Friday, January 15, 2021

Feds complete yet another late-night execution of convicted killer of seven from Virginia

As reported in this CNN piece, headlined "Federal government executes Corey Johnson following prolonged legal fight," the latest federal execution followed, yet again, what has become the standard litigation script with the Supreme Court ultimately rejecting all final arguments for a delay.  Here are some of the details: 

Corey Johnson was executed by lethal injection at the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana, and was pronounced dead at 11:34 p.m. ET on Thursday.

Johnson was sentenced to die after he was convicted of killing seven people in 1992 as a part of the drug trade in Virginia.  The weeks preceding his execution were defined by a tense legal battle after he contracted Covid-19 while on death row.

In his final statement, Johnson apologized for his crimes and told the families of the victims that he hoped they would find peace. He also thanked the staff at the prison, the prison's chaplain, his minister and his legal team....

The Supreme Court denied a last-ditch effort late Thursday by Johnson's legal team that leaned on claims of an intellectual disability and his Covid-19 diagnosis, arguing that his infection paired with a lethal injection would amount to a cruel and unusual punishment.  That appeal came after an appellate court on Wednesday tossed out a lower court's decision to stay the executions of Johnson and another death row inmate who contracted the virus, Dustin Higgs, whose execution is scheduled to take place Friday....

Johnson was found guilty of seven counts of capital murder in 1993, with the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia jury unanimously recommending seven death sentences.

Thursday's execution, six days before President-elect Joe Biden takes office, coincides with a new push from more than three dozen members of Congress for Biden's incoming administration to prioritize abolishing the death penalty in all jurisdictions.  While Biden has pledged to abolish the federal death penalty and to give incentives to states to stop seeking death sentences as a part of his criminal justice plan, 40 members of Congress want to make sure the practice ends on his first day in office.

January 15, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, January 12, 2021

Split Third Circuit panel declares that planned safe injection site would be in violation of federal law

As noted in this post from 15 months ago, a federal district judge ruled a Philadelphia nonprofit group's plan to open a sef injection site would not violate the Controlled Substances Act. But, as reported in this local press piece, headlined "A federal court rejected the plan for a supervised injection site in Philly," a Third Circuit panel has now reversed this ruling. Here is the start of the majority opinion in US v. Safehouse, No. 20-1422 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2021) (available here):

Though the opioid crisis may call for innovative solutions, local innovations may not break federal law.  Drug users die every day of overdoses.  So Safehouse, a nonprofit, wants to open America’s first safe-injection site in Philadelphia.  It favors a public-health response to drug addiction, with medical staff trained to observe drug use, counteract overdoses, and offer treatment.  Its motives are admirable. But Congress has made it a crime to open a property to others to use drugs.  21 U.S.C. §856.  And that is what Safehouse will do.

Because Safehouse knows and intends that its visitors will come with a significant purpose of doing drugs, its safeinjection site will break the law.  Although Congress passed §856 to shut down crack houses, its words reach well beyond them. Safehouse’s benevolent motive makes no difference.  And even though this drug use will happen locally and Safehouse will welcome visitors for free, its safe-injection site falls within Congress’s power to ban interstate commerce in drugs.

Safehouse admirably seeks to save lives.  And many Americans think that federal drug laws should move away from law enforcement toward harm reduction.  But courts are not arbiters of policy. We must apply the laws as written.  If the laws are unwise, Safehouse and its supporters can lobby Congress to 11 carve out an exception.  Because we cannot do that, we will reverse and remand.

The dissenting opinion authored by Judge Roth starts this way:

The Majority’s decision is sui generis: It concludes that 8 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) — unlike § 856(a)(1) or any other federal criminal statute — criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct, based solely on the “purpose” of a third party who is neither named nor described in the statute.  The text of section 856(a)(2) cannot support this novel construction.  Moreover, even if Safehouse’s “purpose” were the relevant standard, Safehouse does not have the requisite purpose.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

It will be interesting to see if Safehouse seeks en banc review and/or certiorari.  It will also be interesting to see if the Justice Department under the Biden Administration might have a different view on safe injections sites than the Trump Administration.

January 12, 2021 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, January 08, 2021

"Thirteen Charged in Federal Court Following Riot at the United States Capitol; Approximately 40 charged in Superior Court"

The title of this post is the heading of this new DOJ press release.  Here are excerpts:

Thirteen individuals have been charged so far in federal court in the District of Columbia related to crimes committed at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C, on Wednesday, Jan. 6, 2021. In addition to those who have been charged, additional complaints have been submitted and investigations are ongoing.

“The lawless destruction of the U.S. Capitol building was an attack against one of our Nation’s greatest institutions,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Michael Sherwin. “My Office, along with our law enforcement partners at all levels, have been expeditiously working and leveraging every resource to identify, arrest, and begin prosecuting these individuals who took part in the brazen criminal acts at the U.S. Capitol. We are resolute in our commitment to holding accountable anyone responsible for these disgraceful criminal acts, and to anyone who might be considering engaging in or inciting violence in the coming weeks – know this: you will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.”

“ATF is committed to the rule of law and the protection of all citizens’ Constitutional rights,” said Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Deputy Director Regina Lombardo. “We continue to support our law enforcement partners to ensure those who violated the law during the events at the Capitol this week are brought to justice. ATF has dedicated all appropriate resources to complete these investigations as soon as possible.”

“Today’s charges are just the beginning of the FBI’s ongoing efforts to hold those responsible for the criminal acts of violence and destruction that unfolded during the U.S. Capitol building breach on January 6th,” said FBI Director Christopher Wray. “To be clear, what took place that day was not First Amendment-protected activity, but rather an affront on our democracy. The FBI, along with our local, state and federal partners, is committed to ensuring that justice is served. We will continue to aggressively investigate each and every individual who chose to ignore the law and instead incite violence, destroy property, and injure others."...

In addition, approximately 40 individuals have been arrested and charged in Superior Court with offenses including, but not limited to, unlawful entry, curfew violations, and firearms-related crimes.

I have left out the lengthy details of all the charges for the 13 defendants listed in the release, but there is a bit of diversity as to the charges facing some of the particular defendants.  And the press release also includes links to the criminal complaints and statements of facts for these 13 defendants.  The main charge is often "knowingly entering or remaining in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority" under 18 U.S.C. § 1752, and that seems to carry a max sentence of one year imprisonment, though that max goes up to 10 years if the offender had a weapon or "the offense results in significant bodily injury."

January 8, 2021 in Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, December 23, 2020

"Versari Crimes"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Stephen Garvey available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The versari doctrine alleges that if a person commits a crime, he or she is strictly liable for all the resulting consequences.  This doctrine, which goes back to canon law, doesn't get much attention these days from criminal law theorists.  But it probably should.  A fair case can be made that the doctrine underwrites the felony murder rule, the misdemeanor manslaughter rule, the legal wrong doctrine, constructive malice, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and the Pinkerton doctrine.  Those doctrines don't have many friends in the academy today, although they endure in positive law despite all the academic criticism.  Because they endure, criminal-law theorists should perhaps pay more attention to the versari doctrine.  Perhaps they should try to understand what the doctrine says and why it seems to have some intuitive appeal to some people, despite not having much intuitive appeal to those inside the academy.  The paper, written for a conference ASU sponsored on mens rea and criminal justice reform, is an effort to better understand the versari doctrine

December 23, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, December 19, 2020

Ohio Supreme Court strikes down "anti-procreation community-control condition" for man convicted for failing to pay child support to mothers of his 11 children

The Ohio Supreme Court yesterday rendered an interesting decision, by a 6-1 vote, striking down an interesting community control condition in Ohio v. Chapman, No. 2020-Ohio-6730 (Ohio Dec. 18, 2020) (available here). Here is the start and key concluding paragraphs from the majority opinion:

A man was convicted for failing to pay child support to the mothers of his 11 children and sentenced to community control.  One of the conditions of community control imposed by the court was that the man “make all reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating a woman” during his sentence.  The question before us is whether that condition was appropriate.  We conclude that it was not....

Chapman’s failure to properly prioritize his obligations toward his children and pay support as he is able could prompt several conditions of community-control sanctions that would reasonably relate to his offense.  The trial court properly ordered Chapman to obtain and maintain full-time employment.  It could have gone further in this direction: it might have ordered him to participate in job training, placed him in a program that would ensure that he was working and that child support was being deducted from his paycheck, required that he undergo education in financial planning and management, or placed restrictions on his spending.  All of these would be reasonably related to Chapman’s crime of nonpayment of child support.  But as long as the crime of nonsupport depends on an offender’s ability to pay, a prohibition requiring Chapman to “make reasonable measures” to avoid fathering another child during his term of community control is not.

The lack of a fit between the offense of which Chapman was convicted and the availability of other more effective conditions leads to the conclusion that the condition “unnecessarily impinge[d] upon the probationer’s liberty.”  Jones at 52.  On remand, the trial court must remove the anti-procreation condition, but may impose other conditions that are appropriately tailored to the goals of community control.

Justice French was the lone dissenter, and her opinion concluded with these points:

In Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, at ¶ 20-21, this court concluded that an anti-procreation community-control condition was overly broad because it did not contain a mechanism for lifting the condition.  But here, the trial court required only that Chapman make reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating another woman during his five-year community-control period.  The trial court then outlined a minimum of 12 ways by which Chapman could have the condition lifted.  This is not a case in which the trial court decided to impose an anti-procreation community-control condition for minor instances of failure to pay child support.  Chapman currently has at least 11 children that he is not supporting, and his child-support arrearage at the time of his 2018 resentencing was already over $200,000.  The trial court found that Chapman’s violations of his prior child-support obligations were “egregious and systemic.”  Under these facts, its anti-procreation condition is not overly broad.

December 19, 2020 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, December 18, 2020

"How States Transformed Criminal Justice in 2020, and How They Fell Short"

The title of this post is the title of this big retrospective put together masterfully by Daniel Nichanian at The Appeal: Political Report.  I highly recommend review of the whole piece, so that you can fully understand its subhealine: "This year of crises, revisited. Nearly 90 state-level bills and initiatives. 17 themes. 7 maps." And here is the lengthy piece's preamble to the issue-by-issue review of reforms:

Throughout 2020’s unprecedented challenges, criminal justice reform advocates called for sweeping changes.  But state officials and legislatures largely ducked the COVID-19 pandemic that is raging inside prisons and jails, and the protests against police brutality and racial justice that followed Breonna Taylor and George Floyd’s murders.  With some exceptions, they forgoed the sort of reforms that would have significantly emptied prisons amid the public health crisis or confronted police brutality and racial injustice in law enforcement.

Still, on other issues there was headway, and states — whose laws and policies control a lot about incarceration and criminal legal systems—set new milestones: They decriminalized drug possession, expanded and automated expungement availability, repealed life without parole for minors and the death penalty, and ended prison gerrymandering, among other measures.

Throughout the year, The Appeal: Political Report tracked bills, initiatives, and reforms relevant to mass incarceration.  Just as in 2019, here’s a review of major changes states adopted in 2020.

Jump to the sections on: the death penaltydrug policyearly release and paroleyouth justicepolicingfines and feespretrial detentiontrials and sentencingvoting rightsexpungement and re-entryprison gerrymandering — and then there’s more.

December 18, 2020 in Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Bipartisan drug sentencing reform in Ohio thwarted by opposition from prosecutors (and former prosecutors)

As well reported in this local article, headlined "Ohio lawmakers pass one criminal justice measure, but a second, broader bill appears to be dead," a long-running effort to reform drug sentencing in Ohio failed to get completely to the finish line in the state General Assembly.  Here are the details:

The Ohio Senate passed a bill Thursday evening that urges more drug treatment and makes it easier for people to have their criminal records sealed.

But a broader criminal justice reform measure that reclassifies many smaller-level drug possession felonies to misdemeanors and requires addicts get treatment looks like it will die in these final days of the 133rd Ohio General Assembly....

“Barring a miracle, I believe it’s dead,” said the Buckeye Institute’s Greg Lawson. “Everything I’ve heard is it’s not coming to the floor.”

A large coalition that includes dozens of organizations across the ideological spectrum — from the conservative Buckeye Institute and the Ohio chapter of Americans for Prosperity to the progressive American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio and Faith in Public Life — was pushing for both bills to pass. Advocates are disappointed that SB 3 appears to have failed....

SB 3 had powerful detractors in prosecutors and judges — including Ohio Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor — who felt the bill would strip judges of discretion, would neutralize the tools that drug courts can use to nudge people through rehabilitation, and would remove an incentive to overcome addiction if there was no threat of a felony conviction.

Gov. Mike DeWine, a former Ohio attorney general and county prosecutor, has said he opposed the bill.

What that ignores, argued Micah Derry, AFP Ohio director, is that felonies follow people for the rest of their lives, even when someone does recover from addiction.  These days, with the power of data mining on the Internet, sealing a record may not shut the books on one’s past.  Many companies that specialize in employment background checks can still find past crimes, thanks to capturing and saving data over time.  “There’s not a single county prosecutor who is a person of color,” Derry said. “Not to get too racial about it, but there’s a reason why people of color have the books thrown at them more than other people.”

Earlier on Thursday, Harm Reduction Ohio, the largest distributor of naloxone in the state, reported drug overdose deaths were high in 2020, with many counties reporting records for the year — especially in Central Ohio and the Appalachian part of the state.  Final data for the year isn’t expected until mid-2021 from the Ohio Department of Health.

The crux of SB 3, mandatory treatment for addicts and reclassification of many felonies to misdemeanors, will unlikely be resurrected next year, said ACLU of Ohio’s Chief Lobbyist Gary Daniels. DeWine will still be in office.  So will Ohio House Speaker Bob Cupp, a former Ohio Supreme Court justice who hasn’t brought it to a floor vote.

Especially because I know many folks who have worked so very hard for years to advance SB3, it is really disappointing that House Speaker Cupp (a former local prosecutor) would not allow a floor vote even after the bll earned committee approval.  I sense that SB3 would have passed in the Ohio House if given a floor vote, and I suspect Gov DeWine (a former local prosecutor) might have ultimately been convinced to sign the bill or allow it to become law.  Especially because House Speaker Cupp perviously served on the Ohio Supreme Court, I wonder if the consistent SB3 opposition of Chief Justice O'Conner (a former local prosecutor) contributed to his unwillingness to even allow this bill to get a vote.

Among other stories, this sad legislative tale serves as yet another reminder of how hard it will be to even slightly revamp the war on drugs no matter how clear its failures are (as well documented by Harm Reduction Ohio).  SB3 did not decriminalize anything (and I believe it increased sentences for hgh-level trafficking); the bill simply sought to reclassify the lowest level drug-possession offenses from felonies to misdemeanors.  But after two years of very hard work by effective advocates on both sides of the aisle, prosecutors and former prosecutors were able to keep this modest reform from even getting a full and fair vote in the Ohio General Assembly.  Sigh.

December 18, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, December 12, 2020

"Institutionalizing inequality in the courts: Decomposing racial and ethnic disparities in detention, conviction, and sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this recent article published in the latest issue of Criminology authored by Marisa Omori and Nick Petersen.  Here is its abstract:

A significant body of literature has examined racial and ethnic inequalities in sentencing, focusing on how individual court actors make decisions, but fewer scholars have examined whether disparities are institutionalized through legal case factors.  After finding racial and ethnic inequalities in pretrial detention, conviction, and incarceration based on 4 years of felony court data (N = 83,924) from Miami‐Dade County, we estimate nonlinear decomposition models to examine how much of the inequalities are explained by differences in criminal history, charging, and for conviction and incarceration, pretrial detention.

Results suggest that inequality is greatest between White non‐Latinos and Black Latinos, followed by White non‐Latinos and Black non‐Latinos, ranging from 4 to more than 8 percentage points difference in the probability of pretrial detention, 7–13 points difference in conviction, 5–6 points in prison, and 4–10 points difference in jail.  We find few differences between White non‐Latinos and White Latinos.  Between half and three‐quarters of the inequality in pretrial detention, conviction, and prison sentences between White non‐Latino and Black people is explained through legal case factors.  Our findings indicate that inequality is, in part, institutionalized through legal case factors, suggesting these factors are not “race neutral” but instead racialized and contribute to inequalities in court outcomes.

December 12, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 10, 2020

US completes execution of Brendan Bernard despite high-profile appeals for relief

As reported in this AP piece, the "Trump administration on Thursday carried out its ninth federal execution of the year and the first during a presidential lame-duck period in 130 years, putting to death a Texas street-gang member for his role in the slayings of a religious couple from Iowa more than two decades ago."  Here is more:

Four more federal executions, including one Friday, are planned in the weeks before President-elect Joe Biden’s inauguration.

The case of Brendan Bernard, who received a lethal injection of phenobarbital inside a death chamber at a U.S. prison in Terre Haute, Indiana, was a rare execution of a person who was in his teens when his crime was committed.

Several high-profile figures, including reality TV star Kim Kardashian West, had appealed to President Donald Trump to commute Bernard’s sentence to life in prison.

With witnesses looking on from behind a glass barrier, the 40-year-old Bernard was pronounced dead at 9:27 p.m. Eastern time.

Bernard was 18 when he and four other teenagers abducted and robbed Todd and Stacie Bagley on their way from a Sunday service in Killeen, Texas. Federal executions were resumed by Trump in July after a 17-year hiatus despite coronavirus outbreak in U.S. prisons....

[J]ust before the execution was scheduled, Bernard’s lawyers filed papers with the Supreme Court seeking to halt the execution. The legal team expanded to include two very high-profile attorneys: Alan Dershowitz, the retired Harvard law professor who was part of Donald Trump’s impeachment defense team and whose clients have included O.J. Simpson, Claus von Bulow and Mike Tyson; and Ken Starr, who also defended Trump during the impeachment and is most famous as an independent counsel who led the investigation into Bill Clinton.

But about two and a half hours after the execution was scheduled, the Supreme Court denied the request, clearing the way for the execution to proceed.

The Supreme Court's denial of Benard's application for a stay of execution and cert petition is available at this link. The vote was 6-3, with Justice Sotomayor writing the only full dissent. That dissent starts this way:

Today, the Court allows the Federal Government to execute Brandon Bernard, despite Bernard’s troubling allegations that the Government secured his death sentence by withholding exculpatory evidence and knowingly eliciting false testimony against him.  Bernard has never had the opportunity to test the merits of those claims in court.  Now he never will. I would grant Bernard’s petition for a writ of certiorari and application for a stay to ensure his claims are given proper consideration before he is put to death.

December 10, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

SCOTUS unanimously rejects narrowed interpretation of UCMJ statute of limitation for rape

The Supreme Court this morning handed down a unanimous opinion opinion in US v. Briggs, No. 19-108 (S. Ct. Dec. 10, 2020) (available here), concerning the applicable statute of limitations in military rape prosecutions.  Here is how Justice Alito's opinion for the Court gets started:

We must decide in these cases whether, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a prosecution for a rape committed during the period from 1986 to 2006 had to be commenced within five years of the commission of the charged offense or whether such a prosecution could be brought at any time, as is the rule at present.  The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), reversing its prior decisions on this question, held that the statute of limitations was five years and that it therefore barred the rape convictions of respondents, three military service members.  See 78 M. J. 289 (2019); 78 M. J. 415 (2019); 79 M. J. 199 (2019).  We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ___ (2019), and now reverse.

The opinion that follows goes on to discuss Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the course of conclude that this jurisprudence should not impact interpretation of the statute of limitation at issue here. Here are some key passages:

In short, if we accepted the interpretation of Article 43(a) adopted by the CAAF and defended by respondents, we would have to conclude that this provision set out a statute of limitations that no one could have understood with any real confidence until important and novel legal questions [regarding the Eighth Amendment] were resolved by this Court. That is not the sort of limitations provision that Congress is likely to have chosen....

Viewing Article 43(a) in context, we are convinced that “punishable by death” is a term of art that is defined by the provisions of the UCMJ specifying the punishments for the offenses it outlaws. And under this interpretation, respondents’ prosecutions were timely.

December 10, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 07, 2020

"Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Kate Levine and now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

This Article makes two contributions to the fields of policing and criminal legal scholarship.  First, it sounds a cautionary note about the use of individual prosecutions to remedy police brutality.  It argues that the calls for ways to ease the path to more police prosecutions from legal scholars, reformers, and advocates who, at the same time, advocate for a dramatic reduction of the criminal legal system’s footprint, are deeply problematic.  It shows that police prosecutions legitimate the criminal legal system while at the same time replaying the racism and ineffectiveness that have been shown to pervade our prison-backed criminal machinery.

The Article looks at three recent trials and convictions of police officers of color, Peter Liang, Mohammed Noor, and Nouman Raja, in order to underscore the argument that the criminal legal system’s race problems are playing themselves out predictably against police officers.  The Article argues that we should take the recent swell of prison abolitionist scholarship to heart when we look at police prosecutions and adds to that literature by exploring this controversial set of defendants that are considered a third rail, even among most abolitionists.

Second, the Article argues that police prosecutions hamper large-scale changes to policing.  By allowing law enforcement to claim that brutality is an aberration, solvable through use of the very system that encourages brutality in the first place, we re-inscribe the failures of policing and ignore the everyday systemic and destructive violence perpetrated by police on communities of color.  In order to achieve racial justice and real police reform, we must reduce our reliance on the police, rather than looking to the criminal legal system to solve this crisis.

December 7, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, December 05, 2020

"Banishing ‘Sex Offenders': How Meaningless Language Makes Bad Law"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith.  Here is its abstract:

An essay on how the term "sex offender" is functionally meaningless, and invites policy responses that are out of step with the reality of sexual harm.  These policy responses, in turn, hobble our efforts to reckon with sexual harm, foreclose accountability and redemption, and elide more effective approaches.

December 5, 2020 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 30, 2020

Two criminal cases up for SCOTUS oral argument this week

A day before the calendar makes it official, the Supreme Court starts its December argument sitting this morning. Two cases being heard this week are interesting criminal matters, and here are the basics thanks to SCOTUSblog:

Van Buren v. United States (Nov. 30): Whether a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violates Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he accesses the same information for an improper purpose.

Case preview: Justices to consider breadth of federal computer fraud statute (Ronald Mann)

 

Edwards v. Vannoy (Dec. 2): Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury that applies in both federal and state courts, applies retroactively to cases that have already become final on direct review.

November 30, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, November 18, 2020

Seventh Circuit panel reverses below-guideline 16-year prison sentence as substantively unreasonable in terrorism case

Regular readers know I do not blog much about federal sentence reasonableness review these days because there is usually not that much worth blogging about.  Out of many thousands of appeals brought by federal defendants each year, typically only a few hundred are successful, and these are usually involve miscalculation of the guideline range.  The government rarely appeals, though it does often have a better success rate in the few dozen appeals it brings each year. 

In one particular (and rare) categories of cases, namely terrorism cases, the government has a particularly notable history of appellate success when arguing a sentence in unreasonably lenient (see posts linked below for some historical examples).  A helpful reader made sure I did not miss a new Seventh Circuit panel ruling handed down yesterday in this category: US v. Daoud, No. 19-2174 (7th Cir. Nov. 17, 2020) (available here).  Federal sentencing fans will want to review this 26-page opinion in detail, but the start and few passages from the body of the opinion provides the basics:

Adel Daoud pressed the button to detonate a bomb that would have killed hundreds of innocent people in the name of Islam.  Fortunately, the bomb was fake, and the FBI arrested him on the spot.  Two months later, while in pretrial custody, Daoud solicited the murder of the FBI agent who supplied the fake bomb.  Two and a half years later, while awaiting trial on the first two charges, Daoud tried to stab another inmate to death using makeshift weapons after the inmate drew a picture of the Prophet Muhammad.  Daoud eventually entered an Alford plea, and the cases were consolidated for sentencing.  The district court sentenced Daoud to a combined total of 16 years’ imprisonment for the crimes.  The government appeals that sentence on the ground that it was substantively unreasonable.  We agree.  We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing....

[W]hile the district court paid lip service to the seriousness of the offenses, it undercut its own statements by unreasonably downplaying Daoud’s role in each offense.  District courts have broad discretion as to how to weigh the § 3553(a) factors, but a district court’s sentence must reflect a reasonable view of the facts and a reasonable weighing of the § 3553(a) factors....  Here, the district court sterilized Daoud’s offense conduct in ways that cannot be reconciled with the objective facts of these violent offenses.  That unreasonable view of the facts prevented the district court from properly weighing the seriousness of the offenses when selecting its sentence....

In the district court’s telling, Daoud’s age, mental health, and general awkwardness and impressionability converged to render him uniquely susceptible to criminal influence. A sentencing court is well within its rights to consider a defendant’s mental limitations in mitigation.... But that factor only goes so far in this case.  Daoud committed the attempted bombing around his 19th birthday.  He was 19 when he solicited the FBI agent’s murder and 21 when he tried to stab a fellow inmate to death.  In other words, he was college aged at all relevant times.  He may have been immature, but, as the court recognized, he was old enough to know what he was doing.

Prior posts on similar reasonableness ruling:

November 18, 2020 in Booker in the Circuits, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, November 03, 2020

Listening to today's SCOTUS oral argument in two big sentencing cases

The year 2020 has been remarkable for so many reasons, and this morning it means for me a focus on the Supreme Court rather than on voting on this historic 2020 Election Day.  This is because I already voted early (about two weeks ago, in fact), and COVID realities mean that oral arguments are now available in real time.  And because SCOTUS this morning just happens to be hearing its two biggest sentencing cases on the docket, I plan to listen in live.  Here are the basics thanks to SCOTUSblog with links to where all can listen:

Jones v. Mississippi, 18-1259 

Issue: Whether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole.

 LISTEN to Jones HERE

 

Borden v. United States, 19-5410

Issue: Whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with a mens rea of mere recklessness.

LISTEN to Borden HERE

November 3, 2020 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, October 30, 2020

Will problematic definition of "violence" convictions impact Oklahoma sentencing reform initiative SQ 805?

I have highlighted in a few prior posts SQ 805, a fascinating Oklahoma ballot initiative seeking to block non-violent prior convictions from enhancing statutory punishment ranges.  This new Mother Jones story provide useful context concerning Oklahoma reforms while also noting a potential problem with how SQ 805 is drafted.  The full headline of the piece serves to summarize its coverage: "How a Domestic Violence Loophole Could Doom a Campaign to Cut Oklahoma’s Harsh Prison Sentences: A wrinkle threatens public support for the state’s progress against mass incarceration."  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

For the last four years, the fight against mass incarceration in Oklahoma has been a story of unlikely success.  In 2016, after decades of creeping prison populations, the state’s incarceration rate reached levels so astronomical that the Prison Policy Initiative would dub it the “world’s prison capital“: More than 1 in 100 Oklahomans was locked up in a prison, jail, juvenile hall, or immigration detention facility.  But that year, the same electorate that voted to send Donald Trump to the White House by a 36-point margin also approved a ballot measure softening their state’s notoriously hardline criminal code.

That measure, State Question 780, was a turning point.  It downgraded drug possession and a slate of minor property crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, while a second measure ensured the money saved by downsizing prisons would go to rehabilitative programs.  In 2017, 14,000 fewer felony charges were filed by Oklahoma prosecutors; not long after, the state’s prison population began to fall. Meanwhile, politicians took note of the message the voters had sent.  In 2018, the state legislature, where Republicans hold a supermajority, passed more reforms, including streamlining the parole process.  Republican businessman Kevin Stitt made reducing the prison population part of his pitch for the governor’s seat, and won.

This year, Oklahoma voters could send another jolt to the system by voting for State Question 805 — another adjustment to the state’s harsh sentencing practices.  If it passes, SQ 805 could reduce the prison population by 8.5 percent over the next 10 years, according to a projection by the Oklahoma Council of Public Affairs, a conservative think tank that supports the initiative.

SQ 805 would add a provision to the state constitution prohibiting prosecutors and courts from jacking up the sentences of people convicted of nonviolent felonies if they have an earlier nonviolent felony on their record....

But there’s a significant wrinkle threatening public support for SQ 805, and in turn, Oklahoma’s slow but steady progress against mass incarceration: The measure distinguishes violent from nonviolent felonies using an outdated list from Oklahoma’s legal code.  As of January, that list of “violent” crimes did not include certain domestic violence charges, such as domestic abuse by strangulation, or domestic assault with a dangerous or deadly weapon. If SQ 805 passes, it would continue to allow courts to impose enhanced sentences for any crimes on that list as of January 1, 2020 — including assault and battery, murder, rape, child abuse, and so on — but not those domestic violence charges.  (Oklahoma lawmakers added some domestic violence charges to the violent felonies list in May, too late for SQ 805’s cutoff date.)

Prior related posts:

October 30, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 28, 2020

"How Criminal Law Lost Its Mind"

The title of this post is the great title of this new Boston Review commentary by Michael Serota focused on the need for mens rea refrom.  Here is an excerpt:

In our era of mass incarceration, most would say that we need fewer criminal convictions and less punishment.  But exactly what conduct are we prepared to decriminalize, and which sentences are we ready to shorten?  These are hard questions in part because low-level, non-violent offenders account for only a small percentage of the total number of incarcerated people; the vast majority of people in prison are there for serious offenses, including homicide, assault, and drug trafficking.  But it’s also true that our most serious offenses are being applied in overly broad ways that conflict with our moral intuitions about guilt.  To commit a crime, after all, is not just to do a bad thing.  Conduct becomes criminal only when it is accompanied by a blameworthy state of mind. Or at least that’s the idea behind the legal principle of mens rea (Latin for “guilty mind”).

All too often, this principle is ignored by our criminal justice system — both in who it convicts of crimes and in the length of sentences it hands out.  That should change. Good intentions may not be enough to shield someone who stumbles into harm’s way from civil liability, but they should keep individuals outside the reach of the criminal justice system. And even for those who act with a guilty mind, the criminal justice system should recognize important moral gradations between culpable mental states.  Reforming our criminal codes in these ways won’t rid our system of all its problems, but doing so is an important part of a just vision for change.

October 28, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, October 24, 2020

"What If Nothing Works? On Crime Licenses, Recidivism, and Quality of Life"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting new piece authored by Josh Bowers available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

We accept uncritically the “recidivist premium,” which is the notion that habitual offenders are particularly blameworthy and should be punished harshly.  In this article, I question that assumption and propose a radical alternative.  Consider the individual punished repeatedly for hopping subway turnstiles.  As convictions accumulate, sentences rise — to weeks and ultimately months in jail.  At some point, criminality comes to signal something other than the need for punishment.  It signals the presence of need.  Perhaps, the recidivist was compelled by economic or social circumstances.  Perhaps, he was internally compulsive or cognitively impaired. The precise problem matters less than the fact that there was one.  No rational actor of freewill would continue to recidivate in the face of such substantial and increasing sentences.  My claim is that, in these circumstances, it would be better to just stop punishing.

To that end, I offer a counterintuitive proposal, which is to provide “crime licenses” to recidivists.  But I limit this prescription model to only a collection of quality-of-life offenses, like drug possession, vagrancy, and prostitution.  My goals are at once narrow and broad.  I present the crime license as a modest opportunity to test bolder concepts like legalization, prison abolition, and defunding police.  I situate the provocative proposal within a school of social action called “radical pragmatism,” which teaches that radical structural change is achievable, incrementally.  I draw upon successful prescription-based, radical-pragmatic reforms, like international addiction-maintenance clinics, where habitual drug users receive free heroin in safe settings.  I endorse “harm reduction,” the governance philosophy that grounds those reforms.  And I imagine our system reoriented around harm reduction, with crime licenses as one pragmatic, experimental step in that direction.

October 24, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, October 13, 2020

Noticing a lurking Eighth Amendment issue in SCOTUS arguments over statute of limitations for military rape prosecutions

The US Supreme Court issued another order list this morning with little of interest for sentencing fans, and I am not expecting much criminal law discussion in the on-going confirmation hearings for Judge Amy Coney Barrett.  But SCOTUS is hearing oral argument today in US v. Briggs, which is worth watching for reasons Evan Lee explains in this post at SCOTUSblog under the title "Case preview: Determining the statute of limitations for military rape — and possibly a lot more."  Here is an excerpt:

When the Supreme Court entertains argument on Tuesday in United States v. Briggswhich had originally been scheduled for Monday, March 23, it will be asked to decide whether three men convicted of military rape should not have been prosecuted in the first place because of the statute of limitations.  And, should each side’s principal argument fail, the court may be forced to decide a bigger question: whether the Eighth Amendment prohibition against capital punishment for non-homicide rape applies to rape in the military.

This litigation consists of three consolidated cases, which all involve male military personnel convicted of raping female military personnel.  Michael Briggs, Richard Collins and Humphrey Daniels claim that the statute of limitations should have barred their prosecutions.  The government argues that there is no statute of limitations for military rape because Congress exempted all military crimes punishable by death from limitations.  The defendants counter that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for all rapes not involving fatalities, including military rapes.  That, in turn, means there is a statute of limitations for military rape, and it expired before any of the three men were prosecuted.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces agreed with the defendants....

A key issue in this litigation is which subsection of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. Section 843, applies: subsection (a), which states that “any [military] offense punishable by death may be tried and punished at any time without limitation,” or subsection (b), which creates a five-year statute of limitations for other military offenses.  The government argues that Section 843(a) applies because military rape is made “punishable by death” by 10 U.S.C. Section 920(a), which states, “Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse, by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.”  The three defendants argue that military rape is not “punishable by death” because the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment precedents prohibit capital punishment for non-fatality rapes.  And if military rape is not punishable by death, then the applicable limitations period is the default provision of Section 843(b)....

At oral argument, it will be interesting to see whether any of the justices demonstrate an appetite for the constitutional issue, or whether they think the statutory interpretation questions are dispositive.  

I strongly agree it will be interesting to see how the Justices may bring up the Eighth Amendment during oral argument today, and I will plan to update this post accordingly.

UPDATE: The oral argument transcript in Briggs is now available here.  A quick search reveals the term "Eighth Amendment" coming up 32 times over the transcript's 65 pages.  Over at Crime & Consequences, Kent Scheidegger has this extended post on the case under the title "The Eighth Amendment and Statutes of Limitations." Here is how this post starts and ends:

What do statutes of limitations and the constitutional ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” have to do with each other? The logical answer is “nothing.” But the law follows strange paths, and the two issues crossed in today’s Supreme Court argument on the statute of limitations for rape in the military justice system....

I won’t venture a prediction based on this argument. If the eight justices divide four-four, we might be seeing a reargument.

October 13, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 08, 2020

"Decarceration and Default Mental States"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Benjamin Levin now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

This Essay, presented at “Guilty Minds: A Virtual Conference on Mens Rea and Criminal Justice Reform” at ASU’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, examines the politics of federal mens rea reform legislation.  I argue that current mens rea policy debates reflect an overly narrow vision of criminal justice reform.  Therefore, I suggest an alternative frame through which to view mens rea reform efforts — a frame that resonates with radical structural critiques that have gained ground among activists and academics.

Common arguments for and against mens rea reform reflect a belief that the problem with the criminal system is one of miscalibration: To the reform proponents, criminal law, incarceration, and the institutions of the U.S. criminal system are necessary for dealing with “real criminals,” but overcriminalization, strict liability crimes, and sloppily drafted statutes cause undeserving and “otherwise law-abiding” people to suffer.  To reform opponents, the criminal system might be flawed (see, e.g., the War on Drugs, racial disparities, police violence, etc.), but that doesn’t mean it is illegitimate or without important uses.  The brutalities of the system’s treatment of marginalized people don’t indicate an irredeemable system; rather, prosecutors could right the balance by shifting their attention to the wealthy and “white collar” offenders, and lawmakers and judges could grease the wheels of these prosecutions by reducing the burden on prosecutors to prove mens rea elements.  Arguments from opponents and proponents offer little to commentators who see the problems with the criminal system as deeper or more intractable — problems of structure, rather than scope.

Ultimately, therefore, I offer a different frame for mens rea reform and for understanding the stakes of the debate that might resonate with more radical critics.  I suggest that mens rea reform can be analogized to the rule of lenity and the libertarian or anti-statist aspects of the Bill of Rights — these rules are not solely focused on sorting the guilty and the innocent; rather, I suggest, they can be viewed as “anti-criminalization” rules, directives to put a thumb on the scale in favor of defendants and against the state, state violence, and criminal punishment.  Framed in this way, I argue that mens rea reform should be appealing to commentators concerned about mass incarceration, state violence, and the sweeping reach of criminal law and its enforcement.  Perhaps more provocatively, I also argue that mens rea reform could be understood as consistent with more radical calls for abolition or dismantling of the carceral state.

October 8, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (0)

"A Willful Choice: The Ineffective and Incompassionate Application of Wisconsin’s Criminal Laws in Combating the Opioid Crisis"

The title of this post is the title of this paper recently posted to SSRN authored by Emily O'Brien. Here is its abstract:

Wisconsin’s drug-induced homicide law, known as the Len Bias law, was intended to prosecute for-profit drug dealers and was rarely charged for several decades after it was enacted in 1986.  In recent years, prosecutors have brought hundreds of Len Bias charges in response to opioid deaths.  Often, these charges are brought against overdose victims’ friends and family members — people who are also mired in addiction and who shared or helped obtain the fatal drug.  In contrast, Wisconsin’s Good Samaritan overdose law (GSOL), enacted in 2014, focuses on harm reduction.  If a person calls for help when another person is overdosing, the law provides both people with some insulation from prosecution of a range of drug-related charges.  These laws approach the problem of overdose death from very different angles: The Len Bias law punishes addicts for their role in overdose deaths, while the GSOL offers addicts protection from prosecution in order to encourage calls for medical intervention in overdose situations.  Unfortunately, the current implementation of the Len Bias law diminishes the potential of GSOL to save lives because addicts are faced the possibility of a homicide charge when they summon help for an overdose victim.

With the rise of lethal synthetic opioids in Wisconsin, the criminal justice system must adjust its current laws and practices in order to reduce overdose deaths.  The criminalization of addiction represented by the Len Bias law thwarts rehabilitation efforts, miring addicts in a cycle of incarceration and drug use that ends with death in too many cases.  This Comment proposes a solution: separating addicts from for-profit drug dealers in the eyes of the law by implementing a joint-user defense in Len Bias cases. Addicts are more likely to use opioids with other addicts than alone.  By removing the possibility of a homicide conviction, addicts will more readily utilize the GSOL and call for medical intervention when a fellow addict is overdosing. Additionally, separating addicts from dealers allows the Len Bias law to be charged in accordance with its intended purpose, while freeing up investigatory and prosecutorial resources for the more complex task of investigating commercial drug dealers and disrupting the drug trade.  This proposed solution would begin to align Wisconsin’s criminal laws with the state’s rehabilitation-focused public health efforts at combating opioid addiction in communities and reducing overdose deaths.

October 8, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 06, 2020

Feds officially seek SCOTUS certiorari to review First Circuit's reversal of Boston Marathon bombers death sentence

As reported in this Boston Globe piece, "Federal prosecutors on Tuesday formally filed their request for the US Supreme Court to review an appeals court ruling in July that threw out the death penalty in the case against Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev." Here is more (links from the original):

The 424-page request, known as a writ of certiorari, raises two questions for the high court to consider.

First, it asks whether the District Court should have allowed “evidence that respondent’s older brother was allegedly involved in different crimes two years before the offenses for which respondent was convicted.”

Second, the document asks whether the federal appeals court that overturned Tsarnaev’s death sentence made a mistake in concluding that the District Court should have asked “each prospective juror for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage that he or she had read, heard, or seen about respondent’s case.”...

The move by prosecutors comes after the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on July 31 issued a 182-page ruling that infuriated some survivors, finding that George A. O’Toole Jr., who presided over Tsarnaev’s high-profile 2015 trial in US District Court in Boston, “did not meet the standard” of fairness while presiding over jury selection....

With their filing Tuesday, prosecutors formally asked the Supreme Court to take up the matter. If the high court, which agrees to hear only a fraction of the cases submitted to the panel for review each year, does review the case, it could affirm the appellate decision or reverse it, reinstating Tsarnaev’s death sentence.  Tsarnaev, now 27, remains incarcerated at a federal supermax prison in Colorado. 

Prior recent related posts:

October 6, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, September 21, 2020

"Wage Theft Criminalization"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Benjamin Levin now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Over the past decade, workers’ rights activists and legal scholars have embraced the language of “wage theft” in describing the abuses of the contemporary workplace.  The phrase invokes a certain moral clarity: theft is wrong.  The phrase is not merely a rhetorical flourish. Increasingly, it has a specific content for activists, politicians, advocates, and academics: wage theft speaks the language of criminal law, and wage theft is a crime that should be punished.  Harshly.  Self-proclaimed “progressive prosecutors” have made wage theft cases a priority, and left-leaning politicians in the United States and abroad have begun to propose more criminal statutes to reach wage theft.

In this Article, I examine the drive to criminalize wage theft.  In the literature on workers’ rights, “wage theft” has been accepted uncritically as a distinct problem.  But the literature fails to grapple with what makes wage theft clearly distinguishable from other abusive practices endemic to capitalism.  For scholars concerned about worker power and economic inequality, does classifying one class of conduct “wage theft” actually serve to legitimate the other injustices of the labor market?

Further, the literature on wage theft has failed to reckon with the stakes of using criminal law and incarceration as the tools to remedy workplace violations.  Absent from the discourse on wage theft is any engagement with one of the most vital contemporary movements to confront structural inequality: the fight to end mass incarceration.  Despite insistence from proponents of wage theft criminalization that their focus is on society’s most marginalized, particularly poor people of color, these advocates have turned to a criminal system that is widely viewed as inimical to the interests of those same marginalized populations.  Moreover, in calling for criminal prosecution, many commentators have embraced the same actors and institutions that have decimated poor communities and constructed a hyper-policed population.  By resituating wage theft within the literature on mass incarceration, I examine the limitations of using criminalization to redress economic injustices.  I frame pro-criminalization arguments within the growing literature and activist discourse on decarceration and abolition, examining why criminalization of wage theft is and might be particularly problematic.

September 21, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 17, 2020

At re-re-re-sentencing, Amy Locane gets eight years in New Jersey state prison for drunk driving vehicular manslaughter

Because it is such an interesting case (and perhaps because I watched Melrose Place way back when), I have blogged repeatedly about the sentencings saga of Amy Locane after her conviction in a tragic and deadly drunk driving case.  Today, Locane was sentenced for the fourth time in this matter, and this Fox News piece provides the details:

Amy Locane has been resentenced to eight years in state prison for a fatal 2010 drunk driving crash that occurred in New Jersey. The former “Melrose Place” actress, 48, has already served a prison sentence but a judge agreed with prosecutors Thursday that her initial sentence was too lenient.

State Superior Court Judge Angela Borkowski said Locane still refuses to fully acknowledge her culpability in the crash that killed 60-year-old Helene Seeman and severely injured Seeman's husband.  State law requires her to serve more than six years before being eligible for parole.  Locane apologized to the Seeman family in a brief statement.  She was placed in handcuffs and taken into custody by court deputies after the proceeding in state court in Somerville.

It was a startling development in a case that has bounced around the New Jersey court system for nearly a decade and has now featured four sentencings in front of three judges, plus numerous appeals.

Locane — who acted in 13 episodes of the popular 1990s Fox series and has also appeared in several movies — was convicted on several counts including vehicular manslaughter, and faced a sentencing range of five to 10 years on the most serious count. The state initially sought a seven-year sentence, but a trial judge sentenced her to three years in 2013.  An appeals court ruled he misapplied the law, but at a resentencing, the same judge declined to give her additional time.

Last year, a different judge sentenced her to five years, but an appeals court ruled he didn't follow guidelines it had set and ordered yet another sentencing.  Locane's attorney, James Wronko, had argued unsuccessfully that sentencing her again would violate double jeopardy protections since she had already completed her initial sentence and parole term.

According to witnesses, Locane had consumed several drinks before she headed home on the night of the accident and slammed into the Seemans' car as it turned into their driveway in Montgomery Township, near Princeton.  The actress contended a third motorist, whose car Locane had bumped into at a traffic light minutes earlier, distracted her by honking at and chasing her.  Locane wasn't indicted for drunken driving, but a state expert testified her blood alcohol level was likely about three times the legal limit and that she was driving roughly 53 mph (85 kmh) in a 35-mph (56-kmh) zone at the time of the crash.

Fred Seeman, who nearly died from his injuries suffered in the crash, attended Thursday's proceeding and said Locane's shifting of blame "shows contempt for this court and the jury that rendered the verdict.”  The judge took a similar view, and said Locane's past alcohol abuse makes her a risk for reoffending.

“You made a conscious decision to drink that day and continued to drink, recognizing at the onset that you needed a ride but didn’t obtain one," Borkowski said.  "If you hadn’t gotten behind the wheel of your vehicle on this night, the incident never would have happened.” Wronko called the sentence “outrageous.  She has always taken full responsibility," and criticized the judge for not taking into account Locane's current sobriety and her work counseling others against alcohol abuse.

Locane has 45 days to appeal her sentence. Wronko said he is waiting to see if the state Supreme Court decides to hear his appeal on the double jeopardy question.

Prior related posts:

September 17, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, September 14, 2020

Bureau of Justice Statistics reports encouraging crime declines in release of results of 2019 National Crime Victimization Survey

As reported in this press release and as fully detailed in this 53-page report, the Bureau of Justice Statistics has just published the results from its annual survey of households about their experiences with crime. Notably, most other reports about crime rates are based on crimes reported to police, but this annual survey in different: "TheNCVS is the nation's largest crime survey and collects data on nonfatal crimes both reported and not reported to police." Here are some of the statistical highlights via the press release:

After rising from 1.1 million in 2015 to 1.4 million in 2018, the number of persons who were victims of violent crime excluding simple assault dropped to 1.2 million in 2019, the Bureau of Justice Statistics announced today. Statistics on crimes that have occurred in 2020, during the coronavirus pandemic, are being collected now and will be reported next year....

The rate of violent crime excluding simple assault declined 15% from 2018 to 2019, from 8.6 to 7.3 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older.  Among females, the rate of violent victimization excluding simple assault fell 27% from 2018 to 2019, from 9.6 to 7.0 victimizations per 1,000 females age 12 or older.  Violent crimes other than simple assault are those that are generally prosecuted as a felony.

From 2018 to 2019, the portion of U.S. residents age 12 or older who were victims of one or more violent crimes excluding simple assault fell from 0.50% to 0.44%, a 12% decrease.  There were 880,000 fewer victims of serious violent or property crimes (generally felonies) in 2019 than in 2018, a 19% drop. From 2018 to 2019, 29% fewer black persons and 22% fewer white persons were victims of serious crimes.  Victims of serious crimes are those who experienced a serious violent crime or whose household experienced a completed burglary or completed motor-vehicle theft.

This year, BJS provides new classifications of urban, suburban and rural areas, with the goal of presenting a more accurate picture of where criminal victimizations occur. Based on the NCVS’s new classifications, the rate of violent victimization in urban areas declined from 26.5 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older in 2018 to 21.1 per 1,000 in 2019, a 20% decrease from 2018 to 2019.

Nationally, rape or sexual assault victimizations declined from 2.7 per 1,000 persons age 12 or older in 2018 to 1.7 per 1,000 in 2019. Across all crime types, victimizations reflect the total number of times people or households were victimized by crime. Based on the 2019 survey, less than half (41%) of violent victimizations were reported to police. The percentage of violent victimizations reported to police was lower for white victims (37%) than for black (49%) or Hispanic victims (49%).

In 2019, there were 5.4 million total violent incidents involving victims age 12 or older. The portion of violent incidents involving black offenders (25%) was 2.3 times the portion involving black victims (11%), while the portion involving white offenders (50%) was 0.8 times the portion involving white victims (62%) and the portion involving Asian offenders (1.0%) was 0.4 times the portion involving Asian victims (2.3%).

The 2019 survey found that an estimated 12.8 million U.S. households experienced one or more property victimizations, which include burglaries, residential trespassing, motor-vehicle thefts and other thefts. The rate of property crime declined 6% from 2018 (108.2 victimizations per 1,000 households) to 2019 (101.4 per 1,000).

This decline in property crime was partly due to a 22% decrease in burglary from 2018 to 2019 (from 15.0 to 11.7 burglary victimizations per 1,000 households). Moreover, the rate of burglary victimization declined to the lowest level since the NCVS was redesigned in 1993.

In addition to being eager to celebrate this report of important crime declines in 2019, I am tempted to highlight that the FIRST STEP Act became law at the very tail end of 2018 and was in effect for all of 2019.  I do not want to seriously claim, based only on this data, that there is likely a cause-and-effect relationship between modest federal sentencing and prison reforms in December 2018 and national crime declines in 2019.  But I still think it quite notable given that some prominent critics of criminal justice reform loudly called part of the Act a "foolish ... jailbreak that would endanger communities" or regularly asserted that this "leniency legislation inevitably would lead to more crime."  As long-time students of crime and punishment know well, it is almost impossible to make simple and accurate predictions about what kinds of sentencing legislation will or will not end up having an impact (positive or negative) on crime.

September 14, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, National and State Crime Data, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, September 13, 2020

"Revisiting Hate Crimes Enhancements in the Shadow of Mass Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Shirin Sinnar and Beth A. Colgan.  Here is its abstract:

Although civil rights advocates have largely supported hate crimes laws over the last four decades, growing concern over mass incarceration is now leading some to question the focus on enhancing prison sentences.  This Essay explores two alternatives to the traditional sentence enhancement model that might retain the expressive message of hate crimes laws — to convey society’s particular condemnation of crimes of bias — while relying less heavily on police and prisons: the reformation of victim compensation programs to help victims and targeted communities and the application of restorative justice processes to hate crimes.  Each of these alternatives presents complications, but both offer sufficient potential to justify further exploration.

September 13, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 09, 2020

New report details racial disparities in every stage of the Massachusetts criminal justice system

Via email I received word of this notable new report released today by the Harvard Law School Criminal Justice Policy Program (CJPP) titled simply "Racial Disparities in the Massachusetts Criminal System."  Here is a brief account of the 100+-page report and its findings from the text of the email that I received:

People of color are drastically overrepresented in Massachusetts state prisons.  According to the Massachusetts Sentencing Commission’s analysis of 2014 data, the Commonwealth significantly outpaced national race and ethnicity disparity rates in incarceration, imprisoning Black people at a rate 7.9 times that of White people and Latinx people at 4.9 times that of White people.

In an attempt to better understand the sources of these disparities, Chief Justice Ralph D. Gants of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts asked Harvard Law School to research racial disparities in the Massachusetts criminal system.

CJPP collected administrative data from several criminal justice agencies, analyzing over 500,000 cases. In our report, we detail the results of our analysis of every stage of the criminal process. Our findings include:

  • Black and Latinx people are overrepresented in the criminal system.  Although Black people make up only 6.5% of the state’s population, African Americans are the subjects of 17.1% of criminal court cases. Similarly, Latinx people constitute only 8.7% of the Massachusetts population but 18.3% of the cases.  By contrast, White people, who make up roughly 74% of the Massachusetts population, account for only 58.7% of cases in the criminal system.
  • Black and Latinx people sentenced to incarceration in Massachusetts receive longer sentences than their White counterparts, with Black people receiving sentences that are an average of 168 days longer and Latinx people receiving sentences that are an average of 148 days longer.
  • Racial and ethnic differences in the type and severity of initial charge account for over 70 percent of the disparities in sentence length, overshadowing all other factors, including defendants’ criminal history and demographics, court jurisdiction, and neighborhood characteristics.
  • Among the subset of cases where the person was sentenced to incarceration in a state prison (i.e. cases involving charges that carry the longest potential sentences and where the racial disparity is largest), Black and Latinx people are convicted of charges roughly equal in seriousness to their White counterparts despite facing more serious initial charges and longer sentences.
  • Black and Latinx people charged with drug offenses and weapons offenses are more likely to be incarcerated and receive longer incarceration sentences than White people charged with similar offenses. This difference persists after controlling for charge severity and other factors.

September 9, 2020 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, August 26, 2020

"Criminal Law Update: A Survey of State Law Changes in 2019"

The title of this post is the title of this notable publication from The Federal Society authored by Robert Alt.  Here is how it gets started:

In 2019, state legislatures across the country modified rules and procedures related to every part of the criminal justice system, from pretrial detention to post-sentence re-entry.  States passed new legislation and amended their criminal codes addressing a range of criminal justice concerns.  A review of the legal landscape shows that states were most willing to adjust their criminal laws related to sentencing, record expungement and offender registries, marijuana legalization, and felon reenfranchisement.  This paper is not intended to serve as an exhaustive list of new criminal justice legislation in 2019, but rather highlights the most common reforms that fall generally among those categories.

As in 2018, criminal justice laws enacted in 2019 did not take a singular approach.  Some states, for example, significantly enhanced penalties for certain offenses, while others reduced sentences and repealed mandatory minimums.  Alaska adopted comprehensive criminal justice legislation that included repealing “catch and release” pretrial protocols, even as New York all but ended its pretrial detention and cash bail system.  Three states revised rules for offender release and re-entry, and two states continued the national trend of restricting civil asset forfeiture and making the process more transparent.  A handful of states amended their treatment of juvenile offenders, and several more stopped suspending driver’s licenses for unpaid fines and court costs.

Support for and opposition to criminal laws and punishments do not tend to break along traditional partisan lines. Although some legislative reforms proved to be politically contentious, including New York’s bail reform and Florida’s new re-enfranchisement requirements, others were largely bipartisan efforts wherein legislatures and governors from both ends of the political spectrum reached tenable compromises. Some legislatures even passed measures unanimously.

August 26, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 22, 2020

Via video, Lori Loughlin and her husband get agreed fixed short prison sentences in college admission scandal

Unnamed-2As reported in this CBS News piece, headlined "Lori Loughlin gets 2 months in prison in college admissions scandal. Her husband Mossimo Giannulli will serve 5 months," a high-profile (but low-drama) sentencing took place in federal court yesterday.  Here are the basics:

Actress Lori Loughlin will serve two months in prison and her husband, fashion designer Mossimo Giannulli, will serve five months after the couple pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges in the college admissions scandal. A federal judge on Friday accepted plea deals from the famous couple in a video sentencing hearing.

After initially vowing to fight the charges, Loughlin and Giannulli reversed course after a judge denied their motion to dismiss the case in May. Prosecutors said the couple paid $500,000 to secure their daughters' admission to the University of Southern California by masquerading them as fake athletic recruits.

"I made an awful decision. I went along with a plan to give my daughters an unfair advantage in the college admissions process. In doing so, I ignored my intuition and allowed myself to be swayed from my moral compass," Loughlin said in the video call.

Loughlin, 56, will also pay a $150,000 fine, serve 100 hours of community service, and be under supervised release for two years. Giannulli, 57, is required to pay a fine of $250,000, serve 250 hours of community service, and serve two years of supervised release.

Earlier in the day, Giannulli apologized for the harm his decisions caused his family. "I'm ready to accept the consequences and move forward with the lessons I've learned from this experience," he said. Prior to rendering the sentence, U.S. District Court Judge Nathaniel Gorton ripped into Giannulli for committing a "crime motivated by hubris" that is "defined by wanton arrogance and excessive pride."

In addition to really liking the aesthetic of this "courtroom sketch" of this video sentencing, I reprinted the picture here in order to wonder aloud whether the US Sentencing Commission is keeping track of which sentencings are taking place via video these days and which ones are taking place in person.  Because six months into this pandemic the USSC still has not even reported how many sentencings are taking place, I am not especially optimistic the USSC is collecting, or will anytime soon be reporting, special granular data on COVID-era sentencing realities.  But my hope for the USSC springs eternal.

A few prior posts focused on these defendants:

A few of many prior posts on other defendants in college admissions scandal:

August 22, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5)

Friday, August 21, 2020

Justice or injustice?: Golden State Killer gets LWOP for at least 13 murders and dozens of rapes after deal to avoid death penalty

As reported in this NBC News piece, a "former police officer known as the Golden State Killer for his crime spree across California in the 1970s and '80s was sentenced Friday to consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole."  Here is more about the crimes and punishment:

Joseph DeAngelo, 74, who had eluded authorities for decades, pleaded guilty in June to 13 counts of first-degree murder and 13 rape-related charges in a deal that spared him the death penalty.  He also publicly admitted to dozens more sexual assaults for which the statute of limitations had expired. Sacramento County Superior Court Judge Michael Bowman said Friday in a rare sentencing statement that DeAngelo would "meet his death confined behind the walls of state penitentiary."

"The court is not saying DeAngelo does not deserve to have the death penalty imposed," Bowman said, but given the age of the defendant and victims, a life sentence made more sense. Bowman said he hopes "survivors will find some resolution" after DeAngelo is permanently placed behind bars.

DeAngelo on Friday made a short statement in court addressing victims and their families. "I’ve listened to all your statements. Each one of them. And I’m truly sorry to everyone I’ve hurt. Thank you your honor," he said.

Prosecutors said DeAngelo admitted to harming 87 victims in 53 separate crimes spanning 11 California counties. As part of the plea agreement, he was required to register as a sex offender and pay restitution to the victims or their families, as well as any fees or fines. Assistant Chief Deputy District Attorney Thien Ho has said the scope of DeAngelo's crime spree is "simply staggering, encompassing 13 known murders and almost 50 rapes between 1975 and 1986."

DeAngelo's crime spree started while he was working as a police officer in Exeter, a northern California community in the San Joaquin Valley near the foothills of the Sierra Nevada. Over the years, his crimes morphed from stalking properties to serial rape and murder. DeAngelo went on to marry and raise his own family, escaping investigators' efforts to find him for decades, before he was arrested in Sacramento County in 2018. It is believed to be the first high-profile case to have been cracked with genetic genealogy. Authorities said they used "discarded DNA" to confirm that DeAngelo was the man generations of authorities and citizen sleuths had searched for....

Some of DeAngelo's victims are in their 80s and 90s. Some are dead. But those who were willing and able spent the week addressing DeAngelo in court in anticipation of his sentencing. Phyllis Henneman said she was 22 years old and "young and carefree" when her life changed forever in June 1976. She was home alone with her sister while their dad was out of town when DeAngelo attacked.

"Joseph DeAngelo, henceforth called 'the devil incarnate,' broke into my home, blindfolded me, tied me up, threatened my life with a knife and raped me," she said, describing DeAngelo's modus operandi, which also included tying up partners and spending hours in homes, leaving his victims wondering what terror would come next. "Life as I knew it irrevocably changed that day," she said in the statement read by her sister, Karen Veilleux. But DeAngelo's arrest and upcoming sentencing meant "his victims and their families are now free."

A recent HBO documentary, "I'll Be Gone in the Dark," detailed the gruesome attacks and the desperate effort to find the killer, even as the years wore on. The documentary is based on crime writer Michelle McNamara's book of the same name, in which she recounted her own obsessive effort to uncover the identity of the Golden State Killer and conviction that genetic genealogy would help her do it. McNamara, the wife of comedian Patton Oswalt, died in 2016, two years before DeAngelo's arrest. Bowman on Friday thanked McNamara by name, along with law enforcement, other citizen detectives and DeAngelo's victims for their "dogged persistence" in their quest to bring him to justice.

August 21, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, August 19, 2020

Lots and lots of federal drug charges resulting from Operation Legend, which is purportedly to "fight violent crime"

Six week ago, Attorney General William Barr announced the launch of operation legend via this press release that stressed the fighting of violent crime.  Here are excerpts from the July 8 DOJ press release (with my emphasis added): 

Attorney General William P. Barr announced the launch of Operation Legend, a sustained, systematic and coordinated law enforcement initiative across all federal law enforcement agencies working in conjunction with state and local law enforcement officials to fight the sudden surge of violent crime, beginning in Kansas City, MO. Operation Legend was created as a result of President Trump’s promise to assist America’s cities that are plagued by recent violence....

“President Trump has made clear: the federal government stands ready and willing to assist any of our state and local law enforcement partners across the nation responding to violent crime. Operation Legend will combine federal and local resources to combat the disturbing uptick in violence by surging federal agents and other federal assets into cities like Kansas City, a city currently experiencing its worst homicide rate in its history,” said Attorney General Barr. “The Department’s Operation Legend is named in honor of one of Kansas City’s youngest victims, four-year old LeGend Taliferro who was shot in the face while sleeping in his bed.  LeGend’s death is a horrifying reminder that violent crime left unchecked is a threat to us all and cannot be allowed to continue.”

Today via this press release, AG Barr "announced updates on Operation Legend," and here are excerpts:

Since the operation’s launch, there have been more than 1,000 arrests, including defendants who have been charged in state and local courts.  Of those arrests, approximately 217 defendants have been charged with federal crimes.  These numbers exclude Indianapolis, whose operation was just announced last Friday. In addition, nearly 400 firearms have been seized by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

The Attorney General launched the operation on July 8, 2020, as a sustained, systematic and coordinated law enforcement initiative in which federal law enforcement agencies work in conjunction with state and local law enforcement officials to fight violent crime.... Launched first in Kansas City, MO., on July 8, 2020, the operation was expanded to Chicago and Albuquerque on July 22, 2020, to Cleveland, Detroit, and Milwaukee on July 29, 2020, to St. Louis and Memphis on Aug. 6, 2020, and to Indianapolis on Aug. 14, 2020. A breakdown of the federal charges in each district, with the exception of Indianapolis, is below.

I am please to see this kind of accounting from DOJ about this operation, but when looking through the breakdown of the federal charges, it is remarkable how for DOJ the effort to "fight violent crime" seems to involve making a whole lot of drug charges:

Kansas City: "Forty-three defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... 17 defendants have been charged with drug trafficking"

Chicago: "Sixty-one defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... 26 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses"

Albuquerque: "Sixteen defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... Six defendants have been charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances; Four defendants have been charged with distribution of controlled substances; Six defendants have been charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance;"

Cleveland: "Thirty-two defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... 22 defendants have been charged with federal drug trafficking charges"

Detroit: "Twenty-two defendants have been charged with federal offenses ... Two defendants have been charged with possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances"

Milwaukee: "Eleven defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... Five defendants have been charged with possession with intent to distribute narcotics"

St. Louis: "Twenty-five defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... 21 defendants have been charged with drug trafficking offenses"

Though it is hard to do an exact accounting based on the DOJ reporting, it seems like roughly half of the federal charges here involve drug trafficking, not actual violent crimes.  (In addition, the vast majority of all the  other federal charges involve illegal gun possession, not actual violent crimes.)  I presume DOJ would defend its work here by asserting that drug trafficking is inherently violent or by contending that disrupting the drug trade via these arrests serves to get people prone to violence off the streets.  But I still find it quite jarring and quite telling that a federal initiative developed and promoted as a means to fight violent crime ends up bringing primarily drug trafficking charges in city after city.

August 19, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, August 12, 2020

"Blanket Exclusions, Animus, and the False Policies They Promote"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Catherine Carpenter now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Saying something is true does not make it so. A nd saying it louder does not make it truer.  But such is the legislative posture behind modern day sex offense registration laws that punish those who commit sex crimes because of entrenched myths that overstate the laws’ positive impact on public safety and exaggerate recidivism rates of offenders.  And it is not only registration schemes themselves that have been scaffold-ed by these myths, but numerous ancillary laws that exclude benefits to offenders strictly because they have committed sex offenses.

Sadly, this sticky, but false, narrative has provided the animus that galvanized implementation of registration and notification regimes. And in its most recent chapter, the narrative has been formalized into blanket exclusions — or what this article calls “all except for” provisions — that have inserted into a myriad of criminal justice reform efforts without much notoriety.

The effect?  Registrants and their families have been prohibited from broad-based and important ameliorative changes to the carceral state, many to which they should be entitled, and to which they are denied only because of their status as registrants.  Indeed, within comprehensive legislation covering numerous crime and sentencing reforms, these ubiquitous blanket exclusions have the markings of boilerplate language that have been introduced even where the new legislation has no rational relationship to the protection of the public’s safety or the prior sex offense conviction.

This article examines the moral panic and false data used to buttress blanket exclusion provisions — their inflated importance obvious. It concludes that these measures, which are un-tethered to public safety concerns, and only supported by governmental and community animus, violate fourteenth amendment protections.

August 12, 2020 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, August 10, 2020

What should we make of a "significant decline" in white-collar criminal enforcement during the Trump Administration?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new Bloomberg article, headlined "Trump Oversees All-Time Low in White Collar Crime Enforcement," which I find puzzling in many ways.  Here are excerpts:

Donald Trump calls himself the “law and order” president, but when it comes to white collar crime, he has overseen a significant decline in enforcement.  The prosecution of securities fraud, antitrust violations and other such crimes has hit a record low as the pandemic slows the courts, according to one tracking service. But even before the coronavirus, the numbers were falling under the Trump administration.

The average annual number of white collar defendants was down 26% to 30% for Trump’s first three years in office from the average under President Barack Obama, according to data from the Justice Department and Syracuse University, respectively.  The trend also shows up in fines on corporations, which fell 76% from Obama’s last 20 months to Trump’s first 20 months, according to Duke University law professor Brandon Garrett. 

“Mr. Trump sets the tone,” said John Coffee, a professor at Columbia Law School whose new book, “Corporate Crime and Punishment: The Crisis of Underenforcement,” analyzes the decline.  Trump’s Justice Department has even presided over a plunge in deferred-prosecution agreements, Coffee said.  In a DPA, a company is charged with a crime but prosecutors agree to drop the case later if it admits wrongdoing, pays a penalty and makes required reforms.  The administration has also brought fewer white collar racketeering and money-laundering cases, crimes that carry harsher penalties, he said. “All that is an indication that white collar crime is not a priority,” Coffee said....

The Justice Department says it hasn’t eased up at all.  Prosecutors “continue to bring federal charges in white collar and other cases according to facts, the law and the principles of federal prosecution,” said Peter Carr, who was a spokesman for the department’s Criminal Division until moving recently to the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Justice “can’t vouch for TRAC’s methodology,” Carr said, referring to Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, which monitors trends in federal law enforcement and whose records reflect a decline of about 30% in prosecutions under Trump....

DOJ spokesman Matt Lloyd said the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, which focuses on white collar crime, “has achieved record numbers of individual and corporate criminal cases and resolutions over the past three years,” including a 59% increase in individuals charged between 2016 and 2019 and a jump of more than a quarter in those convicted.  He didn’t comment specifically on the 26% decline reflected in the data published by the U.S. attorney offices nationwide, which cover a much larger set of white collar prosecutions, but called the Fraud Section’s achievements “a key indicator of the department’s commitment” to the issue.

Prosecutions have been declining for the past decade but have never been so low.  The Justice Department under Trump has shifted its focus from traditional white collar cases, like big securities prosecutions, to immigration and the sort of corporate espionage targeted by the DOJ’s China Initiative, said Robert Anello, a white collar defense lawyer in New York....

The Internal Revenue Service's ... Criminal Investigation division helps send people to prison for crimes such as tax evasion, money laundering and identity theft.  The agency saw a 36% decrease in new criminal investigations from fiscal 2015 to 2019, IRS records show.

One factor in the decline in traditional white collar prosecutions is an important change to what’s known as the Yates memo.  In 2015, under Obama, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates required companies seeking leniency to help develop evidence against their employees and turn over possible suspects.  In 2018, under Trump, the Justice Department softened the criteria. 

So is there an on-going white-collar crime "crisis"?  How would we know?  Why is it that we now see a whole lot of media reporting increases in shootings in urban areas, but we do not see any media looking at possible increases in securities fraud in suburban areas?  I ask these questions not to be cheeky, but rather to note how much more we generally focus upon and tend to better understand "crime in the streets" rather than "crime in the suites."

August 10, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 08, 2020

"Beyond Unreasonable"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by John Inazu and now posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The concept of “reasonableness” permeates the law: the “reasonable person” determines the outcome of torts and contracts disputes, the criminal burden of proof requires factfinders to conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt;” claims of self-defense succeed or fail on reasonableness determinations.  But as any first-year law student can attest, the line between reasonable and unreasonable isn’t always clear.  Nor is that the only ambiguity. In the realm of the unreasonable, many of us intuit that some actions are not only unreasonable but beyond the pale — we might say they are beyond unreasonable.  Playing football, summiting Nanga Parbat, and attempting Russian roulette all risk serious injury or death, but most people do not view them the same.  These distinctions raise vexing questions: what is it that makes us feel differently about these activities?  Mere unfamiliarity?  Moral condemnation?  Relative utility?  Or something else altogether?  Moreover, who exactly is the “we” forming these judgments?

This Article explores the vague lines that separate our sense of reasonable, unreasonable, and beyond unreasonable — the reasonableness lines.  Part I examines the general characteristics of these lines.  Part II explores their significance in law, and Part III considers their application in four discrete areas of law: tax policy for medical expenses, criminal punishment, speech restrictions, and tort liability for inherently dangerous sports.  The Article ends by summarizing the implications of the reasonableness lines for our culture and for ourselves.

August 8, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 06, 2020

"Labeling Violence"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Cecelia Klingele now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

In recent years, federal and state-level criminal justice reforms have softened the punitive responses to crime that defined the quarter-century from 1980–2005.  The main beneficiaries of these reforms have been non-violent criminals, who are increasingly eligible for pre- and post-charge diversion, expungement, early release from custody and early discharge from community supervision.  For those convicted of violent offenses, not much has changed: sentences remain long; opportunities for release remain few; and conditions of post-release supervision are tightly enforced, leading to high rates of return to prison.

The justification for a harsh response to violent crime is that such crime inflicts significant harm and represents a dramatic deviation from standards of acceptable behavior. In fact, “violent” behavior — that is, behavior that is intended to cause, or does in fact cause, physical injury to another person — is hardly anomalous.  Across the life-course, and particularly in youth and young adulthood, such behaviors frequently occur among a broad spectrum of the population and rarely lead to criminal conviction. This Article explores why only some behavior is labeled violent, and what implications this fact has for sentencing and correctional management of people convicted of violent crimes, and for the broader management of the criminal justice system.

August 6, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (1)

Ugly summer stories of southern justice in the form of extreme over-sentencing

The dog days of summer seems especially doggy this year, and here are a couple of notably ugly summer sentencing stories are part of this reality:

From CNN, "Louisiana Supreme Court upholds Black man's life sentence for stealing hedge clippers more than 20 years ago."  An excerpt:

A Black Louisiana man will spend the rest of his life in prison for stealing hedge clippers, after the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his request to have his sentence overturned last week.

Fair Wayne Bryant, 62, was convicted in 1997 on one count of attempted simple burglary. In his appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Louisiana in 2018, his attorney, Peggy Sullivan, wrote that Bryant "contends that his life sentence is unconstitutionally harsh and excessive."  
 
Last week, though, the state Supreme Court disagreed -- with five justices choosing to uphold the life sentence. The lone dissenter in the decision was Supreme Court Chief Justice Bernette Johnson, who wrote that "the sentence imposed is excessive and disproportionate to the offense the defendant committed."

From Fox News, "Disabled Iraq veteran faces five years in Alabama prison for legally prescribed medical marijuana." An excerpt:

By all accounts, Sean Worsley is a war hero. He earned a Purple Heart, along with a laundry list of additional military accolades, for clearing roadside bombs in Iraq. He also earned a lifetime of post-service ailments, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a traumatic brain injury (TBI). As a result of his injuries, Worsley was given a 100 percent disability rating from the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. He treated the worst symptoms of both injuries with medical marijuana prescribed to him legally in Arizona.

Now, Worsley sits in an Alabama jail facing five years in the state’s notoriously violent prison system after admitting to an officer he was in possession of medical marijuana while driving through Alabama and a subsequent probation violation for missing a court date.

UPDATE: I now realize that the headline of this local version of the Fox story more clearly summarizes the ugly sentencing reality: "Black disabled veteran sentenced to spend 60 months in prison for medical marijuana."

August 6, 2020 in Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, August 05, 2020

"#MeToo and the Myth of the Juvenile Sex Offender"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Cynthia Godsoe recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The #MeToo movement has brought much needed attention to the widespread and systemic nature of sexual harm. However, the broad, uncritical push to connect “#MeToo” to criminal prosecution has real downsides, revealing the pathologies and ineffectiveness of the criminal system and re-inscribing the very gendered and racialized hierarchies the movement seeks to eradicate.  The mainstream understanding of #MeToo amplifies the omission of sexual harm from most conversations on decarceration and criminal legal reform.  This side of the movement focuses almost exclusively on individual blame and punishment, ignoring the structural causes of gender violence, as well as meaningful survivor healing and offender accountability.  This is true both as to the scope of criminalization, which is ever-expanding particularly as to sexual harms, and to the response once harm occurs, which is almost always to advocate for longer prison sentences and more restrictions post-release, such as sex offender registration.

This Symposium essay explores these issues by thinking through the way that the mainstream #MeToo movement treats and responds to youth who either engage in or are victims of sexual harm.  Despite the fact that much of the #MeToo reckoning has focused on high-profile men who repeatedly exploit minors — think Jeffrey Epstein, R. Kelly, Kevin Spacey — minors themselves, some as young as eight, constitute one third of those adjudicated sex offenders and one quarter of those required to register, sometimes for life.  At the same time, harm to young people who do not fit a mainstream mold is ignored.  Thus, although girls of color are sexually assaulted at much higher rates than white girls, their victimhood continues to be overlooked and their responses to it even criminalized.

In this essay, I join abolitionist advocates in urging caution about the direction the #MeToo movement is taking, particularly with regard to young people.  Our punishment of sexual harm with respect to youth reveals three significant pathologies of the broader criminal legal system.  First, we rely almost exclusively on criminalization and punishment to address societal problems that have multiple causes beyond individual culpability.  Second, the system is immensely costly, in fiscal and, most importantly, human terms, with very low effectiveness, both at preventing and at redressing harm.  Indeed, punishing youth for sex offenses puts them at much greater risk for being sexually abused themselves by adults — undermining the primary stated goal of the sex offense criminal framework.  Third, the criminal treatment of “sex crimes” reinforces the very gendered and racialized hierarchies that animate them.  Girls and women of color continue to be undervalued and unprotected, while male survivors continue to be stigmatized and disbelieved.  Indeed, Tarana Burke, founded the #MeToo movement to recognize non-normative victims, particularly girls and women of color, and recently lamented the current movement’s public face: “We have to shift the narrative that it’s a gender war, that it’s anti-male, that it’s men against women, that it’s only for a certain type of person — that it’s for white, cisgender, heterosexual, famous women.”

I conclude with the counterintuitive suggestion that decriminalization and decarceration efforts should not only include conduct labelled as “sex offenses,” but likely should begin with them. Transforming our approach to sexual harm is one key piece of an abolitionist vision that seeks to move beyond carceral approaches to achieving racial and gender justice.

August 5, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 28, 2020

US Sentencing Commission publishes "Federal Probation and Supervised Release Violations"

Cover_violations-report-2020The US Sentencing Commission today released this lengthy notable new report titled simply "Federal Probation and Supervised Release Violations." This USSC webpage provides a summary and a extended account of "key findings":

Summary

Federal Probation and Supervised Release Violations presents data on approximately 108,000 violation hearings that occurred between 2013 and 2017.  The report examines the prevalence, types, and locations of federal supervision violations as well as the characteristics of more than 82,000 violators. The report also compares supervision violators to the population of federal offenders originally sentenced to probation or a sentence including a term of supervised release during the same time period. (Published July 28, 2020)

Key Findings
  • Nationally, the number of individuals under supervision was relatively stable during the study period, ranging from 130,224 to 136,156 during the five years. Half of the individuals under supervision, however, were concentrated in only 21 of the 94 federal judicial districts.
  • Nationally, the rate of violation hearings for individuals on supervision also was relatively stable, ranging from 16.2 to 18.4 percent during the five years, with an overall rate of 16.9 percent.  The prevalence of supervision violations, however, varied considerably among the federal judicial districts.
    • Violations accounted for more than one-third of individuals on supervision in the Southern District of California (42.1%), District of Minnesota (37.4%), Western District of Missouri (34.3%), District of Arizona (33.7%), and District of New Mexico (33.4%).  In contrast, violations accounted for less than five percent of individuals on supervision in the Districts of Connecticut (4.5%) and Maryland (4.7%).
  • Supervision violators tended to have committed more serious original offenses than federal offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release during the same time period.
    • For example, the rates of supervision violators originally sentenced for violent and firearms offenses (7.9% and 20.4%, respectively) were approximately twice as high compared to offenders originally sentenced during the study period (3.7% and 12.8%, respectively), a finding which is consistent with prior Commission recidivism research.
  • Drug offenses were the most common primary offense type for both supervision violators and federal offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release during the same time period.  There were, however, notable variations by drug type.
    • For example, crack cocaine offenders accounted for only 9.9 percent of drug offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release, but they accounted for almost one-third (32.1%) of supervision violators, a greater proportion than any other drug type.  The disproportional representation of crack cocaine offenders among supervision violators is consistent with prior Commission recidivism research.  On the other hand, drug offenders who received the safety valve at their original sentencing were underrepresented among supervision violators (19.1% compared to 30.7%), a finding that also is consistent with prior Commission recidivism research.
  • Supervision violators tended to have more serious criminal histories than federal offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release.
    • Approximately one-quarter (24.6%) of offenders with supervision violations were in the lowest Criminal History Category (CHC I) at the time of their original sentencing compared to almost half (44.9%) of offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release during the study period. On the other end of the spectrum, 18.3 percent of offenders with supervision violations were in the highest Criminal History Category (CHC VI) at the time of their original sentencing compared to 9.9 percent of offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release during the study period. This pattern is consistent with prior Commission recidivism research.
  • The majority of supervision violations were based on the commission of an offense punishable by a term of one year or less or a violation of another condition of supervision not constituting a federal, state or local offense (Grade C Violation).
    • More than half (54.9%) of violations were Grade C (the least serious classification), nearly one-third (31.5%) were Grade B, and 13.6 percent were Grade A (the most serious classification).
  • Offenders who were originally sentenced for more serious offenses tended to commit more serious supervision violations.
    • For example, over four-fifths of the Grade A violations were committed by offenders originally sentenced for drug offenses (52.0%), firearms offenses (24.5%), or violent offenses (6.3%).
  • Offenders who violated their conditions of supervision typically did so within the first two years.
    • On average, 22 months elapsed from the time supervision commenced to the commission of the supervision violation, but the elapsed time was notably longer for Grade A violations (the most serious) at 33 months.
  • The majority of supervision violators were sentenced in accordance with the Chapter Seven Revocation Table.
    • More than half (59.8%) were within the applicable range, just over one-quarter (29.1%) were below the range, and 11.1 percent were above the range. Courts tended to impose sentences within the applicable guideline range less often for more serious supervision violations. For example, for Grade A violations (the most serious classification), 39.4 percent were sentenced within the applicable range, and 54.2 percent were sentenced below the range. In contrast, for Grade C violations (the least serious classification), 63.6 percent were sentenced within the range, and 22.1 percent were sentenced below the range.

July 28, 2020 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (6)

At resentencing, Senator Rand Paul's attacker gets additional 13 months (eight to be served in federal prison, six in home confinement)

This local article, headline "KY man who tackled U.S. Sen. Rand Paul sentenced to another 13 months confinement," provides some details from a high-profile resentencing that took place yesterday and included a number of interesting elements:

The neighbor who lost his temper and attacked Republican U.S. Sen. Rand Paul in 2017, breaking six of his ribs, has been sentenced to an additional 13 months confinement.  A federal judge initially sentenced Rene Boucher to 30 days in jail for the November 2017 attack, along with 100 hours of community service and a $10,000 fine.

During a video hearing Monday, U.S. District Judge Matthew F. Leitman handed down the new sentence against Boucher — eight months in prison and six months on home confinement.  However, Leitman gave Boucher credit for the 30 days he already served, so he will have seven more months behind bars.

Prosecutors had appealed the initial sentence for Boucher, arguing it was unreasonably light, and won the right to try to get a longer sentence.  That led to Monday’s hearing.  The new sentence for Boucher still wasn’t as long as the government wanted.  Assistant U.S. Attorney Brad Shepard objected to the sentence, which could lead to yet another appeal by the government for stiffer sentence for Boucher.

The attack made national news because of Paul’s position, but prosecutors have acknowledged it had nothing to do with politics.  Rather, Boucher, who lived next door to Paul in a gated community in Bowling Green, attacked Paul because he got angry over Paul stacking limbs and other yard waste near their shared property line, according to the court record....

Police first charged Boucher with misdemeanor assault in state court, but the federal government stepped in and prosecuted him under a law barring assaults on members of Congress.  Under advisory guidelines, Boucher faced a potential sentence of 21 to 27 months. Federal judges can impost sentences below those guidelines.

In handing down a lower sentence, U.S. District Judge Marianne O. Battani cited Boucher’s military service, his involvement in his church and her belief that the attack was out of character for Boucher.  However, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Battani didn’t give sufficient weight to the seriousness of Paul’s injuries or the need for deterrence, and didn’t sufficiently address the issue of the big difference in Boucher’s sentence and others involving federal assault cases.

Shepard renewed a call for a 21-month sentence for Boucher because of the severity of Paul’s injuries.  The punishment also should to be tough enough deter similar attacks, Shepard said.  “The court I think needs to send the message . . . that we cannot continue as a society to resort to violence,” Shepard said.

Paul and his wife, Kelly, submitted written statements about the attack the first time Boucher was sentenced, but spoke in person during the video hearing Monday.  Paul said he’d never had cross words with Boucher and so had no idea he was unhappy before Boucher blindsided him.  Paul described the intense pain and his struggles to breathe after the attack, as well as the history of physical problems since, including bouts with pneumonia, night sweats and fever; coughing up blood; surgery to remove part of his scarred lung; and still more surgery to drain infected fluid.  Paul said his lung capacity will likely be reduced the rest of his life, and he has chronic pain.  “I don’t know what a night without pain is like, or a day without pain,” Paul said....

Boucher’s attorney, Matthew J. Baker, said Boucher is “profoundly sorry” for the attack, but argued against any additional time for Boucher, a physician.  Baker said Boucher’s initial sentence was appropriate, and that he had faced additional punishment by way of a judgment of more than $600,000 in a state civil lawsuit Paul filed against him over the attack.  That judgment included $375,000 in punitive damages, which by definition are to punish a defendant....

Lietman said it was heartbreaking to hear Paul and his wife describe the fallout from the attack. But the judge said he was choosing a sentence below the guideline range for several reasons, including Boucher’s long record of work with his church, his eight years as a U.S. Army doctor, the fact that the attack was out of character, and the damage to his reputation from the crime.  Leitman said $375,000 punitive damage award in state court also figured into his decision. “That’s a lot of punishment,” he said.

Leitman did not set a date for Boucher to begin the sentence.

I would be surprised if the feds go through with another appeal, and I would be even more surprised if they would prevail on a second appeal.  The Sixth Circuit panel opinion reversing the initial 30-day sentence made much of the original "dramatic downward variance" from a guideline minimum of 21 months, and Judge Lietman seems to have addressed some of the panel's chief concerns when imposing a longer sentence closer to the bottom of the advisory range.  And Judge Lietman's reliance on the civil punishment from the sizable punitive damage award would seem to be a distinctive additional factor supporting the reasonableness of a sentence below the guideline range.

Prior related posts:

July 28, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 24, 2020

Never-ending New Jersey drunk driving case highlights fundamental reason why sentencing is so dang hard

9889228-0-image-a-67_1550300070445I am fond of saying "sentencing is dang hard."  (A version of a speech I gave with this title appears in the February 2020 issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter and also is available here via SSRN.)  An appellate ruling this  week in a high-profile New Jersey case has me recalling this point; this local press piece, headlined "Amy Locane will be sentenced for a fourth time on fatal 2010 DWI charge," provides part of the backstory (with a little emphasis added):

A state appellate court ruled Wednesday that actress Amy Locane, convicted in connection with a fatal drunken driving accident a decade ago in Montgomery, must be sentenced for a fourth time because the first three times were either illegal sentences or sentences imposed outside the state's criminal code.

In a 41-page decision, the appellate court ruled that the latest sentence in the case, handed down by Superior Court Judge Kevin Shanahan in February 2019, was "illogical" based on an "unauthorized sentencing theory" that weighed on what he called "the yin and yang" of the case's facts....

James Wronko, Locane's attorney, said he will ask the state Supreme Court to review the decision. "I don't know what society gains by putting the mother of two back in jail," Wronko said.

Shanahan sentenced Locane to five years in prison, but stayed the sentence because he did not consider her a flight risk. The Somerset County Prosecutor's Office argued the sentence should not be stayed and appealed the judge's decision.

Locane previously had been sentenced to three years in state prison on charges of vehicular homicide and assault by auto in connection with the death of Helene Seeman in the crash.  Her husband, Fred, was severely injured in the crash as the couple were turning into their driveway of their weekend home at 9 p.m. on June 27, 2010.  Locane is an actress who starred with Johnny Depp in “Cry-Baby” and was a featured actress on the TV series “Melrose Place.”...

The Somerset County Prosecutor's Office first appealed the the three-year sentence that was handed down by retired Superior Court Judge Robert Reed who presided over the trial.  Locane served 85 percent of that sentence at the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women in Hunterdon County.  She also successfully completed the conditions of her parole a year ago, Wronko said.  "She's led an exemplary life since her release," Wronko said....

In handing down the five-year sentence, Shanahan said that imposing a higher sentence "would have been an exercise in bad judgment, just like all the others."  Shanahan also said that he was not bound by previous Appellate Court rulings in the case.

"Clearly, changes in (Locane's) personal circumstances warrant divergence," the Appellate Court wrote in the decision, "but it is rudimentary that a trial judge is bound by our prior decision. (Shanahan) ignored the prior findings, while seemingly giving them lip service."

So, in a sad drunk driving case involving a fatal result, New Jersey courts have now been trying and failing to figure out Amy Locane's "right" sentence for now a full decade.  In that time, the defendant has served out a three-year ("wrong") prison sentence (and also paid $1.5 million of a nearly $5 million civil settlement).  I can only speculate about how many (mostly taxpayer) resources have been expended in all these court proceedings trying to get to the "right" sentence, and I wonder whether the surviving victims are really eager to start another decade of wrangling over finding the "right" sentence.

Of course, I keep putting "right" in quotes when discussing this matter because there obviously is no clear right sentence in this case (or most cases).  Sentencing is so dang hard in part because it lacks a clear right/wrong metric no matter what sentencing philosophies one is inclined to adopt.  Moreover, this case especially spotlights the fundamental challenge balancing aggravating offense factors (especially a victim's death) with mitigating offender factors (addiction and lack of criminal history).  The latest appellate opinion (available here) showcases how sentencing judges here have generally focused on the offender, while the appellate judges have focused on the offense (at p. 36):

In this case, the focus has repeatedly shifted away from the crime defendant committed to her individual characteristics at the expense of imposing a just sentence reflective of her offense and the harm she caused.  That she was struggling with addiction did not authorize the court to close its eyes to the harm she inflicted on the victims, the victims' family, and the community.  That harm will never dissipate.  The loss of a loved one, and serious physical injury to another, can never be compensated.

Ironically, another round of resentencing strikes me as a fool's errand in part because I agree with this court's sentiment that the harm caused by Amy Locane "will never dissipate" and "can never be compensated."  Because there is no way the law through any form of punishment can make this kind of harm go away, I struggle to see what is likely to be achieved when the state uses more taxpayer resources to  try, yet again, to add still more years to Locane's sentence.

Notably, there is no mention in this latest appellate opinion of just what the victims of this now-long-ago offense might now want.  I hope for their sake that starting another decade of wrangling over Locane's sentence does not rub salt into their wounds.  I also wonder if some kind of restorative justice efforts have been tried or might now be started to enable the victims and the defendant here to get some measure of peace and resolution that the New Jersey courts have been unable so far to provide.

Prior related post:

July 24, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, July 23, 2020

Ninth Circuit panel thoughtfully debates whether and when overtime parking fees might be an unconstitutional Excessive Fine

A Ninth Circuit panel yesterday handed down an interesting Eighth Amendment opinion on a topic that is (too) dear to my overtime parking heart. Here is how the majority opinion in Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, No. 18-56553 (9th Cir. July 22, 2020) (available here), gets started:

In the opening scene of La La Land, drivers stuck in traffic spontaneously sing and dance on top of their cars and in the streets.  Hollywood, however, rarely resembles reality.  On any given day, Los Angelenos sigh and despair when mired in traffic jams.  One small way the City of Los Angeles tries to alleviate traffic congestion is to impose time restrictions — and fines — for limited public parking spaces.  If a person parks her car past the allotted time limit and forces people to drive around in search of other parking spaces, she must pay a $63 fine.  And if she fails to pay the fine within 21 days, the City will impose a late-payment penalty of $63.

Appellants, who had parking fines and late fees levied against them, challenge the Los Angeles parking ordinance as violating the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.  We hold that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to municipal parking fines.  We affirm the district court's summary judgment order that the initial parking fine is not grossly disproportionate to the offense and thus survives constitutional scrutiny.  But we reverse and remand for the district court to determine whether the City’s late fee runs afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause.

The concurrence authored by Judge Bennett gets started this way:

Because the City of Los Angeles conceded that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to parking “fines,” I concur in the judgment.  I write separately because I do not believe the Excessive Fines Clause should routinely apply to parking meter violations.

July 23, 2020 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 22, 2020

You be the federal judge: what sentence for Senator Rand Paul's attacker at resentencing after 30 days deemed unreasonable?

Regular readers know that, more than 15 years after Booker created the reasonableness standard of appellate review for federal sentencing, circuit courts still almost never find a sentence to be "substantively unreasonable" upon a defendant's appeal claiming the sentence was too high.  But last year, a Sixth Circuit panel decided, upon an appeal by the government, that a high-profile sentence was "substantively unreasonable" as too low.  The ruling in US v. Boucher, No. 18-5683 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (available here), concerned the sentencing resulting from Senator Rand Paul's neighbor attacking him while he was was mowing his lawn in 2017.  Now, as this local article highlights, it is time for resentencing after the Sixth Circuit vacated Boucher’s sentence as substantively unreasonable:

Federal prosecutors have renewed a push for a 21-month sentence for the man who tackled and injured U.S. Sen. Rand Paul in November 2017.

Rene Boucher deserves to spend more time behind bars because of the serious injuries Paul sustained, including six broken ribs that left him in intense pain and led to bouts of pneumonia and damage that ultimately required removing part of Paul’s lung, Assistant U.S. Attorney Bradley P. Shepard said in a memorandum filed Monday.

Shepard also argued that the initial 30-day sentence against Boucher wasn’t enough to deter other potential assaults on members of Congress.  “‘Aggressive’ rhetoric directed at our elected leaders is at a dangerously high level,” Shepard wrote.  “Although this case is lacking in evidence of political motivation, it is still important, in this climate, to send a message to society as a whole that assaults and violence perpetrated against members of Congress will not be tolerated.”

Boucher’s attorney, however, has argued it would be unjust to send him back to prison after he’s already completed his initial sentence, and moved to dismiss the case.

U.S. District Judge Matthew F. Leitman scheduled a sentencing hearing for Boucher on July 27.  Lietman, a judge in Michigan, is sitting as a special judge in Boucher’s case.

Paul, a doctor elected to the Senate in 2010, and Boucher, also a physician, lived next door to each other in a gated community in Bowling Green.  In the summer of 2017, Boucher trimmed five maple trees that were on Paul’s property, but had limbs sticking over the property line onto Boucher’s side, according to a motion from Boucher’s attorney, Matthew J. Baker. In response, Paul piled up a large stack of limbs and brush near the property line in Boucher’s view, Baker said....

[On] Nov. 3, 2017, Boucher saw Paul mowing his yard. Paul blew leaves into Boucher’s lawn and then got off the mower, picked up some limbs and turned toward the place where Boucher had burned the debris the day before, Baker said. Boucher lost his temper, ran 60 yards and tackled Paul from behind....

Police first charged Boucher with misdemeanor assault in state court, but the federal government stepped in and prosecuted him under a law barring assaults on members of Congress.

Paul, a Republican, suggested in a letter to the court that there was a political motive behind the attack, saying that Boucher’s anger toward him “comingles with his hatred of my political policies.”  However, Boucher has said the attack was driven solely by his anger over the yard waste, and prosecutors have acknowledged there was no evidence of a political motivation.

Under advisory guidelines, Boucher faced a potential sentence from 21 to 27 months, though judges can impose sentences outside those guidelines.  U.S. District Judge Marianne O. Battani sentenced Boucher to 30 days in prison, a $10,000 fine and 100 hours of community service, noting Boucher’s military service, career as a doctor and his involvement in his church.

Prosecutors appealed the sentence, arguing it was unreasonably short.  The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a new sentencing hearing for Boucher, ruling last September that Battani didn’t give sufficient weight to the seriousness of Paul’s injuries or the need for deterrence, and didn’t sufficiently address the issue of the big difference in Boucher’s sentence and others involving federal assault cases.

In arguing for more time for Boucher, Shepard cited cases in which two people received as much jail time as he did only for throwing eggs at a member of Congress, and others in which people who attacked federal employees received much longer sentences.  The prosecutor also said that had Boucher’s case been handled in a Kentucky court, Paul’s injuries could have meant a charge of second-degree assault, punishable by five to 10 years in prison.

Baker, however, argued that Boucher’s initial sentence was legitimate and that putting him back in prison would amount to punishing him twice for the same crime....  Baker said it appears that the government is getting a do-over on Boucher’s sentencing because the victim is a U.S. senator.

Shepard, however, said it is not unusual for people to be re-sentenced after completing a sentence.  What Boucher wants, the prosecutor said, “is for those who have received exceptionally low sentences to get further special treatment in the form of a bar to resentencing.”

There are so many interesting elements to this resentencing, including the fact that there is a distinct new "outside judge" in charge of this resentencing.  I am inclined to predict Boucher will get a sentence somewhere between the 30 days originally imposed and the 21 months requested by the feds.  But I am eager to hear what readers think the new sentence should be. 

Prior related posts:

July 22, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (5)

Friday, July 17, 2020

Feds, revving up machinery of death, complete third execution of week

As reported in this Fox News piece, a "drug kingpin from Iowa was executed on Friday afternoon, after he was convicted of murdering two young women and three adults, marking the third time this week that a federal inmate has been put to death after a 17-year capital punishment hiatus." Here is more:

Department of Justice (DOJ) spokeswoman Kerri Kupec issued the following statement after the execution was carried out. “Today, Dustin Lee Honken was executed at USP Terre Haute in accordance with the death sentence imposed by a federal district court in 2004. Honken was pronounced dead at 4:36 p.m. EDT by the Vigo County Coroner," she wrote.

"In 1993, Honken, a meth kingpin, kidnapped, fatally shot, and buried Lori Duncan, a single, working mother, Duncan’s two young daughters — 10-year-old Kandi and 6-year-old Amber — and Greg Nicholson, a government informant who testified against Honken on federal drug trafficking charges. Honken also murdered Terry DeGeus, who Honken thought might also testify against him, by beating him with a bat and shooting him. On October 14, 2004, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa found Honken guilty of numerous federal offenses, including five counts of continuing criminal enterprise murder, and he was sentenced to death."...

Honken had also befriended Daniel Lewis Lee, 47, who was the first federal inmate to die this week, hours after the Supreme Court greenlit the first federal execution to take place since 2003. Lee was convicted of multiple offenses, including three counts of murder in aid of racketeering in the 1996 slayings of William Frederick Mueller, his wife Nancy Ann Mueller and his 8-year-old stepdaughter, Sarah Elizabeth Powell, in Arkansas.

Wesley Ira Purkey was the second man to be put to death two days later, after being convicted in the 1998 kidnapping and killing of 16-year-old Jennifer Long, whose body was dismembered, burned and dumped in a septic pond. That same year, Purkey was also convicted in a state court in Kansas after using a claw hammer to kill an 80-year-old woman who had polio.

After Honken was convicted in 2004, the jury recommended a death sentence. U.S. District Judge Mark Bennett -- who claimed to mostly oppose the death penalty -- said, “I am not going to lose any sleep if he is executed,” The Associated Press reported.

Recent prior related posts:

July 17, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 10, 2020

Is releasing people from prison really that hard? I suppose it is if you cannot shake a carceral mindset.

The question in the title of this post is my response to this recent lengthy Atlantic commentary by Barbara Bradley Hagerty headlined "Releasing People From Prison Is Easier Said Than Done: As the pandemic threatens the lives of those behind bars, the country must confront a system that has never had rehabilitation as its priority."  This piece is reform-minded, and I recommend it, but its headline, much of its prose, and its overall spirit embrace a kind of carceral mentality that serves to reify a mass incarceration message.  These excerpts, as I will explain below, spotlight my concerns:

Some governors, alarmed at the deaths in prisons and jails and worried about the risk to surrounding communities, are listening — sort of, with an ear attuned to the political liability. More than half of the states have agreed to release people convicted of low-level crimes, people who are nearing the end of their sentences, or people who merit compassionate release, such as pregnant people or older, vulnerable inmates.

“It’s been helpful. I know that people have gotten out, and I am moved by their release,” says Nicole Porter, the director of advocacy at the Sentencing Project, a research organization that campaigns for sentencing reform. “But none of it has been substantial.  And what I hope this moment tells us is that our incarceration rate is a function of politics — because there are many questions about who needs to be incarcerated.”

To meaningfully reduce America’s prison population and slow the pandemic will require cutting away not just fat but muscle, releasing not just nonviolent drug offenders but those convicted of violent crimes.  The difficulty of doing so, in both practical and moral terms, is enormous.  Which people convicted of murder or armed robbery do we release? How do we decide?  And how do we guarantee that they won’t offend again, especially as they try to restart their life during the worst economic collapse in nearly a century?...

Advocates say prisons are brimming with candidates who deserve a second chance—men and women who made egregious mistakes when they were young, whose crimes say more about the impulsiveness of youth and the trickiness of navigating inner-city violence than they do about character.  Yet in large part, these are not people whom the system has been preparing for release.

Prison can serve many purposes — to deter people from committing crimes in the first place, to punish them if they do, or to rehabilitate them and usher them back to normal life. America has by and large chosen the punitive path, imposing decades-long sentences intended to reduce crime on the streets.  During that time, inmates usually don’t receive the kind of training or care that would enable them to return to the outside world and build a new, stable life. This presents a giant hurdle for those who would wish to release prisoners now....

Those are the practical challenges.  The moral question — who deserves to be released? — is even more daunting.  Is the inmate truly penitent, or merely saying the right words? Has he matured past his violent tendencies, or is he a tinderbox waiting to ignite once he’s out?  Does the family of the victim agree, or will his release only add to their pain?  Is the crime simply so heinous that even a perfect record cannot overcome it?

The last paragraph I have excerpted here is perhaps the clearest example of a carceral mindset: when asking "who deserves to be released?", the writer is necessarily assuming that everyone incarcerated not only already "deserves" to be incarcerated, but also "deserves" to continue to be incarcerated.  Further, the author then suggests that, to "deserve" release, an "inmate" must be "truly penitent" AND must have "matured past his violent tendencies" AND must have the "family of the victim agree." And, even then it seems, a "perfect record" still should not permit release amidst a global pandemic killing hundreds of prisoners if a person's crime is "simply so heinous."

For anyone eager to see a US criminal justice system operating with a deep commitment to liberty and justice, this thinking should be — must be — completely flipped.  The proper "daunting" moral question  is who deserves to still be incarcerated, especially amidst a global pandemic with inherently and worsening inhumane prison conditions.  If an incarcerated person is "truly penitent" OR likely has "matured past his violent tendencies" OR has the "family of the victim" in support, then that person ought no longer be incarcerated.  And, even without anything close to a "perfect record," an alternative to incarceration should still be the presumption for any and everyone whose crime or criminal record is not truly heinous.

Similar rhetoric earlier in the piece is comparably problematic, such as the query "how do we guarantee that they won’t offend again" when considering who to release from prison.  It is important — and I think this piece means to get us usefully thinking about — the importance of prison programming and outside support that seeks to minimize the risk of recidivism for persons leaving prison.  But we are never going to be able to "guarantee" that any cohort of individuals will never commit any kind of crime.  When we consider building a new highway, nobody expects public officials to "guarantee" there will never be an accident on that highway.  We want a new road to be as safe as possible, but we recognize that the array of benefits that can come from having a new road generally justify the inevitable public safety risks it creates.   Similarly, we must be ever mindful of the array of benefits that can come from having less people in prison and not demand or even suggest that people should be released from prison only if and only when public officials can "guarantee that they won’t offend again."

Finally, for now at least, I must again lament the tendency in so many of these kinds of discussions to start with the framing that meaningful action here "will require cutting away not just fat but muscle, releasing not just nonviolent drug offenders but those convicted of violent crimes."  I agree that cutting away the "fat" may not alone be enough, but let's focus on getting that hard work done before we fixate on the additional challenges of cutting "muscle."  As this great Prison Policy Initiative pie chart reminds us, roughly 50% of our national prison and jail populations are serving time for what are deemed "non-violent" offenses.  When we let out all or most or even some significant portion of this million+ people in cages, then I will be more than ready to wring my hands over which "violent" offenders to release.  But to now get deeply concerned about exactly which "people convicted of murder or armed robbery" should be released risks creating the impression that these types of offenders are the bulk of our prison populations, when they comprise less than 25% of all the people put in cages in the so-called home of the free and land of the brave.  (Also, for the very most serious of offenders, the debate is much less complicated since presumptive release when they are elderly or ill generally makes the most sense.)

I could go on and on, but I hope my point is clear.  Even as we discuss reform and recognize all the challenges surrounding decarceration efforts, we must be ever mindful of how decades of mass incarceration has not only badly hurt our nation and our values, but also badly hurt how we talk and think about doing better.

July 10, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, July 06, 2020

Puzzling though crime data, practically and politically, in the crazy year that is 2020

This new New York Times piece discusses the latest crime data as we head into the back half of 2020.  The piece's full headline captures its themes: "It’s Been ‘Such a Weird Year.’ That’s Also Reflected in Crime Statistics: In large cities across America, murders are up sharply, while other violent crimes have decreased."  Here are excerpts:

The national numbers for murder and other types of violent crime rarely move in opposite directions. But this is no ordinary year.

Overall crime is down 5.3 percent in 25 large American cities relative to the same period in 2019, with violent crime down 2 percent.

But murder in these 25 cities is up 16.1 percent in relation to last year. It’s not just a handful of cities driving this change, either. Property crime is down in 18 of the 25 sampled cities, and violent crime is down in 11 of them, but murder is up in 20 of the cities....

Homicides usually rise in the summer, which coincided this year with many people emerging from pandemic lockdown. In one recent weekend in Chicago, 14 people were killed and at least 106 people were shot, the most in eight years. And as The New York Times reported recently: “It has been nearly a quarter century since New York City experienced as much gun violence in the month of June as it has seen this year.” (On Sunday night, the city reportedly had nine killings in the previous 24 hours.)

An additional 17 cities provide year-to-date murder data. Murder is up 21.8 percent in all 36 cities with 2020 data through at least May, with 29 of those cities seeing an increase this year relative to last year.

How often do murder and other types of violent crime move in opposite directions? There have been only four years since 1960 (1993, 2000, 2002 and 2003) when murder increased but overall violent crime decreased nationally, and the increase in murder was small in each of those years. The average absolute difference between the national change in murder and violent crime since 1990 has been just 2.2 percent, so a big increase in murder nationally while violent crime falls is almost unheard-of.

But this year has been distinct in many ways, because of the pandemic and because of the protests and civil unrest after the death of George Floyd in police custody. Jerry Ratcliffe, a professor of criminal justice at Temple University and host of the Reducing Crime podcast, has cautioned against comparing crime figures in one year with the previous year. This year’s upheaval may be even more reason to be cautious.

Identifying the trend in murder statistics is relatively easy. Understanding why it is happening and what can be done about it is much harder. Phillip Atiba Goff, co-founder and C.E.O. of the Center for Policing Equity, points to increased domestic violence as one possible cause of the increase in murder. “The first explanation that I have is that this comes from people being locked inside (during quarantines) and a lack of social services,” he said. “All those things are things that we would expect to lead to higher rates of violence. That’s speculation, though. I have no evidence that that’s the right thing other than the rise in calls for domestic violence.”

Mr. Ratcliffe agrees that increased domestic violence may be playing a role. He also hypothesizes that “Covid-19 could have reduced the market and opportunities for recreational drug use/dealing, which puts stress on the drug markets and increases violence.”

“If that is one of the causes, then we might see those tensions ease as lockdowns are relieved,” he said.

Jennifer Doleac, associate professor of economics and director of the Justice Tech Lab at Texas A&M, said: “People are worried about increasing domestic violence, and that could certainly lead to increases in homicide. Any kind of crime where most of it is between strangers or requires people being out and about would be down, and homicide is usually between people who know each other, so it might be affected differently.”

It’s plausible that the increase in murder this year might reflect a trend that began before the pandemic got underway. A review of the percent change in murder in 10 cities before coronavirus struck (generally defined as through February or March) and those cities’ most recent June update for the year so far shows a worse year-to-date percent change in eight of them, suggesting that the trend may have accelerated over the last few months....

Some research suggests that a loss of trust in law enforcement can cause citizens to be reluctant to contact the police, and people may be more likely to take justice into their own hands to resolve disputes.

It’s important to keep the rise in historical perspective. Murder in New York was up 25 percent compared with last year as of June 14, but that total was the same one the city had in 2015. Murder is up 22 percent in Chicago, but it’s down 6 percent from where it was at this time in 2017. Murder is up 42 percent in New Orleans, but a year ago murder was its lowest point there in almost half a century.

“These numbers do not tell a story that supports any ideological side of the debate around policing,” Mr. Goff said. “What it supports at most is a need for rigorous curiosity about a vital issue.” Ms. Doleac also says it is too early to draw any firm conclusions: “This is such a weird year in so many dimensions, and it’s going to take us a while to figure out what caused any of these differences in crime. It is perfectly reasonable to think the first half of this year may not tell us what the rest of the year will look like.”...

“The reality is that we just don’t know” what’s driving the change in murder, Mr. Goff said, “and it’s not a straightforward process to figure it out.”

Notably, Prez Trump already has released a campaign ad seeking to tie police reform efforts to increased crime. If homicide numbers keep going up and up in big cities like New York and Chicago, I would expect the Trump campaign to continue to try to stoke up fear of crime and continue to claim that he is the only "law and order" candidate.  That political playbook worked pretty well for Richard Nixon in 1968 and for George H.W. Bush in 1988, and the next few months will show if it can work for Donald Trump.

One final macabre observation: as I reflect on crime data circa July 2020, I am finding that the COVID pandemic skews my perspective on some of the numbers.  These crime data on New York City reports 176 murders in roughly the first six months of 2020 compared to 143 murders during the same period in 2019.  While that is a troubling 23% increase in NYC murders for the first half of the year, it is still well less than half of the 500+ daily deaths from COVID that NYC experienced in early April. Though there are lots of problems with comparing data on homicides and COVID deaths, I am finding that the grim COVID death data that we are all still processing make even elevated homicide numbers look not quite as frightening.  Of course, a global pandemic should not make us complacent about crime, but I am still struck by how the reality and reactions to crime is always going to be contextual and contingent.

Prior related posts:

July 6, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, National and State Crime Data, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 26, 2020

"COVID-19 and Homicide: Final Report to Arnold Ventures"

The title of this post is the title of this very interesting new empirical paper that I can across yesterday. The 13-page work is authored by Thomas Abt, Richard Rosenfeld and Ernesto Lopez.  Here is its summary:

Did crime rates decline in response to the actions taken to address the COVID-19 pandemic?  Several reports have suggested that they did, in the United States and other nations (e.g., Jacoby, Stucka, and Phillips 2020; Mohler, Bertozzi, Carter, et al. 2020; Police Executive Research Forum 2020; Semple and Ahmed 2020).  Some cautioned that crime was not falling at the same pace everywhere, however, and in some US cities it was rising (Dolmetsch, Pettersson, Yasiejko 2020). These accounts are typically based on small samples of cities and brief time periods.

By contrast, the current study, to our knowledge the largest to date, compares monthly homicide rates in 64 US cities during January through June of 2020 with the previous three-year average homicide rates during the same months. We focus on homicide because it is the most serious and reliably measured criminal offense.  We find that, compared with the previous three-year average, homicide rates decreased during April and May of 2020.  Not all cities experienced a homicide decline, however, and the decreases during April were roughly twice as large as those in May.  With few exceptions, we did not find sizable differences between the cities in which homicides dropped and those where they rose.  We conclude by discussing several reasons why homicide rates in US cities might increase over the next several months.

June 26, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, National and State Crime Data, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 22, 2020

No new cert grants from SCOTUS as Justice Thomas laments failure to take up whether First Amendment limits criminalizing "reckless threats"

This morning's Supreme Court order list yet again lacks any new grants of certiorari (which, as explained in this recent post, I have come to expect from this court).  But, showcasing as he did last week that he will call out his colleagues for failing to take up issues he considers important, Justice Thomas has a dissent from the denial of cert in Kansas v. Boettger, No. 19–1051.  Here is how this six-page dissent gets started:

Kansas asks us to decide whether the First Amendment prohibits States from criminalizing threats to “[c]ommit violence . . . in reckless disregard of the risk of causing . . . fear.” Kan. Stat. Ann. §21–5415(a)(1) (2018).  Respondent Timothy Boettger was convicted for telling the son of a police detective that he “‘was going to end up finding [his] dad in a ditch.’” ___ Kan. ___, ___, 450 P. 3d 805, 807 (2019).  Respondent Ryan Johnson was separately convicted for telling his mother that he “‘wish[ed] [she] would die,’” that he would “‘help [her] get there,’” and that he was “‘going to f***ing kill [her] a***.’” ___ Kan. ___, ___, 450 P. 3d 790, 792 (2019).  The Kansas Supreme Court overturned both convictions and held that reckless threats are protected by the First Amendment, relying on Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).

In my view, the Constitution likely permits States to criminalize threats even in the absence of any intent to intimidate. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 760– 767 (2015) (dissenting opinion).  It appears to follow that threats of violence made in reckless disregard of causing fear may be prohibited.  The Kansas Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion by overreading our decision in Black, which did not answer the question presented here.  Other courts looking to Black, however, have upheld similar statutes.  State v. Taupier, 330 Conn. 149, 193 A.3d 1 (2018); Major v. State, 301 Ga. 147, 800 S.E.2d 348 (2017).  I would grant the petition for certiorari to resolve the split on this important question.

June 22, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, June 20, 2020

"The Categorical Imperative as a Decarceral Agenda"

The title of this post is the title of this new essay authored by Jessica Eaglin recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Despite recent modest reductions in state prison populations, Franklin Zimring argues in his forthcoming book that mass incarceration remains persistent and intractable.  As a path forward, Zimring urges states to adopt pragmatic, structural reforms that incentivize the reduction of prison populations through a “categorical imperative,” meaning, by identifying subcategories of offenders best suited for diversion from prison sentences at the state level.  This decarceral method is at odds with popular sentencing reforms in the states.

By exploring the tensions between reform trends in practice and Zimring’s proscription, this Essay illuminates a deeper concern with sentencing reforms in the era of mass incarceration.  Reforms focused on categorizing offenders can obscure and sustain policymakers’ persistent tendency to frame social problems as matters of crime and punishment. Recognizing this shortcoming upfront has important implications for scholars and policymakers alike when contemplating the methodologies that should inform sentencing reforms going forward.

June 20, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 04, 2020

"The Federal Judiciary’s Role in Drug Law Reform in an Era of Congressional Dysfunction"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article now available via SSRN authored by Erica Zunkel and Alison Siegler. Here is its abstract:

While state drug law reform is moving apace, federal drug law reform has moved much more slowly.  Many, including the Judicial Conference of the United States and the United States Sentencing Commission, have urged Congress to enact substantive federal drug law reform for years.  But Congress has not acted.  As a result, the federal system continues to single out drug offenses for harsh treatment at the front end — the bail stage — and the back end — the sentencing stage — of a case.

This article examines the judiciary’s crucial role in federal drug law reform at the front and back ends of a drug case.  On the front end, judges should encourage the release of more people on bail by closely scrutinizing prosecutors’ motions for temporary detention in drug cases and giving little, if any, weight to the Bail Reform Act’s presumption of detention at the detention hearing stage.  Data shows that the drug presumption is over-broad and does a poor job of determining who is a risk of flight or a danger to the community.  At the back end, judges should issue categorical policy disagreements with the drug sentencing guideline and the career offender sentencing guideline under the Supreme Court’s rationale in Kimbrough v. United States.  These guidelines are not based on empirical evidence and national experience, and therefore do not exemplify the Sentencing Commission’s “exercise of its characteristic institutional role.”  At both ends, judges should emphasize the evidence that the drug presumption, the drug sentencing guideline, and the career offender sentencing guideline are flawed.  While these actions are not a cure for Congress’ inaction, they send a clear message from one co-equal branch of government to another that substantive reform is urgently needed.

June 4, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 27, 2020

Council on Criminal Justice releases big new reform report titled "Next Steps: An Agenda for Federal Action on Safety and Justice"

I noted in this post this last summer the notable new group working toward criminal justice reform called the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ).  I flagged here the CCJ's great set of papers and resources taking a close look at the 1994 Crime Bill (which I had a chance to contribute to as noted here); I also flagged here from December a big CCJ report on "Trends in Correctional Control by Race and Sex."  Today, I am excited to see and report on the CCJ's latest (and arguably most important) work, this big new report titled "Next Steps: An Agenda for Federal Action on Safety and Justice."  This press release provides a useful summary of the report and its major recommendations:

Well before COVID-19 surfaced, the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) established an independent task force to chart a course for federal action on criminal justice reform.  The pandemic has underscored the urgency of that effort, and today the Task Force on Federal Priorities released a report detailing 15 achievable, evidence-based proposals for change.  If fully implemented, key recommendations would:

  • Eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug crimes, reducing the prison population
  • Establish a “second look” provision allowing people serving longer sentences -– many of them elderly and infirm –- to ask courts for a sentence reduction
  • Help formerly incarcerated people succeed by sealing certain criminal records from public view
  • Create independent oversight of the federal prison system to improve conditions for incarcerated people and staff, strengthen reentry planning and other services, and hold employees accountable for misconduct
  • Resolve the federal-state conflict over recreational and medical cannabis by providing federal waivers to states that have legalized it
  • Dedicate millions of grant dollars to reducing victimization and trauma in cities most affected by violence...

The 14-member Task Force was established in June of 2019 to build on federal reforms adopted under the FIRST STEP Act, which passed with strong bipartisan support at the end of 2018.  While crime and incarceration rates have dropped, there is broad agreement across the political spectrum that more must be done to make communities safe and guarantee justice — not just by states and localities, where most criminal justice happens, but also by the federal government, which runs the country’s largest correctional system and helps set the tone of the national conversation.

Through their vigorous deliberations, Task Force members zeroed in on reforms that not only target critical needs, but also are politically viable and hold the potential to make the greatest improvements in safety and the administration of justice. Reflecting the commitment of Task Force members to bipartisan, data-driven solutions, all 15 proposals are accompanied by a policy rationale, detailed implementation steps, and a summary of the research and evidence that support them.

Task Force members represent a broad cross-section of stakeholders: former federal prosecutors and defenders; a former mayor and a veteran police leader; experts in prisoner reentry, substance use, and victim rights; and advocates and formerly incarcerated people. Task Forces are strictly independent of CCJ and solely responsible for the content of their reports.  Members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.

Regular readers will not be surprised to hear that I am a big fan of a lot of these recommendations, and I actually like this full list of all 15 recommendations even more than those summarized in the press release. In a few subsequent posts, I hope to give particular attention and scrutiny to the various key sentencing recommendations.  For now I will be content to say, good work CCJ!

May 27, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Recommended reading, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)