Wednesday, March 13, 2019

Mapping out next possible celebrity sentencings in wake of indictment in college admissions scandal

Now that Paul Manafort's sentencings are concluded (basics here and here, new commentary from Ellen Podgor here), perhaps it is time to move on to the next high-profile "celebrity" white-collar case.  Though few cases will have the political intrigue of the Manafort matter, there is plenty of star power surrounding the new indictments yesterday revealing a nationwide conspiracy that facilitated cheating on college entrance exams and the admission of students to elite universities as purported athletic recruits.

For various reasons, I generally tend to avoid making sentencing calculations or predictions before there are convictions.  But this new piece at Law&Crime, headlined "‘I Would Make an Example’: Legal Experts Weigh in on Prison Time Lori Loughlin and Felicity Huffman Could Face," has various experts already chiming in.  Here is part of the piece:

Huffman allegedly paid The Key Foundation Worldwide $15,000 “to participate in the college entrance exam cheating scheme on behalf of her oldest daughter,” according to the government’s lengthy indictment.  Loughlin allegedly made $500,000 worth of fake donations to the same charity in order to secure fake rowing profiles for both of her daughters–when neither daughter actually rowed.

So, are these parents actually facing prison time or might they manage to skate? Law&Crime asked the experts and they had answers.

Former Assistant U.S. Attorney and current Pace Law Professor Mimi Rocah thinks a little time behind bars is within the realm of possibility.  “Given the amount of money involved for each of them, particularly Loughlin, and the sophistication of the scheme, they would likely be facing jail time,” Rocah told Law&Crime.  “However, it will be within the sentencing Judge’s discretion as to whether to follow the guidelines or not and a lot of different factors will play into that.”

CNN legal analyst, criminal defense attorney and University of Georgia Law Professor Page Pate ventured his guesses as to what any prospective sentences might look like for the embattled actresses. Over the course of a series of emails, Pate said the time served in each case would depend “mostly on the ‘loss amount’ (how much money the government can tie to the alleged fraud)” and explained that “federal sentencing guidelines for fraud are primarily based on the amount of money involved, how sophisticated the fraud was what role the person played in the alleged scheme, and whether they were the ‘leader, middle, [or] low-end.'”

With that in mind, Pate estimated that Full House‘s Loughlin was facing “37-46 months if convicted at trial” and between “27-33 months [if she enters a] guilty plea.”  Since Huffman is alleged to have spent quite a bit less, Pate estimated that the Desperate Housewives actress was facing “12-18 months if convicted at trial” whereas she would be looking at “8-14 months (or possible probation)” if she were to plead guilty.

Julie Rendelman is a former prosecutor and currently a defense attorney working in New York City.... While noting that it was “a bit early” to say anything for sure about potential time behind bars, Rendelman said it was a distinct possibility due to the actress’ high profiles.  “My guess is that if the evidence is as strong as it appears, their attorneys will likely advise them to cooperate with the US attorney’s office to provide information on other individuals in the scheme, and hope that their cooperation along with any potential mitigation will help them to avoid jail time,” Rendelman said.  “Keep in mind, that the government/presiding judge may want to make an example of them to deter the act of using wealth to manipulate the system.”

March 13, 2019 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Paul Manafort gets additional (consecutive) 43 months in prison at second sentencing, resulting in 7.5 year total term

As reported in this Politico piece, headlined "Paul Manafort’s prison sentence was upped to seven-and-a-half years on Wednesday, bringing an end to Robert Mueller’s most public legal battle and capping a spectacular fall for the globe-trotting GOP consultant and former chairman of the Trump campaign." Here is more:

It's the longest sentence by far for anyone ensnared in Mueller’s nearly two-year-old probe. Manafort’s punishment reached its final length after U.S. District Court Judge Amy Berman Jackson on Wednesday gave Manafort an additional 43 months in prison for a series of lobbying and witness tampering crimes he pleaded guilty to last fall. Manafort also must serve nearly four years for his conviction in a jury trial for financial fraud crimes in Virginia.

Manafort, wearing a dark suit and seated in a wheelchair, issued a full-throated and blunt apology shortly before Jackson handed out his second — and final — prison sentence in the Mueller case. “I am sorry for what I have done and for all the activities that have gotten us here today," said Manafort, contrite and stone-faced.

But Jackson swiftly upbraided Manafort's penitence, insinuating that it was insincere and hinting that she believed Manafort had previously calibrated his statements to appeal to President Donald Trump for a pardon — the only way out of a multi-year prison sentence at this point for the ex-Trump aide, who turns 70 next month.

"Saying I'm sorry I got caught is not an inspiring plea for leniency," Jackson said, exhaustively recounting Manafort's deception and propensity for hiding money in offshore accounts, ducking millions in U.S. taxes, tampering with witnesses and repeatedly failing to come clean when confronted with his behavior.

"Why?" she asked. "Not to support a family but to sustain a lifestyle at the most opulent and extravagant level," she said, a reference to the high-end suits, designer clothes, custom rugs and luxury cars that Manafort collected over the years. "More houses than one man can enjoy, more suits than one man can wear."...

Manafort made his plea to Jackson about charges brought in the D.C. court, which centered on his lobbying work in Ukraine and conspiring with a suspected Moscow-linked business associate to tamper with potential witnesses. But his shorter-than-anticipated Virginia sentence was hanging over the entire court proceedings.

Jackson stressed that she was not there for a "review or revision" of the Virginia sentence, which drew condemnation from some in the legal community who felt the punishment was unfairly brief, given the scope of the crimes and sentencing guidelines that called for Manafort to receive between about 19 and 24 years....

As a result, one major question facing Jackson, an Obama appointee, was whether she would make Manafort serve his D.C. sentence after he completes the punishment from his Virginia case, or whether she would allow him to serve them both concurrently. Manafort has been using a cane and wheelchair in his recent court appearances and has asked for leniency by citing his deteriorating health, as well as the strains of solitary confinement at the Alexandria, Va., detention center.

Ultimately, Jackson split her decision, making some of her sentence — 30 months — concurrent with the Virginia punishment, but ordering that the rest be served consecutively. Manafort’s nine months already spent in jail since his bond was revoked last June for witness tampering will count toward his time served, meaning Manafort is on track to be released from federal custody around the end of 2025.

By my calculations, if Manafort were to get all available good time credit, he might be eligible for release in 2024.  And, thanks to the FIRST STEP Act, Manafort might also eventually be able to earn some additional time off for participating in prison programming (though the particular of "earned" time credits will likely not be fully in place until next year).

Some of many prior related posts:

March 13, 2019 in Booker in district courts, Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (9)

New California Gov to order moratorium on executions in his state

As reported in this local piece, headlined "Gov. Gavin Newsom to stop death penalty in California, giving reprieves to 737 death row inmates," there is big death penalty news from the Golden State.  Here are the details:

Gov. Gavin Newsom is putting a moratorium on the death penalty in California, sparing the lives of more than 700 death-row inmates.  Newsom plans to sign an executive order Wednesday morning granting reprieves to all 737 Californians awaiting executions – a quarter of the country’s death row inmates.

His action comes three years after California voters rejected an initiative to end the death penalty, instead passing a measure to speed up executions.

Newsom says the death penalty system has discriminated against mentally ill defendants and people of color. It has not made the state safer and has wasted billions of taxpayer dollars, according to prepared remarks Newsom plans to deliver Wednesday morning when he signs the order.

“Our death penalty system has been – by any measure — a failure,” Newsom plans to say. “The intentional killing of another person is wrong. And as governor, I will not oversee the execution of any individual.”

California has not executed anyone in more than a decade because of legal challenges to the state’s execution protocol. But executions for more than 20 inmates who have exhausted their appeals could have resumed if those challenges were cleared up, and Newsom has said he worried that it could happen soon.

Newsom has been a longtime opponent of the death penalty. While campaigning for a measure to repeal the death penalty in 2016, he told The Modesto Bee editorial board he would “be accountable to the will of the voters,” if he were elected governor. “I would not get my personal opinions in the way of the public’s right to make a determination of where they want to take us” on the death penalty, he said.

The moratorium will be in place for the duration of Newsom’s time in office, the governor’s office said. After that, a future governor could decide to resume executions.

California is one of 31 states with capital punishment.  In recent years, other states have abolished the death penalty and several other governors have placed moratoriums on executions. The California Constitution gives the governor power to grant reprieves to inmates, providing he reports his reasoning to the Legislature.

But Newsom’s action will anger death penalty proponents. “The voters of the State of California support the death penalty.  That is powerfully demonstrated by their approval of Proposition 66 in 2016 to ensure the death penalty is implemented, and their rejection of measures to end the death penalty in 2016 and 2006, said Michele Hanisee, president of the Association of Deputy District Attorneys, in a statement late Tuesday.  “Governor Newsom, who supported the failed initiative to end the death penalty in 2006, is usurping the express will of California voters and substituting his personal preferences via this hasty and ill-considered moratorium on the death penalty.”

Preventing executions through a blanket action is an abuse of the governor’s power, death-penalty supporter Kent Scheidegger told The Bee in an interview earlier this month. The governor’s clemency powers are designed to correct individual cases of injustice, said Scheidegger, legal director for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.  “It’s not supposed to be a weapon for blocking the enforcement of the law that the people have passed just because the governor disagrees with it,” Scheidegger said.

In addition to the moratorium, Newsom’s order will also withdraw California’s legal injection protocol and close the execution chamber at San Quentin, where all death row inmates are imprisoned.  Those on death row will remain in prison under the order.

I suspect this moratorium order may be challenged in court, but I doubt there is functionally much that can be done to undo this moratorium given that there has been de facto moratorium in place for more than a decade already.

UPDATE: Over at California Correctional Crisis, Hadar Aviram has this lengthy posting about the moratorium and its implications under the title "Moratorium!!! What Does It Mean?"

ANOTHER UPDATE: This press release from Governor Newsom's office provide a link to this official executive order which orders, inter alia, the "executive moratorium ... in the forms of a reprieve for all people sentenced to death in California."  And I have now seen that Prez Trump had this tweet about this development this morning: "Defying voters, the Governor of California will halt all death penalty executions of 737 stone cold killers. Friends and families of the always forgotten VICTIMS are not thrilled, and neither am I!" 

March 13, 2019 in Clemency and Pardons, Death Penalty Reforms, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (7)

Tuesday, March 12, 2019

"Prosecutors and Frequent Utilizers: How Can Prosecutors Better Address the Needs of People Who Frequently Interact with the Criminal Justice and Other Social Systems?"

The title of this post is the title of this new publication from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice's Institute for Innovation in Prosecution emerging from its series on Reimagining the Role of the Prosecutor in the Community. This paper is authored by John Choi, Bob Gualtieri, Jeremy Travis, and Allison Goldberg, and here is part of the start of this document:

Criminal justice involvement is often the culmination of unmet needs, according to an increasing body of research, testimony, and other evidence.  For many individuals who are arrested and charged, a combination of challenges — including mental illness, substance use, poverty, and trauma — can lead to frequent stays in the local jail, emergency room, and homeless shelter.  But very few of these stays lead to adequate care or address long-term needs.  Rather, social systems — criminal justice, health, and housing, for example  — traditionally exist in silos and operate on an “event-by-event basis,” with little coordination between them about how to address the overlapping populations they serve.  For those who cycle between these systems, often referred to as “frequent utilizers,” these stays offer few off-ramps from the criminal justice system or long-term resources.

For jurisdictions, this results in an ineffective use of public funds and an inadequate response to the needs of frequent utilizers and their communities.  While practitioners, policymakers, academics, and people directly impacted have described this cycle for years, innovations in data and technology offer new avenues to better understand and address the needs of those who frequently interact with the criminal justice and other social systems.  Through collaboration between criminal justice stakeholders, service providers, community organizations, and researchers, jurisdictions across the country are harnessing the power of data to develop new strategies to combat this cycle, invest in long-term solutions, and better meet the needs of frequent utilizers and their communities....

This paper grapples with how prosecutors can develop and implement responses that better meet the needs of frequent utilizers in ways that are also consistent with the prosecutor’s broader responsibilities.

March 12, 2019 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Making progressive (but not political) case that the FIRST STEP Act "does much harm"

Marie Gottschalk has this new Jacobin commentary assailing the FIRST STEP Act under the headlined "Did You Really Think Trump Was Going to Help End the Carceral State?".  The piece reiterates at length a variety of the criticisms from the left waged against the risk assessment tools in FIRST STEP while its fate was being debated in Congress. I recommend the whole piece, and here is how it starts and some excerpts:

With much fanfare, President Donald Trump signed the First Step Act into law in December. New Jersey senator and presidential candidate Cory Booker hailed the legislation as a milestone that marked a “meaningful break from decades of failed policies that led to mass incarceration.” Other supporters were more measured, characterizing it as a modest first step to keep the momentum going for criminal justice reform.

But the greatest sins of the First Step Act are not its modesty. The legislation nicks the edges of the carceral state while bolstering disturbing trends in criminal justice reform. CNN commentator Van Jones has claimed that the First Step Act is a “rare clean bill” that “does no harm.” Jones is wrong — it does much harm.

Grounding penal policy in the best evidence-based research is a mantra in criminal justice reform. Yet key provisions of the First Step Act are at odds with leading research on how to enhance public safety while minimizing social and economic costs and maintaining a fair criminal justice system that treats everyone — including people who are imprisoned — with dignity....

Van Jones’s claim that the First Step Act paves the way for federal prisons to “rehabilitate and heal — not just punish” rings hollow. The legislation authorizes miniscule funding for its ambitious aims. It designates $75 million annually for the next five years to develop and implement the new risk and needs assessment system for each person in the federal prison system. In doing so, the measure diverts “limited resources for programming by requiring a complex risk assessment process that would primarily benefit people deemed at a low or minimal risk of recidivating,” according to the Sentencing Project, which ultimately gave its qualified support to the First Step Act....

The fundamental problem is not that people in prison do not want to participate in programs but rather the critical shortage of those programs, let alone quality programs. Currently, 16,000 people are on the wait list for the BOP’s literacy program.

The federal prison system is currently in crisis due to overcrowding and staff cutbacks that the First Step Act will not alleviate. Many federal facilities are operating way above capacity. Nurses, counselors, and even cooks have been drafted to serve as temporary correctional officers because of severe staffing shortages. Last year a bipartisan group of legislators charged the Bureau of Prisons and the Trump administration with ignoring calls in Congress not to eliminate thousands of jobs in the federal prison system.

It is impossible to run effective prison programs when people are locked down in their cells due to staffing shortages, teachers and counselors are filling in for correctional officers, and assaults and violence are on the rise, as has been the case in the federal prisons.

Concerns about the under-funding and under-staffing of federal prisons are well founded, and the headline of this new Marshall Project report does not provide a basis for any new optimism: "First Step Act Comes Up Short in Trump’s 2020 Budget: Supporters worry because law seeks $75 million a year for five years, but president’s plan lists $14 million." But I always find these kinds of criticisms of modest improvements in criminal justice systems quite politically tone deaf given how politicians on both sides of the aisle have shown so little interest in pursuing any reforms at all until fairly recently.

This author rightly notes that "many federal facilities are operating way above capacity," but she leaves out that the federal prison population is lower now than any year while Prez Obama was in office. If Prez Obama was unwilling or unable to pursue all the big changes that progressives would like to see, there need to be even more of a political sea change to make big reforms viable.  Notably, some of the 2020 candidates are talking big about criminal justice reform on the campaign trail (most notable Cory Booker), and it is seems to me that they have the space to advocate more boldly only because the FIRST STEP Act is law and not just a bill awaiting a vote.

Ultimately, this piece serves as yet another reminder that how the FIRST STEP Act is implemented and what follows legislatively and politically will ultimately define whether this first step really is more harmful than helpful.  I am still in the optimistic camp on this front, but this commentary provides the best argument for pessimism.

March 12, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 11, 2019

New indictment exposes underbelly of federal RDAP program ... and provides still more reason to be thankful for passage of FIRST STEP Act

This interesting new AP piece, headlined "Show up drunk: Indictments spotlight prison rehab scams," reports on indictments surrounding efforts to defraud the only long-standing federal prison program thathas  allowed prisoners to earn reductions in their rehabilitative efforts.  Here are the details:

It's a tip that has been passed onto convicts for years: On your way to federal prison, say you have a substance abuse problem, and you could qualify for a treatment program that knocks up to a year off your sentence.

Federal prosecutors have long suspected abuses in the program, which has enrolled a deep list of high-profile convicts.  Recently, a grand jury in Connecticut indicted three people accused of coaching ineligible convicts on how to get into the Residential Drug Abuse Program, or RDAP, by telling them to show up to prison intoxicated and fake withdrawal symptoms. The charges are among the first filed against prison consultants involving the program.

The case has put a spotlight on the unregulated world of prison consulting, in which some ex-convicts and former prison employees charge thousands of dollars for their inside knowledge to help people prepare for life behind bars. Some consultants say there has been wrongdoing in the industry for decades, including encouraging clients to scam their way into the rehab program.

The small industry now is "totally the Wild West," said Jack Donson, president of New York-based My Federal Prison Consultant and a retired federal Bureau of Prisons employee. "I hope it brings light to things," he said, referring to the Connecticut case.  "I hope it gives people ... pause to not cross that line to illegality and unethical conduct."

Completing the nine-month, 500-hour treatment program for nonviolent offenders is one of only a few ways inmates can get their sentences reduced. About 15,600 inmates — nearly 10 percent of the current federal prison population — participated in the program last year, and thousands more are on waiting lists. To get in, convicts must present evidence they had substance abuse or addiction problems during the year prior to their arrest. Upon completion, their sentences can be reduced and they can spend the last six months of their sentences in a halfway house.

Christopher Mattei, a former federal prosecutor in Connecticut, said the U.S. attorney's office increasingly saw white-collar convicts make use of the program. "It undermines the public's confidence that all people when they go before a court for sentencing will be treated fairly.  People who know how to game the system know how to get the benefits, whereas people who are struggling with addiction don't know all the angles to play," said Mattei, former chief of the financial fraud and public corruption unit in the Connecticut U.S. attorney's office....

The criminal indictments in Connecticut are believed to be among the first criminal charges filed against prison consultants in connection with the treatment program. Arrested were Michigan residents Tony Pham, 49, and Samuel Copenhaver, 47, both of Grand Rapids; and Constance Moerland, 33, of Hudsonville.  The three were managing partners in RDAP Law Consultants, authorities said.

Prosecutors said the three told clients over the past six years to falsely inform Bureau of Prisons officials that they had drug and alcohol problems, taught them how to fake withdrawal symptoms and how to fraudulently obtain medication to treat withdrawal symptoms, so they could show prescriptions to qualify for the program. The partners also told their clients to begin drinking alcohol daily before going to prison and to show up drunk, the indictments said....

Last year in New York City, a lawyer and three other people were charged with defrauding the government and making false statements. They allegedly submitted bogus information to prison officials, claiming that a convicted drug dealer had a history of addiction, in an effort to get the client into the drug treatment program so he could be released early. The case remains pending.

Other consultants coach people on how to lie to get into the program, according to Donson, who said some also claim they can get convicts sent to prisons that have the RDAP program when only federal prison officials have that authority. He said he sees potential for fraud also as consultants rush to offer help related to a new law that allows federal prisoners sentenced for crack cocaine offenses before late 2010 the opportunity to petition for a lighter penalty.

Donson and other consultants say more monitoring of the industry and prosecutions would help deter misconduct. "It's an unregulated industry, so something like this hopefully brings some attention to it," said Dan Wise, an ex-con who completed the RDAP program and now runs a prison consultant business based in Spokane, Washington.

I think it important for the feds to appropriately police the RDAP program to ensure defendants who are truly struggling with addiction are able to access a program with finite resources. But this article fails to highlight that defendants' efforts to sneak into the RDAP program was a symptom of a broader disease, namely that federal prisoners have historically had precious few means to seek to earn reductions in their sentences. Thankfully, the FIRST STEP Act is a significant step toward treating this disease, as it provides an elaborate set of mechanisms for allow some prisoners to earn reductions through other rehabilitative efforts. But, critically, the FIRST STEP Act has a number of problematic exclusions and restrictions on which prisoners can earn reductions AND there is reason to worry that poor implementation of the FIRST STEP could lead to privileged prisoners again being better able to access programming and reduction that should be made properly available to as many prisoners as possible.

Without know more about the indictments and underlying facts referenced in this AP article, I am disinclined to comment directly on whether federal prosecution of prison consultants may be the most efficient and effective way to police the administration of prison programming. But I am eager to encourage everyone involved in counseling defendant and prisoners to be honest and straight-forward in their dealing or else prisoners and their families are likely to be the ultimate victims.

March 11, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

In praise of Collateral Consequences Resource Center for new major study of non-conviction records

Regular readers know I have regularly urged folks to regularly check out the work and commentary over at the Collateral Consequences Resource Center, and today brings a new post at CCRC that seems important to highlight because it talks about filing a very important gap in our understanding of modern law, policy and practice.  Here is the start of the post:

CCRC is pleased to announce that we are undertaking a major study of the public availability and use of non-conviction records – including arrests that are never charged, charges that are dismissed, deferred dispositions, and acquittals.   Law enforcement agencies and courts frequently make these records available to the public through background checks, and allow their widespread dissemination on the internet.  This can lead to significant discrimination against people who have not been judged guilty of any wrong-doing, and result unfairly in barriers to employment, housing, education, and many other opportunities.  While almost every U.S. jurisdiction makes some provision for limiting public access to non-conviction records through mechanisms like sealing or expungement, such relief provisions vary widely in availability and effect, and are often hard to take advantage of without a lawyer.  What’s more, arrest records may remain accessible on the internet long after official files have been made confidential or even destroyed.  While CCRC’s Restoration of Rights Project now includes state-by-state information on how non-conviction records may be sealed or expunged, our new project will examine applicable laws more closely.

The first phase of this project, which is nearing completion, will produce a detailed inventory of the laws in each U.S. jurisdiction for limiting public access to arrests and/or judicial proceedings that do not result in conviction.  Among other things, this inventory will examine eligibility criteria, procedures (including any filing fees), and scope of relief.  We will also note where state law or court rulings permit sealing of dismissed charges where one or more charges in a case do result in conviction.  In a second phase of this project, we will consult with policy experts to conduct a nationwide analysis, examining specific issues across all jurisdictions, identifying patterns and gaps in existing policies.  The goal of a third phase will be to produce model legislation.

March 11, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Data on sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Making (belated) case for a Prez to "choose nominees who will help dismantle mass incarceration"

James Forman has this notable new New York Times op-ed about Supreme Court nominations and the field of potential challengers to Prez Trump under the full headline "The Democratic Candidates Should Tell Us Now Who They’ll Put on the Supreme Court. And they should choose nominees who will help dismantle mass incarceration."  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

In a country that locks up more of its citizens than any other, we should demand that candidates for president have a plan for how they will confront mass incarceration and repair the harms it has caused.  While most of the action in our criminal system takes place at the state and local level — almost 90 percent of prisoners are incarcerated in state, county, or local prisons or jails — the federal government still has an important role to play.

As Rachel Barkow, a law professor at N.Y.U., argues in her important new book, “Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle of Mass Incarceration,” judicial appointments are one of the most powerful ways that a president can influence criminal justice policy. Federal judges make rules that govern nearly every aspect of our system, from police at the beginning of the criminal process to sentencing and prison at the end.

Over the past 50 years, those rules have facilitated mass incarceration.  Judges have held that the Fourth Amendment doesn’t prohibit police from racially profiling drivers during traffic stops, that the Sixth Amendment permits trials with underfunded defense lawyers who present little evidence or argument, and that the Eighth Amendment is no bar to outrageous sentences like life without parole for drug possession.

How did our legal landscape become this anti-defendant?  In part because so many federal judges are former prosecutors. Ms. Barkow reports that 43 percent of federal judges have been prosecutors, while 10 percent have been public defenders.

A judge’s career background doesn’t always predict her rulings — Justice Sonia Sotomayor, a former prosecutor, often stands up for the accused.  But she is the exception.  Federal judicial opinions typically read as if their authors have given little thought to how an excessively punitive criminal justice system can ruin lives, decimate families and lay waste to entire communities.

To upend this dynamic, Democratic presidential candidates must commit themselves to appointing federal judges who will work to challenge mass incarceration.  This will mean going beyond anything President Barack Obama attempted. When Mr. Obama wrote a 55-page law review article on what a president could do to push criminal justice reform, he made no mention of judicial appointments.  Worse, his appointments displayed almost the same pro-prosecution bias as his predecessors’: About 40 percent of his judicial nominees had worked as prosecutors, while some 15 percent had been public defenders.

Democratic candidates should promise to eliminate this bias by reshaping the federal bench so that it has as many former public defenders as it does former prosecutors.  The Supreme Court is a good place to start.  Remember when Donald Trump courted the conservative right by announcing the names of possible nominees several months before the 2016 election?  Any Democratic candidate who wants to win the votes of a Democratic electorate increasingly focused on criminal justice reform should make a similar announcement — and populate the list with lawyers who have seen the criminal system from the standpoint of the accused.

There is no shortage of quality names.  High on my list would be Bryan Stevenson, a career death penalty opponent, consummate Supreme Court litigator and founder of the Equal Justice Initiative in Alabama.  Or Michelle Alexander, former law clerk for Justice Harry Blackmun, civil rights lawyer and author of the canonical “The New Jim Crow.” (Ms. Alexander is also an opinion columnist for The New York Times.)  Or Sherrilyn Ifill, a voting rights expert and head of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the civil rights firm founded by Thurgood Marshall in 1940.

These aren’t the names that typically appear on Democratic short lists. They aren’t sitting judges, and unlike many who now serve on the federal bench, they’ve taken unpopular stands, sometimes at great risk.  As a result, my list might sound unconventional, even outlandish, to those accustomed to the traditional approach to judicial selection.  But it shouldn’t.  With impeccable credentials, unassailable legal acumen and a fierce determination to take down mass incarceration, these are the future nominees whose names should start rolling off the tongues of Democratic candidates who want to be taken seriously as criminal justice reformers.

I am very pleased to see this issue getting attention as the 2020 race starts to heat up. But, as long-time readers know, I think this issue should have been a focal point for reformers for more than a decade and should lead to distinctive analysis of the work of recent Presidents. I am pleased to see some very justified criticisms of Prez Obama on this front (though the failure to mention the Garland appointment blunder is telling), but how about also criticizing Hillary Clinton for not creating a nominee list to compete with the one put out by candidate Trump? How about noting, though this does not play to political bases, that Justice Neil Gorsuch had a smidgen of defense lawyering experience in law school and he has already show a willingness to vote for more defendants' rights than his conservative colleagues?

I could go on and on, but I mostly want to praise Prof Forman for elevating these issues, issues that I hope all the Prez candidates feel bound to engage.

March 11, 2019 in Campaign 2016 and sentencing issues, Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, March 10, 2019

Rounding up some of many thoughts about Paul Manafort's (first) federal sentence

Lots of folks have had lots and lots to say about Paul Manafort's first federal sentence of 47 months in prison (basics here).  I am disinclined to make any definitive assessment of whether I think justice has been served in this matter until we see the results of his first federal sentencing later this week.  In the meantime, however, I am happy to share a sampling of just some of the copious commentary from notable folks about Manafort's fate to date:

From (former federal prosecutor) Frank Bowman, "The (first) Manafort sentencing"

From (former federal judge) Nancy Gertner, "US sentencing needs reform, but Manafort's 47 months was a strange one"

From (former federal prosecutor) Elie Honig, "A shockingly lenient sentence for Paul Manafort"

From (current defense attorney) David Oscar Markus, "Four years for Paul Manafort is the right sentence"

From (current defense attorney) Rachel Marshall, "I’m a public defender. My clients get none of the sympathy Manafort did."

From (former federal prosecutor) Renato Mariotti, "Racial Bias Doesn’t Fully Explain Manafort’s Sentence. It’s Unchecked Judges."

From (former federal prosecutor) Ken White, "6 Reasons Paul Manafort Got Off So Lightly"

March 10, 2019 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

Kansas doctor gets federal LWOP sentence for abusive opioid prescribing

In the wake of Paul Manafort's sentencing, lots of folks are complaining about privileged white defendants getting a different kind of justice than others.  But this federal sentencing story from Kansas, headlined "Wichita doctor who sold pain-med prescriptions for cash sentenced to life in prison," reveals that, in some cases, even some privileged white defendant will be subject to the most severe sentences possible. Here are the details:

A Wichita doctor who illegally distributed addictive prescription drugs has been sentenced to life in federal prison.

Judge J. Thomas Marten said it is “quite clear” that Dr. Steven R. Henson, 57, wrote multiple prescriptions without a legitimate medical purpose and “abused his position of trust as a licensed physician.”

“I have sentenced people to life before,” Marten said in court Friday. “They were people who took guns and shot people.”

The investigation began after a pharmacist raised concerns that a doctor was over-prescribing controlled pain medications. One man died from an overdose after getting a prescription from the doctor.

“I want this case to send a message to physicians and the health care community,” U.S. Attorney Stephen McAllister said in a statement. “Unlawfully distributing opioids and other controlled substances is a federal crime that could end a medical career and send an offender to prison. We are dealing with an epidemic. Nationwide, more than 70,000 Americans died in 2017 from drug overdoses. That is more than all the American casualties during the war in Vietnam.”

Nicholas “Nick” McGovern died in July 2015 after overdosing on a mix of alprazolam and methadone prescribed to him by Henson. It was the count relating to McGovern’s death on which Henson was sentenced to life in prison....

Defense attorney Michael Thompson contended during sentencing that Henson wasn’t writing the prescriptions “to make easy money on the side” because he didn’t need to. He said that the doctor “tried to do what he thought was best for his patients.”

“I only had one goal in life as a physician,” Henson said, “and that was to take excellent care of patients and to increase their functionality,” adding that he tried to serve the under-served in the community and worldwide through mission trips.

But the judge cited Henson’s own testimony during the trial that he raised his fee from $50 to $300 to help pay rent on his medical office.

Federal investigators discovered that Henson would give pain-med prescriptions to patients for $300 in cash at a time, with few questions asked. The investigation began in 2014 with a pharmacist’s concern that a doctor was over-prescribing controlled medications. Prosecutors said Henson falsified patient records during the federal investigation in addition to obstructing investigators....

Henson was found guilty in October of two counts of conspiracy to distribute prescription drugs outside the course of medical practice; 13 counts of unlawfully distributing oxycodone; unlawfully distributing oxycodone, methadone and alprazolam; unlawfully distributing methadone and alprazolam, the use of which resulted in the death of a victim; presenting false patient records to investigators; obstruction of justice; and six counts of money laundering....

Defense attorneys asked for a 20-year prison sentence, saying that Henson led a “model life” outside of this case. “Maybe he wasn’t the best physician,” his attorney said. “He made some very serious mistakes. He wrote these prescriptions not out of greed, malice or ill intent. He was trying to help his patients. That was his goal.”

The judge said he had only met three or four people who he thought were “filled with evil and beyond redemption.”

“In some respects, what I’ve seen from you is worse, in that you don’t seem to understand,” Marten said. “I really don’t think that you get it. I think that in some respects you were numb to what you were doing over time. ... I just wonder if your practices have had any impact on you. It seems as if you’re still thinking, ‘Why am I here, what did I do wrong?’”

Just based on this news report, I think this case could probably sustain a whole book highlighting how this sentencing intersects with our modern opioid and overdose crisis and the broader debates over mass incarceration and equity and the trial penalty in sentencing.

March 10, 2019 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, March 9, 2019

Notable review of juvenile lifers in Tennessee

This local article, headlined "3 takeaways from our review of all 185 Tennessee teen lifers," provides an effective review of the maxed-out incarceration of certain youth in the Volunteer State. Here are excerpts:

In December, activists confronted former Gov. Bill Haslam at an education event and demanded that he grant clemency to Cyntoia Brown, a Nashville woman serving a life sentence in prison for a murder she committed at 16.

At the time, the outgoing Republican governor said he wanted to treat the case fairly, along with cases that were similar but had not received the same level of publicity as Brown's case.  Indeed, Brown had celebrities — including Rihanna and Kim Kardashian West — advocating on her behalf, and she had a team of powerful lawyers who volunteered to pursue her freedom.

Ultimately, Haslam decided to grant Brown clemency, calling her sentence too harsh.  And he acknowledged her case was not unique, saying he hoped "serious consideration of additional reforms will continue, especially with respect to the sentencing of juveniles."

In the wake of his decision, the USA TODAY NETWORK - Tennessee spent weeks reviewing the cases of each of the 185 men and women serving a life sentence — or life without parole — for crimes they committed as teens....

Nearly three-quarters of those serving life sentences for crimes they committed before the age of 18 are African-American men.

Here are some of the other breakdowns of the 185 people serving life.  Seven are serving life sentences for crimes committed at age 14; 26 were 15 years old at the time of their crimes; 53 were 16. The rest were 17.  Ten are women.

Fourteen are serving life sentences without the possibility of parole, while the remainder face at least 51 years behind bars before their first chance for a parole hearing.  The oldest is Robert Walker, sentenced to life in prison for murder in 1972 at age 16. He is now 63....

State Sen. Raumesh Akbari, D-Memphis, said many young defendants face childhood hardships and traumas that can be overcome with time and treatment. “There are so many others like Cyntoia,” Akbari said. “It’s so complicated when you’re dealing with loss of life, but we are talking about children,” she said. “As horrific as it sounds that a child committed murder, the person they are now is not the person they will be in 20 years.”

Indeed, in many of the cases the USA TODAY NETWORK - Tennessee reviewed, court records document a history of abuse suffered by the convicted teens.

A 16-year-old girl sentenced to life in prison in the stabbing death of her mother was repeatedly forced to watch her mother have sex with multiple men.

A 15-year-old boy whose stepfather regularly beat his mother got into a confrontation with the man while asking if he would let them peacefully leave. The boy beat the stepfather to death with a baseball bat.

A 17-year-old boy killed his father after what he and his mother described as years of physical and emotional abuse that had been reported to the state. The father threatened to beat the boy after a suicide attempt and withheld mental health medication, according to the mother. The boy shot his father with a rifle and stole his truck.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a pair of rulings in recent years that found mandatory life sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional except in rare circumstances....  In Tennessee, the Supreme Court's rulings have not had an impact because there is no mandatory life sentence. Life sentences with the possibility of parole include a mandatory review after at least 51 years served — a length of time advocates call a virtual life sentence.

This companion article, headlined "In Tennessee, 185 people are serving life for crimes committed as teens," includes this discussion of some talk of legislative change:

Sen. Raumesh Akbari, D-Memphis, said many young defendants face childhood hardships and traumas that can be overcome with time and treatment. “There are so many others like Cyntoia,” Akbari said....

Gov. Bill Lee's spokeswoman said he is “open to proposals addressing juvenile sentencing,” and a new state panel is considering future reforms. But there remains little consensus among Tennessee policymakers on what to do when children kill.

Akbari is trying to change Tennessee law to lower the minimum time served before a chance for parole to as low as 30 years for juveniles. The proposal could give many of the 185 a second chance at life outside prison walls for the first time in their adult lives.

Her effort is grounded in research about adolescent brain development that shows people do not fully develop rational decision-making abilities until their 20s. Other research has highlighted the impact of adverse childhood experiences on the developing brain, including sexual and physical abuse, poverty and incarcerated parents — events that can negatively wire some children’s brains.

March 9, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Data on sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

"Criminal-Justice Apps"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting essay authored by by Adam Gershowitz recently posted to SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

In recent years, lawyers, activists, and policymakers have introduced cell phone applications -- “criminal justice apps” -- that are very slowly beginning to democratize the criminal justice system.  Some of these apps -- such as DWI apps -- teach citizens about the law, while also connecting them with lawyers and bail bondsman.  Policymakers have created apps to help defendants navigate confusing court systems.  Still other apps are grander in purpose and seek to bring systemic changes to the criminal justice system.  For instance, the ACLU has designed an app to fight wrongful seizures and police brutality by recording police interactions. A non-profit has created an app to aggregate spare change and use it to post bail for the indigent.  This essay explores the universe of criminal justice apps and considers how they are likely to result in modest improvements to the criminal justice system.

March 9, 2019 in Technocorrections, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, March 8, 2019

Senator (and Prez candidate) Cory Booker introduces "Next Step Act of 2019" with wide array of sentencing and criminal justice reforms

As set forth in this press release, "U.S. Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ), a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Congresswoman Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ) today introduced a sweeping criminal justice bill — the Next Step Act  — that would make serious and substantial reforms to sentencing guidelines, prison conditions, law enforcement training, and re-entry efforts."  Here is more about this new (lengthy) legislative proposal from the press release:

The Next Step Act is the most comprehensive criminal justice bill to be introduced in Congress in decades. "It's been 75 days since the First Step Act was signed into law, and already, it's changing lives," Booker said.  "But the First Step Act is just as its name suggests — it is one step on the long road toward fixing our broken criminal justice system. There's more that remains to be done so that our justice system truly embodies those words etched onto our nation's highest court â?“ 'equal justice under law.' That's exactly what the Next Step Act does. It builds off the gains of the First Step Act and pushes for bolder, more comprehensive reforms, like eliminating the sentencing disparities that still exist between crack and powder cocaine, assisting those coming out of prison with getting proper work authorization and ID documents, reducing the barriers formerly incarcerated individuals face when they try to find jobs, and ending the federal prohibition on marijuana."...

Specifically, the Next Step Act would:

  • Reduce harsh mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug offenses: the 20-year mandatory minimum would be reduced to 10 years, the 10-year mandatory minimum would be reduced to 5 years, and the 5-year mandatory minimum would be reduced to 2 years.

  • Eliminate the disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences (currently it is 18:1)

  • End the federal prohibition on marijuana, expunge records, and reinvest in the communities most harmed by the War on Drugs.

  • "Ban the Box" by prohibiting federal employers and contractors from asking a job applicant about their criminal history until the final stages of the interview process, so that formerly incarcerated individuals get a fairer, more objective shot at finding meaningful employment.

  • Removing barriers for people with criminal convictions to receiving an occupational license for jobs, such as hair dressers and taxi drivers.

  • Reinstate the right to vote in federal elections for formerly incarcerated individuals (blacks are more than four times as likely than whites to have their voting rights revoked because of a criminal conviction).

  • Create a federal pathway to sealing the records of nonviolent drug offenses for adults and automatically sealing (and in some cases expunging) juvenile records.

  • Ensure that anyone released from federal prison receives meaningful assistance in obtaining a photo-ID, birth certificate, social security card, or work authorization documents.

  • Improve the ability of those behind bars to stay in touch with loved ones, by banning the practice of charging exorbitant rates for phone calls (upwards of $400-$500 per month) and ensuring authorities take into consideration where someone's kids are located when placing them in a federal facility, a circumstance that acutely impacts women since there are far fewer women's prisons than men's prison.

  • Provide better training for law enforcement officers in implicit racial bias, de-escalation, and use-of-force.

  • Ban racial and religious profiling.

  • Improve the reporting of police use-of-force incidents (currently the Department of Justice is required to report use-of-force statistics to Congress, but states and local law enforcement agencies are not required to pass that information on to federal authorities, creating a significant gap in data that could be used to improve policies and training).

The Next Step Act is an effort to build upon the momentum of the First Step Act, which was signed into law late last year and which represents the biggest overhaul to the criminal justice system in a decade.  Booker was a key architect of the bill — he was instrumental in adding key sentencing provisions to the package after publicly opposing the House-passed version of the First Step Act first released in May 2018.  Booker also successfully fought to include provisions that effectively eliminated the solitary confinement of juveniles under federal supervision and banned the shackling of pregnant women.

The Next Step Act is based upon a number of individual bills Booker has authored, co-authored, or co-sponsored since arriving to the Senate in 2013, including the Marijuana Justice Act, the Fair Chance Act, the REDEEM Act, the Ending Racial Profiling Act, the Smarter Sentencing Act, the Dignity for Incarcerated Women Act, the Democracy Restoration Act, and the Police Reporting Information Data and Evidence Act.

I would be quite excited by a number of the substantive provisions in this bill if it had any chance of moving forward in any form.  But, for a host of political and practical reasons, this bill really serves more as Senator Booker's statement of aspirations rather than as a serious attempt to get something specific passed by Congress in the coming months.  Nevertheless, I am inclined to compliment the Senator for having so many big criminal justice reform aspirations, and the introduction of this bill will help ensure that Senator Booker keeps attention on criminal justice reform as he moves forward with his presidential campaign.

March 8, 2019 in Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

"3 more steps to make 'First Step Act' work"

The title of this post is the headline of this recent Hill commentary authored by Jessica Jackson. Here are excerpts:

The First Step Act aims to transform the federal prison system, prioritize rehabilitation over punishment, and reform some of our nation’s harshest prison sentences — remnants of the outdated War on Drugs.  While getting any meaningful legislation signed into law is worthy of celebration, in most cases it is just the beginning of a much longer battle. The hard work — the part that goes mostly unnoticed — is turning intentions into actual programs, procedures and outcomes for real people. To meet those goals, the Trump administration and Congress must follow through and implement the law quickly, fully and fairly.

Some of the most important provisions have taken effect immediately....  A total of four sentencing reforms began to take effect in courtrooms across the country the day after the bill was signed. In total, they will impact 25,000 defendants every year.

But challenges to fully implementing other provisions have been significant.  Just hours after President Trump signed the First Step Act into law, the federal government entered what would become the longest partial shutdown in history.  Key employees at the Department of Justice and White House were furloughed.  To add to the chaos, the Senate had not yet confirmed an attorney general.  The Bureau of Prisons has not had a permanent director since May 2018, when Mark Inch resigned.

Because of the lack of permanent leadership and the heated battle over border security funding, the first deadline laid out in the First Step Act came and went without effective action.  By Jan. 21, the Department of Justice was supposed to form an Independent Review Committee, which would be responsible for working with the Bureau of Prisons to create a new Risk and Needs Assessment across the federal prison system. One of the most critical components of the new law, the Risk and Needs Assessment System is relied upon by other key provisions.  The Review Committee has not yet been formed and further delays could significantly derail implementation efforts....

Now that leaders in Congress have reached a budget deal to fund the government through September and Attorney General William Barr has taken his oath of office, implementation of the First Step Act must pick up the pace and make up for lost time.

First, Attorney General Barr should nominate a permanent Director of the Bureau of Prisons and establish a credible and committed leader to steer the Bureau into a better future....

Second, Congressional Appropriations committee members must continue the bipartisan spirit that carried the First Step Act onto President Trump’s desk.  They can do so by fully funding the bill in Fiscal Year 2020.  This funding will allow for the valuable programming that will help people change their lives and earn time off the amount of time they have to serve behind the prison bars.

In fact, appropriators gave BOP $200 million more than the president’s budget requested, leaving ample flexibility to begin to implement the bill’s provisions.  As passed, First Step will require $75 million a year for five years to fund the expansion of prison programming and reentry preparedness.  This funding will become necessary after the Risk Assessment system is completed.  It will also allow people inside the prisons to take valuable, life-changing classes to prepare them to come home job-ready.

Finally, Congress must wield its oversight powers to ensure that implementation moves forward effectively and efficiently.  It is important to note that I am not calling for partisan hearings where House Democrats can score political points beating up on the administration’s failings.  Nor am I calling for opportunities for hard-line Senate Republicans to continue to trumpet the alleged dangers of being “soft on crime.”

Now that the First Step Act is the law of the land, both parties have good reason to keep a close watch. President Trump championed this bill as a rare bipartisan win for his administration.  Democrats vying for their party’s nomination have campaigned on the impact the bill will have on our justice system.  Nobody wins and everybody loses (most of all people in prison and their loved ones) if the First Step does not live up to its promise.

March 8, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Prisons and prisoners, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, March 7, 2019

Paul Manafort given (only?) 47 months in prison at first federal sentencing

I worried that my prediction this morning that Paul Manafort would get 100 months at his first federal sentencing was a little low.  Turns out, I was way too high: he got only 47 months today.   Here are some details from The Hill:

A federal judge on Thursday sentenced former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort to 47 months in prison, well below the amount recommended in sentencing guidelines. The sentence handed down by Judge T.S. Ellis III, a Reagan appointee, was significantly less than the 19.5 to 24 years advised in federal guidelines.

Ellis, in remarks from the bench, described Manafort’s financial crimes as “very serious” but said the guideline range was “not at all appropriate,” and pointed to significantly more-lenient sentences handed down in similar cases.

Manafort, who turns 70 next month, appeared in court in a wheelchair and wore a green jumpsuit. His prison sentence will include time served, meaning nine months will be knocked off for the time he has already spent in jail. As a result, he will be incarcerated for three years and two months.

He was also ordered to pay a $50,000 fine and up to $24 million in restitution.

“You’ve been convicted of serious crimes -- very serious crimes -- by a jury,” Ellis said to a packed courtroom after a lengthy sentencing hearing in federal court in Alexandria, Va., that lasted nearly three hours. However, he added, “I think that sentencing range is excessive. I don’t think that is warranted in this case.”

Manafort’s attorneys earlier this month asked for leniency, citing their client’s age, poor health, low risk of reoffending and assistance in Mueller’s probe. On Thursday, defense attorney Thomas Zehnle pointed to other cases in which defendants received much less prison time for similar crimes.

In remarks shortly before receiving his sentence, Manafort described himself as “humiliated and ashamed” of his behavior and for the pain he had caused his family. He thanked Ellis for a fair trial twice and asked him for compassion. “My life professionally and financially is in shambles,” Manafort said. “To say that I feel humiliated and ashamed would be a gross understatement,” “I intend to turn my notoriety into a positive.”

However, Manafort did not express remorse for his actions -- something Ellis noted before handing down the punishment. “I was surprised that I did not hear you express regret,” said Ellis. “That doesn’t make any difference on the judgment that I am about to make … but I hope you reflect on that.”

Manafort was convicted by a jury in August of eight criminal charges -- five counts of filing false tax returns, two counts of bank fraud and one count of failing to report foreign bank accounts. The financial crimes were uncovered during special counsel Robert Mueller’s Russia investigation. His case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia marked the first criminal trial in the Mueller probe. But as the defense noted, Manafort’s crimes had nothing to do with Russian election meddling or collusion with the Trump campaign....

To avoid a second criminal trial on separate charges in Washington, D.C., Manafort reached a plea deal with Mueller that involved his full cooperation with federal prosecutors. But the federal judge presiding over his case in D.C. found that he lied to investigators and a federal grand jury about subjects “material” to Mueller’s investigation into Russian meddling and possible coordination between the Trump campaign and the Kremlin.

Manafort was initially scheduled for sentencing in early February, but Ellis postponed the hearing to let Judge Amy Berman Jackson in D.C. determine whether Manafort’s misstatements were unintentional, as he had argued. Ellis said at the time he thought Jackson’s ruling could impact his own sentencing of Manafort.

Sentencing in the D.C. case is scheduled for Wednesday. He faces a maximum of 10 years in prison for conspiracy against the U.S. and conspiracy to obstruct justice by tampering with witnesses. Jackson will decide whether he should serve those years consecutively or concurrently with the ones handed down by Ellis.

Manafort could walk free from federal punishment if President Trump decides to pardon him, but it’s unclear whether the president plans to pursue that avenue. The New York Times recently reported that Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance Jr. is planning to bring state charges against Manafort regardless.

A few quick points in reaction:

1.  Though I do not know exactly when Manafort will get out, I can confidently predict he will not serve exactly 47 months for two reasons: (a) he may get consecutive time at his next sentencing next week (and I suspect he will), and (b) he will surely earn good-time credits and perhaps have others means of getting released earlier as an elderly offender. (Good-time credit alone could get him seven months off possibly resulting in his release before the end of 2021 on the sentence he received today).

2.  I have already seen lots of Twitter commentary complaining this sentence is way too lenient, but I sense many of the complaints really stem from folks rightly seeing a lot of other sentences as way too harsh.  Title 18 USC § 3553(a) calls upon a federal judge to impose a sentence "sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with" traditional sentencing purposes.  I have a hard time developing forceful arguments that a nearly four-year prison term for a nearly 70-year-old man, plus a $50,000 fine and $24 million in restitution, is not sufficient in response to a nonviolent crime.

3.  Roughly a decade ago, when Bernie Madoff got a max sentence of 150 years, I speculated in this post about prosecutors using that high number as a sentencing benchmark in all sorts of other white-collar cases.  Now I am thinking that Paul Manafort has produced a new kind of white-collar sentencing benchmark that now should be of great use to defense attorneys.  Notably, not only was Manafort facing a guideline range of 19.5 to 24 years, but he went to trial and never fully accepted responsibility or even showed remorse.  "If unremorseful Manafort only merited 47 months in prison," so the argument should go from many defense attorneys, "this white-collar defendant should get even less."

March 7, 2019 in Clemency and Pardons, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (17)

Ohio Governor officially postpones three more scheduled executions

As reported here a few weeks ago, the new Governor of Ohio has imposed something of a de facto moratorium on executions because of concerns over the state's(historically troubled) lethal injection protocol.  This new local article, headlined "DeWine delays three more executions due to lethal drug concerns," reports on the last official manifestation of this unofficial execution moratorium:

After urging from a federal judge, Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine delayed three more executions today.

DeWine has said he doesn’t want to carry out another execution until the judge’s concerns with Ohio’s current method are addressed. He has directed the state Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) to come up with a new protocol after federal Magistrate Judge Michael Mertz said the “current three-drug protocol will certainly or very likely cause (the one being executed) severe pain and needless suffering.”

David Stebbins, assistant federal public defender who is involved in Ohio death penalty cases, called the governor’s move “a commendable first step.” But the defense lawyer noted Ohioans still have “no indication of what the new protocol will be, when it will be made public, or what kind of litigation schedule may ensue. On the current schedule, there is no guarantee that proper vetting can occur before the first execution in September.

In January, DeWine issued a reprieve of execution to Columbus killer Warren Henness, who had been scheduled to die Feb. 13.

So this morning DeWine delayed the death dates for Cleveland Jackson, who was scheduled to be executed May 29, to Nov. 13; Kareem Jackson, set for July 10, moved to Jan. 16, 2020; and Gregory Lott, slated for Aug. 14, now scheduled for March 12. This was not the first delay for Lott, a Cuyahoga County killer; he originally was scheduled for execution on Nov. 19, 2014.

DeWine’s office said the reprieves were granted “because it is highly unlikely that the state’s new execution protocol, which is still in the process of being developed by DRC, would have time to be litigated by scheduled execution dates. Governor DeWine is also mindful of the emotional trauma experienced by victims’ families, prosecutors, law enforcement, and DRC employees when an execution is prepared for and then rescheduled.”

A few (of many) prior recent related posts:

March 7, 2019 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Clemency and Pardons, Death Penalty Reforms, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Proportionality Theory in Punishment Philosophy: Fated for the Dustbin of Otiosity?"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Michael Tonry and available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Proportionality theory’s influence is waning.  It is beset by challenges.  Some, such as difficulties in scaling crime seriousness and punishment severity, and linking them, are primarily analytical and of interest mostly to theorists.  Others, such as trade-offs between proportionality and crime prevention, relate to real world applications. 

The big question is whether the challenges are epiphenomenal and portend displacement of retribution as the most intellectually influential normative frame of reference for thinking about punishment.  My best guess is yes.  The lesser question is whether proportionality theory can provide satisfactory answers to core questions about crime seriousness, punishment severity, and links between them.  Alas, it cannot. 

Proportionality theory does, however, support two injunctions with which most people, citizens, scholars, and professionals alike, would say they agree.  First, no one should be punished more severely than he or she deserves.  Second, all else being equal, people who commit more serious crimes should be punished more severely than people who commit less serious ones, and vice versa.  Converting that principled agreement into real-world policies and practices is not easy.  The post-Enlightment values of fairness, equality, justice, and parsimony, however, that underlie proportionality theory are widely accepted and are likely to remain influential even if punishment paradigms once again shift.  Proportionality theory is likely to be eclipsed but not to disappear.

March 7, 2019 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Any bold predictions for Paul Manafort's (first) sentencing hearing?

As reported in this Reuters piece, "President Donald Trump’s former campaign chairman Paul Manafort will be sentenced by a U.S. judge in Virginia on Thursday for bank and tax fraud uncovered during Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russia’s role in the 2016 election."  Here is more reporting setting the basic context:

U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis could deliver effectively a life sentence to Manafort, 69, if he follows federal sentencing guidelines cited by prosecutors that call for 19-1/2 to 24 years in prison for the eight charges the veteran Republican political consultant was convicted of by a jury in Alexandria last August. The sentencing hearing is scheduled for 3:30 p.m....

Manafort was convicted after prosecutors accused him of hiding from the U.S. government millions of dollars he earned as a consultant for Ukraine’s former pro-Russia government. After pro-Kremlin Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s ouster, prosecutors said, Manafort lied to banks to secure loans and maintain an opulent lifestyle with luxurious homes, designer suits and even a $15,000 ostrich-skin jacket.

Manafort faces sentencing in a separate case in Washington on March 13 on two conspiracy charges to which he pleaded guilty last September. While he faces a statutory maximum of 10 years in the Washington case, U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson potentially could stack that on top of whatever prison time Ellis imposes in Virginia, rather than allowing the sentences to run concurrently. Jackson on Feb. 13 ruled that Manafort had breached his agreement to cooperate with Mueller’s office by lying to prosecutors about three matters pertinent to the Russia probe including his interactions with a business partner they have said has ties to Russian intelligence. Jackson’s ruling could impact the severity of his sentence in both cases....

Mueller’s charges led to the stunning downfall of Manafort, a prominent figure in Republican Party circles for decades who also worked as a consultant to such international figures as former Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi, former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and Yanukovych.

Defense lawyers have asked Ellis to sentence Manafort to between 4-1/4 and 5-1/4 years in prison. They are expected to tell the judge Manafort is remorseful and that the sentencing guidelines cited by prosecutors call for a prison term disproportionate to the offenses he committed. “The Special Counsel’s attempt to vilify Mr. Manafort as a lifelong and irredeemable felon is beyond the pale and grossly overstates the facts before this court,” his lawyers wrote in their sentencing memo.

Prosecutors have not suggested a specific sentence. Mueller’s office, in court filings, said that only Manafort is to blame for his crimes, that he has shown no remorse and that his lies to prosecutors after his guilty plea should be taken into account. “The defendant blames everyone from the Special Counsel’s Office to his Ukrainian clients for his own criminal choices,” prosecutors wrote.

Manafort will be sentenced by a judge who faced criticism by some in the legal community for making comments during the trial that were widely interpreted as biased against the prosecution. Ellis repeatedly interrupted prosecutors, told them to stop using the word “oligarch” to describe people associated with Manafort because it made him seem “despicable,” and objected to pictures of Manafort’s luxury items they planned to show jurors. “It isn’t a crime to have a lot of money and be profligate in your spending,” Ellis told prosecutors.

In my very first post on this case back in October 2017 right after Paul Manafort was indicted, I noted the guideline calculations that would likely mean he was going to be facing at least 10 years of imprisonment if he were convicted of any of the most serious charges against him.  Now, roughly a year and half later, I am tempted to set the "over-under" prediction on his sentence slightly below 10 years.  Though it is hardly a bold prediction, I will here predict that Judge Ellis will impose a sentence somewhere around 100 months.  

Anyone else have predictions or prescriptions for today's high-profile federal sentencing?

Some prior related posts:

March 7, 2019 in Celebrity sentencings, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

"All Talk and No Action: Arizona’s Mandatory Drug Sentencing"

The title of this post post is the title of this notable new "Policy Perspective" document authored by Greg Glod of the Texas Public Policy Foundation's Right on Crime initiative. The piece includes research, insights and lessons that extend well beyond Arizona, and here is the introduction and part of the conclusion:

Drug use affects millions of people, with more than 23 million people over the age of 12 in the U.S. addicted to drugs or alcohol.  Arizona has some of the strictest drug laws in the country, including mandatory prison sentencing.  Politicians and tough-on-crime state prosecutors claim that mandatory prison sentencing for certain drug offenses helps to reduce crime and drug use.  But are they really working?  Research shows that sentencing drug offenders to mandatory prison time does not reduce crime or drug use — it can actually make both worse. Prisons continue to become overpopulated with drug offenders who are better served with treatment than incarceration.

This paper will provide a brief overview of Arizona’s often confusing drug sentencing laws, discussing threshold amounts that trigger mandatory prison sentencing for drug offenses in Arizona, reasons why they are not working, and will overview what other states are doing instead.  It will conclude by recommending actions for state lawmakers to begin to reverse the negative social and fiscal impact of Arizona’s prison sentencing for drug offenses....

Arizona lawmakers have options for how to deal with the future of Arizona’s mandatory drug sentencing.  To avoid exacerbating the problems that mandatory drug sentencing schemes have created, lawmakers must stop advocating for new mandatory drug sentencing laws.  Nor should they support laws increasing or expanding existing mandatory sentencing schemes.  While every option available in other states is not necessarily appropriate for Arizona, some are, including “safety valve” and de-felonizing marijuana possession.

March 7, 2019 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, State Sentencing Guidelines | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, March 6, 2019

Norfolk prosecutor appealing to Virginia Supreme Court after circuit judges denied effort to dismiss marijuana cases on appeal

In this post a few weeks ago, I report on an interesting tussle over low-level marijuana prosecutions in Norfolk, Virginia under the post title "Can judges, legally or functionally, actually refuse to allow a prosecutor to drop or dismiss charges as an exercise of discretion?".  What gives this story a bit of a "man-bites-dog" quality is the fact that a local prosecutor is seeking to dismiss a bunch of marijuana possession cases, but the local judges are refusing to do so.  Consequently, we get this week's fighting news under the headline "Norfolk's top prosecutor says he's taking fight over pot cases to state Supreme Court":

The city’s chief prosecutor said he will ask the state Supreme Court to force local judges into dismissing misdemeanor marijuana cases, effectively de-criminalizing the drug in Norfolk.  Commonwealth’s Attorney Greg Underwood on Friday sent a letter to the chief judge of the city’s highest court [available here], letting him and the seven other Circuit Court judges know that Underwood would appeal their collective decision to deny motions prosecutors have made over the past two months to abandon those cases.

Two months ago, Underwood announced he would undertake several efforts to achieve what he called criminal justice reform, including no longer prosecuting misdemeanor marijuana appeals.  But since then, at least four judges have denied prosecutors’ requests to dismiss marijuana charges. The tug-of-war adds to the confusion about whether it’s OK to have a small amount of weed in the city.  Norfolk police have said they will continue to cite people for misdemeanor marijuana possession as they’ve always done. Circuit Court judges appear determined to make sure offenders are tried, even if the commonwealth’s attorney refuses to prosecute them.

Both Underwood and the judges believe the other side is violating the state constitution’s division of powers, which mandates that “[t]he legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly belonging to the others.”

Several, including Judge Mary Jane Hall, have said they believe the Norfolk commonwealth’s attorney is trespassing on the state legislature’s territory: making laws.  In turn, Underwood said the judges are preventing him from exercising the executive power voters gave him when they elected him the city’s top prosecutor.  Part of the job is prosecutorial discretion, or deciding which laws should be enforced, especially since he has a limited amount of resources....

Prosecuting people for having marijuana disproportionately hurts black people and does little to protect public safety, Underwood has said.  In 2016 and 2017, more than 1,560 people in Norfolk were charged with first- or second-offense marijuana possession, prosecutor Ramin Fatehi said during a hearing last month. Of them, 81 percent were black in a city that’s 47 percent white and 42 percent black.

This “breeds a reluctance on the part of African Americans, particular young African American men, to trust or cooperate with the justice system,” according to a Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office memo announcing the policy changes. “Such prosecution also encourages the perception that the justice system is not focusing its attention on the legitimately dangerous crimes that regrettably are concentrated in these same communities.”

The judge, Hall, admitted Fatehi made an “extremely compelling case” with his statistics on racial disparities, but said he should pitch it to lawmakers in Richmond. “I believe this is an attempt to usurp the power of the state legislature,” Hall said.  “This is a decision that must be made by the General Assembly, not by the commonwealth’s attorney’s office.”

Until there’s a resolution, Underwood said in his letter, prosecutors will not handle misdemeanor marijuana appeals when simple possession is the only charge. Instead, the arresting officers will testify against the defendant without the guidance of a prosecutor — akin to the way traffic cases are heard.  This is a common practice in the lower District Court and something the Circuit Court judges have suggested. But circumventing the commonwealth’s attorney’s role in the long term would keep marijuana possession cases alive in Norfolk, thwarting Underwood’s criminal justice reform.

Prior related post:

March 6, 2019 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Pot Prohibition Issues, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Notable Eighth Circuit panel ruling finds due process right of confrontation violated in revocation of supervised release

I am expecting (and hoping) that the Supreme Court thought its pending Haymond case (basics here and here) will soon be adding to the constitutional procedural protections of federal defendants when facing significant punishment based on allegations they have violated their supervised release.  A helpful reader made sure I did not miss, while we await the Supreme Court's further guidance, a notable panel opinion from the Eighth Circuit in US v. Sutton, No. 17-3195 (8th Cir. March 5, 2019) (available here). Here is how the panel opinion in Sutton gets started and a key substantive passage:

Craig Sutton appeals the revocation of his supervised release based on the allegation that he committed assault in June 2016.  At the final revocation hearing, the government introduced videos and transcripts of police interrogations of three witnesses who had a connection to the assault.  None of the three witnesses appeared at the hearing to provide live testimony, and Sutton objected that introduction of their interrogations deprived himof his right to confrontation. The district court overruled his objection. Relying almost exclusively on the interrogations, the district court concluded that Sutton more likely than not committed the assault and revoked his supervised release. We conclude that admission of the interrogations was erroneous and accordingly reverse....

A revocation hearing is not a criminal trial, and a defendant on supervised release is not entitled to the full panoply of protections afforded by the rules of evidence. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); United States v. Black Bear, 542 F.3d 249, 253, 255 (8th Cir. 2008).  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) nonetheless gives a defendant the opportunity to “question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear.”  See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488–89 (“[T]he minimum requirements of due process . . . include . . . the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).”).  This rule requires the court to balance the defendant’s due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses during such proceedings “against the grounds asserted by the government for not requiring confrontation.” United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Bell, the court must evaluate two factors to determine if good cause justifies limiting the defendant’s confrontation rights in a particular case.  First, “the court should assess the explanation the government offers of why confrontation is undesirable or impractical,” such as when “live testimony would pose a danger of physical harm to a government informant.” Id. at 643.  Second, the government must establish “the reliability of the evidence which the government offers in place of live testimony.” Id. To demonstrate good cause, the government must prove both factors; only if it shows “that the burden of producing live testimony would be inordinate and offers in its place hearsay evidence that is demonstrably reliable” will good cause exist. United States v. Zentgraf, 20 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Bell, 785 F.2d at 643).

Applying the Bell factors to the testimony of the three witnesses at issue in this case, we conclude that the government failed to meet its burden on either factor and that Sutton was entitled to confrontation.

As the panel explains in a footnote, according the the Eighth Circuit, "because 'a revocation of supervised release is not part of a criminal prosecution,' the right to confrontation afforded at such hearings comes from due process.  United States v. Ray, 530 F.3d 666, 668 (8th Cir. 2008)."  This point and the Sutton case more generally serves as a useful reminder of how impactful, doctrinally and practically, the Supreme Court's Haymond case could prove to be.

March 6, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Spotlighting how credit score concern should be part of criminal justice reform agenda

Students in my classes, as well as long-time readers of this blog, know of my tendency to see and say that every societal issue is in some way a sentencing and criminal justice issue. The latest exhibit is this interesting new Hill commentary by Carlos Fernando Avenancio-León spotlighting how credit scores should be a concern for the ever-growing ranks of serious criminal justice reformers. The astute piece is headlined "Without access to credit, ex-cons may return to lives of crime," and here are excerpts:

Every week, more than 10,000 prisoners are released from U.S. prisons and begin the long process of reintegrating into society. For many, a successful reintegration will occur only if they can access the types of credit commonly used by all American citizens, such as credit cards and auto loans. For those unable to borrow, prospects for successful re-entry fall and recidivism risks rise. That’s bad for all of us....

Some estimates suggest a majority of former inmates engage in criminal activity after their release. An oft-cited reason is the hard time former inmates have in finding employment. That is no doubt a serious problem and one that must be addressed. However, special attention needs to be paid to a challenge that receives little: the hurdles they face in obtaining credit.

The crux of the issue for former inmates is that getting locked up typically hurts their credit scores. It’s not that credit bureaus specifically knockdown scores due to incarceration. The problem is, for obvious reasons, it’s difficult to repay loans or satisfy other debts while behind bars, so credit defaults and delinquencies pile up.

The negative financial effects continue even after release, as former inmates face severe discrimination in the labor market. Consequently, former inmates face significant impediments to accessing credit. But here is the paradox: Without credit, such individuals face myriad financial difficulties, from not being able to afford transportation or a place to live to falling victim to predatory lending and even homelessness.

Under such conditions, it is harder to get a job or make positive societal contributions. And more worrisome, such former inmates risk backsliding into criminal conduct.

In a recent study, my coauthor and I found that former inmates are much less likely to have mortgages or auto loans than non-incarcerated individuals (14 and 24 percentage points lower, respectively), and their average credit scores are about 50 points lower. Moreover, within the former inmate population, those experiencing sharper drops in credit availability are more likely to engage in future criminal activity: For each thousand dollars of available credit card limit lost, recidivism increases by 1.4 percentage points.

Accordingly, a history of incarceration and lack of access to credit creates credit-driven crime cycles for this population. Yet, after accounting for credit history and income, former inmates are less likely to default on loans than individuals who have never been incarcerated.

Because former inmates present lower credit risks, lenders extend former inmates slightly more loans, albeit not nearly enough to overcome a lending contraction driven by low credit scores. This does not mean that instances of discrimination in lending against former inmates do not happen. These, however, appear to be the exception rather than the rule....

Unfortunately, reductions in credit scores caused by lower income and defaults while in jail or prison are not easily remedied. Lenders cannot readily distinguish the real reason behind a default. Proper solutions to this dilemma need to be developed together with the affected communities and the organizations that help foster re-entry.

These solutions could include a combination of providing re-entry support and education to formerly incarcerated borrowers, deferments similar to those provided in student loans or during natural disasters, shorter times for defaults to be erased from credit files or even freezing-up their credit while incarcerated.

Carefully considering credit within the discussion of criminal justice reform may provide an important avenue for improving former inmates’ chances of successfully re-entering our society — all of which can help reduce the overall rate of crime. That makes banking on former inmates a worthy investment for all of us.

March 6, 2019 in Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 5, 2019

FAMM sends letter to BOP and DOJ to urge full implementation of key provisions of the FIRST STEP Act

FAMM President Kevin Ring today sent this letter to Deputy AG Rod Rosenstein and Acting BOP Director Hugh Hurwitz urging them to work to fully implement key provisions of the FIRST STEP ACT. Here are a few passages from the start of the three-page letter:

Seventy-four days ago, President Donald J. Trump signed the First Step Act, bipartisan legislation to reform federal sentencing laws and prison policies.  The new law includes provisions to establish an elderly offender home detention program, require the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to keep incarcerated individuals closer to their families, and increase the amount of good time from 47 days to 54 days per year, among others.  We are writing to urge you to implement these changes as expansively and quickly as possible.

FAMM is a national sentencing and prison reform organization with deep ties to people who are incarcerated and their loved ones.  FAMM regularly writes to nearly 40,000 federal prisoners and their families and loved ones with news about legal, legislative, and policy developments that could affect them.  And, we hear from many prisoners about their experiences.

We have heard from dozens of individuals who believe their incarcerated loved ones qualify for home detention under the Elderly Offender/Terminally Ill Offender Pilot Program. Section 603 of the First Step Act reauthorized and expanded the pilot program initially provided for in Section 231(g) of the Second Chance Act.  Under this program, certain elderly and elderly terminally ill prisoners may be released from prison early if they are at least 60 years old, have served two-thirds of their sentences, and meet various other requirements.  We believe Congress intended that this program take effect immediately upon passage of the First Step Act and be available in all BOP institutions.

To date, however, we are not aware that anyone has been released or even that the program has been established.  This delay stands in sharp contrast to the Bureau's timely release of program guidance for the expanded compassionate release program, also a product of the First Step Act.  The failure to implement the law in this area has been extremely frustrating for families who are anxious to welcome their elderly and terminally ill loved ones home to serve their sentences.  We urge you to immediately begin implementing Section 603 in all BOP facilities.

March 5, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Prisons and prisoners, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

"The Case for a Trial Fee: What Money Can Buy in Criminal Process"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting new article by Darryl Brown now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Money motivates and regulates criminal process. Conscious of adjudication costs, prosecutors incentivize guilty pleas with the prospect of a “trial penalty” — harsher post-trial sentences. Budgetary considerations motivate revenue-generating enforcement policies and asset forfeitures by law enforcement.  States also charge defendants directly for nearly every criminal justice expense through mandatory fees, which can burden decisions to exercise rights.  Additionally, defendants can pay for optional advantages.  Right-to-counsel doctrine protects the right to pay for more and better legal assistance than the state is obligated to provide.  Paying bail yields pretrial liberty.  Diversion programs, for a fee, can supplant ordinary prosecution.  Some defendants can choose their sentence — a fine or jail.  But these opportunities are not available to all; their costs need not match one’s ability to pay.

To examine roles and rules of money in criminal process, this paper considers the case for an optional criminal trial fee.  Defendants who pay it would directly cover public litigation costs, which would leave the state indifferent, as a budgetary matter, between trials and guilty pleas.  In return, defendants would get a penalty-free trial limited to the terms of a proffered plea bargain.  The fee proves a useful device because its rationale and effects accord with entrenched precedents and policies, not least in how it extends the justice system’s differential treatment based on wealth.  Yet the trial fee also promises positive effects.  It would reduce prosecutors’ most-criticized bargaining tactics — excessively harsh trial penalties — without undermining bargaining’s important secondary functions, enlisting informants to cooperate and rewarding defendants who accept responsibility for their crimes.  And even a modest increase in fee-financed trials would yield other benefits, such as citizen participation in applying criminal law and supervising government officials, and more data about “the shadow of trial” in which bargaining takes place

March 5, 2019 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Georgia Supreme Court unanimously declares state's approach to lifetime GPS monitoring for sex offenders violates Fourth Amendment

The Supreme Court of Georgia issued a notable unanimous opinion yesterday in Park v. Georgia, No. S18A1211 (Ga. March 4, 2019) (available here), declaring unconstitutional the state's lifetime GPS monitoring requirement for certain sex offenders. The opinion for the court authored by Chief Justice Melton starts this way:

We granted an interlocutory appeal in this case to address Joseph Park’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 42-1-14, which requires, among other things, that a person who is classified as a sexually dangerous predator – but who is no longer in State custody or on probation or parole – wear and pay for an electronic monitoring device linked to a global positioning satellite system (“GPS monitoring device”) that allows the State to monitor that individual’s location “for the remainder of his or her natural life.” Id. at (e). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that OCGA § 42-1-14(e), on its face, authorizes a patently unreasonable search that runs afoul of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and, as a result, subsection (e) of the statute is unconstitutional to the extent that it does so.

Notably, a concurring opinion by Justice Blackwell seems interested in helping the state legislature find a work around to this ruling. His opinion starts this way:

The General Assembly has determined as a matter of public policy that requiring some sexual offenders to wear electronic monitoring devices linked to a global positioning satellite system promotes public safety, and it enacted OCGA § 42-1-14(e) to put that policy into practice. The Court today decides that subsection (e) is unconstitutional, and I concur fully in that decision, which is driven largely by our obligation to faithfully apply the principles of law set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Grady v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___ (135 SCt 1368, 191 LE2d 459) (2015).  I write separately, however, to emphasize that our decision today does not foreclose other means by which the General Assembly might put the same policy into practice.

Our decision rests in significant part on the fact that subsection (e) requires some sexual offenders to submit to electronic monitoring even after they have completed the service of their sentences.  But nothing in our decision today precludes the General Assembly from authorizing life sentences for the worst sexual offenders, and nothing in our decision prevents the General Assembly from requiring a sentencing court in the worst cases to require GPS monitoring as a condition of permitting a sexual offender to serve part of a life sentence on probation.

March 5, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Federal judge denies request by Philly DA to vacate state death sentence

As reported in this local article, headlined "Judge denies Krasner office’s request to vacate death penalty in 1984 double murder," an effort by the current Philadelphia District Attorney to undo some work by prior DAs hit a federal snag. Here are the interesting details:

A federal judge on Monday denied a request by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office to vacate the death penalty for a Philadelphia man convicted of the 1984 strangulation and drowning deaths of a prominent pastor’s son and daughter-in-law in their East Mount Airy home.

U.S. District Judge Mitchell Goldberg wrote that for three decades, the DA’s Office had “consistently and zealously opposed” inmate Robert Wharton’s efforts to overturn his conviction and death sentence. Early last month, the office informed the judge it would no longer fight the appeal. Max Cooper Kaufman, supervisor of the federal litigation unit under District Attorney Larry Krasner, wrote that the decision came after the office reexamined the case and communicated with the victims’ family.

In his written opinion, Goldberg described the deaths of Bradley Hart, 26, and his wife, Ferne, 31, as “particularly horrific” and noted the DA’s Office didn’t explain the reason behind what he called "this complete reversal of course.” He ordered both parties to submit briefs explaining their positions.

Krasner, a former criminal defense lawyer who took office last year, campaigned on a platform of never seeking the death penalty. His spokesperson, Ben Waxman, said by email Monday that the office had no comment on Goldberg’s ruling “except to say that we are reviewing the opinion and considering next steps in the case." The Federal Community Defender Office, which is representing Wharton, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Wharton’s co-defendant, Eric Mason, was sentenced to life in prison. Both men, construction workers from Germantown, were 20 at the time of the murders. Now 56, Wharton is on death row at the State Correctional Institution-Phoenix in Montgomery County.

According to evidence in the case, on the night of Jan. 30, 1984, Wharton and Mason went to the Harts’ home, tied up the couple, and separated them. Wharton choked Ferne Hart with a necktie and drowned her in a bathtub. Mason denied killing anyone, but was accused by Wharton of killing Bradley Hart by forcing his face in water and strangling him with an electrical cord....

In April 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court partially granted Wharton’s appeal, ordering a new sentencing hearing. That December, a second Philadelphia jury reimposed the double-death sentence for Wharton. In December 2002, then-Gov. Mark Schweiker signed his death warrant, but the execution was stayed after Wharton appealed to federal court.

Goldberg in 2012 denied his petition, but an appellate court sent it back to the district judge on just one claim — whether his lawyer was ineffective for failing to tell the jury about Wharton’s adjustment to prison. That was the claim the District Attorney’s Office last month said it would not fight. The DA’s Office also asked the judge to grant summary relief by taking the death penalty off the table and said that if the judge did so, prosecutors wouldn’t seek a new death sentence in state court.

Krasner has received pushback by the judiciary in at least one other case in which his office tried to throw out a death sentence. In October, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Christine Donohue wrote in a majority opinion that a jury had approved the death penalty for Lavar Brown, and the DA’s Office couldn’t change that result “based upon the differing views of the current office holder.”

Pennsylvania’s death penalty has been used just three times since it was reinstated by the state in 1978. Gov. Tom Wolf imposed a moratorium on its use in 2015. Wolf’s spokesperson said Monday that the governor believes the moratorium should continue in light of a June 2018 report by a bipartisan legislative task force and advisory committee, which found various problems concerning the death penalty.

Because I have not yet had time to find Judge Goldberg's opinion, I am disinclined to comment on the specifics yet. But the case presents a fascinating set of issues concerning finality, prosecutorial discretion and the interplay of federal and state authority over capital prosecutions. And, as it always the case when I learn about long-running capital cases, I cannot help but wonder what litigation over the death penalty has cost (and will continue to cost) state and federal taxpayers here.

March 5, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 4, 2019

Third Circuit panel rules sex offenders subject to registration laws in Pennsylvania are "in custody" for habeas purposes

Last week, a unanimous panel of the Third Circuit issued what seems to be a groundbreaking ruling about habeas jurisdiction. In Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 16-4175 (3d Cir. Feb 27, 2019) (available here), the Third Circuit distinguished a variety of contrary rulings from other circuits to hold that a registered sex offender in Pennsylvania is “in custody” for purposes of having jurisdiction to bring a habeas corpus challenge. Here is how the opinion starts and ends:

We are asked to decide whether a habeas corpus petitioner who was subject only to registration requirements under Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) when he filed his petition was “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court,” as required for jurisdiction.  We hold that the registration requirements were sufficiently restrictive to constitute custody and that they were imposed pursuant to the state court judgment of sentence.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court and remand for further proceedings.....

The writ of habeas corpus “is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy.”  The scope of the writ has grown in accordance with its purpose — to protect individuals against the erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.  SORNA’s registration requirements clearly constitute a restraint upon liberty, a physical restraint not shared by the public generally.  The restraint imposed on Piasecki is a direct consequence of a state court judgment of sentence, and it therefore can support habeas corpus jurisdiction.  For all of the reasons set forth above, the order of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

March 4, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, March 3, 2019

Reviewing the modern reality of robust conservative support for criminal justice reform

Long-time readers know I have been talking for a very long time about a possible "new right" on a range of sentencing and corrections issues.  This post way back in January 2005 asked "Is there a 'new right' on criminal sentencing issues?" and this article in December 2008 explained why principled modern conservatives should be troubled by mass incarceration, and this post in November 2010 wondered "When and how will state GOP leaders start cutting expensive criminal justice programming?". 

But, happily, it is no longer cutting-edge to be talking about folks on the right supporting criminal justice reform.  Three years later, it bears recalling that a majority of the GOP candidates for President in 2016 had a record of support for criminal justice reform.  And, remarkably, the one 2016 GOP candidate with arguably the worst record on these criminal justice reform issues (Donald Trump) went on sign the most significant federal criminal justice reform bill in a generation in the form of the FIRST STEP Act.  And, before and since the 2016 election, many conservative leaders in many red states have been actively advocating and securing significant state-level criminal justice reforms.  

These political realities have found interesting expression in recent days, in part because the annual Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) that took place last week had more than its share of notable criminal justice programming.  Here are some new articles and commentaries resulting from that conference and the broader realities that its programming reflects:

March 3, 2019 in Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Notable new materials from the Drug Policy Alliance on drug decriminalization in Portugal

There is no shortage of talk about trying to move from a criminalization approach to a public health model in response to drug use and misuse, but there often is a shortage of resources examining efforts to make this move. Thus, I am very pleased to see that the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) has some terrific new resources on this topic.  This DPA press release, titled "DPA Releases New Briefing Paper & Video, Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Learning From a Health and Human-Centered Approach," provide a link, background and some details:

The Drug Policy Alliance is releasing a new video and briefing paper examining the human impact and lessons to be drawn from Portugal’s removal of criminal penalties for the possession of drugs for personal use.
 
In March 2018, DPA led a delegation of advocates from 35 racial justice, criminal justice, and harm reduction organizations across the U.S. to Portugal to learn from its health and human-centered approach to drug use.  The group included individuals and organizations representing those hit hardest by the drug war — from those who have been incarcerated for drug offenses to those who have lost loved ones to an overdose. 

Since Portugal enacted drug decriminalization in 2001, the number of people voluntarily entering treatment has increased significantly, overdose deaths and HIV infections among people who use drugs have plummeted, incarceration for drug-related offenses has decreased, and rates of problematic and adolescent drug use has fallen....

By contrast, in the United States, the dominant approach to drug use is criminalization and harsh enforcement, with 1.4 million arrests per year for drug possession for personal use — that makes drug possession the single most arrested offense in the United States. Disproportionately, those arrested are people of color: black people are three times as likely as white people to be arrested for drug possession for personal use.  In addition to possible incarceration, these arrests can create devastating barriers to access to housing, education and employment that systematically oppress entire populations.  Meanwhile, 72,000 people are dying every year of overdose in the United States....
 
While several other countries have had successful experiences with decriminalization — including the Czech Republic, Spain and the Netherlands — Portugal provides the most comprehensive and well-documented example. The success of Portugal’s policy has opened the door for other countries to rethink the practice of criminalizing people who use drugs.  Delegation participants generally agreed that it’s time for the United States to do so as well.
  
“I really would love to see the public health community step up and really demand that the criminal justice system separate themselves,” said Deon Haywood, executive director of New Orleans-based Women With A Vision, who joined DPA’s delegation.  “They need to divest from each other. Addiction should be handled as a public health issue.  Drug use should be handled as a public health issue.  The criminal justice system needs to let go.” 
  
As detailed in a recent DPA report, It’s Time For the U.S. to Decriminalize Drug Use and Possession, there’s an emerging public, political, and scientific consensus that otherwise-law-abiding people should not be arrested simply for possessing an illegal drug for personal use.  A broad range of stakeholders — from the American Public Health Association & World Health Organization to the Movement for Black Lives & NAACP — have taken positions in favor of drug decriminalization.

March 3, 2019 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentencing around the world, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, March 2, 2019

Spotlighting the role of prosecutors as the death penalty fades away in Pennsylvania

Mc-1551374127-s7rtr2h4xf-snap-imageThis lengthy local article, headlined "Death penalty has fallen out of favor with Pennsylvania prosecutors," reports on the steady decline in capital prosecutions and death sentences in the Keystone state in recent decades. Here are excerpts:

Pennsylvania’s death penalty is, by all accounts, embattled.  There hasn’t been an execution in two decades, even before Gov. Tom Wolf imposed a moratorium on them in 2015. The courts have long scrutinized death sentences, throwing out scores of them at appeal.  And juries have become more hesitant to impose the state’s ultimate punishment.  A long-awaited legislative study recently called for a host of reforms.

But a surprising factor is quietly contributing to the death penalty’s decline in Pennsylvania: Prosecutors are increasingly reluctant to pursue capital murder charges, given the high financial cost and lengthy legal battles they guarantee, and the improbability the sentences will ultimately be carried out.

In 2004, 40 percent of murder convictions in Pennsylvania started as death-penalty cases, according to a review of state data by The Morning Call.  By 2017, that number had dropped more than threefold, to 12 percent of murder convictions, the lowest rate in 14 years....

The Morning Call’s figures offer a first accounting of the waning frequency with which the state’s 67 elected district attorneys pursue capital punishment, data that state government does not track.  For its analysis, the newspaper reviewed 4,184 murder convictions in Pennsylvania from 2004 to 2017, using docket sheets, appellate court records and local media accounts to determine whether they were ever listed as capital cases....

The findings showed that in 2004, there were 309 murder convictions statewide, of which 123 started as death-penalty prosecutions.  In 2017, there were 271 murder convictions, of which 33 saw the filing of capital charges.

The downward trend held generally year to year, though there were occasional bumps.  It was driven by Philadelphia, which has long dominated Pennsylvania’s death-penalty cases, but was also seen in the rest of the state, though some individual counties such as Bucks, Chester and Lancaster saw little or no change.  And the numbers should only fall further in the coming years, amid the tenure of Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner, a self-described progressive who took office in 2018 vowing to never pursue the death penalty....

Death sentences are falling across the nation, said Robert Dunham, a former federal public defender in Pennsylvania who now heads the Death Penalty Information Center, a Washington, D.C., nonprofit.  “Pennsylvania reflects that pattern,” Dunham said. “What we’re seeing is that prosecutors have realized these cases are likely to not result in a death sentence.”...

Amid that, the governor’s moratorium remains in effect, with little movement in the Legislature to take up capital punishment.  Wolf tied his decision to a Senate-commissioned report on the death penalty, a long-delayed study that was released in June after seven years of preparation.  The report offered a raft of potential reforms, including calls for a state-funded capital defender’s office, and more protections to prevent the execution of the mentally ill and intellectually disabled.

Wolf will continue blocking executions until the death penalty’s problems are corrected, said J.J. Abbott, a spokesman for the governor.  “He looks forward to working with the General Assembly on their plans to address the report and its recommendations for legislative changes, all of which he believes should be debated and considered,” Abbott said in a prepared statement.

Whether there is momentum to take up the death penalty — either to repeal it or to fix it with an eye to resuming executions — remains unclear.

State Rep. Rob Kauffman, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, said he is open to re-examining capital punishment, considering its cost to taxpayers and the lack of executions.  But he said it just isn’t a big topic in Harrisburg.  “There’s a lot that has been talked about regarding criminal justice reform, but this is not one of those front-burner issues,” said Kauffman, R-Franklin.

In the meantime, the number of inmates on death row continues to fall, as do the number of new death sentences.  In 2018, juries added only one killer to death row in Pennsylvania.

March 2, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Mitigations: The Forgotten Side of the Proportionality Principle"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper now available via SSRN authored by Paul Robinson.  Here is its abstract:

In the first change to the Model Penal Code since its promulgation in 1962, the American Law Institute in 2017 set blameworthiness proportionality as the dominant distributive principle for criminal punishment.  Empirical studies suggest that this is in fact the principle that ordinary people use in assessing proper punishment.  Its adoption as the governing distributive principle makes good sense because it promotes not only the classic desert retributivism of moral philosophers but also crime-control utilitarianism, by enhancing the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community and thereby promoting deference, compliance, acquiescence, and internalization of its norms, rather than suffering the resistance and subversion that is provoked by perceived violations of blameworthiness proportionality.

Such a principle has been commonly used as the basis for criticizing improper aggravations, such as the doctrines of felony murder and “three strikes,” but the principle also logically requires recognizing a full range of deserved mitigations, not as a matter of grace or forgiveness but as a matter of entitlement.  And given ordinary people’s nuanced judgments about blameworthiness proportionality, maintaining moral credibility with the community requires that the criminal law adopt an equally nuanced system of mitigations.

Such a nuanced system ideally would include reform of a wide variety of current law doctrines as well as, especially in the absence of such specific reforms, adoption of a general mitigation provision that aims for blameworthiness proportionality in all cases.  Such a general mitigation ought not be limited to cases of “heat of passion” or limited to cases of murder, as today’s liability rules commonly provide.  It ought to be available whenever the offense circumstances and the offender’s situation and capacities meaningfully reduce the offender’s blameworthiness, as long as giving the mitigation does not specially undermine community norms.

March 2, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, March 1, 2019

"The Lingering Stench of Marijuana Prohibition: People with pot records continue to suffer, even in places where their crimes are no longer crimes."

The title of this post is the title of this great new article by Jacob Sullum at Reason. I recommend the article in full, as it goes through the expungement law of each state which has now fully legalized marijuana for adult use and tells stories of individuals still stuggling with the lingering impact of marijuana prohibition. Here is part of the start of the piece:

Franklin Roosevelt, who took office in the final year of Prohibition, issued some 1,300 pardons for alcohol-related offenses during his first three terms. As a 1939 report from the Justice Department explained, "pardon may be proper" in light of "changed public opinion after a period of severe penalties against certain conduct which is later looked upon as much less criminal, or as no crime at all." The report cited Prohibition as "a recent example."

That logic made sense to governors as well. When Indiana repealed its alcohol prohibition law in 1933, Gov. Paul McNutt (D) issued pardons or commutations to about 400 people who had been convicted of violating it. "If these men were kept in prison after the liquor law is repealed," he said, "they would be political prisoners."

Alcohol prohibition lasted 14 years. Marijuana prohibition has been with us almost six times as long. Police have arrested people for violating it about 20 million times in the last three decades alone. Many of those people were ultimately convicted of felonies that sent them to prison, although the vast majority were charged with simple possession and spent little or no time behind bars. Either way, marijuana offenders have had to contend with the lingering effects of a criminal record, which can shape people's lives long after they complete their sentences.

Depending on the jurisdiction and the classification of the offense, people who were caught violating marijuana laws may lose the right to vote, the right to own a gun, the right to drive a car (for up to a year), the right to live in the United States (for noncitizens), and the right to participate in a wide variety of professions that require state licenses. They may find it difficult to get a job, rent an apartment, obtain student loans, or travel to other countries. They may even be barred from coaching kids' sports teams or volunteering in public schools.

The employment consequences can be explicit, as with state laws that exclude people convicted of felonies from certain lines of work, or subtle, as with private businesses that avoid hiring people who have criminal records, possibly including arrests as well as convictions, because of liability concerns....

Such ancillary penalties seem especially unjust and irrational in the growing number of U.S. jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana for recreational use. In those places (which so far include 10 states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands), people convicted under the old regime continue to suffer for actions that are no longer crimes.

California has gone furthest to address that problem. The state's 2016 legalization initiative authorized expungement of marijuana records, and a 2018 law will make that process easier. Demanding expungement as a remedy for injustice, activists in California emphasized the racially disproportionate impact of the war on weed: Black people are much more likely to have pot records than white people, even though they are only slightly more likely to be cannabis consumers.

Other states offer various forms of relief, ranging from generous to nearly nonexistent. All of them put the onus on prohibition's victims to seek the sealing or expungement of their criminal records, a process that can be complicated, expensive, and time-consuming....

People with marijuana records are looking for a way out in every state that has legalized recreational use, as the stories below show.

As some readers may recall, I wrote a paper last year on this topic under the title "Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement Practices".  I have also covered these issues a whole lot over at Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform, and here is just a small part of that coverage:

March 1, 2019 in Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, February 28, 2019

Texas completes execution of triple killer ... and his family gets arrested

This local article, headlined "Texas death row inmate's son arrested for outburst during father's execution," reports on an execution and its remarkable aftermath. Here are details:

Billie Wayne Coble's son pounded on the execution chamber windows, cursing and shouting "no" as he watched his father die. It was just after 6:20 p.m., and the 70-year-old triple killer was about to become the oldest Texan executed in the modern era of capital punishment.

The aging Vietnam veteran who murdered his in-laws in an apparent rash of vengeance offered a only a short final statement before he was pronounced dead, according to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. "That will be five dollars," he said. "I love you, I love you, and I love you."...

But as soon as he finished speaking, the witness room erupted into chaos.  Gordon Coble started banging on the glass, and his son Dalton joined in the furor.  Both men — along with another relative — were removed from the room before the execution ended, and the two ended the night in the Walker County Jail, facing resisting arrest charges....

It was a dramatic and unexpected end to a decades-long saga. Back in the summer of 1989, Coble was distraught over the disintegration of his third marriage when he kidnapped his estranged wife and killed her parents and brother before attempting to kill himself.

But the Waco man, now 70, had no priors and, as he racked up years of good behavior in prison, his attorneys argued that a pair of experts for the state got it wrong at trial when they offered testimony claiming he'd be a future danger even behind bars....

This year, Coble's lawyer filed a plea for clemency.  "He is now 70 years old, in poor health, and has an almost blemish-free prison record for the past 30 years," attorney Richard Ellis wrote.  "His execution would serve no valid purpose."

The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles turned his request down on Tuesday, leaving him with a final appeal in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.  In that claim, Coble's attorney argued that the Waco man's trial attorneys shouldn't have admitted his guilt because Coble asked them not to.  Last year, the same concern came up in a Louisiana case — and the high court sided with the condemned prisoner.  In Coble's case they did not....

Coble was the second man executed in Texas in 2019. There are five more executions on the calendar, including a June death date for Harris County killer Dexter Johnson.

February 28, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Clemency as the Soul of the Constitution"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Mark Osler in the latest issues of the Journal of Law & Politics.  Here is part of the piece's introduction:

In this essay, I will not call for the abolition or restriction of the Pardon Power, even as we struggle with the seeming unfairness of some recent grants of clemency.  Instead, I argue that we must embrace what the Pardon Power is, and recognize the true nature of this tool of mercy.  We don’t need to drive a stake through its heart.  Rather, it requires a more consistent and committed public attention than we have given it, which among other things should include a discussion of its use by those who seek the office of president.

Section II below will offer an overview of the more striking employments of the Pardon Power, with a focus on its uses and abuses by more recent presidents.  The controversial aspects of clemency often precisely track the controversial aspects of a president’s personality; that is one reason that we see a discontinuity not only in whether clemency is used or not, but in the way that its use reflects different values in different administrations.

Section III will then look backward at the Constitution’s soul and its roots.  Clemency drew on English precedents, but its core idea of mercy was woven into the culture of the time.  For example, it is a primary theme in Shakespeare’s The Tempest — and George Washington went to see The Tempest during the Constitutional Convention.   At that Constitutional Convention, the Pardon Clause was actively debated, and its final form survived a direct challenge that proposed the power be shared with the legislature.

Finally, Section IV will consider the arguments for and against maintaining the Pardon Power as an unalloyed tool of the president. In the end, the use of clemency has been a net good, in that the positive uses have outweighed the controversies.  The institution continues to connect us to the core value of mercy, maintains the intent of the Framers, and gives hope to those who are incarcerated.  This section closes by considering what we can do when we are dismayed by the exercise of clemency, as will happen when an action follows a conscience not our own.

February 28, 2019 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Terrific new Yale Law Journal collection: "Critical Voices on Criminal Justice: Essays from Directly Affected Authors,"

The Yale Law Journal has this terrific new collection of papers under the banner "Critical Voices on Criminal Justice: Essays from Directly Affected Authors." Here is how the collection is introduced and titles with links:

People who have experienced incarceration have unique insights into the criminal system—insights that are often missing from legal scholarship and criminal justice policy. This Collection begins to bridge that gap.

Reginald Dwayne Betts, "What Break Do Children Deserve? Juveniles, Crime, and Justice Kennedy’s Influence on the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence"

Tarra Simmons, "Transcending the Stigma of a Criminal Record: A Proposal to Reform State Bar Character and Fitness Evaluations"

Andrea James, "Ending the Incarceration of Women and Girls"

Shon Hopwood, "The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System"

February 28, 2019 in Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, February 27, 2019

SCOTUS, ruling 6-3, refuses to let appeal waivers impact ineffectiveness claims when attorney improperly fails to appeal

The Supreme Court this morning handed down an opinion in Garza v. Idaho, No. 17-1026 (S. Ct. Feb. 27, 2019) (available here), a case concerning the distinctive Sixth Amendment jurisprudence addressing whether defense counsel has been constitutionally deficient when failing to appeal upon a defendant's instructions.  The ruling in the case is 6-3, with Justice Sotomayor delivering the opinion of the Court, which was joined by the Chief Justice as well as Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan and Kavanaugh.  Here is how the opinion gets started:

In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), this Court held that when an attorney’s deficient performance costs a defendant an appeal that the defendant would have otherwise pursued, prejudice to the defendant should be presumed “with no further showing from the defendant of the merits of his underlying claims.” Id., at 484. This case asks whether that rule applies even when the defendant has, in the course of pleading guilty, signed what is often called an “appeal waiver” — that is, an agreement forgoing certain, but not all, possible appellate claims. We hold that the presumption of prejudice recognized in Flores-Ortega applies regardless of whether the defendant has signed an appeal waiver.

Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which Justices Gorsuch joined in full and Justice Alito joined in part. (The last part of the dissent reviews originalist approaches to the Sixth Amendment, and only Justice Gorsuch joined that part). The dissent starts this way:

Petitioner Gilberto Garza avoided a potential life sentence by negotiating with the State of Idaho for reduced charges and a 10-year sentence. In exchange, Garza waived several constitutional and statutory rights, including “his right to appeal.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a, 49a.  Despite this express waiver, Garza asked his attorney to challenge on appeal the very sentence for which he had bargained.  Garza’s counsel quite reasonably declined to file an appeal for that purpose, recognizing that his client had waived this right and that filing an appeal would potentially jeopardize his plea bargain. Yet, the majority finds Garza’s counsel constitutionally ineffective, holding that an attorney’s performance is per se deficient and per se prejudicial any time the attorney declines a criminal defendant’s request to appeal an issue that the defendant has waived.  In effect, this results in a “defendant-always-wins” rule that has no basis in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), or our other ineffective-assistance precedents, and certainly no basis in the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. I respectfully dissent.

February 27, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (7)

SCOTUS, ruling 5-3, clarifies execution competency standards and remands in Madison v. Alabama

The Supreme Court this morning handed down an opinion in Madison v. Alabama, 17-7505 (S. Ct. Feb. 27, 2019) (available here), a case concerning the distinctive Eighth Amendment jurisprudence addressing whether a defendant is competent to be executed.  The ruling in the case is 5-3, as Justice Kavanaugh had not yet joined the Court at the time the case was argued.  Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by the Chief Justice as well as Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor.  Here is how the opinion gets started:

The Eighth Amendment, this Court has held, prohibits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness prevents him from “rational[ly] understanding” why the State seeks to impose that punishment. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007). In this case, Vernon Madison argued that his memory loss and dementia entitled him to a stay of execution, but an Alabama court denied the relief.  We now address two questions relating to the Eighth Amendment’s bar, disputed below but not in this Court.  First, does the Eighth Amendment forbid execution whenever a prisoner shows that a mental disorder has left him without any memory of committing his crime?  We (and, now, the parties) think not, because a person lacking such a memory may still be able to form a rational understanding of the reasons for his death sentence. Second, does the Eighth Amendment apply similarly to a prisoner suffering from dementia as to one experiencing psychotic delusions?  We (and, now, the parties) think so, because either condition may — or, then again, may not — impede the requisite comprehension of his punishment.  The only issue left, on which the parties still disagree, is what those rulings mean for Madison’s own execution.  We direct that issue to the state court for further consideration in light of this opinion.

Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined, and starts with these pointed passages:

What the Court has done in this case makes a mockery of our Rules.

Petitioner’s counsel convinced the Court to stay his client’s execution and to grant his petition for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of deciding a clear-cut constitutional question: Does the Eighth Amendment prohibit the execution of a murderer who cannot recall committing the murder for which the death sentence was imposed? The petition strenuously argued that executing such a person is unconstitutional.

After persuading the Court to grant review of this question, counsel abruptly changed course. Perhaps because he concluded (correctly) that petitioner was unlikely to prevail on the question raised in the petition, he conceded that the argument advanced in his petition was wrong, and he switched to an entirely different argument, namely, that the state court had rejected petitioner’s claim that he is incompetent to be executed because the court erroneously thought that dementia, as opposed to other mental conditions, cannot provide a basis for such a claim.  See Brief for Petitioner 16.

This was not a question that the Court agreed to hear; indeed, there is no mention whatsoever of this argument in the petition — not even a hint. Nor is this question fairly included within those on which the Court granted review.  On the contrary, it is an entirely discrete and independent question.

Counsel’s tactics flagrantly flouted our Rules.  Our Rules make it clear that we grant certiorari to decide the specific question or questions of law set out in a petition for certiorari. See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court”).  Our whole certiorari system would be thrown into turmoil if we allowed counsel to obtain review of one question and then switch to an entirely different question after review is granted. In the past when counsel have done this, we have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.  See, e.g., Visa, Inc. v. Osborn, 580 U.S. ___ (2016); City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. ___ (2015). We should do that here.

Instead, the majority rewards counsel’s trick.  It vacates the judgment below because it is unsure whether the state court committed the error claimed in petitioner’s merits brief.  But not only was there no trace of this argument in the petition, there is nothing in the record showing that the state court ever adopted the erroneous view that petitioner claims it took.

As all Court watchers know, "death is different" not only for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence but also for how the Justices approach these cases procedurally. I suspect Justice Alito is not surprised that some fellow Justices are approaching a capital case in a unique way, but I wonder if he is surprised that the Chief Justice provides the key swing vote for the defendant here.

February 27, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1)

"Failure should not be an option: Grading the parole systems of all 50 states"

The title of this post is the title of this new report from the Prison Policy Initiative.  Here is how this report gets started:

From arrest to sentencing, the process of sending someone to prison in America is full of rules and standards meant to guarantee fairness and predictability.  An incredible amount of attention is given to the process, and rightly so.  But in sharp contrast, the processes for releasing people from prison are relatively ignored by the public and by the law.  State paroling systems vary so much that it is almost impossible to compare them.

Sixteen states have abolished discretionary parole, and the remaining states range from a system of presumptive parole — where when certain conditions are met, release on parole is guaranteed — to having policies and practices that make earning release almost impossible.

Parole systems should give every incarcerated person ample opportunity to earn release and have a fair, transparent process for deciding whether to grant it.  A growing number of organizations and academics have called for states to adopt policies that would ensure consistency and fairness in how they identify who should receive parole, when those individuals should be reviewed and released, and what parole conditions should be attached to those individuals.  In this report, I take the best of those suggestions, assign them point values, and grade the parole systems of each state.

Sadly, most states show lots of room for improvement.  Only one state gets a B, five states get Cs, seven states get Ds, and the rest either get an F for having few of the elements of a fair and equitable parole system or a zero — for having passed laws to eliminate the option of release on parole.

February 27, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, February 26, 2019

FBI reports on encouraging crime data from the first half of 2018

This FBI press release, titled "Preliminary Semiannual Crime Statistics for 2018 Released; Report Shows Overall Crime Declined in First Half of Last Year," provides heartening news about recent crime trends.  Here are the basics from the release:

Preliminary statistics show declines in both violent crime and property crime in the first half of 2018 when compared to statistics from the first half of the previous year, according to the FBI’s Preliminary Semiannual Uniform Crime Report, released today.

The report contains data from more than 14,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide that voluntarily submitted crime data to the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. The report showed nearly all offenses in the violent crime category declined. Robbery offenses decreased 12.5 percent, murder and nonnegligent manslaughter offenses decreased 6.7 percent, and aggravated assault offenses declined 2 percent.  Rape (revised definition), however, increased 0.6 percent.

When comparing data from the first six months of 2018 with the first six months of 2017, all property crime categories showed a decrease. Burglaries were down 12.7 percent, larceny-thefts decreased 6.3 percent, and motor vehicle thefts declined 3.3 percent.

The full Crime in the United States, 2018 report will be released later this year.

The data follow reports from last year that the first-half of 2017 crime data also reflected a decline in most categories of crime. This FBI table providing year-to-year trends of the last four years provides a little more context for this latest data.  It is especially encouraging to see violent crime move down significantly after increases in 2015 and 2016 and a small decline in 2017.  And the continued huge decline in property crime remains remarkable.

February 26, 2019 in National and State Crime Data, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

Haymond seemingly to become major Apprendi progeny altering federal supervised release revocations

Though I have not yet had time to read the full transcript of oral argument in United States v. Haymond, which is now available here, reading Amy Howe's argument analysis at SCOTUSblog suggests the tea-leaves are easy to read after the oral argument. The posting is titled "Court poised to rule for challenger in dispute over constitutionality of sex-offender law," and here are snippets:

This morning the Supreme Court heard oral argument in a dispute over the constitutionality of a federal law that requires convicted sex offenders to return to prison for at least five years – and possibly for the rest of their lives – if a judge finds that they have committed certain crimes. The defendant in the case, an Oklahoma man who served time for possessing child pornography and was then sent back to prison after he violated the terms of his supervised release, argues that the law violates his right to have his sentence determined by a jury, rather than a judge, beyond a reasonable doubt. Today the justices seemed overwhelmingly likely to agree with him, even if it was not entirely clear how they will remedy the constitutional violation....

Eric Feigin, an assistant to the U.S. solicitor general, defended the law on behalf of the federal government. But he was quickly interrupted by a skeptical Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who asked him whether there was any other area of the law in which the United States allows a defendant to be sent to prison based on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

Feigin responded that both parole and probation operate in a similar way, but Sotomayor dismissed that analogy as comparing “apples and oranges.” With parole, she stressed, the state gives a benefit by cutting a sentence short. Where do we allow more prison time based on the preponderance of the evidence, she repeated?

Justice Brett Kavanaugh echoed Sotomayor’s thinking toward the end of Feigin’s initial stint at the lectern. When the government revokes an inmate’s parole, Kavanaugh suggested, it is simply denying a benefit. But when the government revokes an individual’s supervised release, he continued, that’s more like a penalty: The government is “adding a chunk of time on.”

Several justices also questioned the government’s contention that a jury was not required to find the facts leading to the conclusion that Haymond had violated the terms of his supervised release and the imposition of the new five-year sentence....

Only Justice Samuel Alito seemed to be squarely on the government’s side, warning that a ruling for Haymond could potentially “bring down the entire supervised release system.” As a result, much of the second half of the oral argument focused less on whether the law was unconstitutional and more on what should happen next.

I am not surprised, but I am still pleased, to learn that there may now be eight Justices prepared to extended Apprendi/Blakely rights to supervised release revocation. Now we wiat to see just how big the ultimate opinion will be (and how loudly Justice Alito will complain about more procedural rights for criminal defendants).

Some prior related posts:

February 26, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

New letter urges Prez Trump "to make lasting reforms to the clemency process by removing its administration from the Department of Justice"

A number of notable folks signed on to this new letter urging Prez Trump to make changes to the federal clemency process.  Here are excerpts from the letter:

Last year, you achieved a historic accomplishment when you signed the First Step Act into law.  This new law will reduce the imposition of unjust sentences for thousands of Americans, allowing people who make a mistake the opportunity to make amends and turn their lives around.

The law primarily addresses future sentencing, however, and does little to correct the unjust nature of past sentences that have left many behind bars for far longer than their crimes warranted.  But you can deliver justice for those Americans by making full use of the pardon power for as many deserving individuals as possible and by reforming the structure of the federal clemency process to improve presidential exercise of this important constitutional authority.

During the last administration, former law enforcement officials and criminal justice reform advocates urged President Barack Obama to use his pardon power aggressively.  While President Obama's clemency initiative did lead to hundreds of deserving individuals receiving commutations, he left thousands more behind when he left office.  When President Obama’s term expired, approximately 9,400 clemency petitions remained pending.  Thousands of other individuals saw their petitions denied, despite many of them meeting most or all of the conditions the Obama administration laid out for clemency eligibility.  Furthermore, his administration never even fully considered granting sweeping clemency to broad categories of people who also deserved clemency but may not have known how to obtain an attorney or petition for relief....

[W]e urge you to make lasting reforms to the clemency process by removing its administration from the Department of Justice.  The Constitution grants the clemency power solely to the president.  There is no constitutional or legal requirement that it be overseen by DOJ.  While DOJ should be able to comment on clemency petitions, there is an obvious conflict of interest when the same agency responsible for prosecuting individuals is asked to supervise their petitions for clemency.  By changing the management of the clemency process, you could improve a process not only for your time in office, but also for your successors.  President Obama failed to fix the clemency process and instead opted to for an ad hoc approach, leaving behind thousands of people who otherwise met the stated criteria.  You can succeed where he did not and leave a lasting legacy in this area.

February 26, 2019 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Paul Manafort's sentencing memorandum in DC makes pitch for a sentence "significantly below" ten years

As reported in this Politico piece, counsel for "Paul Manafort, the former Trump campaign chairman, pleaded on Monday for a federal judge to spare their 69-year-old client from a sentence that would essentially send him to prison for the rest of his life."  Here is more about the latest sentencing filing:

In a 47-page filing, Manafort’s attorneys described a client who has been “personally, professionally, and financially” broken by special counsel Robert Mueller’s Russia investigation and who deserves a sentence “significantly” below the statutory maximum of 10 years he faces after pleading guilty in Washington to a pair of conspiracy charges.

“Mr. Manafort has been personally and financially devestated [sic] as a result of his conduct and the forfeiture he has agreed to,” his lawyers wrote. “There is no reason to believe that a sentence of years in prison is necessary to prevent him from committing further crimes.”

Manafort’s lawyers added that he “poses no risk to the public, which itself has certainly been generally deterred from engaging in similar conduct based on the widespread negative publicity this case has garnered, as well as his incarceration in solitary confinement.”

Two federal judges are scheduled to sentence Manafort twice next month over criminal charges brought by Mueller’s office, including tax and bank fraud, as well as witness tampering and unregistered lobbying for a foreign government. U.S. District Court Judge T.S. Ellis III is scheduled first in Virginia, on March 8, and U.S. District Court Judge Amy Berman Jackson in Washington goes second, on March 13.

The memo that Manafort’s attorneys submitted Monday aims to rebut Saturday’s filing from Mueller, who told Jackson that the longtime Republican operative “repeatedly and brazenly violated the law” for more than a decade and should be considered for a total sentence in the roughly 17-to-22-year range by stacking her sentence on top of the one Ellis issues.

The full filing is available at this link, and here is an excerpt from its introduction:

Mr. Manafort, who over the decades has served four U.S. presidents and has no prior criminal history, is presented to this Court by the government as a hardened criminal who “brazenly” violated the law and deserves no mercy.  But this case is not about murder, drug cartels, organized crime, the Madoff Ponzi scheme or the collapse of Enron.  Rather, at its core, the charges against the defendant stem from one operable set of facts: Mr. Manafort made a substantial amount of income working as a political consultant in Ukraine, he failed to report to the government the source and total amount of income he made from those activities, and he attempted to conceal his actions from the authorities. He has accepted full responsibility by pleading guilty to this conduct....

Mr. Manafort has been punished substantially, including the forfeiture of most of his assets. In light of his age and health concerns, a significant additional period of incarceration will likely amount to a life sentence for a first time offender.

Some prior related posts:

February 26, 2019 in Booker in district courts, Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, February 25, 2019

Will Haymond argument generate any haymaker questions as SCOTUS takes up supervised release?

Tomorrow the Supreme Court has a day of sentencing arguments scheduled, as the Justices will from counsel in United States v. Haymond and Mont v. United States.  Here are the questions presented and argument previews via SCOTUSblog:

United States v. Haymond Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit erred in holding “unconstitutional and unenforceable” the portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) that required the district court to revoke the respondent’s 10-year term of supervised release, and to impose five years of reimprisonment, following its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent violated the conditions of his release by knowingly possessing child pornography.

Mont v. United States Issue: Whether a period of supervised release for one offense is tolled under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) during a period of pretrial confinement that upon conviction is credited toward a defendant’s term of imprisonment for another offense.

For hard-core sentencing fans, the Haymond case could be the sleeper of the Term because a major ruling on constitutionally required procedures for revocation of supervised release could have profound implications not only for the federal system, but also potentially for some state systems. 

I doubt that oral argument will provide any big indication of just how big a ruling Haymond could produce, but I will be particular eager to see what the newer Justices might have to say about the kind of judicial factfinding that landed Andre Haymond back in prison for a (mandatory) five years after a judge found by only a "preponderance of the evidence" that he had violated the terms of his supervised release.  I think serious originalists should be troubled by the kinds of procedures used to deprive Haymond of his liberty, but the modern tradition of lax procedures at the "back-end" of sentencing systems is considerable.  I am hoping a number of Justices might take big swings with their questions in Haymond, but lately I am thinking I should not be expecting too much from the Justices.

Some prior related posts:

February 25, 2019 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Making the conceptual and statistical case for going well beyond the FIRST STEP Act

UZU3HWQVUVE2JH5FXAH56P5MMMKeith Humphreys has this notable new Washington Post piece headlined "The new criminal justice law will modestly shrink prison populations. Should we go further?".   The piece has an important little chart that speaks interestingly to the reality of federal prison populations,and I recommend this piece in full.  Here are excerpts:

The recently enacted First Step Act reduces criminal sentences and promotes rehabilitative programs within the federal justice system. Combined with earlier reforms implemented during the Obama administration, the law should return the federal imprisonment rate back to what it was a generation ago.  But that would still leave the federal prison system with about seven times as many inmates as it had in 1980.  Could the United States ever return to a federal prison population that small, or would that unleash a horrific crime wave?

Questions about how big or small the federal prison system should be are part of the ongoing debate about mass incarceration. But they also have a unique dimension because even though the Constitution assigns most law enforcement powers to states, the federal role in prosecution and incarceration expanded in recent decades (e.g., to include many white-collar crimes, carjacking, DVD piracy, street-corner drug dealing).  As a result, the federal prison system went from accounting for only 7.4 percent of all imprisonment in 1980 to 12.6 percent of all imprisonment in 2016.  Even a decade before the federal prison system reached its peak size, a bipartisan American Bar Association task force argued that the expansion of federal law enforcement and corrections were “inconsistent with the traditional notion that prevention of crime and law enforcement in this country are basically state functions.”

Sometimes it is helpful in public policy to ask questions about first principles: Why should the federal government ever imprison anyone at all?  A common fear — which some opponents of the First Step Act stoked — is that the United States would be overwhelmed with violent crime if not for federal law enforcement and incarceration.  In reality, virtually every murder, rape, assault and battery is charged under state law and results in imprisonment at the state or local level.  The federal prison system holds only 1.8 percent of U.S. inmates serving time for violent crimes.

Federal law enforcement and imprisonment thus do not serve as the nation’s primary bulwark against violence.  But they are important in three defined contexts.

Combating state and local corruption....

Battling criminal organizations that overwhelm state and local law enforcement....

Punishing crimes specifically against the federal government....

All of the above types of crimes are destructive, and those who commit them and are sent to federal prison do not deserve our sympathy.  But it is implausible that the number of and deserved sentence length for such offenses are seven times greater than they were before the federal prison population exploded.  That reality, combined with the fact that the generational cutback in the size of the federal prison system has caused no evident problems, suggest the First Step Act should be considered just that — a first step.  The extremely broad coalition that supported the First Step Act can reasonably aim higher in its next round of proposed reform, returning the federal prison system to its traditional role as an important — but small — part of the U.S. correctional system.

February 25, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Excited for "The Prohibition Era and Policing" at Ohio State on March 4

As detailed at this link (where folks can register), the Drug Enforcement & Policy Center at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law has a very exciting event scheduled for next Monday afternoon (March 4, 2019).  The event is titled "The Prohibition Era and Policing"  and here are the basics:

The legal precedents created during Prohibition have lingered, leaving search-and-seizure law much better defined than limits on police use of force, interrogation practices, or eyewitness identification protocols.  Please join us as Professor Wesley M. Oliver discusses his latest book, The Prohibition Era and Policing: A Legacy of Misregulation, followed by a discussion with:

February 25, 2019 in Drug Offense Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

After swift cert denial in Rivera-Ruperto, should I just give up hoping for an improved Eighth Amendment to check extreme non-capital sentences?

Intrepid readers may realize that I have paid close attention to a case out of the First Circuit, US v. Rivera–Ruperto, because I thought it involved extraordinarily facts that made for a compelling Cruel and Unusual Punishments argument if that clause was to function as even the most minimal check on the imposition of extreme prison sentences on adult offenders.  But, frustratingly, today's Supreme Court order list has under a long list of cert denials "18-5384  Rivera-Ruperto, Wendell v. United States."  Grrrr.

Of course, I was not the only one who thought this was was exceptional: as noted here, the entire First Circuit issued a remarkable opinion last year while denying en banc review (available here) in which Judge Barron spoke for all his colleagues in urging the Justices to take up the Rivera-Ruperto to reconsider its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  I was sincerely hoping that this unusual statement from an entire circuit might at least get Rivera-Ruperto a single relist from the Supreme Court or maybe just a short statement from some Justices about the issue.  A single relist or a statement about a denial of cert would suggest that there was at least a single Justice who might think that a toothless Eighth Amendment is a problem in an era of mass incarceration.  (Tellingly, the legal press and criminal justice twitterverse has also entirely ignored this case, confirming my fears that one need to be a murderer on death row before just about anyone gets interested in an Eighth Amendment claim.)

I still want to hope that maybe a district court or the First Circuit could find a way to do better in this case when Wendell Rivera-Ruperto eventually brings a 2255 claim (which could now juice an Eighth Amendment argument, as I suggested here, on the fact that the FIRST STEP Act has changed the federal law that lead to his 130 years of mandatory-minimum prison time).  But even if Rivera-Ruperto is able to get some relief eventually, I am still this morning left deeply troubled by the notion that not a single Justice seems to be at all concerned about modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence relating to extreme non-capital sentences.  Sigh. 

A few prior related posts:

February 25, 2019 in Gun policy and sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, February 24, 2019

After special favors and CVRA violation, what should happen to Jeffrey Epstein and his problem prosecutors?

The Miami Herald has done extraordinary work looking behind Jeffrey Epstein too-sweet deal, and it reports effectively here on the significant federal court ruling last week that prompts the question in the title of this post.  Here are the details:

Federal prosecutors, under former Miami U.S. Attorney Alex Acosta, broke the law when they concealed a plea agreement from more than 30 underage victims who had been sexually abused by wealthy New York hedge fund manager Jeffrey Epstein, a federal judge ruled Thursday [available here].

While the decision marks a victory for crime victims, the federal judge, Kenneth A. Marra, stopped short of overturning Epstein’s plea deal, or issuing an order resolving the case.  He instead gave federal prosecutors 15 days to confer with Epstein’s victims and their attorneys to come up with a settlement. The victims did not seek money or damages as part of the suit.

It’s not clear whether the victims, now in their late 20s and early 30s, can, as part of the settlement, demand that the government prosecute Epstein. But others are calling on the Justice Department to take a new look at the case in the wake of the judge’s ruling.

"As a legal matter, the non-prosecution agreement entered into by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of Florida does not bind other U.S. Attorneys in other districts. They are free, if they conclude it is appropriate to do so, to bring criminal actions against Mr. Epstein and his co-conspirators," said lawyer David Boies, representing two of Epstein’s victims who claim they were trafficked by Epstein in New York and other areas of the country.

Earlier this month, the Department of Justice announced it was opening a probe of the case in response to calls from three dozen members of Congress. Nebraska Sen. Ben Sasse, the Republican chairman of the Senate Judiciary Oversight Subcommittee, on Thursday asked the DOJ to re-open Epstein’s plea deal. "The fact that it’s taken this long to get this far is heartbreaking and infuriating," said Sasse. "The Department of Justice should use this opportunity to reopen its non-prosecution agreement so that Epstein and anyone else who abused these children are held accountable."...

Brad Edwards, who represents Courtney Wild — Jane Doe No. 1 in the case — said he was elated at the judge’s ruling, but admitted he is troubled that it took 11 years to litigate. He blamed federal prosecutors for needlessly dragging it out when they could have remedied their error after it was brought to their attention in 2008. "The government aligned themselves with Epstein, working against his victims, for 11 years,’’ Edwards said. "Yes, this is a huge victory, but to make his victims suffer for 11 years, this should not have happened. Instead of admitting what they did, and doing the right thing, they spent 11 years fighting these girls."

Marra, in a 33-page opinion, said prosecutors not only violated the Crime Victims’ Rights Act by not informing the victims, they also misled the girls into believing that the FBI’s sex trafficking case against Epstein was still ongoing — when in fact, prosecutors had secretly closed it after sealing the plea bargain from the public record.

The decision follows a three-part series published by the Miami Herald in November, "Perversion of Justice," which detailed how federal prosecutors collaborated with Epstein’s lawyers to arrange the deal, then hid it from his victims and the public so that no one would know the full scope of Epstein’s crimes and who else was involved.

The 66-year-old mogul lured scores of teenage girls from troubled homes — some as young as 13 — as part of a cult-like scheme to sexually abuse them by offering them money to give him massages and promising some of them he would send them to college or help them find careers. Future president Donald Trump, former president Bill Clinton, lawyer Alan Dershowitz, Prince Andrew and other world leaders, scientists and academics were friends with Epstein, who also owns a vast home in Manhattan, a private jet, and an island in the U.S. Virgin Islands, where he now lives....

Instead of prosecuting Epstein under federal sex trafficking laws, Acosta allowed Epstein to quietly plead guilty in state court to two prostitution charges and he served just 13 months in the Palm Beach County jail. His accomplices, some of whom have never been identified, were not charged.

Epstein’s victims were not told the case was closed until it was too late for them to appear at his sentencing and possibly upend the deal. Two of them filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in 2008, claiming that prosecutors violated the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, which grants victims of federal crimes a series of rights, including the ability to confer with prosecutors about a possible plea deal....

Acosta, who was nominated as labor secretary in 2017, issued a written statement through a spokesman: “For more than a decade, the actions of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida in this case have been defended by the Department of Justice in litigation across three administrations and several attorneys general. The office’s decisions were approved by departmental leadership and followed departmental procedures. This matter remains in litigation and, thus, for any further comment we refer you to the Department of Justice.”

Michelle Licata, who was molested by Epstein when she was 14, said the judge’s decision was "a step for justice." But she still questions why federal authorities have failed to open a new case against Epstein, given that more victims and evidence has come to light in recent years. "They should see if they can prosecute him for something. I mean, really prosecute him — instead of giving him 13 months where he was allowed to come and go as he pleased. I just want to see him face some consequences for what he did."

Francey Hakes, a former federal prosecutor, said the Crime Victims’ Rights Act doesn’t spell out any punishment for violating its terms, so it would set a precedent to re-open Epstein’s agreement. "Epstein will surely argue he complied with the agreement, relied upon it, and plead guilty under it so it can’t be overturned in fairness to him," she said. "I will be very interested to see what the parties say the remedy for the violation should be. Ultimately, it is simply shocking the Government went to the lengths they did to keep the victims in the dark in order to make a serious predator’s high priced defense team happy. Justice should not, and does not, look like this."

This commentary by two former federal prosecutors asserts that there should be lots of consequences from the new ruling in this matter:

Outside of the Justice Department, it also seems untenable for Acosta to be allowed to remain in his position as head of the Department of Labor — a federal agency with significant role to play in combating and prosecuting human trafficking cases and protecting the rights of minors. He should be fired or resign.

Most significantly, Epstein and anyone else involved in this crime need to be held fully accountable and the rights of the victims fully vindicated. Judge Marra has already ruled that the CVRA authorizes “the rescission or ‘reopening’ of a prosecutorial agreement, including a non-prosecution agreement, reached in violation of a prosecutor’s conferral obligations under the statute.” Judge Marra seems to be suggesting that Epstein’s agreement be voided and the federal investigation reopened. (Sen. Ben Sasse, R-Neb., has called for DOJ to do just that.)

It is always tricky to Monday morning quarterback another prosecutor’s decision: There are often facts and circumstances known only to the prosecutors that factor into whether to proceed with charges, take a case to trial or even enter into an NPA. However, given the many deficiencies in the NPA — most notably the systematic exclusion of victims from the resolution of this case, DOJ should reopen the investigation, and assign it to another U.S. attorney’s office or an arm of the DOJ.

The only way to preserve the integrity of this case is for a clean set of eyes to review the facts and ensure that justice is done.

UPDATE: For some additional commentary on this case and the latest CVRA opinion, check out Paul Cassell's posting at The Volokh Conspiracy, "Prosecutors Violated the Rights of Jeffrey Epstein's Victims" and Kent Scheidegger's posting at Crime and Consequences, "The Crime Victims Rights Act and the Epstein Case."

February 24, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Another reminder that substantive reasonableness review has very little bite

A helpful reader made sure I saw a notable little federal sentencing ruling handed down by an Eighth Circuit panel in US v. Johnson, No. 17-2572 (8th Cir. Feb 22, 2019) (available here). The start of the main opinion sets out the basics for the reasonableness review discussion that follows:

Michael Johnson pleaded guilty in 2016 to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base.  Police arrested Johnson after a traffic stop and found him in possession of two baggies that contained rocks of crack cocaine.  A search of Johnson’s pocket discovered 22.9 grams of cocaine base and $895 in cash.

At sentencing, the district court calculated an advisory guideline range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment, but concluded that several factors justified an upward variance from the advisory range and imposed a sentence of 204 months.

The panel ultimately rejects the defendant's various claims that his sentence is unreasonable, but Judge Grasz write separately to lament the conclusion.  Here are excerpts from a short opinion worth reading in full:

While I believe the sentence here was excessive, I cannot conclude it is reversible error under the standard of review mandated by Supreme Court precedent.  This precedent makes the substantive reasonableness of a sentence nearly unassailable on appeal and renders the role of this court in that regard somewhat akin to a rubber stamp in all but the rarest cases....

So, what is left for appellate courts to review in terms of substantive reasonableness in sentencing when they cannot meaningfully police compliance with the Guidelines? Of course, sentences must still comply with the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but these “sentencing factors . . . are so broad that they impose few real restraints on sentencing judges.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 63 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Thus, appellate review of substantive reasonableness is usually an exercise in futility.

There is no doubt that maximizing sentencing court discretion has its benefits.  See, e.g.,Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101–05 (allowing sentencing courts to depart based on a disagreement with the Guidelines’ unjustified disparity in treatment of powder and crack cocaine).  But the downside, in other contexts, is the resulting disparities and inconsistencies in sentencing. In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress sought to reduce sentencing disparities by placing some limitations on the discretion of sentencing courts by means of the mandatory Guidelines.  However, “[i]t is unrealistic to think [the goal of reducing sentencing disparities] can be achieved over the long term if sentencing judges need only give lipservice to the Guidelines.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 63 (Alito, J., dissenting).  In reality, the result of Gall and Kimbrough is that “district judges have regained most of the unconstrained discretion that Congress eliminated in 1984.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 470 (Colloton, J., concurring).

February 24, 2019 in Booker in the Circuits, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, February 23, 2019

Latest Manafort sentencing memorandum from Special Counsel pulls few punches

As reported in this Politico article, a "federal judge should consider giving former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort a sentence that would send him to prison for at least 17 and a half years, special counsel Robert Mueller said in a court filing made public Saturday."  Here is more from the article about the filing and the legal context now:

Manafort faces a pair of sentencing hearings in the coming weeks in Virginia and in Washington where judges will determine what punishment he should face in two separate criminal cases brought by Mueller’s office involving tax fraud, bank fraud, unregistered lobbying for a foreign government and witness tampering.

The latest submission from Mueller accuses Manafort of a bold, brazen and wide-ranging series of crimes carried out over decades and continuing while Manafort was managing the Trump campaign in the summer of 2016, although prosecutors seemed to avoid mentioning the president directly in their new filing....

The new court submission in Washington released on Saturday makes no explicit recommendation about how much prison time Manafort should serve, but urges U.S. District Court Judge Amy Berman Jackson to consider making the longtime political consultant and lobbyist serve a total sentence in the roughly 17-to-22-year range by making her sentence consecutive to one a Virginia judge is expected to impose ahead of her early next month.

Jackson has the power in her case to sentence Manafort to up to ten years: the maximum allowed by law for the conspiracy and obstruction of justice crimes he pleaded guilty to before her last year as part of plea deal.

Last week, Mueller’s prosecutors told U.S. District Court Judge T.S. Ellis in Alexandria that sentencing guidelines applicable to Manafort’s case there call for him to serve between 19 and a half and 24 and a half years in prison. The prosecution team also made no explicit recommendation for a sentence in that case, beyond urging that the punishment be “serious” and adequate to deter others from similar conduct.

In theory, Ellis could sentence Manafort to as long as 80 years in prison on the charges of tax fraud, bank fraud and failing to report foreign bank accounts that he was convicted of at a high-profile jury trial last August.

The full 25-page filing (with a few redactions) is available at this link. Here is part of its introduction:

Based on his relevant sentencing conduct, Manafort presents many aggravating sentencing factors and no warranted mitigating factors. Manafort committed an array of felonies for over a decade, up through the fall of 2018.  Manafort chose repeatedly and knowingly to violate the law— whether the laws proscribed garden-variety crimes such as tax fraud, money laundering, obstruction of justice, and bank fraud, or more esoteric laws that he nevertheless was intimately familiar with, such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).  His criminal actions were bold, some of which were committed while under a spotlight due to his work as the campaign chairman and, later, while he was on bail from this Court. And the crimes he engaged in while on bail were not minor; they went to the heart of the criminal justice system, namely, tampering with witnesses so he would not be held accountable for his crimes.  Even after he purportedly agreed to cooperate with the government in September 2018, Manafort, as this court found, lied to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), this office, and the grand jury.  His deceit, which is a fundamental component of the crimes of conviction and relevant conduct, extended to tax preparers, bookkeepers, banks, the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice National Security Division, the FBI, the Special Counsel’s Office, the grand jury, his own legal counsel, Members of Congress, and members of the executive branch of the United States government.  In sum, upon release from jail, Manafort presents a grave risk of recidivism. Specific deterrence is thus at its height, as is general deterrence of those who would engage in comparable concerted criminal conduct.

Some prior related posts:

February 23, 2019 in Booker in district courts, Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"There's a gender imbalance in many African-American neighborhoods. Mass incarceration is largely to blame."

The title of this post is the sub-headline of this new Governing piece with the main headline "Where Have All the Black Men Gone?." Here is an excerpt:

Governing reviewed the latest population estimates for all black adults ages 18 to 64 in Census tracts where they totaled at least 2,000. In those neighborhoods, there were only a median of 81 black men for every 100 black women. The imbalance was greatest in 380 neighborhoods, where there were fewer than two adult black men for every three adult black women under age 65. In contrast to the numbers for adults, Census estimates show that nationally, there are marginally more African-American boys than girls under age 18....

The single biggest driver behind the absence of many black men is mass incarceration. A few academics have held up ratios of black men to women as a proxy for incarceration. Despite recent declines in prison populations, disparities remain massive. African-American males are imprisoned in state and federal facilities at six times the rate of white men, and about 25 times that of black women, according to figures from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Black men, underrepresented in the overwhelming majority of neighborhoods, are instead heavily concentrated in relatively few places, and those tend to be home to prisons. We identified 79 such Census tracts with more than twice as many black men as women....

The ramifications of all this are far-reaching. Partners and families of the “missing men” face a host of negative social and economic consequences, such as a shortage of income and assets.  Huge numbers of women have ties to incarcerated family members: One in every 2.5 black women has a family member in prison, more than three times the number for white women, according to a Scholars Strategy Network report.  For children, research suggests growing up with an incarcerated parent increases the likelihood of learning disabilities, behavioral problems and other challenges.

February 23, 2019 in Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (1)