Tuesday, January 25, 2022

Notable new report on juve LWOP reviews "Montgomery v. Louisiana Six Years Later: Progress and Outliers"

This morning I received this email from the folks at the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth that highlighting this new report "Montgomery v. Louisiana Six Years Later: Progress and Outliers." The full short report is worth a full read, and the emails provides this brief accounting of the report's coverage:

Six years ago today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, making Miller v. Alabama’s requirement that judges consider the mitigating attributes of youth retroactive and offering new hope to thousands of people who had been sentenced to life without parole as children.  For many, that hope has led to shorter prison sentences, and for hundreds of others, it’s meant freedom.  At the time of the decision, 2,800 individuals in the U.S. were serving life without parole for crimes committed as children.  In the six years since, 835 individuals formerly serving this sentence have been released from prison. 

Today, 25 states and the District of Columbia ban life-without-parole sentences for children, and in six additional states, no one is serving life without parole for a crime committed as a child.  While we celebrate this inspiring progress, we recognize that far too many others have not yet received the relief they rightfully deserve.  Thus, we are pressing forward in the fight for these individuals across all areas of our work, with a particular focus on state legislatures and advocacy in outlier states. You can read more about how far we have come and the challenges we still face in this report authored by Rebecca Turner, the CFSY’s Senior Litigation Counsel.  

The full report gives particular attention to developments in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Louisiana, which "each had more children sentenced to life without parole than any other state in the country" when Montgomery was handed down.  Here is how the report describes subsequent developments in those states and nationwide:

A majority of the 2,800 individuals serving juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) following Miller have been resentenced in court or had their sentences amended via legislation, depending on the jurisdiction in which they were convicted.

Yet despite the 80% reduction in people serving JLWOP, jurisdictions have varied significantly in their implementation of Miller. As a result, relief afforded to individuals serving JLWOP is based more on jurisdiction than on whether the individual has demonstrated positive growth and maturation.

The uneven implementation of Miller disproportionately impacts Black individuals, who represent 61% of the total JLWOP population....

Within that population [serving JLWOP when Montgomery was decided], 29% have been released, over 50% have had their sentences reduced from JLWOP, about 17% have not yet been afforded relief, and approximately 3% have been resentenced to JLWOP.

January 25, 2022 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, January 24, 2022

Connecticut Supreme Court reverses sentence based "materially false information" that defendant was in "mythical group of teenage 'superpredators'"

A few helpful folks made sure I did not miss the notable ruling by the Connecticut Supreme Court this past Friday in State v. Belcher, No. SC 20531 (Conn. Jan 21, 2022) (available here). The start of the unanimous opinion sets out the basics:

The defendant, Keith Belcher, a juvenile offender, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. After his conviction, the defendant received a total effective sentence of sixty years of incarceration.  He claims, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to correct on the basis of the court’s conclusion that the sentencing court did not impose the sentence in an illegal manner by relying on materially false information.

Our review of the record reveals that the defendant established that the sentencing court substantially relied on materially false information in imposing his sentence, specifically, on the court’s view that the defendant was a ‘‘charter member’’ of a mythical group of teenage ‘‘superpredators.’’  Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to correct.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and the case is remanded with direction to grant the defendant’s motion and for resentencing.

The full opinion merits a full read for many reasons.  Therein, one learns that the defendant here was only 14 when committing his crimes way back in 1993 (meaning he has now already served nearly three decades).  Also of note, the court avoids resolution of constitutional claims by deciding he gets resentencing based on the illegal manner of the original sentence's imposition. Here are a few highlights from the interesting opinion:

We conclude that the superpredator theory was baseless when it originally was espoused and has since been thoroughly debunked and universally rejected as a myth, and it therefore constituted false and unreliable information that a sentencing court ought not consider in crafting a sentence for a juvenile offender....

In the context of the sentencing of the defendant, a Black teenager, the court’s reliance on the materially false superpredator myth is especially detrimental to the integrity of the sentencing procedure for two reasons.  First, reliance on that myth invoked racial stereotypes, thus calling into question whether the defendant would have received as lengthy a sentence were he not Black.  Second, the use of the superpredator myth supported treating the characteristics of youth as an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor....

In summary, by invoking the superpredator theory to sentence the young, Black male defendant in the present case, the sentencing court, perhaps even without realizing it, relied on materially false, racial stereotypes that perpetuate systemic inequities — demanding harsher sentences — that date back to the founding of our nation.  In addition, contrary to Roper and its progeny, in relying on the superpredator myth, the sentencing court counted the characteristics of youth as an aggravating factor against the defendant.  Although we do not mean to suggest that the sentencing judge intended to perpetuate a race based stereotype, we cannot overlook the fact that the superpredator myth is precisely the type of materially false information that courts should not rely on in making sentencing decisions.  Whether used wittingly or unwittingly, reliance on such a baseless, illegitimate theory calls into question the legitimacy of the sentencing procedure and the sentence.

January 24, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, January 22, 2022

SCOTUS takes up reach of McGirt's limit on state prosecution in "Indian country"

The Supreme Court via this order last night granted cert in one case, Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, a criminal case concerning the reach of a notable Court ruling from a few terms ago.  This SCOTUSblog post provides the details and context, and here is an excerpt:

Less than two years ago, the Supreme Court ruled in McGirt v. Oklahoma by a vote of 5-4 that a large portion of eastern Oklahoma, which was reserved for the Creek Nation in the 19th century, remains a reservation for purposes of a federal law that gives the federal government sole power to try certain major crimes committed by “any Indian” in “Indian country.” On Friday, the justices — with Justice Amy Coney Barrett having replaced the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who was in the McGirt majority — agreed to consider how broadly McGirt applies, but they declined to reconsider the decision itself, which the state describes as having a “more immediate and destabilizing effect on life in an American State” than any of the court’s other recent decisions.

The justices granted review in the case of Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta, who was convicted of neglecting his five-year-old stepdaughter.  Although Castro-Huerta is not a Native American, his stepdaughter is a member of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals vacated his conviction because the crime occurred in Indian country.  The decision rested on the court’s conclusion that McGirt applies not only to major crimes committed by Native Americans but also to crimes committed by others in Indian country.

Oklahoma filed more than 30 separate petitions asking the justices to overrule McGirt.  It told the justices that the effects of the decision have been “calamitous and are worsening by the day.”  Thousands of crime victims are now seeking justice from federal and tribal prosecutors, the state wrote, overwhelming those offices and federal district courts and leaving many crimes “uninvestigated and unprosecuted.”...

In a brief order on Friday afternoon, the justices agreed to take up only the first question presented by the state’s petition, relating to the application of McGirt to bar state prosecutions of non-Native defendants who commit crimes against Native Americans in “Indian country.”  The court set the case for argument in its April 2022 argument session, with a decision to follow by summer.

January 22, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, January 14, 2022

Illinois judge decides to acquit teen in sexual assault case to avoid four-year mandatory minimum term

The New York Times has this interesting new article about a troubling example of how mandatory minimum sentences can (and often do) end up distorting the operation of our justices systems.  The full headline of the article provides the essentials: "Judge Tosses Teen’s Sexual Assault Conviction, Drawing Outrage; Drew Clinton, 18, faced four years in prison under Illinois sentencing guidelines. But the judge, Robert Adrian, overturned his conviction this month, saying the sentence was “not just." Here are the details:

Last October, a judge in western Illinois convicted an 18-year-old man of sexually assaulting a 16-year-old girl while she was unconscious at a graduation party.

The man, Drew Clinton, faced a mandatory minimum sentence of four years in prison, but at a hearing earlier this month, Judge Robert Adrian reversed his own decision and threw out the conviction.  The nearly five months Mr. Clinton had served in jail, the judge said, was “plenty of punishment.”

The decision, which was reported by the Herald-Whig of Quincy, Ill., has dismayed organizations that help survivors of sexual assault, the Adams County state’s attorney’s office and the girl who reported the assault, who told a local television station that she was present when Judge Adrian overturned Mr. Clinton’s conviction. “He made me seem like I fought for nothing and that I put my word out there for no reason,” she told WGEM-TV. “I immediately had to leave the courtroom and go to the bathroom. I was crying.”...

Mr. Clinton was charged with criminal sexual assault on June 1, 2021.  The girl reported that he sexually assaulted her after she became intoxicated at a party on May 30, according to court records.  During the bench trial, she testified that she was unconscious and woke up to find a pillow covering her face and Mr. Clinton assaulting her....

Mr. Schnack [a lawyer for Mr. Clinton] argued that mandatory sentences take away a judge’s discretion. “Every individual should be judged by the court in doing its sentence and not by a legislator years and hundreds of miles removed,” he said, according to the transcript.

He also said that prosecutors had not proved their case against Mr. Clinton and that the girl was able to consent.  Mr. Schnack said that she made many decisions that night, including drinking and stripping down to her underwear to go swimming. “They weren’t the best decisions,” he said. “She did know what was going on.”

Judge Adrian said he knew that, by law, Mr. Clinton was supposed to serve time in prison, but in this case, the sentence was unfair, partly because Mr. Clinton turned 18 just two weeks before the party and, until his arrest, had no criminal record.  “That is not just,” Judge Adrian said during the Jan. 3 hearing, according to the transcript. “There is no way for what happened in this case that this teenager should go to the Department of Corrections. I will not do that.”

He said that if he ruled that the sentence was unconstitutional, his decision would be reversed on appeal.  Instead, he said, what he could do was “find that the people failed to prove their case.” Judge Adrian chastised the parents and other adults who he said provided liquor to the teenagers at the party and failed “to exercise their parental responsibilities.”...

Carrie Ward, the chief executive of the Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault, said the judge’s comments and his decision to throw out Mr. Clinton’s conviction were “a clean and clear example of victim blaming.” By highlighting the girl’s clothing and chastising the hosts of the party, the judge shifted “100 percent of the blame from the perpetrator, from the actual person who committed the sexual assault, to everyone else, including the victim,” Ms. Ward said.

I am troubled that the judge here felt compelled to nullify guilt because he was unable or unwilling to develop an argument that a four-year prison term would be unjust and possibly illegal. I do not know Illinois law well enough to know if state constitutional jurisprudence or other doctrines could have provided a basis for the judge to rule that he had to be able to give effect to the defendant's youth and other mitigating factors. But if the judge made a compelling case for a more just sentence, perhaps prosecutors would not have appealed or perhaps appellate courts would have embraced the analysis. Instead, we have a case in which a judge seems to want to believe that two legal wrongs make a right.

January 14, 2022 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (9)

Wednesday, January 12, 2022

Split New Jersey Supreme Court rules NJ constitution requires allowing juvenile offenders "to petition for a review of their sentence after they have served two decades in prison"

A helpful reader ensured I did not miss the fascinating New Jersey Supreme Court ruling in NJ v. Comer, A-42-20)(NJ Jan 10, 2022) (available here), regarding limits on extreme juvenile sentencing.  The start of the opinion for the Court provide the context and the essentials of the ruling:

This appeal raises challenging questions about the constitutional limits that apply to sentences for juvenile offenders.

The law recognizes what we all know from life experience -- that children are different from adults.  Children lack maturity, can be impetuous, are more susceptible to pressure from others, and often fail to appreciate the long-term consequences of their actions. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012).  They are also more capable of change than adults. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).  Yet we know as well that some juveniles -- who commit very serious crimes and show no signs of maturity or rehabilitation over time -- should serve lengthy periods of incarceration.

The issue before the Court is how to meld those truths in a way that conforms to the Constitution and contemporary standards of decency.  In other words, how to impose lengthy sentences on juveniles that are not only just but that also account for a simple reality: we cannot predict, at a juvenile’s young age, whether a person can be rehabilitated and when an individual might be fit to reenter society.

The question arises in the context of two juveniles who committed extraordinarily serious crimes for which they received long sentences.  In one case, the juvenile offender, who was convicted of felony murder, will not be released for three decades and cannot be considered for parole throughout that time.  In the other appeal, it will be more than four decades before the 14-yearold offender, convicted of purposeful murder, will first be eligible to be considered for parole.

Both juveniles argue that their sentences violate federal and state constitutional provisions that bar cruel and unusual punishment.  See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 12.  They ask the Court to find that a mandatory sentence of at least 30 years without parole, which N.J.S.A. 2C:11- 3(b)(1) requires, is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.

We decline to strike that aspect of the homicide statute. But we recognize the serious constitutional issue defendants present under the State Constitution. The Court, in fact, anticipated the question in 2017 and asked the Legislature to consider amending the law to allow juvenile offenders who receive sentences with lengthy periods of parole ineligibility to return to court years later and have their sentences reviewed. State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 451-53 (2017).

Today, faced with actual challenges that cannot be overlooked, we are obligated to address the constitutional issue the parties present and cannot wait to see whether the Legislature will act, as the State requests. That approach is consistent with the basic roles of the different branches of government.  The Legislature has the responsibility to pass laws that fix the range of punishment for an offense; the Judiciary is responsible to determine whether those statutes are constitutional.  Under settled case law, courts also have the authority to act to protect statutes from being invalidated on constitutional grounds.

Here, the statutory framework for sentencing juveniles, if not addressed, will contravene Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution.  To remedy the concerns defendants raise and save the statute from constitutional infirmity, we will permit juvenile offenders convicted under the law to petition for a review of their sentence after they have served two decades in prison.  At that time, judges will assess a series of factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth in Miller v. Alabama, which are designed to consider the “mitigating qualities of youth.” 567 U.S. at 476-78 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).

We provide for the hearing, rather than strike the homicide statute on constitutional grounds, because we have no doubt the Legislature would want the law to survive. The timing of the hearing is informed by a number of sources, including acts by the Legislature and other officials.

At the hearing, the trial court will assess factors it could not evaluate fully decades before -- namely, whether the juvenile offender still fails to appreciate risks and consequences, and whether he has matured or been rehabilitated.  The court may also consider the juvenile offender’s behavior in prison since the time of the offense, among other relevant evidence.

After evaluating all the evidence, the trial court would have discretion to affirm or reduce the original base sentence within the statutory range, and to reduce the parole bar to no less than 20 years.  A juvenile who played a central role in a heinous homicide and then had a history of problematic behavior in prison, and was found to be incorrigible at the time of the later hearing, would be an unlikely candidate for relief.  On the other hand, a juvenile who originally acted in response to peer pressure and did not carry out a significant role in the homicide, and who presented proof at the hearing about how he had been rehabilitated and was now fit to reenter society after two decades, could be an appropriate candidate for a lesser sentence and a reduced parole bar.

The Appellate Division rejected the juveniles’ constitutional claims. We therefore reverse and remand both matters for resentencing. We express no opinion on the outcome of either hearing.

Three Justices dissented from this holding by the NJ Supreme Court, and the dissenting opinion begins this way:

The majority today holds that the New Jersey Constitution requires a 20- year lookback period for juvenile offenders who were waived to adult court and tried and convicted as adults of homicide offenses.  We acknowledge our colleagues’ view that the New Jersey Constitution permits our intervention here.  But we are not legislators imbued by our Constitution with such authority. In our view, the majority today act “as legislators” instead of as judges. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976). Thus, we respectfully dissent.

The majority asserts that it is required to act by our Constitution and landmark juvenile sentencing cases from both this Court and the United States Supreme Court. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017).  The cited cases hold that, for the purpose of sentencing, the Constitution requires courts to treat juveniles differently and to consider certain factors before sentencing them to life without parole or its functional equivalent.  We believe that our current sentencing scheme fulfils that constitutional mandate.  Thus, it is not our prerogative to impose an additional restriction on juvenile sentencing.

In our view, a 30-year parole bar for juveniles tried as adults and convicted of homicide conforms with contemporary standards of decency, is not grossly disproportionate as to homicide offenses, and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve legitimate penological objectives.

Accordingly, we believe that the majority’s imposition of a 20-year lookback period for homicide offenses is a subjective policy decision rather than one that is constitutionally mandated.  As such, it must be left to the Legislature, which could have considered all of the factors the majority has, and some it has not.  Instead, the majority joins a small minority of states with lookback periods imposed by judicial fiat rather than by statute.

January 12, 2022 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

US Sentencing Commission issues new report on "Recidivism of Federal Drug Trafficking Offenders Released in 2010"

Cover_recidivism-drugs-2021The US Sentencing Commission today published some more findings from its big eight-year recidivism study of federal offenders released from prison in 2010. This new 144-page report is titled "Recidivism of Federal Drug Trafficking Offenders Released in 2010," and this USSC webpage provides this overview with key findings:

Overview

This report is the third in a series continuing the Commission’s research of the recidivism of federal offenders.  It provides an overview of the recidivism of the 13,783 federal drug trafficking offenders released from incarceration or sentenced to a term of probation in 2010, combining data regularly collected by the Commission with data compiled from criminal history records from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  This report provides an overview of recidivism for these offenders and information on key offender and offense characteristics related to recidivism. This report also compares recidivism outcomes for federal drug trafficking offenders released in 2010 to drug trafficking offenders released in 2005.

The final study group of 13,783 drug trafficking offenders satisfied the following criteria:

  • United States citizens
  • Re-entered the community during 2010 after discharging their sentence of incarceration or by commencing a term of probation in 2010
  • Not reported dead, escaped, or detained
  • Have valid FBI numbers that could be located in criminal history repositories (in at least one state, the District of Columbia, or federal records)

Key Findings

  • The rearrest rate for drug trafficking offenders released in 2010 was similar to the rate for those released in 2005 despite intervening changes in the criminal justice system: the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, adjustments to sentencing of crack cocaine offenses, and increased use of evidence-based practices in federal supervision.
  • The rearrest rate for a new offense or an alleged violation of supervision conditions was similar for drug trafficking offenders (47.9%) as compared to all other offenders released in 2010 (50.4%).
  • Of those drug trafficking offenders released in 2010 who were rearrested, the median time from re-entry to the first rearrest was 23 months. By comparison, the median time from re-entry to the first rearrest for all other offenders was 16 months.
  • Crack cocaine trafficking offenders were rearrested at the highest rate (57.8%) of any drug type, while powder cocaine trafficking offenders were rearrested at the lowest rate (41.8%). Rearrest rates for other primary drug types ranged from 42.7 percent to 46.7 percent.
  • Approximately one-third (32.0%) of drug trafficking offenders who were rearrested had drug-related offenses (either drug trafficking, drug possession, or another drug offense) as their most serious new charge at rearrest. Nearly one-fifth (19.9%) were charged with assault at rearrest.
  • Criminal history was strongly correlated with rearrest. Drug trafficking offenders’ rearrest rates ranged from 29.9 percent for offenders with zero criminal history points to 74.9 percent for offenders with 13 or more criminal history points.
  • Age at release into the community also was strongly correlated with likelihood of rearrest. Drug trafficking offenders released prior to age 21 had the highest rearrest rate of 70.1 percent, while drug trafficking offenders who were 60 years or older at the time of release had the lowest rearrest rate of 16.4 percent.
  • Over an eight-year follow-up period, 47.9 percent of drug trafficking offenders in the 2010 release cohort were rearrested compared to 50.0 percent of drug trafficking offenders in the 2005 release cohort.

January 12, 2022 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, January 10, 2022

Spotlighting guideline circuit split, two Justices express "hope" US Commission will be back "in near future"

The Supreme Court issued this lengthy order list this morning which, as is typical, is mostly full of lots and lots of denials of certiorari. The Justices granted review in three cases (one involving habeas procedure) and called for the Solicitor General's views in two other cases.  But, at the very end of the 24-page order list without much of interest for sentencing fans, was a notable short statement by Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Barrett, respecting the denial of certiorari in Guerrant v. US, No. 21-5099. Here are highlights:

This petition implicates a split among the Courts of Appeals over the proper definition of a “controlled substance offense,” and, accordingly, over which defendants qualify as career offenders.... Defendants in [most Circuits] qualify as career offenders for federal sentencing purposes even if their only prior offenses involved substances not prohibited under federal law. As a result, they are subject to far higher terms of imprisonment for the same offenses as compared to defendants similarly situated in the Second or Ninth Circuits.

It is the responsibility of the Sentencing Commission to address this division to ensure fair and uniform application of the Guidelines. Cf. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991).  In March 2021, I wrote concerning an unresolved Circuit split over the proper interpretation of a Guideline. See Longoria v. United States, 592 U. S. ___. The Sentencing Commission lacked a quorum of voting members then, and it still does today.  At this point, the Sentencing Commission has not had a quorum for three full years.  As the instant petition illustrates, the resultant unresolved divisions among the Courts of Appeals can have direct and severe consequences for defendants’ sentences. I hope in the near future the Commission will be able to resume its important function in our criminal justice system.

I am intrigued and pleased to see Justice Barrett now joining Justice Sotomayor in flagging the need for a functioning US Sentencing Commission to address problematic circuit splits.  But it bears noting that plenty of circuit splits, including this one, pre-date the USSC's loss of a quorum.  Even when fully functioning, the USSC has never been able to resolve all challenging circuit conflicts, and I share Dawinder Sidhu's view that we should all "be troubled by the court’s refusal to review conflicts involving the federal sentencing guidelines." (See full article here.) 

I think it is the responsibility of the USSC and SCOTUS to help "ensure fair and uniform application of the Guidelines."  And, as Justice Sotomayor notes, we are now a full three years into a quorum-less Commission and still do not even have Commissioner nominees.  Moreover, even if Prez Biden were to nominate new Commissioners in the next few weeks (which seems unlikely) and the Senate were to confirm those nominees quickly (which seems unlikely), a new Commission could not "fix" this broken guideline until Nov 2022 at the earliest (and Nov 2023 or later is much more realistic).  But SCOTUS could, and arguably should, "solve" this issue and others with a per curiam opinion that advances consistency for the time being subject to future review by a future Commission.

Because the Supreme Court has largely abdicated its role in guideline interpretation for over three decades now, I am not surprised that it is not now trying to fill the gap created by a quorum-less Commission.  But I wish there were more than just a couple of Justices willing to do a lot more than just talk up their "hope" that another part of the federal judiciary would be able to soon help advance sentencing justice. 

January 10, 2022 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (15)

Wednesday, January 05, 2022

Making the case, because "upper-class offenders ... might be even more reprehensible," for a severe sentence for Elizabeth Holmes

Former federal prosecutor Barbara McQuade has this notable MSNBC opinion piece that makes a full-throated argument for throwing the book ay former Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes. I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

Some people steal money with guns.  Other people steal money with lies.  In a court of law, they’re all crooks. But not all crooks are treated the same by the justice system, a fact Elizabeth Holmes may be counting on when it comes to her sentencing....  White-collar criminals like Holmes may not get their hands dirty in the traditional sense, but their conduct is no less criminal than a stickup in an alley.  In fact, upper-class offenders like Holmes might be even more reprehensible; while street crime is often motivated by need, white-collar crime is usually motivated by greed....

The government quantified Holmes’ investor fraud, arguing it amounted to more than $140 million, a figure that will largely influence her eventual sentence. Federal sentencing guidelines consider a number of factors, including the amount of money involved in the scheme. Based on that number, as well as enhancements and the sophistication of her scheme, Holmes is likely looking at a sentence between 14 and 17 years.

Sentencing is a key inflection point for disparities in the criminal justice system.  But will a judge actually give Holmes a 15-year sentence? Holmes’ defense attorneys, like the attorneys of many criminals before her, will certainly try to argue that the sentencing guidelines in white-collar cases are simply “too high.”  This argument has worked with judges in the past, and high-priced attorneys know that judges can reduce the sentence considerably in a fraud case, as long as they articulate a good reason. (Unlike in criminal cases involving drugs or guns, for example, Holmes does not face a mandatory minimum sentence.)...

Perhaps because judges see offenders who look like them or who share similar backgrounds, they often bite on the argument that sentences for white-collar crimes should be something less than the guidelines range.  I have heard defense attorneys argue that their clients have already been punished enough through societal shame.  You can imagine one of these white-collar defendants lamenting to his lawyer that he can’t even walk through the country club dining room without getting a nasty look from a fellow member.

The other advantage white-collar defendants enjoy at sentencing is their ability to showcase a life of good deeds and letters of support.  An upper-income defendant can often point to service on boards or donations to charitable causes as mitigating factors.  Here again we find problematic disparities baked into the justice system: A low-income defendant lacks the resources to amass anything resembling that kind of track record.  Similarly, while a defendant like Holmes can likely find prominent people to write her letters of support, a defendant lacking her resources usually also lacks the connections needed to mount a similar campaign.

Another argument often made by defense attorneys in white-collar cases is that incarcerating their clients would be a waste of resources because they pose no threat to public safety.  This may be true, but the federal sentencing statute provides that the purpose of sentencing also includes deterrence and just punishment.  Deterrence is especially important in white-collar cases because these are crimes that are carefully planned. No one commits investor fraud in the heat of passion. If defendants who perpetrate massive fraud can get away with a slap on the wrist, then others will calculate that it is worth the gamble to do the same.  A strong sentence in white-collar cases can provide an important data point in that calculation. And fraud is not an inherently victimless crime.

As we think about ways to address racial and economic disparities in the criminal justice system, we should consider not only the disproportionately long sentences that are imposed on street criminals.  We should also consider the paltry ones that are meted out to the wealthy.  We will find out soon enough how Elizabeth Holmes’ sentence does or does not contribute to this pattern.

Because I do not think all that many federal defendants (even "wealthy" ones) actually do get "paltry" sentences — unless and until they cut a special deal with a federal prosecutor, see, e.g., Jeffrey Epstein's first pass — I think we generally need to worry a whole lot more about disproportionately long federal sentences than about problematically short ones.  Still, this commentary  does usefully highlights how advantaged defendants are often better able to present mitigating sentencing factors than disadvantages ones.  For me, that provides a reason for the system to work harder to help the disadvantaged, not a reason to slam the advantaged.  As I expressed in an article nearly 15 years ago, it always worries me when an emphasis on sentencing consistency  fuels "a leveling up dynamic"  that pushes sentences to be more consistently harsh.

Prior related post:

January 5, 2022 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (8)

“A Family-Centered Approach to Criminal Justice Reform.”

The title of this post is the title of this interesting new report authored by Christopher Bates, a legal fellow at the Orrin G. Hatch Foundation.  This 100+-page report is styled a "Hatch Center Policy Review," and here is part of its introduction:

Conversations about criminal justice typically center around two groups of individuals: individuals who are convicted of crimes, and individuals who are victims of crime.  The former receive perhaps the lion’s share of attention, as policymakers and commentators debate what consequences they should face, how such consequences should be meted out, what procedural protections should apply, and what can be done to reduce the likelihood that an individual will offend or reoffend. As to victims of crime, discussions may focus on the individual level — how to ensure justice is done in particular cases — or on a broader level—what can be done to reduce crime and improve public safety.

There is another group, however, that can and must be part of the conversation — the family members of convicted individuals.  These include spouses and intimate partners, parents and siblings, and, perhaps most importantly, children....

For decades, researchers have documented the deleterious effects that incarceration and criminal involvement have on the families of individuals who engage in criminal activity. They have also recorded the ways in which strong family ties benefit communities and reduce recidivism. Taking into account both sides of this equation—the impacts on, and the impacts of, family members — is essential to designing effective criminal justice policy.

This paper seeks to do just that — to suggest an approach to criminal justice policy that builds on the decades of research regarding the interrelationship between family ties, incarceration, and criminal behavior....

This paper proceeds in five parts.  Part I surveys the research on family relationships, incarceration, and recidivism, with a focus on how incarceration impacts family members and children and how family relationships affect recidivism.  It also discusses the research on prison visitation and recidivism and how maintaining stronger family ties during incarceration can lead to better reentry outcomes.  Part II turns to the topic of prison policy and how this research can inform decisions about inmate placement, visitation, and contact with family members.  Part III considers the issue of reentry and how policymakers can design laws and programs that aid, rather than impede, the ability of formerly incarcerated individuals to find employment, housing, and other necessities so they can provide for their families and avoid cycles of recidivism and reincarceration.  Part IV turns to punishment and asks what insights a family-centered approach to criminal justice reform can offer regarding sentencing practices and determining what conduct should be subject to criminal penalties in the first place.  It suggests that a principle called parsimony — which says policymakers should seek the least amount of criminal punishment necessary to accomplish a law’s legitimate ends — can fit well with a family-centered approach because it seeks to avoid inflicting more harm than is necessary on convicted individuals and their families.  Part V discusses police reform and offers suggestions for how the principles that can be drawn from the research described in this paper can inform discussions about improving police transparency, accountability, and officer-resident interactions.  A brief conclusion follows.

January 5, 2022 in Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, January 03, 2022

Elizabeth Holmes convicted on 4 of 11 fraud charges ... but now can be sentenced on all and more

The high-profile fraud trial of Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes resulting in a mixed verdict, but her conviction on four counts each with 20-year maximums means that she now faces up to eight decades in federal prison. And, as regular readers know, her acquittal/non-conviction on various charges do not preclude the federal judge at sentencing from considering evidence associated with those charges.  This short New York Times piece, headlined "What happens next to Elizabeth Holmes," provides some details about what may lie ahead:

Elizabeth Holmes, the founder of the failed blood testing start-up Theranos, now awaits sentencing after being found guilty of four of 11 charges of fraud on Monday.

Ms. Holmes, 37, left the San Jose, Calif., courtroom through a side door after the verdict was read in the case, which was closely scrutinized as a commentary on Silicon Valley. She was found guilty of three counts of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. She was found not guilty on four other counts. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on three counts, which were set aside for later.

After the verdict was read, defense and prosecution lawyers discussed plans for Ms. Holmes’s sentencing, the status of her probation and the fate of the three hung charges. Judge Edward J. Davila of the Northern District of California, who oversaw the case, said he planned to declare a mistrial on those charges, which the government could choose to retry. The parties agreed that Ms. Holmes would not be taken into custody on Monday.

A sentencing date is expected to be set at a hearing on the three hung charges next week. Ms. Holmes can appeal the conviction, her sentence or both. She will also be interviewed by the U.S. Probation Office as it prepares a pre-sentence report....

Each count of wire fraud carries up to 20 years in prison, though Ms. Holmes is unlikely to receive the maximum sentence because she has no prior convictions, said Neama Rahmani, the president of the West Coast Trial Lawyers and a former federal prosecutor.

But he said her sentence was likely to be on the higher end because of the amount of the money involved. Ms. Holmes raised $945 million for Theranos during the start-up’s lifetime and those investments were ultimately wiped out.

Given the amount of loss and other factors likely to lead to upward guideline adjustment, Holmes is sure to face a very high guideline sentencing range (perhaps a range as high as life imprisonment). But her lack of criminal history and other potential mitigating personal factors leads me to expect her to receive a below-guideline sentence. But exactly what that sentence might be (and what the parties will argue for) will be interesting to following in the months ahead.

January 3, 2022 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (11)

Will SCOTUS take up challenge to Georgia's remarkable standard for implementing Eighth Amendment's ban on executing the intellectually disabled?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new Sidebar piece by Adam Liptak for the New York Times about Georgia's unique way for (not quite) protecting the intellectually disabled from an unconstitutional execution. The full piece is a great read under this full headline: "Language Mistake in Georgia Death Penalty Law Creates a Daunting Hurdle: The Supreme Court will decide whether to hear a challenge to the law, which requires that defendants in capital cases who are intellectually disabled prove it 'beyond a reasonable doubt' — a phrase that was inserted in error."  Here are excerpts:

The U.S. Supreme Court will soon decide whether to hear [an Eighth Amendment] case, which challenges a Georgia law that places an extraordinary burden on capital defendants seeking to be spared execution.  In the process, the justices could clarify whether it is just the words or also the music of their precedents that binds lower courts.

The case concerns Rodney Young, who was convicted in 2012 of killing the son of his estranged girlfriend.  Mr. Young grew up in New Jersey, where his schools classified him, in the language of the time, as “mentally retarded.”  These days, they would call him intellectually disabled.

A 2002 Supreme Court decision, Atkins v. Virginia, ruled that the Eighth Amendment forbids putting intellectually disabled people to death.  But the Georgia law at issue in the case, unique in the nation, requires capital defendants seeking to be spared execution to prove they are intellectually disabled beyond a reasonable doubt.

That is the standard that ordinarily applies to the government in criminal cases. It is intended to be hard to meet and, in the context of prosecutions, is meant to tolerate letting some guilty people go free rather than risk sending innocent ones to prison. The Georgia law inverts this dynamic, tolerating the executions of some intellectually disabled people.... The Atkins decision largely let states decide who qualified as intellectually disabled. But two later decisions, in 2014 and 2017, struck down measures creating, as Justice Anthony M. Kennedy put it, “an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.”

The Georgia law has a curious origin story.  Enacted in 1988, it was the first in the nation to ban the execution of intellectually disabled people, predating the Atkins decision by 14 years. But it was drafted in haste. “I dropped the ball,” Jack Martin, one of the provision’s drafters, told the Georgia House of Representatives in 2013. He and his co-author, Mr. Martin said, had not meant to impose a reasonable doubt standard, but they put a key clause in the wrong place. “It was sloppy draftsmanship, pure and simple,” Mr. Martin said. “I don’t think anybody intended that to happen.”

Almost every other state requires defendants to prove they are intellectually disabled by just a preponderance of the evidence — that is, by showing it to be more likely than not. The difference in the two standards matters, lawyers with the American Civil Liberties Union, which represents Mr. Young, told the Supreme Court in a recent petition asking the justices to hear his case. “In the states that apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, approximately one-third of those asserting that they are intellectually disabled succeed in invoking the Eighth Amendment’s protection,” they wrote. “In Georgia, not a single person convicted of intentional murder has prevailed at trial in establishing that he is intellectually disabled.”...

Dissenting from the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision upholding the state law, Justice Charles J. Bethel said simple logic demonstrated that the law created, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, “an unacceptable risk” that some intellectually disabled people would be executed. In his concurring opinion, Justice Nahmias, who served as a law clerk to Justice Antonin Scalia and is now the chief justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, acknowledged that the question in the case was a close one and that the reasoning in U.S. Supreme Court precedents “certainly casts doubt on this state’s uniquely high standard of proof.”

Justice Nahmias added another consideration, one seemingly grounded in a realistic assessment of the U.S. Supreme Court’s new conservative supermajority. “If I had to guess today,” he wrote, “I would say that it is likely that if the United States Supreme Court, as currently comprised, is called on to decide whether Georgia’s beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for proof of intellectual disability violates the Eighth Amendment, a majority of the justices would not extend the holdings” of the decisions in 2014 and 2017 “to strike down our state’s statute, notwithstanding the reasoning of the majority opinions in those two cases.”

January 3, 2022 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Sunday, January 02, 2022

Reviewing federal criminal prosecutions of January 6 rioters one year later

A few weeks ago, I flagged this CNN piece reporting on the first 50 sentences imposed on those convicted for federal crimes for their involvement in the January 6 riot at the US Capitol.  Today I see this lengthy new AP piece, headlined "Capitol rioters’ tears, remorse don’t spare them from jail," providing another overview of the state of federal prosecutions as we approach the one-year anniversary of these high-profile crimes.  Here are excerpts:

Judges are hearing tearful expressions of remorse — and a litany of excuses — from rioters paying a price for joining the Jan. 6 insurrection, even as others try to play down the deadly attack on a seat of American democracy.

The Justice Department’s investigation of the riot has now entered the punishment phase.  So far, 71 people have been sentenced for riot-related crimes.  They include a company CEO, an architect, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, a gym owner, a former Houston police officer and a University of Kentucky student.  Many rioters have said they lost jobs and friends after their mob of Donald Trump loyalists disrupted the certification of Joe Biden’s presidential victory.

Fifty-six of the 71 pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor count of parading, demonstrating or picketing in a Capitol building. Most of them were sentenced to home confinement or jail terms measured in weeks or months, according to an Associated Press tally of every sentencing.  But rioters who assaulted police officers have gotten years behind bars.

With hundreds of people charged, the Justice Department has taken heat for not coming down harder on some rioters, and it has failed to charge anyone with sedition or treason despite hints early on in the investigation.  But lower-level cases tend to be easier to prosecute and typically get resolved before more complex ones.

At least 165 people have pleaded guilty so far, mostly to crimes punishable by a maximum sentence of six months.  There are dozens of cases involving more serious offenses still moving through the system.  More than 220 people have been charged with assaulting or impeding law enforcement officers at the Capitol, according to the Justice Department.  Since November, three of them have been sentenced to prison terms ranging from more than three years to just over five years.

The District of Columbia federal court is overloaded with Jan. 6 cases.  More than 700 people have been charged so far and the FBI is still looking for more.  Among the most serious charges are against far-right extremist group members accused of plotting attacks to obstruct Congress from certifying the 2020 presidential election.  Their cases haven’t yet gone to trial.

The rioters’ refrains before the judges are often the same: They were caught up in the moment or just following the crowd into the Capitol. They didn’t see any violence or vandalism.  They thought police were letting them enter the building.  They insist they went there to peacefully protest.

Their excuses often implode in the face of overwhelming evidence.  Thousands of hours of videos from surveillance cameras, mobile phones and police body cameras captured them reveling in the mayhem.  Many boasted about their crimes on social media in the days after the deadly attack....

Eighteen judges, including four nominated by Trump, have sentenced the 71 defendants.  Thirty-one defendants have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment or to jail time already served, including 22 who received sentences of three months or less, according to the AP tally.  An additional 18 defendants have been sentenced to home confinement. The remaining 22 have gotten probation without house arrest.

A seemingly genuine display of contrition before or during a sentencing hearing can help a rioter avoid a jail cell.  The judges often cite remorse as a key factor in deciding sentences.

Some of many prior related posts:

January 2, 2022 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, December 29, 2021

"How Much Prison Time Could Ghislaine Maxwell Serve After Sex Trafficking Conviction?"

The question in the title of this post is the headline of this new Newsweek article that explores a bit what I started thinking about upon hearing that Ghislaine Maxwell, Jeffrey Epstein's "helper," had been convicted on five of six federal sex trafficking charges.  The simple technical answer to the question is 65 years, and the article provides these (helpful?) additional details:

The most serious charge Maxwell was convicted of, sex trafficking of a minor, carries a maximum prison sentence of 40 years.  She was also convicted of transporting a minor with the intent to engage in illegal sexual activity, a charge punishable by up to 10 years, as well as three other charges that each carry maximum sentences of five years.... It is unclear when she could be tried on two separate counts of perjury, which could also add a five-year sentence apiece.

[I]f 60-year-old Maxwell is given a sentence anywhere near the maximum allowable term, she may spend the rest of her life behind bars, especially since the federal prison system does not include parole. If federal prison sentencing guidelines are allowed and she is ordered to serve sentences concurrently, Maxwell could face as little as 10 years.

Maxwell was sent back to Brooklyn's Metropolitan Detention Center after the verdict was read on Wednesday.  She has been held at the facility in isolation since being arrested in July 2020. Maxwell is likely to remain there until she is sentenced and assigned to a federal prison....

It is unclear whether security measures for Maxwell will be altered in light of her convictions.  Maxwell has denied all of the charges that she was convicted of on Wednesday. Plans to launch an appeal have already been set in motion, her attorney Bobbi Sternheim told reporters after the verdict. "We firmly believe in Ghislaine's innocence," Sternheim said. "Obviously we are very disappointed with the verdict, we have already started working on the appeal and we are confident that she will be vindicated."

U.S. District Judge Alison Nathan has yet to announce the date of Maxwell's pending sentencing hearing.

I think this article means to make the point that if federal sentencing guidelines are followed (not "allowed"), then Maxwell would be quite likely to get a term lower than the 65-year  statutory maximum available.  (It is perhaps worth noting that the most serious count of conviction now carries a statutory maximum sentence of life, but the stat max was "only" 40 years at the time of Maxwell's offense conduct.)

I am not an expert on guideline calculations for this set of offenses, but my sense is that the recommend range will be at least as high as 20 years, and perhaps even much higher.  It will be interesting to see the precise calculation and the sentencing advocacy by the prosecution and the defense in the months ahead.  It will also be interesting to watch if Judge Nathan's nomination to the Second Circuit, or the effort by some GOP Senators to question her sentencing work, could come to somehow impact Maxwell's eventual sentencing.

December 29, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (10)

Tuesday, December 28, 2021

Signing of NDAA into law brings some (low profile) federal sentencing reform to the military justice system

Who says significant federal sentencing reform cannot makes its way though Congress these days?  As this week proved, as long as a reform involves a relatively small and low-profile part of the federal justice system, and especially if it is part of a must-pass/must-sign National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), federal sentencing reform can become law without even a peep in the press.  Indeed, I would be entirely unaware that Prez Biden's signing of the NDAA was worthy of this blog post, but for a helpful colleague ensuring I did not miss the sentencing piece of the military justice reform story in this year's NDAA.

Of course, as can be found in various press pieces, there was considerable attention given to one high-profile piece of military justice reform in the NDAA: "Democrats applauded provisions in the bill overhauling how the military justice system handles sexual assault and other related crimes, effectively taking prosecutorial jurisdiction over such crimes out of the hands of military commanders."  But, as this Just Security piece laments, the new law only makes "piecemeal changes" in this arena, because "the FY22 NDAA military justice reform provisions transfer only a narrow class of crimes out of the chain of command and into the hands of military lawyers under their respective service secretaries."  Helpfully, in addition to giving extensive critical attention to the high-profile reforms of the NDAA, this Just Security piece also just summarizes the sentencing story:

Revolutionizes military sentencing. The NDAA mandates that sentencing for all non-capital offenses be conducted by military judges instead of the current practice, which allows for panel (jury) sentencing.  It provides for offense-based sentencing, as opposed to the current unitary model (imposing a single sentence for all offenses) and directs that non-binding sentencing guidelines be created. This sentencing reform is a much-needed step forward, though it leaves in place the only criminal justice system in the United States that tolerates non-unanimous votes to convict, a practice the U.S. Supreme Court found unconstitutional for states last year. 

Because I tend to be a fan of jury sentencing, but this press article from a few months ago, headlined "'Crapshoot' Sentencing by Court-Martial Juries Likely to End, Advocates for New Legislation Say," highlights the disparity problems it seemed to produce in the military system:

Court-martial sentencing by juries may go the way of flogging, a change many military justice experts say is long overdue. Military judges instead would hand down sentences based on federal guidelines as part of military justice system reforms proposed in the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act....

Supporters say the revision would make sentences in military trials fairer, as well as more consistent and predictable.  "People convicted of sexual assault, one guy gets five years, the other guy gets no confinement," Don Christensen[, a former Air Force prosecutor and president of Protect Our Defenders,] said. "In drug cases, you'd also see huge disparities with no justification. With shaken baby cases, sentences were all over the place."

Military defendants currently may choose whether a judge or a jury, called a "panel," decides their cases, including sentencing.  Military jurors have little experience, context or guidance when determining sentences, Christensen said.  That is magnified by the fact that under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, jurors' sentences can range from no punishment all the way to lengthy prison terms, he added....

Proposals to end it in the military date to at least 1983. The Pentagon proposed an overhaul in 2016, but the idea was dropped.

Critically, in addition to shifting sentencing from juries to judges, the new NDAA calls for the creation of "sentencing parameters" and "sentencing criteria" to guide military judges with "no fewer than 5 and no more than 12 offense categories."  These new parameters and criteria are to be created by a "Military Sentencing Parameters and Criteria Board" with five members, all judges, within the next two years.  In other words, a brand new set of (more simple) federal sentencing guidelines are due to be created for the military justice system.  All sentencing fans should be sure to keep an eye on this process, and one can hope that it might provide some useful lessons for reform to the civilian federal justice system.

December 28, 2021 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, December 27, 2021

Early preview of SCOTUS cases considering criminal convictions for doctors opioid prescribing practices

I briefly noted the interesting federal criminal drug cases that the Supreme Court took up in early November in this post.  With the top-side briefs now being submitted to SCOTUS, this local press article, headlined "U.S. Supreme Court will hear case of Alabama doctor who prescribed powerful opioids," provides a somewhat fuller preview. Here are excerpts:

Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have agreed to hear the appeal of an Alabama pain doctor convicted of running a pill mill, a case that could change how federal prosecutors handle opioid cases.  A federal judge in 2017 sentenced Dr. Xiulu Ruan of Mobile to 21 years in prison for several charges including drug distribution and money laundering related to operations at Physicians Pain Specialists of Alabama.  Ruan appealed his conviction last year to the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals but lost.  The U.S. Supreme Court agreed earlier this year to hear Ruan’s appeal.

The doctor claims his prescriptions of fentanyl and other opioids were supposed to help patients with severe pain.  In a brief, his lawyers said physicians should not risk arrest and prosecution for unconventional treatments when other approaches have failed.  In Ruan’s case, he prescribed fentanyl approved for patients with cancer pain to people suffering from back, neck and joint pain, according to the U.S. Department of Justice....

Ruan’s appeal has been consolidated with another case, Dr. Shakeel Kahn, who practiced in Arizona and Wyoming.  Both men were found guilty of violating the federal Controlled Substances Act and said juries were not allowed to consider a “good faith” defense, which is aimed at protecting doctors trying to help patients.  The supreme court could uphold his conviction or send his case back to trial.

Ruan’s criminal trial lasted seven weeks in 2017 and featured testimony from patients who supported the doctor and family members who said loved ones received dangerous doses of addictive painkillers.  Prosecutors acknowledged that many patients received good care at the two clinics, but said some prescriptions fell far outside the norm.  Ruan and another practitioner at the clinic, Dr. John Patrick Couch, were among the nation’s top prescribers of fentanyl painkillers.  Couch was also convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison.  He has also appealed his case.

In its response, attorneys for the U.S. Department of Justice said Ruan prescribed much higher rates of opioids than other doctors and earned more than $4 million as a result. Ruan and his partner issued almost 300,000 prescriptions for controlled substances, they wrote. Prosecutors said Ruan had deep ties to drug companies that created fentanyl medications. After his conviction, they seized assets that included exotic cars, residential and commercial property....

In his brief, Ruan’s attorney wrote that Physicians Pain Specialists of Alabama did not operate as pill mills. The clinics only accepted patients with insurance, refused cash payment and used diagnostic tools to find the sources of patients’ pain.  Only patients with intractable pain received fentanyl, Ruan testified at his trial. “He also testified that the medication was a ‘lifesaver’ for patients who would otherwise ‘have to go to [the] ER’ during such an episode,” the brief said.

Pain patients have criticized crackdowns on pain clinics and doctors.  Compassion & Choices, an organization that advocates for dying patients, submitted a brief in support of Ruan. “Medical practitioners prescribing opioids to such patients in good faith are not drug pushers under the Act,” according to the Compassion & Choices brief.  “Practitioners thus should not have to suffer the specter of criminal liability simply for treating such patients at such a vulnerable, critical, and private time in their lives.”...

Arguments in Ruan’s case are scheduled for March 1, 2022.

The briefing in Ruan v. US, No. 20-1410, is available at this SCOTUSblog link, and the brief from the defense sets up the issue this way in its Introduction:

To ensure that licensed medical professionals do not risk criminal prosecution and felony conviction based on simple malpractice, nearly all courts, construing the CSA and the implementing regulations, require that the government prove that the physician lacked a good faith basis for her prescription.  See Pet. 4-5, 18-27.  But not the Eleventh Circuit. According to the court of appeals, a doctor may be convicted under the CSA if her prescription fell outside of professional norms — without regard to whether she believed in good faith that the prescription served a bona fide medical purpose.  That outlier position, if sustained, would result in the kind of “sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction” that this Court has repeatedly condemned. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020) (quoting Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24 (2000)); see also Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 862-865 (2014). It would also chill medical progress, disrupt the doctor-patient relationship, and criminalize prescriptions whenever a lay jury is persuaded that the physician exceeded the “usual” practice of medicine.

Though these cases are formally about the standards for criminal liability for these doctors, there are sentencing stories lurking here.  First, of course, are the high sentencing stakes for any doctors found guilty of illegal drug distribution.  Decades-long federal sentences are common — but not at all consistent as Prof Adam M. Gershowitz has detailed — and local press indicates federal prosecutors wanted sentences considerably longer than the two decades given to Drs. Ruan and Couch.  But why might such extreme prison terms be needed, given that, once these doctors lose their prescribing licenses, they are functionally unable to repeat their crimes and their risk of recidivism is very low at their age?  Simply put, some vision of retribution must be driving the severity of the sense, especially since deterrence of doctors is likely achieved by any criminal prosecutions and over-deterrence seems like a real risk here.

In the end, the fact that the sentencing stakes are so high likely helps explain why these cases got the Supreme Court's attention.  And the debate over the whether the law requires proving a lack of good faith would, in a sense, get the the heart of the retributivist question of just how blameworthy these doctors really are.  For all those reasons (and others), when oral argument takes place in a couple months, I will be interested to see if any Justices bring up any of the sentencing issues lurking beneath these cases. 

Prior related post:

December 27, 2021 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, December 24, 2021

Previewing sentencing facing former officer Kim Potter after manslaughter convictions for killing Daunte Wright

This extended AP article provide a helpful accounting of what we might now expect in sentencing of former Minneapolis police officer Kim Potter after a jury convicted her yesterday on two counts of manslaughter.  Here are excerpts:

The former suburban Minneapolis police officer who said she confused her handgun for her Taser when she killed Daunte Wright will be sentenced in February after a jury convicted her Thursday on two counts of manslaughter.  The most serious charge against Kim Potter — first-degree manslaughter — carries a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison....

Under Minnesota statutes, Potter, who is white, will be sentenced only on the most serious charge of first-degree manslaughter.  That’s because both of the charges against her stem from one act, with one victim.

The max for that charge is 15 years.  But state sentencing guidelines call for much less.  For someone with no criminal history, like Potter, the guidelines range from just more than six years to about 8 1/2 years, with the presumptive sentence being slightly over seven years.

Prosecutors have said they'd seek a sentence above the guideline range, while the defense said they would seek no prison time.  In order for Judge Regina Chu to issue a sentence that's outside the guideline range, she would first have to find either mitigating or aggravating factors.  Both sides are expected to file written arguments.

Prosecutors say aggravating factors in Potter's case include that she caused a greater-than-normal danger to the safety of other people when she fired into the car, including danger to her fellow officers, to Wright’s passenger and to the couple whose car was struck by Wright’s after the shooting.... Prosecutors also say Potter abused her authority as a police officer.

Defense attorney Paul Engh said the defense would be seeking a “dispositional departure” from sentencing guidelines. Under state statutes, a mitigated dispositional departure occurs when guidelines recommend a prison sentence, but a judge allows the sentence to be “stayed" — meaning the defendant doesn't go to prison....

In arguing that Potter should remain free on bail until she is sentenced, Engh said: "She is amenable to probation. Her remorse and regret for the incident is overwhelming.  She’s not a danger to the public whatsoever.  She’s made all her court appearances.” Chu was unmoved, and Potter was taken into custody after the verdicts were read....

The defense can also make the argument that as a police officer, Potter's confinement would likely be harsher than most because of the need to keep her safe.  The former Minneapolis police officer convicted in George Floyd's death, Derek Chauvin, has been in solitary confinement for that reason....

In determining a final sentence, Chu will consider the arguments made by both sides, as well as victim impact statements.  She has also ordered a pre-sentence investigation of Potter.  And Potter can make a statement at her sentencing hearing — a time when judges are typically looking to see if a person takes responsibility for the crime or shows remorse....

No matter what sentence Potter gets, in Minnesota it’s presumed that a defendant with good behavior will serve two-thirds of their penalty in prison and the rest on supervised release, commonly known as parole.  That means if Potter is sentenced to the presumptive seven years, she would likely serve about four years and nine months behind bars, and the rest on supervised release.  Once on supervised release, she could be sent back to prison if she violates conditions of his parole.  If she gets the maximum 15 years, she could be behind bars for 10 before being placed on parole.

December 24, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, State Sentencing Guidelines | Permalink | Comments (9)

Wednesday, December 22, 2021

More timely new Prison Policy Initiative briefings on the many challenges of incarceration

I am often not able to keep up with all the great "briefings" produced by the folks at Prison Policy Initiative. Last month in this post, I noted a set of important recent work detailing ugly economic realities and disparities intertwined with prison experience. I am pleased now to have a chance to flag three more important and timely new briefings about other incarceration realities:

"Research roundup: The positive impacts of family contact for incarcerated people and their families: The research is clear: visitation, mail, phone, and other forms of contact between incarcerated people and their families have positive impacts for everyone — including better health, reduced recidivism, and improvement in school. Here’s a roundup of over 50 years of empirical study, and a reminder that prisons and jails often pay little more than lip service to the benefits of family contact."

"Since you asked: What information is available about COVID-19 and vaccinations in prison now?: Despite the new variants of COVID-19, prison systems are failing to publish up-to-date and necessary data and we don’t know much about booster shot access."

"Recent studies shed light on what reproductive 'choice' looks like in prisons and jails: States that are otherwise hostile to abortion rights are especially likely to make it difficult for incarcerated people."

December 22, 2021 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 21, 2021

A deep dive into extreme sentences in the Pelican State

61bbccc672eb3.imageThe Marshall Project with the Times-Picayune and The Advocate has a new series of pieces exploring extreme sentences in Louisiana.  Here are headlines, links and a few passages:

"Her Baby Died After Hurricane Katrina. Was It a Crime?: An expansive definition of murder in Louisiana leaves many behind bars forever."

Louisiana sentences people to life without parole at one of the highest rates in the nation, data shows. Nearly 4,200 men and women are serving lifetime sentences in the state, for crimes that range from homicide and rape to rarer cases of repeat purse snatchings and child neglect, an investigation by The Marshall Project and The Times-Picayune | The Advocate found.

Second-degree murder charges, like the ones Woods and Scott were found guilty of, are a big driver of life-without-parole sentences. The state has long had the highest homicide rate in the nation. But Louisiana law contains an unusually sweeping definition of second-degree murder that includes even some accidental deaths, legal experts say. And despite the wide variations in circumstances that can produce a second-degree murder conviction — from a premeditated ambush to a getaway car accident — the sentence is the same: mandatory life without parole. Judges have almost no discretion.

"‘The Only Way We Get Out of There Is in a Pine Box’: Elderly, ailing and expensive, lifetime prisoners cost Louisiana taxpayers millions a year."

Total medical spending for state corrections eclipsed $100 million last year. That’s an increase of about 25% from 2015, according to state budget figures....

Now, one in six people incarcerated in Louisiana has been sentenced to die in state custody. Nearly 1,200 lifers are over 60. Those geriatric lifers make up nearly 5% of the state prison population.

"A life sentence for $20 of weed? Louisiana stands out for its unequal use of repeat offender laws."

The crime that landed Kevin O’Brien Allen a spot among the more than 4,100 Louisianans now serving life-without-parole sentences wasn’t a bloody one: He sold $20 in marijuana to a childhood friend....

Agents booked Allen on two counts of marijuana distribution, and prosecutors in District Attorney Schuyler Marvin’s office made him an offer: a 5-year sentence if he pleaded guilty. Allen, a father of two with a steady job but a handful of drug convictions, balked....

Louisiana law affords prosecutors wide discretion to increase a repeat offender’s sentence, up to life, and Marvin’s office drew on Allen’s past convictions: possession with intent to distribute marijuana in 2004, marijuana possession in 2007 and 2011, and methamphetamine possession in 2013.

Once invoked by a prosecutor, the habitual-offender law gives little leeway to judges. They can sentence a defendant to less time if they find the minimum is so far out of line that it defies “acceptable goals of punishment” or serves as “nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering.” But courts have described those scenarios as “exceedingly rare.”...

Allen [received a life sentence and] now works in the prison kitchen, making juice for pennies a day, serving a sentence that ends when he dies. He’s among nearly 300 people serving life without parole in Louisiana prisons based on their status as habitual offenders, an analysis of recent state corrections data show. In 40% of those cases, the incarcerated person is locked up for life on a non-violent crime....

Corrections data show wide variances in how district attorneys around the state have used the habitual offender law. Nearly two-thirds of habitual lifers in the state were sentenced in one of four large parishes: Caddo, Orleans, St. Tammany or Jefferson, according to the data. The practice is somewhat less common in East Baton Rouge Parish, the state’s most populous.

Overall, Louisiana prosecutors have mostly aimed the law at Black defendants, like Allen. Black people make up 31% of Louisiana’s population, but 66% of its state prisoners; 73% of those serving life sentences; and 83% of those serving life as habitual offenders, corrections and census data show.

December 21, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

BJS releases "Employment of Persons Released from Federal Prison in 2010"

The Bureau of Justice Statistics has just released this fascinating new accounting of employment dynamics for over 50,000 persons who were released from federal prison in 2010.  Here is how the report starts to explain its scope:

The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) produced this study to fulfill a congressional mandate in the Fair Chance to Compete for Jobs Act, part of the 2019 Defense Reauthorization Act (P.L. 116-92, Title XI, Subtitle B, Section 1124).  Congress tasked BJS and the U.S. Census Bureau with reporting on post-prison employment of persons released from federal prison. The study population in this report includes 51,500 persons released from the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) whose release records could be linked by the U.S. Census Bureau to employment and wage files from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program.

I cannot readily summarize all the findings from this report, but here are a few passages I found notable:

More than two-thirds (67%) of the study population released from federal prison in 2010 obtained formal employment at any point during the 16 quarters following release. However, the total study population’s employment did not exceed 40% in any of the individual 16 quarters after release. The highest percentage of persons in the study population who were employed occurred in the first full quarter after prison release for whites (46%) and American Indians and Alaska Natives (37%), in quarter 2 for blacks (37%) and Hispanics (34%), and in quarter 5 for Asians and Native Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders (38%). Males who obtained post-prison employment worked for an average of 9.1 quarters during the 16 quarters following release, while females worked an average of 10.2 quarters....

A third (33%) of persons in the study population were employed 12 quarters prior to their admission to federal prison. This percentage declined in each subsequent quarter, with 18% employed in the last full quarter before admission to prison and 11% employed in the quarter of prison admission....

A higher percentage of persons in the study population who served time in federal prison for drug offenses before their 2010 release were employed during the 16 quarters after release (72%) compared to other offense types, while persons who served time for public order offenses had the lowest (60%).  Seventy percent of persons in the study population who returned to federal prison during the time from their 2010 release to yearend 2014 found employment in at least 1 quarter of the follow-up period, compared to 66% of persons who were not reimprisoned by the BOP....

Persons in the study population worked in a wide range of jobs after prison, but five industrial sectors employed the majority of persons released in 2010: administrative support and waste management and remediation services; accommodation and food services; construction; manufacturing; and retail trade (table 7). Together, these sectors employed 72% of persons in the study population who obtained work in the first quarter after their 2010 prison release, declining to 66% in quarter 16. During each of the 16 quarters after release, the top nine employment sectors accounted for more than 85% of the jobs worked by the employed persons in the study population.

Because I do not see this report including any data about education levels or any in-prison vocational training efforts, I am not sure quite what to make of all these particulars. But the particulars are still quite interesting.

December 21, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 20, 2021

Eighth Circuit panel affirms time-served sentence for enticement of a (fake) minor when guidelines recommended 46-57 months

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss this interesting Eighth Circuit panel ruling today in US v. Davis, No. 21-1283 (8th Cir. Dec. 20, 2021) (available here). Here are portions from the opinion's start and heart:

Fredrick M. Davis pled guilty to attempted coercion or enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a).  The district court sentenced him to time served and 120 months’ supervised release, including one year of home confinement. The United States appeals the below-guidelines sentence....

In 2019 Davis contacted “Addyson” and “Sara” online.  They identified themselves as 14-year-old girls, but were actually personas of undercover law enforcement. Davis asked them to meet with him in a hotel in Dickinson, North Dakota.  He sent them sexually explicit messages and a graphic picture, and asked them to send him explicit pictures.

Davis was arrested at the North Dakota hotel where he intended to meet the girls. Under a pretrial agreement, Davis pled guilty to one charge—attempted coercion or enticement of a minor. His advisory guideline range was 46-57 months.  As required by the pretrial agreement, the parties jointly recommended a 60-month sentence and five years of supervised release.  The district court sentenced Davis to time served (two months) and 120 months of supervised release, including one year of home confinement, participation in sex offender treatment, and registration as a sex offender....

The government objected to the sentence for failing to afford adequate deterrent effect (the district court noted the objection).  But a district court has “wide latitude” to weigh factors, and it “may give some factors less weight than a [party] prefers or more weight to other factors, but that alone does not justify reversal.”  United States v. Brown, 992 F.3d 665, 673–74 (8th Cir. 2021).  In its written statement of reasons, the district court did acknowledge the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. It chose to give other factors more weight than the deterrence factor, which is not a clear error of judgment.

The government also argues that the district court erred in weighing the Post Conviction Risk Assessment.  The record shows the district court considered the PCRA in conjunction with other factors.  In fact, at sentencing, the court asked the prosecutor: “do you agree with the assessment in the PSR that the risk level is very low for this offender to reoffend?”  He replied, “I do agree, yes, Your Honor.”  It is within the district court’s discretion to weigh such factors.

The government contends Davis’s commendable 20-year military career and his exemplary behavior on pretrial release are not “sufficiently compelling” to justify his below-guidelines sentence.  See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.  But, this court “may not require ‘“extraordinary” circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines.’” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 462, quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 47.  The district court’s rationale for granting the variance does not need to be extraordinary, only substantively reasonable.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) instructs the sentencer to consider a defendant’s history and characteristics.  In his meritorious military career — half his adult life — he earned numerous awards and commendations, including the Combat Action Ribbon and recognitions for service in Iraq and Somalia.  Cf. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11 (“Military service may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military service, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.”).  He also did more than simply staying out of trouble while on pretrial release: he acknowledged his conduct, expressed remorse, sought ongoing treatment for his service-related PTSD, and got and maintained a job....

The ten years of supervised release, one year of home confinement, and other restrictions here are a substantial punishment.  “[T]he Guidelines are only one of the factors to consider when imposing a sentence, and § 3553(a)(3) directs the judge to consider sentences other than imprisonment.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 59.  “[C]ustodial sentences are qualitatively more severe than probationary sentences of equivalent terms,” but “[o]ffenders on probation are nonetheless subject to several standard conditions that substantially restrict their liberty.” Id. at 48.  In Gall itself, the Court reversed for not giving due deference to the district court’s “reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justified the sentence” of probation. Id. at 59-60. 

December 20, 2021 in Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, December 16, 2021

New BJS reports on "Probation and Parole in the United States, 2020" and "Profile of Prison Inmates, 2016"

Earlier this week, the Bureau of Justice Statistics released its latest detailed accounting of US prison populations (discussed here), and today brought two more notable data reports from BJS.  Here is a brief summary (with links) via the email I received this morning from the office of Justice Programs:

The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics today released Probation and Parole in the United States, 2020.  The report is the 29th in a series that began in 1981. It includes characteristics of the population such as sex, race or ethnicity and most serious offense of adult U.S. residents under correctional supervision in the community. The report details how people move onto and off community supervision, such as completing their term of supervision, being incarcerated, absconding or other unsatisfactory outcomes while in the community.  Findings are based on data from BJS’s 2020 Annual Probation Survey and Annual Parole Survey.

BJS also released Profile of Prison Inmates, 2016.  This report describes the characteristics of state and federal prisoners in 2016, including demographics, education and marital status.  Findings are based on data from BJS’s 2016 Survey of Prison Inmates (SPI), which is conducted periodically and consists of personal interviews with prisoners.  For the first time, the 2016 SPI measured sexual orientation and gender identity, and those estimates are included in this report.  Statistics on prisoners’ offenses, time served, prior criminal history and any housing status prior to imprisonment, including homelessness, are also presented.  The report concludes with a summary of the family background of prisoners while they were growing up and any family members who have ever been incarcerated.

I am hoping in the weeks ahead to find some time to really mine some interesting factoids from all this notable new BJS data. For now I will be content to flag just a few "highlights" from the start of these two new document:

December 16, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Though guidelines recommend federal LWOP sentence for Derek Chauvin, plea deal provides for concurrent sentence between 20 and 25 years

I just got a chance to look at the high-profile federal plea agreement entered yesterday in US District Court in Minnesota in US v ChauvinThis Justice Department press release sets out the basics of the plea and the sentencing particulars:

The Justice Department announced [on December 15] that Derek Chauvin, 45, pleaded guilty in federal court to two violations of a federal civil rights statute.

First, defendant Chauvin pleaded guilty to willfully depriving, while acting under color of law, George Floyd of his constitutional rights, resulting in Mr. Floyd’s bodily injury and death. Defendant Chauvin also agreed that the appropriate sentencing base offense level for this crime is second-degree murder because he used unreasonable and excessive force that resulted in Mr. Floyd’s death, and he acted willfully and in callous and wanton disregard of the consequences to Mr. Floyd’s life.

Second, defendant Chauvin pleaded guilty to willfully depriving, while acting under color of law, a then 14-year-old juvenile of his constitutional rights, resulting in the juvenile’s bodily injury....

Defendant Chauvin pleaded guilty [on December 15] before U.S. District Court Senior Judge Paul A. Magnuson.  Defendant Chauvin will be sentenced at a hearing to be scheduled at a later date.  According to the plea agreement, defendant Chauvin faces a sentence of between 20- and 25-years imprisonment.  Under the terms of the plea agreement, defendant Chauvin will serve his sentence in federal custody and will not be eligible to work in any law enforcement capacity following his release.

It is notable, but perhaps unsurprising, that the DOJ press release does not highlight why the terms of Chauvin's plea in fact amount to a pretty good deal given the federal sentencing realities he was facing.  In the wake of his state convictions, Chauvin's federal conviction was a near certainty; as his plea agreement details, here is the likely guideline calculation for Chauvin's offenses: "the defendant's adjusted offense level is 43 and ... [thus] the advisory guideline range is life imprisonment."

Despite the guidelines recommending a federal LWOP sentence, federal prosecutors agreed for Chauvin to a plea deal that binds the federal sentencing judge to these terms (as specified in this Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea): 

The Court should impose a sentence of imprisonment of no less than 240 months and no greater than 300 months (expected to serve no less than 204 months and no greater than 255 months, assuming all goodtime credit);...

The Court, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(2), should order that the sentence of imprisonment imposed in this case be served concurrent to the 270-month sentence imposed in State of Minnesota v. Derek Chauvin,No. 27-CR- 20-I2646 (expected to serve approximately 178 months, assuming all good-time credit); and

At sentencing, the Court, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1), should adjust the sentence for any period of imprisonment/incarceration already served....

I can understand all sorts of reasons for the feds to accept these plea terms, and the agreement notes "the United States intends to advocate for a sentence of 300 months" and that the "agreed sentence is based on the parties' consideration of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."  Still, I thought it worth highlighting that this especially notable case is yet another where it seems everyone agrees that the guidelines do not actually guide toward a proper sentence.

A few prior related posts:

December 16, 2021 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, December 14, 2021

After Missouri expands parole eligibility for certain juve offenders, Bobby Bostic secures parole 25 years after getting 241-year sentence

The name Bobby Bostic may be familiar to some readers, as he became a focal point for debate and litigation over the application of the Supreme Court's Graham Eighth Amendment ruling prohibiting LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.  Back in the 1990s, Bostic received in Missouri state court a sentence of 241 years for armed robberies and would possibly not be eligible for parole for nearly 100 years under Missouri law at that time.  Back in 2018, I blogged here about the sentencing judge's op-ed urging the US Supreme Court to take up Bostic's cert petition, but the Justices declined to do so.

Fast forward a few years, and Bostic's case in the news again reporting that MIssouri law has changed and that Bostic has now secured parole after serving a quarter century behind bars.  This local article, headlined "Sentenced to 241 Years as a Teen, Bobby Bostic Wins Parole," provides these details:

A Missouri man sentenced to 241 years in prison for crimes committed when he was just sixteen will be released next year after a quarter-century behind bars.  The ACLU announced today that 42-year-old Bobby Bostic has been granted parole.  He will be released late next year after being provided courses designed to aid him in his re-entry.

On December 12, 1995, Bostic and 18-year-old Donald Hutson were high on PCP when they robbed a group of St. Louisans delivering holiday gifts to a needy family. In the course of the armed robbery, Bostic shot one victim in the side.  Hutson shot another individual.  Both the gunshot victims survived.

Bostic was charged with 18 felonies.  He took his case to trial and in 1997 was found guilty on all counts. His earliest parole date was set for the far-flung year of 2201.  The trial's judge, Evelyn Baker, told Bostic at his sentencing, "You're gonna die with your choice," and added, "Nobody in this room is going to be alive in the year 2201."

Baker retired in 2008.  Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered a ruling in Graham v. Florida that “prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” Bostic's 241-year sentence, however, was not technically a life sentence. In theory, he would have been eligible to be considered for parole at the age of 112....

In recent years, Judge Baker has come to regret the 241-year sentence she handed down to Bostic, writing in an op-ed published in Riverfront Times last year that, "At the time, I didn’t know, and the criminal justice system didn’t understand how the juvenile brain worked and how long it took to mature."

In August of this year, the Missouri legislature passed a state statute allowing individuals who are serving "de facto" life sentences for nonhomicide crimes committed as juveniles to receive parole hearings after 15 years of incarceration.  The ACLU says that, in addition to Bostic, there are about 100 other individuals in Missouri prisons who meet this criteria.

Bostic had a parole hearing in November that, according to the ACLU, was "one of the first under the new law."  At Bostic's side was the same judge who had sentenced him to nearly a quarter of a millennium in prison.  At the parole hearing, Baker advocated for Bostic's release....

Donald Hutson, Bostic's accomplice in 1995, died in prison in 2018.

Prior related post:

December 14, 2021 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (8)

Saturday, December 04, 2021

Fourth Circuit panel finds probation sentence for abusive police officer procedurally and substantively unreasonable

I just saw a notable Fourth Circuit per curiam panel ruling which was handed down on Thanksgiving Eve.  The (unpublished) opinion in US v. George, No. 19-4841 (4th Cir. Nov. 24, 2021) (available here), gets started this way:

A jury convicted Robert Michael George, a former sergeant with the City of Hickory Police Department, of using objectively unreasonable force against a pretrial detainee, Chelsea Doolittle, depriving her of the constitutional right to due process of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242.  The presentence report calculated an advisory guidelines sentencing range for George’s crime of 70 to 87 months of imprisonment, but the district court sentenced him to a downward variance term of four years’ probation.  The Government appeals, arguing that George’s sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Because the district court grounded its reasoning for the chosen sentence in conclusions contrary to the evidence and the jury’s verdict, we cannot uphold the sentence as either procedurally or substantively reasonable.  Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand to a different judge for resentencing.

Here are some passages toward the end of a fairly lengthy opinion in George:

In its reasoning, the district court relied heavily on its view, counter to the weight of the evidence and George’s conviction, that the incident was “almost accidental.”  Through the prism of that impermissible belief, the district court determined that the Guidelines range, reflecting the appropriate sentence for an officer that willfully deprives someone of their constitutional rights, did not apply to George because he was not in that category of offender.  Other circuits have vacated sentences as substantively unreasonable in instances in which the trial court took an impermissible view of the facts, and that is the predominant reason for our holding as to substantive reasonableness today....

Further, the district court gave excessive weight to its favorable perceptions of George as a former police officer, and in turn the post-conviction consequences for George, dismissing other considerations set forth in the Guidelines.  However, “a defendant’s status as a law enforcement officer is more akin to an aggravating as opposed to a mitigating sentencing factor, as criminal conduct by a police officer constitutes an abuse of public position.”  United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 614 (5th Cir. 2000).  Rather than acknowledge an abuse of public trust, the court relied heavily on its positive perception of George as a former law enforcement officer in its discussion of the first and second § 3553(a) factors, failing to significantly weigh the seriousness of the crime.  As to the goals of the § 3553(a) factors to “promote respect for the law,” “provide just punishment,” “afford adequate deterrence”, and “protect the public,” the court spoke first and foremost of the “total life changes to Mr. George,” enumerating collateral consequences, including George’s loss of his job and pension, as sufficient deterrent to justify the variance. J.A. 512.  But such outcomes are common in § 242 cases and do not justify this significant variance to a probationary sentence.  Indeed, “it is not unusual for a public official who is convicted of using his governmental authority to violate a person’s rights to lose his or her job and to be barred from future work in that field.”  Koon, 518 U.S. at 110.  That reasoning does not provide the “significant justification” necessary for such a substantial departure.  Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.

December 4, 2021 in Booker in the Circuits, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, November 26, 2021

Pervis Payne has death sentences set aside (based on intellectual disability) three decades after SCOTUS affirmed them (with focus on victim impact evidence)

This local article reports on a notable development in a capital case that caught my attention because it involves a defendant who was involved in a major development in Supreme Court capital jurisprudence more than 30 years ago.  The press piece is headlined "Pervis Payne death penalty set aside, judge will decide if life sentences are concurrent or consecutive," and here are excerpts:

Rolanda Holman remembers being 13 years old, listening to the judge sentence her brother, Pervis Payne, to death by the electric chair. The judge said, “May God have mercy on his soul," Holman recalled.

Thirty-four years later, Holman and her family know that Payne won't be dying by the death penalty after Judge Paula Skahan signed an order Tuesday vacating his capital sentence....

Skahan's action came after the Shelby County District Attorney's office announced Thursday that it was dropping its pursuit of the death penalty against Payne after a state expert examined Payne and records "and could not say that Payne's intellectual functioning is outside the range for intellectual disability," according to a news release.

Both the U.S. and Tennessee supreme courts have ruled that it is unconstitutional to execute someone with an intellectual disability. In April, Tennessee legislators created a law allowing death row inmates like Payne to appeal their sentences on intellectual disability grounds. Since the court finds that Payne is a person with intellectual disability, his capital sentence must be vacated, Skahan wrote in her order....

Payne will serve two life sentences in prison for the murders of Charisse and Lacie Christopher. However, whether those sentences will be concurrent or consecutive is currently being debated.

Steve Jones, assistant district attorney, argued Tuesday that a transcript of the original sentencing 34 years ago shows the judge saying that Payne's sentences ought to be served consecutively.

That, [attorney Kelley] Henry said, would make Payne ineligible for parole until he is 85. Henry argued, however, that precedent shows the court has the discretion to rule his sentences should be carried out at the same time, which would make him eligible for parole in about six years. “Consecutive sentencing would be an effective life without parole for Mr. Payne and we suggest that would not be justice for him and his family," Henry said. "Elder Carl Payne deserves a chance to hug his son as a free man. And we will continue our fight to exonerate Mr. Payne.”

A hearing will be held Dec. 13 to determine whether the life sentences should be held consecutively or concurrently.

Payne, who is being held in Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in Nashville, is convicted of the 1987 deaths of Millington woman Charisse Christopher, 28, and her 2-year-old daughter, Lacie. Christopher’s 3-year-old son, Nicholas, survived multiple stab wounds in the brutal attack that took place in Christopher’s apartment.

Payne has maintained his innocence. In his 1988 trial, Payne said that he discovered the gruesome crime scene after hearing calls for help through the open door of the apartment. He said he bent down to try to help, getting blood on his clothes and pulling at the knife still lodged in Christopher's throat. When a white police officer arrived, Payne, who is Black, said he panicked and ran, fearing he would be seen as the prime suspect.

It is quite remarkable that it took newly 20 years for Payne to be moved off death row after the US Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), that the Eighth Amendment precluded the execution of the intellectually disabled.  But it is perhaps even more remarkable that this is the same defendant whose case made it all the way to the Supreme Court more than 30 years ago. In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), the Supreme Court reversed prior precedents limiting victim impact evidence and held "that, if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar."  Is this a fitting time for the aphorism "what goes around comes around," especially if it is a capital case?

November 26, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, November 21, 2021

Detailing "Mellowed Federal Enforcement" and other federal stories from Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform

In a recent post over at Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform, I have already noted a new essay, "How State Reforms Have Mellowed Federal Enforcement of Marijuana Prohibition" that I had the pleasure of co-authoring with my colleague Alex Fraga.  The forthcoming short piece is now up on SSRN, and here is part of its abstract:

Over [a] quarter century of state reforms, blanket federal marijuana prohibition has remained the law of the land. Indeed, though federal marijuana policies have long been criticized, federal prohibition has now been in place and unchanged for the last half century.  But while federal marijuana law has remained static amidst state-level reforms, federal marijuana prohibition enforcement has actually changed dramatically.  In fact, data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) reveals quite remarkable changes in federal enforcement patterns since certain states began fully legalizing marijuana in 2012.

This essay seeks to document and examine critically the remarkable decline in the number of federal marijuana sentences imposed over the last decade.  While noting that federal sentences imposed for marijuana offenses are down 83% from 2012 to 2020, this essay will also explore how the racial composition of persons sentenced in federal court has evolved as the caseload has declined....  The data suggest that whites are benefiting relatively more from fewer federal prosecutions.

Reports from the Drug Enforcement Administration indicate that marijuana seizures at the southern US border have dwindled as states have legalized adult use and medicinal use of marijuana, and the reduced trafficking over the southern border likely largely explain the vastly reduced number of federal prosecutions of marijuana offenses. Nonetheless, though still shrinking in relative size, there were still more than one thousand people (and mostly people of color) sentenced in federal court for marijuana trafficking in fiscal year 2020 and over 100 million dollars was committed to the incarceration of these defendants for activities not dissimilar from corporate activity in states in which marijuana has been legalized for various purposes. 

In addition to welcoming feedback on this short piece, I also figure it would be useful to highlight a few additional posts with other recent coverage of federal reform issues and dynamics over at MLP&R:

November 21, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Marijuana Legalization in the States, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Pot Prohibition Issues, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, November 19, 2021

Brock Turner 2.0 in New York?: privileged teen receives surprisingly lenient sentence for multiple sex offenses (and now national attention)

Because there are literally tens of thousands of state and federal sentences imposed every month, one can always find an array of notable stories of notable leniency and notable severity in individual sentencings.  But only a handful of sentencing stories ever garner broad national attention, and a variety of predictable and unpredictable factors usually account for what gives certain sentencing stories particular salience.  The case of Stanford swimmer Brock Turner, the 20-year old given only six months in a California jail for a sexual assault, had a bunch of factors that led it to receive more attention than any single state sentence of recent vintage.  I am now wondering if the lenient sentence this week of Christopher Belter might also have similar factors.

This USA Today article provide these details under the headline, "A New York man pleaded guilty to rape and sexual abuse charges. He wasn't sentenced to prison":

A New York man who pleaded guilty to rape and sexual abuse charges will not face prison time, and instead was sentenced to probation earlier this week. Christopher Belter, 20, in 2019 pleaded guilty to felony charges including third-degree rape and attempted first-degree sexual abuse. He also pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor sexual abuse charges, according to multiple reports.

The crimes against four victims occurred when he was 16 and 17 years old. Three of the victims were 16 years old at the time, and one was 15. Belter was facing a maximum sentence of up to eight years in prison. But Niagara County Court Judge Matthew J. Murphy III on Tuesday gave the man eight years probation. The judge said a prison sentence would be "inappropriate.”

“I’m not ashamed to say that I actually prayed over what is the appropriate sentence in this case because there was great pain. There was great harm. There were multiple crimes committed in the case,” Murphy said, according to WKBW. “It seems to me that a sentence that involves incarceration or partial incarceration isn’t appropriate, so I am going to sentence you to probation,” he added.

Belter will have to register as a sex offender under his sentence, according to multiple reports.

Steven Cohen, an attorney representing one of the victims, said in a statement to USA TODAY that his client is “deeply disappointed in the sentencing.” He added that his client “threw up in the ladies room following the sentencing."

“I have been practicing law for over 30 years. If Chris Belter was not a white defendant from a rich and influential family, it is my belief he wouldn’t have received the original plea deal, and he would surely have been sentenced to prison,” Cohen said. “The greater harm, however, is that the sentencing in this matter would seem to perpetuate the insane belief that rape is not a serious crime and that its occurrence results in little consequence to the perpetrator. Our society needs to do much better,” he added.

Barry Covert, Belter's attorney, said the man “is tremendously remorseful for what he's done.” "There are clients who are never able to empathize with their victims no matter how much counseling they receive. Chris isn't one of them," he said, The Buffalo News reported....

The crimes occurred in 2017 and 2018 at Belter’s parents' home in Lewiston, New York. In 2019, judge Sara Sheldon, who has since retired, put Belter on two years’ interim probation. She said he could apply for youthful offender status, which would have lowered his maximum sentence and allowed him not to register as a sex offender.

Belter confirmed in court last month that he violated the agreement by installing software on a computer to view pornography. Murphy later denied Belter the youthful offender status, ruling that he would be sentenced as an adult.

Niagara County District Attorney Brian Seaman said in a statement obtained by USA TODAY: "Based on the seriousness of these crimes, the very powerful and emotional statements of the victims and the fact that Christopher Belter was already given a shot at interim probation and failed, my office has been very clear that we believed a prison sentence was entirely appropriate in this case.”

Here is just a sampling of some of the other national press coverage that this case is now receiving:

From ABC News, "Judge sentences admitted rapist to probation, no prison time"

From CBS News, "A judge sentenced a rapist to probation. One of his victims warns "he will offend again"

From NBC News, "Judge says prison 'inappropriate' for New York man who sexually assaulted 4 teens"

November 19, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (9)

"How families respond to the collateral consequences of incarceration and prisoner reentry"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Brittany Hood and Shytierra Gaston in the journal Family Relations. Here is its abstract:

Objective

The goal of this research was to investigate the ways in which families respond to the collateral consequences of incarceration and reentry.

Background

Although scholars have extensively documented the collateral consequences of mass incarceration for individuals, far less attention has been paid to families, particularly the adult relatives of incarcerated or formerly incarcerated persons who are the primary social support agents.

Method

The current study draws from 24 in-depth, semistructured interviews with the parents, siblings, romantic partners, and other relatives of formerly incarcerated persons in an urban, mid-sized Midwestern city.  We employed a multistage qualitative analysis.

Results

The analysis revealed 10 stress-induced responses among families.  These responses largely involved individuals' self-reliance on their personal efficacy, some reflecting maladaptive responses, while having limited external or formal supports on which to rely when facing strains from familial incarceration.

Implication

Findings suggest that the significant socioeconomic and psychological tax families pay when supporting a justice system–involved relative compromises their well-being.  This study has the potential to inform treatment, research, practices, and policies involving families that are affected by incarceration.

November 19, 2021 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, November 17, 2021

Notable Sentencing Project fact sheet on "Parents in Prison"

The Sentencing project today released this short fact sheet titled simply "Parents in Prison" that provides key facts on parents in prison and policies that impede their ability to care for their children when released. Here is how it starts:

Half of imprisoned people in the United States are parents of minor children who are under age 18: 47% in state prisons and 57% in federal prisons.  Most imprisoned parents of minor children are fathers (626,800 fathers, compared to 57,700 mothers).  But a higher proportion of imprisoned women (58%) than imprisoned men (47%) have minor children.  Between 1991 and 2016, the latest year for which national data is available, the number of fathers in prison increased 48% and the number of mothers increased 96%.  This brief examines trends in parental incarceration, strains on families, missed opportunities for interventions, as well as recent reforms.

November 17, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (0)

Henry Montgomery (of Montgomery v. Louisiana) finally granted parole at age 75

Henry Montgomery back in 2016 won in the US Supreme Court with his claim that the landmark Eighth Amendment decision in Miller v. Alabama must be applied retroactively. But that win only garnered him a chance to be paroled after serving more than 50 years on a murder charge as a teenager in the early 1960s.   Montgomery was in February 2018 denied parole as detailed in this post, and he was denied parole again in April 2019 as detailed in this post.  But I am pleased to now be able to report that the third time was a charm for Montgomery as reported in this UPI piece headlined "Longtime inmate and key figure in juvenile sentence reforms finally wins parole." Here are some of the details:

A Louisiana man who's spent the vast majority of his life in prison for killing a sheriff's deputy when he was a minor almost 60 years ago -- and whose case has been instrumental in freeing hundreds of inmates who were sentenced to life for crimes as juveniles -- is finally getting his chance to walk free.

Henry Montgomery on Wednesday appeared at his third hearing before a Louisiana parole board. The first two turned him down.  The third gave him his freedom after 57 years behind bars.

For years, advocates have said Montgomery is serving an unconscionably long sentence for a crime he committed as a minor, in spite of state Supreme Court rulings that determined that life sentences for juveniles amount to "cruel and unusual punishment."...

Montgomery was 17 when he shot and killed East Baton Rouge Paris Deputy Charles Hurt in 1963, after the lawman caught him skipping school. He's now 75. He was initially sentenced to death, but that sentence was overturned in 1966 when the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that he did not receive a fair trial. After a retrial, he was sentenced to life without parole.

Montgomery has been locked up in the Louisiana State Penitentiary, known as "Angola" after the former plantation that occupied the area. "Through his personal growth, maturity, and maintenance of an excellent record of conduct while in prison, Henry proves daily that he is no longer the 17-year-old child he was in 1963," Marshan Allen, national policy director of Represent Justice, said in a tweet before Wednesday's decision....

Montgomery's case was at the center of a legal fight that went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, and resulted in a ruling that's allowed nearly 1,000 people who were sentenced to life without parole as a juvenile to be freed....

At his first two parole hearings -- in 2018 and 2019 -- he was denied release. At both hearings, two of the three board members voted to grant him his release from prison and one voted to keep him imprisoned. At the time, parole decisions had to be unanimous. Earlier this year, however, Louisiana changed its law to require only a majority vote if an inmate meets certain conditions -- meaning Montgomery would be freed if he got another 2-1 vote in his favor.

The dissenting voter who voted against releasing Montgomery in 2019 said that he hadn't presented enough programs in prison. But Andrew Hundley, one of the people who was released as a result of Montgomery vs. Louisiana and director of the Louisiana Parole Project, said that Angola did not offer such programs for decades of his sentence. "It was the most violent prison in America.  There wasn't this idea of rehabilitation and that prisoners should take part in programming to rehabilitate themselves," he told The Atlantic. "That culture didn't exist and there weren't programs. You just woke up every day trying not to get killed."

Hundley added that he's felt like it's his "life's work" to get Montgomery and others like him out of prison. "Henry was in prison 18 years before I was born. And I've been home five and a half years now."

November 17, 2021 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, November 15, 2021

Noting the SCOTUS "state of capital punishment" without discussing the state of capital punishment

Adam Liptak has this notable new New York Times "Sidebar" piece headlined "In Death Penalty Cases, an Impatient Supreme Court; Recent rulings, including one turning down a death row inmate’s request supported by the prosecution, offer telling glimpses of the state of capital punishment."  Here are excerpts (with a bit of emphasis added):

Two weeks ago, on the same day it heard arguments about the future of abortion rights in Texas, the Supreme Court turned down an appeal from a federal prisoner facing execution.  The move was in one sense routine, as the court has grown increasingly hostile to arguments made by death row inmates.   This became apparent in the final months of the Trump administration, when, after a hiatus of 17 years, the federal government executed 13 inmates.  “Throughout this expedited spree of executions, this court has consistently rejected inmates’ credible claims for relief,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote in a dissent at the time.

The court’s impatience was also evident last week at an argument over whether an inmate’s pastor could pray with and touch him in the death chamber.  Several conservative justices expressed dismay at what they said was last-minute litigation gamesmanship in death penalty cases.

Still, the case the court turned down two weeks ago was exceptional, providing a telling glimpse of the state of capital punishment in the United States.  The court rejected the inmate’s petition even though the prosecution agreed that his case deserved a fresh look.  In an 11-page dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Elena Kagan, said the majority had crossed a new bridge. “To my knowledge, the court has never before denied” such relief “in a capital case where both parties have requested it, let alone where a new development has cast the decision below into such doubt,” Justice Sotomayor wrote.

The case concerned Wesley P. Coonce Jr., who was serving a life sentence for kidnapping and carjacking when he helped murder another prisoner in the mental health ward of a federal prison.  A murder committed by an inmate already serving a life sentence is a capital crime, and he was sentenced to death.  Lawyers for Mr. Coonce asked the justices to return his case to an appeals court for reconsideration of his argument that he could not be executed because he was intellectually disabled.  There had been, the lawyers wrote, an important new development that could alter the appeals court’s analysis....

While the majority did not explain its thinking, a 2014 dissent from Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas, provided a hint. Justice Alito wrote that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment should not be determined by “positions adopted by private professional organizations.”  The majority may also have thought that the Biden administration had its own tools to address Mr. Coonce’s case, notably by granting him clemency.

As the title of this post is meant to highlight, I am struggling a bit to see how the denial of cert by SCOTUS in Coonce serves as a "glimpse of the state of capital punishment in the United States."  For starters, the state of capital punishment in the United States is largely one of modern desuetude.  As detailed in this DPIC fact sheet, in 1999 there were 279 death sentences imposed and 98 executions; in 2019 there were 24 death sentences imposed and 22 executions.  Moreover, I am pretty sure Coonce still can have his death sentence reviewed via a 2255 motion and perhaps via other means, so maybe the case really is a "glimpse" into the various means capital defendants have to get their claims reviewed.

Moreover, as highlighted by the clemency point, what this case really shows to me is that the Biden Administration would rather push for courts to take people off death row rather than do it on their own.  After all, if lawyers in the Justice Department have genuinely concluded that Coonce is intellectually disabled, their constitutional oath would seemingly call for them to ask for Prez Biden to moved him off death row since the Eighth Amendment precludes an execution of someone intellectually disabled.  That DOJ is merely urging here a "fresh look" strikes me far more as a "glimpse" into the state of the Biden Administration's actions on capital punishment.

November 15, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (10)

Thursday, November 11, 2021

Making the case for criminal justice reform as a way to honor those who served on Veterans Day

Jason Pye has this potent and personal Hill commentary headlined "Veterans fought for our freedom: To return the favor, fight for criminal justice reform."  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

One way veterans deal with their problems is by self-medicating through alcohol and drugs.  This wasn’t an issue in our home, but given the pain that was so apparent in my father, I understand all too well why veterans disproportionately struggle with addiction.  Alcohol and prescription or illicit drug abuse often lead to entanglements in our broken criminal justice system, and instead of healing these men and women, incarceration simply adds to their trauma.  In the criminal justice reform movement, we advocate for alternatives to incarceration for sick people — those with addiction and mental health issues who are better served with treatment, counseling and rehabilitative services. 

recent report showed 8 percent of people incarcerated at the state level, and more than 5 percent incarcerated at the federal level, are military veterans, constituting a disturbing 107,400 current or former members of America’s armed forces behind bars.  More than one in 10 veterans have been diagnosed with a substance use disorder, so it should come as no surprise that nearly 30 percent of the veterans in federal prison are there for drug convictions.

At the state level, veterans’ courts, more diversion and treatment options and expanded reentry services have led to better outcomes for many veterans. But we must do more, especially for communities of color that are sending a greater number of young people into military service.

In Congress, a bill called the EQUAL Act is stalled in the Senate after receiving a rare and overwhelming bipartisan 361-to-66 vote in the House of Representatives.  This bill would eliminate the shocking 18-to-1 sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, perhaps the worst vestige of injustice in America’s drug policy.

During Military Families Appreciation Month and on Veterans Day, my hope is that we can view criminal justice, and particularly drug policy reforms, through the lens of those who have served our country.   I’ll be pushing for the EQUAL Act to honor my father, Lamar Pye, and the tens of thousands of other military veterans who suffered severe trauma, many of whom are left alone to struggle with addiction and the consequences of America’s archaic, unfair, counterproductive drug policies.  

These men and women fought for our freedoms. Now it’s time for us to fight for theirs.

Regular readers know I have often blogged about the intersection of veterans' issues and criminal justice on Veterans Day.  For example, this day has always seemed to me a good day for some focused advocacy for clemency for veterans, as I suggested in these prior posts:

Disappointingly, 10 months into his Presidency, Prez Biden has not yet granted clemency to a single person yet, so I doubt we will see him grant clemency to any veterans today.  But a recent US Sentencing Commission report (discussed here) indicates that over 10,000 veterans are serving time in federal prisons now and tens of thousands more have federal criminal records.  It is a darn shame that no Prez has had the wisdom and the courage to try to start a tradition of clemency grants to honor veterans on this special day. 

I will continue to honor this day and those who serves by highlighting issues at the intersection of military service and criminal justice, as I have in a number of prior posts: 

November 11, 2021 in Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, November 10, 2021

Feds get 41 months for one high-profile January 6 rioter and seek 51 months for another

Two new Politico articles provide updates on the latest sentencing news from the prosecution of persons involved in the January 6 Capitol riot.  Here are links and excerpts:

"N.J. man hit with toughest sentence yet in Jan. 6 attack":

A federal judge on Wednesday imposed the most serious sentence yet in connection with the Jan. 6 Capitol riot, ordering a New Jersey man to serve almost three-and-a-half years in prison for punching a police officer in the face during the melee.

Scott Fairlamb, 44, a former MMA fighter and gym owner, is the first defendant charged with assaulting an officer during the attack to face sentencing. The judge, Royce Lamberth, said he expected Fairlamb’s 41-month sentence would end up lower than others also facing charges for assaulting police that day.

That’s because Fairlamb was the first to plead guilty to such an assault and, despite initially celebrating the attack, has since expressed remorse that both prosecutors and Lamberth himself described as “genuine.”

Some of many prior related posts:

November 10, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, November 08, 2021

"Resurrecting Arbitrariness"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Kathryn Miller available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

What allows judges to sentence a child to die in prison?  For years, they did so without constitutional restriction.  That all changed in 2012’s Miller v. Alabama, which banned mandatory sentences of life without parole for children convicted of homicide crimes. Miller held that this extreme sentence was constitutional only for the worst offenders — the “permanently incorrigible.”  By embracing individualized sentencing, Miller and its progeny portended a sea change in the way juveniles would be sentenced for serious crimes. But if Miller opened the door to sentencing reform, the Court’s recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi appeared to slam it shut.

Rather than restrict the discretion of a judge to throw away the key in sentencing child defendants, the Court in Jones increased that discretion.  It recast Miller as a purely procedural decision that only required a barebones “consideration” of a defendant’s “youth and attendant circumstances” to fulfill its mandate of individualized sentencing. Jones further held that judges need not engage in any formal factfinding before sentencing a child to die in prison, which renders these sentences nearly unreviewable.  This article argues that, through these two jurisprudential moves, Jones created conditions that will maximize arbitrary and racially discriminatory sentencing outcomes nation-wide, resembling the unconstitutional death sentences of the mid-twentieth century.

This article is the first to comprehensively analyze Jones, contending that the decision represents an embrace of unfettered discretion in the sentencing of children facing life without parole.  Given the Supreme Court’s gutting of the Eighth Amendment, I contend that state solutions are the way forward.  I propose that states join the national trend of abandoning life without parole sentences for children.  Short of abolishing the sentence, I offer three procedural interventions.  First, states should enact “genuine narrowing” requirements that establish criteria designed to limit eligibility for life without parole sentences for children to the theoretical “worst of the worst.”  While inspired by the narrowing requirement in capital sentencing, “genuine narrowing” relies on meaningful and concrete criteria that seek to achieve the mandate of Miller that such sentences be uncommon.  Second, states should require jury sentencing, which ensures that sentences will be imposed by multiple, and typically more diverse, voices than what currently occurs with judicial sentencing.  Third, states should go beyond merely telling sentencers to take youth into account in their sentencing decisions, but should instead inform them that the characteristics of youth are “mitigating as a matter of law,” and when pre-sent, must weigh against an imposition of life without parole.

November 8, 2021 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Is longest prison term for Jan 6 rioter, and a possible new benchmark, coming this week?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this recent AP article, headlined "Prosecutors seek 44 months in 1st sentence for riot violence," previewing a notable sentencing scheduled for this coming Wednesday. Here are the basics:

Federal prosecutors on Wednesday recommended a prison sentence of nearly four years for a New Jersey gym owner who is on track to be the first person sentenced for assaulting a law enforcement officer during the riot at the U.S. Capitol.

Scott Fairlamb’s sentencing, scheduled for next Wednesday, could guide other judges in deciding the appropriate punishment for dozens of other rioters who engaged in violence at the Capitol that day.

Prosecutors said Fairlamb, one of one of the first rioters to breach the Capitol, incited and emboldened other rioters around him with his violent actions....

If U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth adopts the Justice Department’s recommendation for a 44-month prison term, Fairlamb’s sentence would be the longest for a rioter.  An 8-month prison term is the longest sentence among the nearly two dozen rioters who have been sentenced so far.  A man who posted threats connected to Jan. 6 but didn’t storm the Capitol was sentenced to 14 months in prison.

Defense attorney Harley Breite said during an interview Wednesday that he intends to ask Lamberth to sentence Fairlamb to the time he already has served in jail, allowing for his immediate release.  Fairlamb has been jailed since his Jan. 22 arrest at his home in Stockholm, New Jersey....

Fairlamb, a 44-year-old former mixed martial arts fighter, owned Fairlamb Fit gym in Pompton Lakes, New Jersey.  He is the brother of a Secret Service agent who was assigned to protect former first lady Michelle Obama, according to defense attorney Harley Breite.

Fairlamb picked up a police baton as he joined the mob that broke past a line of police officers and breached the Capitol, according to prosecutors. A video showed him holding the collapsible baton and shouting, “What (do) patriots do? We f——— disarm them and then we storm the f——— Capitol!”  After he left the building, Fairlamb shoved and punched a Metropolitan Police Department officer in the face, an attack captured on video by a bystander.  The officer said he didn’t suffer any physical injuries, according to prosecutors.

Fairlamb pleaded guilty to two counts, obstruction of an official proceeding and assaulting the police officer.  The counts carry a maximum of more than 20 years in prison, but sentencing guidelines calculated by the court’s probation department recommend a term of imprisonment ranging from 41 to 51 months.  Lamberth isn’t bound by any of the recommendations....

Fairlamb’s social media accounts indicated that he subscribed to the QAnon conspiracy theory and promoted a bogus claim that former President Donald Trump would become the first president of “the new Republic” on March 4, prosecutors wrote.  QAnon has centered on the baseless belief that Trump was fighting against a cabal of Satan-worshipping, child sex trafficking cannibals, including “deep state” enemies, prominent Democrats and Hollywood elites.

Some of many prior related posts:

November 8, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, November 05, 2021

"Specialization in Criminal Courts: Decision Making, Recidivism, and Re-victimization in Domestic Violence Courts in Tennessee"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now available via SSRN authored by Aria Golestani, Emily Owens and Kerri Raissian. Here is its abstract:

Local governments increasingly rely on “specialized” or “problem solving” courts as a way to improve the provision of criminal justice.  Using administrative data on misdemeanor DV cases between 2000 and 2006, we exploit the arbitrary courtroom assignment of low-income defendants to evaluate the social impact of specialized domestic violence courts in the General Sessions Court of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.  We find that, compared to traditional court, defendants assigned to specialized court are less likely to be convicted, but no more likely to be charged with a future crime 1 to 3 years later.  This offender-focused measure of recidivism masks a potentially important increase in safety.  Police records suggest that victims in cases assigned to specialized court are less likely to be involved in a future domestic incident.  Conditional on future police involvement, these same victims appear to be more willing to cooperate with police and prosecutors.

November 5, 2021 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, November 04, 2021

Should veteran status justify reducing or increasing the sentences of January 6 rioters?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this lengthy new AP piece headlined "Feds seek tougher sentences for veterans who stormed Capitol."  The piece merits a full read, and here are excerpts:

During his 27 years in the U.S. Army, Leonard Gruppo joined the Special Forces, served in four war zones and led a team of combat medics in Iraq before retiring in 2013 as a lieutenant colonel.

During his six minutes inside the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, Gruppo joined a slew of other military veterans as a mob of pro-Trump rioters carried out an unparalleled assault on the bastion of American democracy.  He’s among dozens of veterans and active-service members charged in connection with the insurrection.

Now, cases like his are presenting a thorny question for federal judges to consider when they sentence veterans who stormed the Capitol: Do they deserve leniency because they served their country or tougher punishment because they swore an oath to defend it?

The Justice Department has adopted the latter position. In at least five cases so far, prosecutors have cited a rioter’s military service as a factor weighing in favor of a jail sentence or house arrest.  Prosecutors have repeatedly maintained that veterans’ service, while commendable, made their actions on Jan. 6 more egregious....

Prosecutors’ arguments about rioters’ military service didn’t sway one of the first judges to hear them — at Gruppo’s sentencing hearing last Friday.  “I don’t view his military service that way. I just can’t bring myself to do that,” Chief U.S. District Judge Beryl Howell said before sentencing Gruppo to two years of probation, including 90 days of house arrest....

In most criminal cases, judges typically view a defendant’s military service as a mitigating factor that favors leniency, said James Markham, a professor of public law and government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  But he recognizes how the Justice Department could conclude that rioters with military experience should be held to a higher standard than those without it.  “It’s obviously not related to their military service directly, but it’s also not entirely conceptually unrelated that somebody who is a veteran or had military service could be viewed as having a more refined understanding of the importance of civilian control and electoral stability,” said Markham, a lawyer and Air Force veteran.

More than 650 people have been charged in the Jan. 6 attack. Some of the rioters facing the most serious charges, including members of far-right extremist groups, have military backgrounds.  A handful of riot defendants were on active duty, including an Army reservist who wore a Hitler mustache to his job at at a Navy base.

More than 100 riot defendants have pleaded guilty, mostly to misdemeanors punishable by a maximum of six months of incarceration. Two dozen had been sentenced as of Friday.  At least three of the sentenced defendants are veterans, according to an Associated Press review of court records.

In September, U.S. District Judge James Boasberg sentenced Air Force veteran Derek Jancart to 45 days in jail for joining the riot.  Prosecutors had sought a four-month jail sentence for Jancart, an Ohio steelworker....  Another Air Force veteran, Thomas Vinson, was sentenced on Oct. 22 to five years of probation.  Prosecutors had recommended three months of house arrest for Vinson, a Kentucky resident who served in the Air Force from 1984 through 1988....

At least two other rioters who served in the military are scheduled to be sentenced in the coming days.  Prosecutors have recommended two months in jail for Boyd Camper, who served in the U.S. Marines from 1987 to 1990...  Prosecutors are seeking two months of house arrest for Air Force veteran Jonathan Ace Sanders Sr., who is scheduled to be sentenced on Thursday. 

Some of many prior related posts:

November 4, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, November 01, 2021

Some notable dissents and a statement together with SCOTUS criminal justice cert denials

The merits cases scheduled to be argued before the Supreme Court this week on topics like abortion and gun rights are rightly getting a lot of attention.  But the week has started with this order list in which Court has 5+ pages listing cases on which certiorari has been denied.  In three cases involving criminal-law related issues, some Justices penned statements concerning these denials.  Via How Appealing, here are the basics with links:

In Simmons v. United States, No. 20-1704, Justice Sonia Sotomayor issued a statement, in which Justice Elena Kagan joined, respecting the denial of certiorari.

In Coonce v. United States, No. 19–7862, Justice Sotomayor issued a dissent, in which Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Kagan joined, from the denial of certiorari.

And in American Civil Liberties Union v. United States, No. 20–1499, Justice Neil M. Gorsuch issued a dissent, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, from the denial of certiorari.

The lengthiest and most notable of these separate opinions is in the Coonce case, where Justice Sotomayor starts her 11-page dissent this way:

Petitioner Wesley Paul Coonce, Jr., was convicted in federal court of murder. Facing the death penalty, he argued that his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment because he has an intellectual disability.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002).  The District Court denied Coonce’s Atkins claim without a hearing, the jury sentenced him to death, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

In denying Coonce relief without a hearing, the courts relied on the definition of intellectual disability by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), which then required that an impairment manifest before age 18.  It is undisputed that Coonce’s impairments fully manifested at age 20.  After Coonce petitioned for certiorari, the AAIDD changed its definition to include impairments that, like Coonce’s, manifested before age 22.

The Government urges us to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand (GVR), conceding that it is reasonably probable that the Eighth Circuit would reach a different result on reconsideration given the significant shift in the definition that formed the basis of its opinion. Instead, the Court denies certiorari.  Because Coonce is entitled to a hearing on his Atkins claim, and because our precedents counsel in favor of a GVR, I respectfully dissent.

One of many notable aspects of this case is highlighted by this observation in the dissent:

In light of the above, the material change in the AAIDD’s leading definition of intellectual disability plainly warrants a GVR.  To my knowledge, the Court has never before denied a GVR in a capital case where both parties have requested it, let alone where a new development has cast the decision below into such doubt.

I believe the defendant in this case will still be able to bring a 2255 motion, so the Justices voting to deny cert may be content to have these "execution competency" issues addressed in that setting. But Justice Sotomayor closes her dissent explaining why that seems to her insufficient:

I can only hope that the lower courts on collateral review will give Coonce the consideration that the Constitution demands. But this Court, too, has an obligation to protect our Constitution’s mandates. It falls short of fulfilling that obligation today. The Court should have allowed the Eighth Circuit to reconsider Coonce’s compelling claim of intellectual disability, as both he and the Government requested. I respectfully dissent.

November 1, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, October 28, 2021

"Federal Offenders Who Served in the Armed Forces"

Cover_armed-forcesThe title of this post is the title of this fascinating new report from the US Sentencing Commission released today.  This USSC webpage provides this overview and key findings:

The Department of Veterans Affairs estimates that there are more than 19 million Americans who are veterans. Over 10,000 veteran offenders were in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons at the end of 2019, accounting for almost six percent of all BOP inmates.

This report provides an analysis of the relatively small number of veterans each year who are sentenced for a federal felony or Class A misdemeanor offense, most often committed well after they left military service.  In particular, the report examines federal offenders with prior military service who were sentenced in fiscal year 2019, the crimes they committed, and an assessment of whether that prior service was given special consideration at sentencing.

Key Findings

  • In fiscal year 2019, 4.4 percent of all U.S. citizens sentenced in the Federal courts for a felony or Class A misdemeanor had served in the military.  For these offenders, the average length of time between separation from the military and the sentence for the federal offense was 23 years.

  • The most common crime type committed by both veteran offenders and citizen offenders overall was drug trafficking (25.0% and 37.6%, respectively).  Veteran offenders, however, committed child pornography offenses more than four times as often as citizen offenders overall, 11.6 percent compared to 2.7 percent, and sex abuse offenses more than twice as often, 6.7 percent compared to 2.4 percent.

  • The sentences imposed on veteran offenders and citizen offenders overall were similar in terms of type of sentence imposed and average sentence imposed.  For veteran offenders, 79.2 percent received a sentence of imprisonment compared to 83.9 percent of all citizen offenders, and the average sentence for veteran offenders was 64 months compared to 62 months for all citizen offenders.

  • Although veteran offenders were more likely to be sentenced below the applicable guideline range (38.9% received a downward variance compared to 31.8% of all citizen offenders), military service does not appear to have a significant influence on the sentences imposed.  The court specifically cited an offender’s military service as a reason for the sentence imposed in only 15.0 percent of cases involving veteran offenders.

  • When the court did cite an offender’s military service as a reason for the sentence, it was almost always for service that the military had characterized as honorable.

  • Only two other offender characteristics were correlated with sentences where a court cited the offender’s military service as a reason.  Two-thirds (66.9%) of the offenders whose military service was cited by the court indicated that they had some history of mental health problems, compared to 51.1 percent for veteran offenders generally.  Also, more than half (54.8%) of the offenders whose service was cited by the court had served in a combat zone, compared to 22.6 percent for all veteran offenders.

October 28, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

BJS releases "Federal Justice Statistics, 2019" with immigration and drugs dominating federal dockets

Via email this morning I learned of the release of this notable new data report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics titled simply "Federal Justice Statistics, 2019."  The email summarized the report this way:

This report, the 33rd in an annual series which began in 1979, provides national statistics on the federal response to crime. It describes case processing in the federal criminal justice system for fiscal year 2019, including—

  • investigations by U.S. attorneys
  • prosecutions and declinations
  • convictions and acquittals
  • sentencing
  • pretrial release
  • detention
  • appeals
  • probation and parole
  • prisons.

Findings are based on BJS’s Federal Justice Statistics Program (FJSP).  The FJSP collects, standardizes, and reports on administrative data from six federal justice agencies: the U.S. Marshals Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Federal Bureau of Prisons, and U.S. Sentencing Commission.

Covering a period from Oct. 1 2018 to Sept. 30, 2019, this report captures the last full yearly snapshot of the federal criminal justice system before COVID hit in early 2020.  And, though federal data always reveal that the modern federal justice system is focused particularly on immigration and drug cases, these new data from the report still paint a notable picture of our federal criminal justice system in operation while highlighting how arrest patterns and sentencing patterns diverge for the two biggest crime categories:

During FY 2019, 8 in 10 federal arrests were for immigration, drug, or supervision violations (165,123). Immigration (117,425 arrests) was the most common arrest offense in FY 2019.  More than half (57%) of federal arrests involved an immigration offense as the most serious arrest offense.  The next most common arrest offenses were for drug offenses (12% of all arrests) and supervision violations (11%)....

In FY 2019, a total of 58,886 federally sentenced persons were admitted to federal prison.  Of these, 45,425 entered federal prison on U.S. district court commitments.  Another 13,461 persons were returned to federal prison for violating conditions of probation, parole, or supervised release, or were admitted for a reason other than a U.S. district court commitment.  In FY 2019, 21,075 persons entered federal prison for drug offenses, most of whom (15,574, or 74%) had been sentenced to more than 1 year.

In 2009 and 2019, most people in federal prison were serving time for a drug offense.  Persons with a drug offense as the most serious commitment offense made up 47% of the prison population at fiscal year-end 2019, down from 53% at fiscal year-end 2009.  Persons serving time for a weapon offense increased from 15% of the prison population in 2009 to 19% in 2019.  Persons serving time for a violent offense remained at 6% in 2009 and 2019, and persons serving time for an immigration offense decreased from 12% in 2009 to 6% in 2019.

October 28, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, October 22, 2021

Oregon Gov uses clemency power to give certain juve offenders opportunity for parole after non-retroactive statutory reform

As reported in this HuffPost piece, "Oregon Gov. Kate Brown (D) commuted the sentences of dozens of people convicted of crimes they committed as kids on Wednesday, potentially reducing their prison time by hundreds of years and marking major progress in a broader reform effort that recognizes people who committed crimes before they were adults have a unique capacity for change." Here is more (with links from the original):

Brown’s clemency order lists more than 70 people who committed crimes before they were 18 years old and are serving sentences of 15 years or more in prison.  They were selected because they were excluded from a 2019 juvenile justice reform bill that dramatically changed the way the state punishes people who commit crimes when they are kids.  Those individuals, many of whom were previously facing life sentences — some without the chance of parole — now have the opportunity to petition the state’s Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision for release after 15 years in prison.  Brown instructed the board to consider each individual’s age and immaturity at the time of the crime and whether they have subsequently shown maturity and rehabilitation.
The clemency order excludes individuals who are serving sentences for crimes they later committed as adults and those who have a release date of 2050 or later — although these individuals can still petition the governor for clemency.

The governor’s move comes months after a HuffPost story about Kipland Kinkel, one of Oregon’s most infamous juvenile offenders, and the ways his high-profile case has been used to justify extreme sentencing for other people who committed crimes when they were kids.  In 1998, when Kinkel was 15 years old and experiencing symptoms of a severe undiagnosed mental illness, he killed his mother, his father, two students at his school, and wounded 25 others.  He was sentenced to nearly 112 years in prison without the chance of parole.

With a projected release date of 2110, Kinkel is not part of Brown’s clemency order.  The 2050 cutoff in Brown’s order appears to be designed specifically to exclude him, although it does impact a handful of other people....

Brown’s clemency action is an effort to correct some of the sentencing inequities created by the state legislature with the non-retroactive reform bill....  Juvenile justice reform advocates praised Brown’s decision to give a second chance to people who have grown up and dramatically changed since the time of their crimes....

Brown outlined her clemency plan in a September letter to Oregon’s Department of Corrections in which she requested a list of names of people in its custody for crimes they committed as juveniles who were sentenced before S.B. 1008 went into effect and who met a set of criteria. 

“SB 1008 takes into account the fact that these youth are capable of tremendous transformation,” Brown wrote in the letter, citing the fact that many who commit crimes during their youth complete college degrees and treatment programs while in youth custody before they even age into adult prison. “For these reasons, I have no doubt that the above-referenced list will be comprised of many individuals who have demonstrated exemplary progress and considerable evidence of rehabilitation, and who — unfairly — did not benefit from the effects of SB 1008.”

Brown’s juvenile clemency plan is two-pronged, according to the September letter.  One part involves providing clemency that enables individuals who are serving a sentence of 15 years or more to get a parole board hearing — which she did on Wednesday.  The second part involves reviewing the sentences of people who were under 18 at the time of their crime and who will have served 50% of their sentences by next December.

For the roughly 200 people in that group, the governor’s office “will engage in an individualized review process to determine whether the youth has made exemplary progress and if there is considerable evidence of rehabilitation, as well as taking into account input from the [district attorney] and victims, if any,” Merah wrote in an email. “If the Governor determines that a commutation is warranted, the youth will be granted a conditional release.”  Both parts of Brown’s clemency plan exclude individuals who are currently in prison for a conviction they subsequently committed as adults.

October 22, 2021 in Clemency and Pardons, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 21, 2021

Notable (re)sentencing of another former Minnesota police officer for another notable homicide

Though not anywhere as high-profile as the conviction and sentencing of Derek Chauvin, another Minnesota police officer was just subject to state sentencing (actually a resentencing) for homicide. This local article, headlined "Judge resentences ex-officer Mohamed Noor to almost 5 years on manslaughter count," reports on an interesting sentencing process and outcome. Here are excerpts:

Former Minneapolis police officer Mohamed Noor received a new sentence of 4 3/4 years on Thursday for his manslaughter conviction after the state's high court overturned the more serious murder conviction for the 2017 shooting of an Australian woman who had called to report a possible crime.

Noor, who turned 36 Wednesday, was resentenced by Judge Kathryn Quaintance on second-degree manslaughter because the Minnesota Supreme Court set aside his third-degree murder conviction last month.  The decision vacated a prison term of 12 1/2 years Noor was already serving on the murder count for shooting Justine Ruszczyk Damond.

Quaintance, in sentencing Noor to the high end as suggested by state sentencing guidelines, said she wasn't surprised Noor has been a model prisoner, but he had fired his gun across the nose of his partner, endangering a bicyclist and others in the neighborhood on a summer evening.  "These factors of endangering the public make your crime of manslaughter appropriate for a high end sentence," she said.

Noor has served 29 1/12 months since he entered prison in May 2019.  With credit for time served, Noor would be scheduled for release after serving 2/3 of his sentence, meaning he must serve another 8 1/2 months. He is likely to be released next May.

Assistant Hennepin County Attorney Amy Sweasy read a statement from Maryan Heffernan, the victim's mother, who was watching from Australia.  The family sought the maximum for Noor. "We should expect complete accountability from our public institutions and their staff," Heffernan's statement said.  The longest sentence would send a message to police "that we require respect for their badges," Heffernan's statement said.  "We will be outraged if the court is unwilling to respect the will of the people and demand that justice be heard, be seen and be done."

The victim's fiance Don Damond appeared via Zoom and took a different tact, saying the Supreme Court's decision, "Does not diminish the truth which was uncovered during the trial.  The truth is that Justine should be alive." Damond said his comments should not be construed that he wasn't still grieving, but his departed wife "lived a life of love, she modeled a life of joy for all and she stood for forgiveness."

"Given her example, I want you to know that I forgive you Mohamed," he said. "All I ask is that you use this experience to do good for other people.  Be the example of how to transform beyond adversity.  Be an example of honesty and contrition. This is what Justine would want."

Second-degree manslaughter is punishable by up to 10 years in prison, but state sentencing guidelines recommend a term between about 3 1/3 and 4 3/4 years in prison for defendants with no criminal history, such as Noor.  The presumptive term is four years, according to the guidelines.

In her comments, Sweasy asked for the maximum, noting this will be the only time a police officer will be sentenced for this offense.  "By every measure ... this is worse-than-typical for a second-degree manslaughter case," Sweasy said, adding that Noor wore the badge of Minneapolis police officer, a social contract that provides privilege to use deadly force to protect other civilians.

Noor's attorney, Thomas Plunkett, said Noor was young and had overreacted. "He was operating with the mistaken belief that he needed to protect his partner," Plunkett said, adding that Noor had wanted to make the world better and chose a career as a police officer to bridge the gap between the police, the justice system and the Somali-immigrant community.

In prison, he was an award-winning inmate for his commitment and respect to others.  Plunkett requested a sentence at the low end of the guidelines, 3 1/3 years.  There is little doubt that Mr. Noor's time in prison was "more punitive" than anyone could have imagined before the pandemic, Plunkett said.  In Noor's brief comments, he said he was "deeply grateful" for Damond's forgiveness and "deeply sorry" for the family's loss. Of Damond, Noor said, "I will take his advice and be a unifier."

Plunkett had asked the judge to give Noor credit for time he's already served in prison and to place him on supervised release, which typically requires regular check-ins with the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC), regular drug and alcohol testing, and restrictions on certain activities.  It can also include electronic home monitoring.  Violations of such terms can result in a defendant being sent back to prison.

Defendants in Minnesota must serve 2/3 of their prison term before becoming eligible for supervised release.  Noor entered prison on May 2, 2019 and was first sentenced in June 2019.  He originally served his time in administrative segregation at Oak Park Heights prison in Minnesota, but was transferred on July 11, 2019 to facility in North Dakota for his own safety.

October 21, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, State Sentencing Guidelines | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 14, 2021

"New York State’s New Death Penalty: The Death Toll of Mass Incarceration in a Post-Execution Era"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting new report from the the Center for Justice at Columbia University which reinforces my sense that we ought to give a lot more attention to functional death sentences (which are relatively frequent) than to formal death sentences (which are relatively rare). Here is the report's introduction (with emphasis in the original and notes removed):

New York State was once an international outlier in its use of capital punishment.  Prior to 1972, when the US Supreme Court outlawed the death penalty, New York ranked second in most executions of any state in the country, executing 1130 people over a 364 year period.  Yet, abolishing the death penalty did not slow death behind bars.  Since 1976 — when the state began compiling data on deaths in custody — 7,504 people died while in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS).  This is seven times the number of deaths of those who were executed by the state.  Those who have died in custody over the last 45 years have largely been Black people, and particularly in the last decade, older people and people serving sentences of 15 years or more.  Increasingly, advocates and lawmakers have come to call this devastating reality “death by incarceration,” or “death by incarceration sentences” that ensure that thousands will die in prison and/or face a Parole Board that denies release to the majority of people who appear before it, and disproportionately denies release to Black New Yorkers.

This report compiles and analyzes data on in-custody deaths in New York State between 1976 and 2020 and offers policy recommendations for curtailing the number of deaths behind bars.  Without policy intervention, thousands of currently incarcerated New Yorkers are at risk of dying behind bars in the years and decades to come. 

All lives lost in the New York State correctional system raise questions about the morality and humanity of the state and its governance.  The large proportion of deaths of incarcerated Black New Yorkers highlight the racism of criminal justice policy in the state, and how the need for racial justice is a matter of life and death.  The disproportionate deaths of older adults serving long sentences highlight important questions about the state’s investments in public and community safety.  Incarcerated adults aged 55 and older are the least likely to commit a new crime across all age groups, and yet are kept in prison due to a lack of meaningful opportunities for release and repeated parole denials. Importantly, death by incarceration sentences and repeated parole denials ignore both the reality and possibility of redemption and transformation for people in prison. Older adults in prison are often leaders, mentors and stewards of the community. Of those who are released from prison, many continue their service and leadership in their communities, mentoring young people, providing reentry services for others released from custody, and intervening to prevent and reduce violence.

This report concludes that New York State must end its new de facto death penalty and offers recommendations towards this goal, including policies with large community and legislative support.

Key Findings 

  • More people have died in NY State custody in the last decade than the total of number of people executed in the 364 years New York State had the death penalty. 1,278 people died in NY State custody in the last decade compared to 1,130 who were executed in NY State between 1608 and 1972.
  • Today, more than 1 in 2 people who die in NY State custody are older adults, compared to roughly 1 in 10 at the beginning of the era of mass incarceration. 
  • Every three days someone dies inside a NYS prison, compared to every 12 days in 1976. 
  • In 2018, Black people accounted for 45% of all deaths in DOCCS custody, despite only making up 14% of all deaths of New York State residents. 
  • People who have already served 15 years in custody account for 9 times more of the total deaths behind bars today than they did in the 1980s, the first full decade of available data. 
  • 40% of all deaths behind bars since 1976 of people 55 and older happened in the last ten years. 
  • In the most recent decade, roughly 1 in 3 people who died behind bars had served at least 15 years, compared to 1 in 29 in the 1980s.

October 14, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (5)

Sunday, October 10, 2021

Prison Policy Initiative briefing highlights disproportionate role of Native peoples in US criminal justice systems

Incarceration_byrace_2019The Prison Policy Initiative has this notable new briefing authored by Leah Wang titled "The U.S. criminal justice system disproportionately hurts Native people: the data, visualized."  Here is part of its text:

This Monday is Indigenous Peoples’ Day, a holiday dedicated to Native American people, their rich histories, and their cultures. Our way of observing the holiday: sending a reminder that Native people are harmed in unique ways by the U.S. criminal justice system.  We offer a roundup of what we know about Native people (those identified by the Census Bureau as American Indian/Alaska Native) who are impacted by prisons, jails, and police, and about the persistent gaps in data collection and disaggregation that hide this layer of racial and ethnic disparity.

The U.S. incarcerates a growing number of Native people, and what little data exist show overrepresentation In 2019, the latest year for which we have data, there were over 10,000 Native people locked up in local jails.  Although this population has fluctuated over the past 10 years, the Native jail population is up a shocking 85% since 2000.  And these figures don’t even include those held in “Indian country jails,” which are located on tribal lands: The number of people in Indian country jails increased by 61% between 2000 and 2018.  Meanwhile, the total population of Native people living on tribal lands has actually decreased slightly over the same time period, leaving us to conclude that we are criminalizing Native people at ever-increasing rates.

Government data publications breaking down incarcerated populations by race or ethnicity often omit Native people, or obscure them unhelpfully in a meaningless “Other” category, perhaps because they make up a relatively small share of the total population.  The latest incarceration data, however, shows that American Indian and Alaska Native people have high rates of incarceration in both jails and prisons as compared with other racial and ethnic groups.  In jails, Native people had more than double the incarceration rate of white people, and in prisons this disparity was even greater.

Native people made up 2.1% of all federally incarcerated people in 2019, larger than their share of the total U.S. population, which was less than one percent.  Similarly, Native people made up about 2.3% of people on federal community supervision in mid-2018.  The reach of the federal justice system into tribal territory is complex: State law often does not apply, and many serious crimes can only be prosecuted at the federal level, where sentences can be harsher than they would be at the state level.  This confusing network of jurisdiction sweeps Native people up into federal correctional control in ways that don’t apply to other racial and ethnic groups.

Native women are particularly overrepresented in the incarcerated population: They made up 2.5% of women in prisons and jails in 2010, the most recent year for which we have this data (until the 2020 Census data is published); that year, Native women were just 0.7% of the total U.S. female population.  Their overincarceration is another maddening aspect of our nation’s contributions to human rights crises facing Native women, in addition to Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women (MMIW) and high rates of sexual and other violent victimization.

October 10, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 06, 2021

"Speeding While Black: Black Motorists Face More-Serious Charges for Excessive Speeding than White Motorists Do"

The title of this post is the title of this short new research brief from RAND, which presents these key findings: 

In 25 U.S. states, motorists accused of excessive speeding can face either a criminal misdemeanor or a traffic infraction, and the charge is at the discretion of law enforcement officers and the courts.  Using data on speeding violations in 18 Virginia counties over a nine-year period, researchers found large racial disparities in who was convicted of a misdemeanor.

Black motorists cited for speeding were almost twice as likely as White motorists to be convicted of a misdemeanor when their speed was in the range that qualified for the more serious charge.

Whom Officers Charged Explained 55% of the Disparity: Among cited motorists speeding at an excessive level, Black motorists were more likely than White motorists to be charged with a misdemeanor instead of an infraction....

Whom Courts Convicted Explained 45% of the Disparity: Among motorists charged with a misdemeanor by law enforcement, Black motorists were more likely than White motorists to be convicted of a misdemeanor by the court.

The full 73-page RAND research report on which this brief is based, titled "Racial Disparities in Misdemeanor Speeding Convictions," is available at this link. Here is part of its initial summary:

Overall Racial Disparity

Among motorists cited for speeding in a range that qualified for a misdemeanor, Black motorists were almost twice as likely as White motorists to be convicted of a misdemeanor. White motorists were convicted of a misdemeanor 19 percent of the time, and Black motorists were convicted 36 percent of the time. 

Significant racial disparities were present at both the law enforcement and the court stages.  We found that 55 percent of the overall racial disparity in conviction rates could be explained by what happened at the law enforcement stage (i.e., by whom law enforcement charged with a misdemeanor), and the remaining 45 percent of the disparity was explained by what happened at the court stage (i.e., by whom the court convicted of a misdemeanor).

Racial Disparities at the Law Enforcement Stage

The county in which a motorist was cited explained almost half of the racial disparity in whom law enforcement charged with a misdemeanor.  Further analyses indicated that location explained such a substantial proportion of the overall disparity at this stage because law enforcement officers offered fewer charge discounts overall in the counties in which Black motorists made up a larger percentage of cited motorists.  We were not able to determine whether there was a race-neutral reason for why enforcement was stricter in these counties.

Almost half of the racial disparity in whom law enforcement charged with a misdemeanor was unexplained by any of the case characteristics that we could control for.  This remaining racial disparity might reflect either disparate treatment by law enforcement officers or underlying racial differences in omitted variables.

Racial Disparities at the Court Stage

About four-fifths of the racial disparity in whom the court convicted of a misdemeanor could be explained by observable case characteristics. In our study, one of the primary reasons that racial disparities occurred at the court stage was because Black motorists were significantly less likely than White motorists to attend the required court appearance to adjudicate a misdemeanor charge.  Although there are several potential policy options to address this — including text message reminders or the adjudication of cases through online platforms — the optimal option will depend on first understanding why this racial difference in court appearance rates occurs.  Another key reason that Black motorists were more likely to be convicted of a misdemeanor at the court stage was that they were less likely to have a lawyer present at their court appearance.  Having an attorney present significantly lowered the likelihood that a motorist was convicted of a misdemeanor, but in Virginia, attorneys are not provided by the court for these violations and must be retained at the motorist’s expense.

October 6, 2021 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, October 05, 2021

Missouri completes execution of inmate who claimed to be intellectually disabled

As reported in this NBC News piece, "Missouri on Tuesday executed Ernest Johnson, despite claims by his attorney and death penalty opponents that he had an intellectual disability and killing him violated the Constitution." Here is more:

Johnson, 61, who was convicted in the murders of three convenience store employees almost three decades ago, was executed by lethal injection at a state prison in Bonne Terre. He was pronounced dead at 6:11 p.m. local time, a spokeswoman for the state department of corrections said.

Pope Francis, two members of Congress and former Democratic governor Bob Holden were among those who spoke out against the execution.

On Monday Gov. Mike Parson, a Republican, denied Johnson clemency and said the state would carry out the execution. The U.S. Supreme Court denied an application for a stay of execution Tuesday.

In a filing to the high court Tuesday, Johnson's legal team reiterated IQ tests have indicated he had the intellectual capacity of a child and wrote that there would be "no tangible harm" if his execution was delayed while questions over whether lower courts had "constitutionally considered" his disability were further explored.

As revealed in this SCOTUS order, no Justices dissented from the denial of a stay and denial of cert before the execution.

October 5, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (7)

Wooden it be remarkable if the Constitution again has something to say about applying ACCA?

For some reason, the Supreme Court's Wooden case concerning proper application of the Armed Career Criminal Act prompts me to make silly post titles.  My prior recent post, "Wooden, SCOTUS on the ACCA, not so free and easy," riffed poorly on song lyrics, while today I am trying a bad pun.  The question within the punny title here is driven by the fact that the Supreme Court has previously blown up part of ACCA based on Fifth Amendment vagueness problems (Johnson from 2015) and has also shaped its application of the statute based on Sixth Amendment jury right worries (Shepard from 2005).  So, perhaps unsurprisingly, during SCOTUS oral argument yesterday in Wooden, a number of Justices raised both Fifth and Sixth Amendment concerns about  courts having to figure out the reach of ACCA's extreme 15-year mandatory minimum for unlawful gun possession based on just whether and when a defendant on a prior crime spree has committed predicate offenses "on occasions different from one another."

I am disinclined to make bold predictions after listening to the oral argument, though I am tempted to predict that the defendant will prevail and the question is going to be on what ground(s). I reach that view because even Justice Alito seemed to be struggling to figure out how to give meaningful content to a key phrase that determines at least five years of federal imprisonment.  Here are a few choice quotes from Justice Alito: "This seems to me to be a nearly impossible question of statutory interpretation because the term 'occasion"' does not have a very precise meaning.";  "I have no idea what an occasion is or what a criminal opportunity is or what a criminal episode is."  If Justice Alito cannot come up with a pro-prosecution reading of the applicable statute, I doubt other Justices will be able to do so -- especially because many of the other Justices who generally tend to favor the government also tend to be fans of the Fifth and/or Sixth Amendment doctrines in play in this case (I am thinking here of the Chief Justice as well as Justices Thomas and Gorsuch).

For some other views on the argument, here is a round up of some of the press coverage I have seen:

From Bloomberg Law, "Justices Parse ‘Occasion’ Meaning in Career-Criminal Appeal"

From Courthouse News Service, "Burglary of many units in one facility poses counting challenge at sentencing"

From Law360, "Justices Dubious About Feds' 'Career Criminal' Interpretation"

From SCOTUSBlog, "A hypothetical-filled argument proves how tricky it is to define an 'occasion'"

October 5, 2021 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, October 04, 2021

Pope Francis among those urging Missou Gov to grant clemency to offender scheduled to be executed tomorrow ... UPDATE: Gov denies clemency

As detailed in this new AP article, "Pope Francis has joined the chorus of people calling on Missouri Gov. Mike Parson to grant clemency to a death row inmate who is set to be executed for killing three people during a 1994 convenience store robbery."  Here is more:

In a letter last week, a representative for Pope Francis wrote that the pope “wishes to place before you the simple fact of Mr. Johnson’s humanity and the sacredness of all human life,” referring to Ernest Johnson, who is scheduled to be executed at 6 p.m. Tuesday at the state prison in Bonne Terre, about 50 miles south of St. Louis.

Parson, a Republican, has been considering whether to reduce the 61-year-old Johnson’s sentence to life in prison without the possibility of parole.  Johnson’s attorney, Jeremy Weis, said executing him would violate the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits executing intellectually disabled people.  He said multiple IQ tests and other exams have shown that Johnson has the intellectual capacity of a child. He also was born with fetal alcohol syndrome and in 2008, he lost about 20% of his brain tissue to the removal of a benign tumor.

Racial justice activists and two Missouri members of congress — Democratic U.S. Reps. Cori Bush of St. Louis and Emmanuel Cleaver of Kansas City — have also called on Parson to show mercy to Johnson, who is Black.

The Missouri Supreme Court in August refused to halt the execution, and on Friday, it declined to take the case up again. Weis and other attorneys for Johnson on Monday asked the U.S. Supreme Court for a stay of execution.  “This is not a close case — Mr. Johnson is intellectually disabled,” they wrote in their court filing.

Johnson admitted to killing three workers at a Casey’s General Store in Columbia on Feb. 12, 1994 — manager Mary Bratcher, 46, and employees Mabel Scruggs, 57, and Fred Jones, 58.  The victims were shot and attacked with a claw hammer. Bratcher also was stabbed in the hand with a screwdriver....

Johnson was sentenced to death in his first trial and two other times.  The second death sentence, in 2003, came after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally ill was unconstitutionally cruel.  The Missouri Supreme Court tossed that second death sentence and Johnson was sentenced for a third time in 2006.

If the execution takes place as scheduled, it would be the seventh in the U.S. this year but the first not involving either a federal inmate or a prisoner in Texas.  The peak year for modern executions was 1999, when there were 98 across the U.S.  That number had gradually declined and just 17 people were executed last year — 10 involving federal prisoners, three in Texas and one each in Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama and Missouri, according to a database compiled by the Death Penalty Information Center.

UPDATE: This AP piece reports that the Missouri Gov was unmoved:

Missouri Gov. Mike Parson on Monday declined to grant clemency to death row inmate Ernest Johnson, despite requests for mercy from the pope, two federal lawmakers and thousands of petition signers.

October 4, 2021 in Clemency and Pardons, Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, October 02, 2021

"Financial Health and Criminal Justice: The Stories of Justice-Involved Individuals and Their Families"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new report from the Financial Health Network. Here is how its introduction gets started:

The United States has the highest prison and jail population, and the highest incarceration rate, in the world.  In 2020, approximately 2.3 million Americans were incarcerated, and, every year, over 10 million people are arrested or charged with crimes.  While these numbers are staggering in their size, they are made up of individuals — each with a unique and complicated human story, each with a family or social network impacted by their involvement in the criminal justice system.  The consequences of involvement with the U.S. criminal justice system run deep and wide — socially, physically, psychologically, and financially — often lasting well beyond release, and usually impacting more than just the individual arrested or incarcerated.  In addition, the criminal justice system disproportionately impacts people from low-income communities and communities of color.

The Financial Health Network presents a look into some of these lives, with particular focus on how their financial health affects their ability to navigate the criminal justice system, and how that system affects their financial health once they’re able to re-enter society.  In partnership with the University of Southern California’s (USC) Center for Economic and Social Research, we collected stories directly from 36 individuals impacted by this system, and learned how navigating the criminal justice system impacts the financial health of justice-involved individuals and their families.  These individuals and their families must traverse a complex and expensive set of processes, whether they’re managing the initial financial shock of arrest and detainment, juggling associated financial obligations, searching for limited employment opportunities upon release, or handling the added expenses or lost income of having a family member who is incarcerated.  Through all this, these individuals and their families often rely on their social networks to get by.

The following five briefs examine the experiences of individuals and their families as they manage the multiple costs of pretrial, incarceration, and re-entry, as well as the challenges associated with securing income, employment, and accessing financial services upon their release.

October 2, 2021 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 30, 2021

US Sentencing Commission releases big new report on "Recidivism of Federal Offenders Released in 2010"

Cover_2021-recidivism-overviewAs I have said repeatedly over the last three years, it is has been great to see that the US Sentencing Commission can continue to do a lot of needed and important data analysis even as its policy work it necessarily on hiatus due to a lack of confirmed Commissioners.  The latest example was released today in this form of this big new report titled "Recidivism of Federal Offenders Released in 2010."  This USSC webpage provides an overview of the report along with a bunch of "Key Findings," some of which are reprinted below:

Overview

This report is the first in a series continuing the Commission’s research of the recidivism of federal offenders. It provides an overview of the recidivism of federal offenders released from incarceration or sentenced to a term of probation in 2010, combining data regularly collected by the Commission with data compiled from criminal history records from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  This report provides an overview of recidivism for these offenders and information on key offender and offense characteristics related to recidivism.  This report also compares recidivism outcomes for offenders released in 2010 to federal offenders released in 2005. In the future, the Commission will release additional publications discussing specific topics concerning recidivism of federal offenders. The final study group of 32,135 offenders satisfied the following criteria:

  • United States citizens;
  • Re-entered the community during 2010 after discharging their sentence of incarceration or by commencing a term of probation in 2010;
  • Not reported dead, escaped, or detained;
  • Have valid FBI numbers that could be located in criminal history repositories (in at least one state, the District of Columbia, or federal records).

Key Findings

  • The recidivism rate remained unchanged for federal offenders released in 2010 compared to offenders released in 2005 despite two intervening major developments in the federal criminal justice system: the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker and increased use of evidence-based practices in federal supervision....
  • For offenders who were rearrested, the median time to arrest was 19 months. The largest proportion (18.2%) of offenders were rearrested for the first time during the first year following release. In each subsequent year, fewer offenders were rearrested for the first time than in previous years. Most offenders in the study were rearrested prior to the end of supervision terms....
  • Assault was the most common (20.7%) offense at rearrest.  The second most common offense was drug trafficking (11.3%), followed by: larceny (8.7%), probation, parole, and supervision violations (8.1%), and administration of justice offenses (7.5%).
  • Combined, violent offenses comprised approximately one-third of rearrests; 31.4 percent of offenders were rearrested for assault (20.7%), robbery (4.5%), murder (2.3%), other violent offense (2.3%), or sexual assault (1.6%).
  • Similar to findings in its previous studies, the Commission found age and Criminal History Category (CHC) were strongly associated with rearrests....  Combined, the impact of CHC and age on recidivism was even stronger.  During the eight-year follow-up period, 100 percent of offenders who were younger than 21 at the time of release and in CHC IV, V, and VI (the most serious CHCs) were rearrested.  In contrast, only 9.4 percent of offenders in CHC I (the least serious CHC) who were aged 60 and older at release were rearrested.
  • Offenders sentenced for firearms and robbery offenses had the highest rearrest rates during the eight-year follow-up period, with 70.6 percent and 63.2 percent, respectively.  In contrast, offenders sentenced for fraud, theft, or embezzlement had the lowest rearrest rate (35.5%).

September 30, 2021 in Detailed sentencing data, National and State Crime Data, Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)