Tuesday, November 13, 2018

Usual Justices make their usual death penalty points in statements accompanying Florida capital case cert denials

In this post last week, I noted that the Supreme Court had relisted a slew of older Florida death penalty cases in which a death sentence had been imposed using procedures that the Supreme Court in the 2016 Hurst decision said violated the Sixth Amendment's requirement that a jury rather than a judge must find all facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death.  This morning, via this new order list, the Supreme Court appears to have denied cert in all of these Florida cases, and three Justices with well-earned reputations for having a lot to say in capital cases all had something to say about this decision through statements in the case of Reynolds v. Florida.

Justice Breyer authored a four-page statement regarding the denial of cert that sets the tone starting this way:

This case, along with 83 others in which the Court has denied certiorari in recent weeks, asks us to decide whether the Florida Supreme Court erred in its application of this Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. ___ (2016).  In Hurst, this Court concluded that Florida’s death penalty scheme violated the Constitution because it required a judge rather than a jury to find the aggravating circumstances necessary to impose a death sentence.  The Florida Supreme Court now applies Hurst retroactively to capital defendants whose sentences became final after this Court’s earlier decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), which similarly held that the death penalty scheme of a different State, Arizona, violated the Constitution because it required a judge rather than a jury to find the aggravating circumstances necessary to impose a death sentence.  The Florida Supreme Court has declined, however, to apply Hurst retroactively to capital defendants whose sentences became final before Ring.  Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (2017).  As a result, capital defendants whose sentences became final before 2002 cannot prevail on a “Hurst-is-retroactive” claim.

Many of the Florida death penalty cases in which we have denied certiorari in recent weeks involve — directly or indirectly — three important issues regarding the death penalty as it is currently administered.

Folks who follow the Supreme Court's modern capital punishment discussions can probably guess what Justice Breyer considers the "three important issues" raised by these Florida cases. Similarly, SCOTUS followers likely can also imagine what Justice Thomas had to say when concurring in the denial of cert in Reynolds.  His opinion runs five pages and here are two key paragraphs:

JUSTICE BREYER worries that the jurors here “might not have made a ‘community-based judgment’ that a death sentence was ‘proper retribution’ had they known” of his concerns with the death penalty. Ante, at 4 (statement respecting denial of certiorari). In light of petitioner’s actions, I have no such worry, and I write separately to alleviate JUSTICE BREYER’s concerns....

JUSTICE BREYER’s final (and actual) concern is with the “‘death penalty itself.’” Ante, at 4. As I have elsewhere explained, “it is clear that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S 35, 94 (2008) (opinion concurring in judgment); see Glossip, supra, at ___–___, and n. 1 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 1–2, and n. 1). The only thing “cruel and unusual” in this case was petitioner’s brutal murder of three innocent victims.

Last but certainly not least, Justice Sotomayor needs seven pages to explain why she dissents from the denial of certiorari, and here opinion starts this way:

Today, this Court denies the petitions of seven capital defendants, each of whom was sentenced to death under a capital sentencing scheme that this Court has since declared unconstitutional.  The Florida Supreme Court has left the petitioners’ death sentences undisturbed, reasoning that any sentencing error in their cases was harmless.  Petitioners challenge the Florida Supreme Court’s analysis because it treats the fact of unanimous jury recommendations in their cases as highly significant, or legally dispositive, even though those juries were told repeatedly that their verdicts were merely advisory.  I have dissented before from this Court’s failure to intervene on this issue.  Petitioners’ constitutional claim is substantial and affects numerous capital defendants.  The consequence of error in these cases is too severe to leave petitioners’ challenges unanswered, and I therefore would grant the petitions.

November 13, 2018 in Blakely in the Supreme Court, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 12, 2018

"The Effects of Holistic Defense on Criminal Justice Outcomes"

The title of this post is the title of anew article which I learned about via this Penn Law press release.  Here is the start of the release, providing a link to the article:

A groundbreaking new study by researchers at RAND and the University of Pennsylvania Law School finds that by adopting an innovative holistic approach to defending poor clients in criminal cases, jurisdictions can significantly reduce incarceration and save taxpayer dollars, without harming public safety.

The study, “The Effects of Holistic Defense on Criminal Justice Outcomes,” to be published in the Harvard Law Review, examined over half a million cases in the Bronx over a 10-year period involving poor criminal defendants who received court-appointed lawyers.  The study was authored by James Anderson and Mary Buenaventura of RAND, and Paul Heaton, Academic Director of Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice at Penn Law.

Heaton and his co-authors compared holistic representation — wherein an interdisciplinary team that includes a lawyer working alongside other advocates such as a social worker, housing advocate, investigator, etc. addresses the wider needs of the client enmeshed in the criminal justice system — to the more traditional public defense model focused around criminal attorneys and criminal case advocacy.  They found that the holistic approach reduced the likelihood of a prison sentence by 16 percent, and actual prison sentence length by 24 percent.

Here is the article's abstract:

Debates over mass incarceration emphasize policing, bail, and sentencing reform, but give little attention to indigent defense.  This omission seems surprising, given that interactions with government-provided counsel critically shape the experience of the vast majority of criminal defendants.  This neglect in part reflects our lack of evidence-based knowledge regarding indigent defense, making it difficult to identify effective reforms.

One newer model gaining support is the holistic defense model, in which public defenders work in interdisciplinary teams to address both the immediate case and the underlying life circumstances — such as drug addiction, mental illness, or family or housing instability — that contribute to client contact with the criminal justice system.  This holistic model contrasts with the traditional public defense model which emphasizes criminal representation and courtroom advocacy. Proponents contend holistic defense improves case outcomes and reduces recidivism by better addressing clients’ underlying needs, while critics argue that diverting resources and attention from criminal advocacy weakens results.  Although widely embraced, there is no systematic evidence demonstrating the relative merits of the holistic approach.

This Article offers the first large-scale, rigorous evaluation of the impact of holistic representation on criminal justice outcomes.  In the Bronx, a holistic defense provider (the Bronx Defenders) and a traditional defender (the Legal Aid Society) operate side-by-side within the same court system, with case assignment determined quasi-randomly based on court shift timing.  Using administrative data covering over half a million cases and a quasi-experimental research design, we estimate the causal effect of holistic representation on case outcomes and future offending.  Holistic representation does not affect conviction rates, but it reduces the likelihood of a custodial sentence by 16% and expected sentence length by 24%.  Over the ten-year study period, holistic representation in the Bronx resulted in nearly 1.1 million fewer days of custodial punishment.

As of one year post-arraignment and beyond, holistic representation has neither a positive or adverse effect on criminal justice contacts.  While holistic representation does not dramatically reduce recidivism, as some proponents have claimed, strengthening indigent defense apparently offers considerable potential to reduce incarceration without harming public safety.  Indigent defense thus deserves a more prominent place in conversations about how to address mass incarceration, and future research should examine the effects of this promising model beyond the criminal justice system and in other jurisdictions.

November 12, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, November 09, 2018

Michelle Alexander frets about "The Newest Jim Crow"

Michelle Alexander has this notable new New York Times opinion piece headlined ""The Newest Jim Crow: Recent criminal justice reforms contain the seeds of a frightening system of 'e-carceration'." I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

Since 2010, when I published “The New Jim Crow” — which argued that a system of legal discrimination and segregation had been born again in this country because of the war on drugs and mass incarceration — there have been significant changes to drug policy, sentencing and re-entry, including “ban the box” initiatives aimed at eliminating barriers to employment for formerly incarcerated people.

This progress is unquestionably good news, but there are warning signs blinking brightly. Many of the current reform efforts contain the seeds of the next generation of racial and social control, a system of “e-carceration” that may prove more dangerous and more difficult to challenge than the one we hope to leave behind.

Bail reform is a case in point.  Thanks in part to new laws and policies — as well as actions like the mass bailout of inmates in New York City jails that’s underway — the unconscionable practice of cash bail is finally coming to an end. In August, California became the first state to decide to get rid of its cash bail system; last year, New Jersey virtually eliminated the use of money bonds.

But what’s taking the place of cash bail may prove even worse in the long run. In California, a presumption of detention will effectively replace eligibility for immediate release when the new law takes effect in October 2019.  And increasingly, computer algorithms are helping to determine who should be caged and who should be set “free.”  Freedom — even when it’s granted, it turns out — isn’t really free.

Under new policies in California, New Jersey, New York and beyond, “risk assessment” algorithms recommend to judges whether a person who’s been arrested should be released. These advanced mathematical models — or “weapons of math destruction” as data scientist Cathy O’Neil calls them — appear colorblind on the surface but they are based on factors that are not only highly correlated with race and class, but are also significantly influenced by pervasive bias in the criminal justice system.  As O’Neil explains, “It’s tempting to believe that computers will be neutral and objective, but algorithms are nothing more than opinions embedded in mathematics.”

Challenging these biased algorithms may be more difficult than challenging discrimination by the police, prosecutors and judges. Many algorithms are fiercely guarded corporate secrets.  Those that are transparent — you can actually read the code — lack a public audit so it’s impossible to know how much more often they fail for people of color.

Even if you’re lucky enough to be set “free” from a brick-and-mortar jail thanks to a computer algorithm, an expensive monitoring device likely will be shackled to your ankle — a GPS tracking device provided by a private company that may charge you around $300 per month, an involuntary leasing fee.  Your permitted zones of movement may make it difficult or impossible to get or keep a job, attend school, care for your kids or visit family members. You’re effectively sentenced to an open-air digital prison, one that may not extend beyond your house, your block or your neighborhood.  One false step (or one malfunction of the GPS tracking device) will bring cops to your front door, your workplace, or wherever they find you and snatch you right back to jail.

Who benefits from this?  Private corporations.  According to a report released last month by the Center for Media Justice, four large corporations — including the GEO Group, one of the largest private prison companies — have most of the private contracts to provide electronic monitoring for people on parole in some 30 states, giving them a combined annual revenue of more than $200 million just for e-monitoring.  Companies that earned millions on contracts to run or serve prisons have, in an era of prison restructuring, begun to shift their business model to add electronic surveillance and monitoring of the same population.  Even if old-fashioned prisons fade away, the profit margins of these companies will widen so long as growing numbers of people find themselves subject to perpetual criminalization, surveillance, monitoring and control....

Many reformers rightly point out that an ankle bracelet is preferable to a prison cell.  Yet I find it difficult to call this progress.  As I see it, digital prisons are to mass incarceration what Jim Crow was to slavery.

If you asked slaves if they would rather live with their families and raise their own children, albeit subject to “whites only signs,” legal discrimination and Jim Crow segregation, they’d almost certainly say: I’ll take Jim Crow.  By the same token, if you ask prisoners whether they’d rather live with their families and raise their children, albeit with nearly constant digital surveillance and monitoring, they’d almost certainly say: I’ll take the electronic monitor.  I would too.  But hopefully we can now see that Jim Crow was a less restrictive form of racial and social control, not a real alternative to racial caste systems.  Similarly, if the goal is to end mass incarceration and mass criminalization, digital prisons are not an answer. They’re just another way of posing the question.

Some insist that e-carceration is “a step in the right direction.”  But where are we going with this? A growing number of scholars and activists predict that “e-gentrification” is where we’re headed as entire communities become trapped in digital prisons that keep them locked out of neighborhoods where jobs and opportunity can be found.

If that scenario sounds far-fetched, keep in mind that mass incarceration itself was unimaginable just 40 years ago and that it was born partly out of well-intentioned reforms — chief among them mandatory sentencing laws that liberal proponents predicted would reduce racial disparities in sentencing.  While those laws may have looked good on paper, they were passed within a political climate that was overwhelmingly hostile and punitive toward poor people and people of color, resulting in a prison-building boom, an increase in racial and class disparities in sentencing, and a quintupling of the incarcerated population.

November 9, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, November 08, 2018

SCOTUS relisting packet of cases dealing with application of Hurst v. Florida to past cases

It has been (too?) many months since I have had occasion to talk about what I have long called the "post-Hurst hydra."  As regular readers may be pained to recall, I coined the term term "post-Hurst hydra" to describe the multi-headed, snake-like litigation that developed in various ways in various courts as state and federal judges tried to make sense of just what the Supreme Court's January 2016 decision in Hurst v. Florida, which declared Florida's death penalty procedures violative of the Sixth Amendment, must mean for past, present and future capital cases.  But the "post-Hurst hydra" is on my mind this morning because of the latest "Rewatch List" from John Elwood at SCOTUSblog, which includes these two paragraphs (with links from the original):

Once again, we have a group of seven relisted cases all presenting the same issue and all involving the same respondent.  Each of the seven involves a Florida man convicted of capital murder and sentenced to the death penalty.  The issue should be familiar to Relist Watch readers. In Hurst v. Florida, the Supreme Court held 8-1 in an opinion by Sotomayor that Florida’s capital-sentencing scheme — under which a jury rendered an “advisory sentence” but a judge had to independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors before entering a sentence of life or death — violated the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that a jury rather than a judge must find all facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death.  The Florida Supreme Court later held that Hurst error was harmless because juries had to unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements necessary to support imposition of the death penalty.  But since that time, challenger after challenger has argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s harmless-error conclusion cannot be squared with Caldwell v. Mississippi, which held that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a jury that has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death sentence rests with someone else. This issue has yielded multiple dissents from denial of cert, in Truehill v. Florida (Sotomayor dissenting, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer; Breyer also dissented separately), Middleton v. Florida (identical lineup), Guardado v. Florida (Sotomayor dissenting alone), and Kaczmar v. Florida (Sotomayor dissenting alone).

Now we have seven more such cases — including one that was the subject of a previous dissent: Guardado v. Florida17-9284Philmore v. Florida17-9556Tanzi v. Florida18-5160Reynolds v. Florida18-5181Franklin v. Florida18-5228Grim v. Florida18-5518, and Johnston v. Florida18-5793.  The arrival of seven cases at once presents Sotomayor with her best opportunity yet to make the case that the issue is a recurring and important one. The big question now is whether Justice Elena Kagan (or some other justice) is now ready to provide a fourth vote to grant — or whether Sotomayor will be filing yet another dissent from denial on this issue.  And to get into the weeds a bit, these cases provide yet another example of what a good job the Supreme Court and its staff do of tracking related cases on the court’s crowded docket.

November 8, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, November 06, 2018

Criminal justice reform ballot measures passing in Florida and Louisiana, but losing badly in Ohio

As noted in prior posts here and here, a whole lot of criminal justice matters were before voters this year. And though results are not yet official, it seems there are a few notable winners and one big loser:

Florida's Amendment 4, which would restore people’s voting rights after they finish their sentences (with a few exceptions), and Amendment 11, which enables the repeal or reform of criminal laws to be applied retroactively, both appear on pace to pass.

And Louisiana's Amendment 2, eliminating non-unanimous jury verdicts in felony trials, also looks to pass.

But Ohio's Issue 1, which sought to reduce all drug possession offenses to misdemeanors and enhance sentence reductions for prisoners participating in rehabilitative programs, has been soundly defeated.

November 6, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Drug Offense Sentencing, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Mandatory minimum drives US District Judge to countenance arguments for jury nullification in federal child porn case

Over at Reason, J.D. Tuccille has this remarkable report about a remarkable federal prosecution in Connecticut under the headline "Federal Judge Advocates Jury Nullification After Being Shocked by Overzealous Child Pornography Prosecution."  Based on the description that follow under the headline, I am not entirely sure it is quite right to say the judge is advocating for nullification. But readers should click through and here is a piece of the story:

"This is a shocking case. This is a case that calls for jury nullification."

Many have had similar reactions when confronting cases involving authorities running roughshod over people with bad laws, punitive sentences, and ill-considered prosecutions. But this time, the person invoking jury nullification was a federal judge — District Judge Stefan R. Underhill of the District of Connecticut — and he spoke in court about a case over which he presided.

The prosecution that shocked Underhill involves Yehudi Manzano, a 30-something man charged with producing and transporting child pornography after saving, and then deleting, a video of his teenage sex partner to and from his own phone and its associated Google cloud account. "The only people who ever saw it were the guy who made it, the girl who was in it, and the federal agents," Norman Pattis, Manzano's attorney, told me.

But that, prosecutors say in the indictment, was enough for the federal government to proceed with charges under the assumption that Manzano acted "knowing and having reason to know that: such visual depiction would be transported and transmitted using any means and facility of interstate and foreign commerce."  And that's important, because the mandatory minimum sentence under federal law for recording video of sex with an underage partner is 15 years.

That draconian sentence — independent of what was in store in the entirely separate state trial for sex with a minor — was too much for Judge Underhill.  "I am absolutely stunned that this case, with a 15-year mandatory minimum, has been brought by the government," he said in court.  "I am going to be allowed no discretion at sentencing to consider the seriousness of this conduct, and it is extremely unfortunate that the power of the government has been used in this way, to what end I'm not sure."

Judge Underhill acknowledged that he's not allowed to encourage jury nullification, but "if evidence comes in about the length of the sentence, or if Mr. Pattis chooses to argue, I do not feel I can preclude that.  I don't feel I'm required to preclude that.  And I think justice requires that I permit that."...

"Juries exist for a reason," Pattis argued in court.  "They stand between the government and the accused, and they provide the accused with an opportunity to hold the government to its burden of proof.  And in certain trials in our history, juries have done more than that.  They've said the law is wrong, and we, the people, say it's wrong."

In response to that, Neeraj N. Patel bluntly told the court on behalf of the U.S. Attorney's office, "you should take steps to prevent jury nullification and not inform the jury of the sentencing consequences."  Normally, that's where the matter would have remained.  Judges don't generally want jurors told they can pull the plug on a prosecution because they don't like the law or the possible sentence.  They're generally not permitted to inform juries about nullification, and they're discouraged from informing juries about the consequences in store for convicted defendants.

However, that doesn't mean judges must ban all discussion of jury nullification and sentencing from trials. And occasionally you run across one who is horrified by what prosecutors have in mind. That's why Pattis, who passionately believes in the right to nullification, keeps arguing for a principle that generally gets shot down in court. And last week, he found a judge sympathetic with his arguments.

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Connecticut declined to comment on this case, but did provide me with a copy of the emergency motion it filed seeking a stay in the trial. Prosecutors want time to get a higher court to prevent Judge Underhill from allowing Manzano's defense counsel to inform jurors of the potential sentence and argue for jury nullification.

I have long thought that juries should be informed of the basic sentencing consequences that go with guilty verdict (and I am also generally a fan of jury sentencing). I also think informing juries of sentencing consequences might reasonably be viewed as a requirement of the Sixth Amendment and the Apprendi line of cases.

And, speaking of provisions of the Constitution, it seems to me that this case, if there were a conviction, calls for serious consideration of the Eighth Amendment's limits on grossly disproportionate sentences. If the full offense here is just taking (and then deleting) a video of a teenager having consensual sex, I have a very difficult time seeing how one would not conclude, in the word of Harmelin v. Michigan, that "a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality."

November 6, 2018 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Monday, November 05, 2018

"Fictional Pleas"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now available via SSRN authored by Thea Johnson.  Here is its abstract:

A fictional plea is one in which the defendant pleads guilty to a crime he has not committed with the knowledge of the defense attorney, prosecutor and judge.  With fictional pleas, the plea of conviction is totally detached from the original factual allegations against the defendant.  As criminal justice actors become increasingly troubled by the impact of collateral consequences on defendants, the fictional plea serves as an appealing response to this concern.  It allows the parties to achieve parallel aims: the prosecutor holds the defendant accountable in the criminal system, while the defendant avoids devastating non-criminal consequences.  In this context, the fictional plea is an offshoot of the “creative plea bargaining” encouraged by Justice Stevens in Padilla v. Kentucky.  Indeed, where there is no creative option based on the underlying facts of the allegation, the attorneys must turn to fiction.

The first part of this Article is descriptive, exploring how and why actors in the criminal justice system — including defendants, prosecutors and judges — use fictional plea for the purposes of avoiding collateral consequences.  This Article proposes that in any individual case, a fictional plea may embody a fair and just result — the ability of the defendant to escape severe collateral consequences and a prosecutor to negotiate a plea with empathy.

But this Article is also an examination of how this seemingly empathetic practice is made possible by the nature of the modern adversarial process — namely, that the criminal system has continually traded away accuracy in exchange for efficiency via the plea bargain process.  In this sense, fictional pleas serve as a case study in criminal justice problem solving.  Faced with the moral quandary of mandatory collateral consequences, the system adjusts by discarding truth and focusing solely on resolution.  The fictional plea lays bare the soul of an institution where everything has become a bargaining chip: not merely collateral consequences, but truth itself.  Rather than a grounding principle, truth is nothing more than another factor to negotiate around.

November 5, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, November 02, 2018

SCOTUS grants cert on another supervised release issue (and a Batson issue in a capital case)

The Supreme Court last week, as noted here, granted cert in United States v. Haymond, No. 17-1672, an interesting case from the Tenth Circuit in which the defendant prevailed on the claim that the procedures used to sentence him following his supervised release violation was unconstitutional.  Today, as reflected in this order, the Court granted cert on another issue related to supervised release through a grant in Mont v. United States, No. 17-8995.  The petitioner's cert petition posed this "Question Presented":

Whether a statute directed to the administration of imprisoned individuals serves as authority to alter or suspend the running of a criminal sentence of supervised release, when such “tolling” is without judicial action, and requires the term “imprisonment” as used in the administrative statute, to include pretrial detention prior to an adjudication of guilt. Is a district court required to exercise its jurisdiction in order to suspend the running of a supervised release sentence as directed under 18 U.S.C. §3583(i) prior to expiration of the term of supervised release, when a supervised releasee is in pretrial detention, or does 18 U.S.C. §3624(e) toll the running of supervised release while in pretrial detention?

Seeking (unsuccessfully) to avoid a cert grant, the government's brief in opposition to cert framed the issue of the case this way:

Whether a period of supervised release for one offense is tolled under 18 U.S.C. 3624(e) during a period of pretrial confinement that upon conviction is credited toward a defendant’s term of imprisonment for another offense.

In addition to some civil grants, the Court also granted cert on a capital case, Flowers v. Mississippi, No. 17-9572, but limited the grant in this way:

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to the following question: Whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), in this case.

November 2, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

"The Biased Algorithm: Evidence of Disparate Impact on Hispanics"

The title of this post is the title of this new article available via SSRN authored by Melissa Hamilton.  Here is its abstract:

Algorithmic risk assessment holds the promise of reducing mass incarceration while remaining conscious of public safety.  Yet presumptions of transparent and fair algorithms may be unwarranted. Critics warn that algorithmic risk assessment may exacerbate inequalities in the criminal justice system’s treatment of minorities.  Further, calls for third party auditing contend that studies may reveal disparities in how risk assessment tools classify minorities. A recent audit found a popular risk tool overpredicted for Blacks.

An equally important minority group deserving of study is Hispanics.  The study reported herein examines the risk outcomes of a widely used algorithmic risk tool using a large dataset with a two-year followup period. Results reveal cumulative evidence of (a) differential validity and prediction between Hispanics and non-Hispanics and (b) algorithmic unfairness and disparate impact in overestimating the general and violent recidivism of Hispanics. 

November 2, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 31, 2018

Guest post series on Chicago "stash-house sting" litigation: Part 3 on "A Path for Future Litigation"

6a00d83451574769e2022ad3762ba2200c-320wiIn this prior post, I explained that Alison Siegler, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the University of Chicago Law School's Federal Criminal Justice Clinic (FCJC), sent me an extraordinary update on the extraordinary litigation her clinic has done in response to so-called "stash house stings" in which federal agents lure defendants into seeking to rob a (non-existent) drug stash-house.  (In this post last year, I highlighted this lengthy Chicago Tribune article, headlined "ATF sting operation accused of using racial bias in finding targets, with majority being minorities," providing an overview on this topic.)  As explained in the prior post, Alison's update is so detailed and interesting, I have divided it into three posts to cover all she has to report.  The first post covered "Sentencing Victories," the second covered "Legal Victories" and this final one set out "A Path for Future Litigation":

A Path for Future Litigation

The new legal standards forged by these three courts of appeals [discussed in this prior post] make it markedly easier for criminal defendants to obtain discovery in support of racially selective law enforcement claims, which in turn makes it possible for defendants to win motions to dismiss on the merits.

The lower discovery standard also supports a lower merits standard for motions to dismiss for racially selective law enforcement than the standard set in Armstrong.  Under Armstrong, a defendant must provide “clear evidence” of discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent to prevail on a selective prosecution claim on the merits.  Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.  As Sellers notes, the Supreme Court explicitly rested that merits standard on “the presumption that prosecutors ‘properly discharged their official duties.’” Sellers, 2018 WL 4956959 at *6 (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464).  Courts have made clear that such a presumption simply does not apply in the selective law enforcement context.  See, e.g., Davis, 793 F.3d at 721; Washington, 869 F.3d at 220–21; Sellers, 2018 WL 4956959 at *6.  Accordingly, there is no basis for applying the “clear evidence” standard to a motion to dismiss for selective law enforcement.  Instead, courts should apply the ordinary preponderance of the evidence standard.

In our Motions to Dismiss, the FCJC asked the district court judges to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a clear evidence standard.  See, e.g., Defendants’ Amended Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Racially Selective Law Enforcement at 2­–4, United States v. Brown, 12-CR-632 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017) (Dkt. No. 630).  Although the only judge to issue a merits ruling rejected our proposed lower standard, see Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 995–97, Sellers supports the FCJC’s position that the standard for obtaining dismissal based on a selective enforcement claim must be less onerous than the merits standard for a selective prosecution claim.

Lawyers in other jurisdictions can use the litigation and precedents discussed above and in Parts 1 and 2 of this guest post series to fight race discrimination by law enforcement in their own cases.  Here are a few ideas:

  • Hire experts and gather data about racial disparities created by law enforcement in fake stash house robbery cases, gun cases, and others.
  • Litigate motions to obtain discovery regarding selective law enforcement in stash house cases and others, and ask district court judges to apply the lower evidentiary standard set by the Seventh, Third, and Ninth Circuits.
    • Appeal denials of selective enforcement discovery motions and advocate for other courts of appeals to adopt the lower discovery standard.
  • Litigate motions to dismiss for selective law enforcement in stash house cases and others, and ask district court judges to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a clear evidence standard.
    • Appeal denials of such motions to dismiss and advocate for other courts of appeals to adopt a preponderance of the evidence standard on the merits.
  • Use the plea agreements in the Chicago cases to advocate to U.S. Attorney’s Offices to dismiss mandatory minimum charges in fake stash house robbery cases.
  • Use the example of the Chicago U.S. Attorney’s Office to convince other USAOs to cease bringing fake stash house robbery cases altogether.
  • Use the time served sentences imposed in the Chicago cases to advocate for lower sentences in stash house cases elsewhere. Sentencing memoranda prepared by the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic in several of the Chicago cases can be found at these links:

Prior related posts:

October 31, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Notable federal sentencing argument that "nature and circumstances of the offense" includes "rhetorical China shop bull who is now our president"

C487660a9f953e1a74a1e5c649ef3640--gloveA helpful reader made sure I did not miss this HuffPost piece concerning a notable federal sentencing filing in a high-profile federal case.  The full headline of the piece sets forth the basics: "Trump Fan Convicted In Anti-Muslim Terror Plot Asks Judge To Consider Trump’s Rhetoric: Patrick Stein’s attorneys also said he learned about the Quran 'from the internet and conservative talk-show hosts such as Sean Hannity and Michael Savage'."  Here are more details from this article (which also include a link to the full filing):

Attorneys for a President Donald Trump supporter who was convicted in a domestic terrorism plot aimed at slaughtering Muslim refugees asked a federal judge to factor in the “backdrop” of Trump’s campaign rhetoric when deciding their client’s sentence.

Patrick Stein was one of three right-wing militiamen found guilty in April of a conspiracy to kill Muslim refugees living in rural Kansas. Ahead of the 2016 election, Stein and two others plotted with an FBI informant and an undercover agent to bomb an apartment complex that housed Muslims in Garden City. Stein went by the handle “Orkin Man” and referred to Muslims as “cockroaches” he wanted exterminated.

His sentence was expected to be announced Friday but has been delayed until Nov. 19.

At trial, defense attorneys referred to the defendants as “knuckleheads” who were engaged in “locker room talk,” and Stein’s attorney argued his client was a victim of a “chaos news” environment that had him thinking a civil war was coming. A jury convicted Stein and his co-defendants, Curtis Allen and Gavin Wright, on weapons of mass destruction and conspiracy against civil rights charges.... The government said it is seeking life sentences for all three defendants.

Stein’s attorneys, James Pratt and Michael Shultz, argued Monday in a sentencing memo that sending Stein to prison for life was unwarranted and that a sentence of 15 years would be appropriate. They said the judge should factor in the “backdrop to this case” when crafting an appropriate sentence.

“2016 was ‘lit.’ The court cannot ignore the circumstances of one of the most rhetorically mold-breaking, violent, awful, hateful and contentious presidential elections in modern history, driven in large measure by the rhetorical China shop bull who is now our president,” they wrote.

“Trump’s brand of rough-and-tumble verbal pummeling heightened the rhetorical stakes for people of all political persuasions,” they added. “A personal normally at a 3 on a scale of political talk might have found themselves at a 7 during the election. A person, like Patrick, who would often be at a 7 during a normal day, might ‘go to 11.’ See SPINAL TAP.  That climate should be taken into account when evaluating the rhetoric that formed the basis of the government’s case.”

Stein’s attorneys, who called their client an “early and avid” Trump supporter, said it was important to keep in mind that “almost no one thought Trump was going to win” when evaluating the likelihood of an attack. The plot was supposed to take place after the election, as the group didn’t want their attack to boost Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign. Stein, in a message to an undercover agent, wrote that if they attacked ahead of the election it would “give a lot of ammunition to the Hillary supporters” and said that Clinton could never be allowed to be president.

“Trump’s win changed everything, and it is reasonable to speculate that it would have changed things among the defendants as well,” the attorneys wrote. “The urgency for action would be gone. The feeling of a losing battle would be gone. The conspiracies, in part, would be disproven as the transition from Obama to Trump took place. It is logical to conclude that the discussed attack would never have happened in the world that existed post-Trump.”

Stein’s attorneys said their client got caught up in the anti-Muslim information he was devouring online. His knowledge of the Quran, his attorneys wrote, “came directly from the internet and conservative talk-show hosts such as Sean Hannity and Michael Savage. Patrick himself had never read the Quran, nor had he participated in a comparative study of any religion.”

Stein, his attorneys wrote, was “the perfect, vulnerable target” for the FBI, and had relapsed into alcoholism and “had used methamphetamine regularly,” including after he met FBI informant Dan Day. They said that Stein’s crimes “demonstrated an extreme level of hatred and fear, but they also demonstrated an utter lack of sophistication.”

Any sentencing document that effectively cites Spinal Tap garners my appreciation, and it obviously deserves to be honored for being willing to take its arguments "one louder."

October 31, 2018 in Booker in district courts, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

I am a big fan of clemency and democracy, but....

I am still not sure I can get behind the proposal discussed in this article under the headline "Vermont Candidate Promises Weekly 'Governor's Pardon TV Show'."  Here are the details:

A Vermont gubernatorial candidate has proposed a nationally televised show in which a booing or cheering crowd would decide the fate of state prisoners.

Independent candidate Cris Ericson, a marijuana advocate who regularly runs for statewide office, outlined her vision in a commentary for Vermont PBS.  “If you elect me, I will host a governor’s pardon TV show every Saturday night and pardon a few of the people who violate the new, unconstitutional anti-gun laws, and some of the nonviolent offenders of other laws, to save Vermonters money,” Ericson said in the commentary.  She was referring, presumably, to new restrictions on gun ownership signed into law in April by her Republican opponent, Gov. Phil Scott.

Ericson said the show would be hosted from the auditorium in Montpelier's Pavilion State Office Building, a few floors below the governor’s office.  “We will have a full audience in the auditorium … and invite 100 Vermonters each week to boo or cheer,” she said. “We will invite family and friends of the prisoners to speak on their behalf.  Then the audience will vote on whether I should grant a pardon as governor with the legal authority to grant pardons.”

Ericson said the state could even generate revenue from the idea, by selling the show and investing the profits in the General Fund.

Though she doesn’t reference the film, the scene Ericson describes bears a striking resemblance to the fictional depiction of America’s justice system in the movie Idiocracy....

A recent poll by Vermont Public Radio and Vermont PBS showed that Ericson had support from about 1 percent of Vermont voters.

October 31, 2018 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 30, 2018

Plea waivers and ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to appeal come to SCOTUS in Garza v. Idaho

The Supreme Court will hear argument today in Garza v. Idaho, which presents this criminal procedure question about the application of ineffective assistance of counsel: "Whether the 'presumption of prejudice' recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega applies when a criminal defendant instructs his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal but trial counsel decides not to do so because the defendant’s plea agreement included an appeal waiver."  Over at SCOTUSblog, Even Lee has this extended preview under the heading "Can a criminal defense lawyer refuse to file an appeal from a guilty plea because of an appeal waiver?" and here is how it starts and a bit of its noting of some broader implications:

The last few decades have seen a sharp rise in the number of plea bargains.  The Supreme Court itself has estimated that 97 percent of federal prosecutions and 94 percent of state prosecutions end in plea bargains.  This increase in negotiated guilty pleas has accelerated a seeming anomaly — appeals from guilty pleas.  In turn, prosecutors now commonly insist on the inclusion of appeal waivers in plea agreements.

This chain of developments, roughly speaking, has led the U.S. Supreme Court to Garza v. Idaho, which it will hear on October 30.  When a defendant’s trial lawyer fails to file an appeal as the client has instructed on the ground that the plea agreement included an appeal waiver, must the defendant demonstrate “prejudice” in order to make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?  Since the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, prejudice has been presumed when a lawyer has failed to file an appeal as directed by the client.  But Flores-Ortega, now almost two decades old, did not involve an appeal waiver.  Garza gives the court an opportunity to address this situation....

The big policy question that underlies this case is to what degree the courts will enforce appeal waivers. A pronouncement in favor of the broad, if not absolute, enforceability of such waivers would promote the smooth functioning of plea bargaining as the principal method of keeping criminal caseloads under control. On the other hand, every Supreme Court decision allowing a defendant to appeal despite an apparent waiver throws an element of doubt into the plea bargaining “market,” as it were. Prosecutors aren’t sure exactly what they are getting in exchange for lighter sentences.

Not everybody wants the plea-bargaining market to function smoothly, though.  In its amicus brief, the libertarian Cato Institute warns that the mushrooming institution of plea bargaining threatens defendants’ effective rights to trial under the Sixth Amendment.  It argues that allowing attorneys to ignore client instructions to appeal undermines client autonomy as enshrined in the criminal procedure portions of the Bill of Rights.

October 30, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, October 28, 2018

Guest post series on Chicago "stash-house sting" litigation: Part 2 on "Legal Victories"

6a00d83451574769e201b7c9134b4d970b-320wiIn this prior post, I explained that Alison Siegler, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the University of Chicago Law School's Federal Criminal Justice Clinic, sent me an extraordinary update on the extraordinary litigation her clinic has done in response to so-called "stash house stings" in which federal agents lure defendants into seeking to rob a (non-existent) drug stash-house.  (In this post last year, I highlighted this lengthy Chicago Tribune article, headlined "ATF sting operation accused of using racial bias in finding targets, with majority being minorities," providing an overview on this topic.)  As explained in the prior post, Alison's update is so detailed and interesting, I have divided into three posts all she has to report.  The first post covered "Sentencing Victories," and this one covers "Legal Victories":

Legal Victories

The FCJC’s stash house litigation has also changed the law in a way that makes racially selective enforcement challenges easier to litigate going forward, which in turn will result in better outcomes and lower sentences for clients around the country.  Last week, the Ninth Circuit built on the framework created in a stash house case litigated by the FCJC and became the third federal court of appeals to institute a lower standard for defendants seeking discovery regarding racially selective law enforcement.

In United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015), a stash house case that was litigated and argued by the FCJC on appeal, the en banc Seventh Circuit became the first court of appeals in the country to relax the legal standard for defendants seeking discovery to support a race discrimination claim against law enforcement officers.  Davis eroded the onerous standard for obtaining discovery regarding racially discriminatory practices set by the Supreme Court in United States v. Armstrong, 527 U.S. 456 (1996).  Davis went to great lengths to distinguish racially selective law enforcement claims from the racially selective prosecution claim in Armstrong, holding, “[T]he sorts of considerations that led to the outcome in Armstrong do not apply to a contention that agents of the FBI or ATF engaged in racial discrimination when selecting targets for sting operations.” Davis, 793 F.3d at 721.  Davis represented a sea change in the law — for the previous 20 years, courts had routinely denied the claims of defendants seeking discovery in support of selective prosecution and selective law enforcement claims alike.

Last year, the Third Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in drawing a distinction between the two types of claims.  See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 216 (3d Cir. 2017). But the Third Circuit took this distinction even further, definitively eliminating two requirements that had made it virtually impossible for defendants to obtain discovery in the twenty years since Armstrong.  Specifically, Washington jettisoned both (1) the requirement under the discriminatory effect prong that defendants provide some evidence that “similarly situated persons of a different race or equal protection classification were not arrested or investigated by law enforcement,” and (2) the requirement that defendants “provide ‘some evidence’ of discriminatory intent. Id. at 221.  The Third Circuit’s elimination of these onerous standards represented an enormous development in the law of discovery for selective enforcement cases.

In United States v. Sellers, 2018 WL 4956959 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2018), the Ninth Circuit built on the framework created in Davis and extended in Washington.  Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit joined the Third Circuit’s holdings without emphasizing or even mentioning that those holdings had dramatically lowered the legal standard.  First, the Ninth Circuit joined the Third in eliminating the biggest barrier to proving the first prong — discriminatory effect — by holding that a defendant could obtain discovery in support of a selective enforcement claim without providing “evidence that similarly-situated individuals of a different race were not investigated or arrested.” Id. at *6.  Second, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant need not present evidence of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent to obtain discovery, but may simply present “some evidence” supporting one prong or the other. Id.  Sellers thus significantly expanded district court discretion to grant discovery.  Judge Nguyen’s concurrence went still further, explaining that evidence that law enforcement was targeting neighborhoods of color is itself proof of discriminatory effect. Id. at *11 (Nguyen, J., concurring).

Prior related post:

October 28, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, October 27, 2018

Following the Charleston script, will federal authorities take the lead in capital prosecution of anti-Semitic mass murderer Robert Bowers?

Shortly after Dylann Roof expressed horrid hatred by slaughtering nine people at house of worship in Charleston in June 2015, I wondered in this post whether the state or feds should be in charge of capitally prosecuting a crime that reflected what Nikki Haley then called the "worst hate that [she has] seen — and that the country has seen — in a long time."  Though it took federal authorities nearly a year to decide to move forward with a capital prosecution in May 2016, not too long thereafter a federal jury returned a death sentence in January 2017.

Sadly, if measured in terms of numbers killed, Dylann Roof's crime has now been passed repeatedly. Around this time just one year ago, Devin Kelley murdered 26 worshipers at church in Texas before being killed. And now, as this Fox News report details, another gunman filled with hate "opened fire in a Pittsburgh synagogue on Saturday morning, killing 11 people and injuring six others, including four police officers, before being taken into custody."  Here is more:

Multiple law enforcement officials identified the suspect in the shooting as Robert Bowers, 48.

Police Chief Scott Schubert said that two police officers were hit during initial contact with the shooter and that two SWAT team members were also struck “during an engagement inside the building.” He confirmed that all four law enforcement officials are in stable condition....

As officials searched for a motive for the brazen attack, which took place on Shabbat, the Jewish Sabbath, distubing details emerged.  Earlier, Hissrich said the episode fell under the category of a hate crime, and would receive a federal investigation.

Indeed, the gunman is said to have shouted that "all Jews must die" as he sprayed bullets indiscriminantly, according to KDKA-TV.  Josh Shapiro, the attorney general of Pennsylvania, said the "shooter claimed innocent lives" at a baby naming ceremony on Shabbat, what is trqaditionally the busiest of days for synagogues.

With other media reporting that Robert Bowers had a social media presence filled with anti-Semitic comments, this horrible case strike me as remarkably parallel to the Charleston church shooting in terms of the offense and the offenders (though the ages of the offenders are distinct). Especially with the current Trump Administration claiming to be even more supportive of the death penalty than the past Obama Administration, I would expect to see the federal capital prosecution script to be followed here as it was in the Roof case. And having the feds take the lead may make even more sense because the death penalty in Pennsylvania, though on the books, has been moribund for decades.

UPDATE: Not long after I published this post, I saw this new statement from Attorney General Jeff Sessions, which included these points:

These alleged crimes are reprehensible and utterly repugnant to the values of this nation. Accordingly, the Department of Justice will file hate crimes and other criminal charges against the defendant, including charges that could lead to the death penalty....

The Department of Justice will continue to support our state and local partners and we will continue to bring the full force of the law against anyone who would violate the civil rights of the American people.

October 27, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Friday, October 26, 2018

Attorney General Sessions indicates pipe bomb suspect Cesar Sayoc charged with five federal crimes and facing "only" 48 years in prison

Deal enough marijuana, as the Life for Pot website highlights, and you can get sent federal prison for life.  But, according to this statement by Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the fellow arrested for sending pipe bombs to a dozen prominent politicians and others is, at least for now, only facing five criminal charges and a maximum sentencing exposure of 48 years.  Here are excerpts from the AG's comments today:

Over the past week, more than a dozen suspicious packages have been sent through the United States Postal Service to a media outlet, a Hollywood actor, and at least seven high-ranking current and former political leaders in the Democratic Party.

This is utterly unacceptable. Political violence — or the threat of violence — is antithetical to our vigorous system of self-government. It is a threat to that respect for law and process that allows our people to accept legislation, elections, and court rulings with which we do not agree.

This is the central feature of our system of government: you advocate for your beliefs enthusiastically but we peaceably and lawfully comply with the results. Please know that from the beginning this investigative team has made this matter a top priority, focusing their great talents and expertise on neutralizing this threat. They have moved swiftly and professionally, using extraordinary technical expertise, to apprehend the one alleged responsible.  This is a demonstration of the skill, the capability, and determination of our American law enforcement.

So I am pleased to participate in this announcement that a suspect is in the custody of the FBI.  I want to remind everyone that the defendant in this case — as in every case — is innocent until proven guilty.

He has been charged today with five federal crimes, including interstate transportation of an explosive, illegal mailing of explosives, threats against former presidents and certain other persons, threatening interstate communications, and assaulting current and former federal officers.

For these charges, the defendant faces up to 48* years in prison. [*An earlier version of these remarks incorrectly stated 58 years.]

These charges may change or expand as the investigation continues.

This is a law-and-order administration.  We will not tolerate such lawlessness, and especially not political violence....

I want to reiterate that the defendant in this case is innocent until proven guilty. But let this be a lesson to anyone — regardless of their political beliefs — that we will bring the full force of law against anyone who attempts to use threats, intimidation, and outright violence to further any agenda.

We will find you.  We will prosecute you to the fullest extent of the law.

Regular readers of this blog should know I am much more troubled by people getting sentenced to "life for pot" than I am by pipe bomb suspect Cesar Sayoc facing "only 48" years in federal prison. Assuming the feds have the right guy, I would predict he ends up facing a lot more charges and that he ends up pleading guilty in the hopes of reducing his sentencing exposure. But what the feds might still charge and ultimately accept in any deal will be interesting to watch.

October 26, 2018 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (14)

Supreme Court grants cert on Haymond from Tenth Circuit to address when Apprendi and Alleyne meet suprevised release!!

I am excited to report that the Supreme Court this afternoon, via this order list, added an interesting sentencing case to its docket by granting cert in United States v. Haymond, 17-1672, a case from the Tenth Circuit in which the defendant prevailed on the claim that the procedures used to sentence him following his supervised release violation was unconstitutional.  The Tenth Circuit opinion below in Haymond is available at this link, and the federal government's cert petition posed this "Question Presented":

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding “unconstitutional and unenforceable” the portions of 18 U.S.C. 3583(k) that required the district court to revoke respondent’s ten-year term of supervised release, and to impose five years of reimprisonment, following its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent violated the conditions of his release by knowingly possessing child pornography. 

Seeking (unsuccessfully) to avoid a cert grant, the defendant's brief in opposition to cert framed the issue of the case this way: 

Following his conviction for possession of child pornography, a Class C felony that carried a statutory sentencing range of zero to ten years, a district court judge in a revocation hearing specifically found by only a preponderance of the evidence that Andre Haymond had violated the terms of his supervised release by committing a “second sex offense” as set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3583(k).  The statute required the district court to impose a sentence of not less than five years up to life in prison for commission of the new crime, rather than the zero to two-year statutory range ordinarily applicable for revocation in Class C felony cases.  Did the enhanced sentencing range carrying a mandatory minimum sentence in the revocation proceeding violate the Court’s longstanding jurisprudence guaranteeing a defendant charged with a serious criminal offense to a right to a jury trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

Given that there are now only two members of the Supreme Court who are generally hostile to Apprendi rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment (Justices Alito and Breyer), I do not think it is a given that this grant of cert means that the Justices are eager to reverse the ruling below. But we really do not know just how far any of the other Justices, and especially the new guys Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, are willing to take the Fifth and Sixth Amendment in the sentencing universe, and so I am disinclined to make any predictions on any votes at this point (save for expected Justice Alito to be his usual vote against a criminal defendant).

October 26, 2018 in Blakely in the Supreme Court, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (6)

Guest post series on Chicago "stash-house sting" litigation: Part 1 on "Sentencing Victories"

6a00d83451574769e201b7c9134b4d970b-320wiI recently received a kind offer from Alison Siegler, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the University of Chicago Law School's Federal Criminal Justice Clinic, for an update on the extraordinary litigation her clinic has done in response to so-called "stash house stings" in which federal agents lure defendants into seeking to rob a (non-existent) drug stash-house.  In this post last year, I highlighted this lengthy Chicago Tribune article, headlined "ATF sting operation accused of using racial bias in finding targets, with majority being minorities," on this topic.  Alison's update is so detailed and interesting, I will need three posts to report all she has to report.  This first one covers what she calls "sentencing Victories":

The Federal Criminal Justice Clinic that I founded and direct at the University of Chicago Law School has engaged in systemic litigation against fake stash house robbery cases in Chicago. Our litigation has resulted in dramatically lower sentences for scores of clients and is changing the law around the country.

Sentencing Victories

Several years ago, the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic (FCJC) filed pretrial Motions to Dismiss for Racially Selective Law Enforcement on behalf of 43 defendants charged in the 12 pending fake stash house cases in Chicago, alleging that the ATF had unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race in targeting people of color.  The FCJC approached the legal issue of racially selective law enforcement in an innovative fashion by coordinating across cases and bringing empirical evidence to bear.  See ATF Sting Operation Accused of Using Racial Bias in Finding Targets—the Majority of Them Being Minorities, Chicago Tribune (Mar. 3, 2017).  Last December, the 9 federal judges presiding over these cases held a joint evidentiary hearing on our motions, an unprecedented occurrence. See Was Racial Profiling Behind ATF Stash House Stings? Chicago Judges to Take Up Landmark Case Today, Chicago Tribune (Dec. 13, 2017); Court Decision Could Force Changes to ATF’s Undercover Operations, NPR: Morning Edition (Dec. 15, 2017).

When the FCJC began this litigation, our clients were facing 15-to-25-year mandatory minimums and far higher sentences under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.  In the wake of the hearing, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Chicago made highly unusual plea offers in all of the cases, offering to dismiss all of the remaining mandatory-minimum gun and drug charges. See Under Pressure by Judges, Prosecutors to Offer Plea Deals in Controversial Drug Stash House Cases, Chicago Tribune (Feb. 21, 2018).

Of the 43 clients who participated in our selective enforcement challenge, 34 have now been sentenced.  Fully 27 of the 34 received sentences of “time served,” despite requests by the government for within-Guidelines sentences that ranged as high as 12 years.  The remaining clients received significantly below-Guidelines sentences.  The chart linked here depicts these incredible outcomes and is being filed publicly with the judges to show that time-served sentences are now the norm in these cases.  As a result of the plea offers and time-served sentences, clients on bond were allowed to remain in the community, clients in custody were promptly released, and our clients collectively were spared hundreds of years in prison.  These remarkable results are attributable to the tremendous efforts of everyone in the FCJC: Professor Erica Zunkel (the Associate Director of the FCJC), Professor Judith Miller, and the many students who worked on the litigation.

These extraordinary sentencing outcomes show the power of litigating creatively and demonstrate that sometimes the fight alone can bring about systemic change, regardless of the legal outcome.  The FCJC did not win the motions to dismiss, but the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the ATF have entirely stopped bringing fake stash house cases in Chicago, even as those cases continue to be prosecuted elsewhere.  The FCJC’s litigation also changed the judges’ perspective on these cases.  Although Chief Judge Castillo “reluctantly denied” the FCJC’s Motion to Dismiss in his two stash house cases, he wrote: “Our criminal justice system should not tolerate false stash house cases in 2018.”  United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 984 (N.D. Ill 2018).  In particular, he said, “The inherent problems of this District’s false stash house cases must be seen through the lens of our country’s sad history of racism,” id. at 985, and implored the government to “relegat[e]” them to “the dark corridors of our past,” id. at 984; see also Editorial: Even Fighting Capone, Feds Knew Better Than to Resort to Cheap Tricks, Chicago Sun Times (Mar. 13, 2018).  In another FCJC case, Judge Gettleman issued a sentencing opinion “express[ing] this court’s disgust with the ATF’s conduct in this case.” United States v. Paxton, 2018 WL 4504160, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2018).

October 26, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, October 25, 2018

"Supermajoritarian Criminal Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Aliza Cover now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Democracy is often equated with majority rule.  But closer analysis reveals that, in theory and by constitutional design, our criminal justice system should be supermajoritarian, not majoritarian.  The Constitution guarantees that criminal punishment may be imposed only when backed by the supermajoritarian — historically, unanimous — approval of a jury drawn from the community.  And criminal law theorists’ expressive and retributive justifications for criminal punishment implicitly rely on the existence of broad community consensus in favor of imposing it. 

Despite these constitutional and theoretical ideals, the criminal justice system today is majoritarian, at best.  Both harsh and contested, it has lost the structural mechanisms that could ensure supermajoritarian support.  By incorporating new supermajoritarian checks and reinvigorating old ones, we could make criminal punishment consonant with first principles and more responsive to community intuitions of justice.

October 25, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 24, 2018

"Undue Influence: A Prosecutor's Role in Parole Proceedings"

The title of this post is the title of this short paper recently posted to SSRN authored by R. Michael Cassidy.  Here is its abstract:

Professor Cassidy explores what it means for a prosecutor to act as a “minister of justice” in the context of parole proceedings.  He argues that prosecutors should not perceive themselves as zealous advocates in what is essentially an administrative setting, and that prosecutors should not oppose release simply because they believe that the nature and circumstances of the crime warrant continued incarceration. 

Rather, Cassidy argues that prosecutors ordinarily should refrain from personally testifying at parole hearings, and should submit written comments to the parole board only in those rare situations where the prosecutor is in possession of otherwise unavailable information pertaining to an inmate’s post-conviction behavior that would assist the board in making an accurate legal and factual determination.  Cassidy surveys the approaches taken by parole board statutes and regulations in fifty states and discusses which of those approaches properly calibrate the scope and limits of a prosecutor’s input in release decisions.

October 24, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (7)

Tuesday, October 23, 2018

Terrific discussions of guideline commentary and agency issues in the Sixth Circuit (while a defendant loses appeal again)

Yesterday a Sixth Circuit panel handed down an interesting and intricate opinion in US v. Havis, No. 17-5772 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2018) (available here), that likely will be of even greater interest to administrative law gurus than to sentencing fans.  The start of the opinion for the court authored by Judge Thapar frames and sets up what follows:

What we do is sometimes less important than how we do it.  The United States Sentencing Commission has the power to promulgate the Sentencing Guidelines.  But Congress has limited how it may exercise that power.  Those limits are important — not only because Congress thinks so, but because they define the Commission’s identity in our constitutional structure.

Jeffery Havis claims that the Commission has disregarded those limits.  And he may have a point.  But a prior published decision of our court requires that we reject this part of his argument.  Following that precedent and finding Havis’s other arguments unavailing, we affirm his sentence

For the defendant, what follows must be especially discouraging: he loses the appeal 2-1 ,and the two votes against him seem to agree that his arguments are compelling but foreclosed by circuit precedent that can only be reviewed via an en banc proceeding. For administrative law gurus, there are many pages with thoughtful judges debating the pros and cons of whether Auer deference presents constitutional problems in this context. As a sentencing fan, I found this passage from Judge Thapar (among many others in all the opinions) notable:

[I]n criminal cases, ambiguity typically favors the defendant.  If there is reasonable doubt, no conviction. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). And if a statute is ambiguous, courts construe the statute in the criminal defendant’s favor.  E.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (describing the “venerable” rule of lenity).  But not here. Auer would mean that rather than benefiting from any ambiguity in the Guidelines, Havis would face the possibility of more time in prison than he otherwise would.  So in this context, Auer not only threatens the separation of powers but also endangers fundamental legal precepts as well.  See Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 732–33 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (highlighting problems with requiring the rule of lenity to bow to Auer deference); see also Perez v. United States, 885 F.3d 984, 990–91 (6th Cir. 2018) (suggesting that the rule of lenity might apply in considering sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act).

For both sentencing and administrative law fans, Havis is a must read.

October 23, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 18, 2018

Remarkable sentencing where district judge decided crooked cops needed more punishment than federal prosecutors sought

This local article from Florida reports on a sentencing in a remarkable federal case under the headline "Ex-Biscayne Park officers get year in prison for roles in framing black teen in crimes." Here are the details from the start of the article:

By helping the feds make a case against a corrupt ex-Biscayne Park police chief, two convicted former officers were hoping to avoid prison time for their roles in framing a black teenager with a string of burglaries. Instead, Charlie Dayoub and Raul Fernandez were handcuffed and led by U.S. Marshals into custody on Tuesday after U.S. District Judge K. Michael Moore sentenced them to the maximum: one year in prison for the false arrests.

As family members cried in disbelief, Moore chastised federal prosecutors for agreeing to recommend eight months of home confinement for Dayoub and one year of probation for Fernandez based on their grand jury testimony and other assistance in helping target former Chief Raimundo Atesiano, who had pressured officers in the mostly white suburban town to pin property crimes on people of color. He pleaded guilty last month. “It would have been a slap on the wrist, and it would have sent entirely the wrong message — particularly to the minority community,” Moore told Assistant U.S. Attorney Harry Wallace. “To think that they can come into court and get a slap on the wrist is insulting to the men and women in law enforcement.”

Moore challenged the prosecutor about his recommendation of leniency for the two defendants, who pleaded guilty in August to depriving a 16-year-old of his civil rights after framing him for four unsolved burglaries in 2013 at the direction of the ex-chief, Atesiano. The misdemeanor conviction carried up to one year in prison, while under the plea agreement prosecutors dropped a more serious civil rights conspiracy charge with a maximum 10-year sentence.

Wallace said his decision allowed the U.S. Attorney’s Office to use testimony by Dayoub and Fernandez to compel Atesiano to plead guilty to the felony civil rights conspiracy. “We were faced with a Hobson’s choice,” Wallace told the judge. But Moore, who accused the prosecutors of “sentencing manipulation,” rejected Wallace’s argument. The judge said had the prosecutors gone to trial against the ex-chief and the two officers, it would have been a “slam dunk.”

The sentencing outcome was a shock to everyone in the courtroom, especially the defendants, who were expecting leniency because the prosecutors joined their defense attorneys in support of no prison time. The reason: The two former Biscayne Park police officers testified before a federal grand jury about how the department’s ex-chief pressured them to arrest people of color and others for crimes they did not commit in the leafy bedroom community north of Miami.

Dayoub, 38, and Fernandez, 62, testified that Atesiano’s goal was to achieve a 100 percent burglary clearance rate, even if it meant pinning unsolved break-ins on people who were innocent victims, according to newly filed court records. Atesiano, 52, and another former Biscayne Park officer, Guillermo Ravelo, 37, already pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the civil rights of innocent victims by falsely arresting them. Ravelo faces up to 10 years at his sentencing on Thursday, while Atesiano faces similar punishment in November.

UPDATE: This new Justice Department press release discusses the underlying crimes in detail while announcing that today "former Biscayne Park Police Officer Guillermo Ravelo was sentenced to 27 months incarceration for conspiracy to deprive a person of his civil rights and deprivation of civil rights under color of law."

October 18, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (11)

Wednesday, October 17, 2018

"Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper by Brandon Garrett now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The American criminal justice system is at a turning point.  For decades, as the rate of incarceration exploded, observers of the American criminal justice system criticized the enormous discretion wielded by key actors, particularly police and prosecutors, and the lack of empirical evidence that has informed that discretion.  Since the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, there has been broad awareness that the criminal system lacks empirically informed approaches.  That report unsuccessfully called for a national research strategy, with an independent national criminal justice research institute, along the lines of the National Institutes of Health.  Following the report, police agencies continued to base their practices on conventional wisdom or “tried-and-true” methods.  Prosecutors retained broad discretion, relying on their judgment as lawyers and elected officials.  Lawmakers enacted new criminal statutes, largely reacting to the politics of crime and not empirical evidence concerning what measures make for effective crime control.  Judges interpreted traditional constitutional criminal procedure rules in deference to the exercise of discretion by each of these actors.  Very little data existed to test what worked for police or prosecutors, or to protect individual defendants’ rights.

Today, criminal justice actors are embracing more data-driven approaches.  This raises new opportunities and challenges.  A deep concern is whether the same institutional arrangements that produced mass incarceration will use data collection to maintain the status quo. Important concerns remain with relying on data, selectively produced and used by officials and analyzed in nontransparent ways, without sufficient review by the larger research and policy community.  Efforts to evaluate research in a systematic and interdisciplinary fashion in the field of medicine offer useful lessons for criminal justice.  This Article explores the opportunities and concerns raised by a law, policy, and research agenda for an evidence-informed criminal justice system.

October 17, 2018 in Data on sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 15, 2018

Federal judge decides Missouri parole practices fail to comply with requirements of Miller and Graham

As reported in this local article, headlined "Missouri violated rights of inmates convicted as juveniles who are serving life without parole, judge says," a federal judge late last week ruled in favor of inmates convicted of murder as juveniles who claimed that Missouri’s parole policies and practices violated their rights in the wake of the Supreme Court's rulings in Miller and Graham. Here are the basics:

A federal judge on Friday said that recent Missouri parole hearings violated the constitutional rights of inmates serving life without parole for offenses they committed when they were juveniles.  State officials have 60 days to develop a plan for providing the inmates “a meaningful and realistic opportunity” for parole, U.S. District Judge Nanette K. Laughrey ruled.

The lawsuit was filed by four inmates who are seeking to represent all inmates who were convicted and sentenced to life without parole for an offense that occurred when they were younger than 18.  Each of the four inmates was recently denied parole after a hearing, and Laughrey said nearly 85 percent of the class of affected inmates did not receive a parole date after a hearing. The majority were not granted another hearing for the maximum of five years, without an explanation “for the lengthy setback,” she wrote.

In a news release about the ruling Sunday, the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center of St. Louis, which represents the inmates along with lawyers from Husch Blackwell, said more than 90 inmates are affected.

The parole board’s decision is communicated to inmates on a two-page “barebones, boilerplate form,” with only two available reasons for denying parole: the seriousness of the original offense or that the inmate’s “inability to... remain at liberty without again violating the law,” Laughrey wrote.  Even state officials admitted Missouri failed to provide adequate explanation for the decisions, the judge said, and fails to tell inmates what “steps they should to take to become better suited for parole.”

Laughrey wrote that while an adult’s “interest in parole is not constitutionally protected,” a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions “has held that those who were children at the time of the crimes for which they were convicted may be subject to certain additional protections.”...

Laughrey ruled that the state needs to come up with “revised policies, procedures, and customs” that will “ensure that all Class members are provided a meaningful and realistic opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” including those who already had unsuccessful hearings.

The full 27-page ruling in Brown v. Percythe, No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL (W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2018), is available at this link.

October 15, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"How Statistics Doomed Washington State’s Death Penalty"

The title of this post is the title of this new commentary at The Atlantic by Garrett Epps.  Here is an excerpt (with links from the original):

Last week, the Washington Supreme Court, in a fairly pointed opinion, declared that, at least in its jurisdiction, numbers have real meaning.  And to those who have eyes to see, numbers make clear the truth about death-sentencing: It is arbitrary and racist in its application.

The court’s decision was based on two studies commissioned by lawyers defending Allen Gregory, who was convicted of rape and murder in Tacoma, Washington, in 2001 and sentenced to death by a jury there. The court appointed a special commissioner to evaluate the reports, hear the state’s response, and file a detailed evaluation.  The evidence, the court said, showed that Washington counties with larger black populations had higher rates of death sentences—and that in Washington, “black defendants were four and a half times more likely to be sentenced to death than similarly situated white defendants.” Thus, the state court concluded, “Washington’s death penalty is administered in an arbitrary and racially biased manner” — and violated the Washington State Constitution’s prohibition on “cruel punishment.”

The court’s opinion is painstaking — almost sarcastic — on one point: “Let there be no doubt — we adhere to our duty to resolve constitutional questions under our own [state] constitution, and accordingly, we resolve this case on adequate and independent state constitutional principles.”  “Adequate and independent” are magic words in U.S. constitutional law; they mean that the state court’s opinion is not based on the U.S. Constitution, and its rule will not change if the nine justices in Washington change their view of the federal Eighth Amendment.  Whatever the federal constitutionality of the death penalty, Washington state is now out of its misery.  

 Last spring, a conservative federal judge, Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit, published 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law,  a book urging lawyers and judges to focus less on federal constitutional doctrine and look instead to state constitutions for help with legal puzzles.  That’s an idea that originated in the Northwest half-a-century ago, with the jurisprudence of former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde.  It was a good idea then and it’s a good idea now.  State courts can never overrule federal decisions protecting federal constitutional rights; they can, however, interpret their own state constitutions to give more protection than does the federal Constitution.  There’s something bracing about this kind of judicial declaration of independence, when it is done properly.

Prior related posts:

October 15, 2018 in Data on sentencing, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, October 14, 2018

"Unstitching Scarlet Letters? Prosecutorial Discretion and Expungement"

In this post last week, I noted a New York Times article headlined "Convicts Seeking to Clear Their Records Find More Prosecutors Willing to Help." A helpful reader made sure I also posted about this article on SSRN with the title of this post authored by Brian Murray. Here is its abstract:

Criminal record history information pejoratively brands those who contact the criminal justice system, whether they were guilty or not.  In theory, the remedy of expungement is designed to mitigate the unanticipated, negative effects of a criminal record.  But the reality is that prosecutors — driven by a set of incentives that are fundamentally antithetical to expungement — control many of the levers that determine who is able to obtain expungement.  The disjunction between the prosecutorial mindset and the minister of justice ideal could not be starker and the consequences can be significant. 

Prosecutors, as agents of the state, can either argue forcefully for the retention or deletion of such information, dramatically affecting the situation of an arrestee or ex-offender given the pervasive web of collateral consequences associated with a criminal record.  This discretion, as it relates to theories of punishment, prosecutorial discretion overall, the ethical responsibilities of prosecutors to do justice, and public policy interests, has been grossly under-analyzed despite the serious implications it has for the prosecutorial role within the criminal justice system and for reentry efforts. 

While many scholars have paid attention to how prosecutorial incentives conflict with the theoretical responsibilities of prosecutors in charging, plea-bargaining, and post-conviction situations involving innocence, none have provided a theoretical framework focused on the role of the prosecutor during expungement.  Many of the complicated incentives that undermine holistic prosecution during those earlier phases exist during the expungement process as well.  But scholarly responses to those incentives are not adequate given the range of considerations during the expungement phase.  As such, this Article argues that scholarly discussions related to prosecutorial discretion need to extend their focus beyond the exercise of prosecutorial judgment pre-trial or the questions of factual and legal guilt.

Given that the primary role of the prosecutor is to do “justice,” this Article calls for increased attention to the exercise of discretion after the guilt phase is complete, specifically in the context of expungement of non-conviction and conviction information.  In doing so, it hopes to provide a framework for exercising such discretion, and to initiate additional conversation about the role of prosecutors during the phases following arrest and prosecution.

October 14, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, October 13, 2018

"The Pope and the Capital Juror"

The title of this post is the title of this new essay authored by Aliza Cover now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Counterintuitively, the Pope’s recent announcement that the death penalty is impermissible in all circumstances may make death sentences easier to come by, at least in the short term.  The reason for this peculiarity is the “death qualification” of capital jurors — the process of questioning prospective jurors about their views on the death penalty and removing for cause those who are “substantially impaired” in their willingness to consider imposing a death verdict.

This Essay anticipates three problematic consequences of the Pope’s declaration, given a capital punishment system that relies on death-qualified juries.  First, prosecutors will likely be able to strike a greater number of death-averse jurors, thereby seating juries tilted in favor of death and obtaining death verdicts with greater ease.  Second, with more believing Catholics excluded from jury service, the representativeness — and hence the legitimacy — of capital juries will suffer.  Third, if the number of death verdicts rises with the ease of disqualification, one of the key “objective indicators” of “evolving standards of decency” will be skewed, registering more support for the death penalty despite — indeed, because of — societal movement against it.  The potential for these unexpected consequences to flow from a major pronouncement against the death penalty highlights how death qualification shapes and distorts the practice of capital punishment in our country.

October 13, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, October 11, 2018

Washington Supreme Court strikes down state's death penalty based on its arbitrary administration

I am on road and so unable to read or comment on this big unanimous opinion. I hope to be able to do so before too long.

UPDATE:  Here is how the opinion for the court in Washington v. Gregory starts and ends:

Washington's death penalty laws have been declared unconstitutional not once, not twice, but three times.  State v. Baker, 81 Wn.2d 281, 501 P.2d 284 (1972); State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979); State v. Frampton, 95 Wn.2d 469, 627 P.2d 922 (1981).  And today, we do so again.  None of these prior decisions held that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional, nor do we.  The death penalty is invalid because it is imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased manner. While this particular case provides an opportunity to specifically address racial disproportionality, the underlying issues that underpin our holding are rooted in the arbitrary manner in which the death penalty is generally administered.  As noted by appellant, the use of the death penalty is unequally applied — sometimes by where the crime took place, or the county of residence, or the available budgetary resources at any given point in time, or the race of the defendant.  The death penalty, as administered in our state, fails to serve any legitimate penological goal; thus, it violates article I, section 14 of our state constitution....

Under article I, section 14, we hold that Washington's death penalty is unconstitutional, as administered, because it is imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased manner.  Given the manner in which it is imposed, the death penalty also fails to serve any legitimate penological goals.  Pursuant to RCW 10.95.090, "if the death penalty established by this chapter is held to be invalid by a final judgment of a court which is binding on all courts in the state, the sentence for aggravated first degree murder ... shall be life imprisonment."  All death sentences are hereby converted to life imprisonment.

October 11, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Set your DVR for HBO's showing of documentary "The Sentence"

1468824_CC-CSR_NYLFF_TheSentence_v02_x1aThe folks at FAMM have been hosting advanced screenings of a new documentary about the impact of mandatory minimum sentencing, and in a few days HBO will make it possible for everyone to see "The Sentence."  Here is how HBO describes the film:

First-time filmmaker Rudy Valdez’s The Sentence tells the story of his sister Cindy Shank, a mother of three who received a 15-year mandatory sentence for conspiracy charges related to her deceased ex-boyfriend’s crimes. The documentary offers a searing look at the consequences of mandatory minimum sentencing and received critical acclaim when it premiered at the 2018 Sundance Film Festival.

The Sentence draws on hundreds of hours of footage shot by Valdez, who initially copes with his sister’s incarceration by filming the family moments Shank misses in prison. In the midst of Shank’s sentence, Valdez discovers his voice as a filmmaker and activist.

During the last months of the Obama administration’s clemency initiative, the family starts to fight for Shank’s release. The aching question at the core of this deeply personal portrait is whether their attempts to free Shank will succeed.

This lengthy Newsweek piece provides more details and context about the movie and the issues it raises. Here is an excerpt:

The Sentence, which won the Audience Award at Sundance and airs October 15 on HBO, tells Shank’s story. Filmmaker Rudy Valdez, her younger brother — at the time a pre-K assistant teacher — began making home videos of his nieces on a spare camera, as a way to record Shank’s children growing up. Before long, he began to see it as an opportunity to tell the story of mandatory minimum sentencing through “the people left behind,” says Valdez. His sister was eager to cooperate: “Tell everyone,” she told him. “Please, somebody see us.”...

Through Shank, Valdez exposes a broken justice system, one that began with the Reagan administration’s war on drugs. Mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent cocaine and marijuana crimes were introduced as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 — an attempt by Democrats to respond to the crack cocaine epidemic following the highly politicized, fatal overdose of college basketball player Len Bias. Mandatory sentences are lengthy for drug offenses; in 2016, the average carried 7.8 years — more than double the average sentence for a drug offense without a minimum. As a result, defendants are encouraged to consider accepting a plea bargain — the option Shank rejected — to receive a lesser sentence than the minimum.

In theory, plea bargains — ruled constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1970 — offer leniency to criminals who accept responsibility for their actions, allowing the accused and the state to avoid a time-consuming and expensive trial. In reality, defendants, even if they proclaim their innocence, are often pressured to plead guilty; go to trial, they are told, and you will likely get a much longer sentence. Such bargains have now become the norm: A 2017 New York Times investigation found that 98 percent of felony convictions occurred after a plea deal. And according to annual reports published by the Administrative Office on the U.S. Courts, total jury trials for U.S. criminal cases had dropped by roughly half between 1997, when there were 3,932 cases, and 2017, when there were 1,742.

The system “allows prosecutors to hold all of the cards,” says litigator Marjorie Peerce, co-chair of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Sentencing Committee. "Even if the government doesn’t have sufficient evidence, people will still plead guilty, for fear that they’ll be convicted and then sentenced with a mandatory minimum. People should not be penalized for exercising their constitutional right to trial.”

And of those penalized, the majority are black or Latino. A 2014 study found that black offenders were 75 percent more likely to face a charge carrying a mandatory minimum sentence than a white offender who committed the same crime. In 2016, Latinos represented the largest racial group in federal prison convicted of an offense that came with such a sentence. (Shank is Latina.)

October 11, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 10, 2018

"Unequal Justice: How Obsolete Laws and Unfair Trials Created North Carolina’s Outsized Death Row"

The title of this post is the title of a new report from the Center for Death Penalty Litigation. Here is a summary of the report from this page at the CDPL website:

The death penalty is all but extinct in North Carolina.  Juries have recommended only a single new death sentence in the past four years.  The state hasn’t carried out an execution since 2006.  Yet, North Carolina has the sixth largest death row in the nation, with more than 140 men and women.  It is a relic of another era.

More than 100 of N.C.’s death row prisoners — about three-quarters — were sentenced in the 1990s, under wildly different laws.  During those years, North Carolina juries sent dozens of people a year to death row, more than Texas. The state’s courtrooms were dominated by prosecutors like Ken Honeycutt in Stanly County, who celebrated new death sentences by handing out noose lapel pins to his assistant prosecutors.

Beginning in 2001, after investigations and DNA testing began to reveal innocent people on death row, a wave of reforms transformed the landscape.  New laws guaranteed capital defendants such basic rights as trained defense attorneys and the right to see all the evidence in their cases.  A court mandate requiring prosecutors to seek death for virtually every first-degree murder — the only such requirement in the nation — was ended.

Today, the death penalty is seen as a tool to be used sparingly, instead of a bludgeon to be wielded in virtually every first-degree murder case.  Yet, new laws and shifting public opinion have had little impact on prisoners sentenced in another era.  The bulk of North Carolina’s death row is now made up of people who were tried 15, 20, even 25 years ago. They are prisoners of a state that has moved on, but has refused to reckon with its past.

CDPL’s report, Unequal Justice, finds that out of 142 death row prisoners in North Carolina:

92% (131) were tried before a 2008 package of reforms intended to prevent false confessions and mistaken eyewitness identifications, which have been leading causes of wrongful convictions across the country.  The new laws require interrogations and confessions to be recorded in homicide cases and set strict guidelines for eyewitness line-up procedures.

84% (119) were tried before a law granting defendants the right to see all the evidence in the prosecutor’s file — including information that might help reduce their sentence or prove their innocence.

73% (104) were sentenced before laws barring the execution of people with intellectual disabilities.  Despite a promise of relief for these less culpable defendants, disabled prisoners remain on death row.

73% (103) were sentenced before the creation of a statewide indigent defense agency that drastically improved the quality of representation for poor people facing the death penalty, and a law ending an unprecedented requirement that prosecutors pursue the death penalty in every aggravated first-degree murder.  Before these changes, prosecutors did not have the ability to seek life sentences in these cases and poor people often received a sub-standard defense.

October 10, 2018 in Data on sentencing, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 09, 2018

Justice Kavanaugh joins the ACCA fray in his first set of SCOTUS arguments

As noted in this prior post, a new Supreme Court, due to the addition of new Justice Brett Kavanaugh, got started working this morning by hearing two cases concerning the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act.  Via SCOTUSblog, I see the oral argument transcript in Stokeling v. United States is available on at this link and the transcript in United States v. Stitt is at this link.  Helpfully, this additional post from SCOTUSblog provides these highlights:

In Stokeling v. United States, about whether a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common-law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance” is categorically a “violent felony” under the ACCA.

This argument has some moments that even young spectators seem to enjoy, such as when Roberts describes having his law clerks try to pull a dollar bill out of his hand while he held tight. (This was in response to an argument in the petitioner’s merits brief that “robbery can … occur where the offender does no more than grab cash from someone’s closed fist, tearing the bill without touching the person.”)

“It tears easily if you go like this,” Roberts says to Brenda Bryn, the lawyer for petitioner Denard Stokeling, motioning as if to tear a bill in half. “But if you’re really tugging on it … it requires a lot of force, more than you might think.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor asks about whether a “ordinary pinch” can involve sufficient force to break the law. And to demonstrate, she pinches her neighbor on her right, Justice Neil Gorsuch. At that moment, he is lifting his coffee mug for a sip, and his wide-eyed reaction to being pinched suggests a mix of bemusement and mild alarm.

Whenever a justice asks a question, Kavanaugh looks down the bench at his colleague. He sometimes dons his reading glasses, and he jots notes. We cannot see whether he has his trademark Sharpie marker.

At 10:25 a.m., Kavanaugh has his first question, asking Bryn about her arguments relating to a 2010 Supreme Court ACCA decision, Curtis Johnson v. United States. “In Curtis Johnson, you rely heavily on the general statements of the court, but the application of those general statements was to something very specific: Battery and a mere tap on the shoulder,” Kavanaugh says to Bryn. “And all Curtis Johnson seemed to hold was that that was excluded. So why don’t we follow what Curtis Johnson seemed to do in applying those general statements to the specific statute at issue here and why wouldn’t that then encompass the Florida statute, which requires more than, say, a tap on the shoulder?”

In the second argument, for the consolidated cases of United States v. Stitt and United States v. Sims, the question is whether burglary of “a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as ‘burglary’” under the ACCA. Kennedy apparently decides that one hour of argument about the ACCA is enough, and he slips out at the break between the two arguments.

The Stitt and Sims argument will lead to questions about cars with mattresses, homeless people living in their cars in New York and Washington, and unoccupied recreational vehicles and campers.

Alito tells Erica Ross, an assistant to the solicitor general arguing that burglary of an unoccupied mobile structure should count as a strike under the ACCA, that the court has “made one royal mess” of its interpretations of the federal statute. Ross says that is something the court may need to think about in “some case,” but “I apologize … for continuing to bring us back to this case.” This simple point really tickles Justice Clarence Thomas for some reason, and he laughs heartily for several seconds.

Kavanaugh asks more questions in this second argument, though he also loses a couple of what I call “faceoffs” — when two justices battle for the floor, continuing to speak until one relents. He defers to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at one point, and to Kagan at another. (Although the rule of thumb is that a junior justice ought to defer to a senior colleague in such situations, that rule is not always observed.)

Kavanaugh will have several extended colloquies, appearing more at ease with each one. Several times, Jeffrey Fisher of Stanford Law School, the court-appointed lawyer for the respondents in the second case, begins his answer by saying, “Well, Justice Kavanaugh, …” It is in those tiny moments that the reality sinks in that Brett Kavanaugh of Maryland is now an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

October 9, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, October 08, 2018

Highlighting efforts by some prosecutors to help with expungements

Today's New York Times has this notable new article under the headline "Convicts Seeking to Clear Their Records Find More Prosecutors Willing to Help." Here are excerpts:

[A]lthough law enforcement officials have traditionally opposed [broadened expungement and sealing laws] for an array of reasons — including accountability, a belief that records are vital to public safety, and unstinting support for crime victims — a growing number of them have begun to recognize that criminal records can be enduring obstacles to self-sufficiency and even help trap people in cycles of crime.  Increasingly, they are overtly endorsing mercy through record suppression.

“It’s just a matter of trying to remove obstacles that would make it more difficult for someone to become a productive member of the community,” said Terry Curry, the elected prosecutor in Marion County, which includes Indianapolis and has a population approaching 1 million residents.  “If an individual has stayed out of the criminal justice system, then why should they continue to have that stain forever?”

Though in most places the paperwork burden for expungements has fallen on private lawyers and nonprofit legal clinics, South Florida prosecutors now routinely hold events intended to help people wipe away records of arrests but not convictions.  A district attorney in rural Louisiana leads information sessions about expungements for some felony convictions after a 10-year waiting period; a Vermont prosecutor recently held a record-clearing clinic; and the authorities near Fort Bragg, N.C., attracted about 500 people to an expungement event last year.  Last month, the Brooklyn district attorney promoted “Begin Again” events, where, one advertisement said, people were invited to “clear your record of a misdemeanor marijuana conviction or warrant.”

But there is still a national patchwork of policies and terminologies, from destroying records to sealing them to simply noting that a conviction is effectively vacated. States have imposed various waiting periods, conditions and fees.  Some places have made their processes deliberately simple, while others have complicated approaches that may require legal assistance or court hearings.

The proliferation of new laws, and newfound enthusiasm on the part of some prosecutors, has hardly erased all doubts about the wisdom of suppressing records.  Many prosecutors, especially in rural areas, remain skeptical of any action to show mercy for a person’s past, and some judges engage in measured resistance, holding hearings more to complain about an expungement law than to weigh an application’s merits.  “You have prosecutors and judges who just think it’s wrong: ‘You’ve caused trouble in this county, you’re a wrongdoer and you shouldn’t get a blank slate,’” said Bernice Corley, the executive director of the Indiana Public Defender Council.

But Margaret Love, the executive director of the Collateral Consequences Resource Center and a former United States pardon attorney, said that clemency and expungements are part of the criminal justice process for a reason.  “It ought to be something that prosecutors welcome and use to their advantage to create criminal justice success stories, to advertise criminal justice success stories,” she said.

The nuanced approach in Indiana, where officials hoped that expungements would improve people’s job prospects, is increasingly seen as a model.  Under its so-called Second Chance law, the state has a tiered system in which the offense, and the outcome of the case, determines the waiting period and the exact relief.  Indiana does not destroy records, but can limit access to them and mark them as expunged, and crime victims are permitted to express their views before any decision is made.  “Indiana should be the worst place in America to commit a serious crime and the best place, once you’ve done your time, to get a second chance,” Gov. Mike Pence, now the vice president, said when he signed the records measure into law in 2013.

I am glad to see this topic garner the attention of the Times, though I am a bit disappointed not to see any mention of the particularly notable marijuana-reform developments on this front. Specifically, as I discussed briefly in this recent paper for the Federal Sentencing Reporter, a number of prosecutors in California began taking proactive steps to clear prior marijuana convictions after the state enacted marijuana legalization in 2016.  

October 8, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

First cases for a new SCOTUS: two more efforts to sort out ACCA uncertainty with old criminal history

A new Supreme Court, due to the addition of new Justice Brett Kavanaugh, will get to work on old convictions by considering Tuesday morning the latest possible twists in an ever-twisting jurisprudence concerning the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act.  The latest ACCA fun comes in the form of oral arguments in Stokeling v. United States and United States v. StittHere are the basics on these cases via SCOTUSblog coverage:

Stokeling Issue: Whether a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance” is categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), when the offense has been specifically interpreted by state appellate courts to require only slight force to overcome resistance.

Argument preview: Do "slight force" robberies count for enhancing Armed Career Criminal Act sentences? by Rory Little

Stitt Issue: Whether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as “burglary” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Argument preview: What vehicle burglaries, if any, count for enhancing Armed Career Criminal Act sentences? by Rory Little

October 8, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, October 07, 2018

"Robot Criminals"

I just noticed this recent paper on SSRN that had a title too good not to blog.  The paper is authored by Ying Hu, and here is its abstract:

When a robot harms humans, are there any grounds for holding it criminally liable for its misconduct? Yes, provided that the robot is capable of making, acting on, and communicating the reasons behind its moral decisions.  If such a robot fails to observe the minimum moral standards that society requires of it, labeling it as a criminal can effectively fulfill criminal law’s function of censuring wrongful conduct and alleviating the emotional harm that may be inflicted on human victims.

Imposing criminal liability on robots does not absolve robot manufacturers, trainers, or owners of their individual criminal liability.  The former is not rendered redundant by the latter.  It is possible that no human is sufficiently at fault in causing a robot to commit a particular morally wrongful action.  Additionally, imposing criminal liability on robots might sometimes have significant instrumental value, such as helping to identify culpable individuals and serving as a self-policing device for individuals who interact with robots.  Finally, treating robots that satisfy the above-mentioned conditions as moral agents appears much more plausible if we adopt a less human-centric account of moral agency.

The article does not discuss sentencing until its very end, but this paragraph covers robot punishment possibilities:

Assuming we can punish robots, a new question naturally follows: how should a robot be punished? In this regard, a range of measures might be taken to secure that the robot commit fewer offenses in the future. These include:

  a. physically destroying the robot (the robot equivalent of a “death sentence”);

  b. destroying or re-write the moral algorithms of the robot (the robot equivalent of a “hospital order”);

  c. preventing the robot from being put to use (the robot equivalent of a “prison sentence”); and/or

  d. ordering fines to be paid out of the insurance fund (the robot equivalent of a “fine”).

In addition, the unlawful incident can be used to design a training module to teach other smart robots the correct course of action in that scenario.

October 7, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

You be the Illinois judge: what sentence for Jason Van Dyke after second-degree murder conviction in slaying of Laquan McDonald?

Though somewhat eclipsed by Supreme Court confirmation controversies, a high-profile criminal case culminated with a murder conviction on Friday when a jury found Chicago police Officer Jason Van Dyke guilty Friday of second-degree murder in the 2014 shooting of 17-year-old Laquan McDonald.  This CNN article about the verdict details that Van Dyke was also "found guilty of 16 counts of aggravated battery with a firearm [but] found not guilty of official misconduct."  And this AP piece, headlined "With conviction, Van Dyke likely avoided decades behind bars," highlights some of the sentencing realities that attend this verdict:

Jurors convicted Chicago police Officer Jason Van Dyke for murder and aggravated battery in the slaying Laquan McDonald, the black teenager who was shot 16 times as he walked away carrying a knife on Oct. 20, 2014.  But a legal expert explained that the 40-year-old Van Dyke is likely looking at less than 10 years in prison for killing the teen rather than many decades because jurors opted to convict him of second- and not first-degree murder.

After less than two full days deliberating on three weeks of testimony, jurors returned Friday with 17 guilty verdicts and one acquittal. By far the most serious charge Van Dyke faced originally was first-degree murder.  But Judge Vincent Gaughan told jurors before they started deliberations that they had the option of replacing first-degree murder with second-degree murder.

First-degree required a finding that Van Dyke's use of deadly force wasn't justified — that it was both unnecessary and unreasonable.  But Gaughan said jurors could find that Van Dyke truly believed his life was in jeopardy but that that belief wasn't reasonable.  That's the criteria for second-degree murder.

The jury also found Van Dyke guilty of all 16 counts of aggravated battery with a firearm. Each count corresponded to every bullet Van Dyke shot into McDonald. They acquitted him on the least serious charge, official misconduct....

First-degree murder carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. And with enhancements for having used a gun, Van Dyke would have faced a mandatory minimum of 45 years, according to Chicago defense attorney Steve Greenberg, who has defended clients at more than 100 murder trials.  Such a sentence, at Van Dyke's age, could have amounted to life.  The punishment for second-degree murder is no less than four years but no more than 20 years behind bars.

Jurors weren't told anything about the range of punishments for each charge. The judge did tell them that whether one charge might carry a greater or lesser sentence shouldn't factor at all into their decisions.

Each count of aggravated battery carries a mandatory minimum six years and a maximum of 30 years in prison. If Van Dyke had to serve six for each of the 16 counts — and do so one sentence after another - that would add up to 96 years. But Greenberg said judges almost always order defendants to serve such sentences simultaneously.  So, if Van Dyke gets the minimum for each count, he'd serve six years for all the battery convictions.

Another possibility is that the defense will ask, under complicated legal rules, for the judge to merge the crimes for which Van Dyke is convicted for sentencing purposes since they were all tied to a single event, Greenberg said.  That could mean Van Dyke is effectively sentenced only for second-degree murder, with its lower four-year mandatory minimum.

For a man convicted with no previous criminal record, Greenberg said the mandatory minimum is his best guess for a sentence handed down on Van Dyke.  "I would be shocked if he got a day over the four or six years," Greenberg said.

Greenberg said prison conditions for an officer, like Van Dyke, could be rougher than for average convicts. As a white officer convicted of killing a young African-American, prison authorities are likely to conclude he has to be kept away from other prisoners for his own safety. "He will probably be in a cell by himself," Greenberg said.  "It will be very hard time." That may have already started.  At prosecutors' request, Van Dyke's bond was revoked minutes after the verdicts were announced and Judge Gaughan ordered he be held in jail pending sentencing. He stood up from the defense table, then put his arms behind his back as two deputies led him away.

I am not an expert on Illinois sentencing law, but presuming this article has the law corrected, I am struck that the mandatory minimum prison term for second-degree murder in the state is 50% less than mandatory minimum for aggravated battery with a firearm. It is also notable and telling that if the sentencing judge here were permitted and inclined to run the various sentences consecutively rather than concurrently, the defendant here would be facing 100 years in prison as the applicable mandatory minimum.  But if the crimes are found to be "merged" under Illinois law, four years could become the minimum and 20 years the max.

October 7, 2018 in Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (8)

Thursday, October 04, 2018

En banc Eleventh Circuit finds way to uphold key clause of § 924(c) mandatory-minimum statute against vagueness challenge

If you cannot get enough of debates over federal statutory interpretation and modern "crime-of-violence" vagueness jurisprudence, the Eleventh Circuit today has delivered for you over 150 pages of excitement in the form of an en banc ruling in Ovalles v. US, No. 17-10172 (11th Cir. Oct. 4, 2018) (available here).  Here is part of the start of the majority opinion:

The question before us is whether one of the key provisions of an important federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), is unconstitutionally vague.  As relevant to our purposes, § 924(c) makes it a federal offense — punishable by a term of imprisonment ranging from five years to life — for any person to use, carry, or possess a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).  The provision challenged here — § 924(c)(3)’s “residual clause” — defines the term “crime of violence” to mean a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”  Id. § 924(c)(3)(B).

This case is in some respects a successor to Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), in which the Supreme Court invalidated similarly-worded residual clauses on vagueness grounds.  In the wake of those decisions, all here seem to agree that if § 924(c)(3)’s residual clause is interpreted to require determination of the crime-of-violence issue using what (in court-speak) has come be called the “categorical approach,” the clause is doomed....  In both Johnson and Dimaya, the Court concluded that application of a standard that requires a reviewing court “to ‘imagine’ an ‘idealized ordinary case of the crime’” rendered the challenged clauses impermissibly vague.  Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1214 (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58).

On the flip side, Johnson and Dimaya also make clear — and it is common ground here — that if § 924(c)(3)’s residual clause is instead interpreted to incorporate what we’ll call a “conduct-based approach” to the crime-of-violence determination, then the provision is not unconstitutionally vague.  As its name suggests, the conduct-based approach, in stark contrast to the categorical, focuses not on formal legal definitions and hypothetical “ordinary case[s],” but rather on the real-world facts of the defendant’s offense — i.e., how the defendant actually went about committing the crime in question....

The obvious (and decisive) question, then: Which is it here — categorical or conduct-based?  Because we find ourselves at this fork in the interpretive road — the categorical approach imperiling § 924(c)(3)’s residual clause, a conduct-based reading saving it—we invoke the canon of “constitutional doubt.”  Pursuant to that “elementary rule,” the Supreme Court has long held, “every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”  Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)....

Joining the Second Circuit, which recently came to the same conclusion, see United States v. Barrett, __ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 4288566 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2018), we find that § 924(c)(3)(B) can be read to embody the conduct-based approach — and therefore, under the constitutional-doubt canon, that it must be.  Accordingly, we hold that § 924(c)(3)(B) prescribes a conduct-based approach, pursuant to which the crime-of-violence determination should be made by reference to the actual facts and circumstances underlying a defendant’s offense. 

The rest of the majority opinion runs less than 50 pages, followed by more than 100 pages of concurrences and dissents that cannot be readily summarized. But Judge William Pryor's concurrence, which garners a number of addition votes, gets off to this start which I really appreciate and applaud:

How did we ever reach the point where this Court, sitting en banc, must debate whether a carjacking in which an assailant struck a 13-year-old girl in the mouth with a baseball bat and a cohort fired an AK-47 at her family is a crime of violence? It’s nuts. And Congress needs to act to end this ongoing judicial charade.

I join the majority opinion in full, but I write separately to explain why our resolution of this appeal forecasts how Congress should address the vexing issue of how to punish violent recidivists under laws like the Armed Career Criminal Act: by restoring the traditional role of the jury.  The caselaw about how to punish recidivists has confounded the federal courts for decades and has made the resolution of this appeal tricky, but our decision also suggests a way out of the mess.  Although our decision involves a contemporaneous crime and not a prior conviction, our conclusion that a jury may make findings about a defendant’s violent conduct applies with equal force to recidivist statutes.  Indeed, the modern abandonment of the jury’s traditional role of making findings about prior convictions has created more problems than it has solved.

October 4, 2018 in Gun policy and sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Massive new report on the state of federal criminal defense by Ad Hoc Committee to Review the Criminal Justice Act

Released today is this 300+-page report that should be of interest to anyone who follows the federal criminal justice system.  The report is titled simply 2017 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Review the Criminal Justice Act, and here are some excerpts from the report's executive summary:

This Committee was tasked to study one of the most fundamental of rights in America, the right of an accused person to legal counsel.  Enshrined in the Constitution under the Sixth Amendment, the right to assistance of counsel is a pillar of our adversarial system of justice and our government....

Chief Justice of the United States John G. Roberts, Jr. tasked this Committee with studying the current quality of public defense in federal courts nationwide provided under the auspices of the Criminal Justice Act — groundbreaking legislation passed in 1963 and expanded in 1970.  That the United States has a fully developed system of public defense at the federal level is evidence of considerable progress in making the Sixth Amendment right to counsel real in practice.... While it has been decades since people charged with crimes — in many cases facing life-altering punishments — faced prosecutor, judge and jury alone, representation by a skilled and devoted advocate with sufficient resources to mount a vigorous defense is far from guaranteed.  Indeed, the quality of defense appears to be highly uneven across the country and from case to case within districts.

Fully 90 percent of defendants in federal court cannot afford to hire their own attorney.  Justice in their cases, and indeed the future course of their lives, depends on the quality of the system that provides lawyers to represent them.  The subject of the Committee’s Report is the examination of that system’s successes and failures, as well as a course of action for improving it....

It was only in studying the federal defender system as a whole and hearing from witnesses across the country that the members of this Committee have come to the unanimous conclusion that despite the best efforts of all parties involved in delivering effective representation under the Sixth Amendment, the current structure for providing public defense results in disparities in the quality of representation that have serious consequences for some defendants.  The Committee hopes its report illuminates the scope and nature of these problems and underlying structural flaws from which they arise — and makes a persuasive case for meaningful change.

October 4, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Third Circuit going en banc to reconsider reach and application of Eighth Amendment to lengthy juvenile term-of-years sentence

In this post back in April, I noted the remarkable Third Circuit panel opinion in US v. Grant, No. 16-3820 (3d CIr. April 9, 2018) (available here), addressing the application of Eighth Amendment limits on juvenile sentences.  The panel opinion in Grant is technically no longer law as of today thanks to this order by the Third Circuit:

A majority of the active judges having voted for rehearing en banc in the above captioned cases, it is ordered that the government’s petition for rehearing is GRANTED.  The Clerk of this Court shall list the case for rehearing en banc on February 20, 2019.  The opinion and judgment entered April 9, 2018 are hereby vacated.

In short form, defendant Corey Grant in the early 1990 was initially sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed when he was 16-years old.  After Graham and Miller, he was resentenced to a 65-year federal prison term.  The panel opinion found this term unconstitutional and suggested that "lower courts must consider the age of retirement as a sentencing factor, in addition to life expectancy and the § 3553(a) factors, when sentencing juvenile offenders that are found to be capable of reform."  The full Third Circuit is apparently no so keen on this approach, and it will thus address this matter anew in the coming year.

October 4, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, October 02, 2018

"Sentencing Reform: Fixing Root Problems"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now available via SSRN authored by Peter Joy and Rodney Uphoff.  Here is its abstract:

In theory, at least, many subscribe to the belief that it is better to let 10 or 100 guilty persons go free rather than convict an innocent person.  Indeed, the American criminal justice system provides criminal defendants a panoply of important rights, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, in large part to ensure that the innocent are not convicted of crimes that they did not commit.  But defense counsel is there not only to protect the innocent, but also to ensure that, if the defendant is found guilty after trial or if the defendant pleads guilty before trial, he or she will receive a fair sentence.

In practice, however, too many criminal defendants receive lackluster representation, and few ever actually exercise their right to trial. Instead, our current criminal justice system is plea-bargain-driven, and the vast majority of state and federal criminal offenders plead guilty — approximately 97% of federal cases and 94% of state cases are resolved by guilty pleas rather than trials. Commenting on the prevalence of negotiated guilty pleas, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “plea bargaining is . . . not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”

Why, then, are criminal defense lawyers able to persuade the vast majority of their clients to plead guilty, even those who are actually innocent?  Put simply, it is because our system punishes so severely those who go to trial and lose.  If we are serious about both minimizing the conviction of the innocent and sentencing reform, we must address this reality.  This essay, therefore, focuses on two pernicious features of our current criminal justice system — misuse of plea bargaining and misuse of informants — that explain why so few criminal defendants exercise their right to trial.  We conclude with proposals that might ameliorate those features of our system.

October 2, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Challenging issues for SCOTUS in criminal cases that may impact only a few persons ever and the entire structure of government always

On the second oral argument day of the new Supreme Court Term, criminal law issues are front and center.  Here is SCOTUSblog's overview via this round-up post:

Today the eight-justice court will tackle two more cases.  The first is Gundy v. United States, in which the justices will consider whether a provision of the federal sex-offender act violates the nondelegation doctrine.  Mila Sohoni previewed the case for this blog. Kathryn Adamson and Sarah Evans provide a preview at Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute, while Matthew Cavedon and Jonathan Skrmetti look at the case for the Federalist Society Review.  Today’s second case is Madison v. Alabama, an Eighth Amendment challenge to the execution of a death-row inmate who has dementia and cannot remember his crime.  This blog’s preview, which first appeared at Howe on the Court, came from Amy Howe. Lauren Devendorf and Luis Lozada preview the case for Cornell. Subscript Law’s graphic explainer is here.  Tucker Higgins reports on the case for CNBC.

As the title of this post suggests, I think the Madison capital case is likely to impact only a few persons ever: only a few dozen of murderers are these days subject to real execution dates each year and only a very few of those persons are likely to able to make a credible claim of incompetence to seek to prevent the carrying out of a death sentence.  The jurisprudential and philosophical issues in Madison still are, of course, very important and lots of SCOTUS cases may end up impacting only a few persons.  But I cannot help but note what seems to me to be relatively small stakes in Madison. 

I stress the limits of Madison in part because, as my post title suggests, I think the Gundy case could be the sleeper case of the Term because a major ruling on the nondelegation doctrine could radically reshape the entire modern administrative state.  In this post last month, the original commentary of Wayne Logan concerning Gundy highlighted that SCOTUS has "not invalidated a congressional delegation in over eighty years ..., [and] the issue [taken up in Gundy could be] clearing the way for a potential major assault on the modern administrative state, which is shaped by countless congressional delegations of authority to agencies."

Prior related preview posts:

UPDATE via SCOTUSblog:  The transcript of oral argument in Gundy v. United States is available on the Supreme Court website; the transcript in Madison v. Alabama is also available; and authored by Amy Howe here, "Argument analysis: A narrow victory possible for death-row inmate with dementia?" 

October 2, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (10)

Monday, October 01, 2018

Previewing SCOTUS consideration of capital competency (and making a case for abolition)

The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral argument in Madison v. Alabama on Tuesday morning, and Amy Howe has this argument preview at SCOTUSblog titled "Justices to consider competency in capital cases."  Her post starts this way:

It has been over 33 years since Vernon Madison shot and killed Julius Schulte, a police officer in Mobile, Alabama. Schulte had come to Madison’s house to protect Madison’s former girlfriend and her daughter while they moved out; Schulte was sitting in his car when Madison shot him twice in the back of the head. Madison was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, but next week the Supreme Court will hear oral argument on whether it would violate the Constitution to execute Madison when he has no memory of his crime.

Madison, now in his late 60s, has been on death row for over 30 years. During that time, he has had several strokes, which have left him with significant brain damage. Madison suffers from dementia and long-term memory loss; he is also legally blind and can no longer walk without assistance. Since Madison’s stroke, his lawyers tell the Supreme Court, Madison “has repeatedly asked for his mother to come and visit him even though she has been dead for years.”

 Madison also cannot remember any of the details of the crime that put him on death row, including Schulte’s name, the events surrounding the crime, or his trial.  After his execution was scheduled for January of this year, Madison went to state court to challenge his competency to be executed, armed with evidence that a court-appointed expert who had evaluated him, and whose findings had played a key role in earlier rulings that Madison was competent to be executed, was abusing narcotics and was eventually suspended from practicing psychology. The state court would have allowed Madison’s execution to go forward, but the Supreme Court stepped in and — over the objection of Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch — put the execution on hold while it considered Madison’s request for review.

Interestingly, the National Review has published this notable commentary authored by George Will discussing this case under the headline "America Should Strike Down the Death Penalty."  Here are excerpts:

The mills of justice grind especially slowly regarding capital punishment, which courts have enveloped in labyrinthine legal protocols.  As the mills have ground on, life has ground Madison, 68, down to wreckage.  After multiple serious strokes, he has vascular dementia, an irreversible and progressive degenerative disease. He also is legally blind, his speech is slurred, he has Type 2 diabetes and chronic hypertension, he cannot walk unassisted, he has dead brain tissue, and urinary incontinence. A nd he no longer remembers the crime that put him on death row for most of his adult life. This is why on Tuesday, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments about the constitutionality of executing him....

The court has said that “we may seriously question the retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life.”  For many people, the death penalty for especially heinous crimes satisfies a sense of moral symmetry.  Retribution — society’s cathartic expression of a proportional response to attacks on its norms — is not, however, the only justification offered for capital punishment.  Deterrence is another.  But by now this power is vanishingly small because imposition of the death penalty is so sporadic and glacial.  Because the process of getting from sentencing to execution is so protracted, currently averaging 15 years, senescent persons on the nation’s death rows are going to be problems as long as there is capital punishment....

Sixty years ago, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the Eighth Amendment — particularly the idea of what counts as “cruel” punishments — “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”  Concerning which, two caveats are apposite: “evolving” is not a synonym for “improving,” and a society can become, as America arguably is becoming, infantilized as it “matures.”  That said, it certainly is true that standards of decency do evolve and that America’s have improved astonishingly since 1958: Think about segregated lunch counters and much else.

Conservatives have their own standards, including this one: The state — government — already is altogether too full of itself, and investing it with the power to inflict death on anyone exacerbates its sense of majesty and delusions of adequacy.

UPDATE: I just saw this interesting new OZY piece discussing Madison and related issues under the headline "Why the Battle over Dementia Patients on Death Row? Better Lawyers."

October 1, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

A bunch of Dimaya GVRs and a hundreds of criminal case cert denials in first SCOTUS order list of October Term 2018

As noted in this post a few weeks ago, law professor Rory Little had this great lengthy post at SCOTUSblog previewing the criminal side of the Supreme Court's docket under the heading "Criminal cases in the October 2018 term: A law professor’s dream."  But as the Court's term officially gets started today, this first SCOTUS order list may seem a bit like a criminal defense lawyer's nightmare because of the extraordinary number of criminal cases in which cert is denied.  Of course, every first order list to start every new Term includes a huge number of denials of cert in all the criminal cases that stack up over the summer break.  But it still is a bit startling to scroll through page after page after page after page of what all appear to be criminal cases in which cert has been denied this morning.

That all said, the SCOTUS order list does include a bunch of GVRs based on the vagueness ruling in Sessions v. Dimaya, most of which appear to involve criminal cases.  I have not been able to follow all the Dimaya fall-out as closely as some true experts, but I suspect that these GVRs are noteworthy not only because they come amidst a sea of cert denials.  Also, there might well be some significant criminal case relists hiding in the certiorari carnage that today's order list reflects.  So criminal justice fans and sentencing fans may still be able to find a SCOTUS silver lining in today's order list.  And, of course, on so many fronts, SCOTUS activity is just getting heated up.

October 1, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 27, 2018

"'You Miss So Much When You’re Gone': The Lasting Harm of Jailing Mothers Before Trial in Oklahoma"

Download (20)The title of this post is the title of this big new report produced by Human Rights Watch and the ACLU. Here is part of the report's starting summary:

Every day in Oklahoma, women are arrested and incarcerated in local jails waiting — sometimes for weeks, months, a year, or more — for the disposition of their cases.  Most of these women are mothers with minor children.

Drawing from more than 160 interviews with jailed and formerly jailed mothers, substitute caregivers, children, attorneys, service providers, advocates, jail officials, and child welfare employees, this report shows how pretrial detention can snowball into never-ending family separation as mothers navigate court systems and insurmountable financial burdens assessed by courts, jails, and child welfare services....

While most women admitted to jails are accused of minor crimes, the consequences of pretrial incarceration can be devastating.  This report finds that jailed mothers often feel an added, and unique, pressure to plead guilty so that they can return home to parent their children and resume their lives.  These mothers face difficulties keeping in touch with their children due to restrictive jail visitation policies and costly telephone and video calls.  Some risk losing custody of their children because they are not informed of, or transported to, key custody proceedings.  Once released from jail, they are met with extensive fines, fees, and costs that can impede getting back on their feet and regaining custody of their children.

Women are the fastest growing correctional population nationwide and since the 1990s, Oklahoma has incarcerated more women per capita than any other US state.  Local jails (which typically house people prior to conviction, sentenced to short periods of incarceration, or awaiting transfer to prisons for longer sentences) are a major driver of that growth.  On a single day, the number of women in jails across the US has increased from approximately 8,000 in 1970 to nearly 110,000 in 2014, a 1,275 percent increase, with rural counties accounting for the largest growth rate. Many times more are admitted to jail over the course of a year.

The growth in women’s incarceration also means growth in the number of jailed mothers, which has doubled since 1991.  Nationwide, more than 60 percent of women in prisons and nearly 80 percent of women in jails are mothers with minor children.  A study conducted by the US Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that a majority of incarcerated mothers lived with and were the sole or primary caretaker of minor children prior to their incarceration.

This means that when mothers go to jail or prison, their children are more likely not to have a parent left at home, and can either end up with other relatives or in foster care. One in 14 children in the US, or nearly six million children, have had a parent behind bars, which researchers identify as an adverse childhood experience associated with negative health and development outcomes.  Children of color are disproportionately impacted by parental incarceration, with one in 9 Black children having had an incarcerated parent compared to one in 17 white children.

Jailed mothers are often dealing with a myriad of issues prior to their incarceration, which is why comprehensive support is essential to keep families together, disrupt cycles of incarceration, and to preserve human rights to liberty, due process, equal protection, and family unity.  Losing contact with and custody of their minor children should not be a consequence of arrest and criminal prosecution.

While nationally and in Oklahoma the rate of women’s incarceration is garnering increasing attention, many barriers to achieving necessary reforms remain.

Human Rights Watch and the ACLU urge Oklahoma and other states to require the consideration of a defendant’s caretaker status in bail and sentencing proceedings, expand alternatives to incarceration, facilitate the involvement of incarcerated parents in their children’s lives and proceedings related to child custody, and substantially curb the imposition of fees and costs, which can impede reentry and parent-child reunification.

September 27, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, September 26, 2018

Another effective preview of coming SCOTUS review of SORNA delegation in Gundy

I was so very pleased to publish this post last week the original commentary of Wayne Logan concerning Gundy v. United States, the soon-to-be-heard Supreme Court case about the administration of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).  I now see that SCOTUSblog here has up its Gundy preview authored by Mila Sohoni and titled "Argument preview: Justices face nondelegation challenge to federal sex-offender registration law." I recommend the piece in full, and here is how it gets started and ends:

Over 12 years ago, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. One provision of SORNA created a requirement that a convicted sex offender register with every jurisdiction in which he resides, works or studies, as well as in the jurisdiction in which he was convicted. Another part of SORNA, its criminal enforcement provision, made it a crime for a convicted sex offender subject to the registration requirement to fail to register or to keep his registration information updated if he travels across state lines. But what about sex offenders convicted before SORNA’s enactment? SORNA did not itself specify whether pre-SORNA offenders were required to register. It instead authorized the attorney general of the United States to “specify the applicability” of SORNA’s registration requirement to “sex offenders convicted before” the date of SORNA’s enactment, and “to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply” with the registration requirement. 

In subsequent years, defendants charged under SORNA contended that the act and its enforcement scheme violated a panoply of constitutional rules....

How the Supreme Court chooses to decide this case could have potentially sweeping implications on several scores. The government notes that since SORNA was enacted, 4,000 sex offenders have been convicted of “federal sex-offender registry violations,” and “many of those offenders who failed to register would go free” if the court were to invalidate the delegation in SORNA. In addition, as Gundy notes, there are “hundreds of thousands” of pre-SORNA offenders now covered by the attorney general’s guidelines — as many people, he points out, as live in Wyoming — and the court’s decision will determine whether or not they will face criminal liability for failure to comply with SORNA’s registration requirements going forward.

Beyond the law of sex-offender registration, the approach the court takes in Gundy could have repercussions across the law of the administrative state. Broad delegations of authority to the executive branch form the foundation of modern regulatory government. But given Ginsburg’s dissenting vote in Reynolds, Justice Clarence Thomas’ recent opinions on nondelegation and administrative power, and Justice Neil Gorsuch’s dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in a U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit case involving SORNA, there is a real possibility that the Gundycourt will issue a ruling that revives the nondelegation doctrine from its 80-year slumber. If the justices ultimately do find that SORNA’s delegation does something more than just “sail[] close to the wind,” then we can confidently expect to see a string of challenges attacking the exercise of federal administrative power in areas ranging from environmental law to immigration law to food-and-drug law to the law of tariffs and trade. Cass Sunstein famously wrote that nondelegation doctrine has had only “one good year”; when the justices issue their ruling in Gundy, we will discover whether it will finally have a second.

Prior related post:

September 26, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, September 24, 2018

Details on not yet complete sentencing of Bill Cosby

The sentencing of Bill Cosby following his conviction on three state charges in Pennsylvania got started today, but did not reach a conclusion. This lengthy New York Times article, headlined "Bill Cosby Sentencing: Psychologist Says Threat to Women Remains," reports on what transpired. Here are excerpts: 

In the first of two days of hearings to determine Bill Cosby’s sentence for sexual assault, a psychologist for a state panel testified that Mr. Cosby deserved to be categorized as a “sexually violent predator” because he had a personality disorder that pushed him to have sex with nonconsenting partners.

The finding by the psychologist for Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offenders Assessment Board can be a factor in sentencing and in the conditions imposed on a person found to be a predator, both in prison and afterward.  But the final decision rests with Judge Steven T. O’Neill who is presiding over the hearing that could end Tuesday with one of the world’s best-known entertainers entering a prison cell.

Mr. Cosby’s lawyer, Joseph P. Green, had argued that Mr. Cosby’s age, 81, and legal blindness meant he was no risk, especially since there have been no new allegations of sexual abuse leveled against him since 2004.  “How’s he going to meet these people?” said Mr. Green. “There is no reasonable prospect that an 81-year-old blind man is likely to reoffend.”

But the psychologist, Kristen F. Dudley, said she did not believe the disorder had dissipated with age. “It is possible that he has already met someone who could be a future victim,” she said.  She said that, while Mr. Cosby had declined to meet with her, she was able to draw that conclusion by going through “boxes of documents,” including transcripts from Mr. Cosby’s two trials, one of which ended in April with his conviction on three counts of aggravated indecent assault. Mr. Cosby was convicted of drugging and assaulting Andrea Constand, a former Temple University employee for whom he emerged as a mentor....

Mr. Cosby’s team said its expert witness could not testify until Tuesday, so Judge O’Neill agreed to wait until then to make a decision on the predator determination and Mr. Cosby’s sentence.  If the judge agrees with the board’s psychological assessment, Mr. Cosby would be required to have routine counseling for the rest of his life, and even if not sentenced to prison, he would be required to report monthly to the police.

Mr. Cosby’s legal team had objected to the whole discussion, asserting that the legality of the state’s predator determination process is questionable because, among other things, it does not use the “beyond reasonable” doubt formula for findings in criminal cases.  “The statute is unconstitutional,” said Mr. Green, but the judge found otherwise.

Mr. Cosby had faced a maximum 30-year prison term, 10 years for each of three counts of aggravated indecent assault he was convicted of.  But Judge O’Neill chose on Monday to merge the counts, as allowed when they stem from the same event.  In this case, they originated with an encounter in January 2004 when, Ms. Constand said, Mr. Cosby sexually assaulted her after giving her pills that made her drift in and out of consciousness.

In their remarks, prosecutors asked Judge O’Neill to sentence Mr. Cosby to a five- to 10-year term. “By deterring this type of conduct with a sentence that is appropriate will say that you can no longer get away with this,” the district attorney, Kevin R. Steele, told the court....

Mr. Green argued in favor of house arrest, saying Mr. Cosby is a danger to no one and that the court must be careful not to allow public opinion to affect its decision-making.  “In this case we rely on you to make sure that that public advocacy doesn’t affect the application of the rule of law,” he said, adding later, “It’s your obligation to make sure that the sentencing decision is not affected by all that noise.”

Judge O’Neill will also have to consider state guidelines that recommend, but do not mandate, appropriate sentence ranges. Those guidelines, which account for any previous criminal record (Mr. Cosby has none), the seriousness of his offense, and mitigating and aggravating factors, suggest a range of about 10 months to four years.  (Sentences in Pennsylvania are given as a range of a minimum and a maximum. Inmates with good behavior may be eligible for parole when they have reached the minimum.)...

Ms. Constand, who now works as a massage therapist in Canada, spoke only briefly as her victim’s impact statement had already been incorporated into the record. “The jury heard me,” she said, “Mr. Cosby heard me and now all I am asking for is justice as the court sees fit.”...  Though dozens of other women have accused Mr. Cosby of drugging and sexually assaulting them, Judge O’Neill rejected a prosecution request to allow any of them to provide their accounts at the hearing.

Mr. Cosby’s defense team chose not to present additional witnesses to discuss, for example, Mr. Cosby’s character or any good works. But in his remarks, Mr. Green emphasized what he called Mr. Cosby’s youth of hardship and racism, his time in the United States Navy and discussed his educational achievements....

Mr. Cosby’s lawyers have filed several motions suggesting that they will file an appeal that challenges the judge’s rulings and even the judge’s personal integrity.  A key question for Tuesday will be whether Mr. Cosby is allowed to remain out on bail while he pursues those appeals, a process that could take years.

His lawyers will argue that he is not a flight risk, and that he is not likely to commit another crime. But if Judge O’Neill were to permit him to stay at home, the judge would surely face bitter criticism from the many female accusers eager for closure this week. “I don’t think the judge will let him out on appeal; he has had his freedom for a long time,” said Barbara Ashcroft, a former prosecutor.

Prior related posts:

September 24, 2018 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, September 22, 2018

"Freedom Now or a Future Later: Pitting the Lasting Implications of Collateral Consequences Against Pretrial Detention in Decisions to Plead Guilty"

The title of this post is the title of this new article on SSRN authored by Vanessa Edkins and Lucian Dervan.  Here is its abstract:

With a criminal conviction comes numerous restrictions on rights, and often these collateral consequences are not adequately communicated to a defendant accepting a plea deal. The question we posed was whether informing individuals of collateral consequences would alter their decisions to plead.  Using prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) and the theory of temporal discounting (Ainslie, 1975), we hypothesized that the delayed nature of collateral consequences — especially if the consequences were competing with overly enticing immediate rewards to accepting a plea deal, namely the ability to be released from pretrial detention — would not have the desired effect of exerting a strong influence on decisions to plead.

Across two studies — the first, an exploratory within-subjects design; the second, a more controlled between-subjects design — we found that while actual guilt mattered the most with regard to decisions to plead, pretrial detention also weighed heavy (especially influential in challenging our innocent participants’ steadfastness to hold out for a trial). Collateral consequences did not have as large of an impact, especially if pretrial detention was involved.  We also saw that, in general, participants were not opposed to the imposition of most collateral consequences.  Future directions for plea bargaining research are discussed.

September 22, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 21, 2018

Why is the Sessions' DOJ now taking death penalty off the table for Donald Fell after so much cost and agony for victims?

The question in the title of this post emerges from this notable federal capital news, headlined "Accused killer Donald Fell to take plea deal, avoid death penalty," emerging from Vermont in a long-running multiple murder case.  Here are the basics:

Nearly 20 years after he allegedly kidnapped and murdered a Vermont grandmother, accused killer Donald Fell is changing his plea and will avoid the death penalty.

Terry King, 53, was arriving for work at the Rutland Price Chopper in 2000 when police say Donald Fell and Robert Lee carjacked her, drove her to New York and killed her on the side of the road.

Fell was convicted and sentenced to death in 2005.  But his federal conviction was overturned due to juror misconduct and a new death penalty trial was set to begin.

But now there is a plea deal that takes the death penalty off the table. Court documents show Fell will plead guilty to four federal crimes, including carjacking and kidnapping with death resulting. In exchange, he will spend the rest of his life in prison without the possibility of parole.  A judge must still accept the agreement.

Fell's alleged accomplice, Robert Lee, never stood trial. He killed himself in prison. Fell and Lee were accused of two other murders that night. Police say before kidnapping Terry King, the men murdered Fell's mother, Debra, and her friend, Charles Conway in Rutland. But those killings took a back seat to King's murder because the feds were charging the men in that case since they brought King across state lines. The feds also had the death penalty to bargain with. The state of Vermont does not have a death penalty.

As highlighted via prior posts below, Fell's legal team has been making an aggressive case against his continued capital prosecution.  But I sincerely doubt federal prosecutors found any of their claims compelling or really worried that federal judges would.  So I am inclined to assume that federal prosecutors just concluded, presumably with the blessing of Attorney General Jeff Sessions, that throwing more federal taxpayer dollars after the pursuit of federal death sentence was just not a good investment of limited resources (perhaps especially because the feds have not executed anyone in over 15 years).

That all said, I still find this decision especially striking because the victims here are vocally against this plea resolution.  This local article, headlined "Victim's family says justice not served with Fell plea deal," explains the family's reaction while also suggesting federal prosecutors had to work had to talk them into being content with this resolution:

The family of Terry King says justice is not being served. That's their response to news a plea deal has been reached with King's accused killer, Donald Fell. The deal means Fell will avoid the death penalty. "I mean they beat her to death. Beat her to death while she prayed for her life. And yet he is allowed to live? What justice is that?" demanded Barbara Tuttle, Terry King's sister.

Tuttle is talking about Donald Fell, the man accused of the brutal murder of Terry King. The North Clarendon grandmother was kidnapped on her way to work back in 2000. "It is a total embarrassment for the U.S. government as far as I am concerned, a total embarrassment," Tuttle said. And King's sister says she speaks for the entire family....

"If you are going to have the death penalty, then enforce it. If you are not going to use it, then why is the law there? Why all these appeals over and over and over again? Eighteen years of this," Tuttle said.

Tuttle says her family has known a plea deal was in the works for several weeks. Under the deal, Fell will plead guilty to four federal crimes including carjacking and kidnapping with death resulting.  Tuttle says her family was convinced by prosecutors it was the best way to go to avoid another lengthy trial and appeal process.  "I would just as soon go to court all over again if I knew that he would come out with the death penalty.  And it was actually be enforced and we wouldn't have to go through 18 more years of appeals," she said. "It is ridiculous."

Tuttle says at least she won't have to keep being reminded of the case once Fell is sentenced to life without parole. She hopes if any good can come of the story, maybe it can lead to changes in the system. "They are always talking about criminal justice reform. Let me tell you, this is a perfect example of why our system is broken," she said....

It is important to note that a federal judge still needs to approve this deal. The case goes back to court Sept. 28.

I doubt the family member speaking here would be content with abolition of the death penalty as a way to fix this part of a broken capital criminal justice system. But I find it so telling that the "tough-and-tougher" federal administration that Prez Trump advocates and that AG Sessions seeks to implement ultimately gave up here on what should not be a uniquely hard capital prosecution.  Another notable data point to support the view that the long-running litigation war against the death penalty is ever closer to a complete victory.

Prior related posts:

September 21, 2018 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, September 20, 2018

"Will Bill Cosby’s Trip From America’s Dad to Sex Offender End in Prison?"

The title of this post is the headline of this lengthy New York Times review of the high-profile sentencing set to take place at the start of next week. The article includes some original analysis of Pennsylvania sentencing outcomes, and here are some excepts that should be of interest to sentencing fans:

When Bill Cosby arrives at the Montgomery County Courthouse next week to be sentenced for sexual assault, he will find out whether prison is the final stop on his descent from beloved entertainer to disgraced felon. But the judge making that decision, Steven T. O’Neill, will confront his own personal pressures, weighty expectations and knotty legal challenges. Chief among them: What to do with an 81-year-old sex offender who could become one of the most famous Americans ever to enter a cell?

At a time when the country is finally reckoning with a culture of predatory sexual abuse by powerful men, Judge O’Neill is likely to survey a courtroom in Norristown, Pa., that is filled with many of the dozens of women who say Mr. Cosby drugged and assaulted not just Andrea Constand, but them, too. A large number of these women expect a long prison sentence, one that will put an exclamation mark on the first major conviction of the #MeToo era.

“My wound was greatly healed by the guilty verdict in the spring,” said Lili Bernard, an actress who says that Mr. Cosby drugged and raped her in the early 1990s. “But to see him in handcuffs, that would be like, ‘Wow.’ We, the victims, deserve that.”

Prosecutors have said they will push for the maximum 30-year prison term: 10 years on each of three counts of aggravated indecent assault. But Mr. Cosby’s lawyers are sure to fight that, depicting him as a frail old man with failing vision, incapable of assaulting another woman or surviving a long sentence.

And Judge O’Neill will have to consider state guidelines that recommend, but do not mandate, appropriate sentence ranges. A New York Times analysis of Pennsylvania court data for the past five years found that offenders convicted of crimes similar to Mr. Cosby’s often did not receive the maximum penalty, but were more typically given sentences of two to five years....

Mr. Cosby’s spokesman, Andrew Wyatt, confirmed that Mr. Cosby would appeal his conviction, but declined to specify on what grounds.... Mr. Wyatt said Mr. Cosby would ask to remain free on bail, post-sentencing, while he pursues his appeal, a process that could take years. If Judge O’Neill were to allow that, he would surely face criticism from the many female accusers looking to find closure in the case.

“We will all feel very let down by that,” said Victoria Valentino, a former model for Playboy who says Mr. Cosby drugged and raped her in Los Angeles in 1969....

Testimony concerning prior alleged crimes is only allowed in Pennsylvania, as in other states, if, among other conditions, it demonstrates a signature pattern of abuse. But its inclusion is extremely rare, and Judge O’Neill never explained why he allowed the five additional women to testify in the trial this year after allowing only one additional accuser to speak at Mr. Cosby’s first trial in 2017. That ended in a mistrial after the jury failed to reach a verdict. “The No. 1 issue is definitely that big change, of letting in those additional complainants in the case,” said Shan Wu, a former sex-crimes prosecutor in Washington. “I am sure that Cosby’s team are licking their chops.”

Experts say judges are often more lenient about bail in cases where the appeal issues are viewed as strong. “When someone has a legitimate issue,” said Brian Jacobs, a former federal prosecutor in New York who has studied the topic, “and there’s an argument that certain evidence should not have been allowed that could reduce the chance of a conviction at retrial, then there is an interest in allowing that person to stay out on bail.”

Mr. Cosby, who has denied sexually abusing any of the women, is currently free on $1 million bail, though he is confined to his suburban Philadelphia home and has to wear a GPS monitoring device. After Mr. Cosby’s conviction, prosecutors had immediately asked for his bail to be revoked, but Judge O’Neill said he did not view Mr. Cosby as a flight risk, one of the criteria weighed in such a decision. Legal experts said it was generally uncommon in Pennsylvania for offenders to be allowed to remain free on bail, pending appeal, after a judge had sentenced them to incarceration.

Mr. Cosby was convicted on these three counts: penetration with lack of consent, penetration of the victim while she was unconscious, and penetration after administering an intoxicant. The New York Times reviewed state sentencing data for 121 cases over the past five years in which the most serious conviction was for at least one of those three counts. Mr. Cosby is far older than all of the others convicted. Their median age was 36, though in a few cases, the offender was in his late 60s.

A vast majority of the offenders also received fewer than 10 years, with a median sentence of two to five. But there were several cases in which judges gave maximum sentences of 20 years or more to offenders who had been convicted on multiple counts of aggravated indecent assault, or a single count in tandem with other, lesser crimes.

In some of those cases, the judge eschewed a common practice of making multiple sentences concurrent and instead ruled that they be served consecutively. In another case, the person qualified for a more severe sentence because he was viewed as a repeat offender under Pennsylvania’s sex offender laws.

Mr. Cosby had never before been convicted of a crime, and his team is expected to argue that his three counts should be merged into a single count, a decision that would mean that he would face a prison term of no more than 10 years.

Prosecutors have asked that an unspecified number of women who have accused Mr. Cosby of sexually assaulting them be allowed to testify at the sentencing hearing, a move that one of Mr. Cosby’s lawyers, Joseph P. Greene Jr., is trying to block. But Ms. Constand will certainly be allowed to speak at the hearing, as will Mr. Cosby, if he so chooses. The person being sentenced usually has the last word.

Mr. Jacobs, the former federal prosecutor, said that even if none of the other women were allowed to speak, he had to believe that the number of accusers who say Mr. Cosby preyed on them for decades would be an important factor in Judge O’Neill’s thinking. One purpose of sentencing in such a high-profile case can be to send a message that might deter others, he said. “The judge would have to be conscious of the fact that this is one of the earliest sentences in the Me Too era,” Mr. Jacobs said.

Judge O’Neill declined to comment for this article. But Dennis McAndrews, a Pennsylvania lawyer who has known the judge since they attended Villanova University School of Law together, said he did not expect Judge O’Neill to have any problem navigating the maze of factors in this sentencing. “He has been a judge for 14 years,” Mr. McAndrews said, “and in terms of experience and temperament, he has got all the tools necessary to assimilate and synthesize every piece of information that will come before him.”

Prior related posts:

September 20, 2018 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, September 18, 2018

Previewing the two capital punishment administration cases before SCOTUS this fall

Garrett Epps has this lengthy new commentary at The Atlantic under the headline "The Machinery of Death Is Back on the Docket: Two Supreme Court cases this fall pose hard questions about the death penalty." Here are some excerpts:

Madison v. Alabamato be argued on October 2, asks whether states can execute demented murderers who no longer remember their crimes; Bucklew v. Precythe asks when, if ever, a prisoner’s individual physical condition makes execution by lethal injection “cruel and unusual.”...

[Vernon] Madison’s legal team — led by Bryan Stevenson of the Equal Justice Initiative—argues that “No penological justification or retributive value can be found in executing a severely impaired and incompetent prisoner.” 

Alabama’s response is that the goals of capital punishment — retribution for the wrong and sending a warning to possible future offenders—are served as long as Madison knows why he is being executed, even if he doesn’t remember committing the acts. Madison’s particular condition may have been verified by doctors, the state argues, but dementia has many causes. Future claims of dementia and memory loss will be too easy to fake.

The high court has already held that states may not execute the mentally ill or the intellectually disabled; the leap to the demented would seem inevitable. But Justice Anthony Kennedy, the force behind these limits, has left the court, and death jurisprudence, as of the first Monday of next month, will likely be more volatile than usual.

In November, the court will take up the case of Russell Bucklew, whom the state of Missouri seeks to execute for the 1996 murder of Michael Sanders.... Bucklew doesn’t contest his guilt, nor does he claim that Missouri’s lethal-injection protocol is in itself “cruel and unusual.” His is what lawyers call an “as applied” challenge. What that means is this: Though lethal injection may pass muster for most executions, he argues, in his individual case, because of his unusual physical condition, the injection will cause him intense and intolerable pain.

He suffers from a rare medical condition call cavernous hemangioma. The condition has given rise to multiple blood-filled tumors in his head and mouth. These make it difficult to breathe and are prone to bloody rupture. He must sleep sitting up to avoid choking on his own blood. Being strapped flat to a gurney will subject him to suffocation, he argues. In addition, since his blood vessels are affected, he says, those administering the drugs will probably have to use a lengthy and painful procedure called a “cutdown” before the drugs can be administered, prolonging the agony....

Bucklew did offer an alternative already provided in Missouri law — a gas chamber filled with nitrogen gas, which would render him unconscious and then dead without the agony of suffocation.  The Eighth Circuit said that he did not prove the gas chamber would be better.  The court below had heard from two expert witnesses — one who described the agony of lethal injection and another who stated that gas would kill him more quickly.  A trial court could compare the two descriptions and reach its own conclusion about relative agony.  Not good enough, said the appeals court; Bucklew was required to provide one expert who would offer “comparative testimony” — in effect, a single witness to say that one method is less cruel than another....

The Bucklew case, however it is resolved, shows how fully the court has become enmeshed in the sordid details of official killing. As the population of death row ages, issues of age-related disease and dementia will become more important in assessing individual death warrants, and the court will be the last stop for those challenged.

The court seems likely to be hostile to prisoners’ claims, however.  In recent years, when the high court stepped in to halt executions, Justice Anthony Kennedy was usually the deciding vote. Kennedy will almost certainly be replaced by Brett Kavanaugh. Kavanaugh is formally an unknown on the issue. His conservatism in general, however, is orthodox, and conservative orthodoxy is hostile to new claims that executions are “cruel and unusual.”

September 18, 2018 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, September 17, 2018

SCOTUS preview guest post: "Strange Bedfellows at the Supreme Court"

Guest-postsI am very grateful that Wayne Logan, the Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law at Florida State University and the author of Knowledge as Power: Criminal Registration and Community Notification Laws in America (Stanford Univ. Press, 2009), reached out to offer me an original commentary on a case to be heard by the Supreme Court next month.  Here it is:

Herman Gundy, convicted of providing cocaine to a young girl and raping her, is a decidedly unlikely emissary in conservatives’ campaign to dismantle the administrative state.  In Gundy v. United States, to be argued the first week of the Supreme Court’s coming term, the Justices will address whether Congress violated the “non-delegation doctrine” when it directed the U.S. Attorney General to decide whether the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) should apply to individuals convicted before its 2006 enactment.  Gundy, whose rape conviction was in 2005, has a dog in the fight because the attorney general made SORNA retroactive, and Gundy was convicted of a felony under SORNA after he traveled interstate in 2012 without informing authorities.

The Court’s decision to hear Gundy’s case came as a major surprise.  The Justices have not invalidated a congressional delegation in over eighty years and all eleven federal appellate courts addressing the issue have concluded that the delegation was proper.  At least four Justices, the number needed to grant certiorari, however, thought the issue worth considering, clearing the way for a potential major assault on the modern administrative state, which is shaped by countless congressional delegations of authority to agencies.

If this occurs, it would be ironic.  Conservatives usually tout people like Gundy as poster boys for tough-on-crime policies, such as SORNA, which was enacted by a Republication Congress, signed into law by Republican President George W. Bush, and made retroactive by his attorney general (Alberto Gonzales).  Meanwhile, liberals, often fans of the administrative state, in areas such as environmental protection and workplace safety, tend to voice concern over such heavy-handed criminal justice initiatives.

On the merits, Gundy appears to have a strong claim.  For a delegation to be proper, Congress must provide an “intelligible principle” to guide the delegated decision, which as Chief Justice John Marshall stated in 1825 should merely “fill up the details” of a law’s application.  With SORNA, Congress simply directed the attorney general to decide the retroactivity question — hardly a detail, as it affected half a million people and has required significant federal prosecutorial resources.

Whether SORNA should apply retroactively is the kind of basic policy question that democratically accountable members of Congress should decide.  But they punted, for obvious political reasons.  The House and Senate could not agree on retroactivity and, when states later provided the attorney general input on SORNA’s possible retroactivity to their own registries, many vigorously objected to retroactivity.

Regardless of whether registration and notification actually promote public safety, which research has cast doubt upon, federal policy on the issue has long been marked by overreach.  Since 1994, when Congress first began threatening states with loss of federal funds unless they followed its directives, federal involvement has rightly been viewed as both foisting unfunded mandates upon states and a ham-fisted effort to policy-make in an area of undisputed state prerogative: criminal justice policy.

When Gundy is argued and decided Justice Neil Gorsuch will likely play a key role.  As a member of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge Gorsuch wrote a lengthy dissent from his colleagues’ refusal to reconsider en banc their decision that the SORNA delegation was proper.  Gorsuch advocated a requirement of heightened guidance in criminal justice delegations, justified by the unique “intrusions on personal liberty” and stigma of convictions.  There is considerable appeal to Justice Gorsuch’s view, which the Court itself suggested in 1991.  Moreover, unlike other policy areas, such as environmental quality and drug safety, criminal justice typically does not require scientific or technical expertise, lessening the practical need for delegations in the first instance.

Ultimately, the Court might conclude, with justification, that the SORNA delegation was invalid because it lacked any “intelligible principle.”  On the other extreme, as Justice Thomas might well urge, the Court could outlaw delegations altogether.  Chief Justice Roberts, in a dissent joined by Justice Alito, recently condemned the “vast power” of the administrative state, and Court nominee Judge Brett Kavanaugh has signaled similar antipathy.  Meanwhile, it is hard to say how the Court’s liberals will vote, given the conflicting interests at work.  Time will tell how the dynamic in Gundy plays out but the uncertainty itself provides yet more evidence of the high stakes involved in filling the Court’s current vacancy.  

September 17, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)