Sentencing Law and Policy

"The Animal Crushing Offense Loophole"

The title of this post is the title of this new essay authored authored by Ben Buell available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture (“PACT”) Act of 2019 established the first federal criminal penalties targeting the most extreme forms of animal abuse.  Hailed by humane groups as a watershed moment in the development of animal welfare law, the PACT Act created a new federal crime: “animal crushing” — i.e., the crushing, burning, drowning, suffocation, and impalement of living non-human creatures.  But as the first defendants convicted under the PACT Act face sentencing in federal courts, judges and other stakeholders find little direction in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The United States Sentencing Commission, which until recently lacked a voting quorum, has yet to promulgate an amendment to the Guidelines that accounts for this change in the law.  Instead, the current framework perpetuates a loophole in which the recommended penalty for animal crushing is typically less than the recommendation for offenders convicted of creating or distributing videos of that conduct.  As federal prosecutors increasingly bring charges under the PACT Act, this gap in the Guidelines will continue to lead to unjust sentencing disparities that do not adequately reflect the depravity of animal torture.

This Essay is the first to identify what it terms the “animal crushing offense loophole.”  It offers three potential solutions on the eve of the Commission’s annual amendment cycle: the creation of a new Animal Crushing Guideline, the express recognition of animal victimhood, and the use of a set of sentencing factors that distinguish among animal crushing defendants.

New GOP Prez candidate DeSantis pledges to repeal FIRST STEP Act

I noted in this post a few month ago a press report that Florida Gov Ron DeSantis was planning to assail former Prez Trump for his support of the FIRST STEP Act back in 2018. And, sure enough, with days of announcing his candidacy for President, Gov DeSantis has attacked Trump's signature criminal justice reform achievement. This Fox News piece, headlined "Ron DeSantis rips Trump over First Step Act, vows to repeal it: 'Basically a jailbreak bill'," provides these details:

Republican presidential candidate and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis vowed Friday to seek a repeal of President Trump's signature First Step Act, a bipartisan criminal justice reform bill that aimed to reduce recidivism, allowed a pathway for non-violent prisoners to shorten their sentences, and reduced mandatory minimum sentences.

"Under the Trump administration — he enacted a bill, basically a jailbreak bill, it's called the First Step Act. It has allowed dangerous people out of prison who have now re-offended, and really, really hurt a number of people," DeSantis said in an interview with the Daily Wire.

"So one of the things I would want to do as president is go to Congress and seek the repeal of the First Step Act. If you are in jail, you should serve your time. And the idea that they're releasing people who have not been rehabilitated early, so that they can prey on people in our society is a huge, huge mistake," he added.

DeSantis voted for the first version of the bill as a member of the House of Representatives in 2018, the same year he was elected as Florida's governor, but had resigned before the final, more moderate version of the bill came to a vote in the chamber.

Trump's campaign responded to DeSantis by pointing to his original vote, and argued he was basically criticizing his own supporters in Congress who also voted for the bill. "Lyin' Ron. He voted for the First Step Act. Would be a shame if there was video of him praising it in an interview with a local FL television station..." Trump campaign spokesperson Stephen Cheung tweeted following the DeSantis' interview.

"DeSantis supporter [Rep. Thomas Massie, R-Ky.] voted for the bill as well. DeSantis is calling out his own Congressional supporters and throwing them under the bus," he later added in a separate tweet.

"Voices Of Redemption: A National Survey Of People With Records"

The title of this post is the title of this notable recent report from the Alliance for Safety and Justice.  Here is its executive summary:

States across the nation continue to grapple with the need for changes in our criminal justice and public safety systems.  There is increasing recognition that over-reliance on incarceration without enough prevention and treatment locks communities into cycles of crime.

The voices and experiences of people who are impacted by crime and incarceration are critical to informing the urgent debate on public safety and defining the best path forward to stop the cycle of crime and promote safety and justice.

Understanding the short and long-term impacts of these policies, however — particularly the impacts of post-sentencing policies on people with records — has been alarmingly limited.

To help decision-makers understand these impacts, in March, 2023, Alliance for Safety and Justice commissioned a first-of-its-kind National Survey of People with Records.  A nationally representative sample of 4,060 people across the country were contacted.  From that pool, 554 people who had been arrested, convicted, or incarcerated were interviewed about their experiences with, and impacts of contact with the criminal justice system.

The 2023 National Survey of People with Records reveals that the majority of people with records have suffered significant barriers to economic mobility as a result of their record, nearly all have been victims of crime who did not receive support in the aftermath of harm, and most experienced crisis prior to arrest.

The following key findings from this survey point to opportunities for further research and reform to advance policies that balance accountability, prevention, rehabilitation, and second chances that keep all communities safe.

A long round-up of sentencing news and commentary before a long weekend

I hope to be mostly off-line for most of the long weekend, and so I will lean into being away by doing a lengthy round-up of various pieces that caught my attention recently but that I did not find time to blog about.  (Also, I must remind everyone that a long weekend is a great time to lean into the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center's new podcast, "Drugs on the Docket.")   As always, I welcome reader thoughts on which of these round-up stories might justify more attention.  Here goes:

From ABC News, "All 123 US federal prisons need 'maintenance': Inspector general"

From the AP, "Alaska court reconsiders 135-year sentence given to youngest girl ever convicted of murder in Alaska"

From Bolts, "Survivors of Solitary Confinement Face the California Governor’s Veto Pen"

From the Detroit Free Press, "They thought they’d die in prison. Now they’re juvenile justice advocates on a mission"

From the Kansas City Star, "American Bar Association calls on Missouri governor to halt execution of Michael Tisius"

From The Lancet, "The death penalty: a breach of human rights and ethics of care"

From Marijuana Moment, "House-Passed Fentanyl Criminalization Bill Would Also Make It Easier To Study Marijuana And Psychedelics"

From the Marshall Project, "LIFE INSIDE, ANIMATED: An animated series featuring the stories of those whose lives have intersected with the criminal justice system."

From National Review, "Weakening Capital Punishment Jury Standards Risks Injustice"

From Pew, "Racial Disparities Persist in Many U.S. Jails"

From The San Francisco Standard, "Can 2 Years and $20M Transform San Quentin Into a Model of Prison Reform?"

From Scripps News, "After the sentence: The work to restore rights of returning citizens"

From Slate, "I Watched My Brother’s Lethal Injection.  No one understands what this is like."

Oath Keepers founder gets 18 years in federal prison for role in Jan 6 riot

As reported in this AP piece, the "founder of the Oath Keepers extremist group was sentenced Thursday to 18 years in prison for orchestrating a weekslong plot that culminated in his followers attacking the U.S. Capitol in a bid to keep President Joe Biden out of the White House after the 2020 election." Here is more:

Stewart Rhodes is the first person charged in the Jan. 6, 2021, attack to be sentenced for seditious conspiracy, and his sentence is the longest that has been handed down so far in the hundreds of Capitol riot cases.

It’s another milestone for the Justice Department’s sprawling Jan. 6 investigation, which has led to seditious conspiracy convictions against the top leaders of two far-right extremist groups authorities say came to Washington prepared to fight to keep President Donald Trump in power at all costs.

Before handing down the sentence, the judge told a defiant Rhodes that he is a continued threat to the U.S., saying it’s clear Rhodes “wants democracy in this country to devolve into violence.”

“The moment you are released, whenever that may be, you will be ready to take up arms against your government,” U.S. District Judge Amit Mehta said....

Prosecutors had sought 25 years for Rhodes, who they say was the architect of a plot to forcibly disrupt the transfer of presidential power that included “quick reaction force” teams at a Virginia hotel to ferry weapons into D.C. if they were needed. The weapons were never deployed.

In remarks shortly before the judge handed down the sentence, Rhodes slammed the prosecution as politically motivated, noted that he never went inside the Capitol and insisted he never told anyone else to do so. “I’m a political prisoner and like President Trump my only crime is opposing those who are destroying our country,” Rhodes said.

In a first for a Jan. 6 case, U.S. District Judge Amit Mehta agreed with prosecutors to apply enhanced penalties for “terrorism,” under the argument that the Oath Keepers sought to influence the government through “intimidation or coercion.”  Judges in previous sentencings had shot down the Justice Department’s request for the so-called “terrorism enhancement” — which can lead to a longer prison term — but Mehta said it fits in Rhodes’ case.

Prosecutors argued that a lengthy sentence is necessary to deter future political violence. Assistant U.S. Attorney Kathryn Rakoczy pointed to interviews and speeches Rhodes has given from jail repeating the lie 2020 election was stolen and saying it would be again in 2024. In remarks just days ago, Rhodes called for “regime change,” the prosecutor said....

A lawyer for Rhodes, who plans to appeal his conviction, said prosecutors are unfairly trying to make Rhodes “the face” of January 6. Attorney Phillip Linder told the judge that Rhodes could have had many more Oath Keepers come to the Capitol “if he really wanted to” disrupt Congress’ certification of the Electoral College vote. “If you want to put a face on J6 (Jan. 6), you put it on Trump, right-wing media, politicians, all the people who spun that narrative,” Linder said.

Another Oath Keeper convicted alongside Rhodes in November — Florida chapter leader Kelly Meggs — was expected to receive his sentence later Thursday. Two other Oath Keepers, acquitted of the sedition charge but convicted of other offenses, will be sentenced Friday. And four other members found guilty of seditious conspiracy at a second trial in January are scheduled to be sentenced next week....

Rhodes’ sentence may forecast what prosecutors will seek for former Proud Boys national chairman Enrique Tarrio, who was convicted of seditious conspiracy alongside other leaders of his far-right group this month for what prosecutors said was a separate plot to block the transfer of presidential power. The Proud Boys will be sentenced in August and September.

Rhodes, 58, and the other Oath Keepers said there was never any plan to attack the Capitol or stop Congress from certifying Biden’s victory. The defense tried to seize on the fact that none of the Oath Keepers’ messages laid out an explicit plan to storm the Capitol. But prosecutors said the Oath Keepers saw an opportunity to further their goal to stop the transfer of power and sprang into action when the mob began storming the building....

Before Thursday, the longest sentence in the more than 1,000 Capitol riot cases was 14 years for a man with a long criminal record who attacked police officers with pepper spray and a chair as he stormed the Capitol. Just over 500 of the defendants have been sentenced, with more than half receiving prison time and the remainder getting sentences such as probation or home detention.

Rhodes will not only be appealing his convictions, but surely also this sentencing.  The application of the guidelines' 'terrorism enhancement" will surely be part of any sentencing appeal, though I suspect there will be plenty of other issues raised for the DC Circuit to consider.

Prior related posts:

• Big spread in sentencing recommendations for Oath Keepers founder convicted of seditious conspiracy
• Extended discussion of issues surrounding upcoming federal sentencing of Oath Keepers 

UPDATE with additional sentencing:  This CBS News piece, which is mostly about the Rhodes sentencing, includes this news about a co-defendant's subsequent sentencing:

Hours after Rhodes was sentenced, his co-defendant Kelly Meggs, the leader of the Florida chapter of the Oath Keepers, was given a sentence of 12 years behind bars. Meggs was convicted of seditious conspiracy alongside Rhodes last November. Prosecutors alleged he spearheaded the effort to enter the Capitol.

Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Jackson) talks up Excessive Fines Clause after SCOTUS majority finds tax forfeiture is a taking

A civil case on the Supreme Court's docket that I have been watching as the Term winds down is Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota, which presented these issues: (1) Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment's takings clause; and (2) whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt, plus interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.  The Supreme Court this morning handed down a unanimous opinion in Tyler, and the opinion for the Court, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, concludes this way:

The Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong, 364 U.S., at 49.  A taxpayer who loses her $40,000 house to the State to fulfill a $15,000 tax debt has made a far greater contribution to the public fisc than she owed.  The taxpayer must render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, but no more.

Because we find that Tyler has plausibly alleged a taking under the Fifth Amendment, and she agrees that relief under “the Takings Clause would fully remedy [her] harm,” we need not decide whether she has also alleged an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed.

But while the Court as a whole dodged the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Jackson) had lots to say on the topic.  Here are a few passages from a short concurrence:

Given its Takings Clause holding, the Court understandably declines to pass on the question whether the Eighth Circuit committed a further error when it dismissed Ms. Tyler’s claim under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. Ante, at 14.  But even a cursory review of the District Court’s excessive-fines analysis — which the Eighth Circuit adopted as “well-reasoned,” 26 F. 4th 789, 794 (2022) — reveals that it too contains mistakes future lower courts should not be quick to emulate.

First, the District Court concluded that the Minnesota tax-forfeiture scheme is not punitive because “its primary purpose” is “remedial” — aimed, in other words, at “compensat[ing] the government for lost revenues due to the nonpayment of taxes.” 505 F. Supp. 3d 879, 896 (Minn. 2020).  That primary-purpose test finds no support in our law. Because “sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose,” this Court has said that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to any statutory scheme that “serv[es] in part to punish.” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (emphasis added).  It matters not whether the scheme has a remedial purpose, even a predominantly remedial purpose.  So long as the law “cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,” the Excessive Fines Clause applies.  Ibid. (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)....

Second, the District Court asserted that the Minnesota tax-forfeiture scheme cannot “be punitive because it actually confers a windfall on the delinquent taxpayer when the value of the property that is forfeited is less than the amount of taxes owed.” 505 F. Supp. 3d, at 896.  That observation may be factually true, but it is legally irrelevant.  Some prisoners better themselves behind bars; some addicts credit court-ordered rehabilitation with saving their lives.  But punishment remains punishment all the same....

Third, the District Court appears to have inferred that the Minnesota scheme is not “punitive” because it does not turn on the “culpability” of the individual property owner.  505 F. Supp. 3d, at 897.  But while a focus on “culpability” can sometimes make a provision “look more like punishment,” this Court has never endorsed the converse view.  Austin, 509 U.S., at 619.  Even without emphasizing culpability, this Court has said a statutory scheme may still be punitive where it serves another “goal of punishment,” such as “[d]eterrence.”  United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329 (1998).  And the District Court expressly approved the Minnesota tax-forfeiture scheme in this case in large part because “‘the ultimate possibility of loss of property serves as a deterrent to those taxpayers considering tax delinquency.’” 505 F. Supp. 3d, at 899 (emphasis added).  Economic penalties imposed to deter willful noncompliance with the law are fines by any other name.  And the Constitution has something to say about them: They cannot be excessive.

Catching up, yet again, with a big bunch of relisted acquitted conduct petitions pending before SCOTUS

Over at SCOTUSblog, John Elwood has his latest "Relist Watch" posting, and this new post is titled "Acquitted-conduct sentencing returns."   As regular readers know, I have been following a number of cert petitions challenging the practice of judges increasing sentences on the basis of conduct on which a defendant was acquitted; I also filed an amicus brief in one of the cases (in support of petitioner Dayonta McClinton).  The SCOTUSblog post provides this effective review of where matters now stand (links from the original):

Back in January, we noted that the Supreme Court had relisted five petitions challenging the constitutionality of the controversial practice of acquitted-conduct sentencing. (Disclosure: I represent the petitioner in one of those cases.) Under it, the fact that a jury has acquitted a defendant of criminal conduct doesn’t end the risk that he or she will be punished for that conduct; so long as the defendant is convicted of any criminal offense, punishment for that offense can be enhanced to account for the conduct of which the person was acquitted. In 1997’s United States v. Watts, the Supreme Court in a summary per curiam opinion held that such enhancements do not violate the double jeopardy clause. Largely based on Watts, every federal court of appeals has rejected challenges brought under the Fifth Amendment due process clause and the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee. But some state courts have held the practice is unconstitutional, and a host of prominent jurists, including Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Clarence Thomas, have criticized the practice.

After that single January relist, the court held those five cases for several months, apparently waiting to see whether the United States Sentencing Commission would act on a proposal that would have placed modest limits on the ability of federal sentencing judges to enhance sentences based on acquitted conduct. The Sentencing Commission recently decided not to act on that proposal this year, although it intends to try again next year. Some of the challengers argue that the Supreme Court should not wait for the Commission to act, because its proposals place only minor restrictions on the practice, and most acquitted-conduct sentences are imposed in state courts beyond the reach of the Commission. Moreover, the challengers note, the federal government argues that the Commission lacks authority to place restrictions on acquitted-conduct sentencing, because 18 U.S.C. § 3661 bars the imposition of restrictions on the information about the background and conduct of defendants that courts can consider.

The Supreme Court has relisted those original five cases a second time now. And they are joined by an additional eight cases raising the same (or closely analogous) issues. We’ll find out soon how lucky these 13 petitions are.

The next order list will be Tuesday morning, May 30, when I just happen to have something else of even more importance to attend to.  Since I will likely be unable to blog for most of Tuesday, I have already predicted to some colleagues that there will be all sorts of SCOTUS acquitted-conduct action that day.  We shall see, and I will surely get to catch up on blogging at some point.

A few recent of many, many prior related posts:

• "Acquitted Conduct Should Not Be Considered At Sentencing"
• Split Michigan Supreme Court finds due process precludes use of acquitted conduct at sentencing 
• "Acquitted. Then Sentenced."
• NJ Supreme Court holds, as a matter of state constitutional law, that "fundamental fairness" precludes sentence enhancement based on acquitted conduct 
• Might SCOTUS finally be ready to take up acquitted conduct sentencing enhancements?
• Hoping and pushing for SCOTUS finally taking up acquitted conduct sentencing enhancements 
• After US Sentencing Commission deferred on issue, Supreme Court back to conferencing acquitted conduct cases 

New report examines "The Opioid Epidemic and Homicide"

The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation has released this notable new report titled "The Opioid Epidemic and Homicide" authored by Joel Wallman, Richard Rosenfeld, and Randolph Roth. Here is the 20-page report's executive summary:

The twenty-five-year epidemic of opioid misuse in the United States has taken at least 750,000 lives through overdose. We undertook to learn whether this toll might have been accompanied by an increase in violence resulting from growth in the illicit opioid market, which, like most illicit drug markets, includes a risk of violence due to conflicts among sellers and between sellers and buyers.  We found that increases in activity in this market were associated with — and arguably caused — increased levels of homicide.

Using county opioid overdose rates as a measure of levels of transactions in the illicit market, we looked for an association between those rates and county homicide rates between 1999 and 2015.  As the epidemic has been especially intense in the White U.S. population, we conducted separate analyses for the White and Black populations. We also compared Appalachian counties to the rest of the country, as Appalachia has been particularly hard hit by the crisis.

In the nation as a whole, White overdose rates in this period were 28 percent higher than Black rates.  The growth in overdose rates differed markedly between the two groups: 34 percent for Blacks and 120 percent for Whites.  Black overdose rates did not differ between Appalachian and non-Appalachian counties.  The White overdose rate, however, was both considerably higher in Appalachia than elsewhere (23.5 vs. 19 per 100,000) and much higher than the Black Appalachian rate (14.5).  The growth in overdose rates was much higher for both groups within Appalachia than elsewhere: 58 percent vs. 32 percent for Blacks and 146 percent vs. 115 percent for Whites.

Despite this growth in overdose rates during the period, homicide rates declined for both groups and in both Appalachian and non-Appalachian counties.  This means that the aggregate effect of all the factors influencing U.S. homicide rates was a beneficial one.  However, to discern the independent association (if any) between changes in activity in the illicit-opioid market and changes in homicide rates, we conducted a series of multiple regression analyses.  We found a positive association between overdoses and homicides in both racial groups and both within and without Appalachia.  Holding constant several other variables known to be associated with homicide rates, we found growth in overdose among Whites in this period was associated with a 9-percent increase in homicide across all counties and a 19-percent increase within Appalachia.  The equivalent figures for Blacks were 3.5 and 16.

Assuming these associations reflect a causal relationship, we conclude that this growth in illicit opioid activity exerted upward pressure on rates of violence; were it not for the violence associated with the opioid market, the national drop in killings would have been greater.  The finding of another harm wrought by the opioid epidemic provides another reason to pursue vigorous public-health efforts, with a strong emphasis on treatment, to stem the epidemic.

Former Alabama Govs now urge the commutation of most of Alabama's death row

Through this recent Washington Post opinion piece, headlined "We oversaw executions as governor. We regret it.", former Alabama governors Robert Bentley and Don Siegelman explain why they would now be eager to commute most of the state's death row. Here are excerpts from the start and end of the piece:

Alabama has 167 people on death row, a greater number per capita than in any other state. As far as the two of us are concerned, that is at least 146 people too many. Here’s why.

As former Alabama governors, we have come over time to see the flaws in our nation’s justice system and to view the state’s death penalty laws in particular as legally and morally troubling. We both presided over executions while in office, but if we had known then what we know now about prosecutorial misconduct, we would have exercised our constitutional authority to commute death sentences to life....

As governors, we had the power to commute the sentences of all those on Alabama’s death row to life in prison. We no longer have that constitutional power, but we feel that careful consideration calls for commuting the sentences of the 146 prisoners who were sentenced by non-unanimous juries or judicial override, and that an independent review unit should be established to examine all capital murder convictions.

We missed our chance to confront the death penalty and have lived to regret it, but it is not too late for today’s elected officials to do the morally right thing.

This piece perhaps provides yet another data point in support of the so-called "Marshall hypothesis," the idea Justice Thurgood Marshall articulated in his Furman opinion that persons learning more about the administration and effects of capital punishment will come to reject it.  It also provides another data point for the reality that it seems much easier for politicians to turn against the death penalty once they are former office holders.

Deep dives in "back-end" sentencing problems in two east coast states

Today brought the release of two notable reports on problematic back-end sentencing practices in two states.  Both reports merit more careful attention that this one post can provide, but here are the basics:

From the Prison Policy Initiative, "Excessive, unjust, and expensive: Fixing Connecticut's probation and parole problems."  A snippet:

This report provides lawmakers and advocates fundamental information to advance essential probation and parole reforms in Connecticut, changes that will reduce unnecessary incarceration and supervision; increase fairness, justice, and public safety; and save taxpayer dollars and other resources.  The report reviews the policies and data related to community supervision and technical violations in Connecticut and describes concrete ways to improve these systems. It also gives an overview of New York’s recent parole reforms, with recommendations for lawmakers and others working to shape meaningful legislation in Connecticut and beyond.. Given the immediate and ongoing signs of success in New York, any state can look to the provisions of the Less Is More Act to help determine ways to reduce excessive supervision and incarcerated populations.

What follows is a deep dive into the policies and practices that entangle too many people in the web of ongoing supervision and cycles of imprisonment in Connecticut. Those who are on probation and parole live in fear of arrest and incarceration for nearly any action that could constitute a violation — a gross misuse of resources and a disservice to families in Connecticut.  By allowing people to remain in their communities, the state can better provide residents the help they may need in the place where they’re most likely to succeed. Connecticut has a momentous opportunity to reshape the probation and parole systems and deliver racial, economic, and procedural justice to people under supervision.

From the Justice Policy Initiative, "Safe at Home: Improving Maryland’s Parole Release Decision-Making." A snippet:

This document highlights the best available research and practice in the parole field and provides recommendations for improvements to Maryland’s parole decision-making process. To develop these recommendations, JPI consulted with experts who provide technical assistance to states looking to improve their parole practices, reviewed research on parole practice and outcomes, spoke with attorneys who assist individuals applying for parole, consulted with family members and individuals who have experience with the Maryland parole system, and examined best practices in parole in other states to identify areas of needed improvement in Maryland....

The parole grant rate decreased between 2020 and 2021 despite the emergence of COVID-19 in early 2020.  Many jurisdictions around the country expedited the release of individuals from prison to reduce the spread of the virus. This was typically accomplished by moving up parole eligibility by months and expanding the number of people eligible for a hearing.  However, Maryland data reveal sharp declines in newly eligible individuals, hearings, and the releases granted.

Grant rates in Maryland follow a bell curve pattern. Emerging adults (25 years of age and younger) report a grant rate of 37 percent.  The rate increases to a high of 43 percent for people between the ages of 31 and 35, steadily declining as individuals age. People over 60 are paroled at a rate of 28 percent.  Parole grant rates that decline with age run counter to everything we know about trends in criminal offending.  Crime is a young person’s endeavor, and the likelihood of reoffending drops precipitously after age 40.  

Fascinating tale of a singular federal prosecution (and notable sentencing) of DC marijuana distributors

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss this new and lengthy story from the Washington Post concerning a federal prosecution and sentencing of modern marijuana offenders.  The full headline highlights some of the notable particulars: "D.C. legalized weed. A marijuana delivery service was indicted anyway.  A judge refused to hand out prison sentences and urged officials to resolve the tension between local legalization and federal prohibition."  I recommend the story, which defies easy summary in full to anyone interested in marijuana reform and prosecutorial (and judicial) decisions issues.  Here are just some snippets:

Connor Pennington always knew he would start his own business, though he wasn’t sure what type....  When nearly 65 percent of D.C. voters approved Initiative 71 in 2014, legalizing the recreational use of marijuana, the 29-year-old found “what I truly believe is my calling,” he said: distributing pot.  He named the company Joint Delivery.

Although he knew marijuana sales were illegal under federal law, Pennington created a website where customers could place orders, and he had delivery workers fan out daily in bikes or cars.  Hoping to create a professional atmosphere, he hired middle managers and a full-time accountant.  The company generated at least $4 million in sales from 2017 to 2022, according to court records....

In July 2022, Pennington, two younger brothers he had hired and five Joint Delivery managers were indicted — the first and so far only D.C. marijuana dispensary to face federal prosecution since Initiative 71 passed. In a related case, Pennington’s accountant was charged with money laundering....

“This is a strange kind of case, because the substance that’s involved is legal in many, many states now. It’s not in the federal system,” U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema said at a hearing May 2. “This disparity has got to get worked out soon because it creates a crazy situation in the law enforcement area.”

The DEA twice raided Joint Delivery’s offices in D.C. last year, finding cash, marijuana and cannabis products, according to the indictment.  All nine defendants pleaded guilty to money laundering or conspiring to distribute a dangerous substance and were ordered to forfeit the money they earned.

But they never set foot in a D.C. courthouse, and none went to prison.  The top federal prosecutor in the District, U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves, declined to prosecute Joint Delivery and generally does not seek charges against any of the dozens of marijuana “gifting” shops and delivery services in the city, despite occasional police raids, according to U.S. officials and defense attorneys involved in the Joint Delivery case.

Instead, all the charges against Pennington and his employees were filed by the U.S. attorney’s office for the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA), led by Jessica D. Aber.  Prosecutors said they had jurisdiction mainly because much of the money laundering occurred in Northern Virginia.  But legal experts and the judge who handled most of the case said they were puzzled by the move, because the drug distribution that prosecutors described happened in D.C.

“I don’t think this case truly belonged here,” Brinkema said at a hearing in Alexandria federal court on Jan. 6, after chiding a prosecutor in Aber’s office for seeking a “completely inappropriate” sentence of four years and nine months in prison for one of Pennington’s shift managers, Robert Spear, who was 27 years old at the time.

The judge sentenced all of those indicted to terms of supervised release of two or three years. “It was always amazing to me that the District of Columbia, where this business essentially was, was not interested in the prosecution of this case,” Brinkema said at one of the final sentencings.

"Calculating Torture: Analysis of Federal, State, and Local Data Showing More Than 122,000 People in Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons and Jails"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new report from the group Solitary Watch.  Here is the report's introduction (with cites removed):

Solitary confinement is a torturous and deadly practice.  Prisons, jails, and detention centers inflict solitary confinement disproportionately on Black people, Latino/a/x people, Native people, and other people of color.  Decades of research have attested to the lived experience of people who have been incarcerated and their loved ones, corroborating that solitary causes devastating harm to physical, mental, and behavioral health and is counterproductive to any goals of safety.  Any length of time in solitary confinement — days, or even hours at a time —can have severe consequences.

While there has been a growing recognition of the need to end solitary confinement, and some groundbreaking policy changes have shown movement in that direction, the use of solitary confinement in prisons, jails, and detention centers across the United States remains common and widespread.

This report provides the first ever comprehensive accounting of the total use of solitary confinement in both prisons and jails across the United States.  Analysis of data recently released by the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and by two state prison systems that did not report to BJS, as well as data from a survey of local jails conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice, reveals that state and federal prisons and local and federal jails in the U.S. have reported on a given day locking a combined total of more than 122,000 people in solitary confinement for 22 or more hours.

These newly available numbers come closer than have any previously published figures in accounting for the number of people in solitary confinement. Yet they still undoubtedly undercount the number of individuals who experience solitary and the number impacted by it.

To begin with, the numbers are self-reported by correctional systems.  Further, they cover only solitary confinement that involves being locked in a cell 22 or more hours a day.  They do not include various informal or transient forms of solitary confinement such as group lockdowns or quarantines, nor do they include so-called alternatives that amount to solitary by another name.

In addition, the figures represent a snapshot of the number of people in solitary confinement at a given moment in time, while many times that number are locked in solitary during the course of a year.

Moreover, the numbers include only people in prisons and jails. Immigration detention facilities lock people in solitary confinement nearly 9,000 times a year, and children and other young people in youth facilities continue to be subjected to solitary. 

Even given all these excluded factors, the numbers far exceed those of other recent counts, which, in the absence of more comprehensive figures, have been widely quoted by media outlets and even scholars and advocates. 

Solitary Watch has been investigating and documenting the widespread use of solitary confinement for more than a dozen years to increase awareness of and accountability for this humanitarian crisis.  The Unlock the Box Campaign and activists across the country have been urging policy makers at the local, state, and federal levels to build on recent efforts to end or limit the use of solitary and to take much more substantial action to significantly reduce or eliminate its use.  Together, we believe that accurate information — including the most comprehensive possible count of the numbers of people in solitary confinement — is critical to creating change.

Extended discussion of issues surrounding upcoming federal sentencing of Oath Keepers

Over at Lawfare, Roger Parloff has this remarkable new piece titled "Should Nine Oath Keepers Receive Terror-Enhanced Sentences?". This lengthy piece examines an array of intricate sentencing issues and it starts this way:

This week, a federal judge will begin handing down sentences for nine members of the Oath Keepers paramilitary group for their roles in the Jan. 6 insurrection, including six convicted of seditious conspiracy.  The government seeks 25 years imprisonment for the group’s founder and leader that day, Elmer Stewart Rhodes III, and sentences ranging from 10 to 21 years for the other eight.  Six of those sentences, if imposed, would become the longest to date for any Capitol Siege rioter.

The sentences, which will be imposed by U.S. District Judge Amit Mehta of Washington, D.C., raise difficult questions with no close precedents.  Although at least 15 people have been sentenced for seditious conspiracy since the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines took effect in 1987, all previous cases involved people prosecuted for conduct “tantamount to waging war against the United States,” a term of art in the sentencing guidelines that the government concedes is not met here.

Among many other items noted, this piece notes that, in some of these cases, federal prosecutors are seeking enhanced punishment based on acquitted conduct:

Three of the nine defendants being sentenced were acquitted of seditious conspiracy.  One of those defendants was actually acquitted of all three conspiracy counts charged. Yet, for sentencing purposes, the government treats those three the same as if they’d been convicted of all counts.

It is true that under controlling D.C. Circuit precedent, a sentencing judge can take into account conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted if the judge believes the conduct was nevertheless proven by the lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard — which is all that is required for sentencing purposes.  Nevertheless, as I’ll discuss later, I will be surprised if Judge Mehta effectively overrides the jury verdict in this manner....

Absent the conspiracy allegations of which Caldwell was acquitted, Caldwell’s acts would have most likely resulted in either no charges at all or class A misdemeanor charges carrying a maximum one-year jail term. Yet the government seeks 14 years imprisonment for him — just two months less than career criminal Schwartz received for, inter alia, four assaults with a dangerous weapon on police officers.

Prior related post:

• Big spread in sentencing recommendations for Oath Keepers founder convicted of seditious conspiracy 

"Risk Averse and Disinclined: What COVID Prison Releases Demonstrate About the Availability of the United States to Reduce Mass Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new report authored by Julia Laskorunsky, Kelly Lyn Mitchell and Sandy Felkey Mullins released today by the Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. Here is the Executive Summary from the 70+ page report:

This report examines the challenges and opportunities that states faced in deciding whether to release people from prison during the COVID-19 pandemic.  It focuses on the legal mechanisms available to jurisdictions and the factors that influenced whether they were willing or able to use those mechanisms to release people from prison.

Our goal is to illuminate whether back-end release mechanisms can be used to reduce prison populations that have been bloated by the policies of the mass-incarceration era or whether relief from mass incarceration must take some other form.

The report presents case studies of six states — Alabama, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington — to gain a more in-depth view of how events unfolded during the pandemic.  Overall, our study found that the number of individuals released early from prisons during the pandemic was limited due to a variety of factors, including politics, risk-averse decision-making, shifting external pressures, the limited scope of compassionate and medical release statutes and the use of discretion to deny release.  In addition, few changes to policy or practice that occurred during the pandemic had a lasting impact on back-end release practices.

We conclude that the back-end release mechanisms offer only a modest opportunity to reduce mass incarceration, and the current system is unlikely to make a substantial difference in addressing mass incarceration due primarily to risk aversion.  Instead, state-level carceral policies that focus on diffusing responsibility for back-end release and that reduce incarceration in the first place have the greatest chance of achieving long-term reductions in prison populations.

Marijuana legalization in Minnesota includes creation of expungement board to aid reforms and collect data

In a couple of articles (see here and here, also flagged below), I have advocated that modern marijuana reform efforts should include the creation of a new criminal justice institution, which I have called a "Commission on Justice Restoration."  As explained most succinctly in this commentary, I suggest this institution be funded by the taxes generated by marijuana reforms and be tasked not only with helping those previously convicted of marijuana offenses, but also with addressing the undue harms of a wide array of prior convictions.  In my vision, this Commission on Justice Restoration could assemble hard-to-collect data about convictions and collateral consequences, conduct and disseminate research on the fiscal and social costs of these collateral consequences, and advocate for legal and court reforms to advance sound record relief practices.

Sadly, no state has yet to embrace my vision for creating a Commission on Justice Restoration.  But, excitingly, the version of marijuana reform about to be signed into law in Minnesota (basics here) includes the creation of criminal justice reform infrastructure that certainly is in the spirit of my proposal.  Specifically, this reform law provides for the creation of what is called the Cannabis Expungement Board, which is described a bit at this new official Minnesota website:

The legislation calls for automatically expunging low-level cannabis convictions and for creating a Cannabis Expungement Board, which will review felonies for expungement or resentencing.  Expungement seals a person’s conviction record, making the record not publicly accessible from the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. Sealing records is intended to remove barriers for people with cannabis-related offenses who are subject to a background check for a job or housing....

The Cannabis Expungement Board will consist of the following members:

• the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or a designee
• the Attorney General or a designee
• one public defender, appointed by the Governor upon recommendation of the State Public Defender
• the Commissioner of Corrections or a designee
• one public member with relevant experience, appointed by the Governor

This local press piece provides some more details about the remedial marijuana efforts called for in the new Minnesota law:

What crimes would be expunged under the bill?

Minnesotans with misdemeanor marijuana charges would see their records cleared, and a new Cannabis Expungement Board would evaluate expungement for felony marijuana crimes on a case-by-case basis.

How many Minnesotans would be eligible for expungement?

More than 60,000 misdemeanor marijuana cases would be eligible for automatic expungement when the bill is signed into law, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) estimates.  That includes cases the defendant won or had dismissed, wiping out all records of offenses from arrest to sentencing.  The BCA told lawmakers that it could take the agency up to a year to finish expunging all of the misdemeanor records.

The BCA doesn't have an estimate for the number of felony-level marijuana cases that would qualify for review by the Cannabis Expungement Board, a spokeswoman said.  That's because the state's criminal history system is unable to sort felony-level drug cases by the type of drug that was used.  A manual review of felony cases would be required.

I am going to be very interested in following the work of Minnesota's Cannabis Expungement Board.  Perhaps if all goes well, Minnesota might give this board responsibility to advance expungements and resentencings more generally.

Prior related writings:

• "Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement Practices" (from 2018)
• "How States Can Ensure That Today's Marijuana Reforms Also Ameliorate Harms Inflicted on Past Offenders" (from 2018)
• "Ensuring Marijuana Reform Is Effective Criminal Justice Reform" (from 20202)

Based on state's new Racial Justice Act, state judge throws out gang enhancements after finding “significant statistical disparity”

This local article, headlined "Judge finds Contra Costa DA’s filing practices are racist, dismisses gang charges in murder case," reports on an interesting new ruling from a California state judge relying on an interesting new California law. Here are some details:

In an unprecedented ruling statewide, a Contra Costa judge on Friday dismissed gang charges against four men under the California Racial Justice Act, ruling that county prosecutors have disproportionately targeted Black people with sentencing enhancements that open the door for life in prison without parole.

It is a case already under heavy scrutiny because two of the defendants were directly referenced in racist text messages sent by Antioch police officers who investigated their alleged crimes. The texts — part of a much larger scandal involving racism, alleged civil rights violations and dozens of impugned officers — made light of injuring the men during their arrests and referred to Black people in explicitly biased, hateful ways.

Contra Costa Judge David Goldstein’s Friday ruling did not take into consideration any of the racist texts. Rather, Goldstein based it on a decade of data — what he called a “significant statistical disparity” — showing that gang charges are more often filed against Black people. The stunning development clears the way for any Black person who has faced or is facing those charges in Contra Costa over the past decade to challenge them in court....

In making his decision Friday, Goldstein relied on data that both prosecutors and defense attorneys largely agreed upon that showed that Black people were from 6 to 8 percent more likely to be charged with “special circumstance gang enhancements” than people who weren’t Black.  Those enhancements, alleging gang membership and added on top of the underlying criminal charges at issue in a case, can greatly increase the sentence a defendant receives.

Goldstein threw out the gang enhancements against four East Bay men — Eric Windom, Terryon Pugh, Keyshawn McGee and Trent Allen — who are accused of fatally shooting a man to benefit an Oakland gang.  His ruling does not affect the murder, attempted murder and conspiracy counts against them.

Friday marks the second time that prosecutors in Contra Costa have made California history for violating the Racial Justice Act.  Last October, Judge Clare Maier ruled that a county prosecutor used “racially coded language” that “evoked racial stereotypes of African American men” during a two-defendant murder trial and threw out murder convictions for both men.

Maier’s ruling dealt specifically with a portion of the act that refers to the prosecution’s statements during trial, while Goldstein’s ruling cited a different subsection that covers the charging practices of an entire DA’s office.

Evan Kuluk, a lawyer with the county’s Alternate Defender’s Office and an attorney in both cases, told this news organization that “the impact of today’s ruling is an acknowledgement that racial bias infects every stage of the criminal legal process.”

Goldstein’s ruling calls into question dozens of other similar cases filed in Contra Costa, going back 10 years. Contra Costa DA Diana Becton — the first Black person and first woman ever to serve in that role in the county’s 173-year history — says her office now plans to look back at some of those cases with this new ruling in mind....

For many defense attorneys in Contra Costa, Friday’s ruling was a seen as vindication after years of calling on Contra Costa prosecutors to audit their own filing decisions.  In 2019, Becton partnered with the Vera Institute for a project intended to identify implicit bias in the way cases are prosecuted but has yet to release the underlying data.  Chief Public Defender Ellen McDonnell said Goldstein’s ruling “drives home the unfair charging practices that too often result from the role of implicit bias in our legal system.”

A (first) weekend plug for Season 1 of "Drugs on the Docket" podcast

In this Monday post, I flagged that the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center at The Ohio State University released Season One of a new podcast, "Drugs on the Docket."  As mentioned there, all six episodes of this first season are now available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts and YouTube.   

In my (admittedly biased) view, the various curated discussions in this "Drugs on the Docket" podcast are all quite interesting and informative.  And because I am quite eager to see this podcast develop and audience (and also because my colleagues at DEPC have worked remarkably hard to put this content together), I am sure to keep using this space to encourage everyone to check out the first set of episodes.  

Once again, here is how the podcast subject matter is described via this podcast webpage:

Drugs on the Docket is a production of the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center (DEPC) at The Ohio State University. Each episode explores how U.S. court rulings — primarily those handed down from the Supreme Court — impact drug law and policy and continue to shape the War on Drugs.  Drugs on the Docket unpacks various ways courts have engaged with and responded to the opioid epidemic, police discretion, the sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine, and more.  The series, hosted by Hannah Miller, invites guests with expertise in criminal justice, drug policy, and drug enforcement to help us break down the sometimes complex and always interesting stories behind today’s drug law landscape.

Drugs on the Docket is produced by DEPC’s Service Engagement Project Manager Hannah Miller and Public Engagement Specialist Holly Griffin.  DEPC Executive Director Douglas A. Berman is our editorial advisor.  Music by Joe DeWitt.

Check it out, makes for great weekend listening.

"The Public Voice of the Defender"

The title of this post is the title of this new article available via SSRN authored by Kay Levine and Russell M. Gold.  Here is its abstract:

For decades police and prosecutors have controlled the public narrative about criminal law — littering the news landscape with salacious stories of violent crimes while ignoring the more mundane but far more prevalent minor cases that clog the court dockets.  Defenders, faced with overwhelming caseloads and fear that speaking out may harm their clients, have largely ceded the opportunity to offer a counternarrative based on what they see every day. Defenders tell each other about overuse of pretrial detention, intensive pressure to plead guilty, overzealous prosecutors, cycles of violence, and rampant constitutional violations — all of which inflict severe harm on defendants and their loved ones.  But defenders rarely show the public the world they inhabit.

That approach hasn’t stopped the carceral state from ballooning over the past fifty years; public defense budgets remain paltry, and clients suffer from too much law and too little justice in a system that disregards and dehumanizes them.  This Article encourages defenders to go on the offensive, to seek transformative change toward a more just legal system.  It builds on the social media literature to analyze how defenders can strategically use social networking sites to add their expertise to ongoing public debates about crime and criminal justice policy.  As a few existing efforts suggest, social media enables defenders to widely share the routine injustices they observe and to engage with local grassroots organizations to build coalitions.  Defenders’ strategic use of social media won’t change policies overnight, but we are hopeful that it will augment public support for defenders and their clients and build power to transform the criminal legal landscape over decades.

Minnesota through new legislation becomes 28th state to prohibit juve LWOP

Via email from The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, I learned this afternoon that "Minnesota has officially become the 28th state to ban juvenile life without parole as an omnibus public safety bill (SF 2909) was signed by Minnesota Governor Walz after passing through the Minnesota Senate and House of Representatives." This Equal Justice Initiative piece provides some details and context:

Minnesota lawmakers this week abolished life imprisonment without parole for children. The reform is part of a public safety bill designed to transform the state’s approach to children accused of criminal offenses.

The bill not only retroactively eliminates juvenile life-without-parole sentences but also provides that children sentenced in adult court will be eligible for supervised release after at least 15 years in prison.

A newly created Supervised Release Board will be required to consider an expert assessment of the individual’s cognitive, emotional, and social maturity as well as relevant science on children’s neurological development.

Approximately 40 people will be eligible for review, University of Minnesota law professor Perry Moriearty told the Star Tribune.

The new law also creates a statewide Office of Restorative Practices to promote alternative, community-based approaches to hold children accountable, respond to victims’ needs, and address the issues underlying children’s behavior.

State grants will be provided to counties to develop local restorative justice initiatives, such as victim-offender dialogues and family group conferences, with input from parents, youths, school administrators, county prosecutors, and local law enforcement.

LawProf Mark Osler has this Twitter thread about the public safety bill that was just signed into law in Minnesota, and it highlights some other interesting sentencing features (among many others):

The bill restructures clemency. Among other features, the Pardon Board (the Gov, AG & Chief Justice) can grant clemency by a 2-1 vote with the gov in the majority. Previously, it required a unanimous vote. It also establishes a clemency commission to evaluate cases....

Adds members to the board of public defense and to the sentencing commission (including a formerly incarcerated member)....

Creates an avenue for prosecutor-initiated re-sentencing.

Caps probation at 5 years, and makes that cap retroactive for those already sentenced....

Establishes good-time credits for those in prison who pursue programming and education (up to 17% of a sentence can be earned), on top of the 1/3 of sentences that already are presumptively on supervised release.

Intriguing report that Trump legal team believes Apprendi can require downgrading his NY criminal charges

A helpful colleague made sure I did not miss this new Daily Beast article headlined "Trump’s New Ploy to Knock the Manhattan DA’s Case Down to Misdemeanors."  Here is how the piece starts:

When the Manhattan District Attorney finally indicted former President Donald Trump in March, Alvin Bragg made the curious decision to not detail Trump’s crimes in the official indictment — something critics seized on almost immediately to say this was an overblown case.

While previous investigators had wrestled with how to charge Trump with felonies, Bragg overcame that hurdle by essentially charging Trump with 34 misdemeanor counts of faking business records — then leveling them up to felonies in a parallel legal document.  Under New York law, faking business records is only a felony if it’s done while committing another crime.  In this case, prosecutors say Trump hid his 2016 porn star hush money payment in order to break election laws, therefore the 34 counts of taking business records become felonies.

But according to a source familiar with the Trump legal team’s internal discussions, the former president’s lawyers are now exploring how to use that otherwise ingenious move as a weakness to severely power down the case.  And Trump’s lawyers believe their new tactic could force the DA to reconsider if this is a fight worth having.  Their legal strategy all comes down to a Supreme Court case where a white guy in New Jersey got drunk and shot at a Black family’s home in 1994 — and then managed to get hate crime charges overturned.

Trump’s lawyers are eyeing the 2000 SCOTUS decision Apprendi v. New Jersey, which stressed the importance of putting in an indictment all the aspects of a crime that could enhance penalties.

Here is more:

When Trump was arraigned in criminal court in April, his defense lawyer Joe Tacopina assured reporters this case would “never” make it to trial.  And the Trump team’s new potential tactic threatens to downgrade the severity of the case before it ever reaches a jury, which could force the DA to consider whether a case full of misdemeanors justifies an expensive prosecution.

The legal precedent Trump’s team is considering is also buttressed by a 1999 Supreme Court decision, Jones v United States, which decided that “any fact other than prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

If Trump’s team successfully uses that defense strategy, it would be an embarrassing defeat for Bragg, who could have just as easily put all the information about the case that was included in the “Statement of Facts” in the indictment and avoided this whole mess.

Prison Policy Initiative shines light on "shadowy form of incarceration" known as civil commitment

The folks at the Prison Policy Initiative have released yet another new effective and informative data report. This new report is titled "What is civil commitment? Recent report raises visibility of this shadowy form of incarceration" and is authored by Emma Peyton Williams.  Here is part of the starting text:

As if serving a prison sentence wasn’t punishment enough, 20 states and the federal Bureau of Prisons detain over 6,000 people, mostly men, who have been convicted of sex offenses in prison-like “civil commitment” facilities beyond the terms of their criminal sentence.  Around the turn of the millennium, 20 states, Washington D.C., and the federal government passed “Sexually Violent Persons” legislation that created a new way for these jurisdictions to keep people locked up — even indefinitely — who have already served a criminal sentence for a “sex offense.”  In some states, people are transferred directly from prison to a civil commitment facility at the end of their sentence.  In Texas, formerly incarcerated people who had already come home from prison were rounded up in the middle of the night and relocated to civil commitment facilities without prior notice.  This practice, though seldom reported on, made some news in 2017 when the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear a case from Minnesota after a federal judge deemed the practice unconstitutional.  The Prison Policy Initiative has included civil commitment in our Whole Pie reports on U.S. systems of confinement, but here we offer a deeper dive, including recently-published data from a survey of individuals confined in an Illinois facility under these laws.

Some advocates call civil commitment facilities “shadow prisons,” in part because of how little news coverage they receive and how murky their practices are.  In Illinois, for example, the Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities are overseen by the John Howard Association, an independent prison watchdog organization.  But Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, a civil commitment center that opened after Illinois enacted its own Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act in 1998, is not subject to the same kind of oversight because it is housed under the Department of Human Services and is not technically classified as a prison.  This is true in many states that have “Sexually Violent Persons” laws on their books, and consequently, horrific medical neglect and abuse proliferate in these shadowy facilities. For instance, a New Jersey civil commitment facility was one of the deadliest facilities at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic....

A second critique of this system is reflected in another term advocates use to describe it: “pre-crime preventative detention.”  Civil commitment (unlike other involuntary commitment practices, such as for the treatment of serious mental illness) can be seen as “double jeopardy” repeat punishment for an initial crime, or preventative detention for a theoretical future crime that has not occurred.  Advocates rightly critique the fact that one of the primary justifications for civil commitment is the predicted risk that detained individuals will “re-offend,” even though people who have been convicted of sex offenses are less likely to be re-arrested than other people reentering society after incarceration.

Regardless, in many states, people who have been convicted of sex offenses are transferred from DOC facilities to civil commitment facilities at the end of their sentence and held pretrial, then re-sentenced by the civil courts.  The length of these sentences is often indeterminate, as release depends on progress through mandated “treatment.”  But neither “risk assessment” nor “progress through treatment” are objective measures.  In fact, advocates and people who have experienced these systems argue that risk assessment tools are used to rationalize the indefinite confinement of identity-specific groups, and that assessing progress through treatment is a highly subjective process determined by a rotating cast of “therapeutic” staff.

Some extended discussion of criminal doctrines as SCOTUS unanimously dismisses federal tort suit against Twitter alleging "aid" to ISIS

The US Supreme Court handed down six opinions in argued cases this morning, many of which were unanimous.  There was an intellectual property theme, of sorts, as the opinions included a patent ruling and an interesting copyright fair use case.  Also arguably in the IP lane was also the disposition of federal tort suits brought against Google and Twitter claiming that they were liable for aiding and abetting ISIS terrorism under 18 USC § 2333(d)(2).  The main opinion from the unanimous Court disposing of these cases was authored by Justice Thomas in Twitter v. Taamhen, No. 21–1496 (S. Ct. May 18, 2023) (available here). And those technically a matter or tort law, lots of the discussion draws on criminal law doctrines. Here is the start of the opinion of the Court and one passage with the lots of talk of criminal doctrines:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, United States nationals who have been “injured . . . by reason of an act of international terrorism” may sue for damages.  § 2333(a).  They are not limited to suing the individual terrorists or organizations that directly carried out the attack, however.  That is because § 2333(d)(2) also imposes civil liability on “any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.”  Victims of terrorist acts therefore may seek to recover from those who aided and abetted the terrorist act that injured them.

The plaintiffs (who are respondents) contend that they have stated a claim for relief under § 2333(d)(2).  They were allegedly injured by a terrorist attack carried out by ISIS.  But plaintiffs are not suing ISIS.  Instead, they have brought suit against three of the largest social-media companies in the world — Facebook, Twitter (who is petitioner), and Google (which owns YouTube) — for allegedly aiding and abetting ISIS.  As plaintiffs allege, ISIS has used defendants’ social-media platforms to recruit new terrorists and to raise funds for terrorism.  Defendants allegedly knew that ISIS was using their platforms but failed to stop it from doing so.  Plaintiffs accordingly seek to hold Facebook, Twitter, and Google liable for the terrorist attack that allegedly injured them.  We conclude, however, that plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to establish that these defendants aided and abetted ISIS in carrying out the relevant attack....

[C]ourts have long recognized the need to cabin aiding-and-abetting liability to cases of truly culpable conduct.  They have cautioned, for example, that not “all those present at the commission of a trespass are liable as principals” merely because they “make no opposition or manifest no disapprobation of the wrongful” acts of another.  Brown v. Perkins, 83 Mass. 89, 98 (1861); see also Hilmes v. Stroebel, 59 Wis. 74, 17 N. W. 539 (1883); Duke v. Feldman, 245 Md. 454, 457–458, 226 A. 2d 345, 347 (1967).  Put another way, overly broad liability would allow for “one person [to] be made a trespasser and even a felon against his or her consent, and by the mere rashness or precipitancy or overheated zeal of another.” Bird v. Lynn, 49 Ky. 422, 423 (1850).  Moreover, unlike its close cousin conspiracy, aiding and abetting does not require any agreement with the primary wrongdoer to commit wrongful acts, thus eliminating a significant limiting principle. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949).

To keep aiding-and-abetting liability grounded in culpable misconduct, criminal law thus requires “that a defendant ‘in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed’” before he could be held liable.  Id., at 619 (quoting Peoni, 100 F. 2d, at 402).  In other words, the defendant has to take some “affirmative act” “with the intent of facilitating the offense’s commission.” Rosemond, 572 U. S., at 71.  Such intentional participation can come in many forms, including abetting, inducing, encouraging, soliciting, or advising the commission of the offense, such as through words of encouragement or driving the getaway car.  2 LaFave § 13.2(a), at 457–460; see also J. Hawley & M. McGregor, The Criminal Law 81 (3d ed. 1899).  Regardless of the particulars, however, it is clear that some culpable conduct is needed. See Rosemond, 572 U.S., at 73, 77.

"What If Criminal Lawmaking Becomes Trustworthy?"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Zachary Price now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

One common theoretical perspective posits that courts should assume a counter-majoritarian role in criminal law because the political process systematically disfavors the interests of criminal suspects and defendants.  Recent shifts in the politics of crime, however, complicate this perspective’s assumptions, raising the paradoxical possibility that welcome improvements in the politics of crime will weaken the theoretical case for counter-majoritarian judicial decisions.  This essay tentatively considers whether, if at all, courts’ interpretive approach should change in response to any continuing moderation of historic “tough on crime” politics.  It suggests that while arguments for narrow construction of criminal statutes will remain strong for the foreseeable future, a more moderate and competitive politics of crime could justify greater judicial deference, at least at the margins and in some limited circumstances, to democratic choices regarding criminal procedure.

Notable sentencing research in recent special issue of "Law and Human Behavior"

I just tripped across the February 2023 issue of the journal "Law and Human Behavior," which is labeled as "Special Issue: Racial Justice in the Criminal Justice and Legal Systems."  This issue has lots of notable research, and sentencing fans might be especially interested in these pieces:

"The trial tax and the intersection of race/ethnicity, gender, and age in criminal court sentencing" by Peter S. Lehmann

"The eye of the beholder: Increased likelihood of prison sentences for people perceived to have Hispanic ethnicity" by Erik Girvan and Heather Marek

"Does 'Jamal' Receive a Harsher Sentence Than 'James'? First-Name Bias in the Criminal Sentencing of Black Men" by Dushiyanthini (Toni) Kenthirarajah, Nicholas P. Camp, Gregory M. Walton, Aaron C. Kay and Geoffrey L. Cohen

A couple of notable new international death penalty stories

A couple of new headlines and Associated Press stories concerning the application of the death penalty worldwide caught my attention this morning.  Here are links and the essential:

"Singapore hangs 2nd citizen in 3 weeks for trafficking cannabis despite calls to halt executions":

Singapore on Wednesday hanged another citizen for trafficking cannabis, the second in three weeks, as it clung firmly to the death penalty despite growing calls for the city-state to halt drug-related executions....  Under Singapore laws, trafficking more than 500 grams (1.1 pounds) of cannabis may result in the death penalty....

Singapore executed 11 people last year for drug offenses after a two-year hiatus due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The hanging of one particular Malaysian believed to be mentally disabled sparked an international outcry and brought the country's capital punishment under scrutiny for flouting human rights norms.

"Executions worldwide rose dramatically in 2022, Amnesty International reports":

Executions worldwide increased by 53% in 2022 from a year earlier, with a significant rise in Iran and Saudi Arabia, Amnesty International said in an annual report Tuesday that also criticized Indonesia as having one of the highest numbers of new death sentences in Asia.

Amnesty said 70% of the executions in the Middle East and North Africa were carried out in Iran, where their numbers rose by 83% from 314 in 2021 to 576 in 2022.  The number of executions in Saudi Arabia tripled from 65 in 2021 to 196 in 2022.

Ninth Circuit panel rules that Elizabeth Holmes cannot stay out on bail while her appeal is pending

As reported in this new AP article, "Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes appears to be soon bound for prison after an appeals court Tuesday rejected her bid to remain free while she tries to overturn her conviction in a blood-testing hoax that brought her fleeting fame and fortune." Here is more:

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling comes nearly three weeks after Holmes deployed a last-minute legal maneuver to delay the start of her 11-year prison sentence.  She had been previously ordered to surrender to authorities on April 27 by U.S. District Judge Edward Davila, who sentenced her in November.

Davila will now set a new date for Holmes, 39, to leave her current home in the San Diego area and report to prison. The punishment will separate Holmes from her current partner, William “Billy” Evans, their 1-year-old son, William, and 3-month-old daughter, Invicta.  Holmes’ pregnancy with Invicta — Latin for “invincible,” or “undefeated” — began after a jury convicted her on four counts of fraud and conspiracy in January 2022.

Davila has recommended that Holmes serve her sentence at a women’s prison in Bryan, Texas.  It hasn’t been disclosed whether the federal Bureau of Prisons accepted Davila’s recommendation or assigned Holmes to another facility.

Holmes’ former lover and top lieutenant at Theranos, Ramesh “Sunny’ Balwani, began a nearly 13-year prison sentence in April after being convicted on 12 counts of fraud and conspiracy last July in a separate trial.  Balwani, 57, was incarcerated in a Southern California prison after losing a similar effort to remain free on bail while appealing his conviction....

Holmes’s lawyers have been fighting her conviction on grounds of alleged mistakes and misconduct that occurred during her trial.  They have also contended errors and abuses that biased the jury were so egregious that she should be allowed to stay out of prison while the appeal unfolds — a request that has now been rebuffed by both Davila and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Some prior related posts:

• Elizabeth Holmes convicted on 4 of 11 fraud charges ... but now can be sentenced on all and more 
• Making the case, because "upper-class offenders ... might be even more reprehensible," for a severe sentence for Elizabeth Holmes 
• Sentencing memos paint very different pictures of Elizabeth Holmes 
• Federal judge imposes (within guideline) sentence of 135 months on Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes 
• Sentencing judge recommended prison camp for Elizabeth Holmes to serve her sentence 
• Citing prior "attempt to flee the country," feds urging that Elizabeth Holmes start her prison sentence in April
• Federal judge denies Elizabeth Holmes motion to remain free pending her appeal of fraud convictions 

Watching a quartet of SCOTUS criminal justices cases as the Term starts to wind down

As has been true in the last few Terms, the current Supreme Court Term is almost certain to be remembered for decisions outside the core realm of criminal justice.  But it has still already been an interesting SCOTUS Term for hard-core criminal justice fans with seemingly lots of (small?) wins for criminal defendants in cases like Reed, Cruz, Ciminelli, and Percoco.  Of course, the "easy" cases tend to be resolved first, and I would not expect quite so many wins for criminal defendants in the weeks ahead.  

By my rough count, there are still around ten still-pending criminal justice (or criminal-justice-related) cases for the Justices still to resolve before they head off for their summer vacations.  All the remaining cases could prove interesting and consequential, but here are four remaining cases that have most captured my attention (with help from this SCOTUSblog list):

Jones v. Hendrix, No. 21-857 [Arg: 11.1.2022]

Issue(s): Whether federal inmates who did not — because established circuit precedent stood firmly against them — challenge their convictions on the ground that the statute of conviction did not criminalize their activity may apply for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C § 2241 after the Supreme Court later makes clear in a retroactively applicable decision that the circuit precedent was wrong and that they are legally innocent of the crime of conviction.

 

Dubin v. U.S., No. 22-10 [Arg: 2.27.2023]

Issue(s): Whether a person commits aggravated identity theft any time they mention or otherwise recite someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense.

 

Counterman v. Colorado, No. 22-138 [Arg: 04.19.2023]

Issue(s): Whether, to establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective "reasonable person" would regard the statement as a threat of violence.

Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota, No. 22-166 [Arg: 04.26.2023]

Issue(s): (1) Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment's takings clause; and (2) whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt, plus interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.

I would welcome in the comments any predictions about likely outcomes in these cases and/or the flagging of other pending criminal-justice-related cases from this Term that folks are keeping a close eye on.  We are not quite to the final stretch of the SCOTUS Term, but there are opinions coming this Thursday and likely just about every week from now until the end of June.

The Sentencing Project releases new report covering “Youth Justice By The Numbers”

The Sentencing Project released today this notable new report titled, “Youth Justice By The Numbers.”  The very first page of this nine-page report spotlights that from "2000 (the peak year) and 2020, the number of youth held in juvenile justice facilities on a typical day fell from 108,800 to 25,000, a 77% decline." Here is how the start of this report contextualizes this finding and others presented in this report:

Youth arrests and incarceration increased in the closing decades of the 20th century but have fallen sharply since that time. Public opinion often lags behind these realities, wrongly assuming both that crime is perpetually increasing and that youth offending is routinely violent.  In fact, youth offending is predominantly low-level, and the 21st century has seen significant declines in youth arrests and incarceration.  Between 2000 and 2020, the number of youth held in juvenile justice facilities fell from 109,000 to 25,000 — a 77% decline.

As The Sentencing Project marks 50 years since the era of mass incarceration began, states working to end this overly punitive era can learn important lessons from both the rise and then the sustained fall in youth arrests and placements.

Lots of sentencing coverage as part of Season 1 of "Drugs on the Docket" podcast

I am extremely pleased to highlight that the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center at The Ohio State University has now officially launched Season One of a new podcast, "Drugs on the Docket."  All six episodes of this season are available on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts and YouTube.  My colleagues at DEPC have worked remarkably hard to put this content together, and I hope folks find the curated discussions interesting and informative.

Here is how the podcast subject matter is described via this podcast webpage along with episode titles:

Drugs on the Docket is a production of the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center (DEPC) at The Ohio State University. Each episode explores how U.S. court rulings — primarily those handed down from the Supreme Court — impact drug law and policy and continue to shape the War on Drugs.  Drugs on the Docket unpacks various ways courts have engaged with and responded to the opioid epidemic, police discretion, the sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine, and more.  The series, hosted by Hannah Miller, invites guests with expertise in criminal justice, drug policy, and drug enforcement to help us break down the sometimes complex and always interesting stories behind today’s drug law landscape.

Drugs on the Docket is produced by DEPC’s Service Engagement Project Manager Hannah Miller and Public Engagement Specialist Holly Griffin.  DEPC Executive Director Douglas A. Berman is our editorial advisor.  Music by Joe DeWitt.

Episode 1 – Federal drug sentencing and the evolution of the crack to powder cocaine ratio with Mark Osler

Episode 2 – Ruan v. United States and the intersection of healthcare, criminal law, and the opioid crisis with Jenn Oliva and Kelly Gillespie

Episode 3 – A Special Conversation with former Supreme Court of Ohio Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor

Episode 4 – United States v. Angelos, federal mandatory minimums, and sentencing reform with Weldon Angelos and Paul Cassell

Episode 5 – Data and storytelling in federal drug sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission with Doug Passon and Mark Allenbaugh

Episode 6 – Whren v. United States, Terry v. Ohio, and the Fourth Amendment with Gabriel “Jack” Chin

In helping with this effort, I came to realize fully just how much work is involved in podcast production.  Still, if this first season finds an audience, we may soon begin the hard work of producing another season.  And so recommendations for fitting topics and guests are welcome.

US Sentencing Commission publishes detailed retroactivity analysis for its amendments to federal guidelines' criminal history rules

In this post last month, I provided some details on the US Sentencing Commission's proposed consequential amendments to alter how criminal history is assessed and calculated under the federal sentencing guidelines. The big ticket items in the proposed amendments concern "status points" and "zero-point offenders"; as detailed here, the Commission has officially sought comment on whether it should make these key parts of its new criminal history amendment "available for retroactive application."

Today, the USSC publish on its website this new 48-page memo titled "Retroactivity Impact Analysis of Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment."  Here is  how the memo gets started:

On April 27, 2023, the United States Sentencing Commission submitted to Congress an amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines revising two criminal history provisions found in Chapter Four of the Guidelines Manual.  Specifically, Part A of the amendment makes targeted changes to reduce the impact of providing additional criminal history points for offenders under a criminal justice sentence (commonly known as “status points”), and Part B, Subpart 1 provides a twolevel downward adjustment for certain offenders with zero criminal history points under the guidelines (“zero-point offenders”).  Because these two provisions reduce the sentencing range for some offenders, the Commission is statutorily required to determine whether either or both of these parts of the amendment should be applied retroactively to previously sentenced, imprisoned defendants.  As required by its Rules of Practice and Procedure,  the Commission voted at the April 5, 2023 public meeting to instruct staff to prepare a retroactivity impact analysis to aid the Commission in determining whether to do so.  This memorandum provides that analysis.  

Part I of this memorandum summarizes the operation of the 2023 criminal history amendment applicable to “status points” and “zero-point offenders.”  Part II of the memorandum provides background on the statutory authority and guidelines policy statement governing retroactive application of amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines, noting the factors to be considered in the Commission’s decision regarding retroactivity. Part III of the memorandum provides an estimate of the impact of Parts A and B, Subpart 1 of the amendment if the Commission were to authorize the courts to apply these parts of the amendment retroactively.  Part IV of this memorandum describes how the analysis was performed.

Here is the summary of the details of the USSC's analysis of who would benefit from retroactive application of its proposed criminal history amendments:

Staff estimates that there are 50,545 offenders in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) as of January 28, 2023, who were assigned status points at sentencing (“status points offenders”)....  Staff estimates that approximately one-quarter (22.7%, n = 11,495) of the 50,545 status points offenders would have a lower guideline range if the Commission were to make Part A of the 2023 criminal history amendment retroactive and, therefore, would be eligible to seek a modification of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  The current average sentence for those offenders is 120 months.  If the courts were to grant the full reduction possible in each case, the projected new average sentence for those offenders would be 106 months, a reduction of 14 months (or 11.7%).  The offenders would be released over a period of many years....

Staff estimates that there are 34,922 offenders in BOP custody as of January 28, 2023, for whom no criminal history points were assigned under Chapter Four, Part A of the Guidelines Manual when sentenced for their instant offense.  Of those 34,922 zero-point offenders, 12,574 meet the criteria in Part B, Subpart 1 of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment.  Staff estimates that slightly more than half (57.8%, n = 7,272) of those offenders would have lower guideline range if the Commission were to make Part B, Subpart 1 of the 2023 criminal history amendment retroactive and, therefore, would be eligible to seek a modification of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  The current average sentence for those eligible zero-point offenders is 85 months.  If the courts were to grant the full reduction possible in each case, the projected new average sentence for those offenders would be 70 months, a reduction of 15 months (or 17.6%).  The offenders would be released over a period of many years.

Putting these particulars together in a very rough way, it seems that the USSC is estimating that just under 19,000 thousand current federal prisoners would be able to get just under 1.2 years off their sentences if these new criminal history amendments are made retroactive.  That adds up to a total of about 23,000 prison years saved were these new guideline amendments made retroactive and these estimated impacts become reality.

SCOTUS grants cert in ACCA cases to address prior drug convictions as predicates for 15-year mandatory minimum

As predicted in this recent post, the Supreme Court today in this morning's SCOTUS order list granted cert in a pair of cases (which were consolidated) raising another question regarding the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act's mandatory minimum 15-year prison term for illegal gun possession.  The cases are Brown v. US, No. 22-6389 and Jackson v. US, No. 22-6640, and here are links to the Brown cert petition and the Jackson cert petition.  Here is the "Question Presented" from the Brown petition:

The Armed Career Criminal Act provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence.  But if the felon already has at least three “serious drug offense” convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. 

Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart.  If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate.

But federal drug law often changes — as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana.  If state law doesn’t follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum.  Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match — and the state offense is an ACCA predicate.  Under the amended version, the offenses do not match — and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate.  So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum.

The question presented is:

Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA’s categorical approach?

UPDATE: A helpful reader made sure I did not overlook the fact that a different drug is at issue in the Jackson case.  At issue in that case is the status of a conviction that came before 2015 when "the federal government removed ioflupane I123 from the federal drug schedules."  

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissents from SCOTUS denial of cert regarding challenge to execution methods

The particulars of constitutional challenges over execution methods has generated three modern Supreme Court Eighth Amendment rulings (Baze, Glossip, and Bucklew).  Though the state prevailed in all these rulings against condemned prisoners' various attacks on various lethal injection protocols, litigation over execution methods are still common and the applicable Eighth Amendment jurisprudence remains contested.  These realities provide the background for a dissent from the denial of cert in this morning's SCOTUS order list today by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, in Hamm v. Smith, No. 22–580. Here are excerpts from the intricate six-page dissent:

In this petition, the State now asks this Court to summarily reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Smith pleaded a viable Eighth Amendment claim. I would do so. The judgment below rests on flawed Circuit precedent that is irreconcilable with our method-of-execution case law....

In 2018, Alabama enacted a statute authorizing execution by nitrogen hypoxia for inmates who elected that method within 30 days of their sentences becoming final or, for those whose sentences were already final before June 1, 2018, within 30 days of that date.  Ala. Code §15– 18–82.1(b)(2). (Smith did not elect nitrogen hypoxia, so lethal injection remains the only method of execution authorized by state law in his case. §15–18–82.1(a).)  Nearly five years later, Alabama has yet to carry out any execution by nitrogen hypoxia or to finalize a protocol for implementing that method — which “ha[s] never been used to carry out an execution and ha[s] no track record of successful use” in any jurisdiction. Bucklew, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[T]he Eleventh Circuit has treated the existence of this Alabama statute as relieving inmates like Smith of their burden to plead and prove that nitrogen hypoxia is feasible and readily implemented in fact.... [But] whether the State has authorized the proffered alternative as a matter of state statutory law has no relevance to the plaintiff ’s burden of showing a constitutional violation.  Bucklew has already explained why: “[T]he Eighth Amendment is the supreme law of the land, and the comparative assessment it requires can’t be controlled by the State’s choice of which methods to authorize in its statutes.” 587 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 19–20)....

When the question is whether the Eighth Amendment requires a State to replace its chosen method with an alternative method in executing the plaintiff, it is simply irrelevant, without more, that the State’s statutes authorize the use of the alternative method in other executions that are to take place sometime in the indefinite future.  Here, Smith alleged only that, and nothing more. He therefore failed to state a claim, and the Eleventh Circuit erred by holding otherwise.

The Eleventh Circuit’s error is not only plain but also serious enough to warrant correction. Even if “the burden of the alternative-method requirement ‘can be overstated,’” Bucklew, 587 U. S., at ___ (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring) (slip op., at 1), it remains an essential element of an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim, and it must be appropriately policed lest it become an instrument of dilatory litigation tactics.  The comparative analysis set forth in Baze, Glossip, and Bucklew contains an inherent risk of incentivizing “an inmate intent on dragging out litigation . . . to identify only a method of execution on the boundary of what’s practically available to the state.”  Middlebrooks v. Parker, 22 F. 4th 621, 625 (CA6 2022) (Thapar, J., statement respecting denial of rehearing en banc).  The Eleventh Circuit’s approach of treating any statutorily authorized method as available as a matter of law — even an entirely novel method that may not be readily implementable in reality — only heightens that danger.  In turn, and as a result, it “perversely incentivize[s] States to delay or even refrain from approving even the most humane methods of execution” any earlier than the moment they are prepared to put them into practice.  Price v. Dunn, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 11).

Latest "Relist Watch" flags yet another ACCA issue splitting circuit and likely to get SCOTUS review

In this latest Relist Watch over at SCOTUSblog,John Elwood includes a discussion of yet another issue dividing circuits concerning how to apply the Armer Career Criminal Act's severe 15-year mandatory minimum term for gun possession.  Regular readers know the wide array of technical issues SCOTUS has had to address in the application of ACCA, but this latest issue seems a bit more interesting than most.  Here are John's full descriptions (with links from the original):

[W]e have a group of three relists that raise the same issue. Brown v. United States, Jackson v. United States, and Jones v. United States all concern a single recurring issue involving the Armed Career Criminal Act, a federal sentencing enhancement provision.  The ACCA provides that someone who has been convicted of a felony and possesses a firearm is normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence.  But if that person already has at least three “serious drug offense” convictions, then the minimum sentence — the minimum — is 15 years.  Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as an ACCA “serious drug offense” using a “categorical approach.”  It requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart.  If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense.  But federal drug law often changes — as here, when Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana.  If the state law doesn’t follow suit, sentencing courts face an issue: What if the state and federal offenses matched (and thus the state offense was an ACCA predicate) under an earlier version of federal law, but federal law has since been narrowed? Thus, the court’s choice of which version of federal law to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum.

The question presented in these three cases is: Whether the “serious drug offense” definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense, or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 10th Circuit have gone with federal law at the time of the firearm offense; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit has gone with federal law at the time of the prior state drug offense.

The government has told the Supreme Court that there is a circuit split on the issue and recommends that the court should grant review in Jackson, and hold Brown and Jones for that case.  I also rate Jackson a likely grant.

We should know more after the court releases its order list next Monday.

In addition to having an eye out for these ACCA cases, I am hopeful (though still not quite optimistic) that Monday's SCOTUS order list might also include some action on the long-pending acquitted conduct cases (background here).

Closing another busy week rounding up some notable commentary

Last month, I used round-up posts here and here to catch up on a number of capital punishment and prison-related stories during busy end-of-the-semester weeks.  This week it is mostly grading and graduation that has kept me from blogging a number of notable commentary pieces that I have seen recently.  So, catching up again with a round up, here goes:

By James Austin & Michael Jacobson, "A Model for Criminal Justice Reform: How New York City Lowered its Jail Population and Crime Rates"

By Emily Beltz, "How an Oklahoma Death Penalty Case Shook Up Evangelical Views on Execution"

By Hillary Blout & Marc Levin, "Give Texas prosecutors the chance to do justice for old cases"

By Kristen Budd, "Expanding voting rights to justice-impacted can improve public safety"

By C.J. Ciaramella, "Newly Released Government Records Reveal Horrible Neglect of Terminally Ill Woman in Federal Prison"

By Whitney Downard, "Probation, parole an overlooked population of the criminal justice system"

By C. Dreams, "How The Prison Litigation Reform Act Blocks Justice For Prisoners: Legislation signed by Bill Clinton makes it nearly impossible for people in prison to have their cases heard in court."

By Eric Reinhart, "How Community Health Workers Can End Mass Incarceration and Rebuild Public Safety"

By Rupa Subramanya, "Is Justice Still Blind in Canada?: Equality under the law is the cornerstone of liberal democracy. But judges across the country are now factoring race into sentencing."

By William Weber, Brooks Walsh, & Steven Zeidman, "New York’s Compassionate Release Laws were Designed to Keep People from Dying Behind Bars; They’re Failing"

By Raymond Williams, "Dear Prison Officials: Stop Searching My Nose for Your Contraband"

SCOTUS unanimously reverses two federal fraud convictions based on novel theories

The Supreme Court this morning handed down two notable wins for federal fraud defendants, rejecting two theories of federal prosecution endorced by lower court in Ciminelli v. US, No. 21-1170 (S. Ct. May 11, 2023) (available here) and Percoco v. US, No. 21-1158 (S. Ct. May 11, 2023) (available here). Here is how the opinion for the Court in Ciminelli authored by Justice Thomas gets started:

In this case, we must decide whether the Second Circuit’s longstanding “right to control” theory of fraud describes a valid basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute, which criminalizes the use of interstate wires for “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  Under the right-to-control theory, a defendant is guilty of wire fraud if he schemes to deprive the victim of “potentially valuable economic information” “necessary to make discretionary economic decisions.” United States v. Percoco, 13 F.4th 158, 170 (CA2 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner Louis Ciminelli was charged with, tried for, and convicted of wire fraud under this theory. And the Second Circuit affirmed his convictions on that same basis.

We have held, however, that the federal fraud statutes criminalize only schemes to deprive people of traditional property interests. Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24 (2000). Because “potentially valuable economic in-formation” “necessary to make discretionary economic decisions” is not a traditional property interest, we now hold that the right-to-control theory is not a valid basis for liability under §1343. Accordingly, we reverse the Second Circuit’s judgment.

Here is how the opinion for the Court in Percoco authored by Justice Alito gets started:

In this case, we consider whether a private citizen with influence over government decision-making can be convicted for wire fraud on the theory that he or she deprived the public of its “intangible right of honest services.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346. Petitioner Joseph Percoco was charged with conspiring to commit honest-services wire fraud during a period of time that included an eight-month interval between two stints as a top aide to the Governor of New York. Percoco was convicted of this offense based on instructions that required the jury to determine whether he had a “special relationship” with the government and had “dominated and controlled” government business. 2 App. 511. We conclude that this is not the proper test for determining whether a private person may be convicted of honest-services fraud, and we therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Though federal criminal law and white-collar folks are going to want to review these (relatively shourt) opinions closely, everyone should take the time to check out Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in Percoco. It was joined by Justice Thomas and here are some brief highlights from its start and closing:

The Court holds that the jury instructions in this case were “too vague.” Ante, at 10.  I agree.  But to my mind, the problem runs deeper than that because no set of instructions could have made things any better.  To this day, no one knows what “honest-services fraud” encompasses.  And the Constitution’s promise of due process does not tolerate that kind of uncertainty in our laws—especially when criminal sanctions loom. “Vague laws” impermissibly “hand off the legislature’s responsibility for defining criminal behavior to unelected prosecutors and judges, and they leave people with no sure way to know what consequences will attach to their conduct.”  United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 1)....

The difficulty here stems from the statute and the lower court decisions that inspired it.  I have no doubt that if all nine Justices put our heads together, we could rewrite § 1346 to provide fair notice and minimize the risk of uneven enforcement.  I have no doubt, too, that we could find a hook for any such rule somewhere in the morass of pre-McNally lower-court case law.  Maybe, too, that is the path we are on, effectively writing this law bit by bit in decisions spanning decades with the help of prosecutors and lower courts who present us with one option after another.  But that is not a path the Constitution tolerates.  Under our system of separated powers, the Legislative Branch must do the hard work of writing federal criminal laws.  Congress cannot give the Judiciary uncut marble with instructions to chip away all that does not resemble David.  See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876) (“It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large”); United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C. J.) (“It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment”).

Doubtless, Congress had high and worthy intentions when it enacted § 1346.  But it must do more than invoke an aspirational phrase and leave it to prosecutors and judges to make things up as they go along.  The Legislature must identify the conduct it wishes to prohibit.  And its prohibition must be knowable in advance — not a lesson to be learned by individuals only when the prosecutor comes calling or the judge debuts a novel charging instruction. Perhaps Congress will someday set things right by revising §1346 to provide the clarity it desperately needs.  Until then, this Court should decline further invitations to invent rather than interpret this law.

"Enforcing Marijuana Prohibitions: Prosecutorial Policy in Four States"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now available via SSRN and produced jointly by The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law's Drug Enforcement and Policy Center and the University of North Carolina School of Law's Prosecutors and Politics Project. Here is its abstract:

As more states have legalized and decriminalized marijuana, the enforcement of criminal laws prohibiting the personal possession of marijuana has become more controversial in states where cannabis remains illegal.  Yet, very little is understood about how other prosecutors enforce criminal prohibitions on the personal possession of marijuana.  This study aims to fill this gap.  It systematically examines prosecutorial enforcement of laws prohibiting the personal possession of marijuana in four states that have not legalized medical or adult-use marijuana.  The study had four major goals: (1) to determine what enforcement policies had been adopted by incumbent prosecutors, (2) to determine the enforcement platforms of candidates running for the office of local prosecutor, (3) to explore the reasons and reasoning behind those policies and platforms, and (4) to determine what information, if any, was accessible to voters about the issue.

As flagged in this post over at my other blog, this study will be discussed at an onlne event next week titled "Prosecuting Cannabis: Approaches from States without Legalization."  Folks can register for this event here, and this event page provides some background along with the scheduled panelists.

First Circuit panel reverses fraud convictions for two Varsity Blues defendants

As reported in this New York Times piece, "a federal appeals court overturned the fraud and conspiracy convictions on Wednesday of two parents found guilty of participating in a far-reaching bribery scheme, known as Operation Varsity Blues, which ensnared dozens of wealthy parents who falsified their children’s credentials to gain admission to prestigious universities across the country."  Here is more:

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Massachusetts found that the lower court had made crucial missteps in the trial of Gamal Abdelaziz, a former casino executive, and John Wilson, a private equity financier.  The court, however, upheld Mr. Wilson’s conviction on tax fraud.

The appeals court made its decision largely on two technical legal grounds.  First, it ruled that the lower court judge wrongly instructed the jury that admissions slots constituted property.  “We do not say the defendants’ conduct is at all desirable,” the decision said.  But the appellate judges faulted the government for being too broad in its argument, to the point where “embellishments in a kindergarten application could constitute property fraud proscribed by federal law.”

The court also found that the government had failed to prove that the two men agreed to engage in a conspiracy with other parents, who were, like them, the clients of William Singer, known as Rick, a college admissions consultant to the rich, the mastermind of the admissions scheme.  The conspiracy charges allowed the government to introduce evidence related to other parents’ wrongdoing, creating the risk of bias against the defendants, the judges said in a 156-page decision....

The victory in the appellate court was striking because Mr. Wilson and Mr. Abdelaziz were the first to take their chances in front of a jury.  Dozens of other wealthy parents, including some celebrities, pleaded guilty, making it seem as if the prosecutions were ironclad.  The investigation became a symbol of how wealthy, prestige-obsessed parents had turned elite universities into brand-name commodities.

“Almost everybody pleaded guilty, so the government’s legal theories weren’t really tested until this case was decided,” Joshua Sharp, the lawyer who argued the case for Mr. Abdelaziz, said on Wednesday.

While Mr. Abdelaziz and Mr. Wilson found the weak spots in the government’s case, parents who pleaded guilty are unlikely to be able to challenge their convictions on similar grounds, legal experts said.

Mr. Abdelaziz was accused of paying $300,000 in 2018 to have his daughter admitted to the University of Southern California as a top-ranked basketball recruit even though she did not make the varsity team in high school.  Mr. Wilson was accused of paying $220,000 in 2014 to have his son admitted as a water polo recruit at U.S.C., even though prosecutors said he was not good enough to compete at the university.

Mr. Wilson was also accused of agreeing to pay $1.5 million in 2018 to have his twin daughters, who were good students, admitted to Harvard and Stanford as recruited athletes.

They were tried together in the fall of 2021; Mr. Wilson was later sentenced to 15 months in prison, and Mr. Abdelaziz to a year and a day. Their lawyers argued that the men thought they were making legitimate donations to the university. They said they trusted Mr. Singer, as their college consultant, to guide them.

The investigation ensnared more than 50 people, including the actresses Felicity Huffman and Lori Loughlin; Ms. Loughlin’s husband, Mossimo Giannulli, a fashion designer; and coaches and exam administrators, among others. Mr. Singer agreed to cooperate with the government and pleaded guilty in 2019 to conspiracy charges. He was sentenced in January to three and a half years in prison.

The full 156-page opinion of the First Circuit panel is available at this link.

Man convicted of murdering BLM marcher, whom Texas Gov has pledged to pardon, sentenced by judge to 25 years in prison

This new AP article, headlined "Army sergeant who fatally shot BLM protester in Texas sentenced to 25 years," reports on the latest legal development in a high-profile case which first caught my attention when Gov. Greg Abbott announced on social media that he would pardon a just-convicted killer.  Here are some of the details:

A U.S. Army sergeant plans to appeal his 25-year prison sentence for fatally shooting an armed man during a Black Lives Matter protest in Texas, and will cooperate with efforts by the state’s Republican governor to issue a pardon, his attorney said Wednesday.

Daniel Perry, 36, was convicted of murder in April for killing 28-year-old Garrett Foster during the downtown Austin protest in July 2020....  Perry attorney Clinton Broden said in a statement that his client would appeal. He called Perry’s conviction the product of “political prosecution” and said the defense team would “fully cooperate in the pardon process.”

Perry’s conviction prompted outrage from prominent conservatives, and Gov. Greg Abbott, citing Texas’ Stand Your Ground laws, has said he would sign a pardon once a recommendation from the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles hits his desk.  The board — which is stacked with Abbott appointees — is reviewing Perry’s case on the governor’s orders, but it is unclear when it will reach a decision.

District Judge Clifford Brown delivered a statement during sentencing that didn’t address the potential pardon directly.  But he insisted that Perry had a “fair and impartial trial” and that the jury’s decision “deserves our honor and it deserves to be respected.” 

Travis County District Attorney Jose Garza said it was Abbott “who decided to insert politics in this case.” Garza said he’s been in touch with the board and has been assured that prosecutors will be allowed to present a case against a pardon, and that it will include a presentation from Foster’s family.

The pardon process is a valuable check on the court system, Broden said. “Those who claim that Governor Abbott’s expressed intent is based on politics simply choose to ignore the fact that it was only the political machinations of a rogue district attorney which led to Sgt. Perry’s prosecution in the first instance,” he said.

Perry was stationed at Fort Hood, about 70 miles (110 kilometers) north of Austin, when the shooting happened. He had just dropped off a ride-share customer and turned onto a street filled with protesters. Perry said he was trying to get past the crowd and fired his pistol when Foster pointed a rifle at him. Witnesses testified that they did not see Foster raise his weapon, and prosecutors argued that Perry could have driven away without shooting.

Perry said he acted in self-defense. His lawyers asked the judge to consider his more than a decadelong military career and hand down a sentence of no more than 10 years. Army spokesman Bryce Dubee has said Perry is classified as in “civilian confinement” pending separation from the military.

On Tuesday, prosecutors submitted into evidence dozens of texts and social media posts Perry wrote, shared or liked, including some shockingly racist images. They had been excluded from Perry’s trial, but were publicly released after his conviction and allowed into the sentencing phase by Brown. “This man is a loaded gun, ready to go off at any perceived threat,” prosecutor Guillermo Gonzalez said, urging Brown to issue a sentence of at least 25 years. “He’s going to do it again.”

Perry, who is white, was working as a ride-share driver in downtown Austin on July 25, 2020, when he shot and killed Foster, an Air Force veteran. Foster, who was also white, was legally carrying an AK-47 rifle as he participated in the demonstration against police killings and racial injustice, following the death of George Floyd, a Black man, by a white Minneapolis police officer.

Prior related post:

• Texas Gov pledges to swiftly pardon man convicted of murder of BLM marcher day after jury conviction

Prison Policy Initiative details "Punishment Beyond Prisons 2023: Incarceration and supervision by state"

Prison Policy Initiative has produced this intricate new report detailing how many folks are under correctional control in every state and throughout the entire US.  The report is titled "Punishment Beyond Prisons 2023: Incarceration and supervision by state," and here is how it gets started:

The U.S. has a staggering 1.9 million people behind bars, but even this number doesn’t capture the true reach of the criminal legal system.  It’s more accurate to look at the 5.5 million people under all of the nation’s mass punishment systems, which include not only incarceration but also probation and parole.

Altogether, an estimated 3.7 million adults are under community supervision (sometimes called community corrections) — nearly twice the number of people who are incarcerated in jails and prisons combined.  The vast majority of people under supervision are on probation (2.9 million people), and over 800,000 people are on parole.  Yet despite the massive number of people under supervision, parole and probation do not receive nearly as much attention as incarceration.  Policymakers and the public must understand how deeply linked these systems are to mass incarceration to ensure that these “alternatives” to incarceration aren’t simply expanding it.

We’ve designed this report specifically to allow state policymakers and residents to assess the scale and scope of their entire correctional systems.  Our findings raise the question of whether community supervision systems are working as intended or whether they simply funnel people into prisons and jails — or are even replicating prison conditions in the community.  The report encourages policymakers and advocates to consider how many people under correctional control don’t need to be locked up or monitored at all, and whether high-need individuals are receiving necessary services or only sanctions.

In this update to our 2018 report, we compile data for all 50 states and D.C. on federal and state prisons, local jails, jails in Indian Country, probation, and parole.  We also include data on punishment systems that are adjacent to the criminal legal system: youth confinement and involuntary commitment.  Because these systems often mirror and even work in tandem with the criminal legal system, we include them in this broader view of mass punishment. We make the data accessible in one nationwide chart, 100+ state-specific pie charts and a data appendix, and discuss how the scale and harms of these systems can be minimized.

New Human Rights for Kids report documents those imprisoned for crimes committed as children

The group Human Rights for Kids has released this big new report titled "Crimes Against Humanity: The Mass Incarceration of Children in the US." Here is part of the report's executive summary:

The extensive negative impact on children from our practice of transferring them into the adult criminal justice system and treating them as if they were adults has been well-documented by state and federal government agencies, researchers, advocates and the press. What has not been documented to date, is the extent of the impact of these policies. This report provides the first ever snapshot and national estimate of the number of people in our prisons who have been there since they were children.

We gathered data from 45 states on every individual currently incarcerated who was under the age of 18 at the time of their offense. Our findings revealed that U.S. prisons are filled with at least 32,359 individuals whose crimes were committed as children....

Beginning in the summer of 2021, we requested data from departments of corrections in all 50 states and the District of Columbia on individuals who are currently incarcerated in adult prisons who committed their offense when they were under the age of 18. We received data from 45 states. Our analysis surfaced trends and findings across sentence length, decade of incarceration, gender, race and ethnicity. In addition to aggregating the data, we also conducted a comparative analysis to highlight which state practices constituted the worst human rights violations across categories.

We are currently incarcerating approximately 32,359 individuals in ourprisons for crimes they committed as children.  Some were so young they were still subject to truancy laws, and an astonishing number weren’t even teenagers.  They comprise a full 3.1% of the United States’ overall state prison population –- the equivalent of an entire prison full of children in every state in the country.  Notably, this is close to the total number of children in youth prisons of 36,469.  We incarcerate more children as adults in our prison system than the total combined prison populations of Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Scotland.  In fact,there are more people in our prisons for crimes they committed as children than people in prison who committed their crimes as adults in 76.68% of the countries and independent territories in the world.

"The Eighth Amendment's Time to Shine; Previewing Florida's Imminent Constitutional Crisis in Capital Punishment"

The title of ths post is the tile of this new piece authored by Melanie Kalmanson now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

In April 2023, Florida Governor DeSantis enacted legislation that lowers the jury vote necessary to impose a sentence of death in the state to 8-4.  The new statute removes the procedural safeguards that were implemented after the U.S. Supreme Court held in 2016 that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violated defendants' right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.

Litigation about the constitutionality and application of the new statute has already started and will likely continue for a while until the full effect of the statute is determined.  This Essay previews some of the issues that will be litigated and forecasts that the Eighth Amendment will be the star of the show in this Act of the play on Florida’s constitutional crises in capital punishment. 

Big spread in sentencing recommendations for Oath Keepers founder convicted of seditious conspiracy

As reported in this Washington Post piece, lawyers for "Stewart Rhodes urged a judge to sentence him to far less than the 25-year prison term sought by federal prosecutors for seditious conspiracy in the Jan. 6, 2021, Capitol attack — asking for a penalty of time served or roughly 16 months behind bars — citing his military service and his founding and leadership of the right-wing extremist group Oath Keepers." Here is more:

In a Monday morning court filing, the attorneys emphasized that Rhodes volunteered for the Army in June 1983, completed Airborne school and was honorably discharged after suffering a spinal fracture in a low-altitude night jump in 1986.  They emphasized his formation of the Oath Keepers in 2009, saying the group provided hurricane and other emergency relief, security in cities experiencing rioting, and protective details for VIPs during President Donald Trump’s rallies after the 2020 presidential election....

The defense filing came after a Friday evening memo by prosecutors asking a federal judge to sentence Rhodes to 25 years in prison and eight followers to at least 10 years behind bars, in the first punishments to be handed down to defendants convicted of seditious conspiracy in the Capitol riot.

Rhodes and the others face sentencing starting later this month. Rhodes was arrested in January 2022 and will have served roughly 16 months at that point....

Rhodes, a top deputy and four others were found guilty at trials in November and January of plotting to unleash political violence to prevent the Biden presidency, stashing a small arsenal of firearms at hotels in Northern Virginia before converging that afternoon at the East Capitol steps in military-style tactical gear.  Three other co-defendants were convicted of obstructing Congress as it met to confirm the results of the 2020 election, among other crimes. Both top offenses are punishable by up to 20 years in prison, but prosecutors asked the court to stack sentences for Rhodes, citing among other things an enhanced terrorism penalty for actions intended to intimidate or coerce the government.

Prosecutors called for “swift and severe” punishment for Rhodes, saying his group’s actions went far beyond the scope and magnitude of any other Jan. 6 defendants sentenced so far.  They said Rhodes exploited his public influence in the anti-government extremist movement and mobilized people for political violence after “spreading doubt about the presidential election and turning others against the government” because their preferred candidate did not win....

Mehta, Rhodes’s sentencing judge, has handed down the two longest punishments to Jan. 6 defendants so far, both for assaulting police: 14 years for Peter Schwartz of Kentucky, who attacked multiple officers and who has a long criminal history of 38 convictions, including multiple domestic and police assaults; and 10 years for Timothy Webster, a former New York City police officer who attacked a Capitol Police officer with a metal flagpole.

Rhodes’s attorneys said only those two men have been sentenced to more than eight years in Jan. 6 cases, attaching a 54-page government chart of sentences to a 16-page defense filing.  About 200 of roughly 450 people sentenced have received no jail time, and more than half of the roughly 250 people who have been sentenced to prison received terms of less than two months.

Of 110 people sentenced for felonies, about 76 who pleaded guilty have been sentenced to an average of 33 months, and about 34 who were convicted at trial have been sentenced to an average of 44 months in prison, according to a separate Washington Post analysis.

The defense's 70-page sentencing filing is available at this link; the government's 183-page sentencing filing is available at this link.

Should every state have a dedicated commission to receive complaints about prosecutors?

The question in the title of this post was my first reaction to the news of a commission just created in Georgia.  This AP piece, headlined "Georgia enacts law letting panel punish, oust prosecutors," provides these details:

Gov. Brian Kemp signed a bill into law Friday creating a new commission empowered to discipline and remove wayward prosecutors, saying it will curb “far-left prosecutors” who are “making our communities less safe.”

Kemp made the remarks at the Chatham County Sheriff's Office in Savannah, where he signed the measure establishing the Prosecuting Attorneys Qualifications Commission, which will launch July 1 and start accepting complaints Oct. 1....

The efforts continue anti-crime campaigns that Republicans ran nationwide last year, accusing Democrats of coddling criminals and improperly refusing to prosecute whole categories of crimes, including marijuana possession.

Georgia Democrats strenuously opposed the measure, saying the Republican legislative majority was seeking another way to impose its will on Democratic voters at the local level....

Crucially, the Georgia law mandates that a prosecutor must consider every case for which probable cause exists and can’t exclude categories of cases from prosecution. Experts have said that considering every case individually is unrealistic, because prosecutors turn down many more cases than they charge. However, it’s unclear if the new law will change prosecutors’ behavior or just lead them to avoid talking publicly about charging decisions.

The eight-member commission will include six current or former prosecutors and two other lawyers. It will oversee DAs and solicitors general — elected prosecutors who handle lower-level crimes in some counties....

The law was born from frustrations involving a white Republican prosecutor in suburban Atlanta who was indicted for bribery related to sexual harassment claims. He lingered in office until he pleaded guilty to unprofessional conduct and resigned in 2022.

Some Democrats were interested in similar measures for a time because of Jackie Johnson, a coastal Georgia DA who was charged with hindering the police investigation into the 2020 killing of Ahmaud Arbery. Democratic interest cooled after voters ousted Johnson.

The rules could also target prosecutors who declared before Roe v. Wade was overturned in 2022 that they wouldn't prosecute abortion-related offenses. Seven current Georgia DAs fit that description.

Though the AP piece leans into the political dynamics driving some debates over prosecutorial behaviors, this official press release from Gov Kemp notes that the new Georgia Commission can and will be policing local prosecutors on various fronts:

Governor Brian P. Kemp, accompanied by First Lady Marty Kemp, members of the General Assembly, district attorneys and solicitors-general, and other local and state leaders, signed Senate Bill 92 today, establishing the Prosecuting Attorneys Qualifications Commission (PAQC). The PAQC will serve as a valuable oversight mechanism for district attorneys and solicitors-general across Georgia, ensuring these officials fulfill their constitutional and statutory duties....

The bill establishes the following grounds for the removal or involuntary retirement of a district attorney or solicitor-general from office:

• Mental or physical incapacity that interferes with the performance of duties that is likely permanent;
• Willful misconduct in office;
• Willful and persistent failure to carry out statutory duties;
• Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
• Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the office into disrepute; or
• Knowingly authorizing or permitting an assistant district attorney or assistant solicitor-general to commit any of the aforementioned acts.

To parrot this press release, I sincerely think it would be a great idea to have a "valuable oversight mechanism for district attorneys" in every state (and for federal prosecutors, too).  I have often heard from persons who sincerely believe they have witnessed a prosecutor engage in "willful misconduct" or "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the office into disrepute"; so creating a central commission (comprised mostly of former and current prosecutors) to hear complaints about, and conduct any needed investigations of, the work of prosecutors makes a lot of sense to me. Of course, like many government entitles, if unduly politicized or problematically ideological, this commission could possibly do more harm than good.  But, given the general lack of transparency and accountability for prosecutorial actions and practices, I am inclined to be hopeful about this new PAQC.

"Evidence Rules for Decarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Erin Collins and available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Two observations about the operation of the criminal legal system are so widely accepted that they are seem undeniable: First, it is a system of pleas, not trials.  Second, the system is too punitive and must be reformed.  One could easily think, therefore, that the Rules of Evidence, which apply intentionally and explicitly only to the adjudicatory phase of criminal procedure, have nothing to do with the solution.  And legal scholarship focusing on decarceration largely reflects this assumption: while many have explored reforms that target front end system actors and processes that lead people into the system (e.g. police, prosecutors, broad criminal statutes), and back end reforms that that seek to lessen the toll of punitive policies (sentencing reform, alternatives to incarceration), markedly fewer have explored how what happens in the middle — adjudication — contributes to mass incarceration.

While this oversight makes sense, it is not justified because it is also equally undeniable that plea bargaining happens in the shadow of trial.  This Essay examines how the shadow of trial — specifically, the shadow cast by evidentiary rulings about the accused person’s past — contributes to the perpetuation of an expansive carceral state.  It identifies how evidence rules have been relaxed, tweaked, specialized, or unmoored from their foundational principles in ways that facilitate prosecution and conviction or essentially force plea deals — without regard for the truth, fairness, or justice of the outcome.  In other words, it identifies ways that evidence law undermines the Rules’ primary purpose, which is to advance fair proceedings “to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”

Longest sentence yet in Jan 6 case, 14+ years in federal prison, given to man with 38 priors

As reported in this Fox News piece, a "Kentucky man with a long criminal record was sentenced Friday to a record-setting 14 years in prison for attacking police officers with pepper spray and a chair as he stormed the U.S. Capitol with his wife." Here is more:

Peter Schwartz’s prison sentence is the longest so far among hundreds of Capitol riot cases.  The judge who sentenced Schwartz also handed down the previous longest sentence — 10 years — to a retired New York Police Department officer who assaulted a police officer outside the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021.  Prosecutors had recommended a prison sentence of 24 years and 6 months for Schwartz, a welder.

U.S. District Judge Amit Mehta sentenced Schwartz to 14 years and two months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release.  Mehta said Schwartz was a "soldier against democracy" who participated in "the kind of mayhem, chaos that had never been seen in the country's history."

"You are not a political prisoner," the judge told him. "You're not somebody who is standing up against injustice or fighting against an autocratic regime."

Schwartz briefly addressed the judge before learning his sentence, saying, "I do sincerely regret the damage that Jan. 6 has caused to so many people and their lives."  The judge said he didn't believe Schwartz's statement, noting his lack of remorse. "You took it upon yourself to try and injure multiple police officers that day," Mehta said.

Schwartz was armed with a wooden tire knocker when he and his then-wife, Shelly Stallings, joined other rioters in overwhelming a line of police officers on the Capitol’s Lower West Terrace, where he threw a folding chair at officers. "By throwing that chair, Schwartz directly contributed to the fall of the police line that enabled rioters to flood forward and take over the entire terrace," prosecutor Jocelyn Bond wrote in a court filing.

Schwartz, 49, also armed himself with a police-issued "super soaker" canister of pepper spray and sprayed it at retreating officers.  to a tunnel entrance, Schwartz coordinated with two other rioters, Markus Maly and Jeffrey Brown, to spray an orange liquid toward officers clashing with the mob.  "While the stream of liquid did not directly hit any officer, its effect was to heighten the danger to the officers in that tunnel," Bond wrote....

Stallings pleaded guilty last year to riot-related charges and was sentenced last month to two years of incarceration.

Schwartz was tried with co-defendants Maly and Brown.  In December, a jury convicted all three of assault charges and other felony offenses.  Mehta sentenced Brown last Friday to four years and six months in prison.  Maly is scheduled to be sentenced June 9.

Schwartz’s attorneys requested a prison sentence of four years and six months.  They said his actions on Jan. 6 were motivated by a "misunderstanding" about the 2020 presidential election.  Then-President Donald Trump and his allies spread baseless conspiracy theories that Democrats stole the election from the Republican incumbent....

Schwartz was on probation when he joined the Jan. 6 riot. His criminal record includes a "jaw-dropping" 38 prior convictions since 1991, "several of which involved assaulting or threatening officers or other authority figures," Bond wrote....

The 10-year prison sentence that Mehta handed down in September to retired NYPD officer Thomas Webster had remained the longest until Friday.  Webster had used a metal flagpole to assault an officer and then tackled the same officer as the mob advanced toward the Capitol.

US Supreme Court stays the execution of Richard Glossip

As reported in this AP article, the "Supreme Court on Friday blocked Oklahoma from executing death row inmate Richard Glossip for his role in a 1997 murder-for-hire after the state’s attorney general agreed Glossip’s life should be spared." Here is more:

Glossip had been scheduled to be put to death on May 18 despite statements by new Oklahoma Attorney General Gentner Drummond that Glossip did not receive a fair trial.  An Oklahoma appeals court subsequently upheld Glossip’s conviction and the state’s pardon and parole board deadlocked in a vote to grant him clemency.

The high court put the execution on hold indefinitely while it reviews the case.  Justice Neil Gorsuch took no part in the decision, presumably because he dealt with the case earlier as an appeals court judge.

“There is nothing more harrowing than the thought of executing a man who the state now admits has never received a fair trial,” Glossip attorney Don Knight said in a statement.  “Our hope is that the court will reverse the decision of the (Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals) and vacate Mr. Glossip’s conviction once and for all.”

Drummond, a Republican, said in a statement he was grateful for the high court’s decision. “I will continue working to ensure justice prevails in this important case,” he said.  In a rare move, Drummond, the state’s top prosecutor, supported a high-court reprieve for Glossip, telling the justices, “Glossip’s trial was unfair and unreliable.”

But Drummond also has said he does not believe Glossip is innocent of the murder-for-hire killing of Glossip’s former boss, Barry Van Treese, in 1997. Another man, Justin Sneed, admitted robbing and killing Van Treese after Glossip promised to pay him $10,000. Sneed received a life sentence in exchange for his testimony and was the key witness against Glossip....

Former Oklahoma County District Attorney David Prater has long said he believes Glossip persuaded Sneed to kill Van Treese. He said that while Sneed’s testimony was most compelling, there was plenty of evidence to corroborate it. “When police came to talk to Glossip about Van Treese’s whereabouts, he directed him away from the room he knew Van Treese was in,” Prater said Friday. “At any point, Glossip had the opportunity to tell the police that Sneed did this. He never did that. He even helped Sneed clean up everything.”

Prater said Sneed and Glossip also both had a large amount of cash that Prater said they stole from Van Treese’s car. “In light of Gentner Drummond’s position regarding the stay, I don’t feel like the Supreme Court had much of a choice,” Prater said. “But the truth will come out.”

Two separate independent investigations have revealed problems with the prosecution’s case. Drummond said Sneed lied on the stand about his psychiatric condition and his reason for taking the mood-stabilizing drug lithium, and that prosecutors knew Sneed was lying. Also, evidence was destroyed, Drummond said.

Some Republican state lawmakers who support the death penalty have joined the growing chorus of Glossip supporters who are seeking to overturn his conviction. “We’re just ecstatic,” state Rep. Kevin McDugle said in a brief telephone interview on Friday.

Glossip’s case has been to the Supreme Court before. He was given a reprieve in 2015, although the court later ruled 5-4 against him in a case involving the drugs used in lethal executions.  Glossip has been just hours away from being executed three separate times. His last scheduled execution, in September 2015, was halted just moments before he was to be led to the death chamber when prison officials realized they had received the wrong lethal drug. That mix-up helped prompt a nearly seven-year moratorium on the death penalty in Oklahoma.

A few prior recent relates posts:

• Oklahoma Gov grants 60-day execution stay for Richard Glossip while courts consider innocence claim 
• New Oklahoma Attorney General formally moves to set aside Richard Glossip's capital conviction
• Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, rejecting state AG's motion, refuses to set aside Richard Glossip's capital conviction

"Law and Order: The Timing of Mitigating Evidence Affects Punishment Decisions"

The title of this post is the title of this paper now available via SSR authored by Emily Conder, Christopher Brett Jaeger and Jonathan Lane. Here is its abstract:

When we hear about a transgression, we may consider whether the perpetrator’s individual circumstances make their transgression more understandable or excusable.  Mitigating circumstances may reduce the severity of punishment that is deemed appropriate, both intuitively and legally.  But importantly, in courts of public opinion and of law, mitigating information is typically presented only after information about a perpetrator’s transgression.  We explore whether this sequence influences the force of mitigating evidence.

Specifically, in two studies, we examined whether presenting evidence about a perpetrator’s background before or after evidence of their violation influenced how severely U.S. participants punished perpetrators.  In Study 1 (N=132), evidence about the perpetrator’s mitigating circumstances reduced punishment only when it was presented before evidence about the perpetrator’s violation.  Study 2 (N=316) additionally revealed this moderating effect of presentation order across a variety of premeditated and impulsive violations.  These findings are consistent with person-centered theories of punishment and with the Story Model of adjudication.

DOJ's Inspector General reports on "aging and deteriorating" federal prison facilities

As detailed in this official press release, "Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz [has] announced ... the release of a report evaluating the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) efforts to maintain and construct correctional institutions. The DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) also launched a web page with photos and videos documenting the condition of prison cells, cell blocks, and kitchen, dining, and other areas at five BOP institutions (FCI Terminal Island, USP Atlanta, FTC Oklahoma City, CI Taft, and MCC New York)."  Here is more:

As described in today’s report, the BOP’s institutions are aging and deteriorating: all 123 of the BOP’s institutions require maintenance, with a large and growing list of unfunded modernization and repair needs, and three of these institutions are in such critical stages of disrepair that they are fully or partially closed.  The DOJ OIG found that the BOP’s efforts to address these issues were negatively impacted by two major factors: a mismatch between available and needed funding, and the absence of a well-defined infrastructure strategy.

As of May 2022, the BOP’s estimated cost for needed, major repairs was approaching $2 billion. However, our audit found that the BOP’s budget requests have been far below its own estimates of resource needs: for example, BOP sought less than $200 million for its infrastructure needs from Congress in FY 2022, and Congress appropriated $59 million.  Consequently, the resources available to address BOP’s maintenance needs are limited, and in many cases, necessary repairs cannot be completed in a timely manner due to a lack of funding.  This results in increasingly costly maintenance and, in the most extreme circumstances, having to shutter institutions and relocate inmates due to unsafe conditions.

At the same time, we found that Congress has set aside over $1 billion for the BOP to construct two new institutions, but these funds remain largely unspent, the projects have been in the planning stages for over a decade, and the BOP’s requests each year that Congress cancel one of these projects and rescind the funds — made at the direction of the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget — have not been acted on.

Florida completes execution of murderer nearly 40 years after his (repeat) crime

As reported in this AP piece, a "Florida man was executed Wednesday for breaking into a woman’s home and stabbing her to death in 1986, a crime committed months after he was released from prison for a rape." Here are more details:

Darryl B. Barwick, 56, was pronounced dead at 6:14 p.m. Wednesday following a lethal injection at Florida State Prison, the office of Republican Gov. Ron DeSantis said. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the inmate’s final appeal for a stay of execution earlier in the day.

After being brought into the death camber, Barwick said, “I can’t explain why I did what I did. It’s time to apologize to the family ... I’m sorry.” He added that he state needs to show more compassion and kindness for people, criticizing Florida’s sentencing of teenagers to life in prison....

Barwick didn’t meet in person with family members in his final hours, but had spoken with them by phone in recent days, prison officials said ahead of the 6 p.m. execution time. Officials said no relatives of the victim had arranged to witness the execution....

Barwick had confessed to killing 24-year-old Rebecca Wendt in her Panama City apartment on March 31, 1986, after watching her sunbathing outside and following her back to her room. He said he intended to rob Wendt but then killed her as she resisted, stabbing her 37 times as she tried to fight him off....

He was convicted of first-degree murder, armed burglary, attempted sexual battery and armed robbery in November 1986, and sentenced to death two months later on the jury’s 9-3 recommendation. The Florida Supreme Court threw out that conviction in 1989 because of prosecutorial misconduct. Barwick was again convicted at his 1992 retrial, and that jury unanimously recommended death.

Barwick killed Wendt less than three months after he was released from prison for raping a 21-year-old woman at knifepoint, according to court records. In his confession for Wendt’s killing, Barwick said he stabbed her because he did not want to go back to prison.

DeSantis signed Barwick’s death warrant last month. It was the third execution conducted in Florida this year after a hiatus dating back to 2019. It also was the state’s 102nd execution since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976.

New "End the Trial Penalty Coalition" seeks to end "coercive elements of plea bargaining" and to restore right to a jury trial

Via email, I received notice of a new colelction of advocacy groups called the "End the Trial Penalty Coalition."  Here are excerpts from the email/press release from this new Coaltion (with links from the original):

Twenty-four criminal justice organizations, impacted people, think tanks, academics, activists, and reform leaders from across the ideological spectrum have united to end the trial penalty -- the substantial and coercive difference between the sentence in a plea offer prior to trial versus the much greater sentence a defendant often receives after trial.  Those who choose to go to trial and are convicted often face sentences that are, on average, three times the plea offer and sometimes measured in decades.

The coercive and punitive effects of the trial penalty are so pervasive that they have virtually eliminated our constitutional right to trial. In fact, over 97% of cases ending in a conviction never go to trial, leading to a range of issues reverberating through our legal system, including the waiver of numerous constitutional freedoms and rights, overcriminalization, loss of public oversight, and racial injustice.  The Coalition aims to restore the right to trial, helping right these wrongs to ensure a fair, rational, and humane criminal legal system.

Members of this new Coalition will work together to raise awareness of the adverse effects of a justice system without trials, advocate policy reform, and forge relationships with key policymakers.  The Coalition will also serve as a resource for people interested in participating in an impactful criminal legal reform movement.  The Coalition has published a comprehensive Policy Overview which includes policy ideas to combat coercive practices in the plea bargaining process, to improve data collection and transparency, and to foster post-trial reform and accountability measures.