Thursday, May 13, 2021

"Representing juvenile lifers: do attorneys in parole hearings matter?"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Stuti Kokkalera and just published online in the Journal of Crime and Justice.  Here is its abstract:

Courts and scholars have advocated for the right to legal representation in the parole process. The state examined in this study qualified that juvenile lifer parole candidates have the right to an attorney at their initial parole board hearing.  Data drawn from written decisions issued by the state parole board were analyzed to determine the association between having an attorney and type of legal representation on two parole outcomes: (1) whether a candidate was granted or denied parole, and (2) length of interval terms, that is, number of years that a candidate waits for another hearing.  While having an attorney at the hearing was not related to both outcomes, type of representation was associated with interval terms.  Hearings with appointed (non-retained) attorneys were associated with reduced odds of a maximum interval term, while having retained attorneys was related to higher odds of a maximum interval term.  Hence, state efforts to provide counsel are necessary since their presence is significantly associated with the ultimate time served by juvenile lifer candidates.  Findings support the need for more comparative research across states as well as the inclusion of other parole-eligible populations.

May 13, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 10, 2021

On fleek and spicy: "Millennials Commit Less Crime Than Prior Generations"

Though my effort to use millennial terminology in the title of this post is surely sus, I wanted to take a high-key approach to spilling the tea about some notable new crime research.  This UT press release has the headline that I quoted in the title of this post, but the published new research discussed in the press release is titled "How Cohorts Changed Crime Rates, 1980–2016."  This article is authored by William Spelman and appears in the Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2021). Here is its abstract:

Objective

Identify the effect of differences in criminal activity among birth cohorts on crime rates over time. Determine the extent to which cohort effects are responsible for nationwide crime reductions of the last thirty years.

Methods

Use a panel of state age-arrest data and frequently used economic, social, and criminal justice system covariates to estimate a proxy or characteristic function for current period effects.  Combine these results with national age-arrest data to estimate nationwide age, current period, and birth cohort effects on crime rates for 1980–2016.

Results

Criminal activity steadily declined between the 1916 and 1945 birth cohorts. It increased among Baby Boomers and Generation X, then dropped rapidly among Millennials, born after 1985. The pattern was similar for all index crimes. Period effects were mostly responsible for the late 1980s crack boom and the 1990s crime drop, but age and cohort effects were primarily responsible for crime rate reductions after 2000. In general, birth cohort and current period effects are about equally important in determining crime rates.

Conclusions vPolicies aimed at reducing delinquency among young children may be more effective in the long run than current policies aimed at incapacitation, deterrence, and opportunity reduction. 

May 10, 2021 in National and State Crime Data, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, May 06, 2021

Covering some interesting developments in some Capitol riot prosecutions

I have previously noted that the high-profile Capitol riot prosecutions provide an interesting lens on how a set of distinctive cases work their way through the federal criminal justice system.  And today I noticed a bunch of recent press pieces with interesting accounts of certain parts of this federal case processing story for certain defendants.  Here are links and headlines:

From BuzzFeed News, "They Said Trump Told Them To Attack The Capitol. Judges Are Keeping Them In Jail Anyway."

From CNN, "Justice Department preps plea deals for rioters from viral video of cops trapped in Capitol tunnel"

From Law & Crime, "Federal Appeals Court Upholds Decision to Keep Proud Boy Behind Bars Ahead of Trial for Pepper Spraying Police"

From NBC News, "FBI still after 'worst of the worst' in Capitol riot as new arrests come at steady pace"

From the New York Times, "‘There Was a Big Battle in Here’: Lawyers Tour Capitol as a Crime Scene"

Prior related posts:

May 6, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 03, 2021

Another round of early (mostly critical) commentary on Jones

I shared in this post some of my first thoughts about the Supreme Court's new Eighth Amendment juvenile LWOP decision in Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259 (S. Ct. April 22, 2021) (available here), and then I rounded up a few days later in this post some notable initial critical commentary.  Just over a week later, I have seen a number of additional notable takes on the ruling, and here is another abridged round up: 

From Andrew Cohen, "Supreme Court: Let’s Make It Easier for Judges to Send Teenagers to Die in Prison"

From Brandon Garrett, "Justices' Life Sentence Ruling Is A Step Back For Youth Rights"

From Jack Karp, "Jones Marks Shift In High Court's Juvenile Justice Rulings"

From Marc Levin, "Supreme Court Puts Onus on Lawmakers to Provide Second Chances for Kids"

From Christine Sarteschi and Daniel Pollack, "Life Without Parole for Minors: The Supreme Court and the Statistics"

From Kent Scheidegger, "Dumping a Dishonest Precedent Less Than Honestly — Part I"

From Beth Schwartzapfel, "Supreme Court Conservatives Just Made It Easier to Sentence Kids to Life in Prison"

Some prior recent related posts:

UPDATE: I just noticed this notable observation from Kent Scheidegger over at Crime & Consequences concerning action by the Justices in related cases via the May 3 order list:

The U.S. Supreme Court released its regular Monday orders list today.  Not surprisingly, there were several wake-of-Jones orders in cases that had been on hold for that decision.  Oklahoma v. Johnson, No. 19-250, and United States v. Briones, No. 19-720, were sent back for reconsideration.  These were cases where the lower court decided in an under-18 murderer’s favor based on a broad interpretation of Montgomery v. Louisiana.  Cases where the lower court ruled against the defendant based on a narrow interpretation of Montgomery were simply denied, including Newton v. Indiana, No. 17-1511, and Garcia v. North Dakota, No. 19-399.

May 3, 2021 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, May 02, 2021

Another effective (but still incomplete) look at possible sentencing outcomes for those prosecuted for Capitol riot

This new AP article, headlined "Charged in Jan. 6 riot? Yes, but prison may be another story," reviews potental sentencing outcomes for their role in the January 6 Capitol riot.  Here are some excerpts, to be followed by a bit of contextual commentary:

More than 400 people have been charged with federal crimes in the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol.  But prison time may be another story.

With new defendants still flooding into Washington’s federal court, the Justice Department is under pressure to quickly resolve the least serious of cases.  While defendants charged with crimes such as conspiracy and assaulting officers during the insurrection could be looking at hefty sentences, some members of the mob who weren’t caught joining in the violence or destruction could see little to no time behind bars.

“The people who were just there for the ride and somewhat clueless, I think for most of them they probably will not get prison time. And for what it’s worth, I think that’s appropriate,” said Rachel Barkow, a professor at the New York University School of Law. “Having a misdemeanor on their record, going through all this is probably a pretty big wake-up call for most of the folks,” she said.

The siege was like nothing the country had ever seen, as the mob of supporters of then-President Donald Trump descended on the Capitol to stop the congressional certification of Joe Biden’s election victory.  But in the months since, Trump loyalists have worked to minimize the assault, while Democrats and others want justice for what they saw as a crime against democracy and the rule of law....

It’s a formidable task for lawyers and judges alike to determine the appropriate punishment to seek and hand down. Many defendants had steady jobs and no criminal records, factors typically rewarded with leniency in the criminal justice system.  As plea negotiations ramp up, the Justice Department must work to differentiate between the varying actions of the members of the mob that day without making it seem like some are getting away with mere slaps on the wrist....

Of the more than 400 federal defendants so far, at least 100 are facing only lower-level crimes such as disorderly conduct and entering a restricted area that do not typically result in time behind bars for first-time offenders.  Hundreds more were also charged with more serious offenses — like conspiracy, assault or obstruction of an official proceeding — that carry hefty prison time of years behind bars, but theses defendants could take pleas that would wipe those charges from their cases. Prosecutors have said they expect to charge at least 100 more people.

It’s going to be a test of racial fairness. The majority of the defendants are white.  Black and Latino defendants tend to face harsher sentences for the same crimes, and from the moment the mob marched on the Capitol, there were questions about whether the law enforcement response would have been different had the rioters been people of color....

If prosecutors seek stiff sentences for the lowest level Capitol riot defendants, they could lose their credibility with judges, said Laurie Levenson, a former federal prosecutor who now teaches at Loyola Law School.  And if they set the standard too high, they’ll be juggling hundreds of cases going to trial instead of focusing on the major offenders. Those most serious cases are where prosecutors can and should send a strong message, Levenson said. “If there’s any pressure on the Justice Department, it’s to deal with these cases in a way so that you never have to see them again,” she said. “And if people think that the price isn’t too high, who knows?”

At least one judge has expressed frustration at the pace of the prosecutions, which have overwhelmed the federal court already backlogged because of pandemic-related delays. On Tuesday, U.S. District Judge Christopher Cooper ordered the pretrial release of a man who was photographed sitting with his feet on a desk in House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s office. The judge expressed concern that the case is moving too slowly.

Cooper noted that Richard Barnett has been jailed for nearly four months and questioned whether his time behind bars while the case is ongoing could exceed a possible sentence should Barnett plead guilty. The prosecutor estimated that the government would recommend a prison term ranging from nearly six years to 7 1/4 years if Barnett is convicted, though he could get credit for accepting responsibility if he pleads guilty.

All high-profile prosecutions, particularly when they involve persons without significant criminal histories, provide interesting settings to explore sentencing purposes and practices. These Capitol riot prosecutions have the added political intrigue of having those who usually advocate for harsher forms of justice likely being much more sympathetic to these defendants, while at least some usually most troubled by harsh sentencing may be more supportive of prison terms this unique setting.  And, as this AP article rightly notes, there overarching surely concerns about racial and social equity in light of historic patterns of prosecution and sentencing practices.

But the equity issue leaves me eager to see more comprehensive and consistent coverage of punishments being handed out to others involved in criminal behavior during other protests through 2020.  For example, consider these sentencing reports from local press in recent weeks:

I am certain that this is NOT anything close to a thorough accounting of the sentences that have been already handed down to persons who have engaged in criminal activity during protests and riots (e.g., here is a press report from Dec 2020 of a few case outcomes in Oregon).  I am even more certain that it could provide incredibly valuable for ultimately examining and assessing Capitol riot outcomes to have some kind of thorough overview of outcomes in these other (similar?) cases.   

Prior related posts:

May 2, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (8)

Tuesday, April 27, 2021

Evan Miller, of Miller v. Alabama, sentenced again to LWOP for murder committed when he was only 14

As reported in this AP piece, headlined "Juvenile lifer who set precedent sentenced to life again," a high-profile juvenile murderer was sentenced yet again to life in prison without parole despite having helped win a Supreme Court ruling reversing his original LWOP sentence. Here are the details:

Evan Miller was just 14 when he committed the slaying that sent him to prison. In reviewing his case, the U.S. Supreme Court banned mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles — saying judges and juries should consider the special factors of youth — a decision that eventually led to inmates across the country getting a chance at release.

But Miller will not get that chance. A judge on Tuesday handed down a second life sentence without possibility of parole.

Lawrence Circuit Judge Mark Craig ruled that Evan Miller, despite being a young teen when he committed his crime, met the legal criteria to be sentenced to life in prison without the chance of parole. Craig said the severity of Miller’s crime outweighed the mitigating factors of Miller’s age and his abuse-filled childhood that the defense argued made him deserving of an opportunity of a chance to get out of prison some day. Craig said a sentence of life without the possibility of parole was the “only just sentence” over the lesser punishment of life with a chance of parole after 30 years.

Miller was 14 in 2003 when he and another teen beat Cole Cannon with a baseball bat before setting fire to his trailer, a crime for which he was originally sentenced to a mandatory life sentence. Before handing down the sentence, Craig repeated the line that Miller was attributed with saying before he delivered a final blow to Cannon: “I am God. I’ve come to take your life.” Craig said those were some of “the most chilling words I have heard.”

Craig said he was not convinced Miller could be rehabilitated and noted that Miller was the primary aggressor in the slaying. “Had you not made the decisions that night, Mr. Cannon, in my view, would still be alive,” Craig said. “You showed cunning, not clumsy, rash thinking.”

Miller, now 32, appeared during the hearing, which was conducted virtually, by video link from an office at the Alabama prison where he is incarcerated. He did not visibly react as the sentence was read.

The Supreme Court in 2012 ruled in Miller’s case that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. In the 2012 opinion in Miller’s case, justices ordered that judges and juries should consider “children’s diminished culpability, and heightened capacity for change” should make such sentences “uncommon.”...

While other juvenile lifers across the country have seen their sentences reduced because of Miller’s case and a later ruling that made the decision retroactive, his own case had lingered without a decision until Tuesday. At an earlier resentencing hearing, Miller’s lawyers cited his childhood of physical abuse and neglect and argued that at 14, his brain was not fully developed....

Alabama Attorney General Steve Marshall said the judge, “restored the punishment that is fitting for Evan Miller’s wicked actions.” “When Evan Miller robbed and savagely beat his neighbor, setting fire to the man’s trailer and leaving his incapacitated victim to die a horrible death, he earned a well-deserved sentence of life in prison without parole,” Marshall said in a statement.

April 27, 2021 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (9)

Friday, April 23, 2021

A few first thoughts on Jones and juve LWOP

Because I am on the road, I have only had a chance to read once and quickly the Supreme Court's new Eighth Amendment juvenile LWOP decision in Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259 (S. Ct. April 22, 2021) (available here).  Though I will need more reads and more time to come to a fully-formed view on this ruling, I do have a few first thoughts on the work of the Court and various Justices.  Here are some of these first thoughts:

1. I have always seen Montgomery as a somewhat clumsy rewrite and extension of Miller (as I discussed in this short piece), and I am not surprised that a more conservative Court has now stressed the importance of state authority to implement Miller without further constitutional elaboration of what the Jones majority calls "particular policy approaches" to juvenile sentencing.  Because I have long viewed all LWOP sentences, for offenders of any age, as poor policy and constitutionally suspect on various grounds, I am disappointed  the Court now has only three votes to embrace and further extend Mongtomery's extension of MIller.  But since a majority of current Justices now think the Constitution readily permits the sentencing of juveniles to die in prison, it readily follows that a majrity of Justices are disinclined to read substantive constitutional limitations into how this such sentencing takes place in the states. 

2. Speaking of the Justices, this ruling (and I fear others to come) may prevent me from wishfully thinking the current Supreme Court is still inclined to be pro-defendant on big sentencing issues.  For a good number of years before recent changes in personnel, criminal defendants got a whole lot of very big wins from SCOTUS on sentencing issues (despite still often losing in circuit courts and elsewhere).  But this Jones ruling is a clear indication that replacing Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Ginsburg with Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett likely means the era of big defense wins in a number of big sentencing cases may be over.  Particularly notable when thinking about the overall Court is how the new Justices may have swayed Chief Justice Roberts, who was with the old majority in Montgomery to extend Miller for the benefit of juveniles, but now is in the Jones majority trmming back the protections of the Eighth Amendment.

3. Speaking of the Chief Justice, I have long hoped that his discussion of as-applied Eighth Amendment claims in Graham might spur many more as-applied Eighth Amendment challenges (especially for cases inolving older teens).  Against that backdrop, I found interesting this statement by the Court toward the end of its Jones opinon: "Moreover, this case does not properly present — and thus we do not consider — any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality regarding Jones’s sentence." This sentence suggests that Brett Jones — as well as every other juvenile sentenced to LWOP in a discretionary scheme — still can and certainly should argue that the particular facts of his case make LWOP unconstitutional as applied.  If future lower court litigation involving Brett Jones or other juveniles might help produce a meaningful as-applied Eighth Amendment jursprudence, perhaps such a jurisprudence could possibly provide some additional protections for a range of persons subject to a range of extreme sentences.

4.  Speaking of additional protections for a range of persons, it is important to remember that even if Jones was resolved in favor of the defendant, the Eighth Amendment would still have been interpreted to provide only the most limited of protections to the most limited set of juveniles convicted of murder.  A lot more than a robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is needed to have a real impact on modern mass incarceration and extreme punishments, and it will always be up to legislatures and executive branch officials to enact sounder sentencing laws and apply them in a more humane manner.  Over the last decade, we have, encouragingly, seen many more legislatures and prosecutors do a lot better on sentencing policy and practice.  The Jones ruling is perhaps ultimately just another reminder that steady policy work, rather than sporatic constitutional litigation, remains the surest path to an improved criminal justice system.

April 23, 2021 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 22, 2021

SCOTUS affirms juve LWOP sentence, 6-3, in Jones v Mississippi

I am on the road today, and so I am not that surprised the Supreme Court has handed down the big sentencing opinion I have been awaiting all Term.  I hope to comment later today.

UPDATE Thanks to airport wifi, I can now provide this link to the full opinion in Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259 (S. Ct. April 22, 2021).  Here is how Justice Kavanaugh's opinion for the Court begins

Under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), an individual who commits a homicide when he or she is under 18 may be sentenced to life without parole, but only if the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment.  In this case, a Mississippi trial judge acknowledged his sentencing discretion under Miller and then sentenced petitioner Brett Jones to life without parole for a murder that Jones committed when he was under 18.  The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the discretionary sentencing procedure satisfied Miller.

Jones argues, however, that a sentencer’s discretion to impose a sentence less than life without parole does not alone satisfy Miller.  Jones contends that a sentencer who imposes a life-without-parole sentence must also make a separate factual finding that the defendant is permanently incorrigible, or at least provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding that the defendant is permanently incorrigible.  And Jones says that the trial judge did not make such a finding in his case.

Jones’s argument that the sentencer must make a finding of permanent incorrigibility is inconsistent with the Court’s precedents.  In Miller, the Court mandated “only that a sentencer follow a certain process — considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing” a life-without-parole sentence.  Id., at 483.  And in Montgomery v. Louisiana, which held that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review, the Court flatly stated that “Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement” and added that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.” 577 U.S. 190, 211 (2016). In light of that explicit language in the Court’s prior decisions, we must reject Jones’s argument.  We affirm the judgment of the Mississippi Court of Appeals.

Justice Sotomayor's dissent, which is joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, starts this way:

Today, the Court guts Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). Contrary to explicit holdings in both decisions, the majority claims that the Eighth Amendment permits juvenile offenders convicted of homicide to be sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) as long as “the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment.” Ante, at 1. In the Court’s view, a sentencer never need determine, even implicitly, whether a juvenile convicted of homicide is one of “those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” Montgomery, 577 U.S., at 209. Even if the juvenile’s crime reflects “‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity,’” Miller, 567 U.S., at 479, he can be sentenced to die in prison.

This conclusion would come as a shock to the Courts in Miller and MontgomeryMiller’s essential holding is that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’” Montgomery, 577 U.S., at 195 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S., at 479–480).  Sentencing discretion is “necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not,” Montgomery, 577 U.S., at 210, but it is far from sufficient.  A sentencer must actually “make th[e] judgment” that the juvenile in question is one of those rare children for whom LWOP is a constitutionally permissible sentence.  Miller, 567 U.S., at 480.  The Court has thus expressly rejected the notion that sentencing discretion, alone, suffices: “Even if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” Montgomery, 577 U.S., at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Today, however, the Court reduces Miller to a decision requiring “just a discretionary sentencing procedure where youth [is] considered.” Ante, at 11.  Such an abrupt break from precedent demands “special justification.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court offers none.  Instead, the Court attempts to circumvent stare decisis principles by claiming that “[t]he Court’s decision today carefully follows both Miller and Montgomery.” Ante, at 19.  The Court is fooling no one.  Because I cannot countenance the Court’s abandonment of Miller and Montgomery, I dissent.

April 22, 2021 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, April 21, 2021

Split Eleventh Circuit panel rejects equal protection challenge to illegal reentry guideline

Yesterday the Eleventh Circuit handed down an interesting split panel opinion in US v. Osorto, No. 19-11408 (11th Cir. April 20, 2021) (available here). These paragraphs from the start of the majority opinion provides a flavor for the issues and the court's holding:

Defendant-Appellant Juan Carlos Osorto was convicted of illegal reentry after the 2016 Guidelines went into effect.  Because he had committed other offenses both before his original deportation and after it, but before his current illegal-reentry offense, he received offense-level increases under both subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3).  He now challenges both subsections as violations of, among other things, his equal-protection rights.  Osorto (and the Dissent) argue that these guidelines, which apply to only illegal-reentry offenses, discriminate against noncitizens by counting their prior convictions twice — once in the offense level and a second time in the Guidelines’ criminal-history calculation. Meanwhile, Osorto contends, citizens cannot illegally reenter the United States, and generally, no guidelines for other offenses count prior convictions in both the offense-level and criminal-history calculations.  So in Osorto’s view, subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) unlawfully discriminate against noncitizens.

We disagree.  First, Osorto’s challenge to § 2L1.2(b)(2) is foreclosed by our binding precedent in the form of Adeleke.  Second, Osorto (and the Dissent) consider the wrong universe of individuals.  Subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) do not apply to all noncitizens convicted of any crime in the United States; rather, they apply to only those noncitizens who both have illegally reentered the United States and have been convicted of other crimes.  This is important because, third, through § 1326(b), Congress has determined that illegally reentering the United States after being deported following conviction on another crime is a more serious offense than simply illegally reentering the United States, and that conduct should be deterred.  The challenged guidelines reflect the national interests that Congress permissibly has endorsed through its enactment and amendment of § 1326(b).  Fourth, Congress has entrusted the Sentencing Commission with direct responsibility for fostering and protecting the interests of, among other things, sentencing policy that promotes deterrence and appropriately punishes culpability and risk of recidivism — the interests the Sentencing Commission cited in issuing the challenged guidelines. Finally, subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) are rationally related to the Commission’s stated interests in issuing them.  So after careful consideration, and with the benefit of oral argument, we must uphold the guidelines at issue and affirm Osorto’s sentence.

Here is part of the start of the dissenting opinion by Judge Martin:

Mr. Osorto challenges Guideline § 2L1.2(b)(3) on equal protection grounds.  This Guideline makes for tougher sentences for defendants who commit a designated offense after reentering the United States without authorization.  See USSG § 2L1.2(b)(3).  This list of designated offenses does not include the offense of unauthorized reentry itself.  See id. Meanwhile, a defendant is already punished for both the unauthorized reentry and any other offense that leads to the increased punishment imposed by § 2L1.2(b)(3) on account of the calculation of a defendant’s criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines.  See USSG § 4A1.1(b).  The result is that any offense committed after unauthorized reentry is double-counted for noncitizens in their Guideline calculation based on little more than their immigration status.  Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2(b)(3) therefore subjects noncitizen defendants to more severe punishment than citizens who commit the same crime.  Mr. Osorto argues that this more severe punishment imposed upon him because he is a noncitizen violates his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.  U.S. Const. Amend. V; see United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (“The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws”).  I believe he is right.

April 21, 2021 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 20, 2021

Derek Chauvin found guilty on all three homicide charges in killing of George Floyd, now on to sentencing phase with Blakely factors

The high-profile trial of Derek Chauvin for killing George Floyd resulted in a jury verdict this afternoon in a Minnesota court with guilt verdict on all three homicice charges of second-degree unintentional murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter. It is my understanding that, under Minnesota state sentencing guidelines, Chauvin would get a prison term of 12.5 years absent proof of aggrvating circumstances, so-called Blakely factors.

I believe that the the prosecution was prepared to argue numerous aggravating Blakely factors to the jury, but that CHauvin's legal team waived its right to jury determination on these issues so that they will now be argued to the judge. Though I am not an expert on Minnesota law, I believe that a judicial finding of aggravating factors in the coming weeks could make Chauvin eligible to receive a sentence up to the 40-year maximum on the second-degree unintentional murder conviction.

The Robina Institute has this helpful primer on Minnesota sentencing law, and it makes this important point about the usual approach to sentences increased based on aggravating factors under the state's sentencing guidelines:

The Guidelines do not themselves limit the degree of durational (length-of-custody) departure, but case law provides that upward departures may not exceed twice the presumptive prison term (the middle figure in grid cells above the disposition line; the sole figure in cells below the line) except in rare cases of extremely aggravated circumstances. (Cite to:  State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. 1981). See also State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 2008) (upholding the rule from Evans despite 27 years of changes to the guidelines).)

April 20, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Sunday, April 18, 2021

Interrogating recent research indicating nonprosecution of certain misdemeanors lowers reoffense

A few weeks ago in this post I flagged the notable new empirical research indicating that nonprosecution of nonviolent misdemeanor offenses produced a large reductions in the likelihood of new criminal complaints.  This research is rightly getting a lot of attention, though this new National Review piece wonders if it might be getting too much attention.  The piece, by Charles Fain Lehman, is headlined "Progressives Are Overreacting to a Startling Crime Study."  And though I might dicker with some points made in the piece, I recommend the full discussion.  Here are excerpts:  

Every year, something like 13 million misdemeanor charges are filed in the United States. These charges, ranging from traffic violations to serious assaults, may be less flashy than felonies, but they are the main way Americans experience the criminal-justice system.

We prosecute misdemeanors because, among other things, we want there to be fewer of them, and we believe prosecution deters reoffending.  But a recent blockbuster paper makes a startling claim to the contrary: Prosecuting misdemeanants actually increases the likelihood that they will offend again.

The paper has been heralded by supporters of progressive district attorneys who have used their position to unilaterally impose reforms on the criminal-justice system, including refusing to prosecute many misdemeanants.  Boston D.A. Rachael Rollins, who provided the data for the study, has claimed it confirms the wisdom of her approach.  So have other reformers such as Chicago-area state’s attorney Kim Foxx and San Francisco district attorney Chesa Boudin.

Policy-makers, however, should exercise caution before reaching such expansive conclusions.  The paper can just as easily be read to endorse more modest reforms — especially keeping in mind long-established principles of criminal justice on which it is silent....

Most of the non-prosecution effect they measure is the result of first-time offenders, who become much more likely to commit crime if prosecuted.  By contrast, prosecuting repeat offenders of any sort has little discernible effect on the likelihood they will offend again in the future....  Diverting [first-time misdemeanants] offenders, with the threat of more serious punishment if they reoffend, could help clear dockets while minimizing crime. It would also free ADAs to focus on repeat misdemeanants....

The above approach is different from the idea that we should in general prosecute misdemeanants a lot less — a valid interpretation of the paper’s findings, but not necessarily the right one, for two reasons.

First, deterrence is not the only reason to prosecute an offender.  Advocates of not prosecuting misdemeanors tend to invoke “victimless” crimes such as drug possession and prostitution. But misdemeanors can also include offenses such as simple assault and auto theft — crimes that harm others.  Such crimes reasonably elicit a demand for retributive justice. It offends our moral sensibilities to think that a person who commits a serious but not felonious assault could get off scot-free.

Second, systematic reductions in leniency may affect all criminals’ decision-making, increasing their propensity to offend in the long-run. The paper shows that Rollins’s move toward non-prosecution of misdemeanors did not in the aggregate increase misdemeanor offenses, but the data it uses account only for the period between her election in January 2019 and March 2020, when the coronavirus crisis began.  It’s entirely possible that criminals will adapt, and misdemeanor offending will increase, in the long run....

Coming face to face with the justice system can be time-consuming and exhausting, and may, at the margins, increase rather than reduce a person’s propensity to offend.  Even those of us highly concerned with public safety should be interested in creative solutions that minimize crime and disorder.

At the same time, policy-makers should not get ahead of themselves — as some have in the rush to defund police departments and decrease the use of more serious charges.  Good research is the basis of good policy, and this research makes a valuable contribution to public-safety policy.  But we should be cautious in how far we go with it — careful changes around the edges are always safer than blanket transformations.

Prior recent related post:

April 18, 2021 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Data on sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, April 09, 2021

North Carolina Gov creates "Juvenile Sentence Review Board" to make clemency recommendations

This local story out of North Carolina reports on the creation of an interesting new sentencing review structure created by the state's chief executive.  The full headline of the piece provides the essentials: "Gov. Cooper announces formation of North Carolina juvenile sentence review board: The Review Board will make recommendations to the Governor concerning clemency and commutation of such sentences when appropriate."  Here are more details from the article:

Governor Roy Cooper announced Thursday the formation of the North Carolina Juvenile Sentence Review Board.  The four-person advisory board, established by Executive Order 208, will review certain sentences imposed in North Carolina on individuals who were tried and sentenced in adult criminal court for acts committed before turning 18. The Review Board will make recommendations to the Governor concerning clemency and commutation of such sentences when appropriate.

“Developments in science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,” said Governor Cooper. “For those who have taken significant steps to reform and rehabilitate themselves, this process can provide a meaningful opportunity for release and a life outside of prison.”

Prior to recommending clemency, commutation, or other action to the Governor, members of the Review Board will conduct a thorough and individualized review based on criteria outlined in the Executive Order, including rehabilitation and maturity demonstrated by the individual. This review will be available to qualifying individuals who have served at least 20 years of their sentence, or at least 15 years in certain instances of consecutive or "stacked" sentences.

In 2017, Governor Cooper signed Senate Bill 445 into law, reducing the wait time for criminal record expungement for first-time, non-violent offenders. Following the passage of Raise the Age legislation, the Governor also signed a proclamation recognizing the expansion of juvenile jurisdiction in North Carolina.

The North Carolina Juvenile Sentence Review Board is a recommendation of the Governor’s Task Force for Racial Equity in Criminal Justice which found that the group of people included in this Executive Order are disproportionately Black. The full report of the Task Force is available here.

The Governor appointed the following individuals to the North Carolina Juvenile Sentence Review Board: Marcia Morey of Durham as Chair. Morey is the Representative for House District 30.... Henry McKinley “Mickey” Michaux Jr. of Durham is a civil rights activist and former member of the North Carolina General Assembly.... Thomas G. Walker of Charlotte is a Partner at Alston & Bird and former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina.... Allyson K. Duncan of Raleigh is a former judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the North Carolina Court of Appeals....

The full text of Executive Order 208 establishing the "Juvenile Sentence Review Board" is available at this link.

I noticed a thoughtful person on Twitter react to this news by wisely wondering why Prez Joe Biden has not yet created something like this (ideally for all offenders).  After all, as I have noted in prior posts, the Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force expressly talked about "establish[ing] an independent clemency board, composed and staffed by people with diverse backgrounds [and expanding] Obama-era criteria for proactive clemency initiative to address individuals serving excess sentences."  The current White House has recently called for all persons to help "ensure that America is a land of second chances and opportunity for all people," but we are still awaiting Prez Biden to go from talking the talk to walking the walk.

A few of many prior related posts on federal clemency reforms:

April 9, 2021 in Clemency and Pardons, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, April 04, 2021

Seemingly encouraging, but quite complicated, analysis of racial disparities in federal drug sentencing

The past week's Washington Post included this notable op-ed by Charles Lane under the headline "Here’s some hope for supporters of criminal justice reform." A focal point of the op-ed was this newly published paper by sociologist Michael Light titled "The Declining Significance of Race in Criminal Sentencing: Evidence from US Federal Courts."  Here is how the op-ed discusses some key findings with a positive spin:

How many more months in prison do federal courts give Black drug offenders as opposed to comparable White offenders?

The correct answer, through fiscal 2018, is: zero.  The racial disparity in federal drug-crime sentencing, adjusted for severity of the offense and offender characteristics such as criminal history, shrank from 47 months in 2009 to nothing in 2018, according to a new research paper by sociologist Michael Light of the University of Wisconsin.  For federal crimes of all types, there is still a Black-White discrepancy, but it, too, has shrunk, from 34 months in 2009 to less than six months in 2018....

What went right?  Basically, decision-makers unwound policies that had provided much higher maximum penalties for trafficking crack cocaine than the powdered variant and, crucially, had encouraged federal prosecutors to seek those maximum penalties.  Supreme Court rulings, in 2007 and 2009, gave federal judges latitude to impose more-lenient sentences for crack dealing. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act reduced the crack vs. powder punishment disparity, from a maximum of 100 times as much prison time to 18.

And starting that same year, the Obama administration Justice Department actively sought to diminish the disparity. As part of this effort, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. instructed federal prosecutors in 2013 not to seek the maximum penalty for drug trafficking by low-level, nonviolent defendants.

The upshot was that the average federal drug sentence for Black offenders fell 23 months, while that for White offenders rose 23 months, possibly due to the growing prevalence of opioids and methamphetamine in White communities.  For all federal crimes, sentences for White offenders rose from 47 months to 61, while those for Black offenders fell from 81 to 67.

The United States has now restored the racial parity in federal sentencing that — perhaps surprisingly — existed before the war on crack’s start in the late 1980s.  As of the mid-1980s, Black and White offenders had received roughly 26 months in prison.

Though I am disinclined to be too much of a skunk at a sentencing equity party, I do not believe the Light study really should be the cause of too much celebration in our era of modern mass incarceration.  For starters, the Light study documents that greater racial parity was achieved as much by increases in the length of federal drug sentences given to white offenders as decreases in these sentences to black offenders.  More critically, in 2018, the feds prosecute a whole lot more drug defendants and the average federal sentence for both White and Black drug offenders is still a whole lot longer (nearly 300% longer) than in an earlier era.  I find it hard to be too celebratory about they fact that we now somewhat more equally send a whole lot more people to federal prison for a whole lot longer for drug offenses.

Moreover, the Light analysis highlights that it is largely changes in the composition of cases being sentenced in federal court that account for why average drug sentences are now more in parity among whites and blacks.  The longest federal drug sentences are handed out in crack cases (disproportionately Black defendants) and meth cases (disproportionately White defendants), so as crack prosecutions declined and meth prosecutions increased over the last decades (see basic USSC data here), it is not that suprising that average federal drug sentences for black offenders went down and those for white offenders went up. 

I do not want to underplay the importance of the harsh federal system now being directed more equally toward whites and blacks, but I do want to be sure to highlight one more key finding from the Light stidy: "In 2018, black offenders received an additional 1.3 mos. of incarceration relative to their white peers.  In drug cases, they received an additional 5 mos.  These results are not explained by measures of offense severity, criminal history, or key characteristics of the crime and trial."  In other words, while Light finds that average federal drug sentences have come into parity across all cases, looking at individual drug cases reveals black offenders are still sentenced to nearly a half-year longer than comparable white offenders.  

That all said, it is fascinating to see the data that Light spotlights and effectively unpacks (I highly recommend his paper), and I am grateful Lane spotlights what still might reasonably be viewed as a hopeful story.  I especially hope folks will keep an eye on these data as we now work our way through the COVID era and its unpredicatable impact on case composition and processing.

April 4, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 01, 2021

Notably split Sixth Circuit panel finds way-above guideline felon-in-possession sentence to be substantively unreasonable

Earlier this week, a Sixth Circuit panel handed down a split (unpublished) opinion finding an above-guideline sentence substantively unreasonable in US v. Stanton, No. 20-5320 (6th Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (available here).  Any and every circuit ruling that finds a sentence substantively unreasonable is quite notable because such opinions are quite rare — for example, USSC data shows only six such reversals in Fiscal Year 2019 and only eight such reversals in Fiscal Year 2020.  (Indeed, with this Sixth Circuit Stanton ruling finding an above-guideline sentence substantively unreasonable handed down on the same day that the Fourth Circuit found a within-guideline sentence substantively unreasonable in Freeman (discussed here, opinion here), one might be tempted to remember March 30, 2021 as an historic day for reasonableness review.)

The majority and dissenting opinions in Stanton are worth full reads, and here is how the majority opinion gets started and wraps up:

Dustin Stanton challenges his 108-month sentence for one count of unlawful possession of a firearm as substantively unreasonable.  Stanton argues that the district court did not provide sufficiently compelling reasons to justify nearly tripling his maximum guideline sentence of 37 months.  We agree.

In sum, based on the reasons it provided at sentencing, the district court “placed too much weight on the § 3553(a) factors concerning criminal history [and] deterrence . . . without properly considering sentencing disparities.”  See Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d at 758. “By ‘relying on a problem common to all’ defendants within the same criminal history category as [Stanton]—that is, that they have an extensive criminal history — the district court did not give a sufficiently compelling reason to justify [its extreme variance].” Warren, 771 F. App’x at 642 (quoting United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 354 (6th Cir. 2007)).  Though Stanton’s continued recidivism and his previous 84-month sentence for the same crime may ultimately warrant an upward variance, they are not — without more — sufficiently compelling justifications for nearly tripling his maximum guideline sentence for a mine-run offense.  See Boucher, 937 F.3d at 714 (vacating sentence as substantively unreasonable and noting that “after the district court reweighs the relevant § 3553(a) factors” the defendant “may or may not be entitled to a” variance).

And here is how Judge Thapar starts and ends his dissent:

District judges are not at liberty to turn a blind eye to reality at sentencing.  Instead, the sentencing factors in the United States Code require judges to consider the real-world consequences of a prison term.  Will the sentence protect the public?  Will it deter the defendant?  What does a defendant’s criminal history tell the court about his likelihood of recidivism?  Are there positive factors that might cut the other way?  The sentencing guidelines help answer these questions.  But district judges understand better than most that the guidelines are not binding for a reason: They don’t fit every case.  Especially one like Dustin Stanton’s.  Here, a conscientious district judge had a violent, repeat offender in front of him.  The last time Stanton was in federal court, Judge Waverly Crenshaw’s colleague sentenced him to 84 months.  Barely a year after his release, Stanton was back — as violent as ever, and for the same offense.  So Judge Crenshaw did what good judges do.  He balanced the sentencing factors and came up with a fair sentence: 108 months.  I respectfully dissent from making him do it again....

Fair sentencing is a key goal of our criminal justice system. The sentencing guidelines help further that goal. Still, district judges must exercise independent judgment when imposing a sentence. Sometimes the reality of a case justifies a variance downward. Sometimes, it justifies the opposite. Here, Judge Crenshaw decided that Stanton’s case called for an upward variance. That decision was reasonable. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

April 1, 2021 in Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 30, 2021

Fascinating split Fourth Circuit ruling finds lawyer ineffective and 210-month sentence substantively unreasonable for addicted opioid distributor

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss an amazingly interesting split Fourth Circuit panel ruling today in US v. Freeman, No. 19-4104 (4th Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (available here).  I recommend the entire lengthy decision, which could probably serves as a foundation for a dozen federal sentencing classes because of all the issues raised, both directly and indirectly, by the case.  Here is the start and a few key parts of the 21-page majority opinion authored by Judge Gregory:

Precias Freeman broke her tailbone as a teenager, was prescribed opioids, and has been addicted to the drugs ever since. In 2018, she was sentenced to serve more than 17 years in prison for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone and oxycodone in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). After Freeman’s appointed counsel initially submitted an Anders brief asking for the Court’s assistance in identifying any appealable issues, we directed counsel to brief whether Freeman’s sentence is substantively reasonable and whether Freeman received ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the record. On both grounds, we vacate Freeman’s sentence and remand this case for resentencing....

Because Freeman’s counsel unreasonably failed to argue meritorious objections [to the presentence report's guideline calculations] and advised his client to waive those objections without understanding the gravity of that waiver — and because those objections would have resulted in a reduction of the Guidelines range applicable to Freeman’s sentence — counsel was constitutionally ineffective....

In sentencing Freeman to serve 210 months, the district court did not address sentencing disparities nor fully consider the history and circumstances of the defendant in relation to the extreme length of her sentence. With regard to sentencing disparities, counsel provides this Court with data obtained from the United States Sentencing Commission’s 2018 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tending to show that Freeman’s sentence is significantly longer than those of similarly-situated defendants...

Based on the disparity between her sentence and those of similar defendants, and on the overwhelming record evidence of Freeman’s addiction to opioids, we conclude that Freeman has rebutted the presumption of reasonableness and established that her sentence is substantively unreasonable.  To the extent that the court referenced the danger of opioids in sentencing Freeman, it was only to condemn Freeman for selling them.  While this was certainly not an improper factor for the district court to consider, it also does not reflect the full picture.  And although the district court stated that Freeman was “no doubt a major supplier” of hydrocodone, it failed to consider that the amount that Freeman sold was frequently no more than half of what she was taking herself.

Judge Quattlebaum's dissent runs 26 pages and it includes some scatter plots! It starts and ends this way:

This sad case illustrates the opioid epidemic ravaging our country.  Precias Freeman is a victim of this epidemic.  As a teenager, she succumbed to the highly addictive nature of opioids in a way that continues to wreak havoc on her life.  As a fellow citizen, I am heartbroken over the toll her addiction has levied.  But Freeman chose to be a culprit too.  By her own admission, she prolifically forged prescriptions to obtain opioids for years — not just for herself, but to sell to others.  Whatever role her addiction played, that conduct was plainly criminal and certainly not bereft of “victims.” Maj. Op. at 21. Thus, today, we consider the sentence she received after pleading guilty of possession with intent to distribute two opioids, Hydrocodone and Oxycodone.  The majority vacates Freeman’s sentence for two reasons.  It concludes that the sentence was substantively unreasonable and that Freeman received ineffective assistance of counsel. Both holdings are unprecedented in our circuit....

I have great sympathy for Freeman’s circumstances. Her story reflects failures in our community.  One could argue her sentence does not reflect sound policy. But that does not make it unreasonable under the law.  And while the record is concerning regarding the effectiveness of counsel Freeman received, it does not conclusively demonstrate a failure to meet the constitutional bar at this juncture.  I dissent.

For a host of reasons, I hope the Justice Department has the good sense not to seek en banc review and that resentencing, rather than further costly litigation over a suspect and long prison term, is the next chapter is this all-too-common variation on the modern story of the opioid epidemic.

March 30, 2021 in Booker in the Circuits, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Four notable new short reports on prison populations from the Bureau of Justice Statistics

I received this press release this morning pointing me to a number of new notable publications. Here is the text of the release, with links to the materials:

The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics today released Time Served in State Prison, 2018.  This report presents findings on the time served by prisoners released from state prison in 2018, including the length of time served by most serious offense and the percentage of sentence served.  Findings are based on data from BJS’s National Corrections Reporting Program, which is an annual voluntary data collection of records on prisoners submitted by state departments of corrections.

BJS also released three briefs: Veterans in Prison, Parents in Prison and Their Minor Children, and Disabilities Reported by Prisoners. The brief on veterans describes their demographics, offenses, sentence length, military branch and combat experience.  The brief on parents provides demographic information about prisoners who have at least one minor child and the number of minor children reported by parents in prison.  The brief on disabilities details statistics about demographics and types of disabilities reported by prisoners.  The findings are based on data collected in the 2016 Survey of Prison Inmates, a survey conducted through face-to-face interviews with a sample of state and federal prisoners.

Time Served in State Prison, 2018 (NCJ 255662) by BJS Statistician Danielle Kaeble

Veterans in Prison: Survey of Prison Inmates, 2016 (NCJ 252646) by BJS Statisticians Laura M. Maruschak, Jennifer Bronson, Ph.D. (former) and Mariel Alper, Ph.D. (former)

Parents in Prison and Their Minor Children: Survey of Prison Inmates, 2016 (NCJ 252645) by BJS Statisticians Laura M. Maruschak, Jennifer Bronson, Ph.D. (former) and Mariel Alper, Ph.D. (former)

Disabilities Reported by Prisoners: Survey of Prison Inmates, 2016 (NCJ 252642) by BJS Statisticians Laura M. Maruschak, Jennifer Bronson, Ph.D. (former) and Mariel Alper, Ph.D. (former)

The Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice is the principal federal agency responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating reliable statistics on crime and criminal justice in the United States. Doris J. James is the acting director.

March 30, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 29, 2021

New empirical study finds "nonprosecution of a nonviolent misdemeanor offense leads to large reductions in the likelihood of a new criminal complaint"

This local press piece from Boston reports on new local empirical work that is likely to garner a lot of attention around the nation. The press article is titled "Study finds not prosecuting misdemeanors reduces defendants’ subsequent arrests," and it discusses at length the findings in this new Working Paper (also here) titled "Misdemeanor Prosecution" authored by Amanda Agan, Jennifer Doleac and Anna Harvey. Here is the abstract of the Working Paper:

Communities across the United States are reconsidering the public safety benefits of prosecuting nonviolent misdemeanor offenses. So far there has been little empirical evidence to inform policy in this area. In this paper we report the first estimates of the causal effects of misdemeanor prosecution on defendants' subsequent criminal justice involvement. We leverage the as-if random assignment of nonviolent misdemeanor cases to Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs) who decide whether a case should move forward with prosecution in the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office in Massachusetts. These ADAs vary in the average leniency of their prosecution decisions. We find that, for the marginal defendant, nonprosecution of a nonviolent misdemeanor offense leads to large reductions in the likelihood of a new criminal complaint over the next two years. These local average treatment effects are largest for first-time defendants, suggesting that averting initial entry into the criminal justice system has the greatest benefits. We also present evidence that a recent policy change in Suffolk County imposing a presumption of nonprosecution for a set of nonviolent misdemeanor offenses had similar beneficial effects: the likelihood of future criminal justice involvement fell, with no apparent increase in local crime rates.

And here is part of the discussion from the press piece highlighting why this is research could prove so potent:

A study examining the effect of declining to prosecute lower-level nonviolent offenses — a signature policy adopted by Suffolk District Attorney Rachael Rollins that has drawn both praise and scorn — suggests the approach leads to significantly less future involvement by those defendants in the criminal justice system.

The new study, which looked at cases handled by the Suffolk County DA’s office going back to 2004, found that those defendants not prosecuted for lower-level misdemeanor cases were 58 percent less likely to face a criminal complaint over the following two years than those who faced prosecution for similar charges. 

The analysis, which is the first of its kind to rigorously evaluate a policy being embraced by reform-minded prosecutors across the country, provides striking evidence that steering defendants, particularly first-time offenders, away from prosecution and a criminal record can reduce their chances of cycling back into the legal system.

The findings, being released on Monday by the National Bureau of Economic Research, are likely to bring heightened attention to the question of how best to deal with lower-level offenses, an issue that has become a controversial topic among law enforcement officials and advocates who say prosecution of these cases exacts an enormous toll on poor and minority communities without enhancing public safety....

“We think this is pretty compelling evidence of beneficial effects from not prosecuting,” said Anna Harvey, a professor of politics at New York University, who led the research along with Amanda Agan, an economist at Rutgers University, and Jennifer Doleac, an economist at Texas A & M University.  The higher rates of new criminal complaints among those who did face prosecution for lower-level charges, on the other hand, mean “we may in fact be undermining public safety by criminalizing relatively minor forms of misbehavior,” write Harvey and her colleagues....

Alexandra Natapoff, a professor at Harvard Law School who has extensively studied the prosecution of misdemeanor offenses, said the study “gives empirical teeth to just how costly and counterproductive low-level misdemeanor arrests and court criminal convictions can be.”  Natapoff, author of the 2018 book Punishment Without Crime: How Our Massive Misdemeanor System Traps the Innocent and Makes America More Unequal, said we have paid far too little attention to the harmful impact on individuals and communities of prosecuting misdemeanors, which account for 80 percent of all criminal cases in the US.  “These cases that we treat as chump change, in fact, are destroying lives, and destroying families, and undermining the economic wellbeing of communities thousands of times over every day,” Natapoff said in a recent video explainer on the reach of misdemeanor convictions.

Miriam Krinsky, executive director of Fair and Just Prosecution, a group formed in 2017 to work with reform-minded DAs, called the study an affirmation of the changing approach to prosecution underway in a number of major cities.  “We are seeing a new normal among elected prosecutors who, like DA Rollins, share a view that we have prosecuted too many individuals who can be better addressed by treatment or support through a public health lens,” she said.  “It’s incredibly significant to see research like this that proves the value of the new thinking and the paradigm shift that’s taking place.”

March 29, 2021 in National and State Crime Data, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, March 18, 2021

Notable new Seventh Circuit panel opinion on ineffectiveness of counsel failing to raise meritorious guideline argument

A helpful reader alerted me to a notable new ineffective assistance opinion from the Seventh Circuit in Bridges v. US, No. 20-1623 (7th Cir. Mar. 17, 2021) (available here).  Here is how this opinion gets started:

This appeal raises fundamental questions about what is expected of defense counsel in the federal criminal justice system, where almost all defendants plead guilty.  Counsel must negotiate guilty pleas and argue for more lenient sentences, both of which require expert knowledge of the federal Sentencing Guidelines.  This knowledge is a core competency for federal criminal defense.  The issue here is whether a lawyer’s failure to raise an important and, in this case, ultimately meritorious guideline argument may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel even where there was no directly on-point precedent within the circuit at the relevant time.  We find that it may in this case.

Now in his sixties, petitioner Jeffery Bridges has been in and out of prison since he was a teenager and has been battling drug addiction even longer.  After staying out of trouble for eight years, Bridges got involved in drugs again and committed four robberies in two days in March 2017.  He netted scarcely $700 in total and was easily caught by the police. A federal grand jury indicted Bridges for four counts of robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951.

Bridges agreed to a guilty plea stipulating that he was subject to the guideline career offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which could apply only if his crimes of conviction were “crimes of violence” as defined by the Guidelines.  This enhancement more than doubled his advisory guideline sentencing range.  The district court imposed a below-guideline sentence of 140 months.  Bridges did not appeal. He had waived that right in his plea deal.

Bridges now seeks postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging he was denied effective assistance of counsel in pleading guilty.  He argues that his lawyer failed to realize and argue that Hobbs Act robbery did not then qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines, so he should not have been categorized as a career offender.  When Bridges pleaded guilty and was sentenced, there was no binding precedent in this circuit on this issue. Bridges argues that competent counsel still would have recognized the issue or at least known to investigate it.  The district court denied relief without holding a hearing, reasoning that counsel’s failure to anticipate arguments that we have not yet accepted cannot be constitutionally deficient.

We reverse for an evidentiary hearing on defense counsel’s performance under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).  First, we join the other circuits that have concluded that Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” as that phrase is currently defined in the Guidelines.  Although we had not so ruled when Bridges pleaded guilty, the building blocks for a successful legal argument were already in place.  Effective counsel would have considered this question that was so important in this case.  At that time, minimal research would have uncovered a Tenth Circuit decision squarely holding that Hobbs Act robbery was no longer a crime of violence under a 2016 amendment to the guideline definition of a crime of violence.

We realize how counterintuitive it is to argue or hold that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence — and that counsel could be deficient for failing to argue for that unexpected result.  Yet defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges in the federal system all appreciate that both statutory and guideline sentencing enhancements for recidivism and crimes of violence have produced many counterintuitive results over the last several decades.  During those years, both federal statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines have used the “categorical method” to classify prior convictions and current offenses.  The Sentencing Commission proposed guideline amendments in 2018 to reduce reliance on the categorical method. 83 Fed. Reg. 65400, 65407–65412 (Dec. 20, 2018).  The Commission has been unable to act on those proposed amendments, though, because it has lacked a quorum for years.  Bridges may be a beneficiary of that odd circumstance.

March 18, 2021 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, March 15, 2021

Georgia Supreme Court affirms discretionary juve LWOP sentence despite judge's statement it could not find juvenile "irreparably corrupt"

In the next few months, perhaps in the coming weeks, we should be getting an opinion from the Supreme Court in Jones v. Mississippi to help us better understand if Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires a sentencer to make a specific finding about a juvenile before exercising its discretion to impose a sentence of life without parole.  In the meantime, states continue to struggle with juvenile LWOP sentencing requirements amidst all the resentencings that had to take place after Miller v. Alabama prohibited mandatory LWOP for juveniles. 

This morning, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Moss v. Georgia, S20A1520 (Ga. Mar. 15, 2021) (available here), addressed this issue in a case in which the sentencing court suggested it was impossible to make a certain finding about a juvenile defendant.  Here is the start and a key passage from the unanimous ruling in Moss:

Jermontae Moss was convicted of felony murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and theft by receiving stolen property in connection with the shooting death of Jose Marin. On appeal, Moss contends that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance and that the trial court erred in sentencing Moss—a 17-year-old juvenile at the time of the crimes—to life in prison without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) for murder.  Neither of Moss’s contentions has merit, so we affirm....

It is true, as Moss points out, that at one point in its lengthy order the trial court also opined on the role of the “Divine” in the ultimate judgment of a human being:

This Court cannot find, in this case or in any other, that the Defendant himself is “irretrievably corrupt” or “permanently incorrigible.” And it is this Court’s firm opinion that no court at any level is ever able to make such a determination; it is beyond human capacity. Only a Divine Judge could look into a person and determine that he is permanently and irretrievably corrupt; that he has reached a state from which there is no return, no hope of redemption, no hope of any restoration.

(Emphasis in original.)  But we do not view Miller or Montgomery — or cases from this Court applying Miller and Montgomery, such as Veal, White, and Raines — as requiring the trial court to conduct a metaphysical assessment of a juvenile defendant.  Given the express determinations contained in the trial court’s order and summarized in part above, we cannot say that the trial court’s additional observations about the metaphysical — especially when viewed in the full context of the court’s order — somehow rendered the trial court’s analysis erroneous.

March 15, 2021 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, March 11, 2021

Split Washington Supreme Court, relying on state constitution, forbids mandatory LWOP sentences for those under 21

Today, via a 5-4 ruling in In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke and Bartholomew, No. 96772-5 (Wash. Mar. 11, 2021) (available here), the Supreme Court of Washington extended the reach of the US Supreme Court's Miller ruling by declaring mandatory LWOP for those under 21 to be unconstitutional (pursuant to Washington's state constitutional prohibition of "cruel punishment").  Here is how the majority opinion starts and ends:

Dwayne Earl Bartholomew and Kurtis William Monschke were each convicted of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole — a mandatory, nondiscretionary sentence under Washington’s aggravated murder statute.  RCW 10.95.030.  Bartholomew was 20 years old; Monschke was 19.  Many years after their convictions, each filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) asking us to consider whether article I, section 14 of our state constitution or the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits a mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentence for youthful defendants like themselves.  Specifically, they ask us to decide whether the constitutional requirement that judges exercise discretion at sentencing, which forbids such mandatory LWOP sentences for those under 18, also forbids those sentences for 18- to 21-year-old defendants.

Modern social science, our precedent, and a long history of arbitrary line drawing have all shown that no clear line exists between childhood and adulthood.  For some purposes, we defer to the legislature’s decisions as to who constitutes an “adult.”  But when it comes to mandatory LWOP sentences, Miller’s constitutional guarantee of an individualized sentence — one that considers the mitigating qualities of youth — must apply to defendants at least as old as these defendants were at the time of their crimes.  Miller v. United States, 567 U.S. 460, 469-80, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012).  Accordingly, we grant both PRPs and order that Bartholomew and Monschke each receive a new sentencing hearing....

There is no meaningful cognitive difference between 17-year-olds and many 18-year-olds.  When it comes to Miller’s prohibition on mandatory LWOP sentences, there is no constitutional difference either.  Just as courts must exercise discretion before sentencing a 17-year-old to die in prison, so must they exercise the same discretion when sentencing an 18-, 19-, or 20-year-old.  We grant Monschke’s and Bartholomew’s PRPs and vacate their mandatory LWOP sentences.  We remand each case for a new sentencing hearing at which the trial court must consider whether each defendant was subject to the mitigating qualities of youth.

The dissent authored by Justice Owens begins this way:

Kurtis Monschke and Dwayne Bartholomew committed brutal murders decades ago.  At the time, they were 19 and 20 years old, respectively.  They were not children. Under Washington law, when an individual turns 18 years old, they are empowered to make a range of life-altering decisions: suddenly, they can form contracts, drop out of school, get married, work a hazardous job, and serve in the military.  But at this same moment, they also obtain the full responsibilities and consequences of adulthood, and the court will no longer intervene on their behalf on the basis of age.  Nonetheless, the lead opinion holds today that we must create an exception in treating these individuals as adults when they commit aggravated murder between the ages of 18 and 20.  Mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentences are now prohibited for this age category.  The lead opinion crafts this new rule by filtering our state constitution’s “cruel punishment” prohibition through a handful of scientific studies and circumvents the reality that no legislatures or courts in the other 49 states have ever recognized such a protection.  WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14.  As the final arbiters of what “cruel” means under article I, section 14 of our state constitution, this court must use a disciplined and evenhanded approach in evaluating its meaning. If we do not, we risk transforming our protection against “cruelty” into whatever is supported by a smattering of studies and five concurring members of this court.

At the heart of this case is the important question of when a person should be held fully accountable as an adult.  This is a question that requires a meticulous examination of a number of scientific, moral, ethical, and practical considerations. Our court is not a legislature, and it is insufficiently equipped to decide this issue on selectively presented evidence put forth by limited parties on a constrained schedule.  The lead opinion broadly seeks to protect against the “unacceptable risk that youthful defendants without fully developed brains will receive a cruel LWOP sentence.”  Lead opinion at 29. But I struggle to identify at what precise age we will stop redrawing these lines based on this brain development evidence, be it 20, 22, 25, or even older.  I further caution that today’s decision may eventually compel us to revisit and invalidate a staggering number of LWOP and Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW, sentences for this growing group under our recent decisions in State v. Bassett and State v. Houston-Sconiers.  This task would tremendously burden the State’s resources and the victims’ families. I respectfully dissent.

March 11, 2021 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, March 08, 2021

Prisons as first frontier of the welfare state in The Last Frontier state

The nickname of the state of Alaska is The Last Frontier, which inspired the title of this post about this local article headlined "Alaska now spends more on prisons than its university system, and the gap is widening."  Here are excerpts explaining what I mean by the post title (with my emphasis added):

Alaska is now spending more on prisons than its state university, a reversal of the state’s longtime practice, and the gap would widen under a draft budget being considered by the state legislature.

Since 2015, when adjusted for inflation, Alaska has cut by 22.4% the amount it spends on the operations of all state agencies combined.  The Alaska Department of Corrections is the only agency whose inflation-adjusted budget has grown during that period.

Sen. Click Bishop, R-Fairbanks, called the current situation “sad.”  Bishop is co-chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, which on Thursday held a hearing that questioned whether the Legislature and governor have reached the limit of budget cuts they can make without significant changes to state law.

Though state spending (not including the Permanent Fund Dividend) has declined by almost half from its peak in 2015, most reductions came early in that period.  The cuts of the past two years have been almost entirely erased by inflation and other annual cost increases....

The budgets for the University of Alaska and the state prison system illustrate the problems now faced by the Legislature and governor.  In 2019, the governor signed an agreement with the University of Alaska Board of Regents that called for three years of budget cuts.  Though the Alaska Legislature was not party to the agreement, it has followed it so far.

At the time, the university system received $327 million from the portion of the budget paid for with revenue from the Permanent Fund and taxes. In the budget under consideration now by the Legislature, the university is slated to receive just $257 million.

One month before signing the university agreement, Dunleavy signed a bill that rolled back prior prison reform legislation.  That prior legislation, known as Senate Bill 91, had encouraged alternatives to prison, such as electronic monitoring, halfway houses and supervised release.

SB 91 reduced prison costs, but many Alaskans believed it was contributing to an increase in property crime and pushed for its repeal.  Since then, the budget of the Alaska Department of Corrections has grown from $291 million in 2019 to $345 million in the plan now being considered by the Legislature.

Much of that increase is due to increases in spending on inmate healthcare and rehabilitation, budget documents show. Department officials told a legislative panel last month that 65% of Alaska’s prison inmates are mentally ill, 80% have some kind of substance abuse disorder, and 65% have reported some kind of traumatic brain injury. Almost one in four inmates is positive for Hepatitis C.

Several hundred inmates were released from custody to relieve prison crowding during COVID-19, but the department now projects a continued rise in the state’s prison population, estimating that by June 2025, more than 4,900 Alaskans will be in prison.  As of February, more than half of the state’s prison population consisted of people who were awaiting trial, not those who had been sentenced.

I share the view that this situation is "sad" with more money now to be spent by Alaskans to cage its citizens than to provide higher education. And it is especially interesting to read that the increased prison spending is mostly for "healthcare and rehabilitation," which likely includes some educational programming, and that the majority of Alaskan prison inmates are mentally ill and/or have substance abuse disorder and/or a serious brain injury.  As is likely true in many states, Alaska is spending more and more monies on prisons in order to tend to its most vulnerable populations, though only after they get involved with the criminal justice system (while other welfare programs like higher education get cut in order to provide welfare services to the incarcerated).

March 8, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, State Sentencing Guidelines | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, March 04, 2021

Lots of SCOTUS talk and debate over the "categorial approach" and ACCA proof burdens in immigration decision

The Supreme Court this morning handed down a 5-3 ruling in Pereida v, Wilkenson, No. 19-438 (S. Ct. Mar. 4, 2021) (available here), in which the majority holds that, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a person subject to removal seeking discretionary relief must prove a prior conviction is not a "disqualifying criminal offense." Federal sentencing fans may already sense where this is going because so much of federal sentencing law, particularly the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), is concerned a lot about whether a prior conviction qualifies a defendant for certain sentencing enhancements. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Gorsuch talks a good deal about these matters, and here are a few passages that caught my eye:

We have described the modified categorical approach as requiring courts to “review . . . record materials” to determine which of the offenses in a divisible statute the defendant was convicted of committing.  Mathis, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16).  We have acknowledged that this process calls on courts to consider “extra-statutory materials” to “discover” the defendant’s crime of conviction.  Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 263 (2013).  We have observed that these “materials will not in every case speak plainly,” and that any lingering ambiguity about them can mean the government will fail to carry its burden of proof in a criminal case.  Mathis, 579 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 (2005)).  And we have remarked that “the fact of a prior conviction” supplies an unusual and “arguable” exception to the Sixth Amendment rule in criminal cases that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime” must be proved to a jury rather than a judge. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489, 490 (2000).

Really, this Court has never doubted that the who, what, when, and where of a conviction — and the very existence of a conviction in the first place — pose questions of fact.  Nor have we questioned that, like any other fact, the party who bears the burden of proving these facts bears the risks associated with failing to do so....

In the criminal context, this Court has said that judges seeking to ascertain the defendant’s crime of conviction should refer only to a “limited” set of judicial records.  Shepard, 544 U.S., at 20–23. In part, the Court has circumscribed the proof a judge may consult out of concern for the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. If a judge, rather than a jury, may take evidence and make findings of fact, the thinking goes, the proceeding should be as confined as possible. Id., at 25–26; see also Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 487–490 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)). But Sixth Amendment concerns are not present in the immigration context

Justice Breyer's dissent in this case also speaks on the "categorial approach" and ACCA jurisprudence at some length.   I will leave it to others to let me know if there are particularly important passages in the dissent (or in the majority) that sentencing fans ought to consider at greater length.

March 4, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, March 03, 2021

US Sentencing Commission issues big new report on "Federal Armed Career Criminals: Prevalence, Patterns, and Pathways"

The US Sentencing Commission has just released this big report providing "information on offenders sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, including an overview of the Act and its implementation in the federal sentencing guidelines. The report also presents data on offender and offense characteristics, criminal histories, and recidivism of armed career criminals."  Here are the "Key Findings" appearing in the first part of the report:

Key Findings
• Armed career criminals consistently comprise a small portion of the federal criminal caseload, representing less than one percent of the federal criminal caseload.  During the ten-year study period, the number of armed career criminals decreased by almost half, from 590 in fiscal year 2010 to 312 in fiscal year 2019.
• Armed career criminals receive substantial sentences.  Offenders who were subject to the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum penalty at sentencing received an average sentence of 206 months in fiscal year 2019.  Offenders who were relieved of the mandatory minimum for providing substantial assistance to the government received significantly shorter sentences, an average of 116 months in fiscal year 2019.
• Armed career criminals have extensive criminal histories. Even prior to application of the armed career criminal guideline, 90.4 percent of armed career criminals qualified for the three most serious Criminal History Categories under the guidelines, and almost half (49.4%) qualified for Criminal History Category VI, the most serious category under the guidelines. 
• The overwhelming majority of armed career criminals had prior convictions for violent offenses. In fiscal year 2019, 83.7 percent of armed career criminals had prior convictions for violent offenses, including 57.7 percent who had three or more such convictions.  Despite the predominance of violence in their criminal history, the most common prior conviction for armed career criminals was for public order offenses, with 85.3 percent having at least one such prior conviction.
• More than half (59.0%) of armed career criminals released into the community between 2009 and 2011 were rearrested within an eight-year follow-up period. When armed career criminals recidivated, their median time to rearrest was 16 months and the most serious common new offense was assault (28.2%).
• Recidivism rates of armed career criminals varied depending on whether they had prior convictions for violent offenses and the number of such prior convictions.
      ◦ Nearly two-thirds (62.5%) of armed career criminals with prior violent convictions and no prior drug trafficking convictions, and more than half (55.0%) of armed career criminals with both prior violent and drug trafficking convictions were rearrested within the eight-year follow-up period.  In comparison, only 36.4 percent of armed career criminals with prior drug trafficking convictions and no prior violent convictions were rearrested during the study period, but there were only 12 such offenders.
     ◦ Furthermore, 61.7 percent of armed career criminals with three or more prior violent convictions were rearrested during the eight-year follow-up period compared to 48.9 percent of armed career criminals with one or two prior violent convictions

March 3, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 02, 2021

En banc Second Circuit needs 120 pages and five opinions to sort out whether NY first-degree manslaughter qualifies as a federal "violent crime"

Great scottI generally do not closely follow lower federal court rulings about what state convictions qualify as predicates for sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") or the career offender sentencing guidelines. I have a hard time just keeping up with the many Supreme Court ACCA cases, and I have previously suggested in this post a few years ago that modern ACCA jurisprudence must reside as some level of hell in Dante's Inferno because this caselaw is so dang inscrutable. 

But a helpful reader alerted me to a new en banc Second Circuit decision today in US v. Scott, No. 18-163-cr (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2021) (available here), which seems like a useful reminder of how nuts this jurisprudence can be.  Here is how the majority opinion in Scott gets started:

Defendant-appellee Gerald Scott is a violent criminal, who has repeatedly threatened, and on two occasions taken, human life.  The killings were undoubtedly brutal: Scott shot one of his victims in the head at point-blank range; he stabbed the other to death. For these killings, Scott stands twice convicted in New York State of first-degree manslaughter under N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1), a homicide crime second only to murder in its severity.   At issue on this appeal is whether Scott’s manslaughter convictions are for violent crimes. An affirmative answer might appear obvious to a man on the street aware of Scott’s conduct.  But the laws relevant here — the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), and the Career Offender Sentencing Guideline, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) — do not identify violent crimes by looking to what a defendant actually did. Rather, they look to the minimum he might have done and still been convicted.  This inquiry focuses on a crime’s elements, asking whether they categorically require a defendant’s use of physical force, specifically violent physical force.  See Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140, 144 (2010) (defining physical force required by ACCA).  Applying that standard here, we conclude that first-degree manslaughter is a categorically violent crime because its elements — (1) the causation of death (2) by a person intent on causing at least serious physical injury — necessarily involve the use of violent force.

The occasion for our ruling is the United States’ appeal from an amended judgment of conviction entered on January 12, 2018, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Laura Taylor Swain, Judge), which resentenced Scott to time served (then totaling approximately 11 years, 3 months) for attempted Hobbs Act robbery and related firearms crimes. Resentencing followed the district court’s grant of Scott’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his original 22-year sentence.  See United States v. Scott, No. 06 CR 988- LTS, 2017 WL 2414796, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2017).  The district court concluded that it had mistakenly relied on ACCA and the Career Offender Guideline in imposing Scott’s initial sentence.  It reasoned that Scott’s two prior convictions for first-degree manslaughter did not qualify as predicate violent crimes because “first degree manslaughter can be committed in New York State by omission and thus without using force.”  Id. at *2 (emphasis added).  A divided panel of this court agreed, with the majority analogizing omission to “complete inaction,” and concluding therefrom that the crime could be committed without the use of force.  See United States v. Scott, 954 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding first-degree manslaughter “not a predicate crime of violence because it can be committed by complete inaction and therefore without the use of force”).

After rehearing the case en banc, we reject this reasoning, which, carried to its logical — or illogical — conclusion, would preclude courts from recognizing even intentional murder as a categorically violent crime because, presumably, it is just as possible for a defendant to cause a person’s death by omission when the defendant’s specific intent is to kill, see N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1) (second-degree murder), as when his specific intent is to cause serious physical injury, see id. § 125.20(1) (first-degree manslaughter).  We decline to take the law down a path leading so far from the violent reality of these two most serious, intentionally injurious homicide crimes.

Disconcertedly, the majority needed 50 more pages to explain why first-degree manslaughter in New York qualifies as a federal "violent crime," and then concurring and dissenting opinions needed 70 more pages to debate a formalistic legal matter that is an awful artifice of poorly conceived and constructed federal sentencing law.  With the rocky jurisprudence of this case and the horrors of so many others, I would love to time warp back to the drafting of ACCA and urge a whole new approach to federal sentencing.  

March 2, 2021 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, February 22, 2021

SCOTUS grants cert on yet another intricate Armed Career Criminal Act issue

The Supreme Court is back in action today after its February hibernation, and it kicked off a new round of activity with this long order list. Though I suspect some extended dissents from the denial of cert on non-criminal issues will garner the most attention, sentencing fans will be intrigued (or perhaps annoyed) that the Justices have taken up yet another case dealing with the intricacies of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The case is Wooden v. United States, No. 20-5279, and cert was granted on this question from the initial pro se cert petition:

Did the Sixth Circuit err by expanding the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) in the absence of clear statutory defintiion with regard to the vague term "committed on occasions different from one another"?

The defendant's reply brief in support of the cert petition spotlights the facts and the extreme sentencing consequences at issue in Wooden:

Petitioner William Dale Wooden broke into a ministorage facility in Georgia one night in 1997.  He entered ten units during the course of the crime and later pleaded guilty to ten counts of burglary.  Were these burglaries committed “on occasions different from one another”?  Fifteen years in federal prison depends on the answer.  If not, Wooden’s sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon would have been only 21 to 26 months; he would have been “home by Christmas 2016.” D.Ct.  Dkt. 84, 1-2.

But the Sixth Circuit answered yes, affirming a harsh mandatory-minimum sentence.  So Wooden will remain incarcerated until 2028.  That wrongheaded decision exacerbated an acknowledged circuit split on an important and recurring question.

Most federal sentening fans know how intricate and consequential interpretations of ACCA can be for certain persons who illegally possess a firearm. But I still find the facts in a (largely unremarkable) case like Wooden remarkable.

As I read the government's filing, the defendant here at the time of sentencing had, besides the nearly 20-year-old ministorage burglaries, one other burglary conviction that was 10 years old and an assault conviction that was more than a quarter-century old.  Rather that having Wooden's illegal firearm possession sentence now turn on judicial consideration of the seriousness of his current offense conduct and his true criminal history, ACCA served to make 15 mandatory(!) years of federal prison time turn entirely on legal technicalities rather than thoughtful consideration of what justice and crime control demands. Sigh. 

February 22, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (6)

Wednesday, February 17, 2021

"'My Bewildering Brain Toils in Vain': Traumatic Brain Injury, the Criminal Trial Process, and the Case of Lisa Montgomery"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper available via SSRN and authored by Alison Lynch, Michael L. Perlin and Heather Cucolo.  Here is its abstract:

Individuals with traumatic brain injuries (TBI) have a greater risk of becoming justice-involved due to the role that many TBIs play in impulse control and judgment.  Attorneys assigned to represent this cohort may not have encountered individuals with TBI before, and may not be familiar with behavioral manifestations that could be relevant as a defense or as mitigation in individual cases. In this regard, TBI is grossly misunderstood.

A grave example of this point, and a foundation for this article, is the case of Lisa Montgomery, who despite evidence of serious mental illness and significant brain damage, was convicted, sentenced to death, and ultimately executed for the murder of a pregnant woman and the kidnapping of the woman’s unborn child.  Her case reflects all that is wrong with the way we treat criminal defendants with traumatic brain injuries.

In this paper, we discuss common ways that individuals with traumatic brain injuries become involved in the criminal justice system, and how attorneys can better prepare an effective defense or mitigation.  We consider, in some depth, several of the substantive areas of criminal law and procedure in which an understanding of TBI is especially significant (including, but not limited to, competency status, the insanity defense and the death penalty), and assess the quality of counsel –and experts -- in such cases, again, in some instances, using the Montgomery case as a prism.

We believe that one (at least partial) remedy for the current situation is a turn to therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) The TJ doctrine emphasizes giving an individual client dignity, voice, validation and voluntariness of action and decision.  This is particularly important for an individual with TBI, who will likely have the capacity to make the majority of decisions about his case, but who may still need behavioral treatment or interventions for symptoms of the TBI.  We will discuss the ways that TJ plays into these issues, and how TJ must be the grounding of any representation of this population.  We conclude with some modest suggestions as to how we can begin to make needed changes in the criminal justice system to take all of these issues into account.

February 17, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, February 11, 2021

Senators Durbin and Grassley re-introduce "COVID-19 Safer Detention Act"

As detailed in this post from last June, US Senators Dick Durbin and Chuck Grassley responded to the ugly realities of the COVID pandemic and its impact on incarcerated persons by introducing a modest, but still important, new bill to reform the procedures surrounding federal elderly home release and compassionate release.  Disappointingly, that bill never moved forward in the last Congress, but this press release reports that it is back on the docket for the new Congress.  Here are excerpts from the release:

Amid the COVID-19 public health pandemic, U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, authors of the bipartisan First Step Act, landmark criminal justice reform legislation, introduced bipartisan legislation to reform the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program and compassionate release from federal prisons.  Sadly, more than 200 federal prisoners with pre-existing medical conditions that made them more vulnerable to COVID-19 have died as a result of the virus, more than half of whom were over 60 years old.  Elderly offenders, the fastest-growing portion of the prison population, have much lower rates of recidivism and are much more expensive to incarcerate due to their health care needs.  

Since enactment of the First Step Act, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has opposed the vast majority of compassionate release petitions.  Since March of last year, BOP has opposed nearly all compassionate release requests, while courts have granted more than 2,000 over the objections of the Department of Justice and BOP.  BOP has reportedly refused to approve any compassionate releases based on vulnerability to COVID-19.

“My legislation with Senator Grassley would help ensure that the most vulnerable prisoners are quickly released or transferred to home confinement for the remainder of their sentence – just as the First Step Act intended.  This is especially critical during the COVID-19 pandemic to protect against the spread of this deadly virus, which we know thrives in places like prisons.  I’m hopeful that we can take up legislation on a bipartisan basis so we can start to properly implement the First Step Act and protect communities from further COVID-19 outbreaks,” said Durbin.

“In the middle of a pandemic the federal government ought to be doing everything it can to protect the inmates in its care.  We already established important home confinement and early release programs in 2018, which are especially important right now as older inmates face very serious risks because of the virus.  Our bill will clarify and expand those programs we wrote into the First Step Act, so we can better protect these vulnerable populations,” Grassley said.

Specifically, the COVID-19 Safer Detention Act would reform the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program and compassionate release by:

  • Clarifying that the percentage of time served required for the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program should be calculated based on an inmate’s sentence, including reductions for good time credits (H.R. 4018, which passed the House by voice vote last Congress); 
  • Expanding the eligibility criteria for the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program to include nonviolent offenders who have served at least 50 percent of their term of imprisonment;
  • Clarifying that elderly nonviolent D.C. Code offenders in BOP custody are eligible for the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program and that federal prisoners sentenced before November 1, 1987 are eligible for compassionate release;
  • Subjecting elderly home detention eligibility decisions to judicial review (based on the First Step Act’s compassionate release provision); and
  • Providing that, during the period of the pandemic, COVID-19 vulnerability is a basis for compassionate release and shortening the period prisoners must wait for judicial review for elderly home detention and compassionate release from 30 to 10 days.

Joining Durbin and Grassley in cosponsoring the legislation are Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Chris Coons (D-DE), Roger Wicker (R-MS), and Cory Booker (D-NJ). 

As the release reveals, Senators Durbin and Grassley are now the leading member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which would seem to improve the odds of this bill moving forward. But, of course, Congress moves in mysterious ways, and I have learned never to expect too much from inside the Beltway.

February 11, 2021 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, February 05, 2021

"Narrating Context and Rehabilitating Rehabilitation: Federal Sentencing Work in Yale Law School’s Challenging Mass Incarceration Clinic"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Miriam Gohara now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

The Challenging Mass Incarceration Clinic (CMIC) at Yale Law School has been representing clients in federal sentencing and state postconviction cases since 2016.  Drawing on a blueprint I set forth in a 2013 article, the clinic teaches a model of noncapital sentencing practice that builds on the best capital defense sentencing practices and seeks to transform judges’ and prosecutors’ assumptions about criminal sentencing.

In this article, I set forth CMIC’s theoretical underpinnings and detail our interdisciplinary, trauma-informed approach to sentencing advocacy and clinical practice.  I then describe CMIC’s case outcomes, including variances which have reduced each of our clients’ prison time an average of five years below the United States Sentencing Guidelines range and more than 18 months below prosecutors’ recommended sentences.  CMIC’s work has also produced innovations to traditional client-centered, holistic lawyering; enhanced approaches to working with experts; and yielded insights into the incorporation of defense-based victim outreach in appropriate cases.

Our experiences in CMIC raise several areas for future research, including whether the model will produce the kind of fundamental sentencing reform I predicted in my earlier work, and questions about fairness, risks, data, and scalability.  I am publishing this article with the hope and intention that other law school clinics will borrow from and improve on CMIC’s model.

February 5, 2021 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, February 03, 2021

The Sentencing Project releases new report documenting "Racial Disparities in Youth Incarceration Persist"

Josh Rovner has authored this new report for The Sentencing Project titled " "Racial Disparities in Youth Incarceration Persist." Here is its executive summary:

In an era of declining youth incarceration, Black and American Indian youth are still overwhelmingly more likely to be held in custody than their white peers.

In ten years, the United States has cut youth incarceration in half. While the reduction is impressive, youth involvement in the juvenile justice system continues to impact youth of color disproportionately.

In every state, Black youth are more likely to be incarcerated than their white peers, about five times as likely nationwide. American Indian youth are three times as likely to be incarcerated as their white peers. For Latinx youth disparities are smaller but still prevalent; Latinx youth are 42 percent more likely than their white peers to be incarcerated.

Nationally, disparities are essentially unchanged from 10 years’ prior for Black and American Indian youth, but represent a 21 percent decrease in incarceration disparities for Latinx youth. In state rankings, New Jersey warrants special mention due to its number one and number three status for highest Black-white and Latinx-white disparities in youth incarceration, respectively.

These disparities are not only caused by differences in offending but also by harsher enforcement and punishment of youth of color.  White youth are less likely to be arrested than other teenagers, which is partly attributable to unequal policing and partly to differential involvement in crime.

After arrest, youth of color are more likely to be detained pre-adjudication and committed post adjudication.  They are also less likely to be diverted from the system.  These patterns hold across a range of offenses.

Advancement of racial justice priorities with youth decarceration efforts has proven elusive.  More steps must be taken to invest in youth and communities in order to prevent crime and to protect youth from overly punitive system responses to misbehavior.

Recommendations

1. Racial impact statements

States and localities should require the use of racial impact statements to educate policymakers about how changes in sentencing or law enforcement policies and practices might impact racial and ethnic disparities in the justice system.

2. Publish demographic data quarterly

States and counties should publish demographic data quarterly on the number of incarcerated or justice-system involved youth, including race and ethnicity. The federal government should disseminate this information nationwide.

3. Invest in communities

States and localities must invest in communities to strengthen public infrastructures, such as schools and medical and mental health services, with particular focus on accommodating the needs of children of color.

February 3, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, January 30, 2021

"Assessing Graham v. Florida at the Ten-Year Mark: Progress and the Prospects for Ongoing Juvenile Sentencing Reform"

The title of this post is the title of this great looking upcoming symposium being conducted by the Catholic University Law Review this coming Friday, February 5, 2021 starting at 1pm EST. Here is how the event is described and the planned coverage (click through to see all the great speakers):

Three Supreme Court decisions in the last decade have dramatically reshaped the treatment of juveniles in our criminal justice system.  In Graham v. Florida (2010), the Court held that juveniles may not be sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for non-homicide crimes.  Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Court held that even juveniles convicted of homicide may not be sentenced to mandatory LWOP.  Finally, in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), the Court held that Miller was retroactively applicable, thereby entitling several thousand individuals to a resentencing hearing at which their youth and all its mitigating attributes would be taken into account.  These cases not only significantly curbed the uniquely American practice of sentencing minors to LWOP, but also, together they stand for the proposition that children are different for purposes of sentencing.

Ten years after the landmark decision in Graham, this symposium will explore the impact that these cases have had on juvenile sentencing in the LWOP context and more broadly. The first of three panels will include practitioners who can provide a firsthand perspective on resentencing hearings and how they are playing out in courtrooms across the country.  The second panel will consider the legislative effects of Graham and will include policymakers working on the ground to pursue related juvenile sentencing reforms. Finally, the closing panel will afford attendees an opportunity to hear directly from individuals affected by Graham, that is, those who were sentenced to life imprisonment as juveniles and have now come home.

The Program

1:00 p.m.  Graham v. Florida at the Ten-Year Mark

1:30 p.m.  Resentencing Hearings Post-Graham

2:45 p.m.  Legislative Effects of Graham

4:00 p.m.  Life after Graham

January 30, 2021 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 15, 2021

Feds complete yet another late-night execution of convicted killer of seven from Virginia

As reported in this CNN piece, headlined "Federal government executes Corey Johnson following prolonged legal fight," the latest federal execution followed, yet again, what has become the standard litigation script with the Supreme Court ultimately rejecting all final arguments for a delay.  Here are some of the details: 

Corey Johnson was executed by lethal injection at the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana, and was pronounced dead at 11:34 p.m. ET on Thursday.

Johnson was sentenced to die after he was convicted of killing seven people in 1992 as a part of the drug trade in Virginia.  The weeks preceding his execution were defined by a tense legal battle after he contracted Covid-19 while on death row.

In his final statement, Johnson apologized for his crimes and told the families of the victims that he hoped they would find peace. He also thanked the staff at the prison, the prison's chaplain, his minister and his legal team....

The Supreme Court denied a last-ditch effort late Thursday by Johnson's legal team that leaned on claims of an intellectual disability and his Covid-19 diagnosis, arguing that his infection paired with a lethal injection would amount to a cruel and unusual punishment.  That appeal came after an appellate court on Wednesday tossed out a lower court's decision to stay the executions of Johnson and another death row inmate who contracted the virus, Dustin Higgs, whose execution is scheduled to take place Friday....

Johnson was found guilty of seven counts of capital murder in 1993, with the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia jury unanimously recommending seven death sentences.

Thursday's execution, six days before President-elect Joe Biden takes office, coincides with a new push from more than three dozen members of Congress for Biden's incoming administration to prioritize abolishing the death penalty in all jurisdictions.  While Biden has pledged to abolish the federal death penalty and to give incentives to states to stop seeking death sentences as a part of his criminal justice plan, 40 members of Congress want to make sure the practice ends on his first day in office.

January 15, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, January 14, 2021

"Race and Ethnicity of Violent Crime Offenders and Arrestees, 2018"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new statistical brief from DOJ's Bureau of Justice Statistics.  Here are portions of the first few paragraphs of the document:

In 2018, based on data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, black people were overrepresented among persons arrested for nonfatal violent crimes (33%) and for serious nonfatal violent crimes (36%) relative to their representation in the U.S. population (13%).  White people were underrepresented.  White people accounted for 60% of U.S. residents but 46% of all persons arrested for rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and other assault, and 39% of all arrestees for nonfatal violent crimes excluding other assault.  Hispanics, regardless of their race, were overrepresented among arrestees for nonfatal violent crimes excluding other assault (21%) relative to their representation in the U.S. population (18%).

These UCR data on incidents of nonfatal violent crime can be compared to data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to determine how much offense and arrest diferences by race and ethnicity can be attributed to diferences in criminal involvement.  The NCVS collects information on victims’ perceptions of ofenders’ race, ethnicity, and other characteristics in incidents of violent crime.  This survey is administered to persons age 12 or older from a nationally representative sample of U.S. households. The 2018 NCVS data fle includes interviews from 151,055 households.

An examination of ofenders’ characteristics, as reported by victims in the NCVS, provides information on racial and ethnic disparities beyond an arrestee and population-based comparison.  Based on the 2018 NCVS and UCR, black people accounted for 29% of violent-crime offenders and 35% of violent-crime offenders in incidents reported to police, compared to 33% of all persons arrested for violent crimes.

At the same time, white offenders were underrepresented among persons arrested for nonfatal violent crimes (46%) relative to their representation among offenders identifed by victims in the NCVS (52%).  When limited to offenders in incidents reported to police, white people were found to be arrested proportionate to their criminal involvement (48%). Hispanic offenders were overrepresented among persons arrested for nonfatal violent crimes (18%) relative to their representation among violent offenders (14% of all violent offenders and 13% of violent offenders in incidents reported to police).  However, victims were unable to determine if the offender was Hispanic in 9% of single-offender incidents and 12% of multiple-offender incidents, which may have resulted in some underestimates of Hispanic offenders’ involvement in violent crime.

January 14, 2021 in National and State Crime Data, Offender Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 13, 2021

Details on Ohio's new ban of juve LWOP and the broader national landscape

JLWOP202101-1200x802As mentioned in this recent post, Ohio recently enacted a new law largely banning life without parole sentences for juveniles.  Daniel Nichanian has this new piece at The Appeal: Political Report about the law and the national develops in this space. I recommend the whole piece, and here are excerpts (with links and the graphic from the original):

Ohio is expanding access to parole hearings for people who have been incarcerated ever since they were children.  It will no longer sentence minors to life without the possibility of parole, and it will significantly curtail sentences that effectively amount to the same. 

Youth justice advocates are celebrating Senate Bill 256, which was signed into law by Governor Mike DeWine on Saturday, as their latest win in nationwide efforts to keep kids from spending their life in prison. The law is a “huge sea change” for the state, said Kevin Werner, policy director at the Ohio Justice & Policy Center, because “it recognizes that people change. … The heart of the bill is that Ohio values redemption over excessive punishment.”

SB 256, which is retroactive, only affects parole eligibility; it does not guarantee that people actually get released, even after spending decades in prison.  Under the new law, people who committed a crime as a minor will be eligible for parole after no more than 18 years of incarceration if the crime did not involve a homicide, or after no more than 25 to 30 years if it did.  That’s longer than in other states that have recently adopted similar laws....

Ohio is the 24th state, plus D.C., that will stop imposing sentences of juvenile life without parole.  A wave of states have adopted similar reforms since the Supreme Court ended mandatory life without parole sentences for minors in a series of early 2010s rulings.  Oregon, in 2019, and Virginia, in 2020, did this most recently. 

Brooke Burns, who heads the Ohio Public Defender’s Juvenile Department, stresses that SB 256 will also help the state confront significant racial inequalities in its prison population.  “When we think about lengthy sentences, it’s overwhelmingly kids of color who are impacted by that,” said Burns.

These inequalities stem from disparate sentencing, but also the rate at which children of color are transferred to adult court in the first place, especially in counties such as Cuyahoga (Cleveland) that do so very aggressively.

The Appeal reported in 2019 that the office of Prosecuting Attorney Michael O’Malley has been transferring minors to adult court far more than other Ohio jurisdictions.  Ninety-four percent of those who were transferred to adult court in 2018 were Black. 

Ohio’s Legislative Services Commission estimates that 50 to 60 people will immediately become eligible for parole when SB 256 becomes effective; this is approximately the number of people who have served at least 18 years, and in some cases much more, of the sentences they received when they were minors.  Many more will become newly eligible for parole in subsequent years.  The law will apply to most people who are serving outright sentences of life without parole, but also to people whose sentences are functionally equivalent since their parole eligibility was set so far in the future....

In Oregon and Virginia, the two states that most recently adopted laws to end juvenile life without parole, the state government is run by Democrats.  But SB 256 had to pass through Ohio’s GOP-run legislature — which it did with wide bipartisan majorities — and get support from the Republican governor.

January 13, 2021 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

After SCOTUS reverses stays by 6-3 votes, US complete early morning execution of only woman on federal death row

As reported here via SCOTUSblog, the "Supreme Court on Tuesday night cleared the way for the execution of Lisa Montgomery, the first woman to be executed by the federal government in 68 years.  Montgomery was convicted in 2008 of strangling Bobbie Jo Stinnett, a Missouri woman who was eight months pregnant, and extracting the premature baby to pass off as her own child." Here is more:

In a series of brief, unsigned orders, the Supreme Court reversed a pair of rulings from federal appeals courts that had put Montgomery’s execution on hold, and it denied two other last-minute requests in which Montgomery argued she was entitled to a postponement. In two of the orders, the court’s three liberal justices indicated that they dissented and would not have allowed the execution to proceed.

Soon after the court issued its final late-night order, Montgomery was put to death by lethal injection at the federal execution facility in Terre Haute, Indiana.  She was pronounced dead at 1:31 a.m.

Four separate cases relating to Montgomery’s execution reached the justices in emergency litigation over the past several days....

Montgomery was the first woman to be executed by the federal government since 1953.  No other women are currently on federal death row.  Montgomery also became the 11th person to be put to death by the federal government since last July, when the Trump administration ended a 17-year moratorium on federal executions.

The Justice Department has scheduled two more executions in the waning days of the Trump administration.  It wants to execute Corey Johnson on Thursday and Dustin Higgs on Friday, but both men recently tested positive for COVID-19, and a federal judge on Tuesday halted their executions based on a risk that lung damage associated with the virus could cause them to suffer severe pain during a lethal injection. 

I had been following all the litigation in the run up to the scheduled execution, but I did not blog about any of the stays because it seemed to me quite likely that the Supreme Court would ultimately clear the path for the feds to move forward.  In most of the previous 10 federal executions over the last six months, the condemned defendant secured or argued forcefully for a stay; in every single case, SCOTUS has allowed the execution to go forward.  I will be surprised if this pattern does not repeat itself again twice more this week with the scheduled executions of Corey Johnson and Dustin Higgs.

As the SCOTUSblog post notes, Montgomery was the first woman executed by the federal government in the modern death penalty era.  She is also the first woman executed anywhere in the US in more than five years; Georgia executed Kelly Gissendaner for orchestrating the murder of her husband back in September 2015.  Montgomery is also the first person executed in 2021.  This DPIC page details that she is the 17th woman executed in the modern death penalty era (out of a total of 1530 total executions).

January 13, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, January 11, 2021

Ohio enacts new laws precluding death penalty for those with "serious mentally illness" and largely eliminating LWOP for juvenile offenders

As detailed in this official notice, Ohio Governor Mike DeWine over the weekend signed a bunch of new bills into law, and two are sure to be of interest to sentencing fans:

House Bill 136, sponsored by Representative Brett Hudson Hillyer, prohibits the death penalty if offender was mentally ill at time of offense. 

Senate Bill 256, sponsored by Senator Nathan Manning and former Senator Peggy Lehner, regards sentencing offenders under the age of 18. 

This local press piece provides a bit of background on these new Ohio laws:

Gov. Mike DeWine has also signed bills taking the death penalty off the table for murders committed by the severely mentally ill... House Bill 136, sponsored by Rep. Brett Hillyer (R., Uhrichsville), prohibits the death penalty for murderers who demonstrate they suffered from a “serious mental illness” at the time of the crime. The most severe punishment would be life without the possibility of parole.

In addition to future cases, the law would open a one-year window for some people currently on death row to ask judges to commute their death sentences. While execution is not an option now for juveniles and the mentally disabled, Ohio law still allows for capital punishment in cases involving mental illness claims that fall short of the threshold for a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

“Serious mental illness” is defined as schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, or any delusional disorder significantly impairing the accused's ability to exercise rational judgment in complying with the law and fully appreciating the consequences of conduct....

Senate Bill 256, sponsored by Sens. Nathan Manning (R., North Ridgeville) and Peggy Lehner (R., Kettering), to remove life without parole as a sentencing option for juveniles and to allow for parole hearings for juveniles after certain periods of time in prison.

It will be fascinating to see how these new laws get implemented.  This other local piece, headlined "Mother of murder victim advocated for new parole changes," partially speaks to the application of the juve LWOP law while also highlighting the powerful role that crime victims can play in advancing criminal justice reform:

A bill that will change Ohio's parole options, signed by Governor Mike DeWine on Saturday, was advocated for by a local mother whose son was murdered in South Cumminsville in 2015.

Suliman Abdul-Mutakallim was walking home with food for his family in June, 2015, when he was shot dead and robbed. "When three assailants walked up behind him and shot him in the back of the head, they didn't even say 'stick 'em up.' They just shot him," said Rukiye Abdul-Mutakallim, Suliman's mother.

The three then took $40 from Suliman, stole his phone and the food he was bringing home. For Rukiye, it was difficult to ignore that two of the three responsible for her son's death were children: The youngest was just 14 years old. "I found it unfathomable. These are human beings, aren't they?" said Rukiye. "And then when I saw them in court and they were children? Ahh."...

"For her to recognize that they were children who made terrible, terrible mistakes and has the grace to understand and hold that out to say, 'This is not what I would want for them,' is really remarkable," said Kevin Werner, with the Ohio Justice and Policy Center. 

Werner said there are currently 11 prisoners in Ohio affected directly by SB 256, which will retroactively apply to juveniles already convicted and sentenced.  The bill instead adds parole possibilities at 18 years, 25 years and 30 years, depending on the severity of the crime.

"It doesn't go far enough and we know that, but it is the beginning," said Rukiye.... "If we are throwing our babies away, we have no future," said Rukiye.

January 11, 2021 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, January 10, 2021

Montana Supreme Court talks through juve LWOP resentencing after Miller

This past Friday, the Montana Supreme Court handed down a notable ruling (with lots of opinions) on the application of the US Supreme Court's juvenile LWOP sentencing jurisprudence and related issues.  The main opinion and various concurring and dissenting opinions in Montana v. Keefe, No. 2021 MT 8 (Mont. Jan. 8, 2021) (available here), all make for interesting reads.  Here are some of the essentials from the majority opinion: 

We agree with the Briones court that post-offense evidence of rehabilitation is clearly required to be considered by a court resentencing a juvenile who is serving a sentence of life without parole.  Because Miller commands a resentencing court to consider “the possibility of rehabilitation” before a juvenile can lawfully be sentenced to life without parole, evidence of rehabilitation in the years since the original crime must be considered by the resentencing court.  This is consistent with the sentencing policy of Montana which does not merely provide for punishment, protection of the public, and restitution, but also for rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders back into the community....

Although we have determined the District Court erred in determining Keefe was “irreparably corrupt” and “permanently incorrigible” and are reversing his sentence on that basis, we must address whether the issue of the irreparable corruption of a minor is a fact which must be found by a jury.  Keefe has argued, pursuant to Apprendi, that he is constitutionally entitled to have a jury determine whether he is, in fact, “irreparably corrupt” before a possible life without parole sentence.  We disagree....

Here, neither “irreparable corruption” nor “permanent incorrigibility” are facts which could increase a possible sentence.  Rather, youth is a mitigating factor which can reduce the possible sentence for deliberate homicide in Montana.  In accordance with Miller and Steilman, a jury is not required to determine irreparable corruption and permanent incorrigibility — that determination is properly left to the resentencing judge.

January 10, 2021 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Blakely in the Supreme Court, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, January 04, 2021

"Expunging Juvenile Records: Misconceptions, Collateral Consequences, and Emerging Practices"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new document authored by Andrea Coleman and recently released by Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Here are the "Highlights" set forth in the first page of the document:

This bulletin discusses common misconceptions surrounding expungement.  It also provides information about the collateral consequences of juvenile records as well as federal, state, and local emerging practices. 

The key information and findings include the following:

  • Expungement, sealing, and confidentiality are three legally distinct methods for destroying or limiting access to juvenile records.  However, these methods may permit police, courts, or the public access to juvenile records, depending on state laws.

  • The public and impacted youth often erroneously believe that once police and courts expunge juvenile records they no longer exist. The handling of expunged juvenile records varies widely from state to state.

  • Youth with juvenile records frequently experience collateral consequences of their arrest or adjudication, which may include difficulty accessing educational services, obtaining employment, serving in the military, and finding and maintaining housing.

  • States, localities, and the federal government have implemented promising practices to decrease collateral consequences, including “ban the box” legislation and expungement clinics (Avery and Hernandez, 2018; Radice, 2017; Shah, Fine, and Gullen, 2014; Shah and Strout, 2016).

January 4, 2021 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 24, 2020

"'I See What Is Right and Approve, But I Do What Is Wrong': Psychopathy and Punishment in the Context of Racial Bias in the Age of Neuroimaging"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now available via SSRN authored by Alison Lynch and Michael L. Perlin.  Here is its abstract:

Criminology research has devoted significant attention to individuals diagnosed either with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) or psychopathy.  While in the past, the two terms were used somewhat interchangeably, researchers today are starting to see that the two terms in fact represent two very different personality types and offending patterns.  In this article, we examine this development from a legal perspective, considering what this might mean in terms of punishment for these two personality types based on the different characteristics they display in their actual offenses and their responses to punishment and rehabilitation.  Specifically, we will focus on how the use of these terms has a disproportionate negative impact on persons of color.

Current research estimates that one in five violent offenders can be classified as a psychopath, a term fraught with controversy and excluded from the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM V).  However, this category of offenders presents dramatically different characteristics than individuals with antisocial personality disorder, which is often incorrectly conflated with psychopathy.  Emerging research using neuroimaging is demonstrating that the brain of a psychopath responds differently to punishment than the brains of other non-psychopathic criminal offenders.  As research continues, it is critical for criminologists, attorneys and judges to begin thinking about whether brain science should affect our modern views of punishment, and whether individuals should be punished differently based on their diagnosis or neurophysiology.  This is not a topic that has been the subject of substantial contemporaneous legal analysis, and we hope that this article invigorates the conversation.

In this article, we first present some background on the controversy of "psychopathy" diagnosis, sharing in this context what we call the “inside baseball” about the debate — on the differences between psychopathy and ASPD — that has rocked the psychology academy.  We focus next on how the instruments that are used to assess these conditions are subject to significant racial bias.  We then unpack these issues through a lens of therapeutic jurisprudence, a school of thought that considers the extent to which the legal system can be a therapeutic agent.  We will also analyze how our current ideas about punishment and recidivism could change, using psychopathy research as a case study. Finally, we will consider how this new research creates extra responsibilities for both lawyers and expert witnesses in their representation of criminal defendants in such cases.

December 24, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, December 19, 2020

Ohio Supreme Court strikes down "anti-procreation community-control condition" for man convicted for failing to pay child support to mothers of his 11 children

The Ohio Supreme Court yesterday rendered an interesting decision, by a 6-1 vote, striking down an interesting community control condition in Ohio v. Chapman, No. 2020-Ohio-6730 (Ohio Dec. 18, 2020) (available here). Here is the start and key concluding paragraphs from the majority opinion:

A man was convicted for failing to pay child support to the mothers of his 11 children and sentenced to community control.  One of the conditions of community control imposed by the court was that the man “make all reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating a woman” during his sentence.  The question before us is whether that condition was appropriate.  We conclude that it was not....

Chapman’s failure to properly prioritize his obligations toward his children and pay support as he is able could prompt several conditions of community-control sanctions that would reasonably relate to his offense.  The trial court properly ordered Chapman to obtain and maintain full-time employment.  It could have gone further in this direction: it might have ordered him to participate in job training, placed him in a program that would ensure that he was working and that child support was being deducted from his paycheck, required that he undergo education in financial planning and management, or placed restrictions on his spending.  All of these would be reasonably related to Chapman’s crime of nonpayment of child support.  But as long as the crime of nonsupport depends on an offender’s ability to pay, a prohibition requiring Chapman to “make reasonable measures” to avoid fathering another child during his term of community control is not.

The lack of a fit between the offense of which Chapman was convicted and the availability of other more effective conditions leads to the conclusion that the condition “unnecessarily impinge[d] upon the probationer’s liberty.”  Jones at 52.  On remand, the trial court must remove the anti-procreation condition, but may impose other conditions that are appropriately tailored to the goals of community control.

Justice French was the lone dissenter, and her opinion concluded with these points:

In Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, at ¶ 20-21, this court concluded that an anti-procreation community-control condition was overly broad because it did not contain a mechanism for lifting the condition.  But here, the trial court required only that Chapman make reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating another woman during his five-year community-control period.  The trial court then outlined a minimum of 12 ways by which Chapman could have the condition lifted.  This is not a case in which the trial court decided to impose an anti-procreation community-control condition for minor instances of failure to pay child support.  Chapman currently has at least 11 children that he is not supporting, and his child-support arrearage at the time of his 2018 resentencing was already over $200,000.  The trial court found that Chapman’s violations of his prior child-support obligations were “egregious and systemic.”  Under these facts, its anti-procreation condition is not overly broad.

December 19, 2020 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, December 12, 2020

"Institutionalizing inequality in the courts: Decomposing racial and ethnic disparities in detention, conviction, and sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this recent article published in the latest issue of Criminology authored by Marisa Omori and Nick Petersen.  Here is its abstract:

A significant body of literature has examined racial and ethnic inequalities in sentencing, focusing on how individual court actors make decisions, but fewer scholars have examined whether disparities are institutionalized through legal case factors.  After finding racial and ethnic inequalities in pretrial detention, conviction, and incarceration based on 4 years of felony court data (N = 83,924) from Miami‐Dade County, we estimate nonlinear decomposition models to examine how much of the inequalities are explained by differences in criminal history, charging, and for conviction and incarceration, pretrial detention.

Results suggest that inequality is greatest between White non‐Latinos and Black Latinos, followed by White non‐Latinos and Black non‐Latinos, ranging from 4 to more than 8 percentage points difference in the probability of pretrial detention, 7–13 points difference in conviction, 5–6 points in prison, and 4–10 points difference in jail.  We find few differences between White non‐Latinos and White Latinos.  Between half and three‐quarters of the inequality in pretrial detention, conviction, and prison sentences between White non‐Latino and Black people is explained through legal case factors.  Our findings indicate that inequality is, in part, institutionalized through legal case factors, suggesting these factors are not “race neutral” but instead racialized and contribute to inequalities in court outcomes.

December 12, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 10, 2020

US completes execution of Brendan Bernard despite high-profile appeals for relief

As reported in this AP piece, the "Trump administration on Thursday carried out its ninth federal execution of the year and the first during a presidential lame-duck period in 130 years, putting to death a Texas street-gang member for his role in the slayings of a religious couple from Iowa more than two decades ago."  Here is more:

Four more federal executions, including one Friday, are planned in the weeks before President-elect Joe Biden’s inauguration.

The case of Brendan Bernard, who received a lethal injection of phenobarbital inside a death chamber at a U.S. prison in Terre Haute, Indiana, was a rare execution of a person who was in his teens when his crime was committed.

Several high-profile figures, including reality TV star Kim Kardashian West, had appealed to President Donald Trump to commute Bernard’s sentence to life in prison.

With witnesses looking on from behind a glass barrier, the 40-year-old Bernard was pronounced dead at 9:27 p.m. Eastern time.

Bernard was 18 when he and four other teenagers abducted and robbed Todd and Stacie Bagley on their way from a Sunday service in Killeen, Texas. Federal executions were resumed by Trump in July after a 17-year hiatus despite coronavirus outbreak in U.S. prisons....

[J]ust before the execution was scheduled, Bernard’s lawyers filed papers with the Supreme Court seeking to halt the execution. The legal team expanded to include two very high-profile attorneys: Alan Dershowitz, the retired Harvard law professor who was part of Donald Trump’s impeachment defense team and whose clients have included O.J. Simpson, Claus von Bulow and Mike Tyson; and Ken Starr, who also defended Trump during the impeachment and is most famous as an independent counsel who led the investigation into Bill Clinton.

But about two and a half hours after the execution was scheduled, the Supreme Court denied the request, clearing the way for the execution to proceed.

The Supreme Court's denial of Benard's application for a stay of execution and cert petition is available at this link. The vote was 6-3, with Justice Sotomayor writing the only full dissent. That dissent starts this way:

Today, the Court allows the Federal Government to execute Brandon Bernard, despite Bernard’s troubling allegations that the Government secured his death sentence by withholding exculpatory evidence and knowingly eliciting false testimony against him.  Bernard has never had the opportunity to test the merits of those claims in court.  Now he never will. I would grant Bernard’s petition for a writ of certiorari and application for a stay to ensure his claims are given proper consideration before he is put to death.

December 10, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Monday, December 07, 2020

"Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Kate Levine and now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

This Article makes two contributions to the fields of policing and criminal legal scholarship.  First, it sounds a cautionary note about the use of individual prosecutions to remedy police brutality.  It argues that the calls for ways to ease the path to more police prosecutions from legal scholars, reformers, and advocates who, at the same time, advocate for a dramatic reduction of the criminal legal system’s footprint, are deeply problematic.  It shows that police prosecutions legitimate the criminal legal system while at the same time replaying the racism and ineffectiveness that have been shown to pervade our prison-backed criminal machinery.

The Article looks at three recent trials and convictions of police officers of color, Peter Liang, Mohammed Noor, and Nouman Raja, in order to underscore the argument that the criminal legal system’s race problems are playing themselves out predictably against police officers.  The Article argues that we should take the recent swell of prison abolitionist scholarship to heart when we look at police prosecutions and adds to that literature by exploring this controversial set of defendants that are considered a third rail, even among most abolitionists.

Second, the Article argues that police prosecutions hamper large-scale changes to policing.  By allowing law enforcement to claim that brutality is an aberration, solvable through use of the very system that encourages brutality in the first place, we re-inscribe the failures of policing and ignore the everyday systemic and destructive violence perpetrated by police on communities of color.  In order to achieve racial justice and real police reform, we must reduce our reliance on the police, rather than looking to the criminal legal system to solve this crisis.

December 7, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, December 04, 2020

"Unpunishable Criminals"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Mihailis Diamantis now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Criminal law strives to do justice. It aims to give wrongdoers the punishment they deserve and the punishment that will. But sometimes justice is out of reach.  Many criminals will never face punishment because circumstance or the law itself immunizes them from sanction.

This Article is the first to conceptualize the large and varied set of what it calls “unpunishable criminals.”  They include recipients of presidential pardons, deceased criminals, diplomats, fugitives, and those whose crimes occurred long ago, among several others.  Does criminal law’s inability to punish these criminals mean that it must wash its hands of them and their victims entirely?

Presently, the answer seems to be “yes.”  But this Article argues that criminal law can do better—it should permit the prosecution of unpunishable criminals.  Trial is an independent source of value. It uncovers truth, allows victims to tell their own stories, and condemns wrongdoing.  With appropriate procedural safeguards, prosecution can advance these values even when punishment cannot follow.

December 4, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, November 19, 2020

"'Some Mother's Child Has Gone Astray': Neuroscientific Approaches to a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model of Juvenile Sentencing"

the title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Michael Perlin and Alison Lynch now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

There is a robust body of evidence that tells us that the juvenile brain is not fully developed by age 18, and this evidence should and does raise important questions about the sentencing of juveniles in criminal cases.  This evidence, though, must be considered in the context of public opinion (about certain juvenile crimes that have been subject to saturation publicity) in the context of judges’ decisionmaking (where such judges do not want to be perceived as “soft on crime”).  The conflict between what we now know and what (false) “ordinary common sense” demands (in the way of enhanced punishments) flies squarely in the face of therapeutic jurisprudence precepts.  If the legal process is to seek to maximize psychological well-being and if it is to coincide with an “ethic of care,” then, it is necessary for those involved in the criminal justice system to speak publicly about this topic, and to “call out” those — be they elected politicians, editorial writers and commentators in the conservative media, or judges — who urge retributive and punitive sentences for adolescents and children.

In this paper, we will first give a brief overview about the current neuroscientific findings about juvenile brain development in the context of criminal behavior, and then discuss the current sentencing standards and regulations that are in place.  Then, we will discuss the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence as a framework for advocating for juvenile clients, in order to maximize and preserve their psychological well-being and to mitigate trauma.  Finally, we will offer recommendations for how experts can work with attorneys who are presenting sentencing arguments, in order to make the most comprehensive, scientifically persuasive case for leniency in juvenile sentencing.

November 19, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, November 18, 2020

Seventh Circuit panel reverses below-guideline 16-year prison sentence as substantively unreasonable in terrorism case

Regular readers know I do not blog much about federal sentence reasonableness review these days because there is usually not that much worth blogging about.  Out of many thousands of appeals brought by federal defendants each year, typically only a few hundred are successful, and these are usually involve miscalculation of the guideline range.  The government rarely appeals, though it does often have a better success rate in the few dozen appeals it brings each year. 

In one particular (and rare) categories of cases, namely terrorism cases, the government has a particularly notable history of appellate success when arguing a sentence in unreasonably lenient (see posts linked below for some historical examples).  A helpful reader made sure I did not miss a new Seventh Circuit panel ruling handed down yesterday in this category: US v. Daoud, No. 19-2174 (7th Cir. Nov. 17, 2020) (available here).  Federal sentencing fans will want to review this 26-page opinion in detail, but the start and few passages from the body of the opinion provides the basics:

Adel Daoud pressed the button to detonate a bomb that would have killed hundreds of innocent people in the name of Islam.  Fortunately, the bomb was fake, and the FBI arrested him on the spot.  Two months later, while in pretrial custody, Daoud solicited the murder of the FBI agent who supplied the fake bomb.  Two and a half years later, while awaiting trial on the first two charges, Daoud tried to stab another inmate to death using makeshift weapons after the inmate drew a picture of the Prophet Muhammad.  Daoud eventually entered an Alford plea, and the cases were consolidated for sentencing.  The district court sentenced Daoud to a combined total of 16 years’ imprisonment for the crimes.  The government appeals that sentence on the ground that it was substantively unreasonable.  We agree.  We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing....

[W]hile the district court paid lip service to the seriousness of the offenses, it undercut its own statements by unreasonably downplaying Daoud’s role in each offense.  District courts have broad discretion as to how to weigh the § 3553(a) factors, but a district court’s sentence must reflect a reasonable view of the facts and a reasonable weighing of the § 3553(a) factors....  Here, the district court sterilized Daoud’s offense conduct in ways that cannot be reconciled with the objective facts of these violent offenses.  That unreasonable view of the facts prevented the district court from properly weighing the seriousness of the offenses when selecting its sentence....

In the district court’s telling, Daoud’s age, mental health, and general awkwardness and impressionability converged to render him uniquely susceptible to criminal influence. A sentencing court is well within its rights to consider a defendant’s mental limitations in mitigation.... But that factor only goes so far in this case.  Daoud committed the attempted bombing around his 19th birthday.  He was 19 when he solicited the FBI agent’s murder and 21 when he tried to stab a fellow inmate to death.  In other words, he was college aged at all relevant times.  He may have been immature, but, as the court recognized, he was old enough to know what he was doing.

Prior posts on similar reasonableness ruling:

November 18, 2020 in Booker in the Circuits, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, November 13, 2020

"Redeeming Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now available via SSRN authored by Rachel Lopez, Terrell Carter and Kempis Songster.  Here is its abstract:

Approximately three decades ago, two co-authors of this Article were sentenced to die in prison.  According to the United States Supreme Court, this sentence represented a determination that they were irredeemable.  This article will interrogate the legal determination that there are some human beings who are incapable of redemption.  In doing so, the article grapples with a basic, yet weighty question.  Specifically, it examines whether, as a matter of law, the capacity for change is so core to the human condition that all people have an inalienable right to pursue personal redemption. It also documents the dehumanizing effect of codified condemnation and the struggle for humanity in the face of a legal system that has said: you are not worthy.

Drawing from human rights law and the lived experience of the co-authors, this Article argues that the capacity for redemption is an innate human characteristic, fundamentally intertwined with the legal concept of human dignity.  Taking a pragmatic approach to human rights jurisprudence, it will contend that all humans have a right to redemption and that this right is embedded in the Eighth Amendment through the latent concept of human dignity.

Such a reading of the Eighth Amendment would require a dramatic re-imagination of our criminal legal system.  One that elevates humanity, not deprives it.  One that creates opportunities for healing and human development, not denies it.  As a starting point, it will require that the law never make impermeable decisions about the human capacity for redemption.  Rather, the law should restore hope that change is always possible.

November 13, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, November 11, 2020

Eager to honor our veterans caught up in our nation's massive criminal justice systems

5fa97d96f3264.imageEvery year when Veterans Day rolls around, I find myself giving a lot more thought to all the veterans who get caught up in our criminal justice systems.  I often see exhortations to honor "all who served" on this important day, and that necessarily means we need to be sure to honor the disconcerting large number of veterans who spend this day behind bars, or under active criminal justice supervision, or struggling with the enduring burdens of a criminal record.

According to these latest (but dated) BJS statistics, "in 2011–12, an estimated 181,500 veterans (8% of all inmates in state and federal prison and local jail excluding military-operated facilities) were serving time in correctional facilities."  Even if the present-day percentage had shrunk considerably, we can still state without any question that there are tens of thousands of veterans spending Veterans Day behind bars today.

And though I cannot find any detailed data on veteran status and probation/parole rate, even if veterans were only 5% of all persons on probation/parole in the US, that would still means that there are hundreds of thousands of veterans currently spending Veteran's Day subject to active community supervision today.

And though I cannot find any detailed data on veteran status and criminal convictions, even if veterans were only 5% of all persons with a criminal record in the US, that would still means that there are millions of veterans currently burdened with a criminal record on Veterans Day 202.

As highlighted in some posts below, I have often used this day to urge the President of the United States to use his clemency pen to honor this day with some grants to veterans.  But, of course, the vast majority of veterans involved in our nation's criminal justice systems are caught up in a state system.  So, those of us eager to really honor all who served ought to be advocating that all chief executives play their part in doing something meaningful for a population that has done something meaningful for all of us.

Some older (some very older) prior related posts: 

November 11, 2020 in Data on sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

DPIC conducting webinar series on veterans and the death penalty

As detailed here via the Death Penalty Information Center's website, the "Death Penalty Information Center is partnering with the Veteran Advocacy Project to present a six-part webinar series on Veterans and the Death Penalty." Here is more information and links on the topic:

The Death Penalty Information Center is partnering with the Veteran Advocacy Project to present a six-part webinar series on Veterans and the Death Penalty.  The webinars, which are co-sponsored by Advancing Real Change, Inc. and Witness to Innocence, will address a broad range of serious issues that have made veterans disproportionately vulnerable to capital prosecution. The series opens Monday, November 9, the week the nation commemorates Veterans Day 2020, with a session on Veterans on Death Row....

The series opens November 9 with an overview of the issues by Veteran Advocacy Project Criminal Programs Director, Art Cody, DPIC Executive Director Robert Dunham, and former DPIC Executive Director and Battle Scars author Richard Dieter. This is followed by panels on Special Issues in Investigating and Presenting Veterans’ Mitigation (Nov. 12); Capital Punishment Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Nov. 13); Mental Health Issues in Veterans’ Capital Cases (Nov. 17), and Veterans, Race, and the Death Penalty (Nov. 18). It concludes on November 19, with a session on Wrongful Capital Convictions of Military Veterans, in which veterans Kirk Bloodsworth, Ray Krone, and Ron Wright tell the stories of their cases and how they were wrongfully sent to death row in the country that they had served.

November 11, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, November 03, 2020

Sentencing reform ballot initiative in Oklahoma, SQ 805, appears likely to lose badly

I have been following closely, as highlighted by prior posted noted below, the interesting ballot initiative in Oklahoma seeking to limit the impact of nonviolent criminal history on sentencing outcomes.  Notably, back in 2016, Oklahoma voters approved a ballot initiative downgrading drug possession and a slate of minor property crimes from felonies to misdemeanors.  So state voters have a history of backing sentencing reform via ballot initiative.  But it seems that SQ 805 did not garner comparable support from Sooner voters.

Specifically, as of 10:15pm EST as reported here, there are over 88% of precincts reporting, and the NO vote has nearly 61% while the YES votes is just over 39%.  So it looks like this ballot initiative will not just lose, but lose by a sufficiently large margin that it might discourage other related reform efforts in the near future.

Prior related posts:

November 3, 2020 in Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Offender Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Listening to today's SCOTUS oral argument in two big sentencing cases

The year 2020 has been remarkable for so many reasons, and this morning it means for me a focus on the Supreme Court rather than on voting on this historic 2020 Election Day.  This is because I already voted early (about two weeks ago, in fact), and COVID realities mean that oral arguments are now available in real time.  And because SCOTUS this morning just happens to be hearing its two biggest sentencing cases on the docket, I plan to listen in live.  Here are the basics thanks to SCOTUSblog with links to where all can listen:

Jones v. Mississippi, 18-1259 

Issue: Whether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole.

 LISTEN to Jones HERE

 

Borden v. United States, 19-5410

Issue: Whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with a mens rea of mere recklessness.

LISTEN to Borden HERE

November 3, 2020 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)