Sentencing Law and Policy

Catching up, yet again, with a big bunch of relisted acquitted conduct petitions pending before SCOTUS

Over at SCOTUSblog, John Elwood has his latest "Relist Watch" posting, and this new post is titled "Acquitted-conduct sentencing returns."   As regular readers know, I have been following a number of cert petitions challenging the practice of judges increasing sentences on the basis of conduct on which a defendant was acquitted; I also filed an amicus brief in one of the cases (in support of petitioner Dayonta McClinton).  The SCOTUSblog post provides this effective review of where matters now stand (links from the original):

Back in January, we noted that the Supreme Court had relisted five petitions challenging the constitutionality of the controversial practice of acquitted-conduct sentencing. (Disclosure: I represent the petitioner in one of those cases.) Under it, the fact that a jury has acquitted a defendant of criminal conduct doesn’t end the risk that he or she will be punished for that conduct; so long as the defendant is convicted of any criminal offense, punishment for that offense can be enhanced to account for the conduct of which the person was acquitted. In 1997’s United States v. Watts, the Supreme Court in a summary per curiam opinion held that such enhancements do not violate the double jeopardy clause. Largely based on Watts, every federal court of appeals has rejected challenges brought under the Fifth Amendment due process clause and the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee. But some state courts have held the practice is unconstitutional, and a host of prominent jurists, including Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Clarence Thomas, have criticized the practice.

After that single January relist, the court held those five cases for several months, apparently waiting to see whether the United States Sentencing Commission would act on a proposal that would have placed modest limits on the ability of federal sentencing judges to enhance sentences based on acquitted conduct. The Sentencing Commission recently decided not to act on that proposal this year, although it intends to try again next year. Some of the challengers argue that the Supreme Court should not wait for the Commission to act, because its proposals place only minor restrictions on the practice, and most acquitted-conduct sentences are imposed in state courts beyond the reach of the Commission. Moreover, the challengers note, the federal government argues that the Commission lacks authority to place restrictions on acquitted-conduct sentencing, because 18 U.S.C. § 3661 bars the imposition of restrictions on the information about the background and conduct of defendants that courts can consider.

The Supreme Court has relisted those original five cases a second time now. And they are joined by an additional eight cases raising the same (or closely analogous) issues. We’ll find out soon how lucky these 13 petitions are.

The next order list will be Tuesday morning, May 30, when I just happen to have something else of even more importance to attend to.  Since I will likely be unable to blog for most of Tuesday, I have already predicted to some colleagues that there will be all sorts of SCOTUS acquitted-conduct action that day.  We shall see, and I will surely get to catch up on blogging at some point.

A few recent of many, many prior related posts:

• "Acquitted Conduct Should Not Be Considered At Sentencing"
• Split Michigan Supreme Court finds due process precludes use of acquitted conduct at sentencing 
• "Acquitted. Then Sentenced."
• NJ Supreme Court holds, as a matter of state constitutional law, that "fundamental fairness" precludes sentence enhancement based on acquitted conduct 
• Might SCOTUS finally be ready to take up acquitted conduct sentencing enhancements?
• Hoping and pushing for SCOTUS finally taking up acquitted conduct sentencing enhancements 
• After US Sentencing Commission deferred on issue, Supreme Court back to conferencing acquitted conduct cases 

Former Alabama Govs now urge the commutation of most of Alabama's death row

Through this recent Washington Post opinion piece, headlined "We oversaw executions as governor. We regret it.", former Alabama governors Robert Bentley and Don Siegelman explain why they would now be eager to commute most of the state's death row. Here are excerpts from the start and end of the piece:

Alabama has 167 people on death row, a greater number per capita than in any other state. As far as the two of us are concerned, that is at least 146 people too many. Here’s why.

As former Alabama governors, we have come over time to see the flaws in our nation’s justice system and to view the state’s death penalty laws in particular as legally and morally troubling. We both presided over executions while in office, but if we had known then what we know now about prosecutorial misconduct, we would have exercised our constitutional authority to commute death sentences to life....

As governors, we had the power to commute the sentences of all those on Alabama’s death row to life in prison. We no longer have that constitutional power, but we feel that careful consideration calls for commuting the sentences of the 146 prisoners who were sentenced by non-unanimous juries or judicial override, and that an independent review unit should be established to examine all capital murder convictions.

We missed our chance to confront the death penalty and have lived to regret it, but it is not too late for today’s elected officials to do the morally right thing.

This piece perhaps provides yet another data point in support of the so-called "Marshall hypothesis," the idea Justice Thurgood Marshall articulated in his Furman opinion that persons learning more about the administration and effects of capital punishment will come to reject it.  It also provides another data point for the reality that it seems much easier for politicians to turn against the death penalty once they are former office holders.

Deep dives in "back-end" sentencing problems in two east coast states

Today brought the release of two notable reports on problematic back-end sentencing practices in two states.  Both reports merit more careful attention that this one post can provide, but here are the basics:

From the Prison Policy Initiative, "Excessive, unjust, and expensive: Fixing Connecticut's probation and parole problems."  A snippet:

This report provides lawmakers and advocates fundamental information to advance essential probation and parole reforms in Connecticut, changes that will reduce unnecessary incarceration and supervision; increase fairness, justice, and public safety; and save taxpayer dollars and other resources.  The report reviews the policies and data related to community supervision and technical violations in Connecticut and describes concrete ways to improve these systems. It also gives an overview of New York’s recent parole reforms, with recommendations for lawmakers and others working to shape meaningful legislation in Connecticut and beyond.. Given the immediate and ongoing signs of success in New York, any state can look to the provisions of the Less Is More Act to help determine ways to reduce excessive supervision and incarcerated populations.

What follows is a deep dive into the policies and practices that entangle too many people in the web of ongoing supervision and cycles of imprisonment in Connecticut. Those who are on probation and parole live in fear of arrest and incarceration for nearly any action that could constitute a violation — a gross misuse of resources and a disservice to families in Connecticut.  By allowing people to remain in their communities, the state can better provide residents the help they may need in the place where they’re most likely to succeed. Connecticut has a momentous opportunity to reshape the probation and parole systems and deliver racial, economic, and procedural justice to people under supervision.

From the Justice Policy Initiative, "Safe at Home: Improving Maryland’s Parole Release Decision-Making." A snippet:

This document highlights the best available research and practice in the parole field and provides recommendations for improvements to Maryland’s parole decision-making process. To develop these recommendations, JPI consulted with experts who provide technical assistance to states looking to improve their parole practices, reviewed research on parole practice and outcomes, spoke with attorneys who assist individuals applying for parole, consulted with family members and individuals who have experience with the Maryland parole system, and examined best practices in parole in other states to identify areas of needed improvement in Maryland....

The parole grant rate decreased between 2020 and 2021 despite the emergence of COVID-19 in early 2020.  Many jurisdictions around the country expedited the release of individuals from prison to reduce the spread of the virus. This was typically accomplished by moving up parole eligibility by months and expanding the number of people eligible for a hearing.  However, Maryland data reveal sharp declines in newly eligible individuals, hearings, and the releases granted.

Grant rates in Maryland follow a bell curve pattern. Emerging adults (25 years of age and younger) report a grant rate of 37 percent.  The rate increases to a high of 43 percent for people between the ages of 31 and 35, steadily declining as individuals age. People over 60 are paroled at a rate of 28 percent.  Parole grant rates that decline with age run counter to everything we know about trends in criminal offending.  Crime is a young person’s endeavor, and the likelihood of reoffending drops precipitously after age 40.  

Fascinating tale of a singular federal prosecution (and notable sentencing) of DC marijuana distributors

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss this new and lengthy story from the Washington Post concerning a federal prosecution and sentencing of modern marijuana offenders.  The full headline highlights some of the notable particulars: "D.C. legalized weed. A marijuana delivery service was indicted anyway.  A judge refused to hand out prison sentences and urged officials to resolve the tension between local legalization and federal prohibition."  I recommend the story, which defies easy summary in full to anyone interested in marijuana reform and prosecutorial (and judicial) decisions issues.  Here are just some snippets:

Connor Pennington always knew he would start his own business, though he wasn’t sure what type....  When nearly 65 percent of D.C. voters approved Initiative 71 in 2014, legalizing the recreational use of marijuana, the 29-year-old found “what I truly believe is my calling,” he said: distributing pot.  He named the company Joint Delivery.

Although he knew marijuana sales were illegal under federal law, Pennington created a website where customers could place orders, and he had delivery workers fan out daily in bikes or cars.  Hoping to create a professional atmosphere, he hired middle managers and a full-time accountant.  The company generated at least $4 million in sales from 2017 to 2022, according to court records....

In July 2022, Pennington, two younger brothers he had hired and five Joint Delivery managers were indicted — the first and so far only D.C. marijuana dispensary to face federal prosecution since Initiative 71 passed. In a related case, Pennington’s accountant was charged with money laundering....

“This is a strange kind of case, because the substance that’s involved is legal in many, many states now. It’s not in the federal system,” U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema said at a hearing May 2. “This disparity has got to get worked out soon because it creates a crazy situation in the law enforcement area.”

The DEA twice raided Joint Delivery’s offices in D.C. last year, finding cash, marijuana and cannabis products, according to the indictment.  All nine defendants pleaded guilty to money laundering or conspiring to distribute a dangerous substance and were ordered to forfeit the money they earned.

But they never set foot in a D.C. courthouse, and none went to prison.  The top federal prosecutor in the District, U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves, declined to prosecute Joint Delivery and generally does not seek charges against any of the dozens of marijuana “gifting” shops and delivery services in the city, despite occasional police raids, according to U.S. officials and defense attorneys involved in the Joint Delivery case.

Instead, all the charges against Pennington and his employees were filed by the U.S. attorney’s office for the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA), led by Jessica D. Aber.  Prosecutors said they had jurisdiction mainly because much of the money laundering occurred in Northern Virginia.  But legal experts and the judge who handled most of the case said they were puzzled by the move, because the drug distribution that prosecutors described happened in D.C.

“I don’t think this case truly belonged here,” Brinkema said at a hearing in Alexandria federal court on Jan. 6, after chiding a prosecutor in Aber’s office for seeking a “completely inappropriate” sentence of four years and nine months in prison for one of Pennington’s shift managers, Robert Spear, who was 27 years old at the time.

The judge sentenced all of those indicted to terms of supervised release of two or three years. “It was always amazing to me that the District of Columbia, where this business essentially was, was not interested in the prosecution of this case,” Brinkema said at one of the final sentencings.

Extended discussion of issues surrounding upcoming federal sentencing of Oath Keepers

Over at Lawfare, Roger Parloff has this remarkable new piece titled "Should Nine Oath Keepers Receive Terror-Enhanced Sentences?". This lengthy piece examines an array of intricate sentencing issues and it starts this way:

This week, a federal judge will begin handing down sentences for nine members of the Oath Keepers paramilitary group for their roles in the Jan. 6 insurrection, including six convicted of seditious conspiracy.  The government seeks 25 years imprisonment for the group’s founder and leader that day, Elmer Stewart Rhodes III, and sentences ranging from 10 to 21 years for the other eight.  Six of those sentences, if imposed, would become the longest to date for any Capitol Siege rioter.

The sentences, which will be imposed by U.S. District Judge Amit Mehta of Washington, D.C., raise difficult questions with no close precedents.  Although at least 15 people have been sentenced for seditious conspiracy since the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines took effect in 1987, all previous cases involved people prosecuted for conduct “tantamount to waging war against the United States,” a term of art in the sentencing guidelines that the government concedes is not met here.

Among many other items noted, this piece notes that, in some of these cases, federal prosecutors are seeking enhanced punishment based on acquitted conduct:

Three of the nine defendants being sentenced were acquitted of seditious conspiracy.  One of those defendants was actually acquitted of all three conspiracy counts charged. Yet, for sentencing purposes, the government treats those three the same as if they’d been convicted of all counts.

It is true that under controlling D.C. Circuit precedent, a sentencing judge can take into account conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted if the judge believes the conduct was nevertheless proven by the lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard — which is all that is required for sentencing purposes.  Nevertheless, as I’ll discuss later, I will be surprised if Judge Mehta effectively overrides the jury verdict in this manner....

Absent the conspiracy allegations of which Caldwell was acquitted, Caldwell’s acts would have most likely resulted in either no charges at all or class A misdemeanor charges carrying a maximum one-year jail term. Yet the government seeks 14 years imprisonment for him — just two months less than career criminal Schwartz received for, inter alia, four assaults with a dangerous weapon on police officers.

Prior related post:

• Big spread in sentencing recommendations for Oath Keepers founder convicted of seditious conspiracy 

Marijuana legalization in Minnesota includes creation of expungement board to aid reforms and collect data

In a couple of articles (see here and here, also flagged below), I have advocated that modern marijuana reform efforts should include the creation of a new criminal justice institution, which I have called a "Commission on Justice Restoration."  As explained most succinctly in this commentary, I suggest this institution be funded by the taxes generated by marijuana reforms and be tasked not only with helping those previously convicted of marijuana offenses, but also with addressing the undue harms of a wide array of prior convictions.  In my vision, this Commission on Justice Restoration could assemble hard-to-collect data about convictions and collateral consequences, conduct and disseminate research on the fiscal and social costs of these collateral consequences, and advocate for legal and court reforms to advance sound record relief practices.

Sadly, no state has yet to embrace my vision for creating a Commission on Justice Restoration.  But, excitingly, the version of marijuana reform about to be signed into law in Minnesota (basics here) includes the creation of criminal justice reform infrastructure that certainly is in the spirit of my proposal.  Specifically, this reform law provides for the creation of what is called the Cannabis Expungement Board, which is described a bit at this new official Minnesota website:

The legislation calls for automatically expunging low-level cannabis convictions and for creating a Cannabis Expungement Board, which will review felonies for expungement or resentencing.  Expungement seals a person’s conviction record, making the record not publicly accessible from the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. Sealing records is intended to remove barriers for people with cannabis-related offenses who are subject to a background check for a job or housing....

The Cannabis Expungement Board will consist of the following members:

• the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or a designee
• the Attorney General or a designee
• one public defender, appointed by the Governor upon recommendation of the State Public Defender
• the Commissioner of Corrections or a designee
• one public member with relevant experience, appointed by the Governor

This local press piece provides some more details about the remedial marijuana efforts called for in the new Minnesota law:

What crimes would be expunged under the bill?

Minnesotans with misdemeanor marijuana charges would see their records cleared, and a new Cannabis Expungement Board would evaluate expungement for felony marijuana crimes on a case-by-case basis.

How many Minnesotans would be eligible for expungement?

More than 60,000 misdemeanor marijuana cases would be eligible for automatic expungement when the bill is signed into law, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) estimates.  That includes cases the defendant won or had dismissed, wiping out all records of offenses from arrest to sentencing.  The BCA told lawmakers that it could take the agency up to a year to finish expunging all of the misdemeanor records.

The BCA doesn't have an estimate for the number of felony-level marijuana cases that would qualify for review by the Cannabis Expungement Board, a spokeswoman said.  That's because the state's criminal history system is unable to sort felony-level drug cases by the type of drug that was used.  A manual review of felony cases would be required.

I am going to be very interested in following the work of Minnesota's Cannabis Expungement Board.  Perhaps if all goes well, Minnesota might give this board responsibility to advance expungements and resentencings more generally.

Prior related writings:

• "Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement Practices" (from 2018)
• "How States Can Ensure That Today's Marijuana Reforms Also Ameliorate Harms Inflicted on Past Offenders" (from 2018)
• "Ensuring Marijuana Reform Is Effective Criminal Justice Reform" (from 20202)

Intriguing report that Trump legal team believes Apprendi can require downgrading his NY criminal charges

A helpful colleague made sure I did not miss this new Daily Beast article headlined "Trump’s New Ploy to Knock the Manhattan DA’s Case Down to Misdemeanors."  Here is how the piece starts:

When the Manhattan District Attorney finally indicted former President Donald Trump in March, Alvin Bragg made the curious decision to not detail Trump’s crimes in the official indictment — something critics seized on almost immediately to say this was an overblown case.

While previous investigators had wrestled with how to charge Trump with felonies, Bragg overcame that hurdle by essentially charging Trump with 34 misdemeanor counts of faking business records — then leveling them up to felonies in a parallel legal document.  Under New York law, faking business records is only a felony if it’s done while committing another crime.  In this case, prosecutors say Trump hid his 2016 porn star hush money payment in order to break election laws, therefore the 34 counts of taking business records become felonies.

But according to a source familiar with the Trump legal team’s internal discussions, the former president’s lawyers are now exploring how to use that otherwise ingenious move as a weakness to severely power down the case.  And Trump’s lawyers believe their new tactic could force the DA to reconsider if this is a fight worth having.  Their legal strategy all comes down to a Supreme Court case where a white guy in New Jersey got drunk and shot at a Black family’s home in 1994 — and then managed to get hate crime charges overturned.

Trump’s lawyers are eyeing the 2000 SCOTUS decision Apprendi v. New Jersey, which stressed the importance of putting in an indictment all the aspects of a crime that could enhance penalties.

Here is more:

When Trump was arraigned in criminal court in April, his defense lawyer Joe Tacopina assured reporters this case would “never” make it to trial.  And the Trump team’s new potential tactic threatens to downgrade the severity of the case before it ever reaches a jury, which could force the DA to consider whether a case full of misdemeanors justifies an expensive prosecution.

The legal precedent Trump’s team is considering is also buttressed by a 1999 Supreme Court decision, Jones v United States, which decided that “any fact other than prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

If Trump’s team successfully uses that defense strategy, it would be an embarrassing defeat for Bragg, who could have just as easily put all the information about the case that was included in the “Statement of Facts” in the indictment and avoided this whole mess.

Prison Policy Initiative shines light on "shadowy form of incarceration" known as civil commitment

The folks at the Prison Policy Initiative have released yet another new effective and informative data report. This new report is titled "What is civil commitment? Recent report raises visibility of this shadowy form of incarceration" and is authored by Emma Peyton Williams.  Here is part of the starting text:

As if serving a prison sentence wasn’t punishment enough, 20 states and the federal Bureau of Prisons detain over 6,000 people, mostly men, who have been convicted of sex offenses in prison-like “civil commitment” facilities beyond the terms of their criminal sentence.  Around the turn of the millennium, 20 states, Washington D.C., and the federal government passed “Sexually Violent Persons” legislation that created a new way for these jurisdictions to keep people locked up — even indefinitely — who have already served a criminal sentence for a “sex offense.”  In some states, people are transferred directly from prison to a civil commitment facility at the end of their sentence.  In Texas, formerly incarcerated people who had already come home from prison were rounded up in the middle of the night and relocated to civil commitment facilities without prior notice.  This practice, though seldom reported on, made some news in 2017 when the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear a case from Minnesota after a federal judge deemed the practice unconstitutional.  The Prison Policy Initiative has included civil commitment in our Whole Pie reports on U.S. systems of confinement, but here we offer a deeper dive, including recently-published data from a survey of individuals confined in an Illinois facility under these laws.

Some advocates call civil commitment facilities “shadow prisons,” in part because of how little news coverage they receive and how murky their practices are.  In Illinois, for example, the Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities are overseen by the John Howard Association, an independent prison watchdog organization.  But Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, a civil commitment center that opened after Illinois enacted its own Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act in 1998, is not subject to the same kind of oversight because it is housed under the Department of Human Services and is not technically classified as a prison.  This is true in many states that have “Sexually Violent Persons” laws on their books, and consequently, horrific medical neglect and abuse proliferate in these shadowy facilities. For instance, a New Jersey civil commitment facility was one of the deadliest facilities at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic....

A second critique of this system is reflected in another term advocates use to describe it: “pre-crime preventative detention.”  Civil commitment (unlike other involuntary commitment practices, such as for the treatment of serious mental illness) can be seen as “double jeopardy” repeat punishment for an initial crime, or preventative detention for a theoretical future crime that has not occurred.  Advocates rightly critique the fact that one of the primary justifications for civil commitment is the predicted risk that detained individuals will “re-offend,” even though people who have been convicted of sex offenses are less likely to be re-arrested than other people reentering society after incarceration.

Regardless, in many states, people who have been convicted of sex offenses are transferred from DOC facilities to civil commitment facilities at the end of their sentence and held pretrial, then re-sentenced by the civil courts.  The length of these sentences is often indeterminate, as release depends on progress through mandated “treatment.”  But neither “risk assessment” nor “progress through treatment” are objective measures.  In fact, advocates and people who have experienced these systems argue that risk assessment tools are used to rationalize the indefinite confinement of identity-specific groups, and that assessing progress through treatment is a highly subjective process determined by a rotating cast of “therapeutic” staff.

"What If Criminal Lawmaking Becomes Trustworthy?"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Zachary Price now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

One common theoretical perspective posits that courts should assume a counter-majoritarian role in criminal law because the political process systematically disfavors the interests of criminal suspects and defendants.  Recent shifts in the politics of crime, however, complicate this perspective’s assumptions, raising the paradoxical possibility that welcome improvements in the politics of crime will weaken the theoretical case for counter-majoritarian judicial decisions.  This essay tentatively considers whether, if at all, courts’ interpretive approach should change in response to any continuing moderation of historic “tough on crime” politics.  It suggests that while arguments for narrow construction of criminal statutes will remain strong for the foreseeable future, a more moderate and competitive politics of crime could justify greater judicial deference, at least at the margins and in some limited circumstances, to democratic choices regarding criminal procedure.

Notable sentencing research in recent special issue of "Law and Human Behavior"

I just tripped across the February 2023 issue of the journal "Law and Human Behavior," which is labeled as "Special Issue: Racial Justice in the Criminal Justice and Legal Systems."  This issue has lots of notable research, and sentencing fans might be especially interested in these pieces:

"The trial tax and the intersection of race/ethnicity, gender, and age in criminal court sentencing" by Peter S. Lehmann

"The eye of the beholder: Increased likelihood of prison sentences for people perceived to have Hispanic ethnicity" by Erik Girvan and Heather Marek

"Does 'Jamal' Receive a Harsher Sentence Than 'James'? First-Name Bias in the Criminal Sentencing of Black Men" by Dushiyanthini (Toni) Kenthirarajah, Nicholas P. Camp, Gregory M. Walton, Aaron C. Kay and Geoffrey L. Cohen

Ninth Circuit panel rules that Elizabeth Holmes cannot stay out on bail while her appeal is pending

As reported in this new AP article, "Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes appears to be soon bound for prison after an appeals court Tuesday rejected her bid to remain free while she tries to overturn her conviction in a blood-testing hoax that brought her fleeting fame and fortune." Here is more:

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling comes nearly three weeks after Holmes deployed a last-minute legal maneuver to delay the start of her 11-year prison sentence.  She had been previously ordered to surrender to authorities on April 27 by U.S. District Judge Edward Davila, who sentenced her in November.

Davila will now set a new date for Holmes, 39, to leave her current home in the San Diego area and report to prison. The punishment will separate Holmes from her current partner, William “Billy” Evans, their 1-year-old son, William, and 3-month-old daughter, Invicta.  Holmes’ pregnancy with Invicta — Latin for “invincible,” or “undefeated” — began after a jury convicted her on four counts of fraud and conspiracy in January 2022.

Davila has recommended that Holmes serve her sentence at a women’s prison in Bryan, Texas.  It hasn’t been disclosed whether the federal Bureau of Prisons accepted Davila’s recommendation or assigned Holmes to another facility.

Holmes’ former lover and top lieutenant at Theranos, Ramesh “Sunny’ Balwani, began a nearly 13-year prison sentence in April after being convicted on 12 counts of fraud and conspiracy last July in a separate trial.  Balwani, 57, was incarcerated in a Southern California prison after losing a similar effort to remain free on bail while appealing his conviction....

Holmes’s lawyers have been fighting her conviction on grounds of alleged mistakes and misconduct that occurred during her trial.  They have also contended errors and abuses that biased the jury were so egregious that she should be allowed to stay out of prison while the appeal unfolds — a request that has now been rebuffed by both Davila and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Some prior related posts:

• Elizabeth Holmes convicted on 4 of 11 fraud charges ... but now can be sentenced on all and more 
• Making the case, because "upper-class offenders ... might be even more reprehensible," for a severe sentence for Elizabeth Holmes 
• Sentencing memos paint very different pictures of Elizabeth Holmes 
• Federal judge imposes (within guideline) sentence of 135 months on Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes 
• Sentencing judge recommended prison camp for Elizabeth Holmes to serve her sentence 
• Citing prior "attempt to flee the country," feds urging that Elizabeth Holmes start her prison sentence in April
• Federal judge denies Elizabeth Holmes motion to remain free pending her appeal of fraud convictions 

Watching a quartet of SCOTUS criminal justices cases as the Term starts to wind down

As has been true in the last few Terms, the current Supreme Court Term is almost certain to be remembered for decisions outside the core realm of criminal justice.  But it has still already been an interesting SCOTUS Term for hard-core criminal justice fans with seemingly lots of (small?) wins for criminal defendants in cases like Reed, Cruz, Ciminelli, and Percoco.  Of course, the "easy" cases tend to be resolved first, and I would not expect quite so many wins for criminal defendants in the weeks ahead.  

By my rough count, there are still around ten still-pending criminal justice (or criminal-justice-related) cases for the Justices still to resolve before they head off for their summer vacations.  All the remaining cases could prove interesting and consequential, but here are four remaining cases that have most captured my attention (with help from this SCOTUSblog list):

Jones v. Hendrix, No. 21-857 [Arg: 11.1.2022]

Issue(s): Whether federal inmates who did not — because established circuit precedent stood firmly against them — challenge their convictions on the ground that the statute of conviction did not criminalize their activity may apply for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C § 2241 after the Supreme Court later makes clear in a retroactively applicable decision that the circuit precedent was wrong and that they are legally innocent of the crime of conviction.

 

Dubin v. U.S., No. 22-10 [Arg: 2.27.2023]

Issue(s): Whether a person commits aggravated identity theft any time they mention or otherwise recite someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense.

 

Counterman v. Colorado, No. 22-138 [Arg: 04.19.2023]

Issue(s): Whether, to establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective "reasonable person" would regard the statement as a threat of violence.

Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota, No. 22-166 [Arg: 04.26.2023]

Issue(s): (1) Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment's takings clause; and (2) whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt, plus interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.

I would welcome in the comments any predictions about likely outcomes in these cases and/or the flagging of other pending criminal-justice-related cases from this Term that folks are keeping a close eye on.  We are not quite to the final stretch of the SCOTUS Term, but there are opinions coming this Thursday and likely just about every week from now until the end of June.

SCOTUS grants cert in ACCA cases to address prior drug convictions as predicates for 15-year mandatory minimum

As predicted in this recent post, the Supreme Court today in this morning's SCOTUS order list granted cert in a pair of cases (which were consolidated) raising another question regarding the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act's mandatory minimum 15-year prison term for illegal gun possession.  The cases are Brown v. US, No. 22-6389 and Jackson v. US, No. 22-6640, and here are links to the Brown cert petition and the Jackson cert petition.  Here is the "Question Presented" from the Brown petition:

The Armed Career Criminal Act provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence.  But if the felon already has at least three “serious drug offense” convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. 

Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart.  If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate.

But federal drug law often changes — as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana.  If state law doesn’t follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum.  Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match — and the state offense is an ACCA predicate.  Under the amended version, the offenses do not match — and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate.  So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum.

The question presented is:

Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA’s categorical approach?

UPDATE: A helpful reader made sure I did not overlook the fact that a different drug is at issue in the Jackson case.  At issue in that case is the status of a conviction that came before 2015 when "the federal government removed ioflupane I123 from the federal drug schedules."  

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissents from SCOTUS denial of cert regarding challenge to execution methods

The particulars of constitutional challenges over execution methods has generated three modern Supreme Court Eighth Amendment rulings (Baze, Glossip, and Bucklew).  Though the state prevailed in all these rulings against condemned prisoners' various attacks on various lethal injection protocols, litigation over execution methods are still common and the applicable Eighth Amendment jurisprudence remains contested.  These realities provide the background for a dissent from the denial of cert in this morning's SCOTUS order list today by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, in Hamm v. Smith, No. 22–580. Here are excerpts from the intricate six-page dissent:

In this petition, the State now asks this Court to summarily reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Smith pleaded a viable Eighth Amendment claim. I would do so. The judgment below rests on flawed Circuit precedent that is irreconcilable with our method-of-execution case law....

In 2018, Alabama enacted a statute authorizing execution by nitrogen hypoxia for inmates who elected that method within 30 days of their sentences becoming final or, for those whose sentences were already final before June 1, 2018, within 30 days of that date.  Ala. Code §15– 18–82.1(b)(2). (Smith did not elect nitrogen hypoxia, so lethal injection remains the only method of execution authorized by state law in his case. §15–18–82.1(a).)  Nearly five years later, Alabama has yet to carry out any execution by nitrogen hypoxia or to finalize a protocol for implementing that method — which “ha[s] never been used to carry out an execution and ha[s] no track record of successful use” in any jurisdiction. Bucklew, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[T]he Eleventh Circuit has treated the existence of this Alabama statute as relieving inmates like Smith of their burden to plead and prove that nitrogen hypoxia is feasible and readily implemented in fact.... [But] whether the State has authorized the proffered alternative as a matter of state statutory law has no relevance to the plaintiff ’s burden of showing a constitutional violation.  Bucklew has already explained why: “[T]he Eighth Amendment is the supreme law of the land, and the comparative assessment it requires can’t be controlled by the State’s choice of which methods to authorize in its statutes.” 587 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 19–20)....

When the question is whether the Eighth Amendment requires a State to replace its chosen method with an alternative method in executing the plaintiff, it is simply irrelevant, without more, that the State’s statutes authorize the use of the alternative method in other executions that are to take place sometime in the indefinite future.  Here, Smith alleged only that, and nothing more. He therefore failed to state a claim, and the Eleventh Circuit erred by holding otherwise.

The Eleventh Circuit’s error is not only plain but also serious enough to warrant correction. Even if “the burden of the alternative-method requirement ‘can be overstated,’” Bucklew, 587 U. S., at ___ (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring) (slip op., at 1), it remains an essential element of an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim, and it must be appropriately policed lest it become an instrument of dilatory litigation tactics.  The comparative analysis set forth in Baze, Glossip, and Bucklew contains an inherent risk of incentivizing “an inmate intent on dragging out litigation . . . to identify only a method of execution on the boundary of what’s practically available to the state.”  Middlebrooks v. Parker, 22 F. 4th 621, 625 (CA6 2022) (Thapar, J., statement respecting denial of rehearing en banc).  The Eleventh Circuit’s approach of treating any statutorily authorized method as available as a matter of law — even an entirely novel method that may not be readily implementable in reality — only heightens that danger.  In turn, and as a result, it “perversely incentivize[s] States to delay or even refrain from approving even the most humane methods of execution” any earlier than the moment they are prepared to put them into practice.  Price v. Dunn, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 11).

"Enforcing Marijuana Prohibitions: Prosecutorial Policy in Four States"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now available via SSRN and produced jointly by The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law's Drug Enforcement and Policy Center and the University of North Carolina School of Law's Prosecutors and Politics Project. Here is its abstract:

As more states have legalized and decriminalized marijuana, the enforcement of criminal laws prohibiting the personal possession of marijuana has become more controversial in states where cannabis remains illegal.  Yet, very little is understood about how other prosecutors enforce criminal prohibitions on the personal possession of marijuana.  This study aims to fill this gap.  It systematically examines prosecutorial enforcement of laws prohibiting the personal possession of marijuana in four states that have not legalized medical or adult-use marijuana.  The study had four major goals: (1) to determine what enforcement policies had been adopted by incumbent prosecutors, (2) to determine the enforcement platforms of candidates running for the office of local prosecutor, (3) to explore the reasons and reasoning behind those policies and platforms, and (4) to determine what information, if any, was accessible to voters about the issue.

As flagged in this post over at my other blog, this study will be discussed at an onlne event next week titled "Prosecuting Cannabis: Approaches from States without Legalization."  Folks can register for this event here, and this event page provides some background along with the scheduled panelists.

Man convicted of murdering BLM marcher, whom Texas Gov has pledged to pardon, sentenced by judge to 25 years in prison

This new AP article, headlined "Army sergeant who fatally shot BLM protester in Texas sentenced to 25 years," reports on the latest legal development in a high-profile case which first caught my attention when Gov. Greg Abbott announced on social media that he would pardon a just-convicted killer.  Here are some of the details:

A U.S. Army sergeant plans to appeal his 25-year prison sentence for fatally shooting an armed man during a Black Lives Matter protest in Texas, and will cooperate with efforts by the state’s Republican governor to issue a pardon, his attorney said Wednesday.

Daniel Perry, 36, was convicted of murder in April for killing 28-year-old Garrett Foster during the downtown Austin protest in July 2020....  Perry attorney Clinton Broden said in a statement that his client would appeal. He called Perry’s conviction the product of “political prosecution” and said the defense team would “fully cooperate in the pardon process.”

Perry’s conviction prompted outrage from prominent conservatives, and Gov. Greg Abbott, citing Texas’ Stand Your Ground laws, has said he would sign a pardon once a recommendation from the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles hits his desk.  The board — which is stacked with Abbott appointees — is reviewing Perry’s case on the governor’s orders, but it is unclear when it will reach a decision.

District Judge Clifford Brown delivered a statement during sentencing that didn’t address the potential pardon directly.  But he insisted that Perry had a “fair and impartial trial” and that the jury’s decision “deserves our honor and it deserves to be respected.” 

Travis County District Attorney Jose Garza said it was Abbott “who decided to insert politics in this case.” Garza said he’s been in touch with the board and has been assured that prosecutors will be allowed to present a case against a pardon, and that it will include a presentation from Foster’s family.

The pardon process is a valuable check on the court system, Broden said. “Those who claim that Governor Abbott’s expressed intent is based on politics simply choose to ignore the fact that it was only the political machinations of a rogue district attorney which led to Sgt. Perry’s prosecution in the first instance,” he said.

Perry was stationed at Fort Hood, about 70 miles (110 kilometers) north of Austin, when the shooting happened. He had just dropped off a ride-share customer and turned onto a street filled with protesters. Perry said he was trying to get past the crowd and fired his pistol when Foster pointed a rifle at him. Witnesses testified that they did not see Foster raise his weapon, and prosecutors argued that Perry could have driven away without shooting.

Perry said he acted in self-defense. His lawyers asked the judge to consider his more than a decadelong military career and hand down a sentence of no more than 10 years. Army spokesman Bryce Dubee has said Perry is classified as in “civilian confinement” pending separation from the military.

On Tuesday, prosecutors submitted into evidence dozens of texts and social media posts Perry wrote, shared or liked, including some shockingly racist images. They had been excluded from Perry’s trial, but were publicly released after his conviction and allowed into the sentencing phase by Brown. “This man is a loaded gun, ready to go off at any perceived threat,” prosecutor Guillermo Gonzalez said, urging Brown to issue a sentence of at least 25 years. “He’s going to do it again.”

Perry, who is white, was working as a ride-share driver in downtown Austin on July 25, 2020, when he shot and killed Foster, an Air Force veteran. Foster, who was also white, was legally carrying an AK-47 rifle as he participated in the demonstration against police killings and racial injustice, following the death of George Floyd, a Black man, by a white Minneapolis police officer.

Prior related post:

• Texas Gov pledges to swiftly pardon man convicted of murder of BLM marcher day after jury conviction

"The Eighth Amendment's Time to Shine; Previewing Florida's Imminent Constitutional Crisis in Capital Punishment"

The title of ths post is the tile of this new piece authored by Melanie Kalmanson now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

In April 2023, Florida Governor DeSantis enacted legislation that lowers the jury vote necessary to impose a sentence of death in the state to 8-4.  The new statute removes the procedural safeguards that were implemented after the U.S. Supreme Court held in 2016 that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violated defendants' right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.

Litigation about the constitutionality and application of the new statute has already started and will likely continue for a while until the full effect of the statute is determined.  This Essay previews some of the issues that will be litigated and forecasts that the Eighth Amendment will be the star of the show in this Act of the play on Florida’s constitutional crises in capital punishment. 

Should every state have a dedicated commission to receive complaints about prosecutors?

The question in the title of this post was my first reaction to the news of a commission just created in Georgia.  This AP piece, headlined "Georgia enacts law letting panel punish, oust prosecutors," provides these details:

Gov. Brian Kemp signed a bill into law Friday creating a new commission empowered to discipline and remove wayward prosecutors, saying it will curb “far-left prosecutors” who are “making our communities less safe.”

Kemp made the remarks at the Chatham County Sheriff's Office in Savannah, where he signed the measure establishing the Prosecuting Attorneys Qualifications Commission, which will launch July 1 and start accepting complaints Oct. 1....

The efforts continue anti-crime campaigns that Republicans ran nationwide last year, accusing Democrats of coddling criminals and improperly refusing to prosecute whole categories of crimes, including marijuana possession.

Georgia Democrats strenuously opposed the measure, saying the Republican legislative majority was seeking another way to impose its will on Democratic voters at the local level....

Crucially, the Georgia law mandates that a prosecutor must consider every case for which probable cause exists and can’t exclude categories of cases from prosecution. Experts have said that considering every case individually is unrealistic, because prosecutors turn down many more cases than they charge. However, it’s unclear if the new law will change prosecutors’ behavior or just lead them to avoid talking publicly about charging decisions.

The eight-member commission will include six current or former prosecutors and two other lawyers. It will oversee DAs and solicitors general — elected prosecutors who handle lower-level crimes in some counties....

The law was born from frustrations involving a white Republican prosecutor in suburban Atlanta who was indicted for bribery related to sexual harassment claims. He lingered in office until he pleaded guilty to unprofessional conduct and resigned in 2022.

Some Democrats were interested in similar measures for a time because of Jackie Johnson, a coastal Georgia DA who was charged with hindering the police investigation into the 2020 killing of Ahmaud Arbery. Democratic interest cooled after voters ousted Johnson.

The rules could also target prosecutors who declared before Roe v. Wade was overturned in 2022 that they wouldn't prosecute abortion-related offenses. Seven current Georgia DAs fit that description.

Though the AP piece leans into the political dynamics driving some debates over prosecutorial behaviors, this official press release from Gov Kemp notes that the new Georgia Commission can and will be policing local prosecutors on various fronts:

Governor Brian P. Kemp, accompanied by First Lady Marty Kemp, members of the General Assembly, district attorneys and solicitors-general, and other local and state leaders, signed Senate Bill 92 today, establishing the Prosecuting Attorneys Qualifications Commission (PAQC). The PAQC will serve as a valuable oversight mechanism for district attorneys and solicitors-general across Georgia, ensuring these officials fulfill their constitutional and statutory duties....

The bill establishes the following grounds for the removal or involuntary retirement of a district attorney or solicitor-general from office:

• Mental or physical incapacity that interferes with the performance of duties that is likely permanent;
• Willful misconduct in office;
• Willful and persistent failure to carry out statutory duties;
• Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
• Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the office into disrepute; or
• Knowingly authorizing or permitting an assistant district attorney or assistant solicitor-general to commit any of the aforementioned acts.

To parrot this press release, I sincerely think it would be a great idea to have a "valuable oversight mechanism for district attorneys" in every state (and for federal prosecutors, too).  I have often heard from persons who sincerely believe they have witnessed a prosecutor engage in "willful misconduct" or "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the office into disrepute"; so creating a central commission (comprised mostly of former and current prosecutors) to hear complaints about, and conduct any needed investigations of, the work of prosecutors makes a lot of sense to me. Of course, like many government entitles, if unduly politicized or problematically ideological, this commission could possibly do more harm than good.  But, given the general lack of transparency and accountability for prosecutorial actions and practices, I am inclined to be hopeful about this new PAQC.

"Evidence Rules for Decarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Erin Collins and available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Two observations about the operation of the criminal legal system are so widely accepted that they are seem undeniable: First, it is a system of pleas, not trials.  Second, the system is too punitive and must be reformed.  One could easily think, therefore, that the Rules of Evidence, which apply intentionally and explicitly only to the adjudicatory phase of criminal procedure, have nothing to do with the solution.  And legal scholarship focusing on decarceration largely reflects this assumption: while many have explored reforms that target front end system actors and processes that lead people into the system (e.g. police, prosecutors, broad criminal statutes), and back end reforms that that seek to lessen the toll of punitive policies (sentencing reform, alternatives to incarceration), markedly fewer have explored how what happens in the middle — adjudication — contributes to mass incarceration.

While this oversight makes sense, it is not justified because it is also equally undeniable that plea bargaining happens in the shadow of trial.  This Essay examines how the shadow of trial — specifically, the shadow cast by evidentiary rulings about the accused person’s past — contributes to the perpetuation of an expansive carceral state.  It identifies how evidence rules have been relaxed, tweaked, specialized, or unmoored from their foundational principles in ways that facilitate prosecution and conviction or essentially force plea deals — without regard for the truth, fairness, or justice of the outcome.  In other words, it identifies ways that evidence law undermines the Rules’ primary purpose, which is to advance fair proceedings “to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”

US Supreme Court stays the execution of Richard Glossip

As reported in this AP article, the "Supreme Court on Friday blocked Oklahoma from executing death row inmate Richard Glossip for his role in a 1997 murder-for-hire after the state’s attorney general agreed Glossip’s life should be spared." Here is more:

Glossip had been scheduled to be put to death on May 18 despite statements by new Oklahoma Attorney General Gentner Drummond that Glossip did not receive a fair trial.  An Oklahoma appeals court subsequently upheld Glossip’s conviction and the state’s pardon and parole board deadlocked in a vote to grant him clemency.

The high court put the execution on hold indefinitely while it reviews the case.  Justice Neil Gorsuch took no part in the decision, presumably because he dealt with the case earlier as an appeals court judge.

“There is nothing more harrowing than the thought of executing a man who the state now admits has never received a fair trial,” Glossip attorney Don Knight said in a statement.  “Our hope is that the court will reverse the decision of the (Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals) and vacate Mr. Glossip’s conviction once and for all.”

Drummond, a Republican, said in a statement he was grateful for the high court’s decision. “I will continue working to ensure justice prevails in this important case,” he said.  In a rare move, Drummond, the state’s top prosecutor, supported a high-court reprieve for Glossip, telling the justices, “Glossip’s trial was unfair and unreliable.”

But Drummond also has said he does not believe Glossip is innocent of the murder-for-hire killing of Glossip’s former boss, Barry Van Treese, in 1997. Another man, Justin Sneed, admitted robbing and killing Van Treese after Glossip promised to pay him $10,000. Sneed received a life sentence in exchange for his testimony and was the key witness against Glossip....

Former Oklahoma County District Attorney David Prater has long said he believes Glossip persuaded Sneed to kill Van Treese. He said that while Sneed’s testimony was most compelling, there was plenty of evidence to corroborate it. “When police came to talk to Glossip about Van Treese’s whereabouts, he directed him away from the room he knew Van Treese was in,” Prater said Friday. “At any point, Glossip had the opportunity to tell the police that Sneed did this. He never did that. He even helped Sneed clean up everything.”

Prater said Sneed and Glossip also both had a large amount of cash that Prater said they stole from Van Treese’s car. “In light of Gentner Drummond’s position regarding the stay, I don’t feel like the Supreme Court had much of a choice,” Prater said. “But the truth will come out.”

Two separate independent investigations have revealed problems with the prosecution’s case. Drummond said Sneed lied on the stand about his psychiatric condition and his reason for taking the mood-stabilizing drug lithium, and that prosecutors knew Sneed was lying. Also, evidence was destroyed, Drummond said.

Some Republican state lawmakers who support the death penalty have joined the growing chorus of Glossip supporters who are seeking to overturn his conviction. “We’re just ecstatic,” state Rep. Kevin McDugle said in a brief telephone interview on Friday.

Glossip’s case has been to the Supreme Court before. He was given a reprieve in 2015, although the court later ruled 5-4 against him in a case involving the drugs used in lethal executions.  Glossip has been just hours away from being executed three separate times. His last scheduled execution, in September 2015, was halted just moments before he was to be led to the death chamber when prison officials realized they had received the wrong lethal drug. That mix-up helped prompt a nearly seven-year moratorium on the death penalty in Oklahoma.

A few prior recent relates posts:

• Oklahoma Gov grants 60-day execution stay for Richard Glossip while courts consider innocence claim 
• New Oklahoma Attorney General formally moves to set aside Richard Glossip's capital conviction
• Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, rejecting state AG's motion, refuses to set aside Richard Glossip's capital conviction

"Law and Order: The Timing of Mitigating Evidence Affects Punishment Decisions"

The title of this post is the title of this paper now available via SSR authored by Emily Conder, Christopher Brett Jaeger and Jonathan Lane. Here is its abstract:

When we hear about a transgression, we may consider whether the perpetrator’s individual circumstances make their transgression more understandable or excusable.  Mitigating circumstances may reduce the severity of punishment that is deemed appropriate, both intuitively and legally.  But importantly, in courts of public opinion and of law, mitigating information is typically presented only after information about a perpetrator’s transgression.  We explore whether this sequence influences the force of mitigating evidence.

Specifically, in two studies, we examined whether presenting evidence about a perpetrator’s background before or after evidence of their violation influenced how severely U.S. participants punished perpetrators.  In Study 1 (N=132), evidence about the perpetrator’s mitigating circumstances reduced punishment only when it was presented before evidence about the perpetrator’s violation.  Study 2 (N=316) additionally revealed this moderating effect of presentation order across a variety of premeditated and impulsive violations.  These findings are consistent with person-centered theories of punishment and with the Story Model of adjudication.

New "End the Trial Penalty Coalition" seeks to end "coercive elements of plea bargaining" and to restore right to a jury trial

Via email, I received notice of a new colelction of advocacy groups called the "End the Trial Penalty Coalition."  Here are excerpts from the email/press release from this new Coaltion (with links from the original):

Twenty-four criminal justice organizations, impacted people, think tanks, academics, activists, and reform leaders from across the ideological spectrum have united to end the trial penalty -- the substantial and coercive difference between the sentence in a plea offer prior to trial versus the much greater sentence a defendant often receives after trial.  Those who choose to go to trial and are convicted often face sentences that are, on average, three times the plea offer and sometimes measured in decades.

The coercive and punitive effects of the trial penalty are so pervasive that they have virtually eliminated our constitutional right to trial. In fact, over 97% of cases ending in a conviction never go to trial, leading to a range of issues reverberating through our legal system, including the waiver of numerous constitutional freedoms and rights, overcriminalization, loss of public oversight, and racial injustice.  The Coalition aims to restore the right to trial, helping right these wrongs to ensure a fair, rational, and humane criminal legal system.

Members of this new Coalition will work together to raise awareness of the adverse effects of a justice system without trials, advocate policy reform, and forge relationships with key policymakers.  The Coalition will also serve as a resource for people interested in participating in an impactful criminal legal reform movement.  The Coalition has published a comprehensive Policy Overview which includes policy ideas to combat coercive practices in the plea bargaining process, to improve data collection and transparency, and to foster post-trial reform and accountability measures.

After US Sentencing Commission deferred on issue, Supreme Court back to conferencing acquitted conduct cases

Regular readers surely recall prior posts about the McClinton case still before the US Supreme Court raising issues about the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing in which I filed an amicus brief in support of petitioner Dayonta McClinton.  As detailed in this SCOTUS docket sheet, a number of notable interest groups have also filed amicus briefs in support of cert in this case.

After various delays, the Justices considered the McClinton case (as well as a number of others raising acquitted conduct issues) at their conference in January 2023.  Upon initial review, these cases were all "relisted," which is usually a sign that at least one Justice is interested in taking a closer look at the case.  But then, interestingly, these cases did not appear in subsequent SCOTUS order lists nor did the docket sheet show that the case was rescheduled for future conferences.  A number of folks speculated, myself included, that the announcement by the US Sentencing Commission to consider an amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines on the acquitted conduct issue had led the Justices to put a hold on McClinton and the other acquitted conduct cases.

But, as reported here, last month the US Sentencing Commission ultimately decided not to advance any guideline amendments addressing the issue of acquitted conduct in this year's amendment cycle.  This USSC decision served, in a sense, to punt this matter back to the Justices.  (The issues and possible work of SCOTUS and the USSC on acquitted conduct are not identical, but they do overlap in various possible ways.)  Excitingly, SCOTUS seems to be back at it as the McClinton docket sheet now shows this case will be reviewed again next week by the Justices at their May 11 conference.

I still think the odds of a cert grant on this issue to be remote.  Stll, I think it important that SCOTUS indicate, one way or another, if it is inclined to review this important issue anew a quarter-century after its Watts ruling.  A host of new Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence raising questions about the practice of acquitted conduct sentencing enhancements could certainly justify review, but the Justices have been disinclined to revisit this issue for quite some time. 

A few recent of many, many prior related posts:

• "Acquitted Conduct Should Not Be Considered At Sentencing"
• Split Michigan Supreme Court finds due process precludes use of acquitted conduct at sentencing 
• "Acquitted. Then Sentenced."
• NJ Supreme Court holds, as a matter of state constitutional law, that "fundamental fairness" precludes sentence enhancement based on acquitted conduct 
• Might SCOTUS finally be ready to take up acquitted conduct sentencing enhancements?
• Hoping and pushing for SCOTUS finally taking up acquitted conduct sentencing enhancements 

"Guilty Minds"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper recently posted to SSRN authored by Michael Serota. Here is its abstract:

This Article develops a new vision of mens rea by returning to a bygone era’s conception of the guilty mind.  The common law understanding of mens rea is broad and moralistic; it encompasses all mental characteristics bearing on an actor’s blameworthiness.  Undertheorized and oft neglected, this “Guilty Minds” approach has been replaced with the Model Penal Code’s reconceptualization of mens rea as the purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence applicable to every element of a criminal offense.  Modern criminal law’s embrace of this narrower and more legalistic “PKRN” approach to mens rea has brought with it many well-known benefits.  But there are also overlooked costs of divorcing mens rea doctrine from its moral foundations.  This Article demonstrates how the Guilty Minds approach, once clarified and refined, can address these costs while revealing a promising new pathway for criminal law reform.

Synthesizing a wide body of experimental research, the Article transforms the historically vague Guilty Minds approach into a multi-dimensional model of culpability rooted in the community’s sense of justice.  Drawing on contemporary criminal theory, the Article then makes the moral philosophical case for viewing this reconceptualization of mens rea as a critical constraint on criminal liability.  After identifying structural flaws in contemporary mens rea policies that violate this constraint, the Article proposes a novel statutory solution: an insufficient blameworthiness defense, which empowers factfinders to dismiss charges based upon a structured assessment of an accused’s mitigating mental states.  The Article argues that the proposed defense would be accessible to juries, administrable by courts, and harmonious with the PKRN approach — thereby providing all U.S. jurisdictions with an effective way to bolster mens rea protections in their criminal codes.

"Why Criminal Defendants Cooperate: The Defense Attorney's Perspective"

The title of this post is the title of this new piece recently posted to SSRN and authored by Jessica Roth, Anna D. Vaynman and Steven D. Penrod. Here is its abstract:

Cooperation is at the heart of most complex federal criminal cases, with profound ramifications for who can be brought to justice and for the fate of those who decide to cooperate.  But despite the significance of cooperation, scholars have yet to explore exactly how individuals confronted with the decision whether to pursue cooperation with prosecutors make that choice.  This Article — the first empirical study of the defense experience of cooperation — begins to address that gap.  The Article reports the results of a survey completed by 146 criminal defense attorneys in three federal districts: the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of Virginia, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Our study provides an entirely new and enriching perspective on the cooperation decision, building on prior theories from the cooperation and plea-bargaining literature, and providing for a more nuanced understanding of cooperation and its motivations.  In several closed- and open-ended responses, attorneys shared their opinions — at times remarkably consistent, at times strikingly and informatively different — about cooperation practices in their respective districts. The results of this study can be used to further explore the theoretical foundations of cooperation and plea bargaining and can be used to build experimental studies to test causal relationships that are otherwise nearly impossible to determine.

Latest reporting of US District Court's experience getting involved with supervised release

A couple of helpful folks recently focused my attention on the notable work that SDNY US District Judge Richard M. Berman has been doing in the arena of federal supervised release.  This work is discussed by Judge Berman in this Regulatory Review article, titled “Federal Court Involvement in Supervised Release,” and here is the start of this article:

In most cases, individuals’ release from federal prison does not mark the end of their sentences. A federal criminal sentence typically also includes a term of “supervised release,” which the U.S. Sentencing Commission defines as a “unique type of post-confinement monitoring that is overseen by federal district courts with the assistance of federal probation officers.”  Supervised release is intended to assist people who have served prison terms with their effective reintegration, or “reentry,” into the community.

Judges are not always actively involved in overseeing supervision.  Rather, officers of the U.S. Probation Office play the dominant role in monitoring individuals on supervised release.  Judges tend to become more involved only after a supervisee has failed to comply with the terms of supervision.  As a result, judges may miss the opportunity meaningfully to assist with reentry and to help ensure that necessary services such as drug treatment, mental health counseling, and housing and employment assistance are provided.

Over the past five-plus years, my chambers staff and I developed a more active and involved approach to supervised release.  The practice features regular supervised release hearings intended to help ensure that supervisees succeed and avoid further negative involvement in the criminal justice system.  Importantly, this practice also includes early termination of supervised release for all those who have shown that they no longer need supervision.

That Regulatory Review article also provides a link to a 2021 report with data about how this court involved supervised release functioned and some of its impacts.  A 2022 version of this report (as will as some slides) were sent my way recently, and are available in links below.  And here is part of the executive sumary of this latest report:

In this report, we provide results from our court involved supervised release project. Data and case studies are presented from the perspectives of recidivism and desistance from crime—in the areas of rearrest, return to prison, and early termination of supervision.

The Study Population rearrest rates over three and five years are 17.1% and 20.4%, respectively; the return to prison rate is 13.2%; and the early termination rate is 46.2%. These results include all Study Population supervisees and make no adjustments for “risky” supervisees.

Acknowledging that comparisons are at best imprecise, we include an AO study which shows rearrest rates of 20.8% at three years (16.3% adjusted) and 27.7% at five years (page 20); a Bureau of Justice Statistics study which shows a return to prison rate of 31.6% (page 22); and an AO early termination study which shows a rate of 18.8% (page 34).

The approach and outcomes presented in our report are very encouraging. At the same time, it is premature to conclude or to celebrate that recidivism is decreasing (page 8).

A fair conclusion to be reached from the data and the case studies is that judges who become actively involved in supervision — together with dedicated probation officers and others — can unequivocally and meaningfully assist supervisees to safely and successfully reenter their communities.

Download Judge Berman Supervised Release Report (2022.10.12)

Download Judge Berman 2023.04.05 Supervised Release Slides

"Rights Violations as Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Kate Weisburd now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Is punishment generally exempt from the Constitution?  That is, can the deprivation of basic constitutional rights — such as the rights to marry, bear children, worship, consult a lawyer, and protest — be imposed as direct punishment for a crime and in lieu of prison, so long as such intrusions are not “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment?  On one hand, such state intrusion on fundamental rights would seem unconstitutional.  On the other hand, such intrusions are often less harsh than the restriction of rights inherent in prison.  If a judge can sentence someone to life in prison, how can a judge not also have the power to strip someone of the right to marry, or speak, as direct punishment? 

Surprisingly, as this Article reveals, existing law offers no coherent explanation as to why rights-violating punishments somehow escape traditional constitutional scrutiny.  Yet the question is critical as courts — often in the name of decarceration — increasingly impose non-carceral punishments that deprive people of constitutional rights.

Three Justices dissent from denial of cert in Tennessee felony-murder capital case

The Supreme Court this morning issued this order list with a lot of certiorari denials (and grants in two related cases involving government social-media activity).  There was one notable statement in dissent from the denial of certiorari by Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, in Burns v. Mays, No. 22–5891.  The seven-page dissent starts this way:

Petitioner Kevin Burns, a defendant sentenced to death for felony murder, brought a 28 U.S.C. §2254 petition claiming inadequate assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.  Burns asserts that counsel failed to present mitigating evidence tending to show that he did not shoot either of the two victims killed during a robbery in which he participated. Such evidence does not bear on Burns’ guilt, since his participation in the underlying robbery suffices to render him guilty of felony murder.  Evidence that Burns did not pull the trigger, however, was plainly relevant to the jury’s determination whether to sentence him to death.  The Sixth Circuit avoided this obvious conclusion only by mischaracterizing Burns’ claim as being about counsel’s failure to introduce residual doubt evidence (i.e., evidence that Burns was not, in fact, guilty of felony murder).  From there, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the claim must fail because this Court has never established a right to introduce residual doubt evidence at sentencing.

Burns argues, and the State does not contest, that the Sixth Circuit’s analysis turned on two erroneous legal assumptions and clearly conflicts with several decisions of this Court.  Burns asks this Court to take summary action to correct these fundamental legal errors so that his claim may be fairly considered before the State executes him. The Court, however, declines to intervene.  I would summarily vacate the error-laden (and precedential) decision below and remand for further consideration of Burns’ claim.  I respectfully dissent from the Court’s failure to do so.

"Abolition Then and Now: The Role of Furman's Failure in Today's Abolition Success"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Corinna Lain and now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

On the fiftieth anniversary of Furman v. Georgia, one cannot help but draw comparisons between the sociopolitical context in which we find ourselves today, and the one in which the Justices found themselves in 1972.  Once again, the death penalty is dying — history, it would seem, is repeating itself.  But beneath these surface similarities lie important differences between the two eras, and what they mean for the larger abolition story.  Abolition today is not a story about the highest court in the land; rather, it is a story about a movement from the bottom-up, with states ending the death penalty on their own.  Instead of aiming high, abolitionists are aiming low.  In two ways, Furman itself played a part in this dramatic shift.  First, the backlash to Furman taught abolitionists that the Supreme Court’s “help” may do more harm than good, halting change already in progress, and that the Court would be a fickle friend. Hence the lesson to aim low.  Second, the Supreme Court’s reaction to Furman’s backlash in Gregg v. Georgia inadvertently set in motion the means to make this dramatic shift happen.  Gregg’s attempt to tame the death penalty created a mass of complicated doctrine, and that gave rise to a cadre of specialized capital defenders to navigate it. Those defenders are the foot soldiers of today’s abolition movement, killing the death penalty by saving one life at a time.  The modern path to abolition is not without its downsides, but the upside to states ending the death penalty on their own is that this time when the death penalty dies, it may well stay that way for good.

"The Illusion of Heightened Standards in Capital Cases"

The title of this post is the title of this new article now available via SSRN and authored by Anna VanCleave. Here is its abstract:

The death penalty has gained its legitimacy from the belief that capital prosecutions are more procedurally rigorous than noncapital prosecutions.  This Article reveals how a project of heightened capital standards, set in motion when the Supreme Court ended and then revived the death penalty, was set up to fail.

In establishing what a constitutional death penalty would look like, the Court in 1976 called for heightened standards of reliability in capital cases.  In the late 1970s and early 80s, the Supreme Court laid out specific constitutional procedures that must be applied in capital cases, and left the door open for the Eighth Amendment to do even more. In the decades that followed, state and federal courts have fueled a perception of heightened procedural rigor in capital cases by referring repeatedly to the heightened standards applicable in capital cases.

However, a review of courts’ application of a standard of “heightened reliability” reveals that (1) courts routinely use the language of “heightened” standards while simultaneously applying exactly the same constitutional tests that are used in noncapital cases and demonstrating no serious effort to tie procedural rigor to the severity of punishment; and (2) even more problematic, some courts have shown a willingness to use the “heightened reliability” language to justify a lesser procedural protection for capital defendants than that applied to noncapital cases — a perverse application of what was clearly intended to be an added measure of assurance that the death penalty is reserved only for those who are truly guilty and who are the most culpable.

This decades-long failure to observe meaningfully heightened constitutional standards calls into question the death penalty’s institutional legitimacy and raises particular concerns in light of current Supreme Court trends.

In 6-3 ruling, SCOTUS rules for Texas capital defendant concerning statute of limitation for seeking DNA testing in § 1983 action

The Supreme Court handed down a notable criminal procedure ruling this morning in Reed v. Goertz, No. 21-422 (S. Ct. April 19, 2023) (available here). Justice Kavanaugh wrote the opinion for the Court which starts this way:

In many States, a convicted prisoner who still disputes his guilt may ask state courts to order post-conviction DNA testing of evidence.  If the prisoner’s request fails in the state courts and he then files a federal 42 U.S.C. §1983 procedural due process suit challenging the constitutionality of the state process, when does the statute of limitations for that §1983 suit begin to run?  The Eleventh Circuit has held that the statute of limitations begins to run at the end of the state-court litigation denying DNA testing, including the state-court appeal. See Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F. 3d 865, 867 (2011).  In this case, by contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the state trial court denied DNA testing, notwithstanding a subsequent state-court appeal. See 995 F. 3d 425, 431 (2021). We conclude that the statute of limitations begins to run at the end of the state-court litigation.

Justice Thomas authored a lengthy solo dissent that starts this way:

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) affirmed the denial of petitioner Rodney Reed’s state-law motion for postconviction DNA testing. Reed petitioned this Court for certiorari, arguing that the CCA’s interpretation and application of the relevant state law violated his federal due process rights. After we denied his petition, Reed repackaged it as a complaint in Federal District Court, naming respondent (the Bastrop County District Attorney) as a placeholder defendant. Like his earlier certiorari petition, Reed’s complaint assails the CCA’s state-law reasoning as inconsistent with due process, and it seeks a declaration that the CCA’s interpretation and application of state law was unconstitutional.

Reed’s action should be dismissed for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. Federal district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to review state-court judgments, and Reed’s action presents no original Article III case or controversy between him and the district attorney. Because the Court erroneously holds that the District Court had jurisdiction over Reed’s action, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Alito wrote a shorter dissent joined by Justice Gorsuch that has these opening pragraphs:

As the Court notes and the parties agree, the statute of limitations for Reed’s claim is two years. Ante, at 4; Brief for Petitioner 17; Brief for Respondent 17. Reed filed his complaint on August 8, 2019, and the lower courts held that this was too late. The question before us is when the 2-year statute of limitations began to run, that is in legal parlance, when Reed’s claim “accrued.” As the parties agree, the general rule is that a claim accrues when the plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action,” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reed contends that his claim did not accrue until the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) denied his petition for rehearing on October 4, 2017, and thus refused to retract the interpretation of Article 64 that the court had unanimously adopted on April 12, 2017. Goertz, on the other hand, argues that Reed’s claim accrued no later than the date of the CCA’s April 12 decision, and because that date preceded the federal lawsuit by more than two years, Goertz maintains that we should affirm the Fifth Circuit’s decision that Reed’s complaint was filed too late.

As I will explain, there is room for debate about exactly when Reed’s DNA testing claim accrued, but in my view, the notion that this did not take place until rehearing was denied is clearly wrong.

In Ninth Circuit appeal, Elizabeth Holmes challenges convictions and also seeks resentencing

As reported in this new Insider piece, former Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes has filed an appeal of her conviction and sentence in the Ninth Circuit.  Here are the basics:

Holmes was convicted on four counts and sentenced last November to 11.25 years in prison, with three years of supervision following her release.  Holmes, 39, is due to begin her sentence on April 27 after a judge last week denied her request to remain free while she appeals her conviction.  At the time her punishment was handed down, Holmes told the court, through tears, that she was "devastated by my failings" and "felt deep pain for what people went through because I failed them."

But in the brief filed Monday with the US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, Holmes's attorneys claim her original trial was flawed, producing an "unjust" conviction and a "severe" prison sentence.  They argue that she was unjustly barred from citing Balwani's testimony in her own defense....

Holmes's defense team also argued that testimony from Theranos' former lab director, Dr. Adam Rosendorff — that the company's technology was "uniquely problematic" — improperly influenced the court, citing the fact that Rosendorff was not cross-examined and questioned about failings in other labs at which he worked.

For those reasons, the court "should reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial or, alternatively, remand for resentencing," Holmes's lawyers wrote.

The full Holmes brief to the Ninth Circuit is available at this link. The last dozen or so pages of the brief develops the sentencing argument, and here is how this part of the brief begins:

At sentencing, the district court applied a 26-level Guidelines enhancement, adding more than 10 years to what otherwise would have been a 0-7 month range.  It did so by making factual findings about the number of victims and the amount of loss by a mere preponderance of the evidence, based in large part on extra-record and untested evidence such as government interview memoranda.  That was error: under this Court’s precedent, the court needed to find the facts supporting its severe enhancement by clear-and-convincing evidence.  The result of this error is an excessive 135-month term of imprisonment.  That is 27 months higher than what the Probation Office recommended, for a woman who — unlike other white-collar defendants — neither sought nor gained any profit from the purported loss and was trying to improve patient health.  At a minimum, this Court should remand for resentencing.

(FWIW: I think the first sentence means to say "a 0-6 month range.")

Some prior related posts:

• Elizabeth Holmes convicted on 4 of 11 fraud charges ... but now can be sentenced on all and more 
• Making the case, because "upper-class offenders ... might be even more reprehensible," for a severe sentence for Elizabeth Holmes 
• Sentencing memos paint very different pictures of Elizabeth Holmes 
• Federal judge imposes (within guideline) sentence of 135 months on Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes 
• Sentencing judge recommended prison camp for Elizabeth Holmes to serve her sentence 
• Citing prior "attempt to flee the country," feds urging that Elizabeth Holmes start her prison sentence in April
• Federal judge denies Elizabeth Holmes motion to remain free pending her appeal of fraud convictions 

Notable new Roll Call review of congressional views of US Sentencing Commission's debate over sentence reductions

Roll Call has this notable new piece discussing the debate over the new federal sentencing guidelines for sentence reduction motions.  The article mostly discusses the politics surrounding reform rather than all the particulars of the legal reforms, and I am not sure it breaks any new ground.  But it is still a useful read for those keeping up on these matters, even though the text and even the headline of the piece is a bit off legally.  Here are excerpts:

A federal agency has given judges a new tool to reduce unusually long sentences for some prisoners if there is a change in a law, an approach Republican senators warned will hamper, if not destroy, the possibility of future criminal justice legislation.

The policy approved this month by the low-profile U.S. Sentencing Commission is deep in the legal weeds, giving guidance for federal judges on how to interpret a section of a sweeping bipartisan overhaul of the federal criminal justice system passed in 2018.  But the debate on that approach, which goes into effect in November unless Congress disapproves it, offers an inside look at the negotiations and challenges for lawmakers who want to take more steps to address racial inequality in the criminal justice system through sentencing changes...

In the 2018 criminal justice law, Congress allowed federal inmates to directly ask courts to release them from prison for extraordinary and compelling reasons. Judges released thousands of inmates through that mechanism during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Under the sentencing guidance the commission adopted this month, a change in a law could be potential grounds for reducing a defendant’s sentence. Specifically, judges could consider reducing the sentence of an inmate who has served 10 years of an “unusually long sentence” if there is a “gross disparity” between their sentence and sentences imposed under new law.

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Sen. Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, who was the lead Republican on the push for the 2018 law, warned the commission that the guidance would cause problems for future bills that would reduce prison sentences. McConnell in a February letter to the commission said that no issue was more controversial during the debate on the 2018 law than whether it would be applied retroactively to those already in prison. Congress is extremely careful with use of retroactivity — if lawmakers want something to be retroactive, they typically say so clearly in the law — and so guidance that approves of judges doing so would “poison the well” in Congress, he said....

The guidelines went through changes following the comments from Senate Republicans and Democrats, but the thrust of the provision remained the same and the commission voted for guidelines that approve of judges retroactively considering certain sentences.

I am inclined to dicker with the very first clause of the article — "A federal agency has given judges a new tool to reduce unusually long sentences for some prisoners if there is a change in a law" — because it was Congress who created the tool to reduce sentences under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and Congress did so way back in 1984.  In addition, as this article notes, the FIRST STEP Act of 2018 (another act of Congress) allowed this tool to function more effectively by allowing prisoners to make motions directly in court for sentence reduction without awaiting a filing by the Bureau of Prisons. 

Moreover, since passage of the FIRST STEP Act, many circuits have ruled that a change in law could be potential grounds for reducing a defendant’s sentence in any and every case, whereas the new guidelines promulated by the US Sentencing Commission significantly restricts the circumstances under which a change of law can be the basis for a sentencing reduction.  Thus, I think a more accurate openning line might have been something like: "A federal agency has narrowed the reach of a long-standing tool that Congress provided to judges as a means to reduce sentences which had become far more widely used after passage of the bipartisan FIRST STEP Act."

Supreme Court grants cert on due process requirements in civil asset forfeiture case

There was a lone cert grant in the US Supreme Court's order list this morning, and this Bloomberg news piece highlights why the case might be of interest to crimina justice fans.  Here is how the press account starts:

The US Supreme Court agreed to hear a case that asks whether people are owed an immediate hearing to recover property that was seized by the government in a crime they didn’t commit.

At the center of the case granted Monday are two Alabama residents whose cars were impounded when someone else was arrested while driving them. Lena Sutton lost her car after her roommate was pulled over for speeding and arrested for possessing large amounts of methamphetamine. Halima Culley lost her vehicle when her son was pulled over and arrested for illegally possessing drugs and a firearm.

The grant carries the case name Culley v. Marshall, and here is how the cert petition in this matter presents the question:

In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post-seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the “speedy trial” test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis as set forth by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits .

Rounding up some notable recent death penalty policy and practice stories

Most weeks bring a number of press pieces on a number of capital punishment topics.  But so many death penalty headlines and stories caught my eye in the last few days that I decided only this round-up allowed me to keep up with a bunch of notable stories:

From ABC11, "NC faith leaders ask Governor Cooper to commute sentences of death row inmates"

From Arizona Capitol Times, "Court reinstates death penalty for man who killed University of Arizona professor"

From Cleveland.com, "Ohio’s broken death-penalty system may be wasting hundreds of millions of dollars, AG warns"

From The Hill, "Pence calls for expedited death penalty for mass shooters during NRA speech"

From MassLive, "10 years on, Boston Marathon bomber at the center of death penalty debate"

From the National Catholic Reporter, "Catholic governor calls on Louisiana lawmakers to abolish the death penalty as 'a pro-life state'"

From the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, "The sisters of two Tree of Life shooting victims want the death penalty: ‘We owe it to our brothers’"

From Reuters, "Florida to allow death penalty with 8-4 jury vote instead of unanimously"

Jury gives defendant (with significant criminal history) a 70-year prison sentence for spitting at cops

There is a lot more to this local sentencing story from Texas than the headline, but what a headline: "Man found guilty of spitting at Lubbock Police gets 70 years in prison."  Here are the details:

Larry Pearson, 36, was sentenced by a Lubbock jury on Wednesday to 70 years in prison after he was found guilty on two counts of harassment of a public servant for spitting at Lubbock Police officers. “You’re not going to get 70 years for something like this when you’ve never been in trouble before,” Prosecutor Jessica Gorman said.

Gorman told EverythingLubbock.com that Pearson was arrested in May of 2022 for domestic violence after a victim flagged down an officer in the 200 block of Zenith Avenue. The victim told police that Pearson hit her several times, and that he had a gun. Gorman said that firearm turned out to be an airsoft gun. A police report at the time stated the victim had “multiple visible injuries” on her face. Gorman said after Pearson was taken into custody, he was upset the victim was not arrested instead.

Gorman said Pearson started kicking at the doors in the officer’s vehicle. When the officers opened the door to tell him to stop, Gorman said he spit at both officers. Gorman said Pearson kept spitting after he arrived at the Lubbock County Detention Center.

During closing arguments of the sentencing phase of Pearson’s trial, Gorman asked the jury to consider a number that would “send a message” to Pearson and society. Gorman told EverythingLubbock.com that Pearson had prior convictions of aggravated robbery and continuous family violence. Due to those convictions, the minimum sentence Pearson could have received would’ve been 25 years.

“If you’re going to live the life of crime, you’re going to do that among other criminals [in prison],” Gorman said during closing arguments. Defense Attorney Jim Shaw told the jury the sentencing was for a “simple misdemeanor” in a circumstance that got “out of control.”

I tend to be a fan of jury sentencing, but this sounds like a lot.

Federal judge denies Elizabeth Holmes motion to remain free pending her appeal of fraud convictions

As reported in this new Bloomberg piece, "Elizabeth Holmes must report to prison as scheduled later this month, a judge ruled, rejecting her request to remain free on bail as she appeals her fraud conviction."  Here is more:

The decision Monday by US District Judge Edward Davila in San Jose, California, is likely his last in the case which he’s handled since Holmes was indicted in 2018. Davila presided over the Theranos Inc. founder’s four-month trial in 2021 and sentenced her in November to serve 11 1/4 years of incarceration for deceiving investors in her blood-testing startup.

Legal experts said Holmes’s bid to remain free during an appeals process that might take two years was a long shot. She’s expected to make one final request for bail from the San Francisco-based federal appeals court, which she has also asked to overturn her conviction.

Davila ruled that even if Holmes won an appeals court ruling overturning his decisions to allow evidence challenging the accuracy and reliability of Theranos’s technology, she had deceived investors in so many different ways that such a decision isn’t likely to require a reversal or new trial on all the fraud counts she was convicted of. “Whether the jury heard more or less evidence that tended to show the accuracy and reliability of Theranos technology does not diminish the evidence the jury heard of other misrepresentations Ms. Holmes had made to investors,” he wrote.

To justify her request for bail, Holmes said she has two young children, continues to work on new inventions, and has raised “substantial questions” of law or facts in her appeal that could win her a new trial. At a hearing last month, Davila was most interested in an argument prosecutors made that there’s a risk Holmes might try to flee, based on a one-way plane ticket to Mexico that was purchased while she was on trial....

“Booking international travel plans for a criminal defendant in anticipation of a complete defense victory is a bold move, and the failure to promptly cancel those plans after a guilty verdict is a perilously careless oversight,” Davila said of the plane ticket. The incident invited “greater scrutiny” of Holmes, he wrote, adding that he concluded the purchase “while ill-advised, was not an attempt to flee the country.”...

Davila previously denied a request for bail pending appeal sought by Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani, the former president of Theranos and Holmes’s ex-boyfriend who was sentenced to 13 years in prison for his fraud conviction. The appeals court upheld Davila’s decision.

This latest ruling in US v. Holmes, which runs 11 pages, can be found at this link.

Some prior related posts:

• Elizabeth Holmes convicted on 4 of 11 fraud charges ... but now can be sentenced on all and more 
• Making the case, because "upper-class offenders ... might be even more reprehensible," for a severe sentence for Elizabeth Holmes 
• Might any victims of Theranos fraud urge leniency at sentencing for Elizabeth Holmes?
• Sentencing memos paint very different pictures of Elizabeth Holmes 
• Federal judge imposes (within guideline) sentence of 135 months on Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes 
• Sentencing judge recommended prison camp for Elizabeth Holmes to serve her sentence 
• Citing prior "attempt to flee the country," feds urging that Elizabeth Holmes start her prison sentence in April

"Sentencing in an Era of Plea Bargains"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Jeffrey Bellin and Jenia Iontcheva Turner now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

The literature offers inconsistent answers to a question that is foundational to criminal law: Who imposes sentences? Traditional narratives place sentencing responsibility in the hands of the judge.  Yet, in a country where 95 percent of criminal convictions come from guilty pleas (not trials), modern American scholars center prosecutors — who control plea terms — as the decider of punishment.  This Article highlights and seeks to resolve the tension between these conflicting narratives by charting the pathways by which sentences are determined in a system dominated by plea bargains.

After reviewing the empirical literature on sentence variation, state and federal plea-bargaining rules and doctrines, and conducting some empirical analysis of our own, we conclude that neither of the competing narratives is correct. Sentencing in the United States has become a dynamic process with substantial contributions from multiple actors, not a static event controlled by any single actor.

Zooming in on judges’ contributions, we find that, contrary to much modern commentary, judges can (and do) influence plea bargained sentences in even the most restrictive jurisdictions.  Yet this judicial imprint is often obscured by formal rules that purport to exclude judges from plea negotiations.  In addition, we identify a few scenarios where judges are prevented from influencing plea bargains and thus lose their traditional role as the ultimate arbiter of an individual’s sentence.  In response to these findings, we propose a reform that would make the already prevalent judicial influence over the substance of plea agreements more transparent.  In addition, we suggest a legal change that would eliminate scenarios where judges are legally authorized but practically unable to reject (unusually harsh) plea deals.

Highlighting US Sentencing Commission's significant amendments to federal guidelines' criminal history rules

The highest profile amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines promulgated by the US Sentencing Commission last week (basics here) concerns a major revision of § 1B1.13 setting terms for a "Reduction in Term of Imprionment under 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)" (discussed here).  But the most consequential amendment might prove to be new provisions altering how criminal history will impact guideline calculations.  USSC Chair Reeves discussed in his statement at last week's hearing (just some of) the particulars:

[W]e have proposed addressing two discrete ways in which the sentencing guidelines punish people for having a “criminal history.”  The first proposal aimed to reduce or eliminate the use of “status points,” which are sentencing enhancements given to people who committed a crime while on parole or probation.  As we heard from many commenters, status points often amount to a form of “double penalty.”...  Moreover, Commission research strongly suggests that status points’ ability to predict recidivism -- a core justification for their use -- may be extremely weak.

In light of all this, the Commission’s final policy eliminates status points in the vast majority of criminal cases. For a limited category of defendants with extensive criminal histories, we are cutting the effect of status points in half, reflecting the idea that this tool may sometimes achieve other goals beyond predicting recidivism.

The second “criminal history” proposal we issued sought to fulfill a core directive Congress gave the Commission at its inception.  That directive says that, in general, “a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense” should not be incarcerated.  The Commission’s proposal sought to define who met this standard and what the consequences for meeting this standard should be.

Ultimately, we decided to answer both questions broadly.  Our final policy provides a larger reduction in sentence for a larger category of people than the status quo.  While we agreed to limit this reduction in a limited set of circumstances, we also agreed to give judges discretion to expand non-carceral options to more people.

These two items concerning "status points" and "zero-point-offenders" are the big ticket criminal history matters, though the Commission also adds to its examples of overrepresented criminal history cases involving criminal history points resulting from marijuana possession convictions. 

As detailed here, the Commission has officially sought comment on whether it should make the key parts of its new criminal history amendment "available for retroactive application."  The Commission states that a "retroactivity impact analysis will be made available to the public as soon as practicable."  I suspect that analysis will show these criminal histpry changes could impact many thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of federal prisoners.  This June 2022 report from the Commission detailed that "over one-third of federal offenders (37.5%) received two 'status points' under §4A1.1(d) as part of their criminal history scores."  And this 2022 USSC Quick Facts accounting of federal prisoners noted that almost 30% "have little or no prior criminal history."  Though not all these populations would clearly benefit from retroactive application of the new criminal history rules, a sizeable number likely would.   

Retroactivity dynamics aside, it appears from Table 23 in the USSC's latest annual data on criminal history scores that over 60% of federal defendants sentences in fiscal year 2022 had either had zero criminal history points (33.9%) or received status points (26.7%).  In other words, the data suggest that more future federal defendants will be impacted by these criminal history amendments than won't be.  In short, these are relatively small criminal history changes sure to have a relatively big impact.

"The Ex Post Facto Clause: Its History and Role in a Punitive Society"

The title of this post is the title of this new SSRN entry that is also the title of this new book authored by Wayne Logan.  Here is the SSRN abstract:

The Ex Post Facto Clause, one of the few civil liberty protections found in the body of the U.S. Constitution, reflects the Framers' acute concern over the tendency of legislatures to enact burdensome retroactive laws targeting unpopular individuals.  Over time, a broad array of Americans has invoked the protective cloak of the Clause, including Confederate sympathizers in the late 1860s; immigrants in the early 1900s; Communist Party members in the 1950s; and, since the 1990s, convicted sex offenders.  Although the Supreme Court enforced the Clause with vigor during much of the nation's history, of late the justices have been less than zealous defenders of the security it was intended to provide.  Even more problematic, their decisions have come amid major changes in the nation's social, political, and institutional life that have made the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause all the more important.

The "Ex Post Facto Clause: Its History and Role in a Punitive Society" begins with a survey of the Framing Era history of the Clause and then examines and critiques the Supreme Court’s extensive case law interpreting and applying it.  The final chapters provide a blueprint for how the Clause can be reinvigorated to play a more robust role in guarding against the penal populism besetting modern American legislatures.

As the Framers of the Constitution were well aware, there always have been, and there always will be, disdained individuals to serve as politically attractive targets of burdensome retroactive laws.  Guided by this reality, the book undertakes a task of historic recovery with the ultimate goal of restoring the Ex Post Facto Clause to its intended constitutional role as a check on legislative excess, so needed in today’s unforgiving and harshly punitive political environment.

Has the US Sentencing Commission now "overruled" circuit decisions saying changes in law cannot provide a basis for 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction?

Perhaps the highest profile amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines promulgated by the US Sentencing Commission yesterday (basics here) concerns the major revision of § 1B1.13 setting terms for a "Reduction in Term of Imprionment under 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)."  This "policy statement" structures the availability of what are often called "compassionate release" motions that, after the FIRST STEP Act, can be brought to sentencing courts directly by federal prisoners.  Notably, when introducting the Commission's amendments to § 1B1.13, USSC Chair Reeves stressed in his statement that the term compassionate release "is a 'misnomer'" because § 3582(c)(1)(A) sets forth a more general "sentence-reducing tool" authorizing judges "to modify sentences whenever new 'extraordinary and compelling' reasons arise."

This Reuters article (which uses the compassionate release "misnomer") provide a brief account of the new amendment to guideline § 1B1.13:

The U.S. Sentencing Commission approved new guidelines on Wednesday that will expand federal inmates' ability to qualify for compassionate release from prison.  The new policy, approved in a vote of 4-3, was part of a broader package of amendments, and represent the most sweeping criminal justice reforms the commission has enacted in more than four years....

The new compassionate release guidelines approved on Wednesday expanded the criteria for what can qualify as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to grant compassionate release, and it will give judges more discretion to determine when a sentence reduction is warranted.  Among the new categories that could make an inmate eligible for compassionate release is if he or she becomes the victim of sexual assault by a corrections officer.

Three members of the panel opposed the final policy, saying they disagreed with a provision that could allow judges to grant compassionate release to inmates if changes to federal sentencing laws renders their prison term inequitable. The policy "makes a systemic, structural change without congressional authorization," commission member Candice Wong said.

Though there are lots of new and important elements to the new § 1B1.13, one particular issue that has generated a particularly interesting debate in the circuit courts (and before the Commission) is whether a district judge can rely on a "change in the law" to grant a 3582(c)(1)(A) sentencing reduction.  This question has deeply divided the circuits; as discussed here, the Sixth Circuit a few months ago rendered a big divided en banc ruling in US v. McCall which held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, "that nonretroactive changes in sentencing law cannot be 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' that warrant relief" pursuant to 3582(c)(1)(A). 

But now the US Sentencing Commission, which Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) expressly gave the responisbility to "describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction," has expressly decided via its new amendments to § 1B1.13 that a "change in the law" legally can and sometimes should be the basis for a 3582(c)(1)(A) sentencing reduction.  Specifically, here is the interesting policy statement provision on this issue in the new guideline (with emphasis added):

(6) UNUSUALLY LONG SENTENCES.—If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.

In other words, the US Sentencing Commission has decided, contra to the position of the Sixth Circuit and some other circuits, that a change in law can serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason for sentence reduction, though the Commission here limits such a "law-change" reason to cases in which a defendant has already served "at least 10 years" of an "unusually long sentence" and the law change "would produce a gross disparity" in sentencing outcomes. 

Though one might well debate the wisdom and reach of how the new guideline seeks to limit when "a change in the law" can provide an extraordinary and compelling reason for sentence reduction, it is beyond debate that the US Sentencing Commission, the expert agency tasked expressly by Congress to "describe what should be considered" reasons for a 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction, has now explicitly decided that at least sometimes a "change in law" CAN statutorily be a proper basis for a reduction under the statute.  In this way, I answer the question in the title of this post as "yes": the US Sentencing Commission's promulagation of this new § 1B1.13 provision serves to functionally "overrule" any and all court precedents that nonretroactive changes in law cannot be the basis for a statutory sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A).

UPDATE:  Thanks to some feedback from a number of helpful readers, I realized it would be useful to note that some circuits speaking to this issue expressly recognized that any court accounting of "extraordinary and compelling reason" would be only a gap-filler until the Commission amended § 1B1.13 and the Justice Department has also said as much when opposing Supreme Court review of the circuit split on this issue.  Professor Erika Zunkel's testimony to the USSC at pp. 9-13 speaks effectively to these issues at great and effective length for anyone interested in a deeper dive.

"Prosecutors as punishers: A case study of Trump-era practices"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Mona Lynch for the journal Punishment & Society that is now available online. Here is its abstract:

Recent punishment and society scholarship has addressed the limits of policy reforms aimed at reducing mass incarceration in the U.S.  This work has focused in particular on the political dimensions of penal legal reform and policy-making, and the compromises and shortcomings in those processes.  Nearly absent in this scholarship, however, has been empirical and theoretical engagement with the role of front-line prosecutors as facilitators and/or resistors to downsizing efforts.

Using the case of the U.S. federal criminal legal system's modest efforts to decrease the system's racially disparate and punitive outcomes, this paper elucidates the fragile nature of such reforms by delineating the critical role that front-line prosecutors play in maintaining punitive approaches.  Focusing specifically on federal prosecutorial policy and practices in the Trump era, I draw on a subset of data from an interdisciplinary, multi-methodological project set in distinct federal court jurisdictions in the U.S. to examine how front-line prosecutors were able to quickly reverse course on reform through the use of their uniquely powerful charging and plea-bargaining tools.  My findings illustrate how federal prosecutors pursued more low-level defendants, and utilized statutory “hammers,” including mandatory minimums and mandatory enhancements to ensure harsh punishments in a swift return to a war-on-crime.

Among many big amendment questions, will the new USSC promulgate new guidelines to limit acquitted conduct enhancements?

As flagged in this post a few weeks ago, we can expect the US Sentencing Commission to vote to promulgate its first set of new guidelines amendments in five years later today.  Specifically, the announcement here on the Commission's website notes that "a public meeting of the Commission was scheduled for Wednesday, April 5, 2023, at 2:00 p.m." and that the agenda will include a "Vote to Promulgate Proposed Amendments."  As I have explained before, and as detailed in some of the prior posts below, there has been significant debate about the significant draft proposed amendments that were released by the USSC earlier this year.  One of those possible amendments in newly discussed in this lengthy Bloomberg Law piece titled "Sentencing Commission to Vote on Handling of Acquitted Conduct."  Here are excerpts (with links from the original):

The US Sentencing Commission is expected on Wednesday to vote on an amendment that would eliminate acquitted conduct from the definition of relevant conduct for purposes of calculating the guidelines range.

Judges would still be able to consider acquitted conduct that was proven beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant in plea proceedings or a colloquy.

The amendment has wide support from the defense bar, current and former federal judges, and three US Senators, although some say it won’t completely solve the problem.

Others, including the Victims Advisory Group, oppose the changes, arguing that courts need to be able to consider the full context of an offense. In its opposition, the Department of Justice emphasized the difficulty judges may have in determining what conduct they can or can’t consider.

In addition to perhaps addressing acquitted conduct, the Commission will also certainly put forward amendments concerning the grounds for compassionate release which will certainly impact many prisoners nationwide. A number of other possible amendments being considered by the Commission could also prove quite consequential. Interesting times.

A few recent related posts:

• US Sentencing Commissions publishes proposed guideline amendments and issues for comment 
• US Sentencing Commission to begin series of public hearings on its proposed guideline amendments
• US Sentencing Commission soon to begin second set of public hearings on proposed guideline amendments
• US Sentencing Commission posts over 1600 pages of public comment on proposed amendments 
• US Sentencing Commission schedules meeting for April 5, 2023, for promulgation of proposed guideline amendments 

Three Justices dissent from denial of cert in Louisiana capital case based on Brady issue

The Supreme Court issued this morning another order list with no new grants of certiorari and lots of cert denials.  One of those cert denials, in the Louisiana capital case of Brown v. Louisiana, generated a short dissent by Justice Jackson, which was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. Here are excerpts from the dissent:

The central question before this Court is whether the prosecution violated Brown’s due process rights by failing to disclose this confession [by Edge, a codefendant].  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Because the evidence was plainly “favorable” and “material” to Brown’s penalty phase, id., at 87, I would have granted certiorari and summarily reversed....

The Louisiana Supreme Court nevertheless held that Edge’s confession was not favorable to Brown because it did not specify who actually killed the victim, nor did it expressly state that Brown was “not present or not involved.” 347 So. 3d, at 836.  The requirement that the withheld evidence must speak to or rule out the defendant’s participation in order for it to be favorable is wholly foreign to our case law....

We have repeatedly reversed lower courts — and Louisiana courts, in particular — for similar refusals to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate that favorable and material evidence in the government’s possession be disclosed to the defense before trial. See, e.g., Kyles, 514 U.S., at 422, 450–453; Smith, 565 U.S., at 76–77; Wearry, 577 U.S., at 392–394, 396.  This Court has decided not to grant Brown’s petition for certiorari, but that determination should in no way be construed as an endorsement of the lower court’s legal reasoning.  In my view, the Louisiana Supreme Court misinterpreted and misapplied our Brady jurisprudence in a manner that contravenes settled law.

"Proving Actionable Racial Disparity Under the California Racial Justice Act"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authroed by Colleen V. Chien, W. David Ball and William A. Sundstrom now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Racial disparity is a fact of the US criminal justice system, but under the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in McCleskey v. Kemp, racial disparities — even sizable, statistically significant disparities — do not establish an Equal Protection violation without a showing of “purposeful discrimination.”  The California Racial Justice Act (CRJA), enacted in 2020 and further amended in 2022, introduced a first-of-its kind test for actionable racial disparity even in the absence of a showing of intent, allowing for relief when the “totality of the evidence demonstrates a significant difference” in charging, conviction, or sentencing across racial groups when compared to those who are “similarly situated” and who have engaged in “similar conduct.”

Though the CRJA was enacted over two years ago, two obstacles have made its promised remedies exist largely on paper — confusion about how to apply its new test and a lack of access to the data needed to demonstrate a significant difference.  This article overcomes these obstacles by exploring and interpreting the significant difference test and by analyzing a database of disparities that enables controls for criminal history and geography (similarly situated) and overlapping elements (similar conduct) based on comprehensive data from the California Department of Justice.  We also present two case studies that demonstrate how defendants might establish an initial showing of significant difference sufficient to successfully move for discovery.

Recapping and assessing a SCOTUS week full of federal criminal case oral arguments

This week's biggest legal news is surely the reports of a notable state indictment out of the Big Apple.  But, as previously previewed here, this week was also a big one for federal criminal case oral arguments before the US Supreme Court.  With help from SCOTUSblog and a few other sources, here are some recaps of how these arguments went:

United States v. Hansen, No. 22-179:

• From Roll Call, "Supreme Court scrutinizes free speech limits of immigration law"
• From SCOTUSblog, "Justices divided on the constitutionality of the federal law that bans 'encouraging' immigrants to remain unlawfully in the United States"

Lora v. United States, No. 22-49:

• From Courthouse News Service, "Supreme Court seems split over Bronx drug dealer’s sentence in rival’s murder"
• From SCOTUSblog, "Court seems reluctant to extend ban on concurrent sentences in Armed Career Criminal Act"

Smith v. United States, No. 21-1576:

• From Bloomberg Law, "Most Justices Skeptical of Retrial Claim in Wrong Venue Case"
• From SCOTUSblog, "Venue is a platypus, a mixed-up animal" 

Samia v. United States, No. 22-196:

• From the New York Times, "Supreme Court Considers a Mercenary’s Confession and the Confrontation Clause"
• From SCOTUSblog, "Justices search for a clear rule for confessions in joint trials" 

Though I have not really followed any of these cases all that closely, I am still prepared to provide an "over/under" betting line at 2.5 wins for federal criminal defendants from this week's SCOTUS cases.  It seems the federal criminal defendant has a pretty good shot of prevailing in Hansen and Lora, but probably not in Smith, and Samia probably should be viewed as a toss up.  But perhaps folks who have followed these cases more closely will have a wiser take.

When are character letters NOT helpful in a fraud sentencing? When they are fraudulent.

In various posts in this space and elsewhere, one sometimes sees debates over the impact and import of submitting an array of character letters on behalf of a defendant facing sentencing.  I sense that, generally speaking, judges find these kinds of letters helpful, and they can often lead to better sentencing outcomes if well developed and effectively presented.  But, this news story from a federal sentencing this week in Pittsburgh provide a distinct view of these matters:

As far as character letters go, Randy Frasinelli submitted the best.  They came from corporate executives, nonprofit groups and an Ivy league university.  There’s one from the bishop of the Diocese of Pittsburgh.  And another from Leadership Pittsburgh.

There’s even one from former Allegheny County Executive Jim Roddey. Well, it was supposed to be from him.  But, if it was, Roddey spelled his own name wrong — twice.  According to the federal government, all of the letters are fake.

Frasinelli, 66, of Scott, pleaded guilty to bank fraud and money laundering in federal court in August after investigators said that he fraudulently obtained $3.8 million in covid-19 Paycheck Protection Program loans during the pandemic.  They said he used the money to buy artwork, luxury vehicles and firearms...

In its case, the government laid out a complex scheme through which Frasinelli applied for the loans in the names of four separate companies and then submitted falsified tax records and payroll records.  Although he was already facing federal charges — and was out on bond — prosecutors said, Frasinelli applied for another fraudulent loan a month after his arrest seeking another half-million dollars.

Now, the U.S. Attorney’s office is accusing him of falsifying his own character letters to be used to mitigate his sentence.  He is scheduled to be sentenced on Wednesday by U.S. District Judge W. Scott Hardy. Whether the sentencing will occur, however, is up in the air.  Frasinelli’s defense attorney — the third he’s had in his federal case — on Saturday filed a motion to withdraw from representing him.

The sentencing did go forward yesterday, and here is another local press piece detailing how things transpired:

A Scott businessman who bilked the government out of nearly $4 million in COVID-19 relief funds, tried to do it again while out on bond and then forged character letters praising himself to present to a judge will spend 6.5 years in federal prison, the judge ruled Wednesday.

U.S. District Judge W. Scott Hardy chastised Randy Frasinelli, 66, before he issued the sentence, which will be followed by five years of supervised release. He said Frasinelli’s forged letters had eroded the court’s trust in him....

Frasinelli, as part of his plea, took responsibility for his actions. That acceptance of responsibility lowered the sentencing range with which Judge Hardy had to work.  As part of the [pre]-sentencing report sent to the judge, Frasinelli included letters from his children and other family members, along with 14 from other non-family members praising him as a businessman and person.  The letters were signed by politicians and business leaders.

In a filing last week, the U.S. Attorney’s Office wrote they’d discovered at least 13 of the 14 letters from non-family members were forgeries.  Attorneys said Frasinelli’s forged letters should negate any special considerations in relation to his sentencing.... The forged letters, attorneys wrote, should negate any reduction Frasinelli was set to receive for accepting responsibility.  Rather than the sentence of 63 to 78 months that prosecutors agreed to recommend, they said the judge should instead consider the non-mitigated range of 78 to 97 months.

For those not great at base-12 math, the 6.5 years of imprisonment imposed here amounts to 78 months, and so the top of the original guideline range calculated in this case as well as the bottom of the new range suggested by prosecutors. I suppose only the judge knows what sentence he might have given absent the forged letters, but I know this case is a useful reminder that sentencing determinations will often reflect post-offense-conduct behaviors both bad and good.

Tenth Circuit deepens split over considering retribution in revocation of federal supervised release

In this post a few weeks ago, I flagged a recent Congressional Research Service document which fully detailed a jurisprudential divide among the circuits over justifications for supervised release revocation.  As that document detailed: 

The federal appeals courts disagree as to whether, and to what extent, retribution may justify the revocation of supervised release in light of this statutory omission. On one side of the divide, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that federal courts may consider retribution in making revocation decisions. On the other side, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that courts either may not consider retribution in these decisions at all or may consider it only to a limited degree.

Notably, yesterday a Tenth Circuit panel jumped into the action and agreed with the minority of other circuit via US v. Booker, No. 22-7000 (10th Cir. March 28, 2023) (available here). Here is how the 17-page opinion in Booker gets started:

After Donald Joe Booker, Jr. repeatedly violated the terms of his supervised release, the district court revoked his supervision and sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison, the statutory maximum.  For the first time on appeal, Mr. Booker argues that the district court erroneously based his sentence for violating supervised release on retribution whereas the statute governing the revocation of supervised release implicitly prohibits considering retribution.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).

We review Mr. Booker’s sentence for plain error.  Clarifying the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), we hold that district courts may not modify or revoke a term of supervised release based on the need for retribution.  Because the district court quoted from a § 3553(a) sentencing factor representing retribution, we conclude that the district court erred. But even assuming this error was plain, Mr. Booker has not shown that it affected his substantial rights because we conclude there is no reasonable probability that his sentence would have been shorter had the court not erred. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we AFFIRM Mr. Booker’s twenty-four-month sentence.

Because of the plain error issue, this new Booker case would likely not make a good vehicle for SCOTUS to resolve this deep circuit divide over supervised release decision-making. (And, as a silly aside, I certainly would not be keen to have another major "Booker" sentencing ruling.)  But, given US Sentencing Commission data showing over 20,000 supervised release violation hearings taking place every year, there are on average nearly 100 federal defendants at least potentially impacted by this jurisprudential divide every single day in federal courts.  SCOTUS really should resolve this matter sooner rather than later if we think some semblance of equal justice is of importance in our federal criminal sentencing systems.

"Criminal Justice Record Clearing: An Analysis from Two States"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Matthew Stubenberg, Renee Danser and D. James Greiner now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Millions in the United States have criminal records.  Many of these records are eligible for some sort of concealment from public view, commonly known as expungement or sealing. In this paper, we analyzed criminal records in four counties in Pennsylvania and several counties in Kansas to determine the number of records eligible for such remedies.  In Pennsylvania, the analysis included both expungement, defined here as petition-based suppression of information, and sealing, defined here as suppression that the government (usually the judicial system) undertakes without petitions.  Kansas law only allows for petition-based expungement.  Our analysis found approximately 100,000 charges eligible for expungement in Kansas and 180,000 charges eligible for expungement in Pennsylvania, supporting prior research that identified a so-called “second chance gap.”

Our primary contribution, however, is an analysis of which statutory reforms would provide the biggest bang for the buck, i.e., would render the largest number of cases or charges eligible for a record-clearing remedy.  We found, for example, that elimination of criteria related to legally imposed financial obligations (“LIFOs”) would render a surprising number of files eligible for information suppression.  In addition, our analysis identified approximately 200,000 charges that were eligible for sealing in Pennsylvania but were still available to the public online at the time of the data retrieval, suggesting that even when the government undertakes information suppression from its own databases, it finds the task challenging.  Finally, our analysis examined why certain records were not eligible for expungement or sealing in each state.  This additional analysis will inform legislatures and activists where their efforts can best be put to use.

Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Kavanaugh) dissents from denial of cert in criminal contempt case

The Supeme Court's new order list this morning has only one cert grant in a civil case, but it concludes with a notable five-page dissent from the denial of certiorari in Donzinger v. US, No. 22–274.  Here is part of the factual backstory as explained in the dissent authored by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Justice Kavanaugh involving prosecution of a lawyer for criminal contempt:

When Mr. Donziger failed to comply fully with the court’s orders, it held him in criminal contempt and referred the matter to the U. S. Attorney’s Office for prosecution.  See 38 F. 4th 290, 295 (CA2 2022).  After some deliberation, however, the U.S. Attorney “‘respectfully declined’” to take up the case. Ibid. (alteration omitted).

Apparently displeased with this decision, the district court responded by setting up and staffing its own prosecutor’s office. Ibid. In the bench trial that followed, that office secured a conviction and the court sentenced Mr. Donziger to six months in prison. Ibid.  Throughout these proceedings and on appeal, Mr. Donziger objected.  He argued that the district court had no lawful authority to override the Executive Branch’s nonprosecution decision and that our Constitution’s separation of powers exists in no small measure to keep courts from becoming partisans in the cases before them.  Despite his arguments, the Second Circuit affirmed Mr. Donziger’s conviction. Id., at 306. Judge Menashi dissented. Id., at 306–315.

Justice Gorsuch goes on to explain the shaky precedents and laws cited to support the unusual process for convicting the defendant here.  And he concludes the dissent this way:

However much the district court may have thought Mr. Donziger warranted punishment, the prosecution in this case broke a basic constitutional promise essential to our liberty.  In this country, judges have no more power to initiate a prosecution of those who come before them than prosecutors have to sit in judgment of those they charge.  In the name of the “United States,” two different groups of prosecutors have asked us to turn a blind eye to this promise. Respectfully, I would not.  With this Court’s failure to intervene today, I can only hope that future courts weighing whether to appoint their own prosecutors will consider carefully Judge Menashi’s dissenting opinion in this case, the continuing vitality of Young, and the limits of its reasoning.  Our Constitution does not tolerate what happened here.