility, it is infrequently used.

A naturally-occurring experiment, just a few miles from the nation’s capital, provides a roadmap for this strategy to safely reduce incarceration, create a more humane justice system and save significant taxpayer dollars.  A landmark court ruling — Unger v. Maryland — and the opportunities it created, offer powerful lessons for policymakers and stakeholders in tackling mass incarceration.  The 2012 case, centered on remedying improper jury instructions, applied to a cohort of 235 people sentenced prior to 1981.  In the six years since the decision, 188 people have been released; at release, the average age of the Ungers was 64, and the average term served was 40 years....

In the six years since the decision, we have learned a number of important lessons, the most significant of which is that the Unger experience proves we can safely release people who have committed a serious, violent offense.  And since they’ve been home, the Ungers have been contributing to their communities; as volunteers and mentors they help keep us all safer by encouraging youths to avoid the mistakes they made when they were younger.

One of the things that make the Ungers unique is that, thanks to an investment by the Open Society Institute-Baltimore, they received specialized reentry programming before and after release.  With that individualized support, the Ungers have had a less than 3 percent recidivism rate, a fraction of the Maryland rate of 40 percent.  This support is a significant advance over what most people receive and should be a model for governments across the country to replicate.

The Ungers were primarily convicted of homicide and rape, yet they have safely returned to the community. Too often we fail to take into consideration a research-based assessment of the risk of reoffending when making release decisions.  It is time to reconsider parole policies and assessment tools that disregard rehabilitation and continue to keep people locked up based solely on the severity of their underlying offense.

Imposing extremely long sentences, alongside low rates of parole, serves political motivations, not increased public safety.  By pivoting away from a parole approach focused solely on the crime committed, to one that assesses the current risk of re-offending and provides tailored re-entry services, states can safely reduce their prison population, save taxpayer money and create a fairer and more effective justice system in the process.  There are hundreds of thousands of geriatric-aged individuals in prisons across the country, many with the same profile as the Ungers.  Maryland alone could save over $100 million in the first year by reducing its low-risk geriatric population.

This commentary builds off this recent report by the Justice Policy Institute titled "The Ungers, 5 Years and Counting: A Case Study in Safely Reducing Long Prison Terms and Saving Taxpayer Dollars."

November 25, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, November 21, 2018

Investigation of BOP treatment of mental health issues highlights challenge of reforming federal prisons

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss this new Marshall Project report headlined "Treatment Denied: The Mental Health Crisis in Federal Prisons." Among other important messages, this story highlights that formal prison reforms in legislation like the FIRST STEP Act have to be followed by functional work by prison officials in order to be fully efficacious.  Here are excerpts from this story:

In 2014, amid mounting criticism and legal pressure, the Federal Bureau of Prisons imposed a new policy promising better care and oversight for inmates with mental-health issues. But data obtained by The Marshall Project through a Freedom of Information Act request shows that instead of expanding treatment, the bureau has lowered the number of inmates designated for higher care levels by more than 35 percent.  Increasingly, prison staff are determining that prisoners — some with long histories of psychiatric problems — don’t require any routine care at all.

As of February, the Bureau of Prisons classified just 3 percent of inmates as having a mental illness serious enough to require regular treatment.  By comparison, more than 30 percent of those incarcerated in California state prisons receive care for a “serious mental disorder.”  In New York, 21 percent of inmates are on the mental-health caseload. Texas prisons provide treatment for roughly 20 percent.

A review of court documents and inmates’ medical records, along with interviews of former prison psychologists, revealed that although the Bureau of Prisons changed its rules, officials did not add the resources needed to implement them, creating an incentive for employees to downgrade inmates to lower care levels.

In an email, the bureau confirmed that mental-health staffing has not increased since the policy took effect.  The bureau responded to questions from a public information office email account and declined to identify any spokesperson for this article.  “You doubled the workload and kept the resources the same. You don’t have to be Einstein to see how that’s going to work,” said a former Bureau of Prisons psychologist who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of a pending lawsuit regarding his time at the agency.

The bureau said it is “developing a strategy” to analyze this drop in mental-health care, consistent with a Justice Department inspector general’s recommendation last year. Although only a small fraction of federal inmates are deemed ill enough to merit regular therapy, officials acknowledged that 23 percent have been diagnosed with some mental illness....

Data analyzed by The Marshall Project shows that the average monthly rate of assault across all federal prisons increased 16 percent from 2015 to 2016, the last full year available. Most of those incidents were not classified as serious assaults — defined by the bureau as likely to cause death or serious injury — which have declined in recent years, even before the mental-health policy change in 2014. In several recent in-prison homicides, records suggest that either the alleged attacker or victim wasn’t getting needed treatment....

At the high-security Hazelton penitentiary, which saw one of the largest drops in mental-health care, the average monthly rate of assault rose from 29 per 5,000 inmates in 2015 to 40 in 2016.  The increase in the rate of serious assault was particularly dramatic, more than quadrupling in that time period. The head of the correctional officers union there has attributed the increase in the rate of assault to guard understaffing.  Violence at Hazelton made headlines this fall when infamous mob boss James “Whitey” Bulger was killed soon after being transferred to the facility.

A reader made this astute observation when flagging this article for me via email: "This article could be useful in an appropriate federal sentencing to argue for mental health treatment outside of BOP, or as mitigation in a BOP homicide case."

November 21, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, November 17, 2018

"Evaluating Intellectual Disability: Clinical Assessments in Atkins Cases"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by James Ellis, Caroline Everington and Ann Delpha. Here is its abstract

The intersection of intellectual disability and the death penalty is now clearly established.  Both under the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions and under the terms of many state statutes, individual defendants who have that disability cannot be sentenced to death or executed.  It now falls to trial, appellate, and post-conviction courts to determine which individual criminal defendants are entitled to the law’s protection.

This Article attempts to assist judges in performing that task.  After a brief discussion of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Atkins v. Virginia, Hall v. Florida, and Moore v. Texas, it analyzes the component parts and terminology of the clinical definition of intellectual disability.  It then offers more detailed discussion of a number of the clinical issues that arise frequently in adjudicating these cases.  For each of these issues, the Article’s text and the accompanying notes attempt to provide judges with a thorough survey of the relevant clinical literature, and an explanation of the terminology used by clinical professionals.  Our purpose is to help those judges to become more knowledgeable consumers of the clinical reports and expert testimony presented to them in individual cases, and to help them reach decisions that are consistent with what the clinical literature reveals about the nature of intellectual disability and best professional practices in the diagnostic process. 

November 17, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, November 13, 2018

"Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018"

Pie_2018_womenThe Prison Policy Initiative has today posted an updated version of its remarkable incarceration "pie" graphic and associated report on the particulars of who and how women are incarcerated in the United States.  Here is part of the report's introductory text and subsequent discussion:

With growing public attention to the problem of mass incarceration, people want to know about women’s experience with incarceration.  How many women are held in prisons, jails, and other correctional facilities in the United States?  And why are they there?  How is their experience different from men’s?  While these are important questions, finding those answers requires not only disentangling the country’s decentralized and overlapping criminal justice systems, but also unearthing the frustratingly hard to find and often altogether missing data on gender.

This report provides a detailed view of the 219,000 women incarcerated in the United States, and how they fit into the even broader picture of correctional control.  This 2018 update to our inaugural Women’s Whole Pie report pulls together data from a number of government agencies and calculates the breakdown of women held by each correctional system by specific offense.  The report, produced in collaboration with the ACLU’s Campaign for Smart Justice, answers the questions of why and where women are locked up:

In stark contrast to the total incarcerated population, where the state prison systems hold twice as many people as are held in jails, incarcerated women are much more evenly split between state prisons and local jails.  This has serious consequences for incarcerated women and their families.

Women’s incarceration has grown at twice the pace of men’s incarceration in recent decades, and has disproportionately been located in local jails.  The explanation for exactly what happened, when, and why does not yet exist because the data on women has long been obscured by the larger scale of men’s incarceration....

Looking at the big picture shows that a staggering number of women who are incarcerated are not even convicted: a quarter of women who are behind bars have not yet had a trial.  Moreover, 60% of women under local control have not been convicted of a crime and are awaiting trial....

Avoiding pre-trial incarceration is uniquely challenging for women.  The number of unconvicted women stuck in jail is surely not because courts are considering women, who are generally the primary caregivers of children, to be a flight risk.  The far more likely answer is that incarcerated women, who have lower incomes than incarcerated men, have an even harder time affording cash bail.  When the typical bail amounts to a full year’s income for women, it’s no wonder that women are stuck in jail awaiting trial....

So what does it mean that large numbers of women are held in jail — for them, and for their families?  While stays in jail are generally shorter than in stays in prison, jails make it harder to stay in touch with family than prisons do.  Phone calls are more expensive, up to $1.50 per minute, and other forms of communication are more restricted — some jails don’t even allow real letters, limiting mail to postcards.  This is especially troubling given that 80% of women in jails are mothers, and most of them are primary caretakers of their children.  Thus children are particularly susceptible to the domino effect of burdens placed on incarcerated women....

Too often, the conversation about criminal justice reform starts and stops with the question of non-violent drug and property offenses.  While drug and property offenses make up more than half of the offenses for which women are incarcerated, the chart reveals that all offenses — including the violent offenses that account for roughly a quarter of all incarcerated women — must be considered in the effort to reduce the number of incarcerated women in this country. This new data on women underlines the need for reform discussions to focus not just on the easier choices but on the policy changes that will have the most impact....

Even the “Whole Pie” of incarceration above represents just one small portion (17%) of the women under correctional supervision, which includes over a million women on probation and parole.  Again, this is in stark contrast to the general incarcerated population (mostly men), where a third of all people under correctional control are in prisons and jails.

November 13, 2018 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 12, 2018

"The Effects of Holistic Defense on Criminal Justice Outcomes"

The title of this post is the title of anew article which I learned about via this Penn Law press release.  Here is the start of the release, providing a link to the article:

A groundbreaking new study by researchers at RAND and the University of Pennsylvania Law School finds that by adopting an innovative holistic approach to defending poor clients in criminal cases, jurisdictions can significantly reduce incarceration and save taxpayer dollars, without harming public safety.

The study, “The Effects of Holistic Defense on Criminal Justice Outcomes,” to be published in the Harvard Law Review, examined over half a million cases in the Bronx over a 10-year period involving poor criminal defendants who received court-appointed lawyers.  The study was authored by James Anderson and Mary Buenaventura of RAND, and Paul Heaton, Academic Director of Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice at Penn Law.

Heaton and his co-authors compared holistic representation — wherein an interdisciplinary team that includes a lawyer working alongside other advocates such as a social worker, housing advocate, investigator, etc. addresses the wider needs of the client enmeshed in the criminal justice system — to the more traditional public defense model focused around criminal attorneys and criminal case advocacy.  They found that the holistic approach reduced the likelihood of a prison sentence by 16 percent, and actual prison sentence length by 24 percent.

Here is the article's abstract:

Debates over mass incarceration emphasize policing, bail, and sentencing reform, but give little attention to indigent defense.  This omission seems surprising, given that interactions with government-provided counsel critically shape the experience of the vast majority of criminal defendants.  This neglect in part reflects our lack of evidence-based knowledge regarding indigent defense, making it difficult to identify effective reforms.

One newer model gaining support is the holistic defense model, in which public defenders work in interdisciplinary teams to address both the immediate case and the underlying life circumstances — such as drug addiction, mental illness, or family or housing instability — that contribute to client contact with the criminal justice system.  This holistic model contrasts with the traditional public defense model which emphasizes criminal representation and courtroom advocacy. Proponents contend holistic defense improves case outcomes and reduces recidivism by better addressing clients’ underlying needs, while critics argue that diverting resources and attention from criminal advocacy weakens results.  Although widely embraced, there is no systematic evidence demonstrating the relative merits of the holistic approach.

This Article offers the first large-scale, rigorous evaluation of the impact of holistic representation on criminal justice outcomes.  In the Bronx, a holistic defense provider (the Bronx Defenders) and a traditional defender (the Legal Aid Society) operate side-by-side within the same court system, with case assignment determined quasi-randomly based on court shift timing.  Using administrative data covering over half a million cases and a quasi-experimental research design, we estimate the causal effect of holistic representation on case outcomes and future offending.  Holistic representation does not affect conviction rates, but it reduces the likelihood of a custodial sentence by 16% and expected sentence length by 24%.  Over the ten-year study period, holistic representation in the Bronx resulted in nearly 1.1 million fewer days of custodial punishment.

As of one year post-arraignment and beyond, holistic representation has neither a positive or adverse effect on criminal justice contacts.  While holistic representation does not dramatically reduce recidivism, as some proponents have claimed, strengthening indigent defense apparently offers considerable potential to reduce incarceration without harming public safety.  Indigent defense thus deserves a more prominent place in conversations about how to address mass incarceration, and future research should examine the effects of this promising model beyond the criminal justice system and in other jurisdictions.

November 12, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, November 11, 2018

How about a few clemency grants, Prez Trump, to really honor vets in need on Veterans Day?

Five years ago in this post, I noted that on Veterans Day I often find myself thinking about veterans who, after serving our country in the military and thereby supporting of our nation's commitment to liberty and freedom, return home and discover the hard way that these constitutional values are not always paramount in our modern criminal justice systems.  This 2015 report on "Veterans in Prison and Jail, 2011–12" found that in "2011–12, an estimated 181,500 veterans (8% of all inmates in state and federal prison and local jail excluding military-operated facilities) were serving time in correctional facilities."

In my Veterans Day 2013 post, I asked "How about a few clemency grants, Prez Obama, to really honor vets in need on Veterans Day?".  Five years later, especially after Prez Trump talked up possibly granting thousands of clemencies earlier this year, it seems fitting to pose the same question to Prez Obama's successor.  It also seems worthwhile to link to posts from the summer and thereafter highlights reports and comments by Prez Trump which generated lots of clemency optimism on which he has yet to deliver.

A few of many recent related posts: 

November 11, 2018 in Clemency and Pardons, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, November 10, 2018

"Farewell to the Felonry"

The title of this post is the interesting title of this interesting new paper authored by Alice Ristroph now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Bastard.  Idiot.  Imbecile.  Pauper.  Felon.  These terms, medieval in origin, have served as formal legal designations and also the brands of substantial social stigma.  As legal designations, the terms marked persons for different sorts of membership in a political community.  The rights and privileges of these persons could be restricted or denied altogether. Today, most of these terms have been abandoned as labels for official classifications.  But the terms felon and felony remain central to American criminal law, even after other developed democracies have formally abolished the felon/felony category.  “Felony” has connotations of extreme wickedness and an especially severe crime, but the official legal meaning of felony is a pure legal construct: any crime punishable by more than a year in prison.  So many and such disparate crimes are now felonies that there is no unifying principle to justify the classification.  And yet, the designation of a crime as a felony, or of a person as a felon, still carries great significance.  Even beyond the well-documented “collateral” consequences of a felony conviction, the classification of persons as felons is central to the mechanics of mass incarceration and to inequality both in and out of the criminal justice system.  American law provides the felonry —the group of persons convicted of felonies — a form of subordinate political membership that contrasts with the rights and privileges of the full-fledged citizenry.

The felon should go the way of the bastard, into the dustbins of legal history.  If that outcome seems unlikely, it is worth asking why a category long known to be incoherent should be so difficult to remove from the law.  This Article examines felony in order to scrutinize more broadly the conceptual structure of criminal law.  Criminal laws, and even their most common critiques and arguments for reform, often appeal to the same naturalistic understanding of crime and punishment that gives felon its social meaning.  When we imagine crime as a natural, pre-legal wrong and the criminal as intrinsically deserving of suffering, we displace responsibility for the law’s burdens from the community that enacts the law and the officials that enforce it.  To bid farewell to the felonry could be a first step toward reclaiming responsibility for our criminal law.

November 10, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, October 31, 2018

Notable federal sentencing argument that "nature and circumstances of the offense" includes "rhetorical China shop bull who is now our president"

C487660a9f953e1a74a1e5c649ef3640--gloveA helpful reader made sure I did not miss this HuffPost piece concerning a notable federal sentencing filing in a high-profile federal case.  The full headline of the piece sets forth the basics: "Trump Fan Convicted In Anti-Muslim Terror Plot Asks Judge To Consider Trump’s Rhetoric: Patrick Stein’s attorneys also said he learned about the Quran 'from the internet and conservative talk-show hosts such as Sean Hannity and Michael Savage'."  Here are more details from this article (which also include a link to the full filing):

Attorneys for a President Donald Trump supporter who was convicted in a domestic terrorism plot aimed at slaughtering Muslim refugees asked a federal judge to factor in the “backdrop” of Trump’s campaign rhetoric when deciding their client’s sentence.

Patrick Stein was one of three right-wing militiamen found guilty in April of a conspiracy to kill Muslim refugees living in rural Kansas. Ahead of the 2016 election, Stein and two others plotted with an FBI informant and an undercover agent to bomb an apartment complex that housed Muslims in Garden City. Stein went by the handle “Orkin Man” and referred to Muslims as “cockroaches” he wanted exterminated.

His sentence was expected to be announced Friday but has been delayed until Nov. 19.

At trial, defense attorneys referred to the defendants as “knuckleheads” who were engaged in “locker room talk,” and Stein’s attorney argued his client was a victim of a “chaos news” environment that had him thinking a civil war was coming. A jury convicted Stein and his co-defendants, Curtis Allen and Gavin Wright, on weapons of mass destruction and conspiracy against civil rights charges.... The government said it is seeking life sentences for all three defendants.

Stein’s attorneys, James Pratt and Michael Shultz, argued Monday in a sentencing memo that sending Stein to prison for life was unwarranted and that a sentence of 15 years would be appropriate. They said the judge should factor in the “backdrop to this case” when crafting an appropriate sentence.

“2016 was ‘lit.’ The court cannot ignore the circumstances of one of the most rhetorically mold-breaking, violent, awful, hateful and contentious presidential elections in modern history, driven in large measure by the rhetorical China shop bull who is now our president,” they wrote.

“Trump’s brand of rough-and-tumble verbal pummeling heightened the rhetorical stakes for people of all political persuasions,” they added. “A personal normally at a 3 on a scale of political talk might have found themselves at a 7 during the election. A person, like Patrick, who would often be at a 7 during a normal day, might ‘go to 11.’ See SPINAL TAP.  That climate should be taken into account when evaluating the rhetoric that formed the basis of the government’s case.”

Stein’s attorneys, who called their client an “early and avid” Trump supporter, said it was important to keep in mind that “almost no one thought Trump was going to win” when evaluating the likelihood of an attack. The plot was supposed to take place after the election, as the group didn’t want their attack to boost Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign. Stein, in a message to an undercover agent, wrote that if they attacked ahead of the election it would “give a lot of ammunition to the Hillary supporters” and said that Clinton could never be allowed to be president.

“Trump’s win changed everything, and it is reasonable to speculate that it would have changed things among the defendants as well,” the attorneys wrote. “The urgency for action would be gone. The feeling of a losing battle would be gone. The conspiracies, in part, would be disproven as the transition from Obama to Trump took place. It is logical to conclude that the discussed attack would never have happened in the world that existed post-Trump.”

Stein’s attorneys said their client got caught up in the anti-Muslim information he was devouring online. His knowledge of the Quran, his attorneys wrote, “came directly from the internet and conservative talk-show hosts such as Sean Hannity and Michael Savage. Patrick himself had never read the Quran, nor had he participated in a comparative study of any religion.”

Stein, his attorneys wrote, was “the perfect, vulnerable target” for the FBI, and had relapsed into alcoholism and “had used methamphetamine regularly,” including after he met FBI informant Dan Day. They said that Stein’s crimes “demonstrated an extreme level of hatred and fear, but they also demonstrated an utter lack of sophistication.”

Any sentencing document that effectively cites Spinal Tap garners my appreciation, and it obviously deserves to be honored for being willing to take its arguments "one louder."

October 31, 2018 in Booker in district courts, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 30, 2018

"Prisoners of Fate: The Challenges of Creating Change for Children of Incarcerated Parents"

The title of this post is the title of this new article available via SSRN authored by Amy Cyphert.  Here is its abstract:

Children of incarcerated parents, the invisible victims of mass incarceration, suffer tremendous physical, psychological, educational, and financial burdens — detrimental consequences that can continue even long after a parent has been released.  Although these children are blameless, policy makers, judges, and prison officials in charge of visitation policies have largely overlooked them.  The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual explicitly instructs judges to ignore children when fashioning their parents’ sentences, and judges have largely hewed to this policy, even in the wake of the 2005 United States v. Booker decision that made those Guidelines merely advisory, not mandatory.

Although some scholars have suggested amending the Guidelines or making other legislative changes that would bring children’s interests forward at the sentencing phase, these suggestions are less likely than ever to bear fruit.  In light of the Trump Administration’s “tough on crime” rhetoric, new Attorney General Jefferson Sessions’ “law and order” reputation, and Republican control of the House and Senate, policy change that is viewed as “progres- sive” is highly unlikely.  Therefore, this Article proposes two other avenues for change. 

First, in a new and unique proposal, this Article suggests federal judges can and should independently order the inclusion of Family Impact Statements into a defendant’s presentence investigation report via a heretofore largely unused “catchall provision” of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Second, this Article makes three modest policy recommendations that are aimed at improving the ability of children to visit their incarcerated parents.  Visitation has been shown in studies to be a powerful tool of mitigation for many of the harms children experience when their parents are incarcerated, but visitation rates are woefully low.  The options for improving circumstances for children of incarcerated parents may well be limited, but there are viable options, and there is no time to waste.

October 30, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 24, 2018

Latest federal sentencing of corrupt New York pol results in former state senate leader Dean Skelos getting 51 months

This New York Post piece, headlined "Dean Skelos sentenced to more than four years in prison," reports on the latest high-profile political corruption sentencing from a state that always seeks to keep the white-collar lawyers busy. Here are the details:

Dean Skelos, once one of the most powerful men in Albany, was sentenced to more than four years in prison Wednesday for using his political office to benefit his do-nothing son — who was noticeably absent from court for his father’s day of reckoning.

Manhattan federal Judge Kimba Wood said she would’ve given the one-time state Senate majority leader less than 51 months behind bars given his advanced age, but tacked on an extra three months because she found he lied on the witness stand.  “Your repeated mischaracterizations and lies about your conduct warrant a three-month enhancement,” Wood told the 70-year-old disgraced pol.

Dean’s son, Adam Skelos, who was convicted alongside him at their retrial in July, was nowhere to be found in court, underscoring the father and son’s strained relationship. Adam will be sentenced later Wednesday afternoon.

In begging for leniency, Dean told the judge he hoped to one day repair their bond. “My son, Adam, I love him more today than yesterday,” he said, his voice cracking. “I always try to protect him and I failed. Although our relationship is strained, I hope one day it will be restored.” Dean also asked Wood to go easy on his only child. “I hope that you show him mercy so that he can be the father he wants to be,” Dean said.

The Long Island Republican, and Adam, 36, were convicted at their retrial in July of strong-arming companies seeking help from Dean into giving Adam no-show jobs and consulting gigs. The pair was first convicted in 2015, but the case was tossed on appeal — paving the way for the politician to take the stand in his own defense in July....

The feds had asked the judge — who sentenced Dean to five years after the first trial — to take it up a notch to at least six-and-a-half years. A lawyer for Dean asked for leniency, saying the case has already taken a severe toll on the once-powerful politician, including straining his relationship with Adam. Dean has also developed a drinking problem due to the stress, his lawyer said.

Adam Skelos was previously sentenced to six-and-a-half years in prison after the judge said the trial showed that he had “no moral compass.” Adam, who is expecting a second child with his fiancée next month, has also asked for leniency, saying the judge’s harsh words have forced him to seek help and to change.

As Senate majority leader, Dean Skelos served as one of the so-called “three men in a room” — the others being Gov. Andrew Cuomo and longtime state Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, who was sentenced in July to seven years for corruption.

October 24, 2018 in Booker in district courts, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 23, 2018

Terrific discussions of guideline commentary and agency issues in the Sixth Circuit (while a defendant loses appeal again)

Yesterday a Sixth Circuit panel handed down an interesting and intricate opinion in US v. Havis, No. 17-5772 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2018) (available here), that likely will be of even greater interest to administrative law gurus than to sentencing fans.  The start of the opinion for the court authored by Judge Thapar frames and sets up what follows:

What we do is sometimes less important than how we do it.  The United States Sentencing Commission has the power to promulgate the Sentencing Guidelines.  But Congress has limited how it may exercise that power.  Those limits are important — not only because Congress thinks so, but because they define the Commission’s identity in our constitutional structure.

Jeffery Havis claims that the Commission has disregarded those limits.  And he may have a point.  But a prior published decision of our court requires that we reject this part of his argument.  Following that precedent and finding Havis’s other arguments unavailing, we affirm his sentence

For the defendant, what follows must be especially discouraging: he loses the appeal 2-1 ,and the two votes against him seem to agree that his arguments are compelling but foreclosed by circuit precedent that can only be reviewed via an en banc proceeding. For administrative law gurus, there are many pages with thoughtful judges debating the pros and cons of whether Auer deference presents constitutional problems in this context. As a sentencing fan, I found this passage from Judge Thapar (among many others in all the opinions) notable:

[I]n criminal cases, ambiguity typically favors the defendant.  If there is reasonable doubt, no conviction. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). And if a statute is ambiguous, courts construe the statute in the criminal defendant’s favor.  E.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (describing the “venerable” rule of lenity).  But not here. Auer would mean that rather than benefiting from any ambiguity in the Guidelines, Havis would face the possibility of more time in prison than he otherwise would.  So in this context, Auer not only threatens the separation of powers but also endangers fundamental legal precepts as well.  See Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 732–33 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (highlighting problems with requiring the rule of lenity to bow to Auer deference); see also Perez v. United States, 885 F.3d 984, 990–91 (6th Cir. 2018) (suggesting that the rule of lenity might apply in considering sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act).

For both sentencing and administrative law fans, Havis is a must read.

October 23, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, October 20, 2018

Paul Manafort seemingly poised to get "senior discount" at upcoming sentencing

This new NBC News piece, headlined "Paul Manafort's health and age could help shorten his sentence," reports on the notable recent court appearance of a former presidential campaign manager and highlights how it could impact his upcoming sentencing. The piece is authored by Danny Cevallos, an MSNBC legal analyst, and here are excerpts:

Former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort appeared in a Virginia federal court Friday in a wheelchair, missing his right shoe, and appearing visibly grayer.  His legal team advised Judge T.S. Ellis that Manafort was dealing with “significant” health issues related to his confinement, and asked the court to expedite his sentencing so that he could be transferred to a facility better equipped to take care of him.

There’s no question that incarceration has negative health effects.  It’s also likely part of a wise strategy for Manafort’s defense team to make these health issues known to the judge well in advance of the sentencing hearing.  Manafort’s age and infirmity can bolster a defense argument to the judge for a significant reduction in his sentence.

Federal judges are permitted to consider a defendant’s advanced age and health issues in order to impose fair punishment and provide essential medical care.  Following an amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 2010, the defendant’s age and physical condition, including his physique, may be relevant in reducing a sentence.  However, this is only if the condition is unusual and distinguishable from other cases.  An extraordinary physical impairment or a seriously infirm defendant can justify granting home detention as a less costly option than imprisonment.  The guidelines permit the court to consider alternative forms of incarceration for such an offender if those alternatives are “equally efficient” as prison.

It’s not clear what health condition confined Manafort to a wheelchair with only one shoe on Friday.  The court may consider a defendant’s need for medical care when fashioning a sentence.  Courts have considered a variety of conditions during sentencing that can affect the feet, including diabetes, and gout.  Still, Manafort’s defense team should be prepared to show that these ailments are extraordinary, and they cannot be treated adequately by the Bureau of Prisons.

The Department of Justice has recognized that the aging process accelerates for prisoners.  Elderly prisoners such as Manafort are more vulnerable to predators. They require special physical accommodations in a place that is not designed for special accommodation.  According to the DOJ, the annual cost of incarcerating elderly prisoners has risen to an average of $60,000 to $70,000 for each elderly inmate compared with about $27,000 for others in the general population....

Elderly defendants are substantially less likely than younger offenders to commit new crimes after they are released.  The U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that over an eight-year period, only 13.4 percent of offenders age 65 or older were rearrested compared to 67.6 percent of offenders younger than age 21 when they were released.  Of course, expect the prosecutors to point out that after he was originally charged and out on release, Manafort committed new obstruction crimes by trying to influence witnesses. The government will surely counter that Manafort is one of those rare older offenders who is likely to commit new crimes — because he already did.

I am pleased this piece highlights the (too-often-ignored) 2010 revisions to the USSG policy statements concerning age and physical impairments as a possible relevant basis for a departure from the applicable guidelines.  But, as federal practitioners know, the guideline policy statements about departures are often ignored because judges have broad general authority to vary based on statutory 3553(a) factors regardless of what the guidelines say.  And, not to be forgotten, as reported in this prior post, Manafort's plea agreement caps his sentencing exposure at 10 years, but includes a calculation of his estimated "Sentencing Guidelines range [at] 210 months to 262 months' imprisonment."

Some prior related posts:

October 20, 2018 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, October 19, 2018

Rastafarian musician gets eight-year sentence after being found with 2.89 pounds of marijuana in car

I sometimes see reporters and others suggest that personal marijuana possession and use has already become essentially de facto legal throughout the country.  This story of a sentencing in Mississippi this week, headlined "Jamaican-born musician sentenced to 8 years in prison for marijuana he legally obtained," puts the lie to this suggestion. Here are the details:

A Jamaican-born musician convicted of drug trafficking in Madison County for marijuana he said he obtained legally in Oregon for his personal use received an eight-year prison sentence without parole Monday. Madison County Circuit Judge William Chapman said Patrick Beadle, 46, of Oregon, faced a maximum 40 years in prison after a jury convicted him in July under the state's drug trafficking law.

Beadle, who performs under the name BlackFire, was charged with drug trafficking, although he said the marijuana he had with him was for his personal use and was obtained legally in Oregon where medical marijuana was legalized in 1998. Oregon voters approved recreational use of marijuana in 2014. Prosecutors admitted there was no evidence to prove Beadle was trafficking in drugs other than the amount of marijuana, 2.89 pounds, and that it was concealed in his vehicle.

Chapman departed from giving Beadle the 10 to 40 years under the drug trafficking law, but he wouldn't reduce it to simple possession because he said the jury convicted Beadle under the drug trafficking law. Chapman said Beadle would have to serve the eight year sentence day-for-day since the law doesn't allow for parole or probation....

Patrick Beadle said he has a medical marijuana card from Oregon to treat chronic pain in both knees where cartilage has worn down from his years of playing college basketball. Marijuana use is also common among Rastafarians.

Beadle said he was traveling March 8, 2017, southbound on I-55 after entering Madison County and at about 10 a.m., he was pulled over on I-55 near Canton by a Madison County deputy for the alleged traffic violation of crossing over the fog line, the painted line on the side of a roadway. He disputes the deputy's assertion that he crossed over the fog line. He said his dreadlocks and out-of-state auto tag made him a target for racial profiling....

In the Beadle case, then-Deputy Joseph Mangino found no large sums of money, drug paraphernalia or weight measuring scale to substantiate the trafficking charge. "This is not the typical defendant you see. "He is not a drug dealer," said Randy Harris, who was Beadle's trial attorney.

This lengthy (pre-sentencing) article from another local paper provides a few more details and some context about this disconcerting case:

Beadle was southbound on I-55 and had crossed from Yazoo into Madison County. A few seconds later, a Madison County sheriff’s deputy pulled him over.  A search of Beadle’s car revealed 2.8 pounds of marijuana.

Following a trial in July, a jury took 25 minutes to find him guilty of charges that could land him in prison for up to 40 years without parole.  Beadle, who is African American, and his allies say the fact that he was pulled over is a clear case of racial profiling while law enforcement officials maintain that a traffic violation led to the stop....

In Madison County, drug dispositions between 2013 and 2017 -- that is, drug charges settled in those years -- neared 1,000, based on data provided by the Administrative Office of Courts. Of those total charges, only two people were found guilty by a jury as Beadle was, Mississippi Today found.  Out of all the drug dispositions, about three in five were faced by African Americans.

That discrepancy goes up when looking only at guilty pleas.  The majority of defendants pled guilty to over 600 charges in Madison County during that timeframe. About 66 percent of those individuals were black -- though black people make up only 38 percent of the county’s population -- while 32 percent were white.

October 19, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Pot Prohibition Issues, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, October 18, 2018

Washington Supreme Court declares all juve LWOP cruel punishment and unconstitutional under state constitution

Last week, as noted here, the Washington Supreme Court struck down the state's death penalty based on its arbitrary administration in Washington v. Gregory. Today the same court brings us another big state constitutional opinion in Washington v. Bassett, No. 94556-0 (Wash. Oct. 18, 2018) (available here). The death penalty abolition, interestingly, was unanimous, while this latest opinion divided 5-4. Here is how the majority opinion starts:

At issue here is the constitutionality of sentencing juvenile offenders to life in prison without the possibility of parole or early release.  The State appeals a Court of Appeals, Division Two decision holding that the provision of our state's Miller-fix statute that allows 16- and 17-year-olds to be sentenced to life without parole violates the Washington Constitution's ban on cruel punishment.  Brian Bassett, recently resentenced to life without parole under the Miller-fix statute, argued at the Court of Appeals that juvenile life without parole is categorically unconstitutional.  The court adopted the categorical approach, rather than our traditional Fain proportionality test, and found that sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole or early release constituted cruel punishment.  State v. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. 714, 744, 394 P.3d 430 (2017) (puhlished in part); State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980).  We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision and hold that sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole or early release constitutes cruel punishment and therefore is unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution.

Here is how the dissent gets started:

The majority's decision to invalidate a provision of our Miller-fix statute, RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii), and to categorically bar the imposition of a juvenile life without parole (LWOP) sentence purports to rest on article I, section 14 of the Washington State Constitution.  However, it offers no basis in state law but is simply a reinterpretation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012).  More precisely, the majority takes Miller's federal constitutional requirement — that a sentencing court consider youth and its attendant characteristics as mitigating factors in exercising sentencing discretion to impose LWOP — and uses it to categorically bar the exercise of such discretion under the state constitution.  Not only is this contrary to the holding in Miller itself, which does not categorically bar LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, it also departs from state precedent rejecting similar constitutional challenges and upholding judicial sentencing discretion.

October 18, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Remarkable sentencing where district judge decided crooked cops needed more punishment than federal prosecutors sought

This local article from Florida reports on a sentencing in a remarkable federal case under the headline "Ex-Biscayne Park officers get year in prison for roles in framing black teen in crimes." Here are the details from the start of the article:

By helping the feds make a case against a corrupt ex-Biscayne Park police chief, two convicted former officers were hoping to avoid prison time for their roles in framing a black teenager with a string of burglaries. Instead, Charlie Dayoub and Raul Fernandez were handcuffed and led by U.S. Marshals into custody on Tuesday after U.S. District Judge K. Michael Moore sentenced them to the maximum: one year in prison for the false arrests.

As family members cried in disbelief, Moore chastised federal prosecutors for agreeing to recommend eight months of home confinement for Dayoub and one year of probation for Fernandez based on their grand jury testimony and other assistance in helping target former Chief Raimundo Atesiano, who had pressured officers in the mostly white suburban town to pin property crimes on people of color. He pleaded guilty last month. “It would have been a slap on the wrist, and it would have sent entirely the wrong message — particularly to the minority community,” Moore told Assistant U.S. Attorney Harry Wallace. “To think that they can come into court and get a slap on the wrist is insulting to the men and women in law enforcement.”

Moore challenged the prosecutor about his recommendation of leniency for the two defendants, who pleaded guilty in August to depriving a 16-year-old of his civil rights after framing him for four unsolved burglaries in 2013 at the direction of the ex-chief, Atesiano. The misdemeanor conviction carried up to one year in prison, while under the plea agreement prosecutors dropped a more serious civil rights conspiracy charge with a maximum 10-year sentence.

Wallace said his decision allowed the U.S. Attorney’s Office to use testimony by Dayoub and Fernandez to compel Atesiano to plead guilty to the felony civil rights conspiracy. “We were faced with a Hobson’s choice,” Wallace told the judge. But Moore, who accused the prosecutors of “sentencing manipulation,” rejected Wallace’s argument. The judge said had the prosecutors gone to trial against the ex-chief and the two officers, it would have been a “slam dunk.”

The sentencing outcome was a shock to everyone in the courtroom, especially the defendants, who were expecting leniency because the prosecutors joined their defense attorneys in support of no prison time. The reason: The two former Biscayne Park police officers testified before a federal grand jury about how the department’s ex-chief pressured them to arrest people of color and others for crimes they did not commit in the leafy bedroom community north of Miami.

Dayoub, 38, and Fernandez, 62, testified that Atesiano’s goal was to achieve a 100 percent burglary clearance rate, even if it meant pinning unsolved break-ins on people who were innocent victims, according to newly filed court records. Atesiano, 52, and another former Biscayne Park officer, Guillermo Ravelo, 37, already pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the civil rights of innocent victims by falsely arresting them. Ravelo faces up to 10 years at his sentencing on Thursday, while Atesiano faces similar punishment in November.

UPDATE: This new Justice Department press release discusses the underlying crimes in detail while announcing that today "former Biscayne Park Police Officer Guillermo Ravelo was sentenced to 27 months incarceration for conspiracy to deprive a person of his civil rights and deprivation of civil rights under color of law."

October 18, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (11)

Monday, October 15, 2018

Federal judge decides Missouri parole practices fail to comply with requirements of Miller and Graham

As reported in this local article, headlined "Missouri violated rights of inmates convicted as juveniles who are serving life without parole, judge says," a federal judge late last week ruled in favor of inmates convicted of murder as juveniles who claimed that Missouri’s parole policies and practices violated their rights in the wake of the Supreme Court's rulings in Miller and Graham. Here are the basics:

A federal judge on Friday said that recent Missouri parole hearings violated the constitutional rights of inmates serving life without parole for offenses they committed when they were juveniles.  State officials have 60 days to develop a plan for providing the inmates “a meaningful and realistic opportunity” for parole, U.S. District Judge Nanette K. Laughrey ruled.

The lawsuit was filed by four inmates who are seeking to represent all inmates who were convicted and sentenced to life without parole for an offense that occurred when they were younger than 18.  Each of the four inmates was recently denied parole after a hearing, and Laughrey said nearly 85 percent of the class of affected inmates did not receive a parole date after a hearing. The majority were not granted another hearing for the maximum of five years, without an explanation “for the lengthy setback,” she wrote.

In a news release about the ruling Sunday, the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center of St. Louis, which represents the inmates along with lawyers from Husch Blackwell, said more than 90 inmates are affected.

The parole board’s decision is communicated to inmates on a two-page “barebones, boilerplate form,” with only two available reasons for denying parole: the seriousness of the original offense or that the inmate’s “inability to... remain at liberty without again violating the law,” Laughrey wrote.  Even state officials admitted Missouri failed to provide adequate explanation for the decisions, the judge said, and fails to tell inmates what “steps they should to take to become better suited for parole.”

Laughrey wrote that while an adult’s “interest in parole is not constitutionally protected,” a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions “has held that those who were children at the time of the crimes for which they were convicted may be subject to certain additional protections.”...

Laughrey ruled that the state needs to come up with “revised policies, procedures, and customs” that will “ensure that all Class members are provided a meaningful and realistic opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” including those who already had unsuccessful hearings.

The full 27-page ruling in Brown v. Percythe, No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL (W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2018), is available at this link.

October 15, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)