Tuesday, October 13, 2020

Noticing a lurking Eighth Amendment issue in SCOTUS arguments over statute of limitations for military rape prosecutions

The US Supreme Court issued another order list this morning with little of interest for sentencing fans, and I am not expecting much criminal law discussion in the on-going confirmation hearings for Judge Amy Coney Barrett.  But SCOTUS is hearing oral argument today in US v. Briggs, which is worth watching for reasons Evan Lee explains in this post at SCOTUSblog under the title "Case preview: Determining the statute of limitations for military rape — and possibly a lot more."  Here is an excerpt:

When the Supreme Court entertains argument on Tuesday in United States v. Briggswhich had originally been scheduled for Monday, March 23, it will be asked to decide whether three men convicted of military rape should not have been prosecuted in the first place because of the statute of limitations.  And, should each side’s principal argument fail, the court may be forced to decide a bigger question: whether the Eighth Amendment prohibition against capital punishment for non-homicide rape applies to rape in the military.

This litigation consists of three consolidated cases, which all involve male military personnel convicted of raping female military personnel.  Michael Briggs, Richard Collins and Humphrey Daniels claim that the statute of limitations should have barred their prosecutions.  The government argues that there is no statute of limitations for military rape because Congress exempted all military crimes punishable by death from limitations.  The defendants counter that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for all rapes not involving fatalities, including military rapes.  That, in turn, means there is a statute of limitations for military rape, and it expired before any of the three men were prosecuted.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces agreed with the defendants....

A key issue in this litigation is which subsection of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. Section 843, applies: subsection (a), which states that “any [military] offense punishable by death may be tried and punished at any time without limitation,” or subsection (b), which creates a five-year statute of limitations for other military offenses.  The government argues that Section 843(a) applies because military rape is made “punishable by death” by 10 U.S.C. Section 920(a), which states, “Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse, by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.”  The three defendants argue that military rape is not “punishable by death” because the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment precedents prohibit capital punishment for non-fatality rapes.  And if military rape is not punishable by death, then the applicable limitations period is the default provision of Section 843(b)....

At oral argument, it will be interesting to see whether any of the justices demonstrate an appetite for the constitutional issue, or whether they think the statutory interpretation questions are dispositive.  

I strongly agree it will be interesting to see how the Justices may bring up the Eighth Amendment during oral argument today, and I will plan to update this post accordingly.

UPDATE: The oral argument transcript in Briggs is now available here.  A quick search reveals the term "Eighth Amendment" coming up 32 times over the transcript's 65 pages.  Over at Crime & Consequences, Kent Scheidegger has this extended post on the case under the title "The Eighth Amendment and Statutes of Limitations." Here is how this post starts and ends:

What do statutes of limitations and the constitutional ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” have to do with each other? The logical answer is “nothing.” But the law follows strange paths, and the two issues crossed in today’s Supreme Court argument on the statute of limitations for rape in the military justice system....

I won’t venture a prediction based on this argument. If the eight justices divide four-four, we might be seeing a reargument.

October 13, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 08, 2020

"Decarceration and Default Mental States"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Benjamin Levin now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

This Essay, presented at “Guilty Minds: A Virtual Conference on Mens Rea and Criminal Justice Reform” at ASU’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, examines the politics of federal mens rea reform legislation.  I argue that current mens rea policy debates reflect an overly narrow vision of criminal justice reform.  Therefore, I suggest an alternative frame through which to view mens rea reform efforts — a frame that resonates with radical structural critiques that have gained ground among activists and academics.

Common arguments for and against mens rea reform reflect a belief that the problem with the criminal system is one of miscalibration: To the reform proponents, criminal law, incarceration, and the institutions of the U.S. criminal system are necessary for dealing with “real criminals,” but overcriminalization, strict liability crimes, and sloppily drafted statutes cause undeserving and “otherwise law-abiding” people to suffer.  To reform opponents, the criminal system might be flawed (see, e.g., the War on Drugs, racial disparities, police violence, etc.), but that doesn’t mean it is illegitimate or without important uses.  The brutalities of the system’s treatment of marginalized people don’t indicate an irredeemable system; rather, prosecutors could right the balance by shifting their attention to the wealthy and “white collar” offenders, and lawmakers and judges could grease the wheels of these prosecutions by reducing the burden on prosecutors to prove mens rea elements.  Arguments from opponents and proponents offer little to commentators who see the problems with the criminal system as deeper or more intractable — problems of structure, rather than scope.

Ultimately, therefore, I offer a different frame for mens rea reform and for understanding the stakes of the debate that might resonate with more radical critics.  I suggest that mens rea reform can be analogized to the rule of lenity and the libertarian or anti-statist aspects of the Bill of Rights — these rules are not solely focused on sorting the guilty and the innocent; rather, I suggest, they can be viewed as “anti-criminalization” rules, directives to put a thumb on the scale in favor of defendants and against the state, state violence, and criminal punishment.  Framed in this way, I argue that mens rea reform should be appealing to commentators concerned about mass incarceration, state violence, and the sweeping reach of criminal law and its enforcement.  Perhaps more provocatively, I also argue that mens rea reform could be understood as consistent with more radical calls for abolition or dismantling of the carceral state.

October 8, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (0)

"A Willful Choice: The Ineffective and Incompassionate Application of Wisconsin’s Criminal Laws in Combating the Opioid Crisis"

The title of this post is the title of this paper recently posted to SSRN authored by Emily O'Brien. Here is its abstract:

Wisconsin’s drug-induced homicide law, known as the Len Bias law, was intended to prosecute for-profit drug dealers and was rarely charged for several decades after it was enacted in 1986.  In recent years, prosecutors have brought hundreds of Len Bias charges in response to opioid deaths.  Often, these charges are brought against overdose victims’ friends and family members — people who are also mired in addiction and who shared or helped obtain the fatal drug.  In contrast, Wisconsin’s Good Samaritan overdose law (GSOL), enacted in 2014, focuses on harm reduction.  If a person calls for help when another person is overdosing, the law provides both people with some insulation from prosecution of a range of drug-related charges.  These laws approach the problem of overdose death from very different angles: The Len Bias law punishes addicts for their role in overdose deaths, while the GSOL offers addicts protection from prosecution in order to encourage calls for medical intervention in overdose situations.  Unfortunately, the current implementation of the Len Bias law diminishes the potential of GSOL to save lives because addicts are faced the possibility of a homicide charge when they summon help for an overdose victim.

With the rise of lethal synthetic opioids in Wisconsin, the criminal justice system must adjust its current laws and practices in order to reduce overdose deaths.  The criminalization of addiction represented by the Len Bias law thwarts rehabilitation efforts, miring addicts in a cycle of incarceration and drug use that ends with death in too many cases.  This Comment proposes a solution: separating addicts from for-profit drug dealers in the eyes of the law by implementing a joint-user defense in Len Bias cases. Addicts are more likely to use opioids with other addicts than alone.  By removing the possibility of a homicide conviction, addicts will more readily utilize the GSOL and call for medical intervention when a fellow addict is overdosing. Additionally, separating addicts from dealers allows the Len Bias law to be charged in accordance with its intended purpose, while freeing up investigatory and prosecutorial resources for the more complex task of investigating commercial drug dealers and disrupting the drug trade.  This proposed solution would begin to align Wisconsin’s criminal laws with the state’s rehabilitation-focused public health efforts at combating opioid addiction in communities and reducing overdose deaths.

October 8, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 06, 2020

Feds officially seek SCOTUS certiorari to review First Circuit's reversal of Boston Marathon bombers death sentence

As reported in this Boston Globe piece, "Federal prosecutors on Tuesday formally filed their request for the US Supreme Court to review an appeals court ruling in July that threw out the death penalty in the case against Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev." Here is more (links from the original):

The 424-page request, known as a writ of certiorari, raises two questions for the high court to consider.

First, it asks whether the District Court should have allowed “evidence that respondent’s older brother was allegedly involved in different crimes two years before the offenses for which respondent was convicted.”

Second, the document asks whether the federal appeals court that overturned Tsarnaev’s death sentence made a mistake in concluding that the District Court should have asked “each prospective juror for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage that he or she had read, heard, or seen about respondent’s case.”...

The move by prosecutors comes after the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on July 31 issued a 182-page ruling that infuriated some survivors, finding that George A. O’Toole Jr., who presided over Tsarnaev’s high-profile 2015 trial in US District Court in Boston, “did not meet the standard” of fairness while presiding over jury selection....

With their filing Tuesday, prosecutors formally asked the Supreme Court to take up the matter. If the high court, which agrees to hear only a fraction of the cases submitted to the panel for review each year, does review the case, it could affirm the appellate decision or reverse it, reinstating Tsarnaev’s death sentence.  Tsarnaev, now 27, remains incarcerated at a federal supermax prison in Colorado. 

Prior recent related posts:

October 6, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, September 21, 2020

"Wage Theft Criminalization"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Benjamin Levin now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Over the past decade, workers’ rights activists and legal scholars have embraced the language of “wage theft” in describing the abuses of the contemporary workplace.  The phrase invokes a certain moral clarity: theft is wrong.  The phrase is not merely a rhetorical flourish. Increasingly, it has a specific content for activists, politicians, advocates, and academics: wage theft speaks the language of criminal law, and wage theft is a crime that should be punished.  Harshly.  Self-proclaimed “progressive prosecutors” have made wage theft cases a priority, and left-leaning politicians in the United States and abroad have begun to propose more criminal statutes to reach wage theft.

In this Article, I examine the drive to criminalize wage theft.  In the literature on workers’ rights, “wage theft” has been accepted uncritically as a distinct problem.  But the literature fails to grapple with what makes wage theft clearly distinguishable from other abusive practices endemic to capitalism.  For scholars concerned about worker power and economic inequality, does classifying one class of conduct “wage theft” actually serve to legitimate the other injustices of the labor market?

Further, the literature on wage theft has failed to reckon with the stakes of using criminal law and incarceration as the tools to remedy workplace violations.  Absent from the discourse on wage theft is any engagement with one of the most vital contemporary movements to confront structural inequality: the fight to end mass incarceration.  Despite insistence from proponents of wage theft criminalization that their focus is on society’s most marginalized, particularly poor people of color, these advocates have turned to a criminal system that is widely viewed as inimical to the interests of those same marginalized populations.  Moreover, in calling for criminal prosecution, many commentators have embraced the same actors and institutions that have decimated poor communities and constructed a hyper-policed population.  By resituating wage theft within the literature on mass incarceration, I examine the limitations of using criminalization to redress economic injustices.  I frame pro-criminalization arguments within the growing literature and activist discourse on decarceration and abolition, examining why criminalization of wage theft is and might be particularly problematic.

September 21, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 17, 2020

At re-re-re-sentencing, Amy Locane gets eight years in New Jersey state prison for drunk driving vehicular manslaughter

Because it is such an interesting case (and perhaps because I watched Melrose Place way back when), I have blogged repeatedly about the sentencings saga of Amy Locane after her conviction in a tragic and deadly drunk driving case.  Today, Locane was sentenced for the fourth time in this matter, and this Fox News piece provides the details:

Amy Locane has been resentenced to eight years in state prison for a fatal 2010 drunk driving crash that occurred in New Jersey. The former “Melrose Place” actress, 48, has already served a prison sentence but a judge agreed with prosecutors Thursday that her initial sentence was too lenient.

State Superior Court Judge Angela Borkowski said Locane still refuses to fully acknowledge her culpability in the crash that killed 60-year-old Helene Seeman and severely injured Seeman's husband.  State law requires her to serve more than six years before being eligible for parole.  Locane apologized to the Seeman family in a brief statement.  She was placed in handcuffs and taken into custody by court deputies after the proceeding in state court in Somerville.

It was a startling development in a case that has bounced around the New Jersey court system for nearly a decade and has now featured four sentencings in front of three judges, plus numerous appeals.

Locane — who acted in 13 episodes of the popular 1990s Fox series and has also appeared in several movies — was convicted on several counts including vehicular manslaughter, and faced a sentencing range of five to 10 years on the most serious count. The state initially sought a seven-year sentence, but a trial judge sentenced her to three years in 2013.  An appeals court ruled he misapplied the law, but at a resentencing, the same judge declined to give her additional time.

Last year, a different judge sentenced her to five years, but an appeals court ruled he didn't follow guidelines it had set and ordered yet another sentencing.  Locane's attorney, James Wronko, had argued unsuccessfully that sentencing her again would violate double jeopardy protections since she had already completed her initial sentence and parole term.

According to witnesses, Locane had consumed several drinks before she headed home on the night of the accident and slammed into the Seemans' car as it turned into their driveway in Montgomery Township, near Princeton.  The actress contended a third motorist, whose car Locane had bumped into at a traffic light minutes earlier, distracted her by honking at and chasing her.  Locane wasn't indicted for drunken driving, but a state expert testified her blood alcohol level was likely about three times the legal limit and that she was driving roughly 53 mph (85 kmh) in a 35-mph (56-kmh) zone at the time of the crash.

Fred Seeman, who nearly died from his injuries suffered in the crash, attended Thursday's proceeding and said Locane's shifting of blame "shows contempt for this court and the jury that rendered the verdict.”  The judge took a similar view, and said Locane's past alcohol abuse makes her a risk for reoffending.

“You made a conscious decision to drink that day and continued to drink, recognizing at the onset that you needed a ride but didn’t obtain one," Borkowski said.  "If you hadn’t gotten behind the wheel of your vehicle on this night, the incident never would have happened.” Wronko called the sentence “outrageous.  She has always taken full responsibility," and criticized the judge for not taking into account Locane's current sobriety and her work counseling others against alcohol abuse.

Locane has 45 days to appeal her sentence. Wronko said he is waiting to see if the state Supreme Court decides to hear his appeal on the double jeopardy question.

Prior related posts:

September 17, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, September 14, 2020

Bureau of Justice Statistics reports encouraging crime declines in release of results of 2019 National Crime Victimization Survey

As reported in this press release and as fully detailed in this 53-page report, the Bureau of Justice Statistics has just published the results from its annual survey of households about their experiences with crime. Notably, most other reports about crime rates are based on crimes reported to police, but this annual survey in different: "TheNCVS is the nation's largest crime survey and collects data on nonfatal crimes both reported and not reported to police." Here are some of the statistical highlights via the press release:

After rising from 1.1 million in 2015 to 1.4 million in 2018, the number of persons who were victims of violent crime excluding simple assault dropped to 1.2 million in 2019, the Bureau of Justice Statistics announced today. Statistics on crimes that have occurred in 2020, during the coronavirus pandemic, are being collected now and will be reported next year....

The rate of violent crime excluding simple assault declined 15% from 2018 to 2019, from 8.6 to 7.3 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older.  Among females, the rate of violent victimization excluding simple assault fell 27% from 2018 to 2019, from 9.6 to 7.0 victimizations per 1,000 females age 12 or older.  Violent crimes other than simple assault are those that are generally prosecuted as a felony.

From 2018 to 2019, the portion of U.S. residents age 12 or older who were victims of one or more violent crimes excluding simple assault fell from 0.50% to 0.44%, a 12% decrease.  There were 880,000 fewer victims of serious violent or property crimes (generally felonies) in 2019 than in 2018, a 19% drop. From 2018 to 2019, 29% fewer black persons and 22% fewer white persons were victims of serious crimes.  Victims of serious crimes are those who experienced a serious violent crime or whose household experienced a completed burglary or completed motor-vehicle theft.

This year, BJS provides new classifications of urban, suburban and rural areas, with the goal of presenting a more accurate picture of where criminal victimizations occur. Based on the NCVS’s new classifications, the rate of violent victimization in urban areas declined from 26.5 victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older in 2018 to 21.1 per 1,000 in 2019, a 20% decrease from 2018 to 2019.

Nationally, rape or sexual assault victimizations declined from 2.7 per 1,000 persons age 12 or older in 2018 to 1.7 per 1,000 in 2019. Across all crime types, victimizations reflect the total number of times people or households were victimized by crime. Based on the 2019 survey, less than half (41%) of violent victimizations were reported to police. The percentage of violent victimizations reported to police was lower for white victims (37%) than for black (49%) or Hispanic victims (49%).

In 2019, there were 5.4 million total violent incidents involving victims age 12 or older. The portion of violent incidents involving black offenders (25%) was 2.3 times the portion involving black victims (11%), while the portion involving white offenders (50%) was 0.8 times the portion involving white victims (62%) and the portion involving Asian offenders (1.0%) was 0.4 times the portion involving Asian victims (2.3%).

The 2019 survey found that an estimated 12.8 million U.S. households experienced one or more property victimizations, which include burglaries, residential trespassing, motor-vehicle thefts and other thefts. The rate of property crime declined 6% from 2018 (108.2 victimizations per 1,000 households) to 2019 (101.4 per 1,000).

This decline in property crime was partly due to a 22% decrease in burglary from 2018 to 2019 (from 15.0 to 11.7 burglary victimizations per 1,000 households). Moreover, the rate of burglary victimization declined to the lowest level since the NCVS was redesigned in 1993.

In addition to being eager to celebrate this report of important crime declines in 2019, I am tempted to highlight that the FIRST STEP Act became law at the very tail end of 2018 and was in effect for all of 2019.  I do not want to seriously claim, based only on this data, that there is likely a cause-and-effect relationship between modest federal sentencing and prison reforms in December 2018 and national crime declines in 2019.  But I still think it quite notable given that some prominent critics of criminal justice reform loudly called part of the Act a "foolish ... jailbreak that would endanger communities" or regularly asserted that this "leniency legislation inevitably would lead to more crime."  As long-time students of crime and punishment know well, it is almost impossible to make simple and accurate predictions about what kinds of sentencing legislation will or will not end up having an impact (positive or negative) on crime.

September 14, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, National and State Crime Data, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, September 13, 2020

"Revisiting Hate Crimes Enhancements in the Shadow of Mass Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Shirin Sinnar and Beth A. Colgan.  Here is its abstract:

Although civil rights advocates have largely supported hate crimes laws over the last four decades, growing concern over mass incarceration is now leading some to question the focus on enhancing prison sentences.  This Essay explores two alternatives to the traditional sentence enhancement model that might retain the expressive message of hate crimes laws — to convey society’s particular condemnation of crimes of bias — while relying less heavily on police and prisons: the reformation of victim compensation programs to help victims and targeted communities and the application of restorative justice processes to hate crimes.  Each of these alternatives presents complications, but both offer sufficient potential to justify further exploration.

September 13, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 09, 2020

New report details racial disparities in every stage of the Massachusetts criminal justice system

Via email I received word of this notable new report released today by the Harvard Law School Criminal Justice Policy Program (CJPP) titled simply "Racial Disparities in the Massachusetts Criminal System."  Here is a brief account of the 100+-page report and its findings from the text of the email that I received:

People of color are drastically overrepresented in Massachusetts state prisons.  According to the Massachusetts Sentencing Commission’s analysis of 2014 data, the Commonwealth significantly outpaced national race and ethnicity disparity rates in incarceration, imprisoning Black people at a rate 7.9 times that of White people and Latinx people at 4.9 times that of White people.

In an attempt to better understand the sources of these disparities, Chief Justice Ralph D. Gants of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts asked Harvard Law School to research racial disparities in the Massachusetts criminal system.

CJPP collected administrative data from several criminal justice agencies, analyzing over 500,000 cases. In our report, we detail the results of our analysis of every stage of the criminal process. Our findings include:

  • Black and Latinx people are overrepresented in the criminal system.  Although Black people make up only 6.5% of the state’s population, African Americans are the subjects of 17.1% of criminal court cases. Similarly, Latinx people constitute only 8.7% of the Massachusetts population but 18.3% of the cases.  By contrast, White people, who make up roughly 74% of the Massachusetts population, account for only 58.7% of cases in the criminal system.
  • Black and Latinx people sentenced to incarceration in Massachusetts receive longer sentences than their White counterparts, with Black people receiving sentences that are an average of 168 days longer and Latinx people receiving sentences that are an average of 148 days longer.
  • Racial and ethnic differences in the type and severity of initial charge account for over 70 percent of the disparities in sentence length, overshadowing all other factors, including defendants’ criminal history and demographics, court jurisdiction, and neighborhood characteristics.
  • Among the subset of cases where the person was sentenced to incarceration in a state prison (i.e. cases involving charges that carry the longest potential sentences and where the racial disparity is largest), Black and Latinx people are convicted of charges roughly equal in seriousness to their White counterparts despite facing more serious initial charges and longer sentences.
  • Black and Latinx people charged with drug offenses and weapons offenses are more likely to be incarcerated and receive longer incarceration sentences than White people charged with similar offenses. This difference persists after controlling for charge severity and other factors.

September 9, 2020 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, August 26, 2020

"Criminal Law Update: A Survey of State Law Changes in 2019"

The title of this post is the title of this notable publication from The Federal Society authored by Robert Alt.  Here is how it gets started:

In 2019, state legislatures across the country modified rules and procedures related to every part of the criminal justice system, from pretrial detention to post-sentence re-entry.  States passed new legislation and amended their criminal codes addressing a range of criminal justice concerns.  A review of the legal landscape shows that states were most willing to adjust their criminal laws related to sentencing, record expungement and offender registries, marijuana legalization, and felon reenfranchisement.  This paper is not intended to serve as an exhaustive list of new criminal justice legislation in 2019, but rather highlights the most common reforms that fall generally among those categories.

As in 2018, criminal justice laws enacted in 2019 did not take a singular approach.  Some states, for example, significantly enhanced penalties for certain offenses, while others reduced sentences and repealed mandatory minimums.  Alaska adopted comprehensive criminal justice legislation that included repealing “catch and release” pretrial protocols, even as New York all but ended its pretrial detention and cash bail system.  Three states revised rules for offender release and re-entry, and two states continued the national trend of restricting civil asset forfeiture and making the process more transparent.  A handful of states amended their treatment of juvenile offenders, and several more stopped suspending driver’s licenses for unpaid fines and court costs.

Support for and opposition to criminal laws and punishments do not tend to break along traditional partisan lines. Although some legislative reforms proved to be politically contentious, including New York’s bail reform and Florida’s new re-enfranchisement requirements, others were largely bipartisan efforts wherein legislatures and governors from both ends of the political spectrum reached tenable compromises. Some legislatures even passed measures unanimously.

August 26, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 22, 2020

Via video, Lori Loughlin and her husband get agreed fixed short prison sentences in college admission scandal

Unnamed-2As reported in this CBS News piece, headlined "Lori Loughlin gets 2 months in prison in college admissions scandal. Her husband Mossimo Giannulli will serve 5 months," a high-profile (but low-drama) sentencing took place in federal court yesterday.  Here are the basics:

Actress Lori Loughlin will serve two months in prison and her husband, fashion designer Mossimo Giannulli, will serve five months after the couple pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges in the college admissions scandal. A federal judge on Friday accepted plea deals from the famous couple in a video sentencing hearing.

After initially vowing to fight the charges, Loughlin and Giannulli reversed course after a judge denied their motion to dismiss the case in May. Prosecutors said the couple paid $500,000 to secure their daughters' admission to the University of Southern California by masquerading them as fake athletic recruits.

"I made an awful decision. I went along with a plan to give my daughters an unfair advantage in the college admissions process. In doing so, I ignored my intuition and allowed myself to be swayed from my moral compass," Loughlin said in the video call.

Loughlin, 56, will also pay a $150,000 fine, serve 100 hours of community service, and be under supervised release for two years. Giannulli, 57, is required to pay a fine of $250,000, serve 250 hours of community service, and serve two years of supervised release.

Earlier in the day, Giannulli apologized for the harm his decisions caused his family. "I'm ready to accept the consequences and move forward with the lessons I've learned from this experience," he said. Prior to rendering the sentence, U.S. District Court Judge Nathaniel Gorton ripped into Giannulli for committing a "crime motivated by hubris" that is "defined by wanton arrogance and excessive pride."

In addition to really liking the aesthetic of this "courtroom sketch" of this video sentencing, I reprinted the picture here in order to wonder aloud whether the US Sentencing Commission is keeping track of which sentencings are taking place via video these days and which ones are taking place in person.  Because six months into this pandemic the USSC still has not even reported how many sentencings are taking place, I am not especially optimistic the USSC is collecting, or will anytime soon be reporting, special granular data on COVID-era sentencing realities.  But my hope for the USSC springs eternal.

A few prior posts focused on these defendants:

A few of many prior posts on other defendants in college admissions scandal:

August 22, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5)

Friday, August 21, 2020

Justice or injustice?: Golden State Killer gets LWOP for at least 13 murders and dozens of rapes after deal to avoid death penalty

As reported in this NBC News piece, a "former police officer known as the Golden State Killer for his crime spree across California in the 1970s and '80s was sentenced Friday to consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole."  Here is more about the crimes and punishment:

Joseph DeAngelo, 74, who had eluded authorities for decades, pleaded guilty in June to 13 counts of first-degree murder and 13 rape-related charges in a deal that spared him the death penalty.  He also publicly admitted to dozens more sexual assaults for which the statute of limitations had expired. Sacramento County Superior Court Judge Michael Bowman said Friday in a rare sentencing statement that DeAngelo would "meet his death confined behind the walls of state penitentiary."

"The court is not saying DeAngelo does not deserve to have the death penalty imposed," Bowman said, but given the age of the defendant and victims, a life sentence made more sense. Bowman said he hopes "survivors will find some resolution" after DeAngelo is permanently placed behind bars.

DeAngelo on Friday made a short statement in court addressing victims and their families. "I’ve listened to all your statements. Each one of them. And I’m truly sorry to everyone I’ve hurt. Thank you your honor," he said.

Prosecutors said DeAngelo admitted to harming 87 victims in 53 separate crimes spanning 11 California counties. As part of the plea agreement, he was required to register as a sex offender and pay restitution to the victims or their families, as well as any fees or fines. Assistant Chief Deputy District Attorney Thien Ho has said the scope of DeAngelo's crime spree is "simply staggering, encompassing 13 known murders and almost 50 rapes between 1975 and 1986."

DeAngelo's crime spree started while he was working as a police officer in Exeter, a northern California community in the San Joaquin Valley near the foothills of the Sierra Nevada. Over the years, his crimes morphed from stalking properties to serial rape and murder. DeAngelo went on to marry and raise his own family, escaping investigators' efforts to find him for decades, before he was arrested in Sacramento County in 2018. It is believed to be the first high-profile case to have been cracked with genetic genealogy. Authorities said they used "discarded DNA" to confirm that DeAngelo was the man generations of authorities and citizen sleuths had searched for....

Some of DeAngelo's victims are in their 80s and 90s. Some are dead. But those who were willing and able spent the week addressing DeAngelo in court in anticipation of his sentencing. Phyllis Henneman said she was 22 years old and "young and carefree" when her life changed forever in June 1976. She was home alone with her sister while their dad was out of town when DeAngelo attacked.

"Joseph DeAngelo, henceforth called 'the devil incarnate,' broke into my home, blindfolded me, tied me up, threatened my life with a knife and raped me," she said, describing DeAngelo's modus operandi, which also included tying up partners and spending hours in homes, leaving his victims wondering what terror would come next. "Life as I knew it irrevocably changed that day," she said in the statement read by her sister, Karen Veilleux. But DeAngelo's arrest and upcoming sentencing meant "his victims and their families are now free."

A recent HBO documentary, "I'll Be Gone in the Dark," detailed the gruesome attacks and the desperate effort to find the killer, even as the years wore on. The documentary is based on crime writer Michelle McNamara's book of the same name, in which she recounted her own obsessive effort to uncover the identity of the Golden State Killer and conviction that genetic genealogy would help her do it. McNamara, the wife of comedian Patton Oswalt, died in 2016, two years before DeAngelo's arrest. Bowman on Friday thanked McNamara by name, along with law enforcement, other citizen detectives and DeAngelo's victims for their "dogged persistence" in their quest to bring him to justice.

August 21, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, August 19, 2020

Lots and lots of federal drug charges resulting from Operation Legend, which is purportedly to "fight violent crime"

Six week ago, Attorney General William Barr announced the launch of operation legend via this press release that stressed the fighting of violent crime.  Here are excerpts from the July 8 DOJ press release (with my emphasis added): 

Attorney General William P. Barr announced the launch of Operation Legend, a sustained, systematic and coordinated law enforcement initiative across all federal law enforcement agencies working in conjunction with state and local law enforcement officials to fight the sudden surge of violent crime, beginning in Kansas City, MO. Operation Legend was created as a result of President Trump’s promise to assist America’s cities that are plagued by recent violence....

“President Trump has made clear: the federal government stands ready and willing to assist any of our state and local law enforcement partners across the nation responding to violent crime. Operation Legend will combine federal and local resources to combat the disturbing uptick in violence by surging federal agents and other federal assets into cities like Kansas City, a city currently experiencing its worst homicide rate in its history,” said Attorney General Barr. “The Department’s Operation Legend is named in honor of one of Kansas City’s youngest victims, four-year old LeGend Taliferro who was shot in the face while sleeping in his bed.  LeGend’s death is a horrifying reminder that violent crime left unchecked is a threat to us all and cannot be allowed to continue.”

Today via this press release, AG Barr "announced updates on Operation Legend," and here are excerpts:

Since the operation’s launch, there have been more than 1,000 arrests, including defendants who have been charged in state and local courts.  Of those arrests, approximately 217 defendants have been charged with federal crimes.  These numbers exclude Indianapolis, whose operation was just announced last Friday. In addition, nearly 400 firearms have been seized by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

The Attorney General launched the operation on July 8, 2020, as a sustained, systematic and coordinated law enforcement initiative in which federal law enforcement agencies work in conjunction with state and local law enforcement officials to fight violent crime.... Launched first in Kansas City, MO., on July 8, 2020, the operation was expanded to Chicago and Albuquerque on July 22, 2020, to Cleveland, Detroit, and Milwaukee on July 29, 2020, to St. Louis and Memphis on Aug. 6, 2020, and to Indianapolis on Aug. 14, 2020. A breakdown of the federal charges in each district, with the exception of Indianapolis, is below.

I am please to see this kind of accounting from DOJ about this operation, but when looking through the breakdown of the federal charges, it is remarkable how for DOJ the effort to "fight violent crime" seems to involve making a whole lot of drug charges:

Kansas City: "Forty-three defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... 17 defendants have been charged with drug trafficking"

Chicago: "Sixty-one defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... 26 defendants have been charged with narcotics-related offenses"

Albuquerque: "Sixteen defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... Six defendants have been charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances; Four defendants have been charged with distribution of controlled substances; Six defendants have been charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance;"

Cleveland: "Thirty-two defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... 22 defendants have been charged with federal drug trafficking charges"

Detroit: "Twenty-two defendants have been charged with federal offenses ... Two defendants have been charged with possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances"

Milwaukee: "Eleven defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... Five defendants have been charged with possession with intent to distribute narcotics"

St. Louis: "Twenty-five defendants have been charged with federal crimes ... 21 defendants have been charged with drug trafficking offenses"

Though it is hard to do an exact accounting based on the DOJ reporting, it seems like roughly half of the federal charges here involve drug trafficking, not actual violent crimes.  (In addition, the vast majority of all the  other federal charges involve illegal gun possession, not actual violent crimes.)  I presume DOJ would defend its work here by asserting that drug trafficking is inherently violent or by contending that disrupting the drug trade via these arrests serves to get people prone to violence off the streets.  But I still find it quite jarring and quite telling that a federal initiative developed and promoted as a means to fight violent crime ends up bringing primarily drug trafficking charges in city after city.

August 19, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, August 12, 2020

"Blanket Exclusions, Animus, and the False Policies They Promote"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Catherine Carpenter now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Saying something is true does not make it so. A nd saying it louder does not make it truer.  But such is the legislative posture behind modern day sex offense registration laws that punish those who commit sex crimes because of entrenched myths that overstate the laws’ positive impact on public safety and exaggerate recidivism rates of offenders.  And it is not only registration schemes themselves that have been scaffold-ed by these myths, but numerous ancillary laws that exclude benefits to offenders strictly because they have committed sex offenses.

Sadly, this sticky, but false, narrative has provided the animus that galvanized implementation of registration and notification regimes. And in its most recent chapter, the narrative has been formalized into blanket exclusions — or what this article calls “all except for” provisions — that have inserted into a myriad of criminal justice reform efforts without much notoriety.

The effect?  Registrants and their families have been prohibited from broad-based and important ameliorative changes to the carceral state, many to which they should be entitled, and to which they are denied only because of their status as registrants.  Indeed, within comprehensive legislation covering numerous crime and sentencing reforms, these ubiquitous blanket exclusions have the markings of boilerplate language that have been introduced even where the new legislation has no rational relationship to the protection of the public’s safety or the prior sex offense conviction.

This article examines the moral panic and false data used to buttress blanket exclusion provisions — their inflated importance obvious. It concludes that these measures, which are un-tethered to public safety concerns, and only supported by governmental and community animus, violate fourteenth amendment protections.

August 12, 2020 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, August 10, 2020

What should we make of a "significant decline" in white-collar criminal enforcement during the Trump Administration?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new Bloomberg article, headlined "Trump Oversees All-Time Low in White Collar Crime Enforcement," which I find puzzling in many ways.  Here are excerpts:

Donald Trump calls himself the “law and order” president, but when it comes to white collar crime, he has overseen a significant decline in enforcement.  The prosecution of securities fraud, antitrust violations and other such crimes has hit a record low as the pandemic slows the courts, according to one tracking service. But even before the coronavirus, the numbers were falling under the Trump administration.

The average annual number of white collar defendants was down 26% to 30% for Trump’s first three years in office from the average under President Barack Obama, according to data from the Justice Department and Syracuse University, respectively.  The trend also shows up in fines on corporations, which fell 76% from Obama’s last 20 months to Trump’s first 20 months, according to Duke University law professor Brandon Garrett. 

“Mr. Trump sets the tone,” said John Coffee, a professor at Columbia Law School whose new book, “Corporate Crime and Punishment: The Crisis of Underenforcement,” analyzes the decline.  Trump’s Justice Department has even presided over a plunge in deferred-prosecution agreements, Coffee said.  In a DPA, a company is charged with a crime but prosecutors agree to drop the case later if it admits wrongdoing, pays a penalty and makes required reforms.  The administration has also brought fewer white collar racketeering and money-laundering cases, crimes that carry harsher penalties, he said. “All that is an indication that white collar crime is not a priority,” Coffee said....

The Justice Department says it hasn’t eased up at all.  Prosecutors “continue to bring federal charges in white collar and other cases according to facts, the law and the principles of federal prosecution,” said Peter Carr, who was a spokesman for the department’s Criminal Division until moving recently to the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Justice “can’t vouch for TRAC’s methodology,” Carr said, referring to Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, which monitors trends in federal law enforcement and whose records reflect a decline of about 30% in prosecutions under Trump....

DOJ spokesman Matt Lloyd said the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, which focuses on white collar crime, “has achieved record numbers of individual and corporate criminal cases and resolutions over the past three years,” including a 59% increase in individuals charged between 2016 and 2019 and a jump of more than a quarter in those convicted.  He didn’t comment specifically on the 26% decline reflected in the data published by the U.S. attorney offices nationwide, which cover a much larger set of white collar prosecutions, but called the Fraud Section’s achievements “a key indicator of the department’s commitment” to the issue.

Prosecutions have been declining for the past decade but have never been so low.  The Justice Department under Trump has shifted its focus from traditional white collar cases, like big securities prosecutions, to immigration and the sort of corporate espionage targeted by the DOJ’s China Initiative, said Robert Anello, a white collar defense lawyer in New York....

The Internal Revenue Service's ... Criminal Investigation division helps send people to prison for crimes such as tax evasion, money laundering and identity theft.  The agency saw a 36% decrease in new criminal investigations from fiscal 2015 to 2019, IRS records show.

One factor in the decline in traditional white collar prosecutions is an important change to what’s known as the Yates memo.  In 2015, under Obama, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates required companies seeking leniency to help develop evidence against their employees and turn over possible suspects.  In 2018, under Trump, the Justice Department softened the criteria. 

So is there an on-going white-collar crime "crisis"?  How would we know?  Why is it that we now see a whole lot of media reporting increases in shootings in urban areas, but we do not see any media looking at possible increases in securities fraud in suburban areas?  I ask these questions not to be cheeky, but rather to note how much more we generally focus upon and tend to better understand "crime in the streets" rather than "crime in the suites."

August 10, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, August 08, 2020

"Beyond Unreasonable"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by John Inazu and now posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The concept of “reasonableness” permeates the law: the “reasonable person” determines the outcome of torts and contracts disputes, the criminal burden of proof requires factfinders to conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt;” claims of self-defense succeed or fail on reasonableness determinations.  But as any first-year law student can attest, the line between reasonable and unreasonable isn’t always clear.  Nor is that the only ambiguity. In the realm of the unreasonable, many of us intuit that some actions are not only unreasonable but beyond the pale — we might say they are beyond unreasonable.  Playing football, summiting Nanga Parbat, and attempting Russian roulette all risk serious injury or death, but most people do not view them the same.  These distinctions raise vexing questions: what is it that makes us feel differently about these activities?  Mere unfamiliarity?  Moral condemnation?  Relative utility?  Or something else altogether?  Moreover, who exactly is the “we” forming these judgments?

This Article explores the vague lines that separate our sense of reasonable, unreasonable, and beyond unreasonable — the reasonableness lines.  Part I examines the general characteristics of these lines.  Part II explores their significance in law, and Part III considers their application in four discrete areas of law: tax policy for medical expenses, criminal punishment, speech restrictions, and tort liability for inherently dangerous sports.  The Article ends by summarizing the implications of the reasonableness lines for our culture and for ourselves.

August 8, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 06, 2020

"Labeling Violence"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Cecelia Klingele now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

In recent years, federal and state-level criminal justice reforms have softened the punitive responses to crime that defined the quarter-century from 1980–2005.  The main beneficiaries of these reforms have been non-violent criminals, who are increasingly eligible for pre- and post-charge diversion, expungement, early release from custody and early discharge from community supervision.  For those convicted of violent offenses, not much has changed: sentences remain long; opportunities for release remain few; and conditions of post-release supervision are tightly enforced, leading to high rates of return to prison.

The justification for a harsh response to violent crime is that such crime inflicts significant harm and represents a dramatic deviation from standards of acceptable behavior. In fact, “violent” behavior — that is, behavior that is intended to cause, or does in fact cause, physical injury to another person — is hardly anomalous.  Across the life-course, and particularly in youth and young adulthood, such behaviors frequently occur among a broad spectrum of the population and rarely lead to criminal conviction. This Article explores why only some behavior is labeled violent, and what implications this fact has for sentencing and correctional management of people convicted of violent crimes, and for the broader management of the criminal justice system.

August 6, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (1)

Ugly summer stories of southern justice in the form of extreme over-sentencing

The dog days of summer seems especially doggy this year, and here are a couple of notably ugly summer sentencing stories are part of this reality:

From CNN, "Louisiana Supreme Court upholds Black man's life sentence for stealing hedge clippers more than 20 years ago."  An excerpt:

A Black Louisiana man will spend the rest of his life in prison for stealing hedge clippers, after the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his request to have his sentence overturned last week.

Fair Wayne Bryant, 62, was convicted in 1997 on one count of attempted simple burglary. In his appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Louisiana in 2018, his attorney, Peggy Sullivan, wrote that Bryant "contends that his life sentence is unconstitutionally harsh and excessive."  
 
Last week, though, the state Supreme Court disagreed -- with five justices choosing to uphold the life sentence. The lone dissenter in the decision was Supreme Court Chief Justice Bernette Johnson, who wrote that "the sentence imposed is excessive and disproportionate to the offense the defendant committed."

From Fox News, "Disabled Iraq veteran faces five years in Alabama prison for legally prescribed medical marijuana." An excerpt:

By all accounts, Sean Worsley is a war hero. He earned a Purple Heart, along with a laundry list of additional military accolades, for clearing roadside bombs in Iraq. He also earned a lifetime of post-service ailments, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a traumatic brain injury (TBI). As a result of his injuries, Worsley was given a 100 percent disability rating from the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. He treated the worst symptoms of both injuries with medical marijuana prescribed to him legally in Arizona.

Now, Worsley sits in an Alabama jail facing five years in the state’s notoriously violent prison system after admitting to an officer he was in possession of medical marijuana while driving through Alabama and a subsequent probation violation for missing a court date.

UPDATE: I now realize that the headline of this local version of the Fox story more clearly summarizes the ugly sentencing reality: "Black disabled veteran sentenced to spend 60 months in prison for medical marijuana."

August 6, 2020 in Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, August 05, 2020

"#MeToo and the Myth of the Juvenile Sex Offender"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Cynthia Godsoe recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The #MeToo movement has brought much needed attention to the widespread and systemic nature of sexual harm. However, the broad, uncritical push to connect “#MeToo” to criminal prosecution has real downsides, revealing the pathologies and ineffectiveness of the criminal system and re-inscribing the very gendered and racialized hierarchies the movement seeks to eradicate.  The mainstream understanding of #MeToo amplifies the omission of sexual harm from most conversations on decarceration and criminal legal reform.  This side of the movement focuses almost exclusively on individual blame and punishment, ignoring the structural causes of gender violence, as well as meaningful survivor healing and offender accountability.  This is true both as to the scope of criminalization, which is ever-expanding particularly as to sexual harms, and to the response once harm occurs, which is almost always to advocate for longer prison sentences and more restrictions post-release, such as sex offender registration.

This Symposium essay explores these issues by thinking through the way that the mainstream #MeToo movement treats and responds to youth who either engage in or are victims of sexual harm.  Despite the fact that much of the #MeToo reckoning has focused on high-profile men who repeatedly exploit minors — think Jeffrey Epstein, R. Kelly, Kevin Spacey — minors themselves, some as young as eight, constitute one third of those adjudicated sex offenders and one quarter of those required to register, sometimes for life.  At the same time, harm to young people who do not fit a mainstream mold is ignored.  Thus, although girls of color are sexually assaulted at much higher rates than white girls, their victimhood continues to be overlooked and their responses to it even criminalized.

In this essay, I join abolitionist advocates in urging caution about the direction the #MeToo movement is taking, particularly with regard to young people.  Our punishment of sexual harm with respect to youth reveals three significant pathologies of the broader criminal legal system.  First, we rely almost exclusively on criminalization and punishment to address societal problems that have multiple causes beyond individual culpability.  Second, the system is immensely costly, in fiscal and, most importantly, human terms, with very low effectiveness, both at preventing and at redressing harm.  Indeed, punishing youth for sex offenses puts them at much greater risk for being sexually abused themselves by adults — undermining the primary stated goal of the sex offense criminal framework.  Third, the criminal treatment of “sex crimes” reinforces the very gendered and racialized hierarchies that animate them.  Girls and women of color continue to be undervalued and unprotected, while male survivors continue to be stigmatized and disbelieved.  Indeed, Tarana Burke, founded the #MeToo movement to recognize non-normative victims, particularly girls and women of color, and recently lamented the current movement’s public face: “We have to shift the narrative that it’s a gender war, that it’s anti-male, that it’s men against women, that it’s only for a certain type of person — that it’s for white, cisgender, heterosexual, famous women.”

I conclude with the counterintuitive suggestion that decriminalization and decarceration efforts should not only include conduct labelled as “sex offenses,” but likely should begin with them. Transforming our approach to sexual harm is one key piece of an abolitionist vision that seeks to move beyond carceral approaches to achieving racial and gender justice.

August 5, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 28, 2020

US Sentencing Commission publishes "Federal Probation and Supervised Release Violations"

Cover_violations-report-2020The US Sentencing Commission today released this lengthy notable new report titled simply "Federal Probation and Supervised Release Violations." This USSC webpage provides a summary and a extended account of "key findings":

Summary

Federal Probation and Supervised Release Violations presents data on approximately 108,000 violation hearings that occurred between 2013 and 2017.  The report examines the prevalence, types, and locations of federal supervision violations as well as the characteristics of more than 82,000 violators. The report also compares supervision violators to the population of federal offenders originally sentenced to probation or a sentence including a term of supervised release during the same time period. (Published July 28, 2020)

Key Findings
  • Nationally, the number of individuals under supervision was relatively stable during the study period, ranging from 130,224 to 136,156 during the five years. Half of the individuals under supervision, however, were concentrated in only 21 of the 94 federal judicial districts.
  • Nationally, the rate of violation hearings for individuals on supervision also was relatively stable, ranging from 16.2 to 18.4 percent during the five years, with an overall rate of 16.9 percent.  The prevalence of supervision violations, however, varied considerably among the federal judicial districts.
    • Violations accounted for more than one-third of individuals on supervision in the Southern District of California (42.1%), District of Minnesota (37.4%), Western District of Missouri (34.3%), District of Arizona (33.7%), and District of New Mexico (33.4%).  In contrast, violations accounted for less than five percent of individuals on supervision in the Districts of Connecticut (4.5%) and Maryland (4.7%).
  • Supervision violators tended to have committed more serious original offenses than federal offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release during the same time period.
    • For example, the rates of supervision violators originally sentenced for violent and firearms offenses (7.9% and 20.4%, respectively) were approximately twice as high compared to offenders originally sentenced during the study period (3.7% and 12.8%, respectively), a finding which is consistent with prior Commission recidivism research.
  • Drug offenses were the most common primary offense type for both supervision violators and federal offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release during the same time period.  There were, however, notable variations by drug type.
    • For example, crack cocaine offenders accounted for only 9.9 percent of drug offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release, but they accounted for almost one-third (32.1%) of supervision violators, a greater proportion than any other drug type.  The disproportional representation of crack cocaine offenders among supervision violators is consistent with prior Commission recidivism research.  On the other hand, drug offenders who received the safety valve at their original sentencing were underrepresented among supervision violators (19.1% compared to 30.7%), a finding that also is consistent with prior Commission recidivism research.
  • Supervision violators tended to have more serious criminal histories than federal offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release.
    • Approximately one-quarter (24.6%) of offenders with supervision violations were in the lowest Criminal History Category (CHC I) at the time of their original sentencing compared to almost half (44.9%) of offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release during the study period. On the other end of the spectrum, 18.3 percent of offenders with supervision violations were in the highest Criminal History Category (CHC VI) at the time of their original sentencing compared to 9.9 percent of offenders whose original sentence was probation or included a term of supervised release during the study period. This pattern is consistent with prior Commission recidivism research.
  • The majority of supervision violations were based on the commission of an offense punishable by a term of one year or less or a violation of another condition of supervision not constituting a federal, state or local offense (Grade C Violation).
    • More than half (54.9%) of violations were Grade C (the least serious classification), nearly one-third (31.5%) were Grade B, and 13.6 percent were Grade A (the most serious classification).
  • Offenders who were originally sentenced for more serious offenses tended to commit more serious supervision violations.
    • For example, over four-fifths of the Grade A violations were committed by offenders originally sentenced for drug offenses (52.0%), firearms offenses (24.5%), or violent offenses (6.3%).
  • Offenders who violated their conditions of supervision typically did so within the first two years.
    • On average, 22 months elapsed from the time supervision commenced to the commission of the supervision violation, but the elapsed time was notably longer for Grade A violations (the most serious) at 33 months.
  • The majority of supervision violators were sentenced in accordance with the Chapter Seven Revocation Table.
    • More than half (59.8%) were within the applicable range, just over one-quarter (29.1%) were below the range, and 11.1 percent were above the range. Courts tended to impose sentences within the applicable guideline range less often for more serious supervision violations. For example, for Grade A violations (the most serious classification), 39.4 percent were sentenced within the applicable range, and 54.2 percent were sentenced below the range. In contrast, for Grade C violations (the least serious classification), 63.6 percent were sentenced within the range, and 22.1 percent were sentenced below the range.

July 28, 2020 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (6)

At resentencing, Senator Rand Paul's attacker gets additional 13 months (eight to be served in federal prison, six in home confinement)

This local article, headline "KY man who tackled U.S. Sen. Rand Paul sentenced to another 13 months confinement," provides some details from a high-profile resentencing that took place yesterday and included a number of interesting elements:

The neighbor who lost his temper and attacked Republican U.S. Sen. Rand Paul in 2017, breaking six of his ribs, has been sentenced to an additional 13 months confinement.  A federal judge initially sentenced Rene Boucher to 30 days in jail for the November 2017 attack, along with 100 hours of community service and a $10,000 fine.

During a video hearing Monday, U.S. District Judge Matthew F. Leitman handed down the new sentence against Boucher — eight months in prison and six months on home confinement.  However, Leitman gave Boucher credit for the 30 days he already served, so he will have seven more months behind bars.

Prosecutors had appealed the initial sentence for Boucher, arguing it was unreasonably light, and won the right to try to get a longer sentence.  That led to Monday’s hearing.  The new sentence for Boucher still wasn’t as long as the government wanted.  Assistant U.S. Attorney Brad Shepard objected to the sentence, which could lead to yet another appeal by the government for stiffer sentence for Boucher.

The attack made national news because of Paul’s position, but prosecutors have acknowledged it had nothing to do with politics.  Rather, Boucher, who lived next door to Paul in a gated community in Bowling Green, attacked Paul because he got angry over Paul stacking limbs and other yard waste near their shared property line, according to the court record....

Police first charged Boucher with misdemeanor assault in state court, but the federal government stepped in and prosecuted him under a law barring assaults on members of Congress.  Under advisory guidelines, Boucher faced a potential sentence of 21 to 27 months. Federal judges can impost sentences below those guidelines.

In handing down a lower sentence, U.S. District Judge Marianne O. Battani cited Boucher’s military service, his involvement in his church and her belief that the attack was out of character for Boucher.  However, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Battani didn’t give sufficient weight to the seriousness of Paul’s injuries or the need for deterrence, and didn’t sufficiently address the issue of the big difference in Boucher’s sentence and others involving federal assault cases.

Shepard renewed a call for a 21-month sentence for Boucher because of the severity of Paul’s injuries.  The punishment also should to be tough enough deter similar attacks, Shepard said.  “The court I think needs to send the message . . . that we cannot continue as a society to resort to violence,” Shepard said.

Paul and his wife, Kelly, submitted written statements about the attack the first time Boucher was sentenced, but spoke in person during the video hearing Monday.  Paul said he’d never had cross words with Boucher and so had no idea he was unhappy before Boucher blindsided him.  Paul described the intense pain and his struggles to breathe after the attack, as well as the history of physical problems since, including bouts with pneumonia, night sweats and fever; coughing up blood; surgery to remove part of his scarred lung; and still more surgery to drain infected fluid.  Paul said his lung capacity will likely be reduced the rest of his life, and he has chronic pain.  “I don’t know what a night without pain is like, or a day without pain,” Paul said....

Boucher’s attorney, Matthew J. Baker, said Boucher is “profoundly sorry” for the attack, but argued against any additional time for Boucher, a physician.  Baker said Boucher’s initial sentence was appropriate, and that he had faced additional punishment by way of a judgment of more than $600,000 in a state civil lawsuit Paul filed against him over the attack.  That judgment included $375,000 in punitive damages, which by definition are to punish a defendant....

Lietman said it was heartbreaking to hear Paul and his wife describe the fallout from the attack. But the judge said he was choosing a sentence below the guideline range for several reasons, including Boucher’s long record of work with his church, his eight years as a U.S. Army doctor, the fact that the attack was out of character, and the damage to his reputation from the crime.  Leitman said $375,000 punitive damage award in state court also figured into his decision. “That’s a lot of punishment,” he said.

Leitman did not set a date for Boucher to begin the sentence.

I would be surprised if the feds go through with another appeal, and I would be even more surprised if they would prevail on a second appeal.  The Sixth Circuit panel opinion reversing the initial 30-day sentence made much of the original "dramatic downward variance" from a guideline minimum of 21 months, and Judge Lietman seems to have addressed some of the panel's chief concerns when imposing a longer sentence closer to the bottom of the advisory range.  And Judge Lietman's reliance on the civil punishment from the sizable punitive damage award would seem to be a distinctive additional factor supporting the reasonableness of a sentence below the guideline range.

Prior related posts:

July 28, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 24, 2020

Never-ending New Jersey drunk driving case highlights fundamental reason why sentencing is so dang hard

9889228-0-image-a-67_1550300070445I am fond of saying "sentencing is dang hard."  (A version of a speech I gave with this title appears in the February 2020 issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter and also is available here via SSRN.)  An appellate ruling this  week in a high-profile New Jersey case has me recalling this point; this local press piece, headlined "Amy Locane will be sentenced for a fourth time on fatal 2010 DWI charge," provides part of the backstory (with a little emphasis added):

A state appellate court ruled Wednesday that actress Amy Locane, convicted in connection with a fatal drunken driving accident a decade ago in Montgomery, must be sentenced for a fourth time because the first three times were either illegal sentences or sentences imposed outside the state's criminal code.

In a 41-page decision, the appellate court ruled that the latest sentence in the case, handed down by Superior Court Judge Kevin Shanahan in February 2019, was "illogical" based on an "unauthorized sentencing theory" that weighed on what he called "the yin and yang" of the case's facts....

James Wronko, Locane's attorney, said he will ask the state Supreme Court to review the decision. "I don't know what society gains by putting the mother of two back in jail," Wronko said.

Shanahan sentenced Locane to five years in prison, but stayed the sentence because he did not consider her a flight risk. The Somerset County Prosecutor's Office argued the sentence should not be stayed and appealed the judge's decision.

Locane previously had been sentenced to three years in state prison on charges of vehicular homicide and assault by auto in connection with the death of Helene Seeman in the crash.  Her husband, Fred, was severely injured in the crash as the couple were turning into their driveway of their weekend home at 9 p.m. on June 27, 2010.  Locane is an actress who starred with Johnny Depp in “Cry-Baby” and was a featured actress on the TV series “Melrose Place.”...

The Somerset County Prosecutor's Office first appealed the the three-year sentence that was handed down by retired Superior Court Judge Robert Reed who presided over the trial.  Locane served 85 percent of that sentence at the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women in Hunterdon County.  She also successfully completed the conditions of her parole a year ago, Wronko said.  "She's led an exemplary life since her release," Wronko said....

In handing down the five-year sentence, Shanahan said that imposing a higher sentence "would have been an exercise in bad judgment, just like all the others."  Shanahan also said that he was not bound by previous Appellate Court rulings in the case.

"Clearly, changes in (Locane's) personal circumstances warrant divergence," the Appellate Court wrote in the decision, "but it is rudimentary that a trial judge is bound by our prior decision. (Shanahan) ignored the prior findings, while seemingly giving them lip service."

So, in a sad drunk driving case involving a fatal result, New Jersey courts have now been trying and failing to figure out Amy Locane's "right" sentence for now a full decade.  In that time, the defendant has served out a three-year ("wrong") prison sentence (and also paid $1.5 million of a nearly $5 million civil settlement).  I can only speculate about how many (mostly taxpayer) resources have been expended in all these court proceedings trying to get to the "right" sentence, and I wonder whether the surviving victims are really eager to start another decade of wrangling over finding the "right" sentence.

Of course, I keep putting "right" in quotes when discussing this matter because there obviously is no clear right sentence in this case (or most cases).  Sentencing is so dang hard in part because it lacks a clear right/wrong metric no matter what sentencing philosophies one is inclined to adopt.  Moreover, this case especially spotlights the fundamental challenge balancing aggravating offense factors (especially a victim's death) with mitigating offender factors (addiction and lack of criminal history).  The latest appellate opinion (available here) showcases how sentencing judges here have generally focused on the offender, while the appellate judges have focused on the offense (at p. 36):

In this case, the focus has repeatedly shifted away from the crime defendant committed to her individual characteristics at the expense of imposing a just sentence reflective of her offense and the harm she caused.  That she was struggling with addiction did not authorize the court to close its eyes to the harm she inflicted on the victims, the victims' family, and the community.  That harm will never dissipate.  The loss of a loved one, and serious physical injury to another, can never be compensated.

Ironically, another round of resentencing strikes me as a fool's errand in part because I agree with this court's sentiment that the harm caused by Amy Locane "will never dissipate" and "can never be compensated."  Because there is no way the law through any form of punishment can make this kind of harm go away, I struggle to see what is likely to be achieved when the state uses more taxpayer resources to  try, yet again, to add still more years to Locane's sentence.

Notably, there is no mention in this latest appellate opinion of just what the victims of this now-long-ago offense might now want.  I hope for their sake that starting another decade of wrangling over Locane's sentence does not rub salt into their wounds.  I also wonder if some kind of restorative justice efforts have been tried or might now be started to enable the victims and the defendant here to get some measure of peace and resolution that the New Jersey courts have been unable so far to provide.

Prior related post:

July 24, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, July 23, 2020

Ninth Circuit panel thoughtfully debates whether and when overtime parking fees might be an unconstitutional Excessive Fine

A Ninth Circuit panel yesterday handed down an interesting Eighth Amendment opinion on a topic that is (too) dear to my overtime parking heart. Here is how the majority opinion in Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, No. 18-56553 (9th Cir. July 22, 2020) (available here), gets started:

In the opening scene of La La Land, drivers stuck in traffic spontaneously sing and dance on top of their cars and in the streets.  Hollywood, however, rarely resembles reality.  On any given day, Los Angelenos sigh and despair when mired in traffic jams.  One small way the City of Los Angeles tries to alleviate traffic congestion is to impose time restrictions — and fines — for limited public parking spaces.  If a person parks her car past the allotted time limit and forces people to drive around in search of other parking spaces, she must pay a $63 fine.  And if she fails to pay the fine within 21 days, the City will impose a late-payment penalty of $63.

Appellants, who had parking fines and late fees levied against them, challenge the Los Angeles parking ordinance as violating the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.  We hold that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to municipal parking fines.  We affirm the district court's summary judgment order that the initial parking fine is not grossly disproportionate to the offense and thus survives constitutional scrutiny.  But we reverse and remand for the district court to determine whether the City’s late fee runs afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause.

The concurrence authored by Judge Bennett gets started this way:

Because the City of Los Angeles conceded that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to parking “fines,” I concur in the judgment.  I write separately because I do not believe the Excessive Fines Clause should routinely apply to parking meter violations.

July 23, 2020 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 22, 2020

You be the federal judge: what sentence for Senator Rand Paul's attacker at resentencing after 30 days deemed unreasonable?

Regular readers know that, more than 15 years after Booker created the reasonableness standard of appellate review for federal sentencing, circuit courts still almost never find a sentence to be "substantively unreasonable" upon a defendant's appeal claiming the sentence was too high.  But last year, a Sixth Circuit panel decided, upon an appeal by the government, that a high-profile sentence was "substantively unreasonable" as too low.  The ruling in US v. Boucher, No. 18-5683 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (available here), concerned the sentencing resulting from Senator Rand Paul's neighbor attacking him while he was was mowing his lawn in 2017.  Now, as this local article highlights, it is time for resentencing after the Sixth Circuit vacated Boucher’s sentence as substantively unreasonable:

Federal prosecutors have renewed a push for a 21-month sentence for the man who tackled and injured U.S. Sen. Rand Paul in November 2017.

Rene Boucher deserves to spend more time behind bars because of the serious injuries Paul sustained, including six broken ribs that left him in intense pain and led to bouts of pneumonia and damage that ultimately required removing part of Paul’s lung, Assistant U.S. Attorney Bradley P. Shepard said in a memorandum filed Monday.

Shepard also argued that the initial 30-day sentence against Boucher wasn’t enough to deter other potential assaults on members of Congress.  “‘Aggressive’ rhetoric directed at our elected leaders is at a dangerously high level,” Shepard wrote.  “Although this case is lacking in evidence of political motivation, it is still important, in this climate, to send a message to society as a whole that assaults and violence perpetrated against members of Congress will not be tolerated.”

Boucher’s attorney, however, has argued it would be unjust to send him back to prison after he’s already completed his initial sentence, and moved to dismiss the case.

U.S. District Judge Matthew F. Leitman scheduled a sentencing hearing for Boucher on July 27.  Lietman, a judge in Michigan, is sitting as a special judge in Boucher’s case.

Paul, a doctor elected to the Senate in 2010, and Boucher, also a physician, lived next door to each other in a gated community in Bowling Green.  In the summer of 2017, Boucher trimmed five maple trees that were on Paul’s property, but had limbs sticking over the property line onto Boucher’s side, according to a motion from Boucher’s attorney, Matthew J. Baker. In response, Paul piled up a large stack of limbs and brush near the property line in Boucher’s view, Baker said....

[On] Nov. 3, 2017, Boucher saw Paul mowing his yard. Paul blew leaves into Boucher’s lawn and then got off the mower, picked up some limbs and turned toward the place where Boucher had burned the debris the day before, Baker said. Boucher lost his temper, ran 60 yards and tackled Paul from behind....

Police first charged Boucher with misdemeanor assault in state court, but the federal government stepped in and prosecuted him under a law barring assaults on members of Congress.

Paul, a Republican, suggested in a letter to the court that there was a political motive behind the attack, saying that Boucher’s anger toward him “comingles with his hatred of my political policies.”  However, Boucher has said the attack was driven solely by his anger over the yard waste, and prosecutors have acknowledged there was no evidence of a political motivation.

Under advisory guidelines, Boucher faced a potential sentence from 21 to 27 months, though judges can impose sentences outside those guidelines.  U.S. District Judge Marianne O. Battani sentenced Boucher to 30 days in prison, a $10,000 fine and 100 hours of community service, noting Boucher’s military service, career as a doctor and his involvement in his church.

Prosecutors appealed the sentence, arguing it was unreasonably short.  The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a new sentencing hearing for Boucher, ruling last September that Battani didn’t give sufficient weight to the seriousness of Paul’s injuries or the need for deterrence, and didn’t sufficiently address the issue of the big difference in Boucher’s sentence and others involving federal assault cases.

In arguing for more time for Boucher, Shepard cited cases in which two people received as much jail time as he did only for throwing eggs at a member of Congress, and others in which people who attacked federal employees received much longer sentences.  The prosecutor also said that had Boucher’s case been handled in a Kentucky court, Paul’s injuries could have meant a charge of second-degree assault, punishable by five to 10 years in prison.

Baker, however, argued that Boucher’s initial sentence was legitimate and that putting him back in prison would amount to punishing him twice for the same crime....  Baker said it appears that the government is getting a do-over on Boucher’s sentencing because the victim is a U.S. senator.

Shepard, however, said it is not unusual for people to be re-sentenced after completing a sentence.  What Boucher wants, the prosecutor said, “is for those who have received exceptionally low sentences to get further special treatment in the form of a bar to resentencing.”

There are so many interesting elements to this resentencing, including the fact that there is a distinct new "outside judge" in charge of this resentencing.  I am inclined to predict Boucher will get a sentence somewhere between the 30 days originally imposed and the 21 months requested by the feds.  But I am eager to hear what readers think the new sentence should be. 

Prior related posts:

July 22, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (5)

Friday, July 17, 2020

Feds, revving up machinery of death, complete third execution of week

As reported in this Fox News piece, a "drug kingpin from Iowa was executed on Friday afternoon, after he was convicted of murdering two young women and three adults, marking the third time this week that a federal inmate has been put to death after a 17-year capital punishment hiatus." Here is more:

Department of Justice (DOJ) spokeswoman Kerri Kupec issued the following statement after the execution was carried out. “Today, Dustin Lee Honken was executed at USP Terre Haute in accordance with the death sentence imposed by a federal district court in 2004. Honken was pronounced dead at 4:36 p.m. EDT by the Vigo County Coroner," she wrote.

"In 1993, Honken, a meth kingpin, kidnapped, fatally shot, and buried Lori Duncan, a single, working mother, Duncan’s two young daughters — 10-year-old Kandi and 6-year-old Amber — and Greg Nicholson, a government informant who testified against Honken on federal drug trafficking charges. Honken also murdered Terry DeGeus, who Honken thought might also testify against him, by beating him with a bat and shooting him. On October 14, 2004, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa found Honken guilty of numerous federal offenses, including five counts of continuing criminal enterprise murder, and he was sentenced to death."...

Honken had also befriended Daniel Lewis Lee, 47, who was the first federal inmate to die this week, hours after the Supreme Court greenlit the first federal execution to take place since 2003. Lee was convicted of multiple offenses, including three counts of murder in aid of racketeering in the 1996 slayings of William Frederick Mueller, his wife Nancy Ann Mueller and his 8-year-old stepdaughter, Sarah Elizabeth Powell, in Arkansas.

Wesley Ira Purkey was the second man to be put to death two days later, after being convicted in the 1998 kidnapping and killing of 16-year-old Jennifer Long, whose body was dismembered, burned and dumped in a septic pond. That same year, Purkey was also convicted in a state court in Kansas after using a claw hammer to kill an 80-year-old woman who had polio.

After Honken was convicted in 2004, the jury recommended a death sentence. U.S. District Judge Mark Bennett -- who claimed to mostly oppose the death penalty -- said, “I am not going to lose any sleep if he is executed,” The Associated Press reported.

Recent prior related posts:

July 17, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 10, 2020

Is releasing people from prison really that hard? I suppose it is if you cannot shake a carceral mindset.

The question in the title of this post is my response to this recent lengthy Atlantic commentary by Barbara Bradley Hagerty headlined "Releasing People From Prison Is Easier Said Than Done: As the pandemic threatens the lives of those behind bars, the country must confront a system that has never had rehabilitation as its priority."  This piece is reform-minded, and I recommend it, but its headline, much of its prose, and its overall spirit embrace a kind of carceral mentality that serves to reify a mass incarceration message.  These excerpts, as I will explain below, spotlight my concerns:

Some governors, alarmed at the deaths in prisons and jails and worried about the risk to surrounding communities, are listening — sort of, with an ear attuned to the political liability. More than half of the states have agreed to release people convicted of low-level crimes, people who are nearing the end of their sentences, or people who merit compassionate release, such as pregnant people or older, vulnerable inmates.

“It’s been helpful. I know that people have gotten out, and I am moved by their release,” says Nicole Porter, the director of advocacy at the Sentencing Project, a research organization that campaigns for sentencing reform. “But none of it has been substantial.  And what I hope this moment tells us is that our incarceration rate is a function of politics — because there are many questions about who needs to be incarcerated.”

To meaningfully reduce America’s prison population and slow the pandemic will require cutting away not just fat but muscle, releasing not just nonviolent drug offenders but those convicted of violent crimes.  The difficulty of doing so, in both practical and moral terms, is enormous.  Which people convicted of murder or armed robbery do we release? How do we decide?  And how do we guarantee that they won’t offend again, especially as they try to restart their life during the worst economic collapse in nearly a century?...

Advocates say prisons are brimming with candidates who deserve a second chance—men and women who made egregious mistakes when they were young, whose crimes say more about the impulsiveness of youth and the trickiness of navigating inner-city violence than they do about character.  Yet in large part, these are not people whom the system has been preparing for release.

Prison can serve many purposes — to deter people from committing crimes in the first place, to punish them if they do, or to rehabilitate them and usher them back to normal life. America has by and large chosen the punitive path, imposing decades-long sentences intended to reduce crime on the streets.  During that time, inmates usually don’t receive the kind of training or care that would enable them to return to the outside world and build a new, stable life. This presents a giant hurdle for those who would wish to release prisoners now....

Those are the practical challenges.  The moral question — who deserves to be released? — is even more daunting.  Is the inmate truly penitent, or merely saying the right words? Has he matured past his violent tendencies, or is he a tinderbox waiting to ignite once he’s out?  Does the family of the victim agree, or will his release only add to their pain?  Is the crime simply so heinous that even a perfect record cannot overcome it?

The last paragraph I have excerpted here is perhaps the clearest example of a carceral mindset: when asking "who deserves to be released?", the writer is necessarily assuming that everyone incarcerated not only already "deserves" to be incarcerated, but also "deserves" to continue to be incarcerated.  Further, the author then suggests that, to "deserve" release, an "inmate" must be "truly penitent" AND must have "matured past his violent tendencies" AND must have the "family of the victim agree." And, even then it seems, a "perfect record" still should not permit release amidst a global pandemic killing hundreds of prisoners if a person's crime is "simply so heinous."

For anyone eager to see a US criminal justice system operating with a deep commitment to liberty and justice, this thinking should be — must be — completely flipped.  The proper "daunting" moral question  is who deserves to still be incarcerated, especially amidst a global pandemic with inherently and worsening inhumane prison conditions.  If an incarcerated person is "truly penitent" OR likely has "matured past his violent tendencies" OR has the "family of the victim" in support, then that person ought no longer be incarcerated.  And, even without anything close to a "perfect record," an alternative to incarceration should still be the presumption for any and everyone whose crime or criminal record is not truly heinous.

Similar rhetoric earlier in the piece is comparably problematic, such as the query "how do we guarantee that they won’t offend again" when considering who to release from prison.  It is important — and I think this piece means to get us usefully thinking about — the importance of prison programming and outside support that seeks to minimize the risk of recidivism for persons leaving prison.  But we are never going to be able to "guarantee" that any cohort of individuals will never commit any kind of crime.  When we consider building a new highway, nobody expects public officials to "guarantee" there will never be an accident on that highway.  We want a new road to be as safe as possible, but we recognize that the array of benefits that can come from having a new road generally justify the inevitable public safety risks it creates.   Similarly, we must be ever mindful of the array of benefits that can come from having less people in prison and not demand or even suggest that people should be released from prison only if and only when public officials can "guarantee that they won’t offend again."

Finally, for now at least, I must again lament the tendency in so many of these kinds of discussions to start with the framing that meaningful action here "will require cutting away not just fat but muscle, releasing not just nonviolent drug offenders but those convicted of violent crimes."  I agree that cutting away the "fat" may not alone be enough, but let's focus on getting that hard work done before we fixate on the additional challenges of cutting "muscle."  As this great Prison Policy Initiative pie chart reminds us, roughly 50% of our national prison and jail populations are serving time for what are deemed "non-violent" offenses.  When we let out all or most or even some significant portion of this million+ people in cages, then I will be more than ready to wring my hands over which "violent" offenders to release.  But to now get deeply concerned about exactly which "people convicted of murder or armed robbery" should be released risks creating the impression that these types of offenders are the bulk of our prison populations, when they comprise less than 25% of all the people put in cages in the so-called home of the free and land of the brave.  (Also, for the very most serious of offenders, the debate is much less complicated since presumptive release when they are elderly or ill generally makes the most sense.)

I could go on and on, but I hope my point is clear.  Even as we discuss reform and recognize all the challenges surrounding decarceration efforts, we must be ever mindful of how decades of mass incarceration has not only badly hurt our nation and our values, but also badly hurt how we talk and think about doing better.

July 10, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, July 06, 2020

Puzzling though crime data, practically and politically, in the crazy year that is 2020

This new New York Times piece discusses the latest crime data as we head into the back half of 2020.  The piece's full headline captures its themes: "It’s Been ‘Such a Weird Year.’ That’s Also Reflected in Crime Statistics: In large cities across America, murders are up sharply, while other violent crimes have decreased."  Here are excerpts:

The national numbers for murder and other types of violent crime rarely move in opposite directions. But this is no ordinary year.

Overall crime is down 5.3 percent in 25 large American cities relative to the same period in 2019, with violent crime down 2 percent.

But murder in these 25 cities is up 16.1 percent in relation to last year. It’s not just a handful of cities driving this change, either. Property crime is down in 18 of the 25 sampled cities, and violent crime is down in 11 of them, but murder is up in 20 of the cities....

Homicides usually rise in the summer, which coincided this year with many people emerging from pandemic lockdown. In one recent weekend in Chicago, 14 people were killed and at least 106 people were shot, the most in eight years. And as The New York Times reported recently: “It has been nearly a quarter century since New York City experienced as much gun violence in the month of June as it has seen this year.” (On Sunday night, the city reportedly had nine killings in the previous 24 hours.)

An additional 17 cities provide year-to-date murder data. Murder is up 21.8 percent in all 36 cities with 2020 data through at least May, with 29 of those cities seeing an increase this year relative to last year.

How often do murder and other types of violent crime move in opposite directions? There have been only four years since 1960 (1993, 2000, 2002 and 2003) when murder increased but overall violent crime decreased nationally, and the increase in murder was small in each of those years. The average absolute difference between the national change in murder and violent crime since 1990 has been just 2.2 percent, so a big increase in murder nationally while violent crime falls is almost unheard-of.

But this year has been distinct in many ways, because of the pandemic and because of the protests and civil unrest after the death of George Floyd in police custody. Jerry Ratcliffe, a professor of criminal justice at Temple University and host of the Reducing Crime podcast, has cautioned against comparing crime figures in one year with the previous year. This year’s upheaval may be even more reason to be cautious.

Identifying the trend in murder statistics is relatively easy. Understanding why it is happening and what can be done about it is much harder. Phillip Atiba Goff, co-founder and C.E.O. of the Center for Policing Equity, points to increased domestic violence as one possible cause of the increase in murder. “The first explanation that I have is that this comes from people being locked inside (during quarantines) and a lack of social services,” he said. “All those things are things that we would expect to lead to higher rates of violence. That’s speculation, though. I have no evidence that that’s the right thing other than the rise in calls for domestic violence.”

Mr. Ratcliffe agrees that increased domestic violence may be playing a role. He also hypothesizes that “Covid-19 could have reduced the market and opportunities for recreational drug use/dealing, which puts stress on the drug markets and increases violence.”

“If that is one of the causes, then we might see those tensions ease as lockdowns are relieved,” he said.

Jennifer Doleac, associate professor of economics and director of the Justice Tech Lab at Texas A&M, said: “People are worried about increasing domestic violence, and that could certainly lead to increases in homicide. Any kind of crime where most of it is between strangers or requires people being out and about would be down, and homicide is usually between people who know each other, so it might be affected differently.”

It’s plausible that the increase in murder this year might reflect a trend that began before the pandemic got underway. A review of the percent change in murder in 10 cities before coronavirus struck (generally defined as through February or March) and those cities’ most recent June update for the year so far shows a worse year-to-date percent change in eight of them, suggesting that the trend may have accelerated over the last few months....

Some research suggests that a loss of trust in law enforcement can cause citizens to be reluctant to contact the police, and people may be more likely to take justice into their own hands to resolve disputes.

It’s important to keep the rise in historical perspective. Murder in New York was up 25 percent compared with last year as of June 14, but that total was the same one the city had in 2015. Murder is up 22 percent in Chicago, but it’s down 6 percent from where it was at this time in 2017. Murder is up 42 percent in New Orleans, but a year ago murder was its lowest point there in almost half a century.

“These numbers do not tell a story that supports any ideological side of the debate around policing,” Mr. Goff said. “What it supports at most is a need for rigorous curiosity about a vital issue.” Ms. Doleac also says it is too early to draw any firm conclusions: “This is such a weird year in so many dimensions, and it’s going to take us a while to figure out what caused any of these differences in crime. It is perfectly reasonable to think the first half of this year may not tell us what the rest of the year will look like.”...

“The reality is that we just don’t know” what’s driving the change in murder, Mr. Goff said, “and it’s not a straightforward process to figure it out.”

Notably, Prez Trump already has released a campaign ad seeking to tie police reform efforts to increased crime. If homicide numbers keep going up and up in big cities like New York and Chicago, I would expect the Trump campaign to continue to try to stoke up fear of crime and continue to claim that he is the only "law and order" candidate.  That political playbook worked pretty well for Richard Nixon in 1968 and for George H.W. Bush in 1988, and the next few months will show if it can work for Donald Trump.

One final macabre observation: as I reflect on crime data circa July 2020, I am finding that the COVID pandemic skews my perspective on some of the numbers.  These crime data on New York City reports 176 murders in roughly the first six months of 2020 compared to 143 murders during the same period in 2019.  While that is a troubling 23% increase in NYC murders for the first half of the year, it is still well less than half of the 500+ daily deaths from COVID that NYC experienced in early April. Though there are lots of problems with comparing data on homicides and COVID deaths, I am finding that the grim COVID death data that we are all still processing make even elevated homicide numbers look not quite as frightening.  Of course, a global pandemic should not make us complacent about crime, but I am still struck by how the reality and reactions to crime is always going to be contextual and contingent.

Prior related posts:

July 6, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, National and State Crime Data, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 26, 2020

"COVID-19 and Homicide: Final Report to Arnold Ventures"

The title of this post is the title of this very interesting new empirical paper that I can across yesterday. The 13-page work is authored by Thomas Abt, Richard Rosenfeld and Ernesto Lopez.  Here is its summary:

Did crime rates decline in response to the actions taken to address the COVID-19 pandemic?  Several reports have suggested that they did, in the United States and other nations (e.g., Jacoby, Stucka, and Phillips 2020; Mohler, Bertozzi, Carter, et al. 2020; Police Executive Research Forum 2020; Semple and Ahmed 2020).  Some cautioned that crime was not falling at the same pace everywhere, however, and in some US cities it was rising (Dolmetsch, Pettersson, Yasiejko 2020). These accounts are typically based on small samples of cities and brief time periods.

By contrast, the current study, to our knowledge the largest to date, compares monthly homicide rates in 64 US cities during January through June of 2020 with the previous three-year average homicide rates during the same months. We focus on homicide because it is the most serious and reliably measured criminal offense.  We find that, compared with the previous three-year average, homicide rates decreased during April and May of 2020.  Not all cities experienced a homicide decline, however, and the decreases during April were roughly twice as large as those in May.  With few exceptions, we did not find sizable differences between the cities in which homicides dropped and those where they rose.  We conclude by discussing several reasons why homicide rates in US cities might increase over the next several months.

June 26, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, National and State Crime Data, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 22, 2020

No new cert grants from SCOTUS as Justice Thomas laments failure to take up whether First Amendment limits criminalizing "reckless threats"

This morning's Supreme Court order list yet again lacks any new grants of certiorari (which, as explained in this recent post, I have come to expect from this court).  But, showcasing as he did last week that he will call out his colleagues for failing to take up issues he considers important, Justice Thomas has a dissent from the denial of cert in Kansas v. Boettger, No. 19–1051.  Here is how this six-page dissent gets started:

Kansas asks us to decide whether the First Amendment prohibits States from criminalizing threats to “[c]ommit violence . . . in reckless disregard of the risk of causing . . . fear.” Kan. Stat. Ann. §21–5415(a)(1) (2018).  Respondent Timothy Boettger was convicted for telling the son of a police detective that he “‘was going to end up finding [his] dad in a ditch.’” ___ Kan. ___, ___, 450 P. 3d 805, 807 (2019).  Respondent Ryan Johnson was separately convicted for telling his mother that he “‘wish[ed] [she] would die,’” that he would “‘help [her] get there,’” and that he was “‘going to f***ing kill [her] a***.’” ___ Kan. ___, ___, 450 P. 3d 790, 792 (2019).  The Kansas Supreme Court overturned both convictions and held that reckless threats are protected by the First Amendment, relying on Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).

In my view, the Constitution likely permits States to criminalize threats even in the absence of any intent to intimidate. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 760– 767 (2015) (dissenting opinion).  It appears to follow that threats of violence made in reckless disregard of causing fear may be prohibited.  The Kansas Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion by overreading our decision in Black, which did not answer the question presented here.  Other courts looking to Black, however, have upheld similar statutes.  State v. Taupier, 330 Conn. 149, 193 A.3d 1 (2018); Major v. State, 301 Ga. 147, 800 S.E.2d 348 (2017).  I would grant the petition for certiorari to resolve the split on this important question.

June 22, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, June 20, 2020

"The Categorical Imperative as a Decarceral Agenda"

The title of this post is the title of this new essay authored by Jessica Eaglin recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Despite recent modest reductions in state prison populations, Franklin Zimring argues in his forthcoming book that mass incarceration remains persistent and intractable.  As a path forward, Zimring urges states to adopt pragmatic, structural reforms that incentivize the reduction of prison populations through a “categorical imperative,” meaning, by identifying subcategories of offenders best suited for diversion from prison sentences at the state level.  This decarceral method is at odds with popular sentencing reforms in the states.

By exploring the tensions between reform trends in practice and Zimring’s proscription, this Essay illuminates a deeper concern with sentencing reforms in the era of mass incarceration.  Reforms focused on categorizing offenders can obscure and sustain policymakers’ persistent tendency to frame social problems as matters of crime and punishment. Recognizing this shortcoming upfront has important implications for scholars and policymakers alike when contemplating the methodologies that should inform sentencing reforms going forward.

June 20, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 04, 2020

"The Federal Judiciary’s Role in Drug Law Reform in an Era of Congressional Dysfunction"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article now available via SSRN authored by Erica Zunkel and Alison Siegler. Here is its abstract:

While state drug law reform is moving apace, federal drug law reform has moved much more slowly.  Many, including the Judicial Conference of the United States and the United States Sentencing Commission, have urged Congress to enact substantive federal drug law reform for years.  But Congress has not acted.  As a result, the federal system continues to single out drug offenses for harsh treatment at the front end — the bail stage — and the back end — the sentencing stage — of a case.

This article examines the judiciary’s crucial role in federal drug law reform at the front and back ends of a drug case.  On the front end, judges should encourage the release of more people on bail by closely scrutinizing prosecutors’ motions for temporary detention in drug cases and giving little, if any, weight to the Bail Reform Act’s presumption of detention at the detention hearing stage.  Data shows that the drug presumption is over-broad and does a poor job of determining who is a risk of flight or a danger to the community.  At the back end, judges should issue categorical policy disagreements with the drug sentencing guideline and the career offender sentencing guideline under the Supreme Court’s rationale in Kimbrough v. United States.  These guidelines are not based on empirical evidence and national experience, and therefore do not exemplify the Sentencing Commission’s “exercise of its characteristic institutional role.”  At both ends, judges should emphasize the evidence that the drug presumption, the drug sentencing guideline, and the career offender sentencing guideline are flawed.  While these actions are not a cure for Congress’ inaction, they send a clear message from one co-equal branch of government to another that substantive reform is urgently needed.

June 4, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 27, 2020

Council on Criminal Justice releases big new reform report titled "Next Steps: An Agenda for Federal Action on Safety and Justice"

I noted in this post this last summer the notable new group working toward criminal justice reform called the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ).  I flagged here the CCJ's great set of papers and resources taking a close look at the 1994 Crime Bill (which I had a chance to contribute to as noted here); I also flagged here from December a big CCJ report on "Trends in Correctional Control by Race and Sex."  Today, I am excited to see and report on the CCJ's latest (and arguably most important) work, this big new report titled "Next Steps: An Agenda for Federal Action on Safety and Justice."  This press release provides a useful summary of the report and its major recommendations:

Well before COVID-19 surfaced, the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) established an independent task force to chart a course for federal action on criminal justice reform.  The pandemic has underscored the urgency of that effort, and today the Task Force on Federal Priorities released a report detailing 15 achievable, evidence-based proposals for change.  If fully implemented, key recommendations would:

  • Eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug crimes, reducing the prison population
  • Establish a “second look” provision allowing people serving longer sentences -– many of them elderly and infirm –- to ask courts for a sentence reduction
  • Help formerly incarcerated people succeed by sealing certain criminal records from public view
  • Create independent oversight of the federal prison system to improve conditions for incarcerated people and staff, strengthen reentry planning and other services, and hold employees accountable for misconduct
  • Resolve the federal-state conflict over recreational and medical cannabis by providing federal waivers to states that have legalized it
  • Dedicate millions of grant dollars to reducing victimization and trauma in cities most affected by violence...

The 14-member Task Force was established in June of 2019 to build on federal reforms adopted under the FIRST STEP Act, which passed with strong bipartisan support at the end of 2018.  While crime and incarceration rates have dropped, there is broad agreement across the political spectrum that more must be done to make communities safe and guarantee justice — not just by states and localities, where most criminal justice happens, but also by the federal government, which runs the country’s largest correctional system and helps set the tone of the national conversation.

Through their vigorous deliberations, Task Force members zeroed in on reforms that not only target critical needs, but also are politically viable and hold the potential to make the greatest improvements in safety and the administration of justice. Reflecting the commitment of Task Force members to bipartisan, data-driven solutions, all 15 proposals are accompanied by a policy rationale, detailed implementation steps, and a summary of the research and evidence that support them.

Task Force members represent a broad cross-section of stakeholders: former federal prosecutors and defenders; a former mayor and a veteran police leader; experts in prisoner reentry, substance use, and victim rights; and advocates and formerly incarcerated people. Task Forces are strictly independent of CCJ and solely responsible for the content of their reports.  Members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.

Regular readers will not be surprised to hear that I am a big fan of a lot of these recommendations, and I actually like this full list of all 15 recommendations even more than those summarized in the press release. In a few subsequent posts, I hope to give particular attention and scrutiny to the various key sentencing recommendations.  For now I will be content to say, good work CCJ!

May 27, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Recommended reading, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, May 04, 2020

Are federal judges approaching prison sentencing differently now that they see BOP ugliness up close?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this notable new Forbes piece by Walter Pavlo headlined "After Seeing Federal Bureau Of Prisons Up Close, Federal Judges May See Sentencing Differently In Future." I recommend the piece in full, though I fear it may be a bit too optimistic about the way the COVID era might impact the work of federal judges.  Here are excerpts:

In late March, U.S. District Judge Jesse Furman struggled to look for a way to free Nkanga Nkanga, a sixty-seven-year old former doctor with no prior criminal record who had admitted to unlawfully prescribing oxycodone and other controlled substances for non-medical purposes. Nkanga was held at MDC Brooklyn New York, a notoriously poorly run, dated and filthy prison operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).

Judge Furman, who had remanded Nkanga into custody in October 2019 after entering a guilty plea, was frustrated by what he could and could not do to free the inmate who was suffering from asthma and lingering conditions from a stroke years earlier.  Furman sentenced Nkanga to three years and was awaiting designation to Federal Medical Center Devens.  Assistant US Attorneys Jacob R. Fiddelman and Cecilia E. Vogel vehemently opposed the ailing doctor’s requests for release, frustrating Furman to call on legislatures and executive branch actions to untie his hands....

While judges may have a limited say in the release of an inmate, they have a big say in how long they are incarcerated....

In Ohio, a federal judge ruled that the BOP’s operation of FCI Elkton amounted to an 8th Amendment violation (Cruel and Unusual Punishment).  Lawyers for the BOP responded on April 28, 2020 that the measures the BOP took to curb the virus’s spread had been effective, stating in its emergency motion that, “These efforts have been working as the number of new cases has been reduced.”  I’m not sure where the attorneys got their stats but according to the BOP’s own website that tracks (under-reports) COVID-19 spread, showed a marked increase in cases....

Federal judges across the country have been hearing horrid stories about the BOP’s conditions and the agencies reaction, lack of action, to COVID-19. American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) chapters have become involved, attempting to bring to light a federal agency’s inept and cruel response to the contagion of a virus that has infected over 2,000 inmates and killed 37. The BOP is inflicting even more, unmeasured, mental distress on both families and inmates.

The BOP’s failure to accurately report positive COVID-19 has endangered both its own staff members and inmates alike.  The promises to send people to home confinement and then taking it away, then possibly reinstating it, is cruel.  Locking minimum security inmates in high security prison cells for weeks and calling it a “quarantine” is something that needs to be investigated.  Directives that have now caused the cutting of communication with family (in-person visits, reduced telephone time and little access to email) is beyond comprehension at a time when people need some social interaction to keep their sanity. Many of these inmates have close family ties and what little correspondence they have had with family has relayed fear, sadness and oppression....

I have given up on prosecutors being a part of any criminal justice reform.  They create narratives, many of them farfetched, to justify long prison terms for crimes that may not have even occurred.  While I’m not saying that “nobody did the crime” what I am saying is that once a prosecutor gets a guilty plea, they exaggerate the crime, usually through inflation of the dollars associated with the crime and enhancements, to get longer sentences.  Judges, who make the ultimate determination of the amount of time a person spends in prison, could be the saving grace to reducing prison populations.  It only took a global pandemic to get them engaged.

Defendants would rather be in front of a judge on July 2020 than one on July 2019.  Judges are going to re-think their sentences.  Their courtrooms are currently jammed with motions for compassionate release, civil rights violations by BOP, and pre-trial pre-sentencing release motions.  Center stage at these hearings are BOP conditions, its policies, its care of inmates and how it treats those employed at these institutions.  In short, federal judges are seeing firsthand how the BOP executes the sentences they impose ... and it is ugly.

Federal judges may hold the key to real criminal justice reform because COVID-19 will make them think about the consequences that their sentences have on the lives of defendants and their families.  They will not be able to un-remember these tragic stories ... and that might be a good thing.

As always, I would be eager to hear (in comments or via email) from persons actively involved in federal sentencing work in this COVID era about whether they think judges are already starting to "re-think their sentences" and whether they are hopeful that federal judges are forever more going to think more "about the consequences that their sentences have on the lives of defendants and their families."  Though I sincerely hope that this current era proves to be "game-changing" for all judges (state and federal, trial and appellate), I am not all that optimistic for a number of reasons (which somewhat echo some points well-made in the great commentary I flagged here this past weekend).

First, as this notable recent Cato report detailed, a remarkably large number of current federal judges are former prosecutors.  As Palvo highlights, a lot of prosecutors get in the habit of assuming defendants are far worse than their convictions reflect and of believing long prison terms effectively achieve serve deterrence and incapacitation goals.  Once acclimated as prosecutors to viewing defendants as generally worse than they seem and tough punishment as critical for public safety, it is easy to take comfort in the notion that all defendants have "earned" whatever terrible prison fate might await them.

Second, judges always have an ultimate "trump card" to get folks out of dangerous prisons by being able to declare prison conditions unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  This commentary mentions the significant ruling by Judge James Gwin (discussed here), but does not note its outlier status.  There have been lots of other rulings nationwide, from federal and state judges, refusing to find constitutional violations and refused to push prison authorities to release inmates from environments where COVID is spread wildly.  (To reinforce my first point, I am pretty sure Judge Gwin never served as a prosecutor, but the federal judge in Louisiana (Judge Terry Doughty) who dismissed a similar suit around the same time served as a state prosecutor for over two decades.)

Third, the federal judicial agency that is supposed to help federal judges do their sentencing jobs better, namely the US Sentencing Commission, has so far failed to say "boo" about the COVID disruption and the ways federal judges are responding (and might be able to better respond).  Of course, this agency has been crippled now for the better part of two years by the failure of Prez Trump and the GOP-led Senate to come together on a slate of new Commissioners so that the agency could be operating at full force.  Still, the USSC staff has managed publish at least three major research documents in the last two months along with a number of smaller publications.  Federal judges might be more emboldened and feel more supported in taking new approaches to sentencing in the COVID era if the USSC was doing more than just whistling its standard sentencing tunes while federal prisons continue to burn.

That all said, my review of dozens of judicial grants of sentence reductions using § 3582(c)(1)(A)  (examples here and here and here and here and here and here) reveals that there are indisputably some — perhaps a good many — sitting federal sentencing judges who "get it" and recognize that the usual horrors and harms of prison are now even more horrible and harmful.  But I still fear that those judges now most concerned with COVID in federal prisons and BOP's inadequate response are just those same judges who have always been most attentive to "the lives of defendants and their families."  I sincerely hope the large number of former-prosecutors-turned-federal judges are starting to look at sentencing issues differently, but my hopefulness ability has been dampened by waiting for former-prosecutor-turned-Justice Samuel Alito to start looking at sentencing issues differently.

On the topic of hope, I would love to hear from readers (in comments or via email) that I am too pessimistic, that lots of judges are likely to look at lots of sentencing issues differently now.  Gosh knows we could all benefit from some small silver linings these days.

May 4, 2020 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (6)

Monday, April 20, 2020

US Sentencing Commission continue to publish helpful data about the pre-COVID federal sentencing world

I keep waiting, impatiently, for the US Sentencing Commission to produce some data or information about federal sentencing realities in our modern COVID world.  I would love to see some data on, for example, how many sentencings are going forward each week given that, in normal times, about an average of 1500 federal sentences are imposed in federal courts every week of the year.  I would also be eager to know if a larger number than usual non-prison sentences are being imposed in those sentencings that are going forward.  And data on sentence reductions motions involving § 3582(c)(1)(A) would also be so very interesting. 

That said, I understand the challenges for the USSC in trying to produce accurate real-time data in even the best of times, and so I will just keep praising the USSC for what they are producing even while I keep hoping for COVID-era data.  Specifically, the USSC merits praise for continuing to produce new reports and data collections and Quick Facts based on its recently completed 2019 Annual Report and Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics.  Specifically, federal sentencing fans will want to check out these newer item from the USSC website:

OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES (Published April 16, 2020)  This publication provides a brief, easy-to-use reference on the types of criminal cases handled by federal courts in fiscal year 2019 and the punishments imposed on offenders convicted in those cases.

2019 GEOGRAPHIC SENTENCING DATA (Published April 17, 2020)  These data reports compare fiscal year 2019 federal sentencing statistics for each judicial district, judicial circuit, and state to the nation as a whole.

QUICK FACTS

April 20, 2020 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

US Senator Kennedy writes to AG Barr to urge him to "deny any request for early release" to certain notable fraudsters

As reported in this Hill piece, "Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.) called for Ponzi scheme architects who targeted the elderly, such as Bernie Madoff or Robert Allen Stanford, to remain in jail as some prisoners are being released because of coronavirus fears." Here is more:

In a letter to Attorney General William Barr, Kennedy requested the Federal Bureau of Prisons consider the “financial, emotional and physical devastation” prisoners have caused before permitting their early release. The attorney general had instructed the bureau to consider releasing nonviolent criminals who are at a higher risk of contracting the virus because of age or pre-existing medical conditions. “Releasing either of these individuals, or anyone similarly situated, would be an affront to those affected by their evil schemes, and a complete failure in the administration of justice,” Kennedy said in his letter.

Allen Stanford was convicted in 2012 of 13 felony counts and sentenced to 110 years for running a scheme that impacted 18,000 people. Kennedy wrote that he expects the 70-year-old to apply for early release. Madoff, 81, who ran an even larger investment-fraud scheme than Allen Stanford, has pre-existing health issues and has already requested early release.

“Our efforts should be focused on protecting those who protected us; our parents, grandparents, and military veterans who led crime-free lives,” Kennedy added. “Criminals such as Stanford and Madoff who preyed on the elderly should be the last ones to benefit from the change in circumstances COVID-19 has caused.”

The Louisiana senator also requested the Federal Bureau of Prisons publish information about inmates who are released, including their name, last known address, the prison they were released from, their age and their offense. He also called on state attorneys general to publish the same information.

The two-page letter from Senator Kennedy to AG Barr is available at this link. I find it quite interesting that (a) no other Senators signed on this this letter (though I do not know if others were asked, and (b) that Senator Kennedy decided to focus on this letter on big-time fraudsters like Madoff and Stanford without making mention of any other types of offenders like terrorists or murderers.

April 20, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Sentences Reconsidered, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

In lengthy split opinion (with interesting splits), Supreme Court holds Sixth Amendment applies to states to require unanimous verdict to convict of serious offense

The Supreme Court this morning handed down a lengthy (surprisingly?) split decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18–5924 (S. Ct. April 20, 2020) (available here). At issue in Ramos was a set of hlaf-century old SCOTUS precendents in which the Court had held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as incorporated against the states, did not require states to adopt a unanimity requirement even for serious cases. Those precedents went up in smoke today, but the break down of votes shows that not all of the Justices were eager to blaze a Sixth Amendment new path:

GORSUCH, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A, III, and IV–B–1, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts II–B, IV–B–2, and V, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV–A, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring as to all but Part IV–A. KAVANAUGH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined, and in which KAGAN, J., joined as to all but Part III–D.

I am going to need some time (and perhaps a number of posts) to process all that appears here, but for now I can spotlight Justice Gorsuch's notable closing paragraph:

On what ground would anyone have us leave Mr. Ramos in prison for the rest of his life?  Not a single Member of this Court is prepared to say Louisiana secured his conviction constitutionally under the Sixth Amendment.  No one before us suggests that the error was harmless.  Louisiana does not claim precedent commands an affirmance.  In the end, the best anyone can seem to muster against Mr. Ramos is that, if we dared to admit in his case what we all know to be true about the Sixth Amendment, we might have to say the same in some others.  But where is the justice in that?  Every judge must learn to live with the fact he or she will make some mistakes; it comes with the territory.  But it is something else entirely to perpetuate something we all know to be wrong only because we fear the consequences of being right.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.

April 20, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, April 13, 2020

Highlighting data showing why it is safe to consider all persons for release when prisons are so dangerous

Building on their recently published recidivism research, J.J. Prescott, Benjamin Pyle and Sonja Starr have this notable new Slate piece headlined "It’s Time to Start Releasing Some Prisoners With Violent Records."  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

Prisons and jails are fast becoming an epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic . Last week, for instance, the New York Times reported that Cook County jail was “now the nation’s largest-known source of coronavirus infections.”  After far too much lost time, some governors and criminal justice officials are finally trying to mitigate the damage by releasing inmates or transferring them to home confinement.

To succeed, these steps must extend to prisoners with violent records.  This should be obvious based on sheer numbers.  People with violent convictions make up a majority of the total state prison population.  Because sentences for violent crimes are longer, they make up an even larger percentage of the older detainees most vulnerable to COVID-19: about two out of every three prisoners over age 55.

So far, this reality is being ignored.  Efforts to move people out of prisons and jails have mainly focused on the lowest-hanging fruit: those detained for inability to pay bail, technical parole violations, minor misdemeanors, and the like. Almost all these measures have excluded people convicted of violent crimes.  Many prepandemic criminal justice reforms have also focused on nonviolent offenders only, so we shouldn’t be surprised.  For many, people with violent convictions seem dangerous, and the idea of granting them any kind of relief is simply anathema.

But how dangerous is it to release prisoners with violent records?  We recently carried out an empirical study using post-release crime data on hundreds of thousands of such prisoners.  We found that it is much less dangerous than you probably think.  And during this pandemic, we can add, it seems doubtless much less dangerous than keeping them behind bars.

Our study found that among those released after serving a sentence for a violent crime, about one of every 10 releasees was sent back to prison for any new crime within the next three years. Only one of every 20 had another violent crime in three years.  In fact, re-offense rates have been consistently shown to be lower for people released after serving sentences for violent crimes than those released for nonviolent crimes.

Crime rates are even lower if you look at older prisoners — the ones most seriously threatened by COVID-19.  We looked at more than 7,000 individuals over age 55 who had served at least five years in state prisons for a violent offense.  Fewer than 1 percent of such individuals were re-incarcerated for any new crime in the three years after release, and fewer than 0.5 percent for another violent crime.

Our study was bigger and more recent than most, but our findings are consistent with the patterns we found in a comprehensive review of the literature.  Moreover, all those low re-offense rates were for normal releases from prison into society.  But “releases” now need not simply mean flinging open the prison gates indiscriminately. It could mean temporary transfers to home confinement for the duration of the emergency.  Protective measures like electronic monitors are also available....

Of course, at many prisons there could be some individuals who really are so dangerous that they cannot be safely released, even to home confinement.  But the data tell us that such cases are likely to be relatively few, and officials should be required to identify them based on clear evidence.  It certainly shouldn’t be assumed to be true of all who have violent convictions.  And once as many people as possible have been removed from facilities, it will be easier to practice social distancing among those who remain.

Are crime rates among those released likely to be zero?  No — but they should be close to it.  The stakes of doing nothing, though, have never been higher.  Categorically refusing to remove violent offenders from these virus hotbeds does not protect public safety. It endangers it....  COVID behind bars threatens everyone outside too.  Staff — and some detainees — come and go daily.  Some will bring COVID in with them, and after it has spread, much larger numbers will take it out.  Plus, sick prisoners will have to be moved to local hospitals, competing for scarce resources.

Prisons and jails are like concerts, conferences, and cruise ships: places where crowds in confined spaces can spread the virus to many, many people fast.  But unlike these other sites, they won’t be shut down.  So COVID outbreaks behind bars threaten our entire society’s ability to control the pandemic and return to normal life....

The COVID-19 situation in prisons is a moral test that, so far, our society is failing.  Even when our own safety is at stake, we make knee-jerk assumptions about people who once committed a violent crime: that they cannot ever reform.  These assumptions are not borne out by data.  And right now, they are blinding us to what is needed to protect all of us.

The new empirical study referenced in this piece is titled "Understanding Violent-Crime Recidivism" and is available at this link via SSRN.  Here is the piece's abstract:

People convicted of violent crimes constitute a majority of the imprisoned population but are generally ignored by existing policies aimed at reducing mass incarceration.  Serious efforts to shrink the large footprint of the prison system will need to recognize this fact.  This point is especially pressing at the time of this writing, as states and the federal system consider large-scale prison releases motivated by the COVID-19 pandemic.  Those convicted of violent crimes constitute a large majority of older prisoners, who are extremely vulnerable to the spread of the virus behind bars.  Excluding them from protective measures will deeply undermine those measures’ effectiveness — and yet many governors and officials have hesitated due to fears of violent-crime recidivism.  In addition, the population imprisoned for violent offenses also exhibits sharper demographic disparities than the general prison population across both age and race.  Consequently, reforms that target those convicted only of nonviolent crimes will likely exacerbate existing inequalities in the criminal justice system.

In this Article, we start from the premise that better understanding individuals convicted of violent crimes is essential to overcoming resistance to the idea of releasing them earlier — and in particular, to address the fear that this population will almost certainly reoffend violently.  We review existing studies and offer new empirical analysis to inform these questions.  Although estimates vary, our synthesis of the available evidence suggests that released violent offenders, especially homicide offenders who are older at release, have lower overall recidivism rates relative to other released offenders.  At the same time, people released after previous homicide convictions may be more likely to commit new homicides than otherwise comparable releasees, although probably not by as much as most would expect.

April 13, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, April 08, 2020

"Reforms without Results: Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new Prison Policy Initiative report authored by Alexi Jones.  Here is how the data-rich report gets started:

States are increasingly recognizing that our criminal justice system is overly punitive, and that we are incarcerating too many people for too long.  Every day, 2.3 million incarcerated people are subject to inhumane conditions, offered only limited opportunities for transformation, and are then saddled with lifelong collateral consequences.  Yet as states enact reforms that incrementally improve their criminal justice systems, they are categorically excluding the single largest group of incarcerated people: the nearly 1 million people locked up for violent offenses.

The staggering number of people incarcerated for violent offenses is not due to high rates of violent crime, but rather the lengthy sentences doled out to people convicted of violent crimes.  These lengthy sentences, relics of the “tough on crime” era, have not only fueled mass incarceration; they’ve proven an ineffective and inhumane response to violence in our communities and run counter to the demands of violent crime victims for investments in prevention rather than incarceration.

Moreover, cutting incarceration rates to anything near pre-1970s levels or international norms will be impossible without changing how we respond to violence because of the sheer number of people — over 40% of prison and jail populations combined — locked up for violent offenses.  States that are serious about reforming their criminal justice systems can no longer afford to ignore people serving time for violent offenses.

There are, unquestionably, some people in prison who have committed heinous crimes and who could pose a serious threat to public safety if released.  And by advocating for reducing the number of people incarcerated for violent offenses, we are not suggesting that violence should be taken any less seriously.  On the contrary, we suggest that states invest more heavily in violence prevention strategies that will make a more significant and long-term impact on reducing violence, which, again, reflects what most victims of violent crime want.  The current response to violence in the United States is largely reactive, and relies almost entirely on incarceration, which has inflicted enormous harms on individuals, families, and communities without yielding significant increases in public safety.

April 8, 2020 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 01, 2020

Wondering again about pace and number of federal sentencings after another Varsity Blues defendant gets imprisonment term

This AP article, headlined "Mother Sentenced to 7 Months in College Admissions Scam," reports on the high-profile federal sentencing that went forward in Boston by video conference yesterday.  Here are the basics:

A California woman was sentenced Tuesday to seven months in prison for paying bribes to rig her two daughters' college admissions exams and get one of them into Georgetown University as a fake tennis recruit.

In an unusual hearing held via videoconference due to the coronavirus pandemic, the judge rejected Elizabeth Henriquez's bid to avoid prison because of the public health crisis but is allowing her to remain free until at least June 30 in the hopes that the outbreak will have diminished by then. “I have every hope that the coronavirus crisis will abate in a matter of months and that Ms. Henriquez will be able to serve her sentence safely and rebuild her life,” U.S. District Judge Nathaniel Gorton said.

Henriquez and her husband were charged with paying $400,000 in bribes to get their oldest daughter into Georgetown as a bogus tennis recruit in 2016. They also paid bribes to have someone cheat on their daughters' college entrance exams, authorities said. In one instance, the purported proctor sat next to her daughter while she took a test and fed her the answers and then “gloated” with Henriquez and the teen about how they had cheated and gotten away with it, authorities said....

Her husband, Manuel Henriquez, is the founder and former CEO of Hercules Capital, a finance firm in Palo Alto, California. He is scheduled to be sentenced April 8.

Her lawyers had urged the judge to give her home confinement, citing a memo written by Attorney General William Barr who said some nonviolent inmates who are particularly at risk to the virus may be safer at home than behind bars....

Henriquez was sentenced via videoconference to keep people from gathering at the federal courthouse in Boston amid the pandemic. The judge talked to Henriquez and lawyers over video chat while news media and other members of the public listened on the phone. The Boston court and halls of justice across the country have delayed jury trials and moved to video and telephone hearings to keep the criminal justice system moving while people are hunkered in their homes.

Prosecutors had argued in court documents that she deserved more than two years behind bars. Gorton ordered Henriquez to begin serving her prison sentence on June 30 but said he would consider a request to push that back further if necessary.

As I mentioned here a few weeks ago, under normal circumstances 300 federal sentences are imposed every work day, 1500 federal sentences are imposed every work week, 6200 federal sentences are imposed every month in US courts nationwide.  Clearly, some number of federal sentencings are going forward, but I am so very eager to know how many.  I am hoping that before too long, the US Sentencing Commission or the Justice Department will try to provide some real-time data on the administration of federal criminal justice amidst the COVID crisis.

A few prior recent related posts:

April 1, 2020 in Data on sentencing, Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, March 10, 2020

Harvey Weinstein requesting (mandatory minimum) five-year prison sentence

As reported in this CNN piece, headlined "Harvey Weinstein's attorneys ask for him to receive the shortest possible prison sentence," defense attorneys have now filed their sentencing arguments a notable 7-page letter before the judge's scheduled sentencing on March 11.  Here are the basics:

Harvey Weinstein's defense attorneys are requesting a five-year prison sentence, the minimum for his first-degree criminal sexual act conviction, according to a sentencing letter provided by his spokesman.

His attorneys wrote in the letter to Judge James Burke that Weinstein's personal charitable giving, advanced age, medical issues and lack of a criminal history should lead to a lower sentence. They wrote that his life "has been destroyed" since the publication of an article in The New Yorker in October 2017 that alleged systemic abuse of women in the entertainment industry. "His wife divorced him, he was fired from The Weinstein Company, and in short, he lost everything," the attorneys wrote.

Weinstein, 67, was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual act and third-degree rape in a New York courtroom in late February based on accusations by Miriam Haley and Jessica Mann. He was acquitted of two more serious charges of predatory sexual assault, which could have come with a life sentence.

The movie producer faces a minimum of five years and a maximum of 25 years in prison for the criminal sexual act charge, and he faces up to 4 years in prison for the rape charge. His sentencing is scheduled for Wednesday.

The Manhattan District Attorney's office argued in an 11-page court filing last week that Weinstein should receive a sentence that "reflects the seriousness of defendant's offenses." He led a "lifetime of abuse towards others, sexual and otherwise," prosecutors argued, and they highlighted three dozen uncharged incidents and accusations. "Starting in the 1970s, he has trapped women into his exclusive control and assaulted or attempted to assault them," prosecutor Joan Illuzzi-Orbon wrote in a letter. Noting that sentencing isn't limited "to the evidence at trial," Illuzzi-Orbon wrote that Burke has "wide discretion" to consider everything known about the defendant when the judge imposes his sentence on the disgraced movie mogul.

However, Weinstein's attorneys argued that the prosecution's request to consider 36 alleged bad acts in sentencing is "inappropriate," adding they intend to expound upon these issues at sentencing....

In the letter, Weinstein's attorneys said his medical issues mean any sentence above five years would effectively be a life sentence. "Given his age and specific medical risk factors, any additional term of imprisonment above the mandatory minimum — although the grave reality is that Mr. Weinstein may not even outlive that term — is likely to constitute a de facto life sentence."...

The attorneys said the trial "did not fairly portray who he is as a person," saying "his life story, his accomplishments, and struggles are simply remarkable and should not be disregarded in total because of the jury's verdict." Besides noting his commercial success and contributions to the entertainment industry, the attorneys highlighted Weinstein's philanthropic endeavors, including that he was an organizer for a 9/11 benefit concert that raised $100 million. The attorneys wrote that Weinstein "always remained involved in the forefront of various social justice causes" during his career.

The defense cited that he has no criminal history and wrote that in providing this information "do not in any way intend to denigrate the seriousness of the conduct for which he was found guilty," adding his background "should be given substantial consideration in reaching a just and appropriate sentence."

The full defense letter is available here, and sentencing fans may be especially interested in the last couple of pages in which the defense makes the case against consideration of uncharged conduct at sentencing. Here are excepts from this portion of the letter:

The People now ask this court to rely on more uncharged conduct in fashioning what they surely hope will be a draconian sentence.  To that end, by and large, the People ask that your honor consider 36 alleged bad acts in arriving at an appropriate sentence.  We submit that this request is inappropriate and intend on expounding upon these issues at sentencing.

First, these allegations have not been admitted, proven, or subject to adversarial testing in any meaningful manner and for the most part mirror allegations made by the People in other filings.  Reliance upon the People’s proffer would be improper.

Second, even under the federal standard, which does not apply, the People neglect to mention that under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (the “3553(a) factors”), or at least the ones it tendentially cites, federal courts are not permitted by Due Process to consider whatever unsupported conjecture the People ask it to.  Rather, in order for “relevant, uncharged conduct” must be proven by a “preponderance of the evidence” standard” before a sentencing court can give it any weight or effect.  See United States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 2000)...

Third, the alleged bad acts cited by the People do not constitute “relevant conduct,” and thus, even in federal court, and even if proven, would not be proper for consideration at sentencing....

Fourth, in the course of the People’s efforts to bootstrap these allegations to its sentencing request, it is unclear if it has met requirements under both C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)Brady applies equally to material relevant to both guilt itself as well as punishment....

Finally, as the court observed, all of the People’s evidence was vigorously contested at trial.  To add weight to a sentence based upon mere allegations, some of which predate even Ms. Sciorra’s rejected claims, would violate Due Process.

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Weinstein, through counsel, requests the Court expressly disregard the People’s request to use these alleged other bad acts as a basis for it sentencing determination as set forth in its March 6, 2020 letter.

Prior related post:

March 10, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, March 05, 2020

Federal prosecutors and hundred of victims write in opposition to Bernie Madoff's compassionate release motion

Last month, as noted in this post, Bernie Madoff filed a motion for compassionate release thanks to a provision of federal law modified by the FIRST STEP Act.  This week, filings in response came from federal prosecutors.  This USA Today piece has the filing and reports on it  starting this way:

Federal prosecutors on Wednesday night objected to Ponzi scheme mastermind Bernard Madoff's bid for release from prison, arguing that the reviled and ailing ex-financier should continue serving his 150-year sentence.

Charging that the 81-year-old convict who ran one of history's biggest scams has "demonstrated a wholesale lack of understanding of the seriousness of his crimes and a lack of compassion for his victims," the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York urged a judge to keep him in prison.

"Madoff's crimes were 'extraordinarily evil.' His sentence was appropriately long. It should not be reduced," Assistant U.S. Attorneys Drew Skinner and Louis Pellegrino wrote in the filing to U.S. Circuit Court Judge Denny Chin, who sentenced Madoff more than a decade ago.

I think the first paragraph of the filing is effective:

The Government respectfully submits this memorandum of law in opposition to defendant Bernard L. Madoff’s request for 92% reduction in his sentence.  The nature of Madoff’s crime — unprecedented in scope and magnitude — wholly justified the 150-year sentence this Court imposed and is by itself a sufficient reason to deny Madoff’s motion.  Furthermore, since his sentencing, Madoff has demonstrated a wholesale lack of understanding of the seriousness of his crimes and a lack of compassion for his victims, underscoring that he is undeserving of compassionate release himself.  Finally, the Section 3553(a) factors weigh heavily against his release.

This CNBC piece report on some of the victim letters opposing Madoff's motion. Here is how this article gets started:

Hundreds of victims of Ponzi scheme kingpin Bernie Madoff really don’t want him to get out of prison despite his claim that he is dying. They recently told a judge their reasons in often-heartbreaking letters.

“Our lives, and not just financially, also emotionally, mentally, and physically . . . were Destroyed,” wrote one victim, who noted that her husband lost $850,000 to Madoff.

Another woman wrote, “I lost all my money and my husband of 40 years committed suicide because of his horrific crimes. As far as I am concerned, he should spend the rest of his life in jail,” she wrote to Judge Denny Chin in U.S. District Court in Manhattan.

Releasing Maddoff, a third victim told Chin, “would be to put another knife in the hearts of his victims.”

Those three letters are among the approximately 520 that Madoff victims sent Chin on the heels of Madoff’s court filing last month seeking early release from his 150-year prison sentence because he has terminal kidney disease.

Prior related posts:

March 5, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Will Oregonians vote to decriminalize all drug possession this November?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this local news piece, headlined "Oregon Voters Could Decide This Year Whether To Decriminalize Drugs," about a ballot proposal that likely will be getting more and more attention in the months ahead.  Here are the basic details:

The proposed ballot measure, which has been financed by the New York-based Drug Policy Alliance, would make Oregon the first state to remove criminal penalties on possession of illegal drugs....

“By removing harsh criminal penalties, we want to bring people into the light,” said Anthony Johnson, a Portland political consultant who is a chief sponsor of the measure.  “We want people to be willing to talk to their friends and families and loved ones and get the treatment they need.”

The measure, now technically known as Initiative Petition 44, would reduce possession of illegal drugs — including heroin, methamphetamine and cocaine — to a non-criminal, $100 citation. And that citation could be waived if a person agrees to get a health assessment at a drug recovery center.  Drug trafficking and possession of large amounts of illegal drugs would continue to carry the same criminal penalties.

The proposed ballot measure also calls for providing a big increase in funding for drug treatment, which surveys suggest is more poorly funded in Oregon than in almost any state in the country. Most notably, the measure would divert most cannabis tax revenues away from schools and other services to provide at least $57 million a year for drug treatment. In addition, the measure calls for the state to take savings from reduced incarceration rates for drug crimes and put them into treatment programs.

Those efforts to boost treatment funding have been emphasized by measure petitioners. Several treatment advocates have endorsed the measure, including Richard Harris.  He founded Central City Concern in Portland and once headed the state’s office of Addictions and Mental Health Services. “The reality of it is that the effort to punish people because they have an addiction has always been a misplaced public policy,” Harris said.

But the initiative, which was first filed last August, has also raised concerns among many providers. Heather Jefferis is executive director for the Oregon Council for Behavioral Health, which represents many of the state’s major treatment providers. She said in a statement that, “We are not confident this proposal will address Oregon’s longstanding access crisis for Substance Use Disorder or Mental Health treatment services.”...

The decriminalization measure has met vociferous opposition from some law enforcement officials. Clackamas County District Attorney John Foote said he worries decriminalization would make it more socially acceptable to use dangerous drugs. “The trick is to not get people hooked in the first place,” he said. “If you get involved in heroin and methamphetamine, the road back is filled with failure.”

Oregon has already taken several steps toward reducing drug penalties. In 2017, the Legislature lowered several drug-possession charges from felonies to misdemeanors. And in many localities, prosecutors have increasingly focused on diverting drug offenders out of the criminal justice system and into treatment programs.

The Drug Policy Alliance, which helped fund Oregon’s 2104 cannabis legalization measure, has received major funding from billionaire investor George Soros. The group has so far provided virtually all the $850,000 donated to the measure campaign. Johnson said the campaign would be run by Oregonians and expects to attract many in-state donors.

The official website supporting Initiative Petition 44 (IP 44) is available at this link.  Here is how it describes the effort:

People suffering from addiction need help, not criminal punishments.  The Drug Addiction Treatment and Recovery Act, or IP 44, is a citizen initiative that Oregonians will vote on in November.  The idea is straightforward: instead of arresting and jailing people for drugs, we would begin using some existing marijuana tax money to pay for expanded addiction and recovery services, including supportive housing, to help people get their lives back on track.

This ballot measure doesn’t legalize any drugs.  Rather, it removes criminal penalties for small amounts of personal possession of drugs and directs people to drug treatment and recovery services.

March 5, 2020 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 03, 2020

"Going Back to Jail When You Haven’t Committed a Crime: Early Findings From a Multi-State Trial"

The title of this post is the title of this new report from the Institute for Justice Research and Development (IJRD) prepared by Carrie Pettus-Davis and Stephanie Kennedy. This report is part of a series of quarterly reports designed to provide real-time results of a multistate study on prisoner reentry currently being conducted in over 100 correctional facilities and 21 urban and rural counties in 7 states.  The full report itself is a reader-friendly 17 pages, and there is also this one-pager with key takeaways.  Here are excerpts from the one-pager:

Although the general public often thinks about recidivism as individuals leaving incarceration and committing new crimes, technical violations contribute to the strikingly high rates of recidivism reported for individuals released from prisons and jails across the United States....

• Research suggests that 45% of the more than 600,000 annual state prison admissions across the nation are due to probation or parole revocations.

• While probation or parole can be revoked for committing new crimes, 26% of new prison admissions are due solely to technical violations. Unpaid fines and fees also contribute to technical violations and may lead individuals back to incarceration.

• Our goal was to explore the circumstance of re-arrest among our study participants.  At this early point in the study, data are incomplete or unavailable.

• This report examines the reasons for re-arrest provided by study participants as these data were the most complete.  They describe a range of technical violations for expected events — missing check-ins with supervising officers and violating curfew — and unexpected events – being arrested, having one’s charges dropped, and returning to jail for coming into contact with law enforcement. Though not the focus of this report, other common technical violations were related to substance use, carrying guns, and reengagement in crime. We will have more complete data on these rates in the future.

• The 35 individuals highlighted in this report were re-arrested for non-drug related, non-criminal technical violations.

• We ask stakeholders to consider whether current policy and practices are meeting the stated purpose and goals of conditional release.  Are the non-criminal behaviors described in this report reason enough to send someone to jail?  Is it worth the financial costs and associated social costs?

March 3, 2020 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Split SCOTUS ruling concludes IRCA does not preempt state prosecution for identify theft for SSN fraud

The Supreme Court handed down a criminal law ruling this morning in Kansas v. Garcia, No. 17-834 (S. Ct. March 3, 2020) (available here), that may ultimately interest federalism fans more than sentencing fans. The majority opinion is authored by Justice Alito, and it starts this way:

Kansas law makes it a crime to commit “identity theft” or engage in fraud to obtain a benefit.  Respondents — three aliens who are not authorized to work in this country — were convicted under these provisions for fraudulently using another person’s Social Security number on state and federal tax-withholding forms that they submitted when they obtained employment.  The Supreme Court of Kansas held that a provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 100 Stat. 3359, expressly preempts the Kansas statutes at issue insofar as they provide a basis for these prosecutions.  We reject this reading of the provision in question, as well as respondents’ alternative arguments based on implied preemption. We therefore reverse.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorscuh, concurs in an opinion that starts this way:

I agree that Kansas’ prosecutions and convictions of respondents for identity theft and making false information are not pre-empted by §101(a)(1) of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U. S. C. §1324a.  I write separately to reiterate my view that we should explicitly abandon our “purposes and objectives” pre-emption jurisprudence.

Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan:

I agree with the majority that nothing in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 100 Stat. 3359, expressly preempts Kansas’ criminal laws as they were applied in the prosecutions at issue here. But I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion about implied preemption.

March 3, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, March 01, 2020

"The Criminal History of Federal Economic Crime Offenders"

The title of this post is the title of this new report released late last week by the US Sentencing Commission.  Here is a basic summary and key findings from this USSC webpage:

Summary

For the first time, this report provides in-depth criminal history information about federal economic crime offenders, combining the most recently available data from two United States Sentencing Commission projects.

Key Findings
  • The application of guideline criminal history provisions differed among the different types of economic crime offenders.
  • The extent of prior convictions differed among the different types of economic crime offenders.
    • About half of all federal economic crime offenders had at least one prior conviction in their criminal history.
    • Prior convictions were most common among counterfeit and forgery (71.1%), identity theft (70.4%), credit card fraud (68.7%), and financial institution fraud (68.6%) offenders.
    • Prior convictions were least common among computer-related (29.6%) and government procurement (25.4%) fraud offenders.
  • Federal economic crime offenders did not “specialize” in economic crime.
    • Convictions for prior economic offenses were not the predominant types of prior convictions. 
    • Fourteen percent of federal economic crime offenders had convictions for prior economic offenses only, to the exclusion of other types of convictions. 
    • Convictions for prior “other” offenses, such as DUI and public order, were the predominant types of prior convictions.
  • The severity of criminal history differed for offenders in the specific types of economic crime.
    • Financial institution fraud, credit card fraud, identity theft, mail-related fraud, and counterfeit and forgery offenders had relatively serious criminal histories compared to other economic crime offenders.
    • Government procurement and computer-related fraud offenders had comparatively less serious criminal histories compared to other economic crime offenders.
  • Only about one-quarter of federal economic crime offenders with prior convictions were not assigned criminal history points under the guidelines.

March 1, 2020 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, February 26, 2020

SCOTUS unanimously rejects effort to narrow ACCA-predicate drug crimes in Shular

Much of the never-ending Armed Career Criminal Act litigation concerns the reach of ACCA's "violent felony" definitions as predicate priors for applying the statute's extreme 15-year mandatory minimum term.  But the Supreme Court addressed unanimously today in Shular v. United States, No. 18–6662 (S. Ct. Feb. 26, 2020) (available here), the reach of the ACCA predicate provision defining "serious drug offense."  And while defendants have often prevailed on challenges to broad application of "violent felony," the unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg in Shular turns away a defense effort to limit what qualifies as a "serious drug felony."  Here is the full start to the Court's opinion:

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. §924(e), mandates a 15-year minimum sentence of imprisonment for certain defendants with prior convictions for a “serious drug offense.”  A state offense ranks as a “serious drug offense” only if it “involv[es] manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” §924(e)(2)(A)(ii).  This case concerns the methodology courts use to apply that definition.

While the parties agree that a court should look to the state offense’s elements, they disagree over what the court should measure those elements against.  In the Government’s view, the court should ask whether those elements involve the conduct identified in §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) — namely, “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.”  Petitioner Eddie Lee Shular, however, contends that the terms employed in the statute identify not conduct, but offenses.  In his view, those terms are shorthand for the elements of the offenses as commonly understood.  According to Shular, the court must first identify the elements of the “generic” offense, then ask whether the elements of the state offense match those of the generic crime.

Under the approach he advances, Shular argues, his sentence is not subject to ACCA enhancement.  The generic offenses named in §924(e)(2)(A)(ii), as Shular understands them, include a mens rea element of knowledge that the substance is illicit.  He emphasizes that his prior convictions were for state offenses that do not make knowledge of the substance’s illegality an element of the offense; the state offenses, he therefore maintains, do not match the generic offenses in §924(e)(2)(A)(ii).

The question presented: Does §924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s “serious drug offense” definition call for a comparison to a generic offense?  We hold it does not.  The “serious drug offense” definition requires only that the state offense involve the conduct specified in the federal statute; it does not require that the state offense match certain generic offenses.

Even for hard-core ACCA fans (and you know who you are), there does not seem to be all that much of great significance in Shular (beyond a reminder that rulings for prosecutors can still sometimes garner unanimity from this Court).  There is an intriguing coda to the Shular ruling in the form of a three-page concurrence by Justice Kavanaugh in order to "elaborate on why the rule of lenity does not apply here."  In his elaboration, Justice Kavanaugh seems mostly just to reiterate basic doctrinal statements about the rule of lenity from past SCOTUS cases, so I am not quite sure what the separate opinion was designed to achieve (beyond giving the Justice an excuse to cite his own Harvard Law Review article: "Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118 (2016)).

February 26, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

"Madoff Wants Leniency. My Dad Received None. Why should the Ponzi scheme king get out to die, when the judges imprisoned my father with just weeks to live?""

The title of this post is the full headline of this notable new Bloomberg Opinion commentary in which Ian Fisher reflects, in a personal way, on compassion and compassionate release.  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

I cannot remember the name of the chaplain who called from the Butner correctional facility, perhaps the nation’s premier federal prison for sick white-collar prisoners. But he was a pro.  He talked slowly, in gentle circles about how my father had been very ill and how they did their best.  This verbal shuffling was all so I could figure out before the chaplain said the actual word that my father, Albert Ernest Fisher III, was dead. He was 78.

So it hit me with unexpected emotion, complicated now as a financial journalist, when I read that Bernie Madoff, 81, my father’s Butner prisonmate, is asking for compassionate release. He says he is dying.  I use “he says” as journalistic distancing and to signal that it may not be wise to believe everything that the engineer of the world’s biggest Ponzi scheme tells you....

After Madoff’s request, I’ve learned that the penal system is trending toward compassion — as well as a more hard-headed desire to unclog prisons and work toward fairness in drug sentencing.  The 2018 First Step Act, passed too late for my father, allows judges more flexibility to release federal prisoners. So when Bernard Ebbers, sent to prison for 25 years for $11 billion in accounting fraud, asked for compassionate release last year, it hardly raised a stir.  He was let out in December and died at home in Mississippi on Feb. 2, just around the time Madoff made his own request.

Still, when your own family life collides with larger forces embodied in First Step, the feelings are less abstract.  My dad was not in Madoff’s league, but there are parallels.  Both ran Ponzi schemes.  The crimes of each caused real damage, from life savings vaporized to student funds for room and board squandered in Bermuda and Neiman Marcus.  Neither was a violent threat to society, but the actions of each incurred a debt to it.  Those actions cost, in explicit ways....

My immediate reaction to Madoff’s request was a personal one: Why should he get out to die, when the judges imprisoned my father with just weeks to live? Madoff’s lawyers say he has maybe 18 months left in him. He’s been in prison nearly 11 years.

I don’t wish to be cruel. I wince seeing the terminally ill suffer in jail, my dad, Madoff or anyone else.  First Step seems like a reasonable attempt at reducing mass incarceration in the United States — case by case, on their merits, under specific guidelines.

But Madoff’s request has unexpectedly forced me to face something basic about being a citizen: Can you live with what you think is abstractly good even if is not good for you personally?  In my case, can I say it’s fine that Madoff may get to die freely when my father could not — even if I believe that people like him should be shown compassion?

Honestly, it’s not going down very well.  To me, Madoff is not a matter of public policy, brushing prison shoulders with my father: a better criminal, richer and more famous, who could glide free simply because times have changed.

Prior related posts:

February 26, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, February 21, 2020

Enjoy full day of "The Controlled Substances Act at 50 Years" via livestream

CSA at 50_socialBlogging will be light over the next few days as I am in the midst of helping to conduct this amazing conference which started last night at the Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.  I have had the pleasure and honor of working with the amazing team at The Ohio State University's Drug Enforcement and Policy Center (@OSULawDEPC), along with the also amazing team at ASU's Academy for Justice (@Academy4Justice), to put together amazing and diverse array of panels and workshops on all sorts of topics relating to the past, present and future of the CSA's development, implementation and enforcement.

The basic agenda for the event can be found at this page, and last night  started with an amazing keynote by the amazing Keith Humphreys, Stanford University, Esther Ting Memorial Professor on "Federal Policy and the Dual Nature of Drugs," followed by an amazing response to keynote by Peter Reuter, University of Maryland, Professor of Public Policy and Criminology asking "Do Drug Problems have more influence on Drug Policy than vice versa?".

I am especially pleased and excited by this list of speakers who are participating, and today begins a series of terrific panels. and I can provide this link with its own links to the livestream for each of the panels. I think every part of the conference will be amazing, and I hope folks can make the time to tune in.

February 21, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, February 20, 2020

Roger Stone gets 40-month federal prison sentence ... but will he ever actually serve it?

As reported in this Politico piece, headlined "Roger Stone was sentenced Thursday to just more than three years in prison, a decision that raises immediate questions about whether President Donald Trump will pardon his longtime political confidant for what the president has decried as a miscarriage of justice." Here is more about notable sentencing:

U.S. District Court Judge Amy Berman Jackson handed down Stone’s 40-month sentence in a packed Washington, D.C., courtroom after spending more than two hours ticking through the twisted history of his case... "The problem is nothing about this case was a joke,” Jackson said moments before sentencing Stone. “It wasn't funny. It wasn't a stunt and it wasn't a prank.”

Stone, who passed on a chance to address the courtroom, stood silently with his attorneys for nearly 45 minutes while the judge explained the reasoning behind her sentence. The punishment, she said, grew in large part from the severity of his attempts to stymie the Russia probe, violations of a gag order limiting his speech during the pre-trial proceedings and for making a threat to the judge through social media. “He was not prosecuted for standing up for the president,” Jackson added in her closing remarks. “He was prosecuted for covering up for the president.”

Jackson’s sentence for Stone — among the most severe to-date in a case originating from special counsel Robert Mueller — came a week after his potential punishment triggered a furor at the Justice Department. Stone’s case has become a flashpoint for broader concerns about political meddling in high-profile legal cases....

Jackson, an appointee of President Barack Obama, jumped at the chance to press one of the newly-assigned prosecutors, John Crabb, about the issue as he delivered the government’s final comments. “I want to apologize to the court for the confusion the government caused with respect to sentencing,” Crabb said.... Under questioning by Jackson, Crabb confirmed that the original recommendation was approved by a former aide to Barr who was recently installed as U.S. Attorney in Washington, Tim Shea.

Crabb said the confusion stemmed from miscommunication between Barr and Shea, but Crabb declined to elaborate. When the judge asked whether Crabb wrote the revised recommendation, he demurred again, saying that — despite his earlier comments — he was not permitted to discuss “internal deliberations.” While Trump has denounced the decision to prosecute Stone, Crabb took a contrary position, echoing comments Barr made in an interview last week, where he called the prosecution of Stone “righteous.”...

Without mentioning any names, the judge suggested that some critics of the original recommendation seemed unusually moved by Stone’s plight, even though the guidelines that DOJ followed — first adopted in the 1980s to rein in judges’ discretion — sometimes produce extraordinarily long sentences.

“For those of you new to this and who woke up last week to the fact that the...guidelines are harsh, I can assure you that defense attorneys and many judges have been making that point for a long time, but we don’t usually succeed in getting the government to agree,” Jackson scoffed.

Later, Jackson noted that the government’s decision to argue that Stone should get less prison time than federal sentencing guidelines recommend was a definite deviation from standard practices adopted by the Trump administration. “It’s not just a question of good faith, but whether it was fully consistent with current DOJ policy,” she said. “The current policy of this Department of Justice is to charge and prosecute the most serious offense available in order to get the highest guideline level.”

Crabb acknowledged that is “generally” DOJ’s current policy and that line prosecutors are not permitted to deviate from it without approval from higher-ups. And while Trump has suggested the judge has been cruel towards his allies like former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort, Crabb came to the judge’s defense Thursday, saying “the government has the utmost confidence” in her, and praising her “thoughtful analysis and fair sentences” in related cases....

The judge also said that when making her decision, she took into account Stone's social media attacks on the court during his prosecution that raised security concerns at the courthouse. "This is intolerable to the administration of justice and the courts should not sit idly by, shrug its shoulders and just say it's 'Roger being Roger,’” Jackson said.

Stone, 67, has sought to avoid any prison time. During Thursday’s hearings, his defense argued he had no criminal record and should get a reprieve because he’s a family man about to become a great-grandfather. “Consider the full scope of the person who stands before you in sentencing," said Seth Ginsberg, a new defense lawyer brought on for sentencing. “Mr. Stone has many admirable qualities,” Ginsberg added, urging Jackson to look beyond the "larger than life persona" Stone plays on TV. He noted Stone's charity work to help veterans, animal welfare and NFL players suffering from traumatic brain injuries.

Earlier this week, Judge Jackson indicated that Stone would not have to start serving his sentence until she rules on his motion for a new trial. I expect that Prex Trump will be inclined to hold back on any possible clemency action at least until that motion is resolved and Stone faces the prospect of heading to prison. (As some may recall, Prez GW Bush did not commute Lewis Libby's prison sentence until the DC Circuit denied his request for bail pending appeal.)

Prior related posts:

February 20, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, February 13, 2020

Oklahoma ballot initiative (State Question 805) seeks to block non-violent prior convictions from enhancing statutory range of punishment

Thanks to an ACLU event, I just learned that Oklahoma criminal justice reform advocates are working toward bringing a fascinating (and potentially far-reaching) new reform proposal directly to the voters.  This local press piece from a few weeks ago explains the basics:

Criminal justice reform advocates want to amend the Oklahoma Constitution to prohibit sentence enhancements based on previous felonies for nonviolent offenders. The measure would also allow nonviolent offenders serving enhanced sentences to seek a modification in court.

“A former conviction for one or more felonies shall not be used to enhance the statutorily allowable range of punishment, including but not limited to minimum and maximum terms, for a person convicted, whether by trial or plea of guilty or nolo contendere, of a felony,” reads the proposed measure [which is available here].  I This measure would not apply to those who have been convicted of a violent felony as defined by Oklahoma Statutes. This includes assault, battery, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, child abuse, rape and human trafficking.

Oklahomans for Sentencing Reform, a bipartisan coalition championing the measure, filed the petition in November and began collecting signatures [in December]. State Question 805 requires nearly 178,000 signatures by 5 p.m. March 26 to be put to a statewide vote in 2020.

“The reality is that Oklahoma has an incarceration crisis,” said Kris Steele, executive director of Oklahomans for Criminal Justice Reform (OCJR). “We have the second-highest incarceration rate per capita of any state in the United States, and we have the highest female incarceration rate in the nation. Unfortunately, we’ve held that distinction since 1991, and the disparity in the number of women we incarcerate continues to grow.”

According to a 2019 report by FWD.us, Oklahoma sends more people to prison than other states, especially for nonviolent crimes, and keeps them incarcerated for much longer. Eight in 10 women go to prison for nonviolent offenses. “Research has shown these long stays in prison have little or no effect on recidivism when people come home,” reads the report. “At the same time, these extra weeks, months and years place emotional and financial burdens on the families of those incarcerated.”

Proponents of the initiative say the state’s incarceration crisis is driven in large part by enhanced sentences, and they hope momentum from recent criminal justice reforms help the initiative succeed. “We’ve been working on responsible criminal justice reform for over a decade, and the good news is that support among voters continues to grow,” Steele said. “We have seen some tremendous momentum in recent years, and we are hoping to build on that momentum and deepen the conversation level of understanding and support statewide for a more effective approach to public safety.”

Gov. Kevin Stitt has publicly opposed the initiative, saying a constitutional amendment is the wrong way to go about criminal justice reform. Steele argues that a constitutional amendment would prevent lawmakers from trying to repeal the measure if approved by voters. He cited an attempt to repeal State Questions 780 and 781 only months after they were approved in November 2016....

District attorneys across the state have also publicly opposed the measure, saying it would negatively impact public safety. But proponents of the measure disagree because they don’t see many positives outcomes from the state’s high incarceration rates.

Some of the concerns of DAs are expressed in this local opinion piece authored by Jason Hicks, President of the Oklahoma District Attorneys Association, under the headline "Proposed state question could affect domestic violence sentencing."  Meanwhile, the  "Yes on 805" campaign has this website, but not a lot of details about 

I have no sense of whether proponents of this interesting initiative will be able to get it to voters, nor do I have any sense of whether Oklahoma voters might be supportive of this proposal.  But I think those troubled by mass incarceration, extreme sentencing terms and racially disparate sentencing practices are wise to focus criticism on the often out-sized impact of (even minor) criminal history at sentencing.  I do not know if this Oklahoma ballot initiative might be just the start of a whole new front for sentencing reform efforts, but I hope it can help generate a robust discussion of the many important issues that relate to the use of criminal history at sentencing.

February 13, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)