Tuesday, December 15, 2020

Reviewing thoughtfully the a history of public defenders in the United States

Writing in The Nation, Matthew Clair has this new extended review of Sara Mayeux's recent book, Free Justice: A History of the Public Defender in Twentieth-Century America Unequal Before the Law. The review is headlined "Unequal Before the Law: How did we end up with our current system of public defenders?," and here is an excerpt:

In her new book, Free Justice: A History of the Public Defender in Twentieth-Century America, Sara Mayeux provides a definitive history of this important yet conflicted institution, documenting along the way how liberal legal reforms can function to legitimate material inequalities and distract from more robust commitments to social justice. Taking readers from the Progressive Era to the height of the Cold War, Mayeux shows the stages by which influential reformers crafted our current indigent-defense system.

These days, she notes, public defenders are often taken for granted: Their presence in the courtroom, whether effective or not, is the norm rather than the exception.  Yet as recently as the 1950s, public defender’s offices were rare, and they were controversial, viewed by many lawyers and policy-makers as a socialist reform contrary to American values. Most poor people faced criminal charges unrepresented, with a patchwork of private firms and voluntary legal aid organizations stepping in to defend the few deemed deserving of their philanthropy.  By the 1970s, this system of legal representation had changed; the majority of Americans lived in jurisdictions served by a public defender’s office, and legal professionals came to view the provision of so-called government lawyers as a cornerstone of liberal democracy.

Mayeux’s account is cautionary.  She documents how transformations to American legal culture were made possible by the persistent efforts of advocates, but she also marks the detours and missed opportunities in the formation of the public defender system as we know it today, which raises a set of questions about the efficacy of technocratic and symbolic reforms.  As activists and scholars organize in the current moment, her book offers a lesson in both the possibilities and the limits of such reforms in addressing social inequalities in the courts.  The seeming success of the concept of the public defender reminds us that the expansion of rights in one domain cannot rectify social injustice without a corresponding expansion in others.  Fixing the failures of our criminal legal system requires more than the provision of effective legal representation to the poor; it requires a redistribution of power and wealth to the marginalized communities and individuals whom criminal law targets for punishment.

December 15, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 14, 2020

US Sentencing Commission issues big new report on "The Influence of the Guidelines on Federal Sentencing: Federal Sentencing Outcomes, 2005–2017"

I am pleased to see that the United States Sentencing Commission is continuing to release notable data reports despite being an incomplete agency due to the absence of confirmed commissioners for years.  Today brings this notable new publication, clocking in at nearly 100 pages, titled "The Influence of the Guidelines on Federal Sentencing: Federal Sentencing Outcomes, 2005–2017."  Here is this reports "Key Findings": 

In this report, the Commission analyzes the difference between average guideline minimums and average sentences imposed.  These differences, measured in a raw number of months and average percentage difference, are analyzed for all cases in the aggregate and selected individual guidelines across three time periods between 2005 and 2017: the Booker, Gall, and Post-Report Periods.  While the extent of those differences vary depending on the individual guideline, the Commission found several overarching trends indicating that the guidelines generally continue to have a substantial influence on sentences imposed after Booker.

  • In the wake of Booker and Gall and continuing into the Post-Report Period, the difference between the average guideline minimum and average sentence imposed widened for the federal caseload overall, indicating that the influence of the guidelines generally decreased after Booker rendered them advisory.  However, this trend has not continued in the most recent years of the Post-Report Period, suggesting that the influence of the guidelines may have stabilized.

  • The influence of the guidelines continued to vary substantially depending on the type of offense throughout the Post-Report Period.  As indicated by the difference between the average guideline minimum and average sentence imposed, the guidelines continued to exert a strong influence on sentences imposed in firearms and illegal reentry offenses, a more moderate influence on sentences imposed in fraud and drug offenses, and a weakening influence in non-production child pornography offenses and career offender cases.

  • Major amendments by the Commission to the drug trafficking and illegal reentry guidelines appear to have strengthened their influence during the most recent years of the Post-Report Period.  The difference between the average guideline minimum and average sentence imposed for these two guidelines narrowed after the Commission reduced the Drug Quantity Table by two offense levels in 2014 and comprehensively revised the illegal reentry guideline in 2016.

  • The guidelines generally exert a greater influence on sentences imposed in cases in which judicial discretion could be meaningfully assessed.  Excluding cases in which judicial discretion could not be meaningfully assessed narrowed the difference between the average guideline minimum and the average sentence imposed for the federal caseload overall, and for all but one individual offense type studied, across every time period studied.  This narrowing was largely attributable to the exclusion of cases with substantial assistance departures, which resulted in an average sentence reduction of 51.8 percent.  Sentence reductions for substantial assistance require a government motion and afford substantial weight to the government’s evaluation.

In short form, and at the risk of being too flip or summary about these findings, I take this all to mean that the USSC has through its data analysis found: (a) federal judges generally follow the less-crazy-severe guidelines somewhat more than the more-crazy-severe guidelines, AND (b) when the USSC finally gets around to amending the guidelines to make some of the more-crazy-severe guidelines a bit less crazy-severe, judges are inclined to follow those guidelines a bit more.  Oh, and (c) we really have no clear idea what the heck may be going on when prosecutors exercise their discretionary sentencing powers through substantial assistance departures (since, I assume, the DOJ shares no information with the USSC about the decision-making of federal prosecutors).

December 14, 2020 in Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Booker in district courts, Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

"Experience to Action: Reshaping Criminal Justice After COVID-19"

Final-Report-Banner-WebsiteI have noted repeatedly (most recently here) the great work being done by a special commission created by the Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) titled the "National Commission on COVID-19 and Criminal Justice."  This commission today released this important new report with the title that I used for the title of this post.  Here is part of the report's executive summary:

This report, Experience to Action: Reshaping Criminal Justice After COVID-19, provides criminal justice policymakers and practitioners with a priority agenda to prepare the nation’s criminal justice system for future public health crises.

Through its recommendations, the Commission seeks to better balance the roles and responsibilities of the public health and public safety fields.  Launched at the end of July, the Commission received multiple reports and extensive testimony from leading national and local experts.  Key findings include:

  • Crime: Property crime and drug offense rates fell from 2019 to 2020, but violent crime increased significantly. In particular, homicide rates increased by 42% during the summer months (June to August) in a sample of more than 20 medium to large cities, and by 34% in the fall (September to October).

  • Prisons: Prison populations have been reduced by about 5% nationally. On average, the COVID-19 mortality rate within prisons (61.8 deaths per 100,000 people in prison) was double the mortality rate for the general population, after adjusting for the gender, age, and race/ethnicity of those incarcerated.  There are also substantial differences among states in the rate of prison infections and deaths.

  • Jails: Jail populations fell by 31% in the early weeks of the pandemic but have been slowly climbing toward prior levels since May. During the pandemic, the rates at which people have been rebooked on new charges 30, 60, and 180 days after release remain below pre-pandemic rates. Unfortunately, data regarding COVID-related infections and deaths in jails is scarce.

  • Racial and Ethnic Disparities: The COVID-19 pandemic may have exacerbated some racial and ethnic disparities in the criminal justice system.  As jail populations began to fall in March at the onset of the pandemic, there were increases in the proportion of people who were Black, who were booked on felony charges, who were male, and who were 25 or younger.  These changes in the population composition persisted even as jail populations began to rise again in early May.

  • Substance Use and Mental Health Disorders: More than 40 states have reported increases in opioid-related fatalities since the onset of the pandemic.  Mandatory lockdowns, restrictions on movement, social distancing guidelines, orders limiting access to facilities for nonessential workers, and the absence of in-person treatment have created gaps in the system's ability to identify and monitor the needs and legal requirements of people with substance abuse and mental health disorders, and to intervene when they are in distress.

  • Budgets: State and local governments face daunting budget deficits that will worsen as the pandemic wears on, and unemployment levels remain high.  Because criminal justice operations (law enforcement, courts, and corrections) are funded more heavily by state and local governments than most other government functions, revenue shortfalls will disproportionately damage the criminal justice system without effective policy interventions....

The report’s findings and recommendations identify weaknesses in the nation’s criminal justice response to the pandemic and provide concrete suggestions for how to build a stronger, fairer, and more resilient system.

As detailed here, there is a webinar to discuss this report is scheduled for midday tomorrow.

December 14, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Making a great case for greater data to improve sentencing decision-making and sentencing systems

I was very pleased this morning to see this new Atlantic piece authored by two Ohio state jurists, Judge Pierre H. Bergeron of the Ohio Court of Appeals and Justice Michael P. Donnelly of the Ohio Supreme Court.  Because I have had the honor of participating in ongoing efforts to improve sentencing data in the Buckeye State, I knew I was going to like the piece when I saw its full title: "How a Spreadsheet Could Change the Criminal-Justice System: A lack of data instills trial-court judges with enormous, largely unrestrained sentencing power."  And the full piece, which I fully recommend, does a terrific job of advocating against allowing sentencing to occur in dangerous darkness because of the absence of sound and accessible sentencing data.  Here are some excerpts from the piece (with links from the original):

Judges have various restrictions on what they can say publicly, and for that reason, you don’t often hear our voices in contemporary public-policy debates.  But as momentum builds to address deep inequities in our criminal-justice system, we feel it’s important to highlight a problem lurking in the background that could jeopardize these efforts: Many court systems lack basic data about themselves, including about their criminal-sentencing decisions.  This means that when a judge considers a sentence for a criminal defendant, he or she has no way to evaluate it against others handed down for similar crimes in the same state, or even the same county....

A lack of data collection and analysis is a nationwide problem.  Many states, including Ohio, where we serve, do not have reliable statewide numbers on the criminal sentences they impose.  The states that do compile statistics have significant gaps.  The problem extends beyond sentencing — many states also can’t measure, for instance, what the average bail rate is for various offenses, or even the effectiveness of the bail system.

All of this may strike one as inconceivable: How does a court system lack basic statistics in this technological day and age?  The answer varies by state, but typically, antiquated IT infrastructure in state courts, no uniform requirements on compiling numbers, and a lack of coordination across jurisdictions precludes gathering meaningful numbers and demographics.  And, in many corners, institutional interests are aligned to resist transparency out of a fear of what might show up....

For states that are starting to gather statistics, they are finding troubling, but not surprising, results.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court commissioned an analysis of statewide numbers to evaluate racial disparities.  Plagued by many data challenges, this effort took several years.  The recently published report showed what many of us know: People of color are vastly overrepresented in the criminal-justice system as defendants; they receive longer sentences than white defendants; and they are typically charged with more serious offenses to begin with (a leverage tool to force plea agreements). When judges see reports that show this is happening in their own courts, they must ask themselves hard questions about their own complicity in these results.   

In 2016, investigative reporters with the Sarasota Herald-Tribune conducted a comparison study that confirmed racial disparities in Florida’s criminal-justice system. One of the examples from their study examined two cases involving armed robbery.  The same judge sentenced a white defendant to two years, but a Black defendant to 26 years — for essentially the same offense.  These two individuals were almost the same age, both had a single prior misdemeanor, and they were rated the same based on Florida’s sentencing guidelines.  When judges have virtually unchecked discretion, and they lack ready access to sentencing data, these discrepancies are bound to continue happening....

Although data challenges are pervasive and a key barrier to criminal-justice reform, they can be solved. In response to the statewide analysis conducted by the Sarasota Herald-Tribune, Florida legislators passed groundbreaking legislation to standardize the way the state gathers and shares information.  The state has already missed some deadlines, but the legislation as designed would render Florida one of the most transparent states in the country from a criminal-data perspective.

Other states are also starting to create comprehensive databases so that informed criminal sentences are accessible to all stakeholders — judges, prosecuting and defense attorneys, defendants, and policy makers.  Currently, the nonprofit Measures for Justice has compiled statistics for 16 states.  Ohio, led by Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, is in the process of developing a felony-sentencing database with the objective of making information accessible, shareable, and reportable.  It can’t come soon enough.  Indeed, if every state acted quickly, we could solve this issue in short order, and then move on to implement lasting criminal-justice reform that would end mass incarceration.

The goal of these efforts is not to eliminate judicial discretion (judges aren’t robots, after all) but to provide sound analysis to inform judges in the exercise of that discretion.  If everyone has complete access to information, the prosecutor can make an informed sentencing recommendation, the defense counsel can use the data to make his or her case, and the judge can feel secure in knowing that the sentence imposed fits well within the range from other courts around the state.  If the sentence deviates up or down, the judge can give a reason on the record, providing greater transparency in the process.  Objective measures that are comparable, consistent, and reliable can better ensure the equalized application of justice....

The judicial system relies on the trust of our citizenry; public confidence is its lifeblood.  We must act in deliberate and real ways to create change in our courts. And that requires working with all stakeholders — including the community, legislators, and law enforcement.  No one, including judges, can sit back and pretend that the problem of inequality is too intractable or the result of someone else’s decisions any longer.  Collecting and utilizing sentencing data will help build a better, more equitable justice system.

December 14, 2020 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Via 6-3 per curiam ruling, SCOTUS reinstates Arizona death sentence after finding Ninth Circuit "clearly violated [its] AEDPA jurisprudence"

The US Supreme Court issued this lengthy order list this morning, though much of its length comes from the Court's 13-page per curiam decision in Shinn v. Kayer, No. 19-1302 (S. Ct. Dec. 14, 2020) (available here). The Kayer case results from a murder committed more than a quarter century ago which resulted in an Arizona death sentence. The SCOTUS decision, from which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented but without any opinion, vacates a Ninth Circuit reversal of the death sentence. Here is how the opinion begins and ends:

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) restricts the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus based on claims that were “adjudicated on the merits” by a state court.  28 U.S.C. §2254(d).  When a state court has applied clearly established federal law to reasonably determined facts in the process of adjudicating a claim on the merits, a federal habeas court may not disturb the state court’s decision unless its error lies “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).  In this case, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering issuance of a writ of habeas corpus despite ample room for reasonable disagreement about the prisoner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.  In so doing, the Court of Appeals clearly violated this Court’s AEDPA jurisprudence.  We therefore grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the judgment below....

Under AEDPA, state courts play the leading role in assessing challenges to state sentences based on federal law.  A state court heard Kayer’s evidence and concluded that he failed to show prejudice.  The court below exceeded its authority in rejecting that determination, which was not so obviously wrong as to be “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id., at 103.  Under §2254(d), that is “‘the only question that matters.’” Id., at 102.

We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

December 14, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, December 13, 2020

An awesome reading list on "Second Look Sentencing"

Greg Newburn has created this terrific new posting under the title "Second Look Sentencing: A (Running) Reading List for Legislators, Staff, Advocates, and Everyone Else." I highly recommend all the items linked in this great reading list, and here is the post's preface to the list:

The idea of “Second Look” sentencing — that the law should allow some mechanism by which institutional actors can legally revisit sentences to ensure they remain appropriate (or to adjust those that never were) — has been around for some time.  Now, it is gaining traction. For example, the Model Penal Code now contains a second look provision; last year, a second look bill was filed in the Florida Legislature, and passed several committees (the bill was recently re-filed for the 2021 session); a second look bill looks poised to pass in Washington, D.C. any day now; the new District Attorney for Los Angeles County, George Gascón, announced his office will create a “resentencing unit” tasked with conducting second look-style reviews in thousands of cases; earlier this year, Broward County, Florida State Attorney Michael Satz announced what he called an “equitable review” process that led to the early release of drug offenders serving sentences no longer found in law; and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers just released model second look legislation, a fantastic aid for legislators interested in adopting second look laws in their states.

Given the momentum second-look sentencing seems to have at the moment — and the fact that adopting such laws is a moral necessity given the way current sentencing structures deny thousands of our fellow human beings their liberty unnecessarily — I thought it might be useful to put together a list of materials — law review articles, opinion pieces, blog posts, panels, etc. — that legislators, staff, advocates, and laypeople could use for a better understanding of some of the theoretical and moral issues surrounding second look sentencing, how it would work in practice, why it would protect and even improve public safety outcomes, and so on.

December 13, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Transforming the Progressive Prosecutor Movement"

The title of this post is the title of this notable paper newly posted to SSRN and authored by Darcy Covert. Here is its abstract:

It is a near universally accepted principle that prosecutors are the most powerful actors in the criminal system.  In response, a new movement has emerged: Its proponents argue that, by electing progressive district attorneys, we can use the power of prosecutors to end mass incarceration and restore fairness to the criminal system without changing a single law.  They propose to accomplish these goals primarily by declining to prosecute certain low-level crimes, expanding diversion programs, and replacing hardline assistants with reform-minded outsiders.  Academics, activists, presidential candidates, and even a Supreme Court Justice have endorsed this movement as the key to change.

With little sustained scrutiny of this development, this Article takes this movement’s objectives as they are and asks whether, as currently framed, it is likely to achieve them.  The conclusion is simple: no.  This movement acknowledges the “breathtaking” power that prosecutors yield, then asks its candidates to use that power for good and trusts them to do so.

This Article offers a more efficacious prescription: if you are a prosecutor truly committed to transforming the criminal system, relinquish your power.  Do not trade the rhetorical appeal of being tough on violent crime for political capital to spend on lenience for low-level offenders.  Advocate for the reallocation of funds from prosecutors’ offices — rather than the expansion of diversion programs — to social services to keep the mentally ill, substance addicted, and poor out of the criminal system.  Rather than hoping to prevent wrongful convictions and over-punitiveness by changing who works in your office, lobby for a stronger indigent defense system and more external limits on prosecutorial power.  To combat racial inequities in the criminal system, support efforts to strengthen defendants’ equal protection rights, instead of simply publishing statistics.  Through these shifts, we can harness this moment when criminal justice reform tops the national agenda to implement truly transformative change.

December 13, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, December 12, 2020

"Institutionalizing inequality in the courts: Decomposing racial and ethnic disparities in detention, conviction, and sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this recent article published in the latest issue of Criminology authored by Marisa Omori and Nick Petersen.  Here is its abstract:

A significant body of literature has examined racial and ethnic inequalities in sentencing, focusing on how individual court actors make decisions, but fewer scholars have examined whether disparities are institutionalized through legal case factors.  After finding racial and ethnic inequalities in pretrial detention, conviction, and incarceration based on 4 years of felony court data (N = 83,924) from Miami‐Dade County, we estimate nonlinear decomposition models to examine how much of the inequalities are explained by differences in criminal history, charging, and for conviction and incarceration, pretrial detention.

Results suggest that inequality is greatest between White non‐Latinos and Black Latinos, followed by White non‐Latinos and Black non‐Latinos, ranging from 4 to more than 8 percentage points difference in the probability of pretrial detention, 7–13 points difference in conviction, 5–6 points in prison, and 4–10 points difference in jail.  We find few differences between White non‐Latinos and White Latinos.  Between half and three‐quarters of the inequality in pretrial detention, conviction, and prison sentences between White non‐Latino and Black people is explained through legal case factors.  Our findings indicate that inequality is, in part, institutionalized through legal case factors, suggesting these factors are not “race neutral” but instead racialized and contribute to inequalities in court outcomes.

December 12, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, December 11, 2020

"The Administrative Law of the Eighth (and Sixth) Amendment"

The title of this post is the title of this book chapter authored by Richard Bierschbach and recently posted to SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

On the surface, few similarities exist between modern administrative law and the modern constitutional law of sentencing.  Administrative law is preoccupied with structural constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and regulatory policy.  Constitutional sentencing law is overwhelmingly concerned with individual constitutional rights, blame, and punishment.  Scholars thus rarely draw connections between the two.

This Chapter — written for a forthcoming volume on “The Eighth Amendment and Its Future in a New Age of Punishment” — does just that.  Administrative law and the constitutional law of sentencing can be seen as sharing a fundamental concern about the structure of decision-making: how to ensure that difficult, value-laden judgments best reflect and filter the viewpoints and concerns of those they affect.  Just as the institutional and procedural structure of administrative law evolved in large part to address issues of voice and perspective in the regulatory context, we might understand the arc of constitutional sentencing law over the last half-decade as slowly moving in a parallel direction.

December 11, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 10, 2020

US completes execution of Brendan Bernard despite high-profile appeals for relief

As reported in this AP piece, the "Trump administration on Thursday carried out its ninth federal execution of the year and the first during a presidential lame-duck period in 130 years, putting to death a Texas street-gang member for his role in the slayings of a religious couple from Iowa more than two decades ago."  Here is more:

Four more federal executions, including one Friday, are planned in the weeks before President-elect Joe Biden’s inauguration.

The case of Brendan Bernard, who received a lethal injection of phenobarbital inside a death chamber at a U.S. prison in Terre Haute, Indiana, was a rare execution of a person who was in his teens when his crime was committed.

Several high-profile figures, including reality TV star Kim Kardashian West, had appealed to President Donald Trump to commute Bernard’s sentence to life in prison.

With witnesses looking on from behind a glass barrier, the 40-year-old Bernard was pronounced dead at 9:27 p.m. Eastern time.

Bernard was 18 when he and four other teenagers abducted and robbed Todd and Stacie Bagley on their way from a Sunday service in Killeen, Texas. Federal executions were resumed by Trump in July after a 17-year hiatus despite coronavirus outbreak in U.S. prisons....

[J]ust before the execution was scheduled, Bernard’s lawyers filed papers with the Supreme Court seeking to halt the execution. The legal team expanded to include two very high-profile attorneys: Alan Dershowitz, the retired Harvard law professor who was part of Donald Trump’s impeachment defense team and whose clients have included O.J. Simpson, Claus von Bulow and Mike Tyson; and Ken Starr, who also defended Trump during the impeachment and is most famous as an independent counsel who led the investigation into Bill Clinton.

But about two and a half hours after the execution was scheduled, the Supreme Court denied the request, clearing the way for the execution to proceed.

The Supreme Court's denial of Benard's application for a stay of execution and cert petition is available at this link. The vote was 6-3, with Justice Sotomayor writing the only full dissent. That dissent starts this way:

Today, the Court allows the Federal Government to execute Brandon Bernard, despite Bernard’s troubling allegations that the Government secured his death sentence by withholding exculpatory evidence and knowingly eliciting false testimony against him.  Bernard has never had the opportunity to test the merits of those claims in court.  Now he never will. I would grant Bernard’s petition for a writ of certiorari and application for a stay to ensure his claims are given proper consideration before he is put to death.

December 10, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

NACDL releases model "Second Look" sentencing legislation providing for resentencing after a decade in prison

As noted in this press release, today "NACDL released its model 'Second Look' sentencing legislation and accompanying report – Second Look = Second Chance: The NACDL Model “Second Look” Legislation.  The NACDL model legislation provides a vehicle that legislatures can use to safely reduce the number of individuals serving excessive, counter-productive sentences: guaranteeing all incarcerated individuals a 'Second Look' once they have spent at least a decade in prison."  Here are links to the model legislation and report:

Here is the key operative provision of the model legislation:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any applicable mandatory minimum sentence, an incarcerated individual who has served at least ten years of their sentence may petition their sentencing judge for a reduction of their sentence.

And here are a few paragraphs from the 14-page report:

This report advocates a simple yet powerful step states can take to safely reduce the number of individuals locked into counter-productive, decades-long sentences: guaranteeing that every inmate will get a “Second Look” once they have spent at least a decade in prison.  This proposal would allow long-term incarcerated individuals, assisted by counsel, to petition courts for a sentence reduction after ten years in prison, and periodically thereafter if warranted.  As this report explains, the procedure created by NACDL’s proposed legislation is flexible, allowing judges to consider a wide range of up-to-date information in assessing whether a lengthy sentence can appropriately be reduced.  It gives victims a voice to whatever extent they want one, without burdening them.  It includes appellate review to ensure fairness and consistency. And it includes mechanisms for channeling the resulting savings back into programs that will help make the program sustainable — and help the individuals who receive a second chance to succeed and become productive members of society, to the benefit of all.

“Second Look” is an idea whose moment has arrived.  By enacting comprehensive legislation like that proposed here, state governments can position themselves as leaders in correcting the worst and most counterproductive excesses of the mass incarceration era, delivering savings to state budgets, and a second chance to individuals and communities who have been left behind for too long.

December 10, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Noting the notable number of prosecutors now supportive of sentencing second looks

The Washington Post had this important and lengthy new article from earlier this week under the headline "A growing group of prosecutors, who say the job is more than locking people up, wants to help free criminals, too."  Here are excerpts from the start of the piece:

When Calvin McNeill was 16, he and a group of friends in Baltimore decided to rob a neighborhood dice game.  Things got chaotic, and McNeill shot and killed a man. It was 1981. The teen was sentenced to life in prison.  Over the next 39 years, McNeill became a model inmate and was approved for parole three times, but each time the Maryland governor vetoed his release. 

So Baltimore State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby joined a defense motion to reconsider his sentence last summer.  A judge granted it, and McNeill was freed in July this year.  Since his release, “everybody that I have come across has opened up their arms to me,” McNeill said, “and said, ‘We’re glad to see you home.  And we understand that you were a baby when you got locked up.’”

On Monday, Mosby announced the launch of a sentencing review unit in Baltimore to address both mass incarceration and racial inequities in the justice system.  Of the 2,500 people serving life sentences in Maryland, 79 percent are Black, Mosby said, though African Americans make up only 30 percent of the state population.  In Baltimore, of the 815 prisoners sentenced to life, 94 percent are Black.

Also Monday, the newly elected district attorney of Los Angeles, George Gascón, announced at his swearing-in that he, too, is launching a sentencing review unit.  Gascón said he conservatively estimates that 20,000 prisoners will immediately qualify for resentencing.  He said he believes some were given drastically long sentences, others are older and unlikely to reoffend, and others should be released because of covid-19 concerns.

“The role of a prosecutor is not only one of seeking justice,” Gascón said in an interview, “but also of correcting injustice . . . This is going to be the first time in the nation where there will be this massive effort coming from the largest prosecution offices in the country.”  He said half of Los Angeles’s prisoners are rated low-risk to reoffend and if thousands are released, “there will be billions of dollars in savings” on incarceration costs. “This is gigantic,” Gascón said.

The push to begin revisiting lengthy prison sentences, as part of the justice reform effort being promoted by big city prosecutors around the country, is gaining momentum even in states like Maryland, where there is no formal mechanism for prosecutors to revisit settled cases.  Prosecutors in San Francisco, Boston, Philadelphia and Brooklyn are also launching sentencing review initiatives.

While a growing number of prosecutors also are seeking to uncover and reverse wrongful convictions, which occur in a small percentage of cases, the move to release those who were correctly convicted but have now served decades in prison could have a far wider impact.  More than 2 million Americans are in jail or prison, which is believed to be the highest incarceration rate in the world.

In Washington state, a bill allowing prosecutors to seek resentencing passed this year, and the district attorney in Seattle announced a sentencing review unit in June. But the office had already been quietly achieving prisoner releases since 2007, “with a bit of a wink to the judge,” King County District Attorney Dan Satterberg said.  “We knew no one was going to appeal it.”  In the District, the city has released 53 inmates since passing a law in 2016 allowing for resentencing if the offender was younger than 18 and served at least 15 years in prison.  Now the city council is considering expanding the group of eligible inmates to those who committed crimes at age 24 or younger and have spent 15 years incarcerated....

Last year in Prince George’s County, newly elected State’s Attorney Aisha Braveboy created the state’s first conviction and sentencing integrity unit to review both convictions and sentencings that might deserve new consideration.  Seven people sentenced to life as juveniles have been released, an office spokeswoman said.

Extreme sentences, particularly those that wouldn’t be imposed today, divert resources away from the root sources of crime, turn prisons into elder care centers and alienate communities torn by mass incarceration, said Miriam Krinsky, executive director of Fair and Just Prosecution, which helps organize and coordinate newly elected prosecutors. “When the system is out of alignment with communities,” Krinsky said, “people will stop trusting the system and stop cooperating, and then we’re all at risk.”

Prosecutors launching such efforts have devised a number of factors to consider for each case, such as the prisoner’s original crime, their rehabilitation in prison, their plan for reentry into society, their likelihood to reoffend and the opinions of the victims in their case.  A number of experts said that victims often don’t oppose the release of the offender and that the occurrence of new crimes by those released is low.

I cannot help but note that many years ago I gave a keynote speech at a conference focused on the work of prosecutors when I suggested they should be much more involved in reviewing past sentences. That speech got published as Encouraging (and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to Be Second-Look Sentencers, 19 Temple Political & Civil Rights L. Rev. 429 (2010).  It is nice to see that it only took about a decade for this idea to start coming into vogue.

December 10, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Is the unanimous SCOTUS ruling in Briggs notably kind to the "evolving standards" approach to the Eighth Amendment?

I noted in this post the Supreme Court's unanimous ruling this morning in US v. Briggs, No. 19-108 (S. Ct. Dec. 10, 2020) (available here), which fundamentally concerned an issue of statutory interpretation.  But the Eighth Amendment was part of the fabric of the statutory debate, and I was struck by how the opinion by Justice Alito for the full Court — save Justice Barrett, who was not yet on the Court by the time of oral argument — discussed how the Eighth Amendment is interpreted in these two passages:

This Court has held that the Eighth Amendment incorporates “‘evolving standards of decency.’” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); emphasis added).  Thus, even if we were to hold that rape could be punished by death in the military context, the evolving-standards test could later lead to a different result and thus a different statute of limitations at some point in the future.  Such evolution has been held to have occurred on a number of past occasions.  Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 321 (2002) (Eighth Amendment prohibits death penalty for defendant described as mentally retarded), with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (Eighth Amendment permits death penalty for such a defendant); compare also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–575 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits death penalty for crime committed by person under 18 years of age), with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 380 (1989) (Eighth Amendment permits death penalty for defendants who are at least 16 years of age)....

As noted, in deciding whether the Eighth Amendment permits a death sentence for a particular category of offenses or offenders, the Court has looked to evolving societal standards of decency and has also rendered its own independent judgment about whether a death sentence would aptly serve the recognized purposes of criminal punishment in certain categories of cases. See Kennedy, 554 U.S., at 419–421, 441–446; Roper, 543 U.S., at 561, 571–575; Atkins, 536 U.S., at 318–321.  Some Justices have eschewed aspects of those approaches and have looked instead to the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment.  See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 99–102 (2010) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U. S., at 348–349 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 864, 872–873 (1988) (same); cf. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 894, 898–899 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).  But under either method, the inquiry is quite different from the one that a lawmaker might make in fixing a statute of limitations.

This accounting of Eighth Amendment interpretation in Briggs is certainly meant to be just descriptive, as it notes how "the Court has" approached Eighth Amendment interpretation and how some Justices " have eschewed aspects of those approaches and have looked instead to the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment."   Nevertheless, this discussion of the "evolving-standards test" still struck me as fairly "kind" to a "living Constitution" vision of the Eighth Amendment in a unanimous Court ruling circa 2020.  Though I am likely reading way too much into these passages, I will be eager in future writings to have a fresh 2020 citation for the proposition that the Supreme Court has indicated that courts are look "to evolving societal standards of decency" when interpreting the Eighth Amendment.  United States v. Biggs, No. 19-108, slip op. at 8 (S. Ct. Dec. 10, 2020).  And, I will also like to be able to say that, as the Supreme Court has clearly explained , "this evolving-standards test could later lead to a different result" under the Eighth Amendment even when a punishment has previous been upheld as constitutional.  Id. at slip op. 6-7.

December 10, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

SCOTUS unanimously rejects narrowed interpretation of UCMJ statute of limitation for rape

The Supreme Court this morning handed down a unanimous opinion opinion in US v. Briggs, No. 19-108 (S. Ct. Dec. 10, 2020) (available here), concerning the applicable statute of limitations in military rape prosecutions.  Here is how Justice Alito's opinion for the Court gets started:

We must decide in these cases whether, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a prosecution for a rape committed during the period from 1986 to 2006 had to be commenced within five years of the commission of the charged offense or whether such a prosecution could be brought at any time, as is the rule at present.  The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), reversing its prior decisions on this question, held that the statute of limitations was five years and that it therefore barred the rape convictions of respondents, three military service members.  See 78 M. J. 289 (2019); 78 M. J. 415 (2019); 79 M. J. 199 (2019).  We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ___ (2019), and now reverse.

The opinion that follows goes on to discuss Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the course of conclude that this jurisprudence should not impact interpretation of the statute of limitation at issue here. Here are some key passages:

In short, if we accepted the interpretation of Article 43(a) adopted by the CAAF and defended by respondents, we would have to conclude that this provision set out a statute of limitations that no one could have understood with any real confidence until important and novel legal questions [regarding the Eighth Amendment] were resolved by this Court. That is not the sort of limitations provision that Congress is likely to have chosen....

Viewing Article 43(a) in context, we are convinced that “punishable by death” is a term of art that is defined by the provisions of the UCMJ specifying the punishments for the offenses it outlaws. And under this interpretation, respondents’ prosecutions were timely.

December 10, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, December 09, 2020

Sentencing Council for England and Wales issues new sentencing guidelines for firearm offenses that include drawing drawing sentencers' attention to historic disparities

As reported in this official news release, titled "Sentencing guidelines for firearms offences published," the Sentencing Council for England and Wales has released some new sentencing guides that includes an especially interesting element intended to respond to historic ethnic sentencing bias.  Here are the basics from the release (with some emphasis added):

Today, the Council is launching eight new sentencing guidelines to be used by the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts in England and Wales when sentencing firearms offences. The new guidelines will come into effect on 1 January 2021.

The aim of the guidelines, which will apply to adult offenders, is to help the courts deliver appropriate sentence levels for the unlawful possession of firearms and take a consistent approach to sentencing these offences.

Firearms offences are serious.  Some offences carry life imprisonment, some carry sentences of up to 10 years, and some require minimum sentences of five years, but there are currently no sentencing guidelines in the Crown Court and only one for use in magistrates’ courts.

Analysis conducted by the Council in preparation for the guidelines suggests there are disparities in sentence outcomes for some firearms offences based on ethnicity (see the response to consultation, pages 29-32).  The Council has taken measures in the guidelines to address this, including drawing sentencers’ attention to evidence of sentencing disparities in specific offences as an integral part the sentencing process.  The Council is committed to continuing to investigate apparent disparity in sentencing outcomes across all offences and will take further action as and when there is evidence of effective measures that can be applied to guidelines. 

This new article from The Guardian, headlined "Judges told they should consider previous racial bias before sentencing: Guidelines remind the bench black offenders tend to receive longer sentences for firearms offences," provides some additional context.  Here is an excerpt:

Judges and magistrates are to be given explicit reminders for the first time in sentencing guidelines of the disparity in punishments being imposed by the courts on white, Asian and black offenders. The advice is included in formal directions circulated by the sentencing council to those on the bench about how they should assess penalties for firearm offences.

The offences, which cover possession, discharge and manufacture of weapons, can result in a maximum prison term of up to 10 years. The eight new guidelines come into effect on 1 January.

Judges and magistrates are asked to consider the culpability of offenders according to whether, for example, the gun was loaded, shots have been fired, if it was for criminal purpose and the harm caused to any victim. But it is the inclusion of explicit reminders to judges and magistrates that the courts have in the past not achieved racial parity in the distribution of punishments that is highly unusual and novel.

In the guideline for the offence of possessing a firearm without a certificate, for example, judges and magistrates are reminded: “Sentencers should be aware that there is evidence of a disparity in sentence outcomes for this offence which indicates that a higher proportion of Black and Asian offenders receive an immediate custodial sentence than White offenders and that for Black offenders custodial sentence lengths have on average been longer than for White offenders.”

The note continues: “There may be many reasons for these differences, but in order to apply the guidelines fairly sentencers may find useful information and guidance … [in specific sections of] the Equal Treatment Bench Book.”

In another note, on possession of a prohibited weapon, the reminder states: “Sentencers should be aware that there is evidence of a disparity in sentence outcomes for this offence which indicates that where the minimum term applies, a higher proportion of White offenders receive a sentence below the mandatory minimum term, and as a result less severe sentences compared to Black, Asian and Other ethnicity offenders.”...

In 2017, a review by David Lammy QC, commissioned by the Ministry of Justice, highlighted bias against black and minority-ethnic suspects in the criminal justice system of England and Wales.  Among possible reasons for disparities, the sentencing council said, may be the “significance given to previous convictions in sentencing firearms cases.  There is an overrepresentation of black, Asian and other ethnic groups at many stages throughout the criminal justice system compared to the White ethnic group which means that, for example, a black offender may have a more significant record than a White offender of the same age.”

December 9, 2020 in Gun policy and sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 08, 2020

"The Court is in Recession: On the Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for Indigent Defense Spending"

The title of this post is the title of this timely new paper available via SSRN authored by Andrew Davies, Victoria M. Smiegocki and Hannah E. Hall. Here is its abstract:

What is the likely effect of the recession brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic on indigent defense budgets in the United States?  To look forward, we look backward.  We examine data on county-level spending on indigent defense in Texas during the Great Recession of 2007-2009.  Redistributive policies — those which use tax payer funds to support individuals who themselves pay little or no tax — are particularly susceptible to cuts during times of fiscal stress. Yet our analysis shows indigent defense policy, measured in terms of spending and access to counsel rates, was generally stable through the Great Recession years, even in counties hit hardest.

We attribute this apparent stability to two general explanations.  First, certain factors made Texas unique: expenditures on indigent defense were already relatively low prior to 2007 and legal changes in the state shored up the mandate to supply representation.  And second, the characterization of indigent defense itself as redistributive seems faulty.  Indigent defense policy is also, in an important sense, a set of mutually-beneficial transactions between lawyers and judges, occurring with comparatively little oversight.  The resilience of indigent defense services during times of scarcity suggests it is not only a policy which allocates funds to help the poor, but also is a policy which allocates funds in support of another clientele — the lawyers.

December 8, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 07, 2020

New Los Angeles County DA wastes no time making big policy and sentencing changes

SJM-L-GASCON-1207As detailed in this new Los Angeles Times article, headlined "On first day as L.A. County D.A., George Gascón eliminates bail, remakes sentencing rules," a prominent prosecutor is kicking off his new job in a potent way. Here are some details:

George Gascón embarked Monday on a plan to reimagine criminal prosecutions in Los Angeles County, announcing sweeping policy changes he’ll make as district attorney that include an end to cash bail, a ban on prosecutors seeking enhanced prison sentences and showing leniency to many low-level offenders.

The dramatic reversals of deeply ingrained, traditional law enforcement strategies in the nation’s largest district attorney’s office, also will include a review of thousands of old cases to determine whether lighter sentences or prisoner releases should be sought, Gascón said in a speech during his swearing-in ceremony.

“I recognize for many this is a new path … whether you are a protester, a police officer or a prosecutor, I ask you to walk with me. I ask you to join me on this journey,” he said.  “We can break the multigenerational cycles of violence, trauma and arrest and recidivism that has led America to incarcerate more people than any other nation.”

The reforms announced Monday added to a list of moves Gascón vowed to make during a contentious election against the incumbent district attorney, Jackie Lacey, including a promise to bar his prosecutors from seeking the death penalty in new cases and to end the practice of trying juveniles as adults. He followed through on both issues Monday, announcing them among the slew of new policies he is implementing....

While Gascón’s victory over Lacey was widely viewed as a repudiation by voters of more traditional, “tough on crime” policies, his focus on reducing incarceration rates could meet resistance at a time when violent crime is surging in Los Angeles.  The city has recorded more than 300 homicides for the first time in over a decade this year, and shootings are up more than 30% compared with 2019, according to L.A. Police Department records....

Of all the policy changes Gascón laid out, the end to cash bail, which is set to go into effect Jan. 1, is perhaps the most seismic.  Instead of seeking to hold criminal defendants in custody unless they can afford to post an amount of cash determined by a judge, prosecutors will be directed to ask judges to release them, except when someone is charged in a homicide or other violent felony. In those cases, prosecutors will seek to have defendants kept in custody....

On Monday, Gascón also ordered L.A. County prosecutors to stop prosecuting first-time offenders accused of a wide array of nonviolent crimes, including criminal trespass, disturbing the peace, public intoxication and loitering.

Defense attorneys contend such low-level nuisance crimes disproportionately affect homeless and mentally ill defendants, and can have long-term implications when those people try to find work and housing later in life. Instead of seeking plea deals or convictions, prosecutors will be expected to steer such defendants into pre-trial diversion programs that resolve cases through counseling or other forms of rehabilitation....

Gascón went on Monday to say he would put an end to the use of sentencing enhancements, which prosecutors have long used to win longer sentences against defendants with prior felony convictions or who had been accused of being in a gang.  Sentencing enhancements have come under fire in recent years for being excessively punitive and, in some cases, reliant on faulty police work.  In the last year, for example, several Los Angeles police officers were charged with falsely labeling people as gang members.  That bogus information was fed into a statewide database that is sometimes used to justify imposing enhanced sentences on someone.

The district attorney’s office, he said, will also review “thousands” of cases in which defendants in L.A. County were sentenced under the enhancement rules — a move that could lead to prisoners having their sentences reduced or, in some cases, being released....

Gascón acknowledged that the changes might seem enormous and asked doubters to trust him. “For those of you at home who may be skeptical, I want to ask you to take a moment, close your eyes, and imagine your ideal safe neighborhood. I imagine most of you will imagine a neighborhood with parks, playgrounds and manicured laws. With kids playing and after-school programs flourishing. I don’t imagine most of you are imagining a neighborhood with a police officer on every corner,” he said. “We know what safety looks like. But we don’t offer it to every community equally.”

UPDATE: I have found online some of DA Gascon's new policy commitments in memos called "Special Directies."  These all make for interesting reads:

DA Gascon Special Directive 20-06: PRETRIAL RELEASE POLICY

DA Gascon Special Directive 20-11: DEATH PENALTY POLICY

DA Gascon Special Directive 20-12: VICTIM SERVICES

DA Gascon Special Directive 20-14: RESENTENCING

December 7, 2020 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, December 04, 2020

"Unpunishable Criminals"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Mihailis Diamantis now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Criminal law strives to do justice. It aims to give wrongdoers the punishment they deserve and the punishment that will. But sometimes justice is out of reach.  Many criminals will never face punishment because circumstance or the law itself immunizes them from sanction.

This Article is the first to conceptualize the large and varied set of what it calls “unpunishable criminals.”  They include recipients of presidential pardons, deceased criminals, diplomats, fugitives, and those whose crimes occurred long ago, among several others.  Does criminal law’s inability to punish these criminals mean that it must wash its hands of them and their victims entirely?

Presently, the answer seems to be “yes.”  But this Article argues that criminal law can do better—it should permit the prosecution of unpunishable criminals.  Trial is an independent source of value. It uncovers truth, allows victims to tell their own stories, and condemns wrongdoing.  With appropriate procedural safeguards, prosecution can advance these values even when punishment cannot follow.

December 4, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 03, 2020

"Cruel & Unusual Non-Capital Punishments"

The title of this post is the title of this new article available via SSRN authored by William Berry.  Here is its abstract:

The Supreme Court has rendered the Eighth Amendment a dead letter with respect to non-capital, non-juvenile life-without-parole sentences.  Its cases have erected a gross disproportionality standard that seems insurmountable in most cases, even for draconian and excessive sentences.  State courts have adopted a similar approach in interpreting state constitutional Eighth Amendment analogues, often finding that they are no broader than the Court’s narrow interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, despite linguistic variations in many cases.

Nonetheless, in a handful of state cases, state courts have found that state punishments violate the Eighth Amendment or its state constitutional analogue.  This article examines those cases to identify what non-capital punishments have caused courts to limit state punishment practices even in the shadow of an overwhelming, albeit unfortunate, trend of according constitutional deference to state punishment practices.  In light of these decisions, this Article advances a series of possible arguments by which to attack state and federal punishment practices in an effort to create more exceptions to the draconian status quo constitutional rule.

In Part I, the Article begins by providing an overview of Eighth Amendment gross disproportionality doctrine and its use in state constitutional analogues to the Eighth Amendment.  Part II examines the handful of state court cases that have found punishments unconstitutionally disproportionate.  In Part III, the Article advances one set of arguments — both systemic and case-based — for use in attacking non-capital state punishments under state constitutions.  Part IV, the Article advances a second set of arguments — both systemic and case-based — for use in attacking non-capital state punishments under the Eighth Amendment.

December 3, 2020 in Examples of "over-punishment", Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, December 02, 2020

Ramos, Tasmanian tigers and Teague, oh my: SCOTUS debates retroactivity of jury unanimity rule in Edwards oral argument

Lions-and-tigers-and-bears-oh-my

The Supreme Court often seems to have a Wizard-of-Oz like quality, especially now that we are all behind a COVID curtain, and so I could not resist an Ozian title for this post noting today's interesting oral argument in Edwards v. Vannoy.   At issue in Edwards is whether the Court’s decision last Term in Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury that applies in both federal and state courts, applies retroactively to cases that have already become final on direct review.  This Bloomberg Law account of the argument, headlined "Justices Divided on Making Jury Unanimity Decision Retroactive," provides a great summary, and here are excerpts:

Supreme Court justices were divided during oral argument over whether their decision barring nonunanimous jury convictions last term applies retroactively.

Questions on Wednesday from Justices Neil Gorsuch, Sonia Sotomayor, and Stephen Breyer suggested all three may favor retroactivity, but the defendant, Thedrick Edwards, could have trouble attracting two more justices to join them. 

Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Elena Kagan, both of whom could hold crucial votes, asked tough questions of both sides....  It’s unclear how the newest justice, Amy Coney Barrett, will vote.  She replaced the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who voted with the majority in last term’s Ramos v. Louisiana.

Justices Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Brett Kavanaugh are likely votes against retroactivity.  Kavanaugh voted with the majority in Ramos, but said in a concurrence that he didn’t think the decision should apply retroactively....

Edwards, a Black man, was convicted in 2007 of armed robbery, kidnapping, and rape by a nonunanimous Louisiana jury and sentenced to life in prison.  The lone Black juror voted to acquit on all counts.  The states most recently to allow split verdicts were Louisiana and Oregon, which were found to have enacted their systems for discriminatory purposes.  Nonetheless, those states, Puerto Rico — which also had them — and the Justice Department are pressing the high court to keep intact the nonunanimous convictions that have already been upheld.  That would bar relief for Edwards and potentially over a thousand people like him who want to take advantage of Ramos even though they already exhausted their initial round of appeals.... 

Bélanger downplayed the notion that a ruling for Edwards would overload the system with new trials.  Prompted by questioning from Breyer, he said “we’re really looking at our estimates of maybe two to three cases per prosecutor.” He said “the system is more than capable of accommodating this type of caseload.”  Louisiana Solicitor General Elizabeth Murrill deemed that assessment unrealistic.  “You can’t just hand out cases to anybody who happens to be an assistant district attorney,” she said.  “I mean, some of those people actually enforce laws in city court and — or do — you know, they collect money from — they do civil cases.”

One way for decisions to apply retroactively is if they reaffirmed an old rule.  Gorsuch, the author of Ramos, expressed support for that idea, while Kagan called it a “steep climb” at the argument.  Another way the court could view the Sixth Amendment unanimity right from Ramos is as a newly-recognized criminal procedure rule, which generally wouldn’t apply retroactively.  But under the court’s 1989 ruling in Teague v. Lane, it can if it’s a “watershed” right implicating fundamental fairness and accuracy.

Yet the court has never expressly identified such a watershed right — it has indicated the right to counsel that predated Teague could be one — leading Gorsuch to wonder if the watershed test is a “false promise.”  Alito said it reminds him “of something you see on some TV shows about the — the quest for an animal that was thought to have become extinct, like the Tasmanian tiger, which was thought to have died out in a zoo in 1936, but every once in a while, deep in the forests of Tasmania, somebody sees a footprint in the mud or a howl in the night or some fleeting thing running by, and they say, a-ha, there still is one that exists.”

Both Kagan and Barrett pressed lawyers about what exactly accuracy means in the Teague analysis.  “I’m having trouble understanding what we’re measuring,” Barrett said. “Are we trying to ask whether juries wrongfully convicted someone because the majority saw the case in the wrong way and the — and the one dissenter in the jury or the two dissenters in the jury were right?”...

[T]hough she dissented in Ramos, Kagan seemed to struggle with whether defendants should benefit from it retroactively.  “I mean, Ramos says that if you haven’t been convicted by a unanimous jury, you really haven’t been convicted at all,” she told assistant to the U.S. solicitor general Christopher Michel, who supported Louisiana’s Murrill at the argument. “And so how could it be that a rule like that does not have retroactive effect?” she asked....

The court could also avoid the retroactivity issue entirely.  Some justices — at least Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh — expressed during the argument that habeas corpus restrictions could bar Edwards from relitigating the issue at all.

December 2, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Fourth Circuit becomes the fourth circuit to embrace a robust view of sentence reduction authority under 3582(c)(1)(A) after FIRST STEP Act

I am very pleased to see today yet another important circuit rulings on the reach and application of the compassionate release provisions amended by the federal FIRST STEP Act.  As regular readers know, in lots of (pre-COVID) prior posts I made much of the provision of the FIRST STEP Act allowing federal courts to directly reduce sentences under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) without awaiting a motion by the Bureau of Prisons.  I have consider this provision a big deal because, if applied appropriately and robustly, it could and should enable many hundreds (and perhaps many thousands) of federal prisoners to have excessive prison sentences reduced. 

The Second Circuit back in September was the first circuit to rule in Zullo/Brooker, quite rightly in my view, that district courts have now broad discretion to consider "any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise" to justify a sentence reduction under 3582(c)(1)(A).  Then, on the same day last month, the Sixth Circuit in Jones and the Seventh Circuit in Gunn issued similar opinions recognizing that district court now have broad authority after the FIRST STEP Act to determine whether and when "extraordinary and compelling" reasons may justify a sentence reduction when an imprisoned person files a 3582(c)(1)(A) motion.  Now, today, the Fourth Circuit has become the fourth circuit to get into this act with a great panel opinion in US v. McCoy, No. 20-6821 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2020) (available here).  Here is how this opinion gets started:

The defendants in these consolidated appeals were convicted of robberies and accompanying firearms violations under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At the time, sentences under § 924(c) were “stacked,” which exposed the defendants to additional mandatory minimums and led to sentences ranging from 35 to 53 years of imprisonment. After the defendants’ convictions became final, Congress passed the First Step Act and ended sentence “stacking” under § 924(c). Today, the defendants’ sentences would be dramatically shorter – in most cases, by 30 years – than the ones they received.

At the same time it shortened sentences under § 924(c), the First Step Act significantly expanded access to compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Prior versions of § 3582(c)(1)(A), which empowers courts to reduce sentences for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” had allowed review of sentences only at the request of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). The First Step Act removed the BOP from that gatekeeping role, authorizing defendants themselves to file motions for sentence reductions.

Relying on both these First Step Act provisions, the defendants moved for reductions in their sentences under § 3582(c)(1)(A), resting their case for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” primarily on the length of their § 924(c) sentences and the disparity between their sentences and those that Congress deemed appropriate in the First Step Act. After considering each defendant’s individual circumstances – including their youth at the time of the offenses, their lack of significant prior criminal history, their exemplary behavior and rehabilitation in prison, and their already-substantial years of incarceration – the district courts granted the defendants’ motions and reduced their sentences to time served.

We now affirm the judgments of the district courts. As the government emphasizes on appeal, § 3582(c)(1)(A) prohibits sentence reductions that are not consistent with “applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” But contrary to the government’s argument, treating the defendants’ § 924(c) sentences as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for release is not inconsistent with any “applicable policy statement” of the Sentencing Commission for the simple reason that the Commission has yet to issue a policy statement that applies to motions filed by defendants under the recently amended § 3582(c)(1)(A). Nor was it otherwise improper, we conclude, for the district courts to consider the First Step Act’s declaration of the appropriate level of punishment under § 924(c) in assessing the defendants’ cases, on an individualized basis, for compassionate release.

Like the other circuit opinions and many comparable district court opinions, this Fourth Circuit ruling is the real McCoy, and its closing paragraph provides a fitting summary of the sound work that district courts are doing in accord with the congressional guidance in the FIRST STEP Act:

We return to the Second Circuit’s description of the First Step Act and its amendment of § 3582(c)(1)(A): an “incremental” change that does not mandate more lenient sentences across the board but instead gives new discretion to the courts to consider leniency.  Zullo, 976 F.3d at 230.  The district courts in these cases appropriately exercised the discretion conferred by Congress and cabined by the statutory requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A).  We see no error in their reliance on the length of the defendants’ sentences, and the dramatic degree to which they exceed what Congress now deems appropriate, in finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for potential sentence reductions. The courts took seriously the requirement that they conduct individualized inquiries, basing relief not only on the First Step Act’s change to sentencing law under § 924(c) but also on such factors as the defendants’ relative youth at the time of their offenses, their post-sentencing conduct and rehabilitation, and the very substantial terms of imprisonment they already served.  Those individualized determinations were neither inconsistent with any “applicable” Sentencing Commission guidance nor tantamount to wholesale retroactive application of the First Step Act’s amendments to § 924(c).

A few of many, many prior related posts:

December 2, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Lots of (surprising and unsurprising) clemency chatter ... and great advocacy for clemency change

The lame-duck end of a presidential (or gubernatorial) term is often a time for lots of discussion of clemency possibilities.  And who follows this space surely sensibly expected that the Term of Prez Trump would wind down with plenty of clemency chatter.  But, as detailed via these recent headlines and links, the array of stories afoot are remarkable:

From Business Insider, "Joe Exotic's lawyer thinks he's 'very, very close' to getting a presidential pardon from Trump"

From the New York Times, "Trump Has Discussed With Advisers Pardons for His 3 Eldest Children and Giuliani"

From NPR, "Justice Department Investigating Possible Bribery-For-Pardon Scheme"

Though I might have "hot takes" about the latest clemency news, the recent piece most worth considering in this space comes from Emily Galvin-Almanza via The Appeal under the headline "Biden Must Fix The Broken Executive Clemency Process.  This Is Who He Should Select To Lead That Effort."  Here are excerpts:

[W]e must work at all levels to transform our criminal legal system.  But we can’t neglect powerful, fast tools like clemency.  We shouldn’t box clemency away as merely some form of mercy, when in fact it is something much more akin to a high-speed mechanism for undoing the worst impacts of bad, outdated policy and enforcement choices.  And yet, we have done exactly that: As [Rachel] Barkow has pointed out, we’ve taken this powerful tool and abandoned it in a dusty closet somewhere in the basement of the Department of Justice.  That’s where a brave new Administration must begin....

As you might expect, this choking process has left clemency in a state of crisis.  It is dysfunctional, available primarily to the powerful, and raises only false hopes for marginalized people. But we are standing, post-election, on the verge of tremendous change.  Looking to a Biden Administration that, at its core, has indicated a commitment to righting the wrongs of the past and looking for smarter, more human (and humane) solutions.  Clemency is a fantastic opportunity for such an administration: fixing clemency in a way that would spur transformative change doesn’t require congress, doesn’t require massive bureaucracy, and doesn’t require anything other than strong executive action–and an executive ready to leverage the unique depths of his own empathy.

The process is simple: first, the new President Joe Biden must move the clemency process out of DOJ and into the White House, and appoint someone with deep grounding in the topic–and bipartisan credibility–to lead a committee on clemency that would not only build a system to process individual applications faster, but create proactive tactics for finding ways to use the clemency power to undo the worst impacts of bad, carceral law–even for people who hadn’t been able to file for relief on their own.  Best of all, this idea isn’t particularly controversial: it was supported during the primary by everyone from Senators Amy Klobuchar to Bernie Sanders, it made it through the Biden-Sanders Unity Taskforce, and it was integrated into the 2020 Democratic Party platform.  For context, this makes it significantly less controversial than, say, legalizing marijuana — a policy many, many states are already enacting.

Rachel Barkow, of course, would be a very smart choice, as someone whose primary body of work has focused on building a better clemency system, and who has also been celebrated by advocates from across the political spectrum.  She’s not only a respected scholar and former clerk to the iconic Justice Scalia, she’s a national policy player who has been through Senate confirmation once already, joining the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 2013.  But importantly, her views aren’t limited to the ivory tower — she’s done the actual work of helping people apply for clemency: she and co-author Mark Osler started a “pop up” clemency clinic to help people apply for clemency in 2014....

Leading a team that would not just include but center the experiences of people who had lived through incarceration, and also reserve space for public defenders, civil rights lawyers, and progressive prosecutors who carry a more modern understanding of second chances than their old-school peers, Barkow could hand the President a mechanism for fostering liberty, opportunity and restoration out of the wreckage of our bloated system.  She could change the game by building a faster, smarter process.  For people who love comparisons, Barkow’s role in the clemency conversation is not dissimilar from the robust academic-yet-tactical power Senator Elizabeth Warren has brought to the conversation around the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  Tasking Barkow with bringing clemency into the White House would be a little like letting Sen. Warren supercharge the CFPB.

Instead of placing endless barriers between deserving, promising people and their chance to be heard, or allowing prosecutorial dinosaurs at DOJ to stand between ordinary people and opportunity, she and her committee could fast-track applications and give President Biden an opportunity to be a groundbreaking leader in this area.  They could seek out specific areas where we know sentences are too long and out of step with current enforcement priorities and find people who may not have had the capacity to file a petition, but whose sentence is wildly out of step with modern views. It would be especially beautiful to break down the legacy of 1994 — and 1990s punitive measures more generally — with this unique and deceptively simple action.

December 2, 2020 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Seventh Circuit panel says old guideline does not limit potential "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for 3582(c)(1)(A) motions after FIRST STEP Act

Last night in this post, I noted the big compassionate release ruling from the Sixth Circuit in US v. Jones, 20-3701 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2020) (available here), which ruled that "the passage of the First Step Act rendered § 1B1.13 'inapplicable' to cases where an imprisoned person files a motion for compassionate release."  In other words, the Sixth Circuit held that district courts now have broad authority to determine what now qualifies as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction under the statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) despite the fact that a pre-FIRST STEP provision of the guidelines, § 1B1.13, might seem to limit that authority. 

Helpfully, a couple of readers made sure I did not miss another ruling from another circuit on the same topic that happened to be handed down the same day as Jones.  Specifically, a Seventh Circuit panel in US v. Gunn, No. 20-1959 (7th Cir. Nov. 20, 2020) (available here), had this (and more) to say on this topic:

Like the Second Circuit, see United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020), we disagree with this reading of the statute’s trailing paragraph.  It says that a reduction must be “consistent with” all “applicable” policy statements.  Section 1B1.13 addresses motions and determinations of the Director, not motions by prisoners.  In other words, the Sentencing Commission has not yet issued a policy statement “applicable” to Gunn’s request.  And because the Guidelines Manual lacks an applicable policy statement, the trailing paragraph of §3582(c)(1)(A) does not curtail a district judge’s discretion.  Any decision is “consistent with” a nonexistent policy statement.  “Consistent with” differs from “authorized by”.

The statute itself sets the standard: only “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justify the release of a prisoner who is outside the scope of §3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).  The substantive aspects of the Sentencing Commission’s analysis in §1B1.13 and its Application Notes provide a working definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons”; a judge who strikes off on a different path risks an appellate holding that judicial discretion has been abused.  In this way the Commission’s analysis can guide discretion without being conclusive....

Like the district court, we hope that the Sentencing Commission’s ability to revise its guidelines and policy statements will be restored by the appointment of additional members.  Until that happens and §1B1.13 is amended, however, the Guidelines Manual lacks an “applicable” policy statement covering prisoner-initiated applications for compassionate release.  District judges must operate under the statutory criteria — “extraordinary and compelling reasons” — subject to deferential appellate review.

A few of many, many prior related posts:

December 2, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 01, 2020

Seventh Circuit panel upholds 140-year with parole state sentence for 15-year-old offender

Via How Appealing, I just saw an interesting new opinion from the Seventh Circuit in Sanders v. Eckstein, No. 2:11‐cv‐868 (7th Cir. Nov. 30, 2020) (available here).  The start of the opinion explains why I describe the matter as interesting:

Rico Sanders received a 140‐year sentence for raping four women.  He was 15 at the time of the sexual assaults, and his offense conduct was heinous and cruel in the extreme.  Now 40 years old, Sanders will first be‐ come eligible for parole under Wisconsin law in 2030.  He sought post‐conviction relief in state court, arguing that Wisconsin’s precluding him from any meaningful opportunity of parole before 2030 offends the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  Sanders later added a claim that the sentencing court’s failure to meaningfully con‐ sider his youth and prospect of rehabilitation when imposing the 140‐year sentence runs afoul Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). After the Wisconsin courts rejected these claims, Sanders invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and sought relief in federal court.  The district court denied the application, and we now affirm.

Here is a part of the unanimous panel's substantive analysis:

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined Sanders’s chance of parole at age 51 — twelve years before his expected end of life at 63 — respects Graham’s requirement of a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 560 U.S. at 75.  Nothing about that conclusion reflects an unreasonable application of Graham.  In time the Supreme Court may give more definition to what constitutes a “meaningful opportunity” for early release.  For now, however, the Wisconsin court’s conclusion that Sanders will have his first chance at parole at the age of 51 is by no means unreasonable.

December 1, 2020 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 30, 2020

Two criminal cases up for SCOTUS oral argument this week

A day before the calendar makes it official, the Supreme Court starts its December argument sitting this morning. Two cases being heard this week are interesting criminal matters, and here are the basics thanks to SCOTUSblog:

Van Buren v. United States (Nov. 30): Whether a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violates Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he accesses the same information for an improper purpose.

Case preview: Justices to consider breadth of federal computer fraud statute (Ronald Mann)

 

Edwards v. Vannoy (Dec. 2): Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury that applies in both federal and state courts, applies retroactively to cases that have already become final on direct review.

November 30, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, November 29, 2020

Reviewing CJUTF Recommendations: will the Biden Administration go all in with progressive prosecutors?

Right after the election, I blogged a bit (here and here) about some criminal justice reform recommendations from the Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force (available here pp. 56-62).  And last week, as explained here, I decided to start a series of posts to spotlight and amplify some recommendations from the CJUTF that ought to be of particular interest to sentencing fans.  This post will focus on prosecutors, and  begin by noting this recent Hill commentary by Miriam Krinsky headlined "Biden can rebuild trust in our justice system by prioritizing prosecutorial reform."  I recommend this piece in full, and here are a few choice passages:

[P]rosecutors wield vast power to determine whether someone comes into the justice system and the course of their case thereafter.  They control which charges to bring and make the high-stakes determination of whether to seek to keep people in jail as they await trial — which, in turn, makes them four times more likely to be sentenced to prison than if released pre-trial....

[T]he new administration’s ability to impact the criminal justice system will depend, in significant part, on its ability to support and work alongside local prosecutors.  To start, a robust task force on “21st Century Prosecution” can propel a new national vision of what it means to be a fair and just prosecutor — and a strategy for how to get there.

In other words, prosecutors are arguably the most consequential players in the criminal justice system, and reform advocates are eager to see the Biden Administration advance a "new national vision of what it means to be a fair and just prosecutor."   So, here is some of what the CJUTF has to say on this front:  

Task Force on Prosecutorial DiscretionCreate a new task force, placed outside of the U.S. Department of Justice, to make recommendations for tackling discrimination and other problems in our justice system that result from arrest and charging decisions....

Federal Prosecutorial Guidelines: Immediately withdraw the Trump Administration’s guidance advising prosecutors to pursue the harshest penalties possible, even for low-level offenses.  Reinstate the Obama-Biden Administration's Smart on Crime Initiative, and issue new federal guidelines that advise prosecutors not to overcharge cases in order to coerce plea deals, or to pursue harsher sentences in order to penalize citizens for exercising their right to a jury trial....

Appointing Prosecutors:  Appoint people committed to criminal justice reform to key prosecutorial positions, including AG, DAG, and U.S. Attorneys.

Transparency & Data Collection: Direct DOJ to collect data on federal prosecution practices and make it public. Include opening investigations, charging, pretrial detention and release, plea offers, and sentence recommendations. Include data on racial disparities....

Support Progressive Prosecutors: Support new state prosecutors through funding and technical support in their efforts to ensure public safety while reducing incarceration.

The commitment to reinstate the Obama-Biden Administration's Smart on Crime Initiative strikes me as notable, though not quite game-changing.  A serious commitment to require DOJ to collect comprehensive data about its practices could be a bigger deal than any particular substantive policy change, though it is unclear just how this data might be collected and used.  Perhaps an independent task force on prosecutorial discretion can and will figure out how to effectively gather and operationalize federal prosecutorial data. 

In the end, the biggest game-changer could be if the Biden Administration were really to go all in with the progressive prosecutors movement.  Directing special federal funding and support to local progessive prosecutors could add momentum to an already significant local movement.  And the commitment to appoint reform-minded folks to all "key prosecutorial positions, including AG to DAG, and U.S. Attorneys" sounds like a commitment to having progressive prosecutors throughout the federal criminal justice system.

In the end, I suspect we will see a broad definition of "people committed to criminal justice reform" in key Biden appointments, and I do not think anyone should expect dramatic change in this arena right away.  But I do think there is reason to be hopeful that in coming years the US Department of Justice could become more of an ally, rathen than a persistent opponent, of at least some progressive criminal justice reforms.

Prior related posts:

November 29, 2020 in Criminal justice in the Biden Administration, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, November 24, 2020

Great discussions of progressive prosecution in latest issue of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

Anyone and everyone intrigued by the progressive prosecutor movement should be sure to check out Volume 110, Issue 4 of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.  These great-looking articles are in this great-looking issue:

November 24, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 23, 2020

"Some Modest Proposals for a Progressive Prosecutor"

the title of this post is the title of this new piece now available via SSRN authored by Steven Zeidman. Here is its abstract:

The progressive prosecutor movement has spawned a number of races for District Attorney where candidates fight to claim the mantle of most progressive potential prosecutor. However, the promises made by self-described forward thinking, if not exactly radical, prosecutor candidates, as well as those made by newly elected District Attorneys, are at best the kind of reformist reforms criticized by many as having little impact on entrenched systems of oppression and as ultimately expanding their reach.

It is incumbent on those looking for fundamental change in prosecutorial practices to try and assess whether any candidates are willing to take bolder steps than simply promising to prosecute more fairly and compassionately.  Instead, the inquiry must be whether the candidate is willing to give up any aspects of the awesome power and the vast resources bestowed upon the office, particularly when it comes to the trial process.

November 23, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Highlighting the need for second-chance sentencing reforms

This new Law360 piece, headlined "2nd Look Law Needed To Fix Broken Criminal Justice System," gives attention to a recent ABA panel discussing second-look sentencing reforms.  Here are excerpts:

To address the mass incarceration that has resulted from older policing practices, which has disproportionately impacted Black men, federal and local governments should adopt so-called second look laws that allow incarcerated individuals to petition judges to reevaluate their sentences after a certain period of time, experts said Thursday at the American Bar Association's annual fall criminal justice conference.

Mary Price, general counsel at Families Against Mandatory Minimums, or FAMM, a nonprofit advocacy organization seeking to end mandatory sentencing, said that our criminal justice system has been addicted to putting people in prison to manage problems leading to mass incarceration, and this needs to stop.  "I don't think we are going to be able to achieve justice in the system until we not only reform the police and practices, but we also ensure that the legacy of older policing — in the form of people serving sentences that are way out of proportion with their conduct, and also people who are thrown away because the nature of the offense or the addiction — is also addressed," Price said.

Last year, Sen. Cory Booker, D-N.J., along with Rep. Karen Bass, D-Calif., introduced the Second Look Act of 2019 that proposes allowing any incarcerated individual who has served at least 10 years to request that their sentence be reevaluated to determine if they are eligible for early release or a sentence reduction, but the bill hasn't passed in the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives yet.

David Singleton, the executive director of the Ohio Justice and Policy Center, said during a panel titled Second Look & Incarceration with Price at the ABA conference that a challenge to getting a federal second look law passed is that lawmakers want carveouts that would exempt certain crimes, such as murder or sex offenses, from the law. Singleton said carveouts defeat the purpose of the law because they leave people behind. "We have to move away from these carveouts," Singleton said.  "If we accept carveouts, the advocates of change, we are throwing people under the bus."...

Booker reinforced the panelists' words during his keynote speech at the conference on Friday, saying that criminal justice reform needs to be throughout the country's entire justice system.  "We must commit ourselves to continuing the work of reforming a savagely broken system and that means everything — our policing to what happens with sentencing to what happens inside our prisons to what happens upon release," Booker said.

November 23, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, November 22, 2020

Notable review of New York's recent parole realities

This Times Union has this notable new article on New York's notable parole realities under the full headline "A 'broken' parole process: Data shows widened racial bias: Four years after racial disparities exposed, a state report has yet to be released." Here is how the piece gets started:

A white inmate in a New York prison is significantly more likely on average to be released on parole than a Black or Hispanic person — and that gap has widened in 2020, according to a Times Union analysis of the nearly 19,000 parole board decisions over the last two years.

The disparities continue despite steps by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision to make the parole board more diverse.  That initiative began about four years ago, after Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo ordered an investigation by the inspector general's office into revelations in a New York Times series that exposed the racial imbalances in parole and prison disciplinary proceedings.  The investigation has languished and no public report has been released.

The inspector general’s office, in an email response to questions, asserted without providing any data that racial disparities have gone down in recent years.  They offered a list of policy changes that have been made, including changes to sentencing guidelines, appeals processes and implicit bias training.

DOCCS, which oversees New York’s 53 state prisons, said the Times Union's analysis was too limited.  Spokesman Thomas Mailey wrote that the analysis was inadequate because detailed factors like disciplinary and program records, positions of the district attorney, sentencing courts and victim impact statements were not considered.

But officials contacted for this story did not provide any evidence countering the Times Union's core findings.  And those findings were averages based on each parole initial hearing and reappearance over the last two years, showing that the racial disparities were prevalent in the outcomes.

In discretionary parole hearings from October 2018 through October 2020, where commissioners from the Board of Parole decided whether incarcerated people should be released from prison, the Times Union’s analysis showed that 41 percent of white people were granted parole, compared to 34 percent of Blacks and 33 percent of Hispanics.  These numbers include initial parole appearances once people meet their minimum sentences, as well as subsequently scheduled reappearances, which are usually every two years.  It excludes more specialized categories such as medical hearings or those relating to deportations.

If Black and Hispanic people were paroled at the same rates as whites over the last two years alone, there would be 675 fewer people behind bars.

November 22, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Therapeutic Discipline: Drug Courts, Foucault, and the Power of the Normalizing Gaze"

The titl of this post is the title of this notable new article available via SSRN and authored by Michael Sousa. Here is its abstract:

Drug treatment courts represent a paradigm shift in the American criminal justice system.  By focusing on providing drug treatment services to low-level offenders with severe use disorders rather than sentencing them to a term of incarceration, drug courts represent a return to a more rehabilitative model for dealing with individuals ensnared by the criminal justice system and away from the retributive model that dictated punishment in the latter half of the twentieth century.  The existing scholarship exploring how drug treatment courts function has been largely atheoretical, and past attempts to harmonize theory to drug treatment courts fail to demonstrate how these institutions normalize offenders prior to reintegration into society.  Relying on Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality together with his concepts of “technologies of power” and “technologies of the self,” I develop the analytical framework of “therapeutic discipline” as a more robust lens through which to understand the operation of drug treatment courts nationwide.  My contribution of “therapeutic discipline” to the existing literature is bolstered by representative examples of qualitative data taken from a long-term, ethnographic study of one adult drug treatment court.

November 22, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, November 20, 2020

NACDL continuing great work spotlighting the ugly trial penalty now through compelling clemency petitions

This news release, titled "NACDL Trial Penalty Clemency Project Submits Second Set of Petitions to White House," reports effectively on work by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to shine light on, and seek needed remedies for, criminal defendants unfairly subject to the "trial penalty."  Here are some details on NACDL's latest efforts and prior work:

As of this week, NACDL’s Trial Penalty Clemency Project submitted four more federal clemency petitions to the Office of the Pardon Attorney and the White House, adding to the first set of six petitions submitted on October 2, 2020.  Of the four petitions, three concern individuals serving life or lengthy sentences for non-violent drug charges, and one concerns an individual serving over 35 years for a non-violent white-collar conviction.

As of late, increased attention to the criminal legal system has led to public outrage and calls to reform myriad facets of the American legal system.  The trial penalty, though, which refers to coercive prosecutorial practices that induce accused persons to waive fundamental rights under threat of a vastly increased sentence when fundamental rights are asserted, persists in undermining the American criminal legal system.  The most obvious examples of its impact are seen in those who assert their rights and receive a geometrically enhanced sentence.  Though reform is badly needed to end the trial penalty, the only immediate remedy for those individuals living this injustice is executive clemency.  NACDL’s Trial Penalty Clemency Project aims to assist those individuals by pairing applicants with volunteer attorneys who will assist them in preparing a clemency petition.

“The trial penalty makes a mockery of the Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to trial and is a large and ever-growing cancer on the American criminal legal system,” said NACDL President Chris Adams.  “Every time a defendant opts to hold the government to its burden and go to trial, and receives a substantially more draconian sentence than was previously offered in a plea deal, the American legal system moves further away from justice.  NACDL’s Trial Penalty Clemency Project is a vital step in beginning to remedy this great injustice.”

Thus far, through affiliates, members, and the assistance of organizations in this space like the CAN-DO Foundation, the Last Prisoner Project, and Life For Pot, the Project has identified, reviewed, and assigned more than 20 cases with attorneys.  The attorneys are crafting petitions or supplements to existing petitions focusing on the impact of the trial penalty. In addition to filing the petitions with the Office of the Pardon Attorney, the Project brought the four cases described below, in addition to six previous cases, to the attention of the White House panel on clemency.  NACDL’s Trial Penalty Clemency Project is a component of NACDL’s Return to Freedom Project...

In 2018, NACDL released a groundbreaking report – The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It. Information and a PDF of NACDL’s 2018 Trial Penalty report, as well as video of the entire 90-minute launch event at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, and other trial penalty-related videos and materials are available at www.nacdl.org/trialpenaltyreport.

In 2019, The Federal Sentencing Reporter, published by University of California Press, released a double issue covering April and June 2019, edited by NACDL Executive Director Norman L. Reimer and NACDL President-Elect Martín Antonio Sabelli, entitled "The Tyranny of the Trial Penalty: The Consensus that Coercive Plea Practices Must End."

And in 2020, NACDL and FAMM released a documentary on the trial penalty, The Vanishing Trial. The trailer for that film is available here.

November 20, 2020 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS grants cert on two new Fourth Amendment cases

The US Supreme Court released this brief order list this afternoon granting certiorari in these two new cases with these questions presented:

19-1414 UNITED STATES V. COOLEY, JOSHUA J.

Cert petition question presented: "Whether the lower courts erred in suppressing evidence on the theory that a police officer of an Indian tribe lacked authority to temporarily detain and search respondent, a non-Indian, on a public right-of-way within a reservation based on a potential violation of state or federal law."

20-157 CANIGLIA, EDWARD A. V. STROM, ROBERT F., ET AL.

Cert petition question presented: "Whether the 'community caretaking' exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extends to the home."

November 20, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

After SCOTUS lifts stay by 6-3 vote, federal government completes it eighth execution of 2020

As reported here via SCOTUSblog, the "Supreme Court on Thursday night allowed the government to proceed with the execution of Orlando Hall, who became the eighth federal inmate to be put to death since the Trump administration resumed federal executions in July."  Here is more:

Hall was sentenced to death for his role in the kidnapping, rape and murder of 16-year-old Lisa René in 1994.  In a one-sentence order, the Supreme Court lifted a district judge’s last-minute injunction that had temporarily blocked Hall’s execution.  Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan dissented and would have left the injunction in place.

The court also rejected three separate emergency requests filed over the past two days in which Hall asked the justices to postpone his execution.  There were no noted dissents to the three brief orders rejecting those requests.  Shortly after the court’s orders, Hall was put to death at the federal prison in Terre Haute, Indiana.  He died at 11:47 p.m., according to local news reports.

Hall’s case reached the Supreme Court after a flurry of litigation in the lower courts over the execution, which the government had scheduled for Thursday at 6 p.m.  On Thursday afternoon, Judge Tanya Chutkan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued an injunction blocking the execution.  The injunction was based on an earlier finding from Chutkan that the government’s method of execution violates the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act because the government uses a lethal dose of sodium pentobarbital without obtaining a prescription for that drug.

The government immediately appealed Chutkan’s injunction.  The government argued that the prescription requirement in the FDCA does not apply to lethal-injection drugs.  It also argued that Hall was not entitled to an injunction based solely on the lack of a prescription.

The Supreme Court sided with the government, issuing an order just before 11 p.m. that lifted Chutkan’s injunction. The majority did not explain its reasoning, and none of the three justices who noted their dissent wrote an opinion explaining why.  At the same time, the court denied Hall’s three emergency applications, each of which presented separate legal arguments for a postponement of his execution....

Hall’s case was the first case involving a pending execution in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett participated since she joined the bench in October.  Barrett, a devout Catholic, co-wrote a 1998 article on the moral and legal dilemma that Catholic judges face in capital cases due to the church’s opposition to capital punishment.  That article raised questions in her confirmation hearings about possible recusals from such cases.  Barrett cited her full participation in capital cases as a law clerk for Justice Antonin Scalia and as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit.

A few prior recent related posts:

November 20, 2020 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, November 19, 2020

"'Some Mother's Child Has Gone Astray': Neuroscientific Approaches to a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model of Juvenile Sentencing"

the title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Michael Perlin and Alison Lynch now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

There is a robust body of evidence that tells us that the juvenile brain is not fully developed by age 18, and this evidence should and does raise important questions about the sentencing of juveniles in criminal cases.  This evidence, though, must be considered in the context of public opinion (about certain juvenile crimes that have been subject to saturation publicity) in the context of judges’ decisionmaking (where such judges do not want to be perceived as “soft on crime”).  The conflict between what we now know and what (false) “ordinary common sense” demands (in the way of enhanced punishments) flies squarely in the face of therapeutic jurisprudence precepts.  If the legal process is to seek to maximize psychological well-being and if it is to coincide with an “ethic of care,” then, it is necessary for those involved in the criminal justice system to speak publicly about this topic, and to “call out” those — be they elected politicians, editorial writers and commentators in the conservative media, or judges — who urge retributive and punitive sentences for adolescents and children.

In this paper, we will first give a brief overview about the current neuroscientific findings about juvenile brain development in the context of criminal behavior, and then discuss the current sentencing standards and regulations that are in place.  Then, we will discuss the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence as a framework for advocating for juvenile clients, in order to maximize and preserve their psychological well-being and to mitigate trauma.  Finally, we will offer recommendations for how experts can work with attorneys who are presenting sentencing arguments, in order to make the most comprehensive, scientifically persuasive case for leniency in juvenile sentencing.

November 19, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, November 18, 2020

Seventh Circuit panel reverses below-guideline 16-year prison sentence as substantively unreasonable in terrorism case

Regular readers know I do not blog much about federal sentence reasonableness review these days because there is usually not that much worth blogging about.  Out of many thousands of appeals brought by federal defendants each year, typically only a few hundred are successful, and these are usually involve miscalculation of the guideline range.  The government rarely appeals, though it does often have a better success rate in the few dozen appeals it brings each year. 

In one particular (and rare) categories of cases, namely terrorism cases, the government has a particularly notable history of appellate success when arguing a sentence in unreasonably lenient (see posts linked below for some historical examples).  A helpful reader made sure I did not miss a new Seventh Circuit panel ruling handed down yesterday in this category: US v. Daoud, No. 19-2174 (7th Cir. Nov. 17, 2020) (available here).  Federal sentencing fans will want to review this 26-page opinion in detail, but the start and few passages from the body of the opinion provides the basics:

Adel Daoud pressed the button to detonate a bomb that would have killed hundreds of innocent people in the name of Islam.  Fortunately, the bomb was fake, and the FBI arrested him on the spot.  Two months later, while in pretrial custody, Daoud solicited the murder of the FBI agent who supplied the fake bomb.  Two and a half years later, while awaiting trial on the first two charges, Daoud tried to stab another inmate to death using makeshift weapons after the inmate drew a picture of the Prophet Muhammad.  Daoud eventually entered an Alford plea, and the cases were consolidated for sentencing.  The district court sentenced Daoud to a combined total of 16 years’ imprisonment for the crimes.  The government appeals that sentence on the ground that it was substantively unreasonable.  We agree.  We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing....

[W]hile the district court paid lip service to the seriousness of the offenses, it undercut its own statements by unreasonably downplaying Daoud’s role in each offense.  District courts have broad discretion as to how to weigh the § 3553(a) factors, but a district court’s sentence must reflect a reasonable view of the facts and a reasonable weighing of the § 3553(a) factors....  Here, the district court sterilized Daoud’s offense conduct in ways that cannot be reconciled with the objective facts of these violent offenses.  That unreasonable view of the facts prevented the district court from properly weighing the seriousness of the offenses when selecting its sentence....

In the district court’s telling, Daoud’s age, mental health, and general awkwardness and impressionability converged to render him uniquely susceptible to criminal influence. A sentencing court is well within its rights to consider a defendant’s mental limitations in mitigation.... But that factor only goes so far in this case.  Daoud committed the attempted bombing around his 19th birthday.  He was 19 when he solicited the FBI agent’s murder and 21 when he tried to stab a fellow inmate to death.  In other words, he was college aged at all relevant times.  He may have been immature, but, as the court recognized, he was old enough to know what he was doing.

Prior posts on similar reasonableness ruling:

November 18, 2020 in Booker in the Circuits, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

County in Washington State approves new diversion program focused on community restoration

This local article, headlined "King County Council OKs plan to let community groups decide some punishment -- not judges," reports on a notable new diversion program just approved in Seattle's county.  Here are the interesting details:

The King County Council on Tuesday voted Tuesday to approve funding for a groundbreaking criminal justice diversion program that will let community groups decide what punishment -- if any -- should be handed out for a select group of accused felons.

The county council voted 9-0 to approve a program known as Community Restorative Pathways, adding funding for it in the county's $12.59 million biennium budget. Instead of facing a judge, juveniles and adults accused of a first-time, non-violent felony offense will be offered an alternative where a non-profit community panel will decide how the accused person can be held accountable for their crime.

Suspects accused of violent crimes and crimes against persons would not be eligible for the diversion program, and if the offender fails to follow through with the community groups recommended punishment or accountability, the original criminal charges could still be pursued in court.

“We can send that person instead (of jail) to a community accountability group, who will define what they think accountability means,” said King County Prosecutor Dan Satterberg. It’s a new concept for King County Superior Courts and the King County Prosecutor’s Office, which has 7,000 cases waiting for disposition, double the amount in a normal year. Accountability would not include jail or even a conviction, said Satterberg, who declined to define what accountability means.

“That’s up to the community groups,” he said, adding that it would target 800 juveniles and 1,000 adults to start. “These are low-level felonies, property offenses, no domestic violence, no sexual assault cases (and) decisions you would make if you were in my shoes.”

The program is slated to begin in mid-2021 and be implemented no later than the start of 2022. The budget for the program is set at $6.2 million, money that would have gone to the King County Sheriff’s Office.

King County Executive Dow Constantine proposed the idea along with Satterberg. Constantine has pledged to phase out the King County Jail after the pandemic is over, what he described as a cost-cutting move. “Locking people up is very costly and it’s not affirmative for people's lives,” King County Councilmember and Budget Chairperson Jeanne Kohl-Welles told KOMO News just before the budget vote. “But we also have to make sure to protect the public, so this is hard, it’s not going to be easy."

November 18, 2020 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 16, 2020

"Presidential Pardons and the Problem of Impunity"

The title of this post is the title of this quite timely article authored by Frank Bowman III now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

This Article considers the reach of the President’s pardon power and its potential employment as one means of creating legal impunity for a President and his personal and political associates.  It addresses, in particular, the possibility that a President might issue self-interested pardons to himself, family members, or political or business associates.  The Article reviews the constitutional origins of the federal pardon power, and the law and practice of its use since the Founding era, and concludes:

A President cannot constitutionally pardon himself, though the point is untested.  In theory, a President could resign, or under the Twenty-fifth Amendment withdraw temporarily from the office, transform the Vice President into the President or Acting President, and secure a pardon from the his former subordinate.  But that seems improbable.

A President can pardon anyone but himself (both humans and corporations), and those pardons, once issued, are almost certainly unchallengeable and irrevocable.  A presidential pardon can cover any (and perhaps all) federal crimes the beneficiary has ever committed, so long as such crimes occurred and were completed prior to the issuance of the pardon. A president cannot pardon crimes that have not yet been committed.  Consequently, a pardon issued corruptly might itself constitute a crime that could not be pardoned.

The pardon power does not extend to state crimes or to any civil or administrative action brought by federal or state authorities.  A presidential pardon cannot block congressional investigations.  Finally, because a pardon effectively erases the Fifth Amendment privilege as to offenses covered by the pardon, it might make it easier for criminal and civil investigative authorities and Congress to compel testimony from the person pardoned.

Therefore, presidential pardons could inconvenience, but could not prevent, thorough investigations of the private and public actions of a former President or his associates.  The Article concludes by recommending a thorough, but judicious, use of available investigative avenues to inquire into well-founded allegations of wrongful behavior by former presidents and their personal and political associates.

November 16, 2020 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Federal judge orders Missouri to improve its parole process

As reported in this local piece, headlined "Judge orders revamp of Missouri’s ‘unconstitutional’ parole system," a notable new federal district court ruling last week "spurred by a class-action lawsuit in 2017 by state prison inmates, requires the state’s Department of Corrections to implement over two dozen reforms related to the agency’s unconstitutional handling of parole revocation proceedings."  Here is more:

The lawsuit alleged that the current practices resulted in the unlawful reincarceration of thousands of people each year. “These reforms should result in fewer people thrown back behind bars, and slow the churn at prison reception centers,” said Amy Breihan, co-director of the MacArthur Justice Center.

The 55-page order from U.S. District Judge Stephen R. Bough found the Department of Corrections has been intentionally failing to provide state-funded counsel to eligible parolees. The court ordered the department to ensure all eligible parolees have an attorney appointed for any proceeding to move forward.  The judge also ordered several other changes. While the agency previously would not disclose evidence against an individual until the hearing, officials are now required to provide evidence at least five days prior to a revocation hearing.

The court also wants the state to move faster on revocation hearings that have previously resulted in parolees waiting hundreds of days in detention. “Having reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing and in the parties’ briefing on the matter, the court finds constitutional deficiencies in the current parole revocation process remain and issues this order to remedy such due process violations,” Bough wrote.

November 16, 2020 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, November 15, 2020

"The Curriculum of the Carceral State"

The title of this post is the title of this recently published essay by Alice Ristroph.  Here is its abstract:

This Essay scrutinizes the canons of substantive criminal law, with a particular focus on the curricular canon.  By curricular canon, I mean the conceptual model used to teach the subject of criminal law, including the cases, narratives, and ideas that are presented to students.  Since the middle of the twentieth century, American law schools have offered (and often required) a course in criminal law in which homicide is the paradigm crime and legality is a core organizing principle.  The curricular canon depicts criminal law as a necessary and race-neutral response to grave injuries, and it also depicts criminal law as capable of self-restraint through various internal limiting principles. 

This model does not correspond closely to actual legal practices, and it never did; it was designed to model what criminal law could become.  Though this curricular model was developed by men who wanted to improve and constrain the criminal law, instead it probably contributed to the vast expansion of criminal interventions in the second half of the twentieth century.  The Essay reveals the pro-carceral implications of the prevailing canon, and it offers the outline of a different model that could alter American attitudes toward criminal law.  

I highly recommend everything penned by Alice Ristroph, and I am especially excited to see her turn her attention to the gaps between "our curricular model and our present criminal law reality" and to how "American law schools, through the required course on substantive criminal law, have contributed affirmatively to the collection of phenomena commonly labeled mass incarceration."  And reading this great piece reminded me of this very short commentary I wrote in the very first issue of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law way back in 2003 to flag my concerns that "failing to discuss the modem dynamics of criminal law doctrine and practice ... [results in] a substantive criminal law course that is often archaic, incomplete and perhaps unjustifiable."  My point back then was that modern criminal justice developments, particularly the drug war, plea realities and sentencing reforms, made the Model Penal Code outdated as a fundamental teaching text.  As I put it then:

The original MPC retains important historical value as a compendium of post-war scholarly thinking about criminal law, and its impact as a practical reform project remains profound. However, because the fundamental issues and concerns of criminal law doctrine and practice have shifted so dramatically in the last 40 years, the original MPC's continued use as a criminal law textbook operates, in my view, as a considerable disservice to criminal law academics and students, and ultimately to the entire field of criminal justice....

[T]he front-line realities of modem criminal law doctrine and practice have become quite grim and messy, and yet study of the original MPC can suggest that criminal law doctrine and practice is quite enlightened and orderly.  The MPC — and our teaching of it — trumpets the foundational concepts of actus reus and mens rea; yet the act requirement is often functionally eclipsed in a world in which conspiracy and possession offenses are staples, and the import of mental states is often functionally eclipsed in a world in which most sentencing factors are strict liability elements.  The MPC — or perhaps more particularly our teaching of it — suggests that homicides and other serious offenses are the central concern of the criminal justice system; yet modem criminal dockets are clogged with 60 times more felony drug and property cases than homicide cases. The MPC — and especially our usual methods for teaching it — suggests that many cases raise legal and factual claims and defenses that are resolved at trials where burdens of proof and precise offense elements are scrupulously considered; yet such matters very rarely occupy real criminal courts as judges spend the bulk of their time processing and sentencing the 19 out of every 20 defendants whose convictions are secured through guilty pleas.  And of course the MPC could not discuss — and I fear our teaching still fails to discuss — the enormous economic and personal costs and consequences of making mass incarceration a defining element of the modem American criminal justice system.

Gosh, I sure wish these musings of mine from this 2003 article felt more dated now, but Alice Ristroph's article effectively highlights how these problems have only gotten worse over time.

November 15, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, November 12, 2020

"Nondelegating Death"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper just posted to SSRN and authored by Alexandra Klein.  Here is its abstract:

Most states’ method-of-execution statutes afford broad discretion to executive agencies to create execution protocols.  Inmates have challenged this discretion, arguing that these statutes unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to executive agencies, violating the state’s non-delegation and separation of powers doctrines.  State courts routinely use the non-delegation doctrine, in contrast to the doctrine’s historic disfavor in federal courts.  Despite its uncertain status, the non-delegation doctrine is a useful analytical tool to examine decision-making in capital punishment.

This Article critically evaluates responsibility for administering capital punishment through the lens of non-delegation.  It analyzes state court decisions upholding broad legislative delegations to agencies and identifies common themes in this jurisprudence.  This Article positions legislative delegation in parallel with historic and modern execution practices that utilize responsibility shifting mechanisms to minimize participant responsibility in carrying out capital sentences and argues that legislative delegation serves a similar function of minimizing accountability in state-authorized killing.

The non-delegation doctrine provides useful perspectives on capital punishment because the doctrine emphasizes accountability, transparency, and perceptions of legitimacy, core themes that permeate historic and modern death penalty practices.  Creating execution protocols carries a high potential for arbitrary action due to limited procedural constraints, secrecy, and broad statutorily enacted discretion.  The decision to authorize capital punishment is a separate policy decision than the decision of how that punishment is carried out.  This Article frames a more robust non-delegation analysis for method-of-execution statutes, and argues that legislators determined to utilize the penalty should carry greater accountability for investigating and selecting methods of execution and should not be allowed to delegate these decisions.

November 12, 2020 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, November 09, 2020

After Tennessee Gov postpones last scheduled state execution of year, will all three scheduled federal 2020 executions still go forward?

As reported in this local article, "Tennessee Gov. Bill Lee has granted death row inmate Pervis Payne a temporary reprieve due to the COVID-19 pandemic."  Here is more:

Payne's execution was scheduled for Dec. 3, 2020. The reprieve lasts until April 9, 2021. Lee said in a written statement that the reprieve was issued "due to the challenges and disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic," but did not elaborate further.

Payne, who is being held on death row in Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in Nashville, is convicted of the 1987 deaths of Millington woman Charisse Christopher, 28, and her 2-year-old daughter, Lacie.  Christopher’s 3-year-old son, Nicholas, survived multiple stab wounds in the brutal attack that took place in Christopher’s apartment.

“This additional time will also allow us to investigate Mr. Payne’s strong innocence claim, together with the Innocence Project," said Kelley Henry, Payne's attorney.  "We are grateful to the 150 faith, legal, legislative, and community groups in Memphis and across the state that support clemency for Mr. Payne. Together with Mr. Payne’s family, we will continue the fight to prove Mr. Payne’s innocence.”

The reprieve also allows time for the Tennessee Black Caucus of State Legislators to potentially pass legislation that would allow a defendant already sentenced to the death penalty and whose conviction is final to still bring a petition regarding a claim of intellectual disability. Although members of the caucus filed the bill Wednesday, it cannot be passed until January at the earliest, initially after Payne's scheduled execution.

Payne has maintained his innocence, and his attorneys have said that he is intellectually disabled, but have been unable to litigate the claim in Tennessee due to procedural reasons. In federal court, Payne’s attorneys have filed a petition asking the court to prevent his execution until hearing his claim that he is intellectually disabled....

During his 1988 trial, Payne said he discovered the gruesome crime scene after hearing calls for help through the open door of the apartment. He said he bent down to try to help, getting blood on his clothes and pulling at the knife still lodged in Christopher's throat. When a white police officer arrived, Payne, who is Black, said he panicked and ran, fearing he would be seen as the prime suspect.

The Shelby County District Attorney's Office has maintained that regardless of what DNA testing shows, the evidence to convict Payne of the crimes was overwhelming. An officer saw him leaving the scene of the crime drenched in blood, and Payne admitted to being there.  His baseball cap was found looped around the 2-year-old victim's arm, and his fingerprints were found inside the apartment.

Payne’s case has drawn the support of a large coalition of advocates, led by the Ben F. Jones Chapter of the National Bar Association, urging for the DNA testing.  The coalition includes the Tennessee Black Caucus of State Legislators, Memphis Chapter of the NAACP, the Memphis Bar Association, 100 Black Men of Memphis, National Council of Negro Women (Memphis Chapter), Stand for Children Tennessee, Memphis Interfaith Coalition for Action and Hope (MICAH) and several leaders in the Church of God in Christ (COGIC), of which Payne is a member.

It strikes me as quite notable and ultimately disturbing that, for a crime that took place 33 years ago(!), it seems that a global pandemic was needed to justify a short reprieve to provide time "to investigate Mr. Payne’s strong innocence claim."  Also, if Payne is actually intellectually disabled and thereby categorically ineligible for execution under the Eighth Amendment, it seems quite problematic to preclude him from properly litigating this constitutional issue fully for mere procedural reasons.

These case specifics aside, this Death Penalty Information Center page details that this planned Tennessee execution had been the last state execution scheduled for 2020.  So, due to lots COVID disruptions as well as other factors, it appears the total number of state executions in 2020 will be only seven individuals, marking the lowest yearly total of state executions in almost 40 years.  But, of course, the federal government really revved up its machinery of death in 2020, and there have already been seven federal executions in 2020.  Moreover, there are three more federal executions still scheduled for 2020: as this BOP page details, one execution is scheduled for next Thursday, and two more are scheduled for the second week of December.

Even if we did not have a consequential federal election this month, the federal defendants scheduled for execution in the coming weeks would surely be seeking a reprieve based on COVID concerns and perhaps on other grounds as well.  But, especially given that the Joe Biden campaign talked about seek to abolish the federal death penalty, if these condemned defendants can find a way to get their executions postponed until after January 20, 2021, they might benefit from a new Administration eager to now completely turn off the entire federal machinery of death.

November 9, 2020 in Criminal justice in the Biden Administration, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, November 08, 2020

Tomorrow can be today for some Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force criminal justice recommendations

Now that former VP Joe Biden is starting to begin work as Prez Elect Joe Biden, I started thinking about some of Dr. Martin Luther King's famous words about the persistent and pressing need for urgent action to advance justice.  As MLK put it in one 1967 speech:

We are now faced with the fact, my friends, that tomorrow is today.  We are confronted with the fierce urgency of now. In this unfolding conundrum of life and history, there is such a thing as being too late.  Procrastination is still the thief of time.

With the fierce urgency of now in mind, I looked through the criminal justice reform recommendations [available here] from the Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force (discussed here) to see which ones might be acted upon ASAP.  Many of the recommendations involve matters that will require congressional action (e.g., "End the federal crack and powder cocaine disparity in sentences") or that must await Prez Elect Biden officially taking office (e.g., "Direct DOJ to collect data on federal prosecution practices").  But there are at least two notable recommendations involving the creation of an independent task force or board which could begin work right away: 

Task Force on Prosecutorial Discretion: Create a new task force, placed outside of the U.S. Department of Justice, to make recommendations for tackling discrimination and other problems in our justice system that result from arrest and charging decisions.

Clemency Board: To avoid possible institutional bias and ensure people have a fair and independent evaluation, establish an independent clemency board, composed and staffed by people with diverse backgrounds. Expand Obama-era criteria for proactive clemency initiative to address individuals serving excess sentences.

Notably, Prez Elect Biden has now promised to announce on Monday a COVID task force. I am pleased he is acting fast on this critical front; but in this unfolding conundrum of life and history, I am always going to be urging leaders to treat tomorrow as today with regard to criminal justice reforms.

November 8, 2020 in Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, Clemency and Pardons, Criminal justice in the Biden Administration, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, November 05, 2020

"The Compassionate Computer: Algorithms, Sentencing, and Mercy"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Netanel Dagan now available on SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Sentencing scholarship largely neglects the possibility of applying algorithms to mercy.  This ‎doesn’t come as a surprise: Is there any greater contradiction than between algorithmic decision-‎making and the compassionate, human and interpersonal nature of mercy?   Such polarity brings ‎some theorists and policy makers to reject algorithm-based sentencing altogether. 

In this chapter, ‎we offer a preliminary attempt at integrating mercy within algorithmic sentencing.  First, we ‎distinguish between two main concepts of mercy — justice and pure — and different types of ‎algorithms — deductive and inductive.  Second, we argue: (a) As long as justice mercy can be ‎reduced to a proportionality-related calculus (e.g., extra harsh suffering) it can be introduced ‎through a deductive algorithm; (b) Pure mercy, being unpredictable, and deviating from justice, ‎can be incorporated mainly through an inductive algorithm.  This is true, at least to some extent, ‎even for theories that permit deviation from equality when exercising mercy.‎

November 5, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, November 04, 2020

Rounding up some accounts of SCOTUS oral arguments in Jones, the latest juvenile LWOP case

I listened live yesterday morning to the Supreme Court oral argument in Jones v. Mississippi18-1259, which will address "Whether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole."  The full argument in Jones is available here, and it is worth the 90 minutes for a full listen because nearly all the Justices were quite engaged and the arguments by counsel were consistently strong and interesting.

If you would rather read accounts of the case and argument, here are a few: 

From Kent Scheidegger at Crime & Consequences, "An Aggressive Interpretation of Precedent

From Amy Howe and SCOTUSblog, "Argument analysis: Justices debate requirements for life sentences for juveniles"

From Nina Totenberg at NPR, "Supreme Court Examines When Juveniles May Be Sentenced to Life Without Parole"

From Steven Erickson at Crime & Consequences, "The Muddy Waters of Miller"

From Mark Walsr at Education Week, "High Court Weighs Whether Juvenile Life Without Parole Requires 'Incorrigibility'"

November 4, 2020 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, November 03, 2020

"Shrinking the Accountability Deficit in Capital Charging"

The title of this post is the title of this paper authored by Sherod Thaxton and recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The price of capital trials, appeals, and clemency proceedings have skyrocketed since the U.S. Supreme Court lifted its moratorium on the death penalty, but this has not translated to more reliable case outcomes — the rate of serious reversible error and wrongful convictions has steadily increased during the same time period.  The overly aggressive use of the death penalty by prosecutors has not only been convincingly linked to these high reversal rates, but may also increase crime, decrease the likelihood of arrests for homicides, and lead to heightened risks of miscarriages of justice for non‐capital defendants.  It follows that limiting hawkish prosecutorial decision‐making in potentially capital cases may be particularly effective in reducing the prevalence of error and reducing unnecessary expense.  Curbing the virtually unfettered discretion of prosecutors is not a new idea, but extant proposals tend to suffer from shortcomings that are likely to render them impractical or ineffective.  Any viable legal intervention must increase prosecutorial accountability for inadequate charge‐screening in capital cases while still permitting prosecutors to retain discretion in seeking the death penalty.  This essay describes a reform that consists of two primary components: (1) an advisory (i.e., non‐binding) opinion from a reviewing authority assessing the appropriateness of a prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty in a case based on the totality of evidence, and (2) financial and administrative cost-shifting mechanisms capable of disincentivizing prosecutorial overreaching in capital charging.

November 3, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 02, 2020

Background reading before argument in Jones v. Mississippi, the latest SCOTUS foray into Eighth Amendment limits on juve sentencing

Remarkably, it has been more than a decade since the US Supreme Court kicked off its interesting (and uncertain) new line of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with its ruling in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)Graham declared sentencing juveniles to life without parole (LWOP) for non-homicide offenses to be unconstitutional, and was quickly followed by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held that mandatory LWOP sentences were unconstitutional for juveniles convicted of homicide. Four years later, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), declared that Miller was to be applied retroactively, and now Jones v. Mississippi will explore exactly what Miller and these other cases actually mean for discretionary sentencing of juvenile homicide offenders.

A whole lot of amicus briefs have been filed in Jones on both sides, and the US Solicitor General has also weighed in and been granted leave to participate in tomorrow's scheduled oral argument.  Amy Howe at SCOTUSblog has this preview, which sets up the case this way:

After Miller and Montgomery, state courts can sentence individual juveniles to life without the possibility of parole as long as the sentence is not a mandatory penalty under state law.  On Tuesday, the justices will hear oral argument in a case that asks them to decide what their rulings in Miller and Montgomery require states to do before imposing that sentence.  A Mississippi man contends that the sentencer must find that the juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation, while the state counters that it is enough that the sentencer considered the juvenile’s youth.

For those looking for other background reading beyond the briefs, there have been a number of good commentaries about the issues in this line of rulings published recently:

-- by Brandon Garrett in The Atlantic, "Life Without Parole for Kids Is Cruelty With No Benefit: The United States is the only country that allows this practice, and soon the Supreme Court could get rid of it."

-- by Katie Rose Quandt in In These Times, "The Supreme Court Said Their Sentencing Was Unconstitutional. But They’re Still Behind Bars. Despite SCOTUS rulings against life without parole sentences for juveniles, most who received that sentence remain incarcerated." 

-- by Marc Levin in the Texas Lawyer, "On Election Day, Remember All Youths Are Candidates for Change"

I am looking forward to the Court's consideration of Jones in part because the case presents the three newest Justices with their first big opportunity to weigh in on the Eighth Amendment in a noncapital case.  Based on Justice Gorsuch's work in capital Eighth Amendment cases, I am not expecting him to be a vote for an expansive interpretation of Miller.  But, especially because Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett both are parents to teenage kids, I am wondering if they might be a bit more open to a more expansive view of the Eighth Amendment in this context.

November 2, 2020 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Will reform of quirky approach to jury sentencing greatly impact Virginia's criminal justice system?

A helpful reader reminded me that I had forgotten to blog about a recent significant change in sentencing procedure in Virginia, which is effectively explained in this local article from a few weeks ago headlined "Virginia lawmakers vote to reform 224-year-old jury sentencing law."  Here are the basics:

Virginia lawmakers passed a closely watched bill Friday aimed at ensuring people can exercise their right to a jury trial without risking much steeper punishments.

Criminal justice reform advocates frequently called the legislation one of the most important changes the General Assembly could adopt during a special legislative session that has been largely devoted to issues of policing, courts and prisons.  “Everything else is window dressing compared to this bill,” said Sen. Joe Morrissey, D-Richmond, who proposed the measure.  “The result will be an end to excessive sentencing in the Commonwealth of Virginia.”

Virginia and Kentucky are currently the only two states where if a defendant or prosecutor asks for a jury trial, the jury must also hand down the sentence....  Morrissey’s bill will transfer sentencing responsibilities to the judge unless a defendant specifically requests it be set by the jury.

The state’s unusual approach to sentencing dates to 1796 and has been called the jury penalty because it often leads to criminal sentences that are significantly longer than defendants would have faced if they had opted for a trial before a judge or taken a prosecutor’s plea deal.  That’s because unlike judges, juries must hand down sentences that fall within statutory sentencing ranges.  And unlike judges, juries aren’t provided the sentencing guidelines that tell them what the typical punishment is for a similarly situated defendant.

That means a defendant facing a robbery or drug distribution charge would face a five year mandatory sentence if a jury finds him guilty, whereas a judge issuing the sentence could suspend time based on the facts of the case and mitigating circumstances.  Juries exceeded sentencing guidelines in half of the cases they heard in 2018, according to the Virginia Sentencing Commission, which found they issued prison sentences that were on average four years longer than would have been recommended.  Judges, meanwhile, handed down sentences that exceeded guidelines in just 9 percent of cases.

Lawmakers and advocates say prosecutors often take advantage of the arrangement by tacking on charges with steep mandatory penalties and threatening to demand a jury trial if the defendant doesn’t accept a plea agreement. “Most defendants plead out, even when they did not do it.  This is a very difficult decision people have to make,” said Del. Don Scott, D-Portsmouth, who like many lawmakers argued the leverage the law gives to prosecutors contributes to Virginia’s higher than average incarceration rates.  “This would be a revolutionary change in the way we do sentencing.”

While the bill won limited bi-partisan support, Republicans mostly opposed the measure, as did most prosecutors in the state.  They warned that the reform could lead to a huge uptick in jury trials that would require more judges, more courtrooms and more prosecutors — all things that would cost the state millions of dollars.... 

The Virginia Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys estimated the change could lead to an eightfold increase in jury trials, writing in a letter to lawmakers that without additional money to hire more prosecutors, they’d be forced to agree to plea deals “that are not commensurate with the crime or the harm inflicted upon the victim.”...

Supporters of the bill, which included a contingent of commonwealth’s attorneys from some of the state’s most populated areas, said the concerns about an explosion of jury trials were misplaced, noting that Virginia would simply be adopting the system already used in most states.  And even if the number of jury trials did increase, that would only prove that the existing system was preventing defendants from exercising their constitutional rights.

I would like to be optimistic that this procedural reform would ensure an "end to excessive sentencing" in Virginia, but we see an awful lot of excessive sentencing in a lot of other jurisdictions that have a more "traditional" approach to trials and sentencing.  And, as the question in the title of this post is meant to suggest, I sincerely doubt Virginia will see a huge increase in jury trial  after this law becomes effective.  As we see nationwide, in all jurisdictions, there are a broad array of legal and structural factors that create, in the words of Justice Kennedy in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S.156 (2012), "the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials."

Because I generally believe juries should play a larger role in the administration of our modern criminal justice systems, I tend to be a supporter of jury sentencing in principle.  But Virginia's recent experiences, which prompted these latest reforms, serve as an important reminder that just how jury sentencing operates in practice plays a critical role in whether this form of sentencing can serve as a help or hinderance to a more fair and transparent and effective criminal justice system.

November 2, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

No new cert grants from SCOTUS, but order lists includes interesting per curiam reversals including one on prison conditions and qualified immunity

This morning's Supreme Court order list starts by noting that "Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the motions or petitions appearing on this Order List." That fact may in part explain why the Court did not grant certiorari in any cases. But the order list is still an interesting read because it included two per curiam opinions, in McKesson v. Doe and Taylor v. Riojas, summarily reversing lower court opinion to order further proceedings in the Fifth Circuit. 

The fed courts nerd in me really likes Mckesson decision because it orders the Fifth Circuit to certify a fascinating questions of Louisiana tort law to the Louisiana Supreme Court in an effort to potentially avoid having to resolve a challenging First Amendment question.  But the Taylor decision gets to the issue of prison conditions and qualified immunity because "Petitioner Trent Taylor is an inmate in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice [who alleged] that, for six full days in September 2013, correctional officers confined him in a pair of shockingly unsanitary cells."  Here is how SCOTUS kept his lawsuit going:

The Fifth Circuit erred in granting the officers qualified immunity on this basis.  “Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.”  Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam).  But no reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period of time.  See Hope, 536 U.S., at 741 (explaining that “‘a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question’” (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997))); 536 U.S., at 745 (holding that “[t]he obvious cruelty inherent” in putting inmates in certain wantonly “degrading and dangerous” situations provides officers “with some notice that their alleged conduct violate[s]” the Eighth Amendment).  The Fifth Circuit identified no evidence that the conditions of Taylor’s confinement were compelled by necessity or exigency.  Nor does the summary-judgment record reveal any reason to suspect that the conditions of Taylor’s confinement could not have been mitigated, either in degree or duration.  And although an officer-by-officer analysis will be necessary on remand, the record suggests that at least some officers involved in Taylor’s ordeal were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of his cells.

Notably, only Justice Thomas dissented from the Taylor ruling in favor of the prisoner in Taylor, although Justice Alito wrote an extended "concurring in the judgment" statement to explain why he thoughts the "petition [was] ill-suited for review."

November 2, 2020 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, October 31, 2020

Effective PPI review of how "technical violations" contribute to incarceration in DC

The Prison Policy Initiative has this notable new detailed briefing about so-called "technical violations" in Washington DC that helps highlight the various was mass supervision contributes to mass incarceration.  The briefing's full title set out its coverage: "Technical difficulties: D.C. data shows how minor supervision violations contribute to excessive jailing; Using D.C. as a case study, we explain how much non-criminal — and often drug related — 'technical' violations of probation and parole contribute to unnecessary jail incarceration." I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

Parole and probation violations are among the main drivers of excessive incarceration in the U.S., but are often overlooked policy targets for reducing prison and jail populations. Nationally, 45% of annual prison admissions are due to supervision violations, and 25% are the result of “technical violations” — noncompliant but non-criminal behaviors, like missing meetings with a parole officer.  The sheer number of people held in jail for mere violations of supervision exemplifies the gross overuse and misuse of incarceration in the U.S.

Despite their impact on local jail and state prison populations, technical violations are not well understood, often appearing in the data simply as “violations” without any description of the underlying behavior.  However, Washington, D.C. stands out by publishing a wealth of local jail data as well as contextual data from federal agencies like the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA), which offers a fuller story of what happens to people on supervision....

When people serving a sentence from D.C. Superior Court are released from jail or prison, many remain under supervision of some form — either supervised release or parole. Each person under supervision must comply with certain conditions, which are monitored by a Community Supervision Officer (CSO).  The same is true of those sentenced by a court to probation, another form of supervision, instead of a period of incarceration.  The Robina Institute estimates that people on probation must comply with 18 to 20 requirements a day; the list of requirements in D.C. illustrates how easy it can be to “violate” these many conditions...

In D.C., the second most common “most serious offense” for men in jail is a parole violation, just behind assault and ahead of weapons violations, drug offenses, property crime, burglary and robbery, and other violations of law.  Among women, parole violations are the third most common “most serious offense.”  The D.C. Department of Corrections (DOC) reported that, as of April 2020, 8.5% of women and 14.3% of men in jails were held on charges that included a parole violation or had a “Parole Violator” status.

For context, we previously found that in both New York and Texas, parole violations made up just over 8% of those in jails statewide.  In comparison to those states, D.C.’s jails hold a larger proportion of people on parole violations.  However, when compared to the share of people held for supervision violations in other large cities like Philadelphia (58%), New York City (27%), and New Orleans (22%), D.C.’s incarceration for violations (about 14%) appears consistent with — or even more modest than — other cities’....

People in jail for technical violations — things that are not criminal offenses for people not under supervision – exemplify the overuse and misuse of incarceration. D.C. is just one criminal legal system among over 50 more in every state and territory.  Dismantling mass incarceration is impossible without also addressing the systems that latch on to people involved in the criminal legal system and refuse to let go.  To get the full picture, politicians, advocates, and scientists must take hard look at the many Americans under supervision and the ways that they are continuously churned through our massive criminal legal system. It is time to end these cycles of criminalization and find solutions that free people from the enormous reach of supervision.

October 31, 2020 in Collateral consequences, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)