Thursday, November 17, 2022

"Assessing the Status of Minors in Possession: Marijuana Versus Alcohol"

The title of this post is the title of this new article available via SSRN authored by Mitchell F. Crusto, Jillian Morrison and Laurel C. Taylor.  (Disclosure: this paper was supported by a grant from the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.)  Here is its abstract:

The legalization and decriminalization of marijuana at state level has an impact on adult use, as well as on use by minors. In many jurisdictions, minor use and possession of marijuana is regulated much like that of alcohol.  This paper examines the statutory language of laws regulating possession of marijuana by minors across states in which marijuana is legalized, decriminalized, and illegal.  From there, data was collected to look at the arrest rates for minors in three case study jurisdictions.  The purpose of this comparison was to reveal how laws criminalizing minors in possession of marijuana are carried out as reflected in the arrest rates of reporting jurisdictions. 

Overall marijuana arrests for minors in possession decreased from 2018 to 2020 across every state case example provided.  Additionally, based on the case examples provided in those states that decriminalized marijuana, arrests for juveniles were lower overall than those with legalized or illegal status.  While further analysis is needed, the study found positive results, noting that states across the board appear to be decreasing arrest rates for marijuana possession, and more and more states are looking to alcohol violation statutes to craft their marijuana violation statutes for minors.  Accordingly, the public shift in thinking about marijuana appears to be impacting the practicalities of drafting statutes and mandating arrests for the better: to create a less hostile approach with less punitive impact on minors.

November 17, 2022 in Marijuana Legalization in the States, Offender Characteristics, Pot Prohibition Issues | Permalink | Comments (5)

Tuesday, November 15, 2022

Local prosecutor seeking LWOP sentence for Michigan school shooter Ethan Crumbley

As reported in this local article, "Oakland County prosecutors plan to seek a life sentence without the chance of parole for the teenage boy who killed four classmates and injured a teacher and six other students at Oxford High School last year."  Here is more:

Ethan Crumbley, 16, pleaded guilty Oct. 24 to terrorism causing death, four counts of first-degree murder, seven counts of attempted murder and 12 counts of felony firearm. Crumbley killed Oxford students Madisyn Baldwin, Tate Myre, Hana St. Juliana and Justin Shilling.

The Oakland County Prosecutor's Office filed a motion Monday notifying the court that it planned to seek a life without parole sentence. "As we previously stated, there have been no plea bargains, no charge reductions, and no sentence agreements," David Williams, Oakland County's chief assistant prosecutor, said Tuesday in a statement. "The shooter has been offered and promised nothing. The motion filed yesterday is a formal declaration of our intent to seek the maximum possible sentence in this case."

Paulette Michel Loftin, Crumbley’s lawyer, said in October before Crumbley entered his plea that he was remorseful and wanted to accept accountability and do the right thing. Pleading guilty was his idea, she said. Crumbley was 15 years old at the time of the shooting on Nov. 30, 2021....

A first-degree murder conviction usually comes with an automatic life without parole sentence, but teenagers are entitled to a hearing where their attorneys can argue for a lighter sentence and present mitigating testimony and evidence about their client's life.  Prosecutors can also put on a case for why their requested sentence is warranted. This hearing is held because of a 2012 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that found mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles are unconstitutional. The sentencing process is scheduled to start in February.

Oakland County Prosecutor Karen McDonald has said that "every person who was in Oxford High School that day will have a chance, if they want to, to speak in their own words about how this has affected them."

Ethan's parents, James and Jennifer Crumbley, are charged with four counts each of involuntary manslaughter. Prosecutors accused them of "gross negligence" leading up to the murders. They face up to 15 years in prison.

As detialed in this post, just a few months ago the Michigan Supreme Court issued a series of rulings addressing, and generally restricting, when and how juveniles convicted of homicide can receive sentences of life with or without parole.  I would expect that a mass shooting at a school would still be a prime case for a discretionary LWOP sentencing, but Crumbley’s relatively young age and his apparent remorsefulness could open up the possibility of a lesser sentence.

Prior related post:

November 15, 2022 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (13)

Sunday, November 13, 2022

Sentencing memos paint very different pictures of Elizabeth Holmes

Two Reuters articles and ledes highlight the very different portraites of Elizabeth Holmes drawn in recent sentencing filings:

"Elizabeth Holmes seeks to avoid prison for Theranos fraud":

Elizabeth Holmes urged a U.S. judge not to send her to prison, as the founder of Theranos Inc prepares to be sentenced next week for defrauding investors in the blood testing startup. In a Thursday night court filing, lawyers for Holmes asked that she receive 18 months of home confinement, followed by community service, at her Nov. 18 sentencing before U.S. District Judge Edward Davila in San Jose, California.

The lawyers said prison time was unnecessary to deter future wrongdoing, calling Holmes, 38, a "singular human with much to give" and not the robotic, emotionless "caricature" seen by the public and media. "No defendant should be made a martyr to public passion," the lawyers wrote. "We ask that the court consider, as it must, the real person, the real company and the complex circumstances surrounding the offense."

"U.S. seeks 15 years for Elizabeth Holmes over Theranos fraud":

Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes should spend 15 years in prison and pay $800 million in restitution to investors defrauded in the blood testing start-up, U.S. prosecutors recommended late on Friday.  The Department of Justice recommendation, made in a court filing, came as Holmes prepares to be sentenced next week.

"Considering the extensiveness of Holmes' fraud... the sentencing of 180 months' imprisonment would reflect the seriousness of the offenses, provide for just punishment for the offenses, and deter Holmes and others," the prosecutors said.

The sentencing filings in this high-profile case are, unsurprisingly, quite entextensive ensice.  Holmes sentencing memorandum runs 82 pages, is available at this link, and here is part of its "preminary statement":

Section 3553(a) requires the Court to fashion a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to serve the purposes of sentencing.  If a period of confinement is necessary, the defense suggests that a term of eighteen months or less, with a subsequent supervised release period that requires community service, will amply meet that charge. But the defense believes that home confinement with a requirement that Ms. Holmes continue her current service work is sufficient.  We acknowledge that this may seem a tall order given the public perception of this case — especially when Ms. Holmes is viewed as the caricature, not the person; when the company is viewed as a house of cards, not as the ambitious, inventive, and indisputably valuable enterprise it was; and when the media vitriol for Ms. Holmes is taken into account.  But the Court’s difficult task is to look beyond those surface-level views when it fashions its sentence.  In doing so, we ask that the Court consider, as it must, the real person, the real company and the complex circumstances surrounding the offense conduct, and the important principle that “no defendant should be made a martyr to public passion.” United States v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp. 2d 349, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Rakoff, J.).  As discussed in more detail in the pages that follow, this is a unique case and this defendant is a singular human with much to give.

The Government's sentencing memorandum runs 46 pages, is available at this link, and here is part of its "introduction":

The Sentencing Guidelines appropriately recognize that Holmes’ crimes were extraordinarily serious, among the most substantial white collar offenses Silicon Valley or any other District has seen.  According to the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), they yield a recommended custodial sentence beyond the statutory maximum.  The factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 — notably the nature and circumstances of the offense, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law, and the need for both specific deterrence and general deterrence — demand a significant custodial sentence.  With these factors in mind, the government respectfully recommends a sentence of 180 months in custody.  The Court should also order Holmes to serve a three-year term of supervised release, pay full restitution to her investors (including Walgreens and Safeway), and pay the required special assessment for each count.

I think I'd put the over/under for this sentencing at around 10 years of imprisonment, but I could readily imagine a judge going much higher or much lower.

Prior related posts:

November 13, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (9)

Saturday, November 12, 2022

After getting 241-year sentence as juvenile, Bobby Bostic released on parole after 27 years in prison

In this post late last year, I provided an update on the case of Bobby Bostic, who had been sentenced in Missouri as a teenager in the 1990s to 241 years in prison.  Because MIssouri law was changed, Bostic was able to secure parole after serving over a quarter century behind bars.  And this past week, as reported in this lengthy local piece, Bostic was formally released on parole.  Here are excerpts from the piece with some legal context

Standing on the Missouri Capitol steps moments after being released from prison, Bobby Bostic said the first place he planned to visit was his mother’s grave in St. Louis — a city he’d last freely walked in 1995. “I’m a free man all because of you all who supported me,” Bostic, 43, said Wednesday morning while surrounded by friends and family donning matching sweatshirts that read “Bobby Bostic is Free.”

“While I cannot change what happened so many years ago,” he said, “I will mentor and teach young people to take a different path than I did when I was a young child myself.”

Bostic was imprisoned in 1995 for a crime he committed when he was 16, when he was an accomplice in two armed robberies in St. Louis.  Now-retired St. Louis judge Evelyn Baker sentenced Bostic to 241 years, with the first chance at parole being when Bostic turned 112.

Baker sentenced him to die in prison without giving him an official life sentence. “Your mandatory date to go in front of the parole board will be the year 2201,” Baker told Bostic at his sentencing date in 1997. “Nobody in this room is going to be alive in the year 2201.”

By sentencing him in this way, Bostic wasn’t protected under a 2010 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that mandated parole hearings for juveniles who’ve been sentenced to life without parole.  Bostic’s case fell into a legal loophole that existed in Missouri and only a few other states.  Missouri courts had held that this mandate didn’t apply to juveniles like Bostic, who received a sentence for multiple offenses that added up to life in prison.  All of Bostic’s legal remedies were exhausted by 2018, when his petitions to both the Missouri Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court were denied without comment.

But then in 2021, Republican Rep. Nick Schroer of O’Fallon successfully pushed legislation to allow juveniles who have been sentenced to 15 years or more to be eligible for parole after serving 15 years in prison.  Bostic is one of about 100 people who got a new chance at parole after the law passed....

Baker, who came to regret how she handled the case in 1995, became one of Bostic’s biggest allies, appearing as his advocate in front of the parole board last year.  “Bobby should’ve had a chance,” Baker said Wednesday, explaining that only after she sentenced him did she learn that teenagers’ brains aren’t fully developed.  “I had no awareness at that time that Bobby, by being certified to be tried as an adult, did not become an adult,” Baker said. “He was still a 16-year-old boy.”

On Dec. 12, 1995, Bostic and then 18-year-old Donald Hutson robbed a group of six people at gunpoint who were delivering Christmas gifts to a needy family in St. Louis, according to the ACLU’s 2017 petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.  During the robbery, two people were shot at.  One received a tetanus shot because the gunshot grazed his skin. The other testified that he was not injured at all.

After the robbery, Bostic and Hutson forced a woman into her car and drove off.  They robbed her and then, at Bostic’s insistence, let her go, the petition states.  Then, Bostic and Hutson threw their guns in the river and used the money to buy marijuana.  Bostic was pulled over by the police and ultimately charged with 18 felonies....

Bostic said he plans on taking things “one day at a time,” doing things he never had the chance to do — like learn to drive, use the internet and talk on a cell phone for the first time.  On Wednesday, he returned home to St. Louis. “It’s perfect because I know St. Louis,” he said, “But I’ve got to relearn it.”

Prior related posts:

November 12, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, November 11, 2022

Wouldn't pardons and commutations for those who served be a great way for Prez Biden to honor Veterans Day?

Veterans-original_cropThe question in the title of this post is inspired by today's national holiday, Veterans Day.  Based on the latest data from Bureau of Justice Statistics, from this March 2021 report "Survey of Prison Inmates, 2016: Veterans in Prison," veterans make up over 5% of the federal prison population (and nearly 8% of state prison populations).  Moreover, as an important new initiative from the Council for Criminal Justice has highlighted, roughly "one third of veterans report having been arrested and booked into jail at least once in their lives, compared to fewer than one fifth of non-veterans."  In other words, at both the federal and state level, there are surely no shortage of justice-involved veterans who could and should be a focus of concern and attention on this important day and for whom clemency consideration would be justified.

Though I am not expecting that Prez Biden will celebrate this Veterans Day by making a special effort to grant commutations or pardons to a special list of veterans, I have long thought criminal justice reform advocates ought to lean into this day by urging the President and all Governors to make a tradition of using clemency powers in this kind of special and distinctive way on this special and distinctive day.  As I have noted before, a key slogan for this day is "honoring  ALL who served," not just those who stayed out of trouble after serving.

Some (or many) prior related posts: 

November 11, 2022 in Clemency and Pardons, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, November 09, 2022

"Set up to Fail: Youth Probation Conditions as a Driver of Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Jyoti Nanda now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Youth probation is the most common form of punishment for youth in the United States criminal legal system, with nearly a quarter of a million youth currently under supervision.  Yet the role youth probation conditions play in the incarceration of youth has not been the focus of legal scholarship. Youth probation is a court-imposed intervention where young people remain at home under the supervision of a youth probation officer and are required to adhere to probation conditions, rules, and court-ordered conditions.  The orders rely on standardized terms on youth probation condition forms.  This is the first scholarly Article to excavate original youth probation condition forms.  It relies on data from 17 different urban and rural jurisdictions across the United States, including the five largest, and provides both a descriptive and perscriptive analysis of the problems with the design and execution of probation conditions.

Based on my analysis of hundreds of youth probation conditions in these different jurisdictions, I argue that standard youth probation conditions are part of a youth probation system that is structurally flawed in its design and execution, and that probation conditions that lack an adolescent framework cause real harm to youth and their families — particularly those who are most vulnerable, especially youth of color.  Simultaneously, youth probation systems concentrate power in probation officers, granting them inordinate discretionary power.  Although youth probation is viewed as the ideal alternative to detention, I argue that youth probation in its current structure is a driver of incarceration — that should be viewed as part of a carceral state — in need of thoughtful re-imagination: perhaps even abolition.

November 9, 2022 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, November 08, 2022

Elizabeth Holmes' federal sentencing ready to go forward after her new trial motion is denied

As detailed in this AP article, headlined "Bid for new trial fails, Elizabeth Holmes awaits sentencing," a high-prfole federal sentencing is now on track for later this month.  Here are the basics:

A federal judge rejected a bid for a new trial for disgraced Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes after concluding a key prosecution witness’s recent remorseful attempt to contact her wasn’t enough to award her another chance to avoid a potential prison sentence for defrauding investors at her blood-testing company.

The ruling issued late Monday by U.S. District Judge Edward Davila is the latest setback for Holmes, a former Silicon Valley star who once boasted an estimated net worth of $4.5 billion but is now facing up to 20 years in prison that would separate her from her 1-year-old son.

In the latest twist in a Silicon Valley soap opera, Holmes appeared to be pregnant when she showed up for an Oct. 17 hearing about her request for a new trial....

Davila has scheduled Nov. 18 as the day he will sentence Holmes, 38, for four felony counts of investor fraud and engaging in a conspiracy with [Rawesh “Sunny”] Balwani.  Earlier Monday, Davila postponed Balwani’s sentencing for his conviction on 12 counts of investor and patient fraud from Nov. 15 to Dec. 7.

I plan to wait until we see the formal sentencing submissions from the parties before even trying to make any predictions as to what kind of prison term Holmes might get.  But I welcome others' predictions in the comments as we gear up for what should be an interesting (and unpredicatable) sentencing proceeding.  

Prior related posts:

November 8, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, October 27, 2022

"Taking stock of incarcerated military veterans: a review of (and guide for) research"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting new research published in Criminal Justice Studies and authored by Matthew W. Logan, Erika J. Brooke, Mark A. Morgan & Andrea R. Hazelwood. Here is its abstract:

The sociodemographic backgrounds of inmates are essential for understanding their prison experiences and the extent to which they cope with incarceration and recidivate upon release.  The notion that military veterans might fare differently from other groups in the correctional system has existed for decades; yet scholars have only recently begun to focus on the effects that prior service has on metrics of prison adjustment and beyond. Increased emphasis on the prison experiences of military veterans necessitates a review of the studies published to date.

In the current study, we take stock of the empirical research conducted on incarcerated veterans by systematically reviewing all articles published online between 2000 and 2022 . Overall, we find little evidence to support the view that veteran status confers any specific benefits or vulnerabilities during incarceration or following release. However, given the limitations of the studies reviewed, we address several methodological concerns regarding the study of former service members and provide directions for future research.

October 27, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 26, 2022

Federal judge gives "real break" due to defendant's autism with home confinement sentence (when prosecutors urged nearly 5 years)

I have not been following closely or blogging about some of the latest sentencing of the January 6 rioters.  But this latest story from Politico, headlined "Jan. 6 rioter gets probation not prison after judge finds autism played a role; U.S. District Court Judge Trevor McFadden concluded that severe mental illness significantly mitigated ‘the blameworthiness’ of the defendant," struck me as worth noting.  Here are the basics:

A Jan. 6 rioter who wielded a hatchet and smashed two windows with a flagpole will serve no jail time, a federal judge ruled Wednesday, finding that Asperger’s syndrome made him susceptible to the influence of the mob.

Nicholas Rodean of Frederick, Md., attempted to address U.S. District Court Judge Trevor McFadden Wednesday and visibly struggled to complete thoughts and sentences while explaining and apologizing for his Jan. 6 conduct. At one point, he clutched his head in frustration.

McFadden ultimately chose to sentence Rodean to 240 days of home confinement.  But he said he was convinced that Rodean’s severe mental illness significantly mitigated “the blameworthiness of your conduct.”

It was an unexpected turn for a defendant whose health struggles were largely discussed under seal during his nearly two-year criminal case. Rodean was charged on Jan. 11, 2021 for his role in the Capitol breach.  McFadden found him guilty during a bench trial in July of shattering two Capitol windows with a flagpole, as well as other crimes associated with breaking into the building and disrupting congressional proceedings....

Rodean’s attorney, Charles Burnham — who also represents Donald Trump associates Jeffrey Clark and John Eastman in ongoing Jan. 6 matters — said Rodean had become fixated on politics during the pandemic, when he was isolated and without his typical support structure. He said Rodean was particularly susceptible to the influence of “assertive male figures” like Trump. And once inside the Capitol, he added, Rodean was similarly drawn in by Chansley, who commanded the attention of the crowd that day.

Rodean’s parents sat in the courtroom during the sentencing proceedings, and his sister Kimberly addressed McFadden, during which she expressed worry that prison would devastate her brother’s mental health and sideline his newly successful dog-walking business.  “Autistic people do not fare well in prison,” she said.

But it was Rodean’s own statement to the judge that appeared to be most affecting. For nearly 15 minutes, Rodean struggled to articulate his conduct on Jan. 6, describing how he consumed an intense amount of media about the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests that, at times, led to rioting. On Jan. 6, he took an Uber to the Stop the Steal rally at which Trump appeared, and then marched along with the crowd. Someone then handed him an object that he used to smash the two windows that had already been struck by other rioters.

“I am really sorry about breaking the window,” he said. “I am really sorry about other crimes that I did.”

“Are you ever going to do anything like this again?” McFadden asked him.

“No,” Rodean replied.

A day earlier, McFadden sentenced Jan. 6 defendant Hunter Seefried to 24 months in prison for similarly joining the early breach of the building and engaging in the same standoff with police outside the Senate chamber.

Prosecutors had initially recommended a 57-month sentence for Rodean.  “There is no indication that he holds any regrets regarding his participation in the riot that day,” the Justice Department wrote in a sentencing recommendation filed last week.

But in his own sentencing memo, Burnham urged McFadden to consider Rodean’s mental health and a doctor’s evaluation that found prison would be uniquely dangerous for his client.

Burnham said Rodean is susceptible to being taken advantage of, easily triggered by loud noises and other stimuli and would likely be put in protective custody by corrections officials who may not have the training for someone with Asperger’s syndrome — forcing him into prolonged periods of isolation.  “We submit that Nicholas’ ‘history and personal characteristics’ make this a unique case among the hundreds of prosecutions to come out of that day,’ Burnham wrote.

October 26, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, October 24, 2022

Michigan school shooter Ethan Crumbley pleads guilty to all counts with sentencing next year

As reported in this AP piece, a "teenager pleaded guilty Monday to terrorism and first-degree murder in a Michigan school shooting that killed four students and may be called to testify against his parents, who’ve been jailed on manslaughter charges for their alleged role in the tragedy."  Here is more with an emphasis on sentencing dynamics:

Ethan Crumbley, 16, pleaded guilty to all 24 charges, nearly a year after the attack at Oxford High School in southeastern Michigan.  In the gallery, some relatives of the victims wept as assistant prosecutor Marc Keast described the crimes.  “Yes,” Crumbley replied, looking down and nodding in affirmation, when asked if he “knowingly, willfully and deliberately” chose to shoot other students.

The prosecutor’s office said no deals were made ahead of Monday’s plea. A first-degree murder conviction typically brings an automatic life prison sentence in Michigan, but teenagers are entitled to a hearing where their lawyer can argue for a shorter term and an opportunity for parole.

“We are not aware of any other case, anywhere, in the country where a mass shooter has been convicted of terrorism on state charges,” Oakland County Prosecutor Karen McDonald said.

The teenager withdrew his intent to pursue an insanity defense, and repeatedly acknowledged under questioning by Judge Kwame Rowe that he understands the potential penalties.

His parents, James and Jennifer Crumbley, are jailed on charges of involuntary manslaughter, accused of making the gun accessible to their son and ignoring his need for mental health treatment. Ethan Crumbley’s lawyer, Paulette Michel Loftin, said it’s possible he could be called upon to testify against them   She said they’re under a no-contact order, and he has not spoken to his parents.  Parents have rarely been charged in school shootings, though the guns used commonly come from the home of a parent or close relative....

Sheriff Michael Bouchard told reporters Monday that Ethan Crumbley still had 18 rounds of ammunition when he was arrested. “It’s my belief he would have fired every one of those had he not been interrupted by deputies going immediately in,” said Bouchard who also called Ethan Crumbley “a twisted and evil person.” “I hope he gets life without parole,” the sheriff added. “He has permanently taken lives away from four lovely souls and he’s permanently affected many, many more.”

Prosecutors earlier this year disclosed that Ethan Crumbley had hallucinations about demons and was fascinated by guns and Nazi propaganda.  “Put simply, they created an environment in which their son’s violent tendencies flourished.  They were aware their son was troubled, and then they bought him a gun,” prosecutors said in a court filing....

In addition to the counts of first-degree murder and terrorism causing death, Ethan Crumbley admitted guilt to seven counts of assault with intent to murder and 12 counts of possessing a firearm in the commission of a felony.

The judge set Feb. 9 for the start of hearings to determine if he’ll be sentenced to life without parole or get a shorter sentence due to his age, and a chance at release. His lawyers will be able to argue a variety of mitigating circumstances, including family life and mental health.  Prosecutors didn’t signal in court if they will argue for a no-parole sentence.

October 24, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, October 23, 2022

"A Second Look for Children Sentenced to Die in Prison"

The title of this post is the title of this new piece now available via SSRN authored by Kathryn Miller.  Here is its abstract:

Scholars have championed “second look” statutes as a decarceral tool.  Second look statutes allow certain incarcerated people to seek resentencing after having served a portion of their sentences.  This Essay weighs the advantages and disadvantages of these statutes as applied to children sentenced to die in prison and argues that focusing on this small, discrete group may be a digestible entry point for more conservative states who fear widespread resentencing.  Moreover, because early data indicates that children convicted of homicide and released as adults have very low recidivism rates, second look beneficiaries are likely to pose little threat to public safety.  While resentencing and even releasing these individuals would not directly result in mass decarceration, it would serve as a litmus test for expanding second look statutes to adults convicted of violent crimes — the very group for whom meaningful decarceral efforts must ultimately be aimed.

The Essay also argues that second look legislation has the potential to redress two specific sentencing problems common to cases involving children: the inability to accurately assess an individual’s capacity for change and racially discriminatory sentencing outcomes.  To redress these problems, and to avoid reflexive impositions of original sentences, this Essay recommends three critical additions to juvenile second look statutes: automatic eligibility for resentencing at age twenty-five, jury resentencing, and inadmissibility of the defendant’s original sentence.

October 23, 2022 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, October 21, 2022

Federal judge sentences Steve Bannon to 4 months of imprisonment for contempt of Congress

As reported in this USA Today piece, "Trump White House strategist Steve Bannon was sentenced to four months in prison Friday, three months after his conviction on contempt of Congress charges for defying a subpoena from the special House committee investigating the Jan. 6, 2021 Capitol attack." Here is a bit more:

The Justice Department had sought a six month prison term for Bannon and recommended that he pay a maximum fine of $200,000 for "his sustained, bad-faith."... While Bannon initially refused to comply with the panel's summons, citing a claim of executive privilege, prosecutors said Monday that the Trump operative's actions were "aimed at undermining the Committee’s efforts to investigate an historic attack on government."

Bannon's attorneys argued that a sentence of probation was more appropriate. "The legal challenges advanced by Mr. Bannon were not meritless or frivolous and were aimed at protecting his constitutional rights," attorney Evan Corcoran argued in court documents. "For these reasons, the fact that Mr. Bannon chose to put the Government to its burden at trial should not preclude him from receiving a reduction to his offense level based on acceptance of responsibility."

Prior related posts:

October 21, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, October 17, 2022

Feds urging six months' imprisonment and $200,000 fined for Steve Bannon as punishment following his convictions for criminal contempt of Congress

As detailed in this extended ABC News piece, the "Justice Department is asking a federal judge to sentence Steve Bannon, adviser to former President Donald Trump, to six months in prison and make him pay a $200,000 fine for his conviction on two counts of criminal contempt of Congress, according to a new court filing." Here is more of the basics:

Bannon was found guilty in July of defying a subpoena from the House select committee investigating the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol.  He had been subpoenaed by the Jan. 6 panel for records and testimony in September 2021.

Bannon is set to be sentenced on Friday at the D.C. courthouse by federal judge Carl Nichols at 9 a.m.  His lawyers are expected to submit their own sentencing memo Monday.

The Government's 24-page sentencing memorandum is available at this link, and it starts this way:

From the moment that the Defendant, Stephen K. Bannon, accepted service of a subpoena from the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (“the Committee”), he has pursued a bad-faith strategy of defiance and contempt.  The Committee sought documents and testimony from the Defendant relevant to a matter of national importance: the circumstances that led to a violent attack on the Capitol and disruption of the peaceful transfer of power. In response, the Defendant flouted the Committee’s authority and ignored the subpoena’s demands.  The Defendant, a private citizen, claimed that executive privilege—which did not apply to him and would not have exempted his total noncompliance even if it had—justified his actions.  Then, on the eve of trial, he attempted an about-face, representing to the Committee that former President Donald J. Trump had waived executive privilege and freed the Defendant to cooperate.  But this proved a hollow gesture; when he realized that his eleventh-hour stunt would not prevent his trial, the Defendant’s cooperative spirit vanished.  Despite the removal of the only purported barrier to his compliance, to this day the Defendant has not produced a single document to the Committee or appeared for testimony.  For his sustained, bad-faith contempt of Congress, the Defendant should be sentenced to six months’ imprisonment—the top end of the Sentencing Guidelines’ range—and fined $200,000—based on his insistence on paying the maximum fine rather than cooperate with the Probation Office’s routine pre-sentencing financial investigation.

UPDATE: Steve Bannon has also today submitted his sentencing memorandum, which can be found at this link. Here is its starting "summary":

The ear of a sentencing judge listens for the note of contrition. Someone was convicted. Did they learn their lesson? This case requires something more. It involves larger themes that are important to every American. Should a person be jailed when the caselaw which sets forth the elements of the crime is outdated? Should a person be jailed for the doing the exact same thing that was done by the highest law enforcement officers in this country, yet they received no punishment? Should a person who has spent a lifetime listening to experts – as a naval officer, investment banker, corporate executive, and Presidential advisor – be jailed for relying on the advice of his lawyers? Should a person be jailed where the prosecutor declined to prosecute others who were similarly situated – with the only difference being that this person uses their voice to express strongly held political views? If the answer to any of these questions is no, then a sentence of probation is warranted. Because we believe that the answer to each of these questions is no, we respectfully ask this Court to impose a sentence of probation, and to stay the imposition of sentence pending appeal.

October 17, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, October 13, 2022

Jury recommends LWOP sentence for Parkland school shooter Nikolas Cruz

As reported in this NPR piece, a state "jury has recommended that the shooter who killed 17 people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Fla., be sentenced to life in prison."  Here is more:

Nikolas Cruz, 24, pleaded guilty last year to 17 charges of premeditated murder and 17 counts of attempted murder. The question facing jurors now was whether Cruz would spend the rest of his life in prison or be sentenced to death. Cruz carried out the massacre on Valentine's Day in 2018. He was 19 at the time, and had been expelled from the school. He entered a school building through an unlocked side door and used an AR-15-style rifle to kill 14 students and three staff members, as well as wound 17 others.

Jurors began deliberations on Wednesday. Late that day, the jury asked to see the murder weapon. On Thursday morning, the jury said it had come to a recommendation on a sentence, about 15 minutes after the jurors were able to examine the weapon, according to The Associated Press.

Prosecutors had pushed for the death sentence. In closing arguments Tuesday, lead prosecutor Mike Satz told jurors that Cruz had hunted his victims during his siege of the school, returning to some of those he'd wounded to shoot them again, and kill them....

In laying out their defense, lawyers for Cruz presented testimony from counselors and a doctor who say the defendant suffers from a fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, a condition that they argued affects his reasoning and behavior. Witnesses testified that his birth mother, Brenda Woodard, had abused alcohol and cocaine while she was pregnant with him....

Cruz's rampage is the deadliest mass shooting to go to trial in the U.S., according to The Associated Press. In other attacks in which 17 or more people were killed, the shooter was either killed by police or died by suicide. Still awaiting trial is the suspect in the 2019 shooting of 23 people at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas.

Some prior related posts:

October 13, 2022 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, October 11, 2022

Notable new research on modern operation and impact of Three Strikes law in California

I just came across this notable new report from the California Policy Lab released a couple of months ago titled simply "Three Strikes in California." Here is the 45-page report's listing of "Key Findings" (with bolding in the original):

October 11, 2022 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, October 06, 2022

"Effective Communication with Deaf, Hard of Hearing, Blind, and Low Vision Incarcerated People"

The title of this post is the title of this new article available via SSRN and authored by Tessa Bialek and Margo Schlanger.  Here is its abstract:

Tens of thousands of people incarcerated in jails and prisons throughout the United States have one or more communication disabilities, a term that describes persons who are deaf, hard of hearing, blind, low vision, deaf-blind, speech disabled, or otherwise disabled in ways that affect communication.  Incarceration is not easy for anyone, but the isolation and inflexibility of incarceration can be especially challenging, dangerous, and further disabling, for persons with disabilities.  Correctional entities must confront these challenges; persons with communication disabilities are overrepresented in jails and prisons and the population continues to grow.  Federal antidiscrimination law obligates jails and prisons to avoid discrimination, promote integration, and ensure effective communication.  This requires adequate resources and preparation, joined by a shift in policy, practice, and values: to meet their antidiscrimination obligations, jails and prisons must offer choice, flexibility, and individuation well beyond what is typical in carceral environments. This white paper offers a starting point for such efforts.

October 6, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 03, 2022

A sadder Pennsylvania variation on Going in Style with elderly, ill, repeat bank robber

GoingHollywood has now twice made the movie Going in Style about a group of elderly gentlemen facing who decide to become bank robbers when facing hard financial times.  I recall getting a big kick out of the 1979 version of the movie as a kid, and I did not think quick as much about the 2017 version as an adult.  This movie came to my mind upon reading this local sad press piece, headlined "Pa. man says he robbed bank to stay in prison, not be an imposition to family," about a recent Pennsylvania state sentencing:

A 60-year-old man says he robbed a bank in Lycoming County so he would remain in jail and not burden the family with whom he has not had contact in 30 years with his medical bills. Robert A. Jones, after pleading guilty to a robbery charge Monday, told county Judge Ryan Tira his health is declining.

The judge expressed concern about Jones’ mental health but proceeded to sentence him to 45 to 90 months in state prison in accordance with the plea agreement. Restitution of $2,000 also was ordered.

Police recovered $3,000 of the $5,000 taken in the Sept. 6 robbery when Jones was arrested the next day at the halfway house in the Harrisburg area where he was living. When authorities confronted with a search warrant, Jones is alleged to have responded: “I have nothing to hide, this is my final chapter.” He was within two months of being released from the halfway house, it was noted in court.

“It’s an unfortunate situation,” his public defender Howard B. Gold said. “He prefers to spend the remaining years of his life in state prison.” Tira said he could not relate to Jones’ decision. Jones had been paroled on June 28, 2021, from the 15- to 30-year robbery sentence imposed in 2008 in Lackawanna County. He claimed when arrested last month he had robbed two dozen banks since the 1990s. Records confirm numerous charges in state and federal courts.

The Sept. 6 robbery was at the Jersey Shore State Bank office in Jersey Shore. The robber was wearing a surgical mask and a yellow rain jacket when he handed a note to a teller that stated, “this is a robbery” and then told her to “just remember your training.” He was handed $5,000 in $100, $50 and $20 bills and then left the bank.

Jones was observed on surveillance video running away from the bank and while cutting through a parking lot removing a yellow jacket. Shortly after he disappeared, a 1999 Toyota Camry appeared and a video showed a yellow object in the back seat. The license plate was visible so police were able to determine the car was owned by Jones....

Surveillance video showed Jones removing a black bag from the Camry in the halfway house parking lot and taking it inside. He was wearing clothing similar to that of the robber. Found inside the vehicle, police said, was a yellow rain jacket, beige colored hat, medical mask and more than $3,000 in currency.

Jones told Tiadaghton Valley Regional Police Officer Justin Segura this was the end of the road, it was a call for help and he had no intent to harm anyone in the bank, the arrest affidavit states. The state Parole Board has lodged a detainer against Jones so could face more court action.

October 3, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, September 29, 2022

Spotlighting again the decarceral success of the CARES Act

Because it is often so very easy to notice and spotlight government failings in the crime and punishment arena, it is nice to have opportunities to highlight government successes in this world.  So, though I have noted before the great data about the success of persons released from federal prison early under the CARES Act, I am happy to see Molly Gill talking up this data in this new Washington Post opinion piece headlined "Thousands were released from prison during covid. The results are shocking."  Here are excerpts:

We are keeping many people in prison even though they are no danger to the public, a jaw-dropping new statistic shows. That serves as proof that it’s time to rethink our incarceration policies for those with a low risk of reoffending.

To protect those most vulnerable to covid-19 during the pandemic, the Cares Act allowed the Justice Department to order the release of people in federal prisons and place them on home confinement. More than 11,000 people were eventually released. Of those, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) reported that only 17 of them committed new crimes.

That’s not a typo. Seventeen. That’s a 0.15 percent recidivism rate in a country where it’s normal for 30 to 65 percent of people coming home from prison to reoffend within three years of release.

Of those 17 people, most new offenses were for possessing or selling drugs or other minor offenses. Of the 17 new crimes, only one was violent (an aggravated assault), and none were sex offenses.

This extremely low recidivism rate shows there are many, many people in prison we can safely release to the community. These 11,000 releases were not random. People in low- and minimum-security prisons or at high risk of complications from covid were prioritized for consideration for release....

The Cares Act policy teaches us that many of our prison sentences are unnecessarily lengthy. People who commit crimes should be held accountable, and that might include serious time in prison. Many of the people released to home confinement had years or even decades left to serve on their sentences. But they changed in prison and are no longer a danger to others, as the new data confirms.

Releases to home confinement were also focused on two groups of people who pose little to no risk to public safety: the elderly and the ill (i.e., those most likely to face serious covid complications). Study after study confirms that people become less likely to reoffend as they get older. America’s elderly prison population is growing rapidly, because of our use of lengthy prison terms.

People with serious chronic illnesses or physical disabilities are another group who can be safely released from long sentences. They are not dangerous, but their increased medical needs make them exponentially more expensive to incarcerate. Taxpayers aren’t getting much public safety bang for their buck when we incarcerate bedridden people.

The federal Cares Act home confinement program should inspire similar programs across the country. Virtually all states have programs available to release elderly or very sick people from prison, but they are hardly used and should be expanded. States should also give people serving the longest sentences a chance to go back to court after 10 or 15 years and prove that they have changed and can be safely released.

The data is in. It shows that we can thoughtfully release low-risk people from prison with supervision and not cause a new crime wave. At a time when crime is going up in so many cities and towns, we cannot afford to waste money or resources keeping those who no longer need to be in prison locked up.

Prior related posts:

September 29, 2022 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 27, 2022

Taking account of extreme sentences under "habitual offender" laws in Mississippi and Louisiana

Tana Ganeva has this lengthy new piece at The Appeal which details the impact and import of repeat offender laws in two southern states. The full title of this piece previews in coverage: "'Habitual Offender' Laws Imprison Thousands for Small Crimes — Sometimes for Life: Data obtained by The Appeal show nearly 2,000 people in Mississippi and Louisiana are serving long — and sometimes life — sentences after they were labeled “habitual offenders." But most are behind bars for small crimes like drug possession." I recommend the full piece and here are some excerpts:

The Appeal took a deeper look at Louisiana and Mississippi, states that changed their laws in 1994 or 1995 and now have some of the highest rates of incarcerated people in the country.  The Appeal sent freedom of information requests to both the Mississippi Department of Corrections and Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections for data on people serving 20-year-plus sentences and, where possible, information regarding whether their sentences had been enhanced by a habitual offender statute.  We broke the data down by race, crime, time served, and sentence. In total, datasets suggest there are close to 2,000 people currently serving long sentences enhanced by habitual offender statutes in these two states.

A small number of these people in these two states committed serious crimes.  But most are serving 20-plus years primarily because of habitual offender status, where the triggering offense was drug possession, drug sale, illegal gun possession, or another crime besides murder or rape.  Scores of people are serving virtual or literal life sentences for nonviolent drug possession....

In the mid-1990s, Mississippi instituted some of the most restrictive habitual offender laws in the country and virtually did away with parole for repeat offenders....  According to data analyzed by The Appeal, as of August 4, 2021, there were nearly 600 people in Mississippi who were serving 20 years or more with no parole date and were considered habitual offenders....  In Mississippi, 75 percent of “habitual offenders” are Black, while 25 percent are white. (Other racial groups make up a negligible number.) ...

The majority of habitual offender convictions analyzed by The Appeal are linked to possession of drugs, possession of firearms, or contraband in prison. In the most extreme cases, multiple people convicted of drug crimes were given virtual life sentences because of their habitual offender status.  Perry Armstead is serving 63 years for five charges of cocaine possession and sales. Keith Baskin is serving 60 years for possession of cannabis with intent to distribute. Timothy Bell is serving 80 years after being convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon and selling meth twice. Malcolm Crump is serving 56 years for selling meth on three occasions. Paul Houser got 60 years for meth. Anthony Jefferson got 60 years for possession of cannabis with intent to distribute....

There are nearly 900 people serving sentences longer than 20 years in Louisiana because of habitual offender statutes who aren’t eligible for parole. (Overall, there are more than four thousand people serving life without parole in the state.)

According to data acquired through a freedom of information request, the most serious crimes are in the minority. Less than 3 percent of those imprisoned due to habitual offender status were convicted of first-degree murder.  Slightly less than 5 percent are serving time for second-degree murder. Almost 6 percent are serving time for rape. Meanwhile, 12.6 percent are serving 20-plus years because of habitual offender statutes triggered by a drug crime.  Of those serving decades for drug crimes, 49 people were convicted for possession, 34 for possession with intent to distribute, and 31 for distribution.

September 27, 2022 in Data on sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 26, 2022

Kentucky parole board orders school shooter to serve out the remainder of his life sentence

In this post last month, titled "Grappling with parole possibilities a quarter-century after horrific school shooting by young teen," I flagged an article discussing the first modern teen school shooter who was due to receive parole consideration 25 years after his crime.  This new lengthy CNN piece reports on the results of the process, and here are excerpts:

The Kentucky Parole Board on Monday denied parole to Michael Carneal, a man serving a life sentence for killing three students in a school shooting in 1997 when he was 14 years old. The ruling by the full parole board to have Carneal serve out his sentence comes after a two-person panel failed to reach a unanimous decision about Carneal’s release last week.

“Due to the seriousness of your crime — your crime involved a weapon, you had lives taken, and the seriousness, again — it is the decision of the parole board today to allow you to serve out the remainder of your sentence,” Parole Board Chairperson Ladeidra Jones said Monday. Carneal, who attended the hearing via video conference, responded, “Yes ma’am,” and stepped out of frame.

Carneal has served nearly 25 years in prison for opening fire at Heath High School in Paducah on December 1, 1997, killing the three students and wounding five others just after the students’ prayer circle in the lobby said “Amen.” Carneal pleaded guilty to three counts of murder, five counts of attempted murder, and a count of first-degree burglary. While he was sentenced to life in prison, Kentucky law requires that minors be considered for parole after 25 years.

Many survivors and families of the victims were opposed to Carneal’s requested release.  But now 39, Carneal pleaded his case to members of the parole board in a hearing last week, saying that if he were released, he planned to live with his parents, continue undergoing mental health treatment and eventually get a job.

Carneal’s public defender, Alana Meyer, asked the board to remember Carneal was a teenager when he opened fire, was suffering from undiagnosed paranoid schizophrenia and was struggling with bullying and the transition from middle to high school. In the quarter century since, Carneal “has committed himself to his mental health treatment, to participating in available educational and vocational programs, and to being a helpful and positive person within the prison,” Meyer wrote....

Carneal told the panel he has received multiple mental health diagnoses and has long heard voices in his head – including on the day of the shooting.  He said that before opening fire he heard a voice telling him to “pick up the gun out of the backpack and hold it in front of me and shoot.”

“There’s no justification or excuse for what I did,” Carneal said. “I’m offering an explanation. I realize there’s no excuse for what I did.”  Carneal said he still hears voices in his head, but now knows when to ignore them.

A colleague has informed me that there is litigation in lower courts contesting the legality of the Kentucky parole board converting a life with parole sentence into a life without parole sentence via this kind of "serve out" order.  

September 26, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, September 14, 2022

"'Take the Motherless Children off the Street': Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and the Criminal Justice System"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Michael Perlin and Heather Cucolo now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Remarkably, there has been minimal academic legal literature about the interplay between fetal alcohol syndrome disorder (FASD) and critical aspects of many criminal trials, including issues related to the role of experts, quality of counsel, competency to stand trial, the insanity defense, and sentencing and the death penalty.  Nor has there been any literature about the interplay between FASD-related issues and the legal school of thought known as therapeutic jurisprudence.

In this article, the co-authors will first define fetal alcohol syndrome and explain its significance to the criminal justice system.  We will then look at the specific role of experts in cases involving defendants with FASD and consider adequacy of counsel.  Next, we will discuss how the impact of FASD on the major fundamentals of criminal law and procedure, especially as it relates to questions of culpability. Under this broad umbrella of topics, we consider questions that may arise in the criminal trial process, such as those related to competency to stand trial (and, to a limited extent, other criminal competencies), the insanity defense, sentencing, and the death penalty.  We look carefully at the way that courts all too often dismiss effectiveness-of-counsel claims in such cases, and the implications of this case law.

Finally, we investigate why it is so significant that the caselaw in this area has totally ignored the teachings of therapeutic jurisprudence, and offer some conclusions and recommendations (based on therapeutic jurisprudence principles) that, we hope, can (at least partially) ameliorate this situation.

This article strikes me as especially timely given that the capital defense of Nikolas Cruz, the Parkland school shooter, has been particularly focused on FASD.  This new article, headlined "Nikolas Cruz trial: FASD expert has ‘never seen’ pregnant woman abuse alcohol as much as shooter’s mother," provides a partial account of the evidence being developed during his on-going capital sentencing proceeding.

September 14, 2022 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, September 06, 2022

"Have American jails become the inferior replacement for mental hospitals?"

The question in the title of this post is the headline of this new Salon piece.  Here are a few excerpts:

London's Bedlam psychiatric hospital is infamous today for how its staff brutally abused their patients....

Things are arguably better for mentally ill people in 21st century America.  Yet a new study by George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government, and published in the medical journal BMC Health Services Research, suggests that any improvement may not be as great as we'd like to think.  At present, there are 10 times as many people with mental illnesses in jails and prisons than in state psychiatric hospitals.  In other words, we've substituted jails for treatment facilities. 

Niloofar Ramezani, assistant professor of statistics at George Mason University and corresponding author of the study ... believes that the study's "most important finding," is that "one should focus on building up the community's capacity to provide mental health services."  Ramezani pointed out that their study also found that "after accounting for the availability of mental health care services, the size of the violent crime problem no longer has an effect to how the jail is used."  American society is filling up its jails with mentally ill individuals in a way that, quantifiably, cannot be plausibly linked to any kind of meaningful violent crime problem....

"We've known for some time that this country's chief response to serious mental illness is incarceration, a fact that stands out because prisons are so clearly unsuited to treating mental illness," Wanda Bertram, Communications Strategist at Prison Policy Initiative, told Salon by email.  "Our organization recently found that even though 43% of people in state prisons have been diagnosed with a mental disorder, only 26% have received some form of mental health treatment, and only 6% are currently receiving treatment."...

Ramezani and the study's other co-authors ultimately argue, as Ramezani put it to Salon, that "more research needs to be done on the type of individuals with mental health issues who are incarcerated and how they are handled.  Once we know more about them, their mental health journey, and how their mental health condition is changing over time while incarcerated, we can find better solutions to provide helpful support to them if they end up in jail."

In addition to doing more research, American policymakers need to exercise the "political will" necessary to address mental health issues in a humane and effective way.

September 6, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (7)

Monday, September 05, 2022

"Condemning Those with Multiple Disabilities to Die: Dual Diagnosis of Substance Abuse and Intellectual Disability in Capital Sentencing Proceedings"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Aliya Sternstein and John R. Mills now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

While the execution of defendants who score significantly low on intelligence tests, struggle to adapt their behavior to their environment, and experience these deficits during the developmental years is unconstitutional -- some courts have imposed or upheld death sentences because they find the defendant also has a drug addiction.

These courts misread the no longer used technical phrase “related to” in the above medical criteria for an intellectual disability (ID) diagnosis.  The criteria stated that shortfalls in adaptive behavior must be “related to” low intellectual functioning.  The long-settled medical community consensus is that there is no requirement to identify the psychological causes of these adaptive deficits.  But the misinformed courts have improperly held that related to means “caused by” instead of “co-existing with,” requiring proof of a negative: that the accused’s deficits in behavior are not caused by a substance use disorder.  This legal and medical error is common in some jurisdictions.  That is so, even in light of U.S. Supreme Court instructions to be informed by the medical consensus when assessing ID.

Although a great deal has been written about the exemption of those with ID from execution, little legal scholarship has addressed the intersection of substance abuse, Supreme Court reliance on the medical consensus in death eligibility decisions, and a misunderstanding or disregard of the consensus that addiction may and often do co-exist with ID.  Limited social skills and a self-perception of being different from others can foster loneliness and an urge to fit in that defendants with ID overcome by abusing drugs and alcohol.  The high Court has explicitly recognized the same: because people with ID often have other psychological impairments, the “existence of a personality disorder or mental-health issue, in short, is not evidence that a person does not also have intellectual disability.”

Judges and jurors perhaps deny protection to defendants with addictions and ID because of a misperception that those with substance use disorders are more blameworthy for their plight than defendants with additional psychological disorders or those with only ID.  But neither the medical consensus nor the Supreme Court has ever suggested that addiction changes the level of culpability of an offender with ID.  Quite the opposite: ID may heighten the risk of developing a substance use disorder.

This paper makes the straightforward case that a defendant, who otherwise meets the ID criteria, cannot be excluded from the constitutional prohibition on executing those with ID simply because of a dual diagnosis of substance abuse. Accordingly, courts must not require a defendant asserting ineligibility for execution to show that their deficits in adaptive behavior are “related to” an intellectual impairment and not related to substance abuse or some other psychological impairment.

September 5, 2022 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, August 30, 2022

New Sentencing Project report highlights court diversion as a means to reduce juvenile justice disparities

The Sentencing Project today released a big new report authored by Richard Mendel titled "Diversion: A Hidden Key to Combating Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Juvenile Justice."  Here are parts of the report's executive summary:

Diverting youth from juvenile court involvement should be a central focus in efforts to reduce racial and ethnic disparities and improve outcomes in our nation’s youth justice systems.

Clear evidence shows that getting arrested in adolescence or having a delinquency case filed in juvenile court damages young people’s futures and increases their subsequent involvement in the justice system.  Compared with youth who are diverted, youth who are arrested and formally petitioned in court have far higher likelihood of subsequent arrests and school failure.  Pre-arrest and pre-court diversion can avert these bad outcomes.

Research shows that Black youth are far more likely to be arrested than their white peers and far less likely to be diverted from court following arrest.  Other youth of color — including Latinx youth, Tribal youth, and Asian/Pacific Islander youth — are also less likely than their white peers to be diverted.  The lack of diversion opportunities for youth of color is pivotal, because greater likelihood of formal processing in court means that youth of color accumulate longer court histories, leading to harsher consequences for any subsequent arrest.

Expanding diversion opportunities for youth of color therefore represents a crucial, untapped opportunity to address continuing disproportionality in juvenile justice....

For most youth, diversion is more effective and developmentally appropriate than court.  Compelling research finds that formal involvement in the justice system tends to undermine rather than enhance public safety and to reduce young people’s future success....

Diversion is vastly underutilized in the United States.  Of the youth referred to juvenile or family courts for delinquency each year, just 7% are accused of serious violent offenses.  Therefore, a large majority of youth accused of delinquency should be diverted rather than arrested and formally processed in a juvenile court.  Yet the use of diversion remains limited....

The diversion stage of the juvenile court process should be a top priority for youth justice reform.  Advocates should push for and system leaders must take aggressive action to address racial and ethnic disparities in diversion.  Combined, reforms to expand and improve the use of diversion offer perhaps the most important and promising avenue currently available to reduce disparities and to improve youth justice systems nationwide.

August 30, 2022 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 29, 2022

US Sentencing Commission releases big new report on "The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: Thirty Years of Innovation and Influence"

Though a full new US Sentencing Commission was confirmed earlier this month, the outgoing folks are continuing to release notable new research reports as we await new action from the newbies.  The latest USSC report runs nearly 100 pages under the title "The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: Thirty Years of Innovation and Influence." This USSC webpage provides this background with key findings:

This publication summarizes the history of Chapter Eight’s development and discusses the two substantive changes made to the elements of an effective compliance and ethics program. It then provides policymakers and researchers a snapshot of corporate sentencing over the last 30 years. Finally, the publication describes Chapter Eight’s impact beyond federal sentencing.

Key Findings:

  • The major innovations of the organizational guidelines are (1) incentivizing organizations to self-police their behavior; (2) providing guidance on effective compliance and ethics programs that organizations can implement to demonstrate efforts to self-police; and (3) holding organizations accountable based on specific factors of culpability.
  • The most significant achievement of Chapter Eight has been the widespread acceptance of the organizational guidelines' criteria for developing and maintaining effective compliance and ethics programs to prevent, detect, and report criminal conduct.
  • During the 30-year period since promulgation of the organizational guidelines, 4,946 organizational offenders have been sentenced in the 94 federal judicial districts. The majority of organizational offenders are domestic (88.1%), private (92.2%), and smaller organizations with fewer than 50 employees (70.4%).
  • Six offense types accounted for 80.4 percent of all organizational offenders from fiscal years 1992 through 2021.
    • Fraud (30.1%) and environmental (24.0%) offenses, accounted for more than half (54.1%) of all organizational offenses.
    • Other common offense types were antitrust (8.4%), food and drug (6.6%), money laundering (6.1%), and import and export crimes (5.2%).
  • Commission data suggests that the lack of an effective compliance and ethics program may be a contributing factor to criminal prosecutions against organizations.
    • Since fiscal year 1992, the overwhelming majority of organizational offenders (89.6%) did not have any compliance and ethics program.
    • Only 11 of the 4,946 organizational offenders sentenced since fiscal year 1992 received a culpability score reduction for having an effective compliance and ethics program.
    • More than half (58.3%) of the organizational offenders sentenced under the fine guidelines received a culpability score increase for the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity.
    • Few organizational offenders (1.5% overall) received the five-point culpability score reduction for disclosing the offense to appropriate authorities prior to a government investigation in addition to their full cooperation and acceptance of responsibility.
    • Since fiscal year 2000, courts ordered one-fifth (19.5%) of organizational offenders to implement an effective compliance and ethics program.
  • Since fiscal year 1992, the courts have imposed nearly $33 billion in fines on organizational offenders. The average fine imposed was over $9 million and the median amount was $100,000.
  • Since fiscal year 1992, courts sentenced over two-thirds of organizational offenders (69.1%) to a term of probation and the average length of the term of probation imposed was 39 months.

August 29, 2022 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, August 28, 2022

Grappling with parole possibilities a quarter-century after horrific school shooting by young teen

The Washington Post has this compelling new piece on what would appear to be the first modern teen school shooter now about to get parole consideration 25 years after his crime.  I recommend the article in full, and it is headlined "A school shooting shattered a town in 1997. Now the gunman could get parole."  Here are excerpts:

At first, Missy Jenkins Smith thought the sound of gunfire at her Kentucky high school was a bad joke.  Her prayer group had just said, “Amen,” and their day was about to begin.  Then one of her classmates fell to the floor, shot in the head. Another student was hit. Then another.  And suddenly, the 14-year-old boy wielding a Ruger .22 fired seven bullets indiscriminately toward the teens gathered inside Heath High School on Dec. 1, 1997, the Monday morning after Thanksgiving break....

The attack upended the small town of West Paducah, in what was then a rarity in the United States: a school shooting. Three students — Nicole Hadley, 14; Jessica James, 17; and Kayce Steger, 15 — were killed and five others wounded. Michael Carneal pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life in prison.  But under Kentucky law, the teenager who claimed to have been bullied was given the possibility of parole in 25 years....

Carneal is up for a hearing next month in what family members of the deceased, survivors and experts say is among the first instances that an assailant in a school shooting has a chance at being released.  The proceeding will be held Sept. 19 and 20 over Zoom to determine whether Carneal, now 39, will be released in November.

The prospect of Carneal potentially getting released has reopened wounds for those who still carry the pain from a shooting largely forgotten by America.  The case also presents a unique question as school shootings continue to afflict the nation: What should happen to child assailants who decades later become eligible for release?

Privately, survivors and families of the victims in Kentucky have grappled with whether and how to forgive him — and if the pain he has caused makes that even possible....

The West Paducah attack was among the first school shootings to rock the country — unfolding 16 months before the Columbine High School massacre in Colorado changed the perception of classroom safety. “When Carneal did what he did, he ripped the veil off that feeling of security in school,” said Assistant McCracken County Commonwealth’s Attorney Jamie Mills, “and, obviously, we have not been able to get that back.”...

In Kentucky, the state passed a juvenile code in 1986 that allows for life sentences as long as parole is considered after 25 years.  At the time, Kentucky prosecutors were given leeway from the state to try teens between the ages of 14 and 17 as adults for serious crimes. But Carneal was charged as a minor.  And in October 1998, he pleaded guilty but mentally ill — requiring him to receive mental health care while in prison.  He was later diagnosed with schizophrenia.  Carneal has repeatedly challenged his guilty plea, arguing in 2007 that he was too mentally ill to submit the plea and pushing for it to be withdrawn altogether in 2012.  Both efforts were rejected....

Dan Boaz, the commonwealth’s attorney for McCracken County, said his goal is to make sure Carneal remains “incarcerated for as long as he lives.”  Although it’s unclear how the Kentucky Parole Board — a mix of appointees from former Republican governor Matt Bevin and Democratic Gov. Andy Beshear — will act, the bar for giving a school shooter parole is much harder, given the regularity of shootings in America.

“We have seen a bit of momentum in America in acknowledging that young people tried with crimes should be given another opportunity, but a school shooting case is going to be the hardest one for a parole board,” said Rachel Barkow, a professor of law at New York University and an expert on parole.  “It’s not supposed to be based on the crime itself, but, realistically speaking, it’s very hard for any parole board not to take into account the nature of the initial crime.”

August 28, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Tuesday, August 23, 2022

New CCJ commission to examine factors driving veterans' involvement in criminal justice system

As detailed via this press release, the folks at the Council for Criminal Justice today announced its latest impressive initiative focused on better serving those who have served.  Here are the basics: 

The Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) today announced the launch of a national commission to examine why so many military veterans land in jail and prison and produce recommendations for evidence-based policy changes that enhance safety, health, and justice.

Chaired by former U.S. Defense Secretary and U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel, the nonpartisan Veterans Justice Commission also includes former defense secretary and White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta, a former Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, the chief justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, two formerly incarcerated veterans, and other top military, veterans, and criminal justice leaders.  Over the next two years, the 15-member Commission will conduct research and gather testimony to assess:

  • the extent and nature of veterans’ involvement in the criminal justice system, and  risk factors that drive it;
  • the adequacy of transitional assistance for veterans as they reenter civilian life, and what strategies could better prevent justice-system involvement; and
  • the nature and effectiveness of the justice system response when veterans break the law, and what other interventions could, or should, occur.

“Criminal justice reform has received significant bipartisan attention in recent years, but the issue of how the system manages the men and women who have served our country has been almost totally absent from the national conversation,” said Hagel, a decorated Vietnam veteran and former U.S. senator from Nebraska who served as defense secretary in the Obama Administration. “Service-related trauma and other legacies of deployment push too many veterans on a path toward incarceration. We can and must do more to understand and interrupt that trajectory.”

Roughly 200,000 active-duty service members leave the armed forces each year.  Most transition successfully, demonstrating resilience amid a wide range of risk factors and obstacles.  Others, however, struggle with mental health challenges, substance abuse, homelessness, and criminality.

Roughly one third of veterans report having been arrested and booked into jail at least once in their lives, compared to fewer than one fifth of non-veterans.  According to the most recent national survey, a total of 181,500 veterans were in U.S. prisons and jails.

The reasons underlying veterans’ justice-system involvement are complex, ranging from combat-related risk factors to “bad-paper” discharges that bar VA benefits such as access to mental health and substance abuse treatment, ineffective procedures to identify veterans upon arrest, and inconsistent diversion mechanisms. Once in the system, many veterans do not receive targeted support to address their conditions, reducing the likelihood of successful reentry.

These and other challenges are summarized in an initial assessment report to the Commission and a video, both of which were also released today.

Kudos to CCJ for putting together an amazing team to critically examine the critical questions surrounding just why our veterans tend to be underserved by, and overrepresented in, our criminal justice systems.

August 23, 2022 in Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, August 22, 2022

"Legal Fiction: Reading Lolita as a Sentencing Memorandum"

The title of this post is the title of this intriguing new article authored by Christina Frohock now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The idea of a legal narrative often focuses on identifying a narrative within the law, for example, the persuasive power of storytelling in a trial court motion or an appellate brief.  The story emerges from the law.  This Article proposes inverting that focus so that we identify the law within a narrative.  Using the example of Vladimir Nabokov’s classic novel Lolita, the Article explains how we can read the novel as a prolonged sentencing memorandum.  That memorandum casts the infamous first-person narrator, recounting his crimes under the pseudonym of Humbert Humbert, as a defendant writing pro se.

In Lolita, the law emerges from the story, showing that an entire legal document may be redrawn as a narrative.  The legal document and the narrative are one, with a distinct point of view in favor of the criminal defendant.  This unity between law and narrative illuminates a deep, essential goal shared by both genres: garnering sympathy.  The notion of law without sympathy thus rings hollow.  Finally, this essential link between law and sympathy shines a new light on the law’s role to promote justice.  Justice must be measured at least partly as an expression of sympathy rather than solely as a cold calculation of costs and benefits.

August 22, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, August 21, 2022

Might any victims of Theranos fraud urge leniency at sentencing for Elizabeth Holmes?

MaxresdefaultThe question in the title of this post is prompted by this Bloomberg article headlined "Elizabeth Holmes’s Victims Asked to Weigh in for Sentencing."  Here are excerpts:

The US Justice Department is seeking input from victims of the frauds at blood-testing startup Theranos Inc. committed by Elizabeth Holmes and her second-in-command, Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani.

The US Attorney’s Office in San Francisco on Thursday issued a “call for information” from victims following the separate convictions of the former executives for their roles in the collapse of the company once valued at $9 billion.  The federal judge in San Jose, California, who presided over the trials will use the information in determining their sentences, according to a statement from the office.

The universe of victims includes investors at all levels who poured more than $700 million into Theranos, some of whom hail from ultra-wealthy families and Silicon Valley venture capital firms, as well as thousands of patients who got inaccurate blood-test results from the startup’s clinics inside Walgreens stores....

Holmes was convicted in January of defrauding investors, while Balwani was found guilty in July on similar counts as well as defrauding patients. The trials for Holmes and Balwani were split because Holmes accused the ex-Theranos president, who was also her boyfriend, of sexually and verbally abusing her....  In their respective trials, the Theranos executives blamed each other for the fraud.

US District Judge Edward Davila will weigh the evidence presented at both trials, as well as the counts each was found guilty of, in determining their sentences. Criminal defense lawyers have said both Holmes and Balwani could face a decade in prison....  Both former executives remain free on bond and have asked Davila to set aside the jury verdicts. Holmes’s sentencing is scheduled for October; Balwani’s is set for November.

While prosecutors are busy gathering victim statements to make a case for lengthy periods of incarceration, the defendants are doing their own legwork in a bid for leniency, according to criminal defense attorney Seth Kretzer. “Two can play this game,” he said. “Both Balwani and Holmes will submit letters from their respective family and friends stating how horribly off they will all be with long prison terms.”

As this article explains, there are actually two sets of victims being asked for statements: "investor victims" and "patient victims." Here are links to the four-page statement for for each:

Victim Impact Statement For Investor Victims

Victim Impact Statement For Patient Victims

Notably, these forms do not include any questions that directly ask the victims to opine on the sentence that they would like to see the defendants receive.  But both forms close with this fairly open-ended query: "Is there anything else you would like the sentencing Judge to know about your experience with Theranos, Inc.?"

Prior related posts:

August 21, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, August 16, 2022

"Youth Incarceration & Abolition"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Subini Annamma and Jamelia Morgan.  Here is its abstract:

The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the dangers of the juvenile legal system; this should make it harder to look away from the societal inequities that are exacerbated by youth incarceration.  Indeed, the current moment, including the unprecedented nationwide protests in response to the murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor in summer 2020, has illuminated the power of social movements working to abolish the prison industrial complex, and, as legal scholars have argued, lawyers and law professors should engage with these movements and their calls for abolition and transformative change.  Yet conversations on abolition are mainly centered on adult prisons.  While appreciating and supporting the call for abolishing adult prisons, the absence of youth incarceration from abolitionist movements and discourse is concerning given the violence and disparities that are reflected in youth incarceration.  Furthermore, despite earlier calls to consider abolishing the juvenile legal system, a sustained engagement with abolitionist theory and the juvenile punishment system has not featured in the legal scholarship.  This Article discusses the urgent need to abolish youth incarceration in the context of a global pandemic, surveys arguments for abolition generally, and sets forth an abolitionist critique of youth incarceration using Disability Critical Race Theory (DisCrit) as a lens for analysis.  Applying a DisCrit lens, we discuss how COVID-19 demonstrates the urgency of addressing the harms facing incarcerated youth, particularly Youth of Color and disabled Youth of Color.

August 16, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 11, 2022

Another Jan 6 rioter who was convicted at trial sentenced to 87 months in federal prison

Last week, as discussed in this post, Guy Reffitt, the first Jan. 6 defendant to be convicted at a jury trial (rather than through plea), was sentenced to 87 months in federal prison.  This AP piece reports on today's sentencing of another Jan 6 defendant conviction at trial and the similar outcome (coming from a different sentencing judge):

An off-duty Virginia police officer who stormed the U.S. Capitol on Jan, 6, 2021, with a fellow officer was sentenced Thursday to more than seven years in prison, matching the longest prison sentence so far among hundreds of Capitol riot cases.

Former Rocky Mount Police Sgt. Thomas Robertson declined to address the court before U.S. District Judge Christopher Cooper sentenced him to seven years and three months in prison.  Cooper also sentenced Robertson to three years of supervised release after his prison term.

Federal prosecutors had recommended an eight-year prison sentence for Robertson.  His sentence equals that of Guy Reffitt, a Texas man who attacked the Capitol while armed with a holstered handgun.  Robertson gets credit for the 13 months he has already spent in custody.  Robertson has been jailed since Cooper ruled last year that he violated the terms of his pretrial release by possessing firearms.

The judge said he was troubled by Robertson's conduct since his arrest — not only his stockpiling of guns but also his words advocating for violence.  After Jan. 6, Robertson told a friend that he was prepared to fight and die in a civil war and he clung to baseless conspiracy theories that the 2020 election was stolen from then-President Donald Trump, the judge noted.

Sentencing guidelines calculated by Cooper recommended a prison term ranging from seven years and three months to nine years.  “It's a long time because it reflects the seriousness of the offenses that you were convicted of,” the judge said.

In April, a jury convicted Robertson of attacking the Capitol to obstruct Congress from certifying Joe Biden’s 2020 presidential victory.  Jurors found Robertson guilty of all six counts in his indictment, including charges that he interfered with police officers at the Capitol and that he entered a restricted area with a dangerous weapon, a large wooden stick....

Robertson traveled to Washington on that morning with another off-duty Rocky Mount police officer, Jacob Fracker, and a third man, a neighbor who wasn't charged in the case.  Fracker was scheduled to be tried alongside Robertson before he pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge in March and agreed to cooperate with federal authorities. Cooper is scheduled to sentence Fracker next Tuesday.

Prosecutors have asked Cooper to spare Fracker from a prison term and sentence him to six months of probation along with a period of home detention or “community confinement.”  They said Fracker's “fulsome” cooperation and trial testimony was crucial in securing convictions against Robertson.

Robertson's lawyer, Mark Rollins, sought a prison sentence below two years and three months. He questioned the fairness of the wide gap in sentences that prosecutors recommended for Robertson and Fracker given their similar conduct. Robertson served his country and community with distinction, his lawyer told the judge. “His life already is in shambles,” Rollins said....

In a letter addressed to the judge, Robertson said he took full responsibility for his actions on Jan. 6 and “any poor decisions I made.” He blamed the vitriolic content of his social media posts on a mix of stress, alcohol abuse and “submersion in deep ‘rabbit holes’ of election conspiracy theory.” “I sat around at night drinking too much and reacting to articles and sites given to me by Facebook” algorithms, he wrote.

A few of many prior related posts:

August 11, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Man beats his dog ... and gets 25 years in a Texas prison!?!

I just saw a discussion of what sound like a remarkable local sentencing case out of Texas.  This local story, headlined "San Antonio man handed one of Texas' longest ever animal abuse prison sentences," provides these basics:

A San Antonio man is headed to prison on one of the longest sentences for animal abuse in Texas History.

Animal Care Services said that Frank Javier Fonseca was sentenced to 25 years in prison on animal abuse charges for a violent beating of his puppy, which was captured on video. He was sentenced in June and has previous felony convictions that include drug possession and crimes of retaliation, according to an ACS news release.

The video was captured in February 2019, showing Fonseca repeatedly hitting his young Rottweiler puppy named Buddy with his fists and a piece of wood, as well as kicking and choking the dog. ACS said the video was recorded by "an anonymous Good Samaritan." Court records show Fonesca was arrested in September 2021.

The 56-year-old San Antonio man told ACS that he was disciplining the dog for leaving his yard on Fenfield Avenue. Buddy survived the abusive attack and is now living with a new adoptive family, officials said.

This new Reason commentary, authored by Billy Binion, rightly questions this outcome under this full headline: "A 25-Year Prison Sentence for Beating Up a Dog Is Not Justice: Frank Javier Fonseca's punishment, which may amount to a life sentence, is a microcosm for many of the issues with the U.S. criminal legal system."  

A quick google search has not turned up much more information to justify or even fully explains what seems like a severe outcome, though I suppose I should never be too surprised by the lengthy sentences that can be and often are imposed under various habitual offender statutes.

August 11, 2022 in Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (6)

Monday, August 08, 2022

"'The World of Illusion Is at My Door': Why Panetti v. Quarterman Is a Legal Mirage"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Michael Perlin, Talia Roitberg Harmon and Haleigh Kubiniec now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Some fifteen years ago, in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 956 (2007), the Supreme Court ruled that a mentally ill defendant had a constitutional right to make a showing that his mental illness “obstruct[ed] a rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution.”  In a recent paper, two of the authors (MLP & TRH) analyzed the way the Fifth Circuit had construed that case, and concluded that that court “has basically ignored Panetti’s holdings in all its decisions.” See “Insanity is Smashing up Against My Soul”: The Fifth Circuit and Competency to be Executed Cases after Panetti v. Quarterman, 60 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 557, 578 (2022).  In this article, we expand that inquiry to consider how all federal circuits have interpreted Panetti, and we find that Panetti has never -- with the exception of one case, later vacated -- been a remedy upon which defendants with serious mental illness facing the death penalty could rely.

We analyze all the circuit-level Panetti decisions, and consider the case law through a therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) filter, concluding that this body of cases violates all TJ precepts, and offer a series of recommendations -- as to issues related to adequacy of counsel, the need for databases of experts competent to testify in such matters, the need for other scholars to study the cases we discuss here, and to seek to breathe new life into arguments made some years ago barring the death penalty in all cases of defendants with serious mental illness -- to, we hope, ameliorate this situation in the future.

August 8, 2022 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, August 03, 2022

"Punishment as Communication"

The title of this post is title of this new book chapter authored by R.A. Duff and now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

This chapter defends a communicative theory of punishment, as making plausible sense of the retributivist idea that wrongdoers should not enjoy impunity.  In the context of criminal law, the wrongs that matter are public wrongs that concern the whole polity: the criminal law defines those wrongs, and provides for those who commit them to be called to formal public account, for them through the criminal process.  That calling to account is a communicative process: it culminates in a conviction that censures the offender, and seeks an apologetic response from him.  The punishment that typically ensues furthers this communicative exercise: the offender is required to undertake, or undergo, a penal burden that constitutes an apologetic reparation for his crime, and so communicates to him the need for such reparation.

Central to this communicative conception is that punishment is a two-way process, which seeks an appropriate response from the offender, who has an active role in the process. The role of prudential deterrence in such an account is discussed: it is a necessary condition of a justifiable system that it has some dissuasive efficacy, and deterrence might be a dimension of that dissuasion — inextricably interwoven with the moral message that is the core of the communication.  A purely communicative account that allows no room for deterrence might be implausible as an account of what human punishment ought to be; but one that portrays a two-way moral communication as the primary, distinctive aim of criminal punishment can be defended.

August 3, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, July 29, 2022

Via multiple rulings, Michigan Supreme Court places new restrictions on when juveniles can receive life sentences

The Michigan Supreme Court yesterday issued five(!) rulings addressing, and generally restricting, whether, when, and how juveniles convicted of homicide can receive sentences of life with or without parole.  Some of the most notable of the rulings are discussed in these press pieces that have headlines providing a basic summary:

"Mich. court bars automatic life sentences for 18-year-olds"

"State Supreme Court rules life with parole for juveniles who commit 2nd-degree murder violates MI Constitution"

"Michigan high court extends juvenile age for first-degree murder sentences; Ruling in Macomb County case also places burden on prosecutors for juvenile life sentences"

Here are links to all of the Michigan Supreme Court rulings, all of which are quite lengthy and divided:

154994, People v Robert Taylor 7/28/2022

162425, People v Montez Stovall 7/28/2022

162086, People v Kemo Parks 7/28/2022

157738 & 158695, People v Demariol Boykin, People v Tyler Tate 7/28/2022

Because Michigan has long had a significant juvenile lifer population, I suspect these rulings can and will lead to a notable number of resentencing in the state.  I would be eager to hear from Michigan experts about just how consequential these rulings might prove to be.

UPDATE:  Ashley Nellis of the Sentencing Project has this new tweet noting part of the likely impact of these state rulings:

Michigan #LWOP ban for 18 yr olds should ease the excessive sentences imposed on ~300 people sentenced for first and second degree murder.

July 29, 2022 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 26, 2022

US Sentencing Commission reports on "Older Offenders in the Federal System"

Cover_older-offendersI received an email this morning spotlighting two interesting and important new data reports from the US Sentencing Commission. One of these new USSC reports is this 68-page effort titled "Older Offenders in the Federal System." Highlights are provided via this USSC webpage where one can find this "Summary" and "Key Findings":

Congress requires courts to consider several factors when determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed in federal cases, among them the “history and characteristics of the defendant.”  The sentencing guidelines also specifically authorize judges to consider an offender’s age when determining whether to depart from the federal sentencing guidelines.  In this report, the Commission presents information on relatively small number of offenders who were aged 50 or older at the time they were sentenced in the federal system.  In particular, the report examines older federal offenders who were sentenced in fiscal year 2021 and the crimes they committed, then assesses whether age was given a special consideration at sentencing.  This report specifically focuses on three issues that could impact the sentencing of older offenders: age and infirmity, life expectancy, and the risk of recidivism.

Older offenders commit fraud and sexual offenses at higher rates than all other offenders.

  • Older offenders had roughly three times the rate of fraud offenses (17.8%) and a greater proportion of sex offenses (7.3%), compared to offenders under age 50 (6.4% and 4.1%, respectively).
  • The rate of offenders committing sex offenses increased incrementally as the age of the offender increased. Offenders 70 and older committed sex offenses at nearly three times the rate (11.9%) of offenders under the age of 50 (4.1%).

Roughly 40 percent (40.7%) of older offenders had a physical disability prior to arrest for the instant offense.

  • The rate of offenders with a disability increased incrementally as offenders' age at sentencing increased, so that roughly two-thirds (63.3%) of offenders 70 and older had a physical disability.

About one-third (31.2%) of older offenders had used drugs or misused prescription drugs in the year prior to arrest.

  • Among older drug users, the most used substances were marijuana (32.4%) and methamphetamine (28.5%).

Older offenders have less extensive criminal histories, compared to all other federal offenders.

  • More than half (52.5%) of older offenders were in Criminal History Category (CHC) I, the lowest criminal history category, compared to 37.5 percent of offenders under 50 years of age.

The overwhelming majority (80.1%) of older offenders were sentenced to prison. However, older offenders were also more likely to receive fines and alternative sentences, compared to offenders under age 50.

  • The oldest offenders were the most likely to receive an alternative sentence or fine; roughly a third (31.3%) of offenders 65 through 69 and more than 40 percent (42.1%) of offenders 70 and older received an alternative sentence or fine.
  • The oldest offenders were most likely to have received sentences that exceed life expectancy.

Nearly forty percent (38.6%) of offenders who were sentenced at 70 years of age or older received a sentence that exceeds their life expectancy, compared to 7.1 percent of offenders 65 through 69, and less than one percent of offenders under the age of 50.

In fiscal year 2021, a nearly equal proportion of older offenders (36.7%) were sentenced within the guideline range as received a below range variance (35.5%).

  • The proportion of offenders receiving variances increased as an offender’s age at sentencing increased, with the oldest offenders being the most likely to receive a variance.
  • Offenders 65 and older were nearly as likely to receive a variance (48.9%) as they were to receive a sentence under the Guidelines Manual (51.1%).

The recidivism rate of older offenders (21.3%) was less than half that of offenders under the age of 50 (53.4%).

  • As offenders’ age at sentencing increased, recidivism rates decreased.
  • Recidivism events for older offenders were less serious, compared to offenders under the age of 50.
  • Older offenders take a longer time to recidivate, compared to their younger peers.

July 26, 2022 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 22, 2022

Should "pardoned conduct" be part of Steve Bannon's sentencing after his convictions for contempt of Congress?

Regular readers know that I have long been troubled by the use of so-called "acquitted conduct" in federal sentencing, but today's news of Steve Bannon's conviction on two federal criminal charges brings an interesting twist on what conduct a federal judge should or should not consider at sentencing.  First, here are the basic's of Bannon's convictions and coming sentencing via NBC News:

A jury on Friday found former Donald Trump adviser Steve Bannon guilty on two counts of contempt of Congress for blowing off the Jan. 6 select committee.

Bannon's sentencing is scheduled for Oct. 21 when he will face a mandatory minimum prison sentence of 30 days and up to one year behind bars. He could also be fined $100 to $100,000. He is expected to appeal....

Judge Carl Nichols repeatedly refused to delay Bannon's trial despite the defense team's contention that publicity from the Jan. 6 committee hearings would affect the jury pool and their contention that Bannon was barred from testifying due to Trump's purported claims of executive privilege.  A jury was seated on Tuesday morning.

Second, here is the full text (with sentencing terms) of the federal statute, 2 USC § 192, which served as the foundation for Bannon's convictions:

Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.

Third, recall that Bannon was indicted by federal prosecutors back in August 2020 on fraud and money laundering charges, but Prez Trump pardoned Bannon on this last day in office before the case had moved significantly forward.  This Washington Post article made note of notable comments by the federal judge who dismissed the charges following the pardon:  

A federal judge on Monday formally dismissed the fraud case against Stephen K. Bannon, the conservative provocateur and ex-adviser to President Donald Trump, ending months of litigation over how the court system should handle his pardon while related criminal cases remain unresolved.

U.S. District Judge Analisa Torres, citing examples of other cases being dismissed following a presidential reprieve, granted Bannon’s application — saying in a seven-page ruling that Trump’s pardon was valid and that “dismissal of the Indictment is the proper course.”...

In her decision Tuesday, the judge pointed to past judicial discussions on pardons and what they imply about individuals who receive one.  She quoted from a New Jersey court that, in 1833, found that “pardon implies guilt.”

“If there be no guilt, there is no ground for forgiveness. … A party is acquitted on the ground of innocence; he is pardoned through favor,” it says, according to Torres’s ruling.

Putting all these pieces together leads me to the question in the title of this post, namely whether folks think it would be proper (perhaps even obligatory) for Judge Carl Nichols to consider and give significant attention to the prior (and now pardoned) allegations of fraud involving Bannon. 

Of course, 18 USC § 3553(a)(1), calls upon a court at sentencing to consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant."  The past (alleged and pardoned) fraud conduct certain has part of Bannon's history and characteristics, and a pardon is arguably the antithesis of an exoneration and does not undercut historic jury trial rights like the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing.  Nevertheless, because I think better practice for all purposes is for pardons to be honored and respected through a complete wiping away of all criminal justice sanctions and consequences, I am inclined to want Judge Nichols to not give attention to "pardoned conduct."

July 22, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, July 21, 2022

One officer involved in George Floyd's killing sentenced to 30 months on federal charges

As reported in this AP article, a "federal judge sentenced former Minneapolis police Officer Thomas Lane to 2 1/2 years in prison Thursday for violating George Floyd’s civil rights, calling Lane’s role in the restraint that killed Floyd 'a very serious offense in which a life was lost' but handing down a sentence well below what prosecutors and Floyd’s family sought." Here is more:

Judge Paul Magnuson’s sentence was just slightly more than the 27 months that Lane’s attorney had requested, while prosecutors had asked for at least 5 1/4 years in prison — the low end of federal guidelines for the charge Lane was convicted on earlier this year.  He said Lane, who faces sentencing in September on state charges in Floyd’s killing, will remain free on bond until he must turn himself Oct. 4.

Lane, who is white, held Floyd’s legs as Officer Derek Chauvin pinned Floyd for nearly 9 1/2 minutes on May 25, 2020. Bystander video of Floyd, who was Black, pleading that he could not breathe sparked protests in Minneapolis and around the world in a reckoning over racial injustice over policing. Two other officers, J. Alexander Kueng and Tou Thao, were also convicted of violating Floyd’s civil rights and will be sentenced later.

Floyd family members had asked Magnuson to give Lane the stiffest sentence possible, with brother Philonise Floyd rejecting the idea that Lane deserved any mercy for asking his colleagues twice if George Floyd should be shifted from his stomach to his side. “Officer Lane did not intervene in one way or another,” he said.

Prosecutor Manda Sertich had also argued for a higher sentence, saying that Lane “chose not to act” when he could have saved a life. “There has to be a line where blindly following a senior officer’s lead, even for a rookie officer, is not acceptable,” she said.

Magnuson told Lane the “fact that you did not get up and remove Mr. Chauvin when Mr. Floyd became unconscious is a violation of the law.” But he also held up 145 letters he said he had received supporting Lane, saying he had never received so many on behalf of a defendant. And he faulted the Minneapolis Police Department for sending Lane with another rookie officer on the call that ended in Floyd’s death.

Gray argued during the trial that Lane “did everything he could possibly do to help George Floyd.” He pointed out that Lane suggested rolling Floyd on his side so he could breathe, but was rebuffed twice by Chauvin. He also noted that Lane performed CPR to try to revive Floyd after the ambulance arrived. Lane testified at trial that he didn’t realize how dire Floyd’s condition was until paramedics turned him over. Sertich countered that his expressions of concern showed he knew Floyd was in distress but “did nothing to give Mr. Floyd the medical aid he knew Mr. Floyd so desperately needed.”

When Lane pleaded guilty in state court in May, Gray said Lane hoped to avoid a long sentence. “He has a newborn baby and did not want to risk not being part of the child’s life,” he said.

July 21, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Cruel and Unusual Youth Confinement"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Cara Drinan and now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

In a series of cases known as the Miller trilogy, the Supreme Court recognized that children are both less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults, and that those differences must be taken into consideration at sentencing.  Relying on the principle that kids are different for constitutional purposes, the Court abolished capital punishment for minors and significantly limited the extent to which minors can be subject to life-without-parole (“LWOP”) terms.  Equally important, the Miller trilogy was predicated on the concept of inherent human dignity, and it recognized the youthful prisoner’s need for “hope” and “reconciliation with society.”  While scholars have grappled with the implementation of these cases for nearly a decade, there has been no comprehensive analysis of what these cases mean for conditions of confinement.  That is, if children are different for constitutional purposes at the moment of sentencing, surely, they are still different when transported to a correctional facility and confined by the state. This Paper seeks to close that gap in the literature by making two specific contributions: first, by arguing that the Court’s juvenile sentencing decisions impose affirmative obligations upon states regarding youth conditions of confinement; and second, by articulating a standard for measuring when youth conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment.  As long as the United States persists in its extreme juvenile sentencing practices, the project of articulating what constitutes cruel and unusual youth confinement remains crucial.

July 21, 2022 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 20, 2022

"Federal Sentencing of Illegal Reentry: The Impact of The 2016 Guideline Amendment"

Cover_illegal-reentryThe title of this post is the title of this notable new US Sentencing Commission report. This relatively short report (only 38 pages) is summarized on this USSC webpage providing an "Overview" and a bunch of "Key Findings." Here is that overview and some of the key findings:

Overview

In 2016, the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated an amendment that comprehensively revised the guideline covering illegal reentry offenses — §2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States).  The amendment, Amendment 802, became effective November 1, 2016, and represented the most comprehensive revision of a major guideline in the last two decades.  This report examines the impact of Amendment 802 by looking back at sentencings under §2L1.2 over the last ten fiscal years.  The report first describes the concerns leading to the amendment, including that §2L1.2’s 12- and 16-level increases were overly severe and led to variances, and that using the “categorical approach” to apply enhancements was overly complex, resource intensive, and increased litigation and uncertainty.  After outlining the changes made by Amendment 802, the report assesses its impact on guideline application for §2L1.2 offenders and on appeals involving §2L1.2.

Key Findings

  • Over the last ten fiscal years, immigration offenders have represented either the highest number or second-highest number of offenders sentenced annually.  The vast majority of immigration offenders were sentenced under §2L1.2.
     
  • Amendment 802 to the Guidelines Manual ameliorated concerns about the severity of §2L1.2’s enhancements.
    • While variance rates for §2L1.2 offenders remained largely consistent before and after the amendment, courts imposed sentences within the applicable guideline range at a higher rate on average (66.0%) in the five fiscal years after the amendment than the five fiscal years before the amendment (56.6%). Furthermore, the difference between the average guideline minimum and the average sentence imposed decreased from at least three months before the amendment to no more than one month between fiscal years 2017 and 2020, and slightly over two months in fiscal year 2021.
    • These sentencing trends likely are attributable to the decreasing severity of the sentencing enhancements applicable to offenders sentenced under §2L1.2. The number of offenders who received sentencing increases of 12 or more offense levels decreased substantially from 26,094 in the five fiscal years before the amendment to 5,497 in the five fiscal years after the amendment. The average sentencing increase similarly decreased from seven to four offense levels.
       
  • Amendment 802 significantly simplified guideline application and reduced appeals.
    • In the five fiscal years before the amendment, 31,824 offenders sentenced under §2L1.2 (37.1%) received a sentencing enhancement that potentially required courts to analyze predicate offenses using the categorical approach. That number decreased considerably to only 59 offenders (0.1%) in the five fiscal years after the amendment.
    • After Amendment 802, the number of opinions on §2L1.2 appeals decreased by 90 percent, from 239 in fiscal year 2017 to 24 in fiscal year 2021. Notably, this decline occurred even while the number of immigration sentencings rose steadily from fiscal year 2017 to a ten-year high in fiscal year 2019. By contrast, before the amendment, appellate courts issued 249 opinions on §2L1.2 appeals in fiscal year 2016 alone, and two-thirds of the appeals raised application issues relating to the categorical approach.

July 20, 2022 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 18, 2022

"Reimagining Restitution: New Approaches To Support Youth And Communities"

The title of this post is the title of this new report from the Juvenile Law Center. Here is part of the report's executive summary:

Across the country, juvenile courts impose restitution orders on youth too young to hold a job, still in full-time school, and often living in families already struggling to get by. This process doesn’t work for anyone.  Because children can’t make restitution payments, people owed restitution often don’t get paid or face long delays before they are compensated. Meanwhile, restitution is linked to higher recidivism rates for children, family stress, and deeper justice system involvement. In short, no one wins.

Restitution laws also heighten racial and economic disparities in the juvenile justice system. Most young people who make mistakes, including those who damage property, don’t end up in the justice system at all. Instead, schools, families, and communities solve the problem in ways that work for everyone involved. Because of structural racism, discrimination, economic disparities, and persistent bias, however, certain groups of youth are disproportionately pulled into the justice system for the same types of mistakes. The risk of system involvement is particularly high for Black, Latinx, Indigenous, and other youth of color, young people in poverty, youth with disabilities, and LGBTQIA+ youth.1 As described in this publication, young people then face a rigid and unforgiving set of restitution laws, including severe consequences for nonpayment.

This report provides an overview of the legal framework for restitution in juvenile court, examines the impact on youth, families, and people owed restitution, and highlights key recommendations as jurisdictions across the country begin to reimagine restitution.

July 18, 2022 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, July 16, 2022

Feds seeking (above-guideline) sentence of 15 years for first Jan 6 defendant to be sentenced after trial convictions

Based on a recent AP accounting of the January 6 riot cases, I believe there have already been around 200 defendants sentenced for their activities related to the Capitol riot, but all of those sentences have been handed down after guilty pleas.  As detailed in this Insider article, federal prosecutors are seeking a particularly severe sentence for the first rioter due to be sentenced following a conviction at trial.  Here are the basics:

Guy Reffitt, the first Capitol rioter convicted at trial on charges stemming from the January 6, 2021 insurrection, should receive a 15-year prison sentence for his "central role" in leading a pro-Trump mob that clashed with police protecting Congress, federal prosecutors said in a court filing Friday.

A jury in Washington, DC, needed just hours in early March to find Reffitt guilty on all five charges he faced in connection with the Capitol attack, including obstruction of an official proceeding. Reffitt, of Texas, was also found guilty of entering restricted Capitol grounds with a handgun and with later threatening his children to keep them from reporting him to law enforcement.

In a 58-page court filing, federal prosecutors argued that Reffitt played a pivotal role in "overwhelming officers and showing the mob the way forward at the outset of the riot." The language echoed their description of Reffitt at his weeklong trial, where prosecutors called Reffitt the "tip of this mob's spear" and played video footage of him ascending stairs up to the Capitol in tactical gear, with fellow members of the pro-Trump mob following him.

If ordered, the 15-year sentence would go down as the longest prison term given to a Capitol rioter to date, nearly tripling the more than 5-year sentence Robert Scott Palmer received after throwing a fire extinguisher at police during the January 6 attack. Judge Dabney Friedrich, a Trump appointee confirmed in 2017, is set to sentence Reffitt on August 1....

In a separate court filing Friday, Reffitt's defense lawyer argued that he should receive a sentence of no longer than 2 years in prison. His lawyer, F. Clinton Broden, noted that Reffitt never entered the Capitol.

The Government's lengthy sentencing memorandum is available at this link, and it begins this way:

For Defendant Guy Reffitt’s central role in leading a mob that attacked the United States Capitol while our elected representatives met in a solemn Joint Session of Congress — including his intention to use his gun and police-style flexicuffs to forcibly drag legislators out of the building and take over Congress, and his later threats to harm his children if they turned him into the FBI — the government respectfully requests that this Court sentence him to 15 years of incarceration.

The Court should depart upwards from the PSR’s Sentencing Guidelines range of 9 to 11.25 years (108 to 135 months)2 of incarceration both because Reffitt’s crime “was calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion,” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4, cmt. n.4, and because the Guidelines’ grouping analysis provides “inadequate scope” for Reffitt’s possession of multiple weapons in the commission of his offenses, see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, bkgd. cmt. (upward departure based on grouping); § 5K2.6 (upward departure based on use of weapons).

The defense's sentencing memorandum is available at this link, stresses to the court the "need to avoid sentencing disparities" and it contends that "most if not all defendants who received a sentence of greater than 24 months imprisonment are at a whole different level than Mr. Reffitt."  It concludes this way:

Based upon the foregoing, Undersigned Counsel respectfully suggests that a sentence of no more than 24 months imprisonment is, in fact, sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553.

Some of many prior related posts:

July 16, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (21)

Wednesday, July 13, 2022

Some more coverage and commentary on what criminalization of abortion can and will mean 

In a few posts here and here not long after the Dobbs decision, I flagged some news pieces and some commentaries discussing how the overruling of Roe and the criminalization of abortion in some states might echo through our criminal justice system.  In recent days, have now seen a few more notable pieces further exploring what abortion criminalization could and will mean:

From The 19th, "Prosecutor explains what preparing for a future of post-Roe abortion cases might look like"

From Bloomberg Law, "Progressives Look to Pardon Power as Abortion Access Fix"

From CNN, "Michigan governor signs executive order to protect abortion providers and patients from extradition"

From Mother Jones, "Why Progressive Prosecutors Won’t Save Us in a Post-Roe World"

From Slate, "Why Even Progressive Prosecutors Won’t Be Able to Keep Women Who Have Abortions Out of Jail"

From The Texan, "Texas Freedom Caucus Warns Law Firm of Criminal Liability for Covering Employees’ Abortion Costs"

From the Texas Observer, "Abortion Is (Again) A Criminal-Justice Issue

A few prior related posts:

July 13, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (10)

Thursday, July 07, 2022

In accord with plea deal, federal judge give (below-guideline) sentence of 21 years to Derek Chauvin for civil rights violations

As reported in this post back in December, Derek Chauvin pleaded guilty in federal court to civil rights violations arising from his murder of George Floyd.  He did so with a plea deal in place that would bind the federal judge to impose a sentence of between 20 and 25 years even though Chauvin's advisory guideline range is life imprisonment.  Today, as reported here by the AP, the judge decides to sentence toward the bottom of this plea bargained range:

A federal judge on Thursday sentenced Derek Chauvin to 21 years in prison for violating George Floyd’s civil rights, telling the former Minneapolis police officer that what he did was “simply wrong” and “offensive.”

U.S. District Judge Paul Magnuson sharply criticized Chauvin for his actions on May 25, 2020, even as he opted for the low end of a sentencing range called for in a plea agreement. Chauvin, who is white, pinned Floyd to the pavement outside a Minneapolis corner store for more than nine minutes as the Black man pleaded, “I can’t breathe,” and became unresponsive....

Magnuson, who earlier this year presided over the federal trial and convictions of three other officers at the scene, blamed Chauvin alone for what happened.... “You absolutely destroyed the lives of three young officers by taking command of the scene,” Magnuson said.

Chauvin’s plea agreement called for a sentence of 20 to 25 years to be served concurrent with a 22 1/2-year sentence for his state conviction of murder and manslaughter charges. Because of differences in parole eligibility in the state and federal systems, it means that Chauvin will serve slightly more time behind bars than he would have on the state sentence alone.

He would be eligible for parole after 15 years on the state sentence, but must serve almost 18 years of his federal time before he could be released.  He will also do his time in the federal system, where he may be safer and may be held under fewer restrictions than in the state system....

Chauvin attorney Eric Nelson had asked for 20 years, arguing that Chauvin was remorseful and would make that clear to the court.  But Chauvin, in brief remarks, made no direct apology or expression of remorse to Floyd’s family. Instead, he told the family that he wishes Floyd’s children “all the best in their life.”...

Prosecutor LeeAnn Bell asked Magnuson to give Chauvin the full 25 years possible in the plea deal, highlighting the “special responsibility” that he had as a police officer to care for the people in his custody....

Floyd’s brother Philonise also asked for the maximum possible sentence, telling Magnuson the Floyd family had “been given a life sentence.” He said afterward that he was upset that Chauvin didn’t get more time behind bars.

Chauvin’s mother, Carolyn Pawlenty, told Magnuson that her son didn’t go to work intending to kill someone. “Many things have been written about him that are totally wrong such as he’s a racist, which he isn’t, that he has no heart,” she said. “I believe it is God’s will for all of us to forgive.”

Chauvin’s guilty plea included an admission that he willfully deprived Floyd of his right to be free from unreasonable seizure, including unreasonable force by a police officer.  It also included a count for violating the rights of a Black 14-year-old whom he restrained in an unrelated case in 2017.  John Pope, now 18, told Magnuson that Chauvin “didn’t care about the outcome” of that restraint.  “By the grace of God I lived to see another day,” Pope said. “It will continue to be a part of me for the rest of my life.”

A few prior related posts:

July 7, 2022 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 01, 2022

Longest prison sentence yet in Varisity Blues case, 30 months, given to Georgetown tennis coach

It has now been more than three years since I reported in this post about the first pleas in the high-profile college fraud Varsity Blues case detailed in this press release from the US Attorney's Office for the District of Massachusetts, headlined "14 Defendants in College Admissions Scandal to Plead Guilty."  I covered a number of the early and celebrity sentencings closely, but there have been too many cases for me to keep track of them all.  Helpfully, DOJ has assembled here all the cases charged and sentenced in the Varsity Blues investigation, and today comes this news of the longest prison term imposed on the roughly four dozen defendants sentenced in this high-profile scandal:

Gordon "Gordie" Ernst, a Rhode Island tennis legend, was sentenced Friday to 30 months in prison — the longest sentence yet for a defendant in the "Operation Varsity Blues" case.

Ernst, 55, previously pleaded guilty to multiple bribery charges after being swept up in the federal investigation into dubious college admission schemes.

Prosecutors for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Massachusetts had argued that Ernst warranted a significantly harsher sentence than others charged in the case, because of his "raw greed" and the "breathtaking scale" of his offenses.

Ernst, in his appeal for leniency, portrayed himself as the product of a difficult upbringing in Cranston, in a family that sometimes struggled to make ends meet but seemed from the outside to be the pinnacle of athletic success.  He alleged that he was routinely beaten by his father, Richard “Dick” Ernst, a legendary coach who died in 2016.

According to prosecutors, Ernst accepted nearly $3.5 million in bribes while working as tennis coach at Georgetown University, in exchange for identifying wealthy high-school students who would not have otherwise qualified for the team as promising tennis recruits.  He collected at least $2 million more than any other coach or administrator charged in Operation Varsity Blues, according to the government's sentencing memo....

Ernst said that since his arrest, he has worked part-time at Hertz cleaning cars — a significant departure from the days when he was brought into the White House to give tennis lessons to the Obama family.  He still coaches tennis on a part-time basis, he said, and volunteered at COVID vaccination sites in Cape Cod.

Federal prosecutors had requested a sentence of four years in prison and two years of supervised release, plus the forfeiture of more than $3.4 million in proceeds.  They noted that unlike parents charged in the scheme, Ernst "cannot claim to have acted out of a desire to help his own children gain admission to college."...

Ernst's attorneys argued that their client should not receive more than one year and a day in prison, given the much lighter sentences given to other defendants, and should not be ordered to pay restitution.  In their sentencing memo, Ernst's legal team described the coach as "a kid from Cranston, Rhode Island whose family at times depended on public assistance," and "flew too close to the sun" when he found himself surrounded by power and wealth.

A few of many prior posts on other defendants in college admissions scandal:

July 1, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, June 28, 2022

Ghislaine Maxwell given 20-year federal sentence for sex trafficking for Jeffrey Epstein

In this post over the weekend, I asked in anticipation of today's high-profile sentencing, "what federal sentence for convicted sex trafficker Ghislaine Maxwell?."  Commentor tmm nailed the outcome, as reported here by the AP:

Ghislaine Maxwell, the jet-setting socialite who once consorted with royals, presidents and billionaires, was sentenced to 20 years in prison Tuesday for helping the financier Jeffrey Epstein sexually abuse underage girls.  The stiff sentence was the punctuation mark on a trial that explored the sordid rituals of a predator power couple who courted the rich and famous as they lured vulnerable girls as young as 14, and then exploited them.

Prosecutors said Epstein, who killed himself in 2019 while awaiting trial, sexually abused children hundreds of times over more than a decade, and couldn’t have done so without the help of Maxwell, his longtime companion and onetime girlfriend who they said sometimes also participated in the abuse.  In December, a jury convicted Maxwell of sex trafficking, transporting a minor to participate in illegal sex acts and two conspiracy charges.

U.S. District Judge Alison J. Nathan, who also imposed a $750,000 fine, said “a very significant sentence is necessary” and that she wanted to send an “unmistakable message” that these kinds of crimes would be punished.  Prosecutors had asked the judge to give her 30 to 55 years in prison, while the 60-year-old Maxwell’s defense sought a lenient sentence of just five years....

When she had a chance to speak, Maxwell said she empathized with the survivors and that it was her “greatest regret of my life that I ever met Jeffrey Epstein.” Maxwell called him “a manipulative, cunning and controlling man who lived a profoundly compartmentalized life,” echoing her defense attorneys’ assertions that Epstein was the true mastermind. Maxwell, who denies abusing anyone, said she hoped that her conviction and her “unusual incarceration” bring some “measure of peace and finality.”

Nathan refused to let Maxwell escape culpability, making clear that Maxwell was being punished for her own actions, not Epstein’s. She called the crimes “heinous and predatory” and said Maxwell as a sophisticated adult woman provided the veneer of safety as she “normalized” sexual abuse through her involvement, encouragement and instruction....

Assistant U.S. Attorney Alison Moe recounted how Maxwell subjected girls to “horrifying nightmares” by taking them to Epstein. “They were partners in crime together and they molested these kids together,” she said, calling Maxwell “a person who was indifferent to the suffering of other human beings.”

Epstein and Maxwell’s associations with some of the world’s most famous people were not a prominent part of the trial, but mentions of friends like Bill Clinton, Donald Trump and Britain’s Prince Andrew showed how the pair exploited their connections to impress their prey.

Over the past 17 years, scores of women have accused Epstein of abuse them, with many describing Maxwell as the madam who recruited them.  The trial, though, revolved around allegations from only a handful of those women.  Four testified that they were abused as teens in the 1990s and early 2000s at Epstein’s mansions in Florida, New York, New Mexico and the Virgin Islands....

At least eight women submitted letters to the judge, describing the sexual abuse they said they endured for having met Maxwell and Epstein.  Six of Maxwell’s seven living siblings wrote to plead for leniency.  Maxwell’s fellow inmate also submitted a letter describing how Maxwell has helped to educate other inmates over the last two years.  Anne Holve and Philip Maxwell, her eldest siblings, wrote that her relationship with Epstein began soon after the 1991 death of their father, the British newspaper magnate Robert Maxwell.

Based on the sentencing filings noted in this prior post, I believe the Government argued the applicable federal sentencing guideline range was 360 month-life, but this CBS article indicates that Judge Nathan concluded the proper guideline range was 188-235 months.  So, by adopting a more lenient guideline calculation, Judge Nathan technically gave Maxwell and above-guideline sentence.

Prior related posts:

June 28, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, June 27, 2022

US Sentencing Commission releases another recidivism report examining "status points" in criminal history calculations

Despite lacking a quorum, the US Sentencing Commission keeps churning out a remarkable amount of research in recent times, especially in the area of recidivism of federal offenders.  Today brings this notable notable USSC report on recidivism and criminal history under the title "Revisiting Status Points."  The term "status points" is a short-hard reference to the two points added to a defendant's criminal history score under guideline § 4A1.1(d) if he committed the offense while still serving a sentence in another case (eg, while being on probation or parole).  This webpage provides an overview and key findings from the new report:

Overview

In 2005, the Commission examined status points (addressed in §4A1.1(d)) as part of a broader analysis of how well the guidelines’ criminal history computation predicts recidivism.  This report revisits the examination of status points with greater focus, including a detailed analysis of their application and significance.  The report begins by outlining how criminal history is calculated under the guidelines and by reviewing prior Commission research on the association between criminal history and recidivism.  The report then examines how many offenders received status points in the last five fiscal years and compares them to offenders who did not receive status points.  Next, the report analyzes the rearrest rates for offenders with and without status points who were released from prison or began a term of probation in 2010.  Finally, the report considers how much status points contribute to the criminal history score’s prediction of rearrest.

Key Findings

In the last five fiscal years:

  • Over one-third of federal offenders (37.5%) received two “status points” under §4A1.1(d) as part of their criminal history scores. For 61.5 percent of such offenders, the inclusion of the two points resulted in a higher Criminal History Category.
  • The vast majority of offenders who received status points (92.6%) had criminal history scores that placed them in Criminal History Category III and higher, compared to a little less than half of offenders who did not receive status points (47.0%)....

Among offenders who were released in 2010:

  • Those who received status points were rearrested at similar rates to those without status points who had the same criminal history score. For example, among offenders whose criminal history score was seven, 69.6 percent of those with status points and 70.4 percent of those without status points were rearrested in the eight years after release.
  • Three-fifths (61.1%) of offenders who received status points had five or more criminal history points for prior sentences (i.e., before adding in two status points). These offenders had a statistically similar rearrest rate to offenders without status points who had the same number of points for prior sentences.
  • The remaining two-fifths (38.9%) of offenders who received status points had one to four criminal history points for prior sentences (i.e., before adding in two status points). These offenders had a statistically higher rearrest rate than offenders without status points who had the same number of points for prior sentences.
  • Status points only minimally improve the criminal history score’s successful prediction of rearrest — by 0.2 percent. With status points included in the calculation for eligible offenders, the score successfully predicts rearrest 65.1 percent of the time, compared to 64.9 percent of the time with status points removed.

June 27, 2022 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, June 26, 2022

You be the judge: what federal sentence for convicted sex trafficker Ghislaine Maxwell?

A high-profile sentencing is scheduled for NYC federal court this coming week.  This CNN article from last last, reporting on prosecutors' sentencing filing, provides a partial preview:

Federal prosecutors asked a judge in a court filing Wednesday to sentence Ghislaine Maxwell to 30 to 55 years in prison for sex trafficking a minor and other charges related to a sprawling conspiracy to abuse young girls with the wealthy financier Jeffrey Epstein.

"Maxwell was an adult who made her own choices. She made the choice to sexually exploit numerous underage girls. She made the choice to conspire with Epstein for years, working as partners in crime and causing devastating harm to vulnerable victims," prosecutors wrote in the sentencing memo. "She should be held accountable for her disturbing role in an extensive child exploitation scheme."

Last week, Maxwell's lawyers asked a judge to sentence her to between 4.25 and 5.25 years in prison, saying her difficult childhood made her vulnerable to Epstein and that she shouldn't face a harsh sentence because of his actions. "But this Court cannot sentence Ms. Maxwell as if she were a proxy for Epstein simply because Epstein is no longer here," her attorneys wrote in their sentencing recommendation....

Epstein, who pleaded guilty in 2008 to state prostitution charges, was indicted on federal sex trafficking charges in July 2019 but died by suicide in prison a month later. Maxwell, his confidante and former girlfriend, was arrested a year afterward and has been held in jail since. In the sentencing memo, the prosecution wrote that the defense's argument was "absurd and offensive."

"The lenient sentence the defendant seeks would send the message that there is one system of laws for the rich and powerful, and another set for everyone else," prosecutors wrote.... 

Maxwell, 60, was found guilty of five federal charges in December: sex trafficking of a minor, transporting a minor with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity and three related counts of conspiracy.  However, she will only be sentenced on three counts after the judge presiding over her case agreed that two of the conspiracy counts she faced were repetitive.

The probation department recommended a 20-year sentence, below the sentencing guidelines. 

At her trial late last year, prosecutors argued Maxwell and Epstein conspired to set up a scheme to lure young girls into sexual relationships with Epstein from 1994 to 2004 in New York, Florida, New Mexico and the US Virgin Islands. Four women testified during the trial that Epstein abused them and that Maxwell facilitated the abuse and sometimes participated in it as well.

Her defense, meanwhile, said she was a "scapegoat" for Epstein's actions and attacked the memories and motivations of the women who said they were sexually abused.

The federal prosecutors' sentencing filing, which is available here, contends that "the applicable sentencing range is 360 months to life imprisonment [but] the statutory maximum penalty is 660 months’ imprisonment, [so] the Guidelines range becomes 360 to 660 months’ imprisonment."  But the defense sentencing memorandum, which is available here, requests "that the Court grant Ms. Maxwell a significant variance below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 292-365 months and below the 240-month sentence recommended by the Probation Department."

But, as of this writing on the morning of June 26, it now seem there is a chance the sentencing will not go forward this week.  This Reuters article explains:

Ghislaine Maxwell has been put on suicide watch at a Brooklyn jail, and may seek to delay her Tuesday sentencing for aiding Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse of underage girls, her lawyer said on Saturday night.  In a letter to the judge overseeing Maxwell's case, Maxwell's lawyer, Bobbi Sternheim, said her client is "unable to properly prepare, for sentencing," after officials at the Metropolitan Detention Center on Friday declared the suicide watch and abruptly moved Maxwell to solitary confinement.

Sternheim said Maxwell was given a "suicide smock," and her clothing, toothpaste, soap and legal papers were taken away. The lawyer also said Maxwell "is not suicidal," a conclusion she said a psychologist who evaluated the 60-year-old British socialite on Saturday morning also reached.

"If Ms. Maxwell remains on suicide watch, is prohibited from reviewing legal materials prior to sentencing, becomes sleep deprived, and is denied sufficient time to meet with and confer with counsel, we will be formally moving on Monday for an adjournment," Sternheim wrote.

Prior related post:

June 26, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, June 23, 2022

"Nothing but Time: Elderly Americans Serving Life Without Parole"

The title of this post is the title of this new report from The Sentencing Project. Here is most of the executive summary and recommendations from the start of the report:

Prisons are a particularly hazardous place to grow old.  The carceral system is largely unprepared to handle the medical, social, physical, and mental health needs for older people in prison.  Nearly half of prisons lack an established plan for the care of the elderly incarcerated....

Warnings by corrections budget analysts of the crushing costs of incarcerating people who are older have gone almost entirely unheeded. Indeed, sociologist and legal scholar Christopher Seeds accurately described a transformation of life without parole “from a rare sanction and marginal practice of last resort into a routine punishment in the United States” over the last four decades.  And in the contemporary moment of rising concerns around crime, there are reasons to be concerned that ineffective, racially disproportionate, and costly tough-on-crime measures such as increasing sentence lengths will proliferate, leading to even higher numbers of incarcerated people who will grow old in prison.  In this, as in many other aspects of its carceral system, the United States is an outlier; in many Western democracies those in their final decades of life are viewed as a protected class from the harsh prison climate.

Older incarcerated people describe sentences of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) — with the expectation that they will die in prison — as particularly cruel, involving a devastating loss of human dignity.  Considering the consistent observation across dozens of studies that people “age out” of criminal conduct, the dedication of resources toward a group that is of extremely low risk is a foolish investment.  Yet people serving LWOP are a growing share of the overall life-sentenced population and the number of people in prison serving LWOP is at an all-time high.  While LWOP sentences have been a sentencing component of the American punishment spectrum for much of its existence, recent mandatory and preferential imposition of life sentences with no chance for parole are a more prominent feature than ever.  In 2020, The Sentencing Project produced a 50-state survey of departments of corrections that revealed that more than 55,000 Americans are incarcerated in state and federal prisons with no chance of parole, reflecting a 66% rise in people serving LWOP since 2003.

Because compassionate release, whether based on chronological age (geriatric parole) or diagnosis of a terminal illness (medical parole), typically excludes people serving life sentences by statute, the only option for an early release for people serving LWOP is executive clemency.  While clemency was common for older people serving life sentences sixty years ago, it was nearly terminated by the 1970s, and is still rarely used today.

This report explores the features of the LWOP population in more detail, focusing on the aging demographic in particular.  The data presented in this report reflect the patterns of 40,000 people serving LWOP sentences across 20 states.  These 20 states reflect three quarters of the LWOP population nationwide. The main findings in this report are the following:

• Almost half (47%) of the people serving LWOP are 50 years old or more and one in four is at least 60 years old.

• In ten years, even if no additional LWOP sentences were added in these states, 30,000 people currently serving LWOP will be 50 or older.

• 60% of the elderly imprisoned serving LWOP have already served at least 20 years....

• Half of aging people serving LWOP are Black and nearly 60% are people of color....

• The majority of people serving LWOP have been convicted of murder, but a growing share of the overall LWOP population has been convicted of less serious crimes, reflecting an over-expansion of LWOP.

We make a series of recommendations for reform based on the research presented in this report:

• Reinstate parole or resentencing opportunities for those currently ineligible.

• Give added weight to advanced age at review hearings. Advanced age considerations should begin at age 50 in light of the accelerating aging process that accompanies imprisonment.

• Allow immediate sentence review with presumption of release for people who are 50 and older and have served 10 years of their LWOP sentence.

• Revise medical parole release statutes to include all incarcerated people regardless of crime of conviction and age.

• Upon release, transition elderly persons, including those who have been convicted of a violent crime and those who are serving LWOP and other life sentences, to well-supported systems of community care if they are too frail to live independently.

• Require states to disclose the cost of incarcerating elderly people, including the cost of all medical care, as well as projections for future costs. Failing in such fiscal transparency keeps taxpayers in the dark about the true cost of mass incarceration.

• Expand clemency release opportunities to reflect their higher usage in earlier eras.

June 23, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (8)

Wednesday, June 22, 2022

Split North Carolina Supreme Court rulings declares sentences excluding parole for over 40 years unconstitutional for juveniles

Last week, as reported in this local article, the Supreme Court of North Carolina issues two notable opinions placing a notable limit on sentences for juvenile offenders.  Here are the basics:

Juveniles convicted of the most violent crimes in North Carolina cannot spend more than 40 years behind bars before becoming eligible for parole.  The N.C. Supreme Court made that determination Friday in a pair of 4-3 decisions.  The court’s four Democratic justices ruled in favor of the defendants in both cases.  The three Republican justices dissented.

In State v. Conner, Democratic justices determined that a 15-year-old convicted of rape and murder faced an excessive prison sentence.

According to Justice Michael Morgan’s majority opinion, Riley Dawson Conner pleaded guilty to raping his aunt outside her home in 2016, then killing her “with blows from a shovel.” He then left her dead body in a wooded area near her home.

Under the original consecutive sentences on rape and murder charges, Conner would have reached the age of 60 before having the chance to seek parole. Such a lengthy sentence would violate federal court precedents involving juvenile offenders, Morgan argued. Instead he and his fellow Democratic justices set a new 40-year maximum prison sentence before a juvenile offender would become eligible for parole....

Republican Justice Phil Berger Jr. rejected the argument. He accused Democratic justices of writing the 40-year maximum sentence into law.  “[T]he majority darts into the legislative lane, usurping legislative authority by enacting its new law simply because they find this result ‘desirable’ for violent juveniles,” Berger wrote in dissent....

Democratic and Republican justices also split in State v. Kelliher.  As with the Conner case, the court’s majority ruled that defendant James Ryan Kelliher should serve no more than 40 years in prison for murders committed when he was 17.

All of the opinions in the Connor and Kelliher cases make for interesting reads. From a quick review, I was struck by the fact that the Connor ruling suggests that both the US and North Carolina constitutions supported the 40-year cap announced by the court. But the Kelliher ruling more expressly relies on the NC constitution as revealed in this paragraph from near the start of the opinion:

After careful review, we hold that it violates both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution to sentence a juvenile homicide offender who has been determined to be “neither incorrigible nor irredeemable” to life without parole.  Furthermore, we conclude that any sentence or combination of sentences which, considered together, requires a juvenile offender to serve more than forty years in prison before becoming eligible for parole is a de facto sentence of life without parole within the meaning of article I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution because it deprives the juvenile of a genuine opportunity to demonstrate he or she has been rehabilitated and to establish a meaningful life outside of prison.  Thus, Kelliher’s sentence, which requires him to serve fifty years in prison before becoming eligible for parole, is a de facto sentence of life without parole under article I, section 27.  Because the trial court affirmatively found that Kelliher was “neither incorrigible nor irredeemable,” he could not constitutionally receive this sentence.

June 22, 2022 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)