Monday, July 19, 2021

New York Times reporting Biden Justice Department agrees with OLC memo stating prisoners transferred to home confinement must return to prison after pandemic ends

As reported in this new New York Times article, headlined "Biden Legal Team Decides Inmates Must Return to Prison After Covid Emergency," it appears that the US Department of Justice is not changing its view of the limits of congressional authority to move people to home confinement under the CARES Act. Here are the details:

The Biden administration legal team has decided that thousands of federal convicts who were released to home confinement to reduce the risk of spreading Covid-19 will be required by law to return to prison a month after the official state of emergency for the pandemic ends, officials said on Monday.

The administration has come under pressure from criminal justice reform activists and some lawmakers to revoke a Trump-era memo by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, which said inmates whose sentences lasted beyond the “pandemic emergency period” would have to go back to prison.

But the Biden legal team has concluded that the memo correctly interpreted the law, which applies to about 4,000 nonviolent inmates, according to officials who spoke on condition of anonymity about sensitive internal deliberations.  Several officials characterized the decision as an assessment of the best interpretation of the law, not a matter of policy preference.

The official state of emergency is not expected to end this year because of a rise in new infections caused by the coronavirus’s Delta variant. But the determination means that whenever it does end, the department’s hands will be tied.

That leaves two options if those prisoners are not to be sent back into cells: Either Congress could enact a law to expand the Justice Department’s authority to keep them at home beyond the emergency, or President Biden could use his clemency powers to commute their sentences to home confinement.

The Biden team is said to be wary of a blanket, mass commutation, however, both because it would represent an extraordinary intervention in the normal functioning of the judicial system and it could create political risks if any recipient who would otherwise be locked up commits a serious crime.  Another option is case-by-case assessment for commutations, but the volume of work required to individually evaluate so many people is daunting.

When asked for comment, the White House responded with a general statement about the administration’s support for policies that can reduce incarceration. “President Biden is committed to reducing incarceration and helping people to re-enter society,” said Andrew Bates, a White House spokesman. “As he has said, too many Americans are incarcerated, and too many are Black and brown. His administration is focused on reforming our justice system in order to strengthen families, boost our economy and give people a chance at a better future.”...

The disclosure of the Biden legal team’s internal decision came as an ideologically broad range of advocacy groups — nearly two dozen organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty International, FreedomWorks and the Faith and Freedom Coalition — stepped up pressure on the Biden administration not to recall inmates from home confinement when the emergency ends.

Notably, however, those organizations issued a letter framing their request in terms of Mr. Biden using his clemency powers to resolve the issue. “On the campaign trail and during your presidency, you have spoken about the importance of second chances,” according to the letter. “This is your opportunity to provide second chances to thousands of people who are already safely out of prison, reintegrating back into society, reconnecting with their loved ones, getting jobs and going back to school. We urge you to provide clemency now to people under CARES Act home confinement.”

I do not find this news especially surprising; if there was any considerable legal wiggle room here, I think the Justice Department would have spoken some time ago.  And, as this article highlights, I have sensed that a number of advocates have been talking up blanket clemency as the most fitting way to resolve this issue.  But I am always eager to highlight the point I made in this recent post, titled "Why aren't there much stronger calls for CONGRESS to fix post-pandemic home confinement problems?," that Congress readily could (and I think should) enact a statute that provides for the home confinement program to be extended beyond the end of the pandemic.

In addition, as I highlighted in this recent post, another option for case-by-case relief is through compassionate release motions.  This is how Gwen Levi got relief, and such motions have the potential to reduce sentences and not just allow these sentences to be served at home.  Of course "the volume of work required" for so many CR motions would be considerable, but the Justice Department could (and I think should) support and even bring sentence reduction motions under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Some prior recent related posts:

July 19, 2021 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

First Jan 6 rioter to be sentenced on felony charges gets (below-guideline) sentence of eight months in federal prison

As noted in this preview post on Friday, this morning was the scheduled sentencing day for Paul Allard Hodgkins, who carried a Trump flag into the well of the Senate during the January 6 riot at the Capitol.  Hodgkins' sentencing has been seen as particularly significant because he is the very first person to be sentenced on felony charges stemming from his actions on January 6 — one misdemeanor defendant has been sentenced to probation — and because Hodgkins' sentencing memo and the Government's sentencing memo made notable arguments as he sought probation and as the government urged an 18-month prison term (at the midpoint of the calculated guidelines range of 15 to 21 months).

This AP piece reports via its headline that the federal sentencing judge here did what often happens in these kinds of cases, namely he came quite close to splitting the difference: "Capitol rioter who breached Senate sentenced to 8 months."  Here are more details on this notable federal sentencing:

A Florida man who breached the U.S. Senate chamber carrying a Trump campaign flag was sentenced Monday to eight months behind bars, the first resolution for a felony case in the Capitol insurrection.

Paul Allard Hodgkins apologized and said he was ashamed of his actions on Jan 6. Speaking calmly from a prepared text, he described being caught up in the euphoria as he walked down Washington’s most famous avenue, then followed a crowd of hundreds up Capitol Hill and into the Capitol building. “If I had any idea that the protest … would escalate (the way) it did … I would never have ventured farther than the sidewalk of Pennsylvania Avenue,” Hodgkins told the judge. He added: “This was a foolish decision on my part.”

Prosecutors had asked for Hodgkins to serve 18 months behind bars, saying in a recent filing that he, “like each rioter, contributed to the collective threat to democracy” by forcing lawmakers to temporarily abandon their certification of Joe Biden’s 2020 election victory over President Donald Trump and to scramble for shelter from incoming mobs.

His sentencing could set the bar for punishments of hundreds of other defendants as they decide whether to accept plea deals or go to trial. He and others are accused of serious crimes but were not indicted, as some others were, for roles in larger conspiracies. Under an agreement with prosecutors, Hodgkins pleaded guilty last month to one count of obstructing an official proceeding, which carries a maximum 20-year prison sentence. In exchange, prosecutors agreed to drop lesser charges, including entering a restricted building and disorderly conduct.

Video footage shows Hodgkins wearing a Trump 2020 T-shirt, the flag flung over his shoulder and eye goggles around his neck, inside the Senate. He took a selfie with a self-described shaman in a horned helmet and other rioters on the dais behind him.

His lawyer pleaded with Judge Randolph Moss to spare his 38-year-old client time in prison, saying the shame that will attach to Hodgkins for the rest of his life should be factored in as punishment. The lawyer argued in court papers that Hodgkins’ actions weren’t markedly different from those of Anna Morgan Lloyd — other than Hodgkins stepping onto the Senate floor. The 49-year-old from Indiana was the first of roughly 500 arrested to be sentenced. She pleaded guilty to misdemeanor disorderly conduct and last month was sentenced to three years of probation.

Hodgkins was never accused of assaulting anyone or damaging property. And prosecutors said he deserves some leniency for taking responsibility almost immediately and pleading guilty to the obstruction charge. But they also noted how he boarded a bus in his hometown of Tampa bound for a Jan. 6 Trump rally carrying rope, protective goggles and latex gloves in a backpack — saying that demonstrated he came to Washington prepared for violence.

Prior related posts:

July 19, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (6)

NIJ releases new publication with "Guidelines for Post-Sentencing Risk Assessment"

Via this webpage, headed "Redesigning Risk and Need Assessment in Corrections," the National Institute of Justice discusses its notable new publication titled "Guidelines for Post-Sentencing Risk Assessment."  Here is how the webpage sets up the full publication:

Over the past several decades, the use of RNA in correctional systems has proliferated. Indeed, the vast majority of local, state, and federal correctional systems in the United States now use some type of RNA. Despite the numerous ways in which RNA instruments can improve correctional policy and practice, the kind of RNA currently used across much of the country has yet to live up to this promise because it is outdated, inefficient, and less effective than it should be.

In an effort to help the corrections field realize the full potential of RNA instruments, NIJ recently released Guidelines for Post-Sentencing Risk Assessment.  These guidelines, assembled by a trio of corrections researchers and practitioners, are built around four fundamental principles for the responsible and ethical use of RNAs: fairness, efficiency, effectiveness, and communication.  Each of these principles contributes to an innovative, practical checklist of steps practitioners can use to maximize the reliability and validity of RNA instruments.

Here is part of the executive summary from the full report:

Risk and needs assessment (RNA) tools are used within corrections to prospectively identify those who have a greater risk of offending, violating laws or rules of prison or jail, and/ or violating the conditions of community supervision.  Correctional authorities use RNA instruments to guide a host of decisions that are, to a large extent, intended to enhance public safety and make better use of scarce resources.  Despite the numerous ways in which RNA instruments can improve correctional policy and practice, the style and type of RNA currently used by much of the field has yet to live up to this promise because it is outdated, inefficient, and less effective than it should be.

In an effort to help the corrections field realize the potential that RNA instruments have for improving decision-making and reducing recidivism, we have drawn upon our collective wisdom and experience to identify four principles that are critical to the responsible and ethical use of RNAs.  Within each principle is a set of guidelines that, when applied in practice, would help maximize the reliability and validity of RNA instruments.  Because these guidelines comprise novel, evidence-based practices and procedures, the recommendations we propose in this paper are relatively innovative, at least for the field of corrections.

■ The first principle, fairness, holds that RNA tools should be used to yield more equitable outcomes. When assessments are designed, efforts should be taken to eliminate or minimize potential sources of bias, which will mitigate racial and ethnic disparities. Preprocessing, in-processing, and post-processing adjustments are design strategies that can help minimize bias. Disparities can also be reduced through the way in which practitioners use RNAs, such as delivering more programming resources to those who need it the most (the risk principle). Collectively, this provides correctional agencies with a strategy for achieving better and more equitable outcomes.

■  The second principle, efficiency, indicates that RNA instruments should rely on processes that promote reliability, expand assessment capacity, and do not burden staff resources. The vast majority of RNAs rely on time-consuming, cumbersome processes that mimic paper and pencil instruments; that is, they are forms to be completed and then manually scored by staff. The efficiency of RNA tools can be improved by adopting automated and computer-assisted scoring processes to increase reliability, validity, and assessment capacity. If RNA tools must be scored manually, then inter-rater reliability assessments must be carried out to ensure adequate consistency in scoring among staff.

■  RNA instruments should not only be fair and efficient, but they should also be effective, which is the third key principle. The degree to which RNA instruments are effective depends largely on their predictive validity and how the tool is used within an agency. Machine learning algorithms often help increase predictive accuracy, although developers should test multiple algorithms to determine which one performs the best. RNA tools that are customized to the correctional population on which they are used will deliver better predictive performance.

■  Finally, it is important to focus on the implementation and use of RNAs so that individuals can become increasingly aware of their risk factors. To this end, the fourth key principle is to employ strategies that improve risk communication. Training the correctional staff who will be using the RNA tool is essential for effective communication, particularly in how to explain the needs and translate it into a case plan. A risk communication system, which includes case plan improvement, treatment-matching algorithms, and graduated sanctions and incentives, provides an integrated model for decision-making that helps increase an individual’s awareness of their own circumstances and need for programming.

July 19, 2021 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Technocorrections, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 16, 2021

Feds advocate for (mid-guideline) prison term of 18 months for first Jan 6 defendant due to be sentenced on felony charge

As noted in this Washington Post piece, a notable federal sentencing is scheduled for Monday and federal prosecutors have a notable sentencing recommendation for the judge: "U.S. prosecutors on Wednesday urged a federal judge to impose an 18-month prison term on the first defendant to face sentencing for a felony in the Jan. 6 Capitol breach, citing the need to deter domestic terrorism."  Here is more:

“The need to deter others is especially strong in cases involving domestic terrorism, which the breach of the Capitol certainly was,” Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Mona Sedky said in a government sentencing request for Tampa crane operator Paul Allard Hodgkins, 38, who carried a Trump flag into the well of the Senate....

Hodgkins’s sentencing, scheduled for Monday, could set the bar for what punishment 100 or more defendants might expect to face as they weigh whether to accept plea offers by prosecutors or take their chances at a trial by jury.  About 800 people entered the building, U.S. officials have said, with more than 500 individuals charged to date and charges expected against at least 100 others.  About 20 people have pleaded guilty, and one misdemeanor defendant has been sentenced to probation.

In Hodgkins’s case, Sedky cited FBI Director Christopher A. Wray’s testimony in March to the Senate that the problem of homegrown violent extremism is “metastasizing,” with some actors growing emboldened by the Capitol riot....  Sedky also asked U.S. District Judge Randolph D. Moss of Washington to recognize prior court findings that though individuals convicted of such behavior may have no criminal history, their beliefs make them “unique among criminals in the likelihood of recidivism.”

Hodgkins pleaded guilty on June 2 to one felony count of entering the Capitol to obstruct Congress, a common charge being used by prosecutors.  Unlike other defendants, he was not accused of other wrongdoing or involvement with extremist groups, nor did he enter a cooperation deal with prosecutors.  Under advisory federal guidelines, he could face a prison sentence of 15 to 21 months.

Hodgkins poses an intriguing example for defendants against whom prosecutors have threatened to seek enhanced domestic terrorism penalties, lawyers said.  Such enhancements, if found to apply, could more than double a defendant’s guidelines range or otherwise increase recommended penalties, although judges would have the final say. In Hodgkins’s case, prosecutors did not ask the judge to apply the enhancement, even though they wrote Wednesday that his conduct met the definition of violence “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion.”  Instead, prosecutors said a “midpoint” sentence in Hodgkins’s existing range was appropriate, but still urged Moss to consider the importance of dissuading future acts of domestic terrorism.

Hodgkins has asked for a below-guidelines sentence of probation.  His attorney urged Moss to follow the example of President Abraham Lincoln’s planned approach to the defeated South after the Civil War, before he was assassinated.  “Today, this Court has a chance to make a difference,” Tampa attorney Patrick N. Leduc wrote, asserting that America now is “as divided as it was in the 1850s” on racial and regional lines.  “We have the chance to be as Lincoln had hoped, to exercise grace and charity, and to restore healing for those who seek forgiveness. Alternatively, we can follow the mistakes of our past: to be harsh, seek vengeance, retribution, and revenge, and continue to watch the nation go down its present regrettable path,” Leduc said.

Lawyers familiar with the Capitol probe have said the case illustrates how prosecutors are taking a carrot-and-stick approach in plea talks, threatening to hit some defendants with tougher sentencing guidelines calculations while showing some flexibility for those not accused of any violent conduct in a bid to resolve cases short of trial.

For example, another Jan. 6 defendant pleaded guilty Wednesday to the identical charge as Hodgkins. However, Josiah Colt, 34, of Idaho, faced a sentencing guidelines range three times as high, 51 to 63 months, after admitting that he came armed to Washington and was with others accused of violently interfering with police. Colt, however, entered a cooperation deal, implicating two men he was with in plea papers and agreeing to aid investigators in exchange for a recommendation of leniency.

Several defense attorneys in the probe privately called prosecutors’ tactics draconian in some cases, saying they are threatening years of prison time for individuals not charged with violence and giving them little choice but to face trial.

The Post has also helpfully provided links to Hodgkins' sentencing memo and the Government's sentencing memo.  They both make for interesting reads.  And, as always, I welcome reader views on how they think the 3553(a) factors ought to play out in sentencing in this high-profile case.

Prior related posts:

July 16, 2021 in Booker in district courts, Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, July 13, 2021

Interesting (but unclear) local report on federal sentencings in NYC impacted by COVID realities

The New York Daily News has this interesting (but less-than-clear) article discussing some federal sentencing issues under the headline "Brutal conditions in NYC jails during COVID pandemic caused federal judges to impose lighter sentences: analysis."  Here are excerpts:

Federal judges handed down dozens of lighter sentences due to brutal conditions in New York City’s federal jails during the coronavirus pandemic, new statistics obtained by the Daily News show.

A Daily News analysis of 43 cases involving people who could not afford their own attorneys shows that judges in Manhattan and Brooklyn federal courts imposed sentences that were on average 58% lower than what federal guidelines recommended.  In nearly all of the cases, judges either cited coronavirus conditions behind bars in their sentences, or attorneys emphasized the conditions in legal briefs.

In one case in July 2020, Judge Paul Engelmayer noted that punishment for Juan Carlos Aracena De Jesus’ illegal reentry into the U.S. after being deported was never supposed to include catching coronavirus. “I am mindful ... that you have served most of your time in prison so far during the worst pandemic in this country during the past 100 years,” Engelmayer said. “I’m mindful that your experience in prison as a result of the pandemic, the preceding lockdown, the ensuing lockdown, and your own illness was frightful. Prison is supposed to be punishment, but it is not supposed to be trauma of that nature or close.” While the sentence guidelines in the case was for 30-37 months, Engelmayer sentenced Aracena to time served.  He had spent six months at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan.

Judge Paul Oetken went so far as to come up with a formula for how much credit inmates should receive toward a sentence if they were behind bars during the pandemic. “I do believe that because it’s been harsher than a usual period that it’s more punitive, that it’s essentially the equivalent of either time and a half or two times what would ordinarily be served,” Oetken said on April 2 while sentencing a low-level crack dealer.  The sentence amounted to time served for the dealer, Daniel Gonzalez, who said he has a recurring foot infection due to unsanitary showers at MCC.

In all the cases, COVID was not the sole factor judges used to determine sentences.  Judges also considered an inmate’s health, the nature of the crime and other factors.  For Victor Marmolejo, 47, the risk of deadly consequences from his diabetes resulted in him receiving an 18-month sentence when prosecutors had asked for up to four years....

Lawsuits have alleged that coronavirus ravaged the MCC in Manhattan and the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn and that staff failed to implement commonsense preventative measures. Inmates, meanwhile, were kept in lockdown and had limited or no access to family and their attorneys.  Judges have become unusually outspoken about problems at the MCC and MDC since the pandemic began....

The head of the Federal Defenders in Brooklyn, Deirdre Von Dornum, said the cases where incarcerated pretrial detainees received shorter-than-guidelines sentences based on medical and jail conditions were “far more” than they usually get.  “COVID-19 did not change the sentencing calculus.  Consistent with governing sentencing law, judges have always taken medical conditions and medical risks into account.  What changed was the breadth and depth of this medical crisis and the clear inability of MDC and MCC to protect those in their custody and care who had pre-existing medical conditions,” Von Dornum said.

I am not at all surprised to hear accounts of federal judges taking COVID-related matter into account at sentencing.  Indeed, the instructions Congress has set forth for sentencing judges in 18 USC § 3553(a) really mandates consideration of factors that COVID realities can impact in various ways.  So, what is most notable and important is not just how, but really how much, judicial sentencing decision-making is being impacted by COVID matters.

Unfortunately, this Daily News report, which the article describes as an "analysis of 43 cases involving people who could not afford their own attorneys" in Manhattan and Brooklyn federal courts, is too opaque to provide a clear picture of COVID-era sentencing realities.  During the COVID era, there have probably more than 1000 cases sentenced in Manhattan and Brooklyn federal courts, so the 43 cases analyzed by the Daily News are likely not truly representative.  Moreover, even before COVID, judges in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York typically imposed within-guideline sentences in only about 25% of all cases.  So lots of below-guideline sentences for lots of reasons was the norm even before COVID.

That all said, the impact of COVID on sentencing practices presents critical and hard questions that I am pleased to see this local newspaper discuss.  I hope more media, as well as federal agencies and academics and many others, will keep seeking to explore these important issues.

July 13, 2021 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 12, 2021

A true scholarly feast for Apprendi fans

I was quite pleased to discover that the North Carolina Law Review now has fully available online here the full contents of its June 2021 issue with article from its Apprendi at 20 symposium.  Everyone of these articles looks like a must-read and I am already joyously working my way through them all:

July 12, 2021 in Blakely Commentary and News, Blakely in Appellate Courts, Blakely in the States, Blakely in the Supreme Court, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (1)

Spotlighting prosecutors advocating for and embracing second-look sentencing mechanisms

At a conference a dozen years ago, I spoke about the need for second-look sentencing mechanisms and argued that prosecutors should be much more involved in reviewing past sentences.  That speech got published as Encouraging (and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to Be Second-Look Sentencers, 19 Temple Political & Civil Rights L. Rev. 429 (2010). 

I am very pleased that these ideas are finally coming into vogue, as highlighted by this new Law360 piece headlined "New Wave Of Prosecutors Push For Resentencing Laws."   I recommend this piece in full, and here are excerpts:

Washington county prosecutor Dan Satterberg knew when his state passed its three-strikes law in 1993, mandating that repeat offenders of certain crimes be sentenced to life without parole, that those sentences would one day need to be undone....

When Satterberg was elected district attorney of Washington's King County in 2007, he created a team to review cases, identify people who received life sentences under the three-strikes law and try to find a legal avenue for those people to be resentenced....

But Satterberg realized that in order to move more quickly with resentencing in more cases, he needed to have the explicit legal authority to request judges to resentence people.  So Satterberg drafted and lobbied for the passage of S.B. 6164 that gives Washington state prosecutors the power to request resentencing in the interest of justice.  The law was passed last year.

So far, Satterberg has not been able to get anyone resentenced under the new law, because the court asked prosecutors not to file these resentencing petitions in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and limited court operations. Satterberg's office, however, has identified more than 100 cases that could be eligible for resentencing under the law. The office hopes to have its first resentencing under this law in August....  "I think it's consistent with the overall mission of the prosecutor, which is to seek justice," Satterberg said about S.B. 6164. "If there are procedural barriers to seeking justice, then you need to advocate to remove those."

More state and county prosecutors are reaching the same conclusion as Satterberg that they need the power to request resentencing from judges to correct past injustices, end mass incarceration, give people second chances and divert money spent on incarceration to more effective crime prevention methods.

In April, more than 60 current and former prosecutors signed a statement by the nonprofit network Fair and Just Prosecution urging their colleagues to review decadeslong sentences in their jurisdictions and to no longer seek such sentences, except in cases where the convicted individual poses a serious safety risk....

The bill that Satterberg spearheaded was inspired by the first prosecutor-initiated resentencing law passed by California in 2018.  The California law, A.B. 2942, was drafted by Hillary Blout, a former San Francisco prosecutor who worked under Vice President Kamala Harris when she served as the district attorney of San Francisco.

After Blout served as a prosecutor for six years, she founded the nonprofit For the People in 2019 that works with prosecutors to implement resentencing legislation in their states.  Blout said that resentencing laws are important to correct failed policies that sought to achieve public safety by imprisoning people for as long as possible....

Twenty-five states including New York, Virginia and Texas are currently considering resentencing legislation, according to a report released in May by The Sentencing Project, a nonprofit research organization that aims to improve the U.S. criminal justice system and reduce the prison population.  Oregon and Illinois both passed prosecutor-initiated resentencing laws during this legislative session that were signed by their respective state governors in late June.

While these resentencing laws have the power to end harsh sentences and end mass incarceration, some advocates have criticized resentencing laws that only allow prosecutors to request resentencing.  Advocates argue that incarcerated people should also be allowed to petition courts for resentencing in their cases.  Not all prosecutors are prioritizing resentencing even when they have the power to do so, leaving incarcerated people serving overly long sentences, they say.

A few of many prior related posts:

A sampling of my prior writing on this front through the years:

July 12, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, July 11, 2021

"Innocence in the Shadow of COVID-19: Plea Decision Making During a Pandemic"

The title of this post is the title of this new article by Miko Wilford, David Zimmerman, Shi Yan, and Kelly Sutherland published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. Here is its abstract:

Over 95% of criminal convictions in the United States are the result of guilty pleas.  Consequently, it is critical that we ensure the process of pleading guilty is as free of coercion as possible.  Yet, research has indicated that incarcerating defendants to await trial could have an undue influence on their decision to plead guilty.  The current research employed a novel computer simulation to examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on plea decision making among the innocent and the guilty when faced with potential pretrial detention.  While presenting COVID-related information to participants increased both true and false guilty pleas, further analyses indicated that concerns about COVID-19 weighed more heavily on the innocent than the guilty.  These findings illustrate the negative impact a pandemic could have in combination with a system of pleas that often allows prosecutors to provide defendants with just one guaranteed respite from jail — a guilty plea.

July 11, 2021 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, July 10, 2021

"Are There Stories Prosecutors Shouldn't Tell?: The Duty to Avoid Racialized Trial Narratives"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Olwyn Conway now available via SSRN. Here's the abstract:

The purportedly race-neutral actions of courts and prosecutors protect and perpetuate the myth of colorblindness and the legacy of white supremacy that define the American criminal system.  This insulates the criminal system’s racially disparate outcomes from scrutiny, thereby precluding reform.  Yet prosecutors remain accountable to the electorate. In recent years, activists and community organizers have mobilized communities to support and elect prosecutors who have pledged to address the racial inequities of the criminal system.  After a summer of protests for racial justice and growing acceptance for the demands of the Movement for Black Lives, we find ourselves in a moment that demands and necessitates transformative proposals that call on prosecutors to reject the myth of colorblindness and adopt a race-conscious approach to criminal prosecution.  This creates an opportunity — and need — to generate and articulate specific and innovative frameworks to change the culture of prosecution.

This Article seeks to provide one such framework by examining the ethical duties of American prosecutors in the underexplored area of prosecutorial storytelling.  This Article focuses on trial narratives as a lens through which to view the ethical duties of the prosecutor writ large, arguing that trial narratives that advance or invoke a racialized stereotype or stock story violate the prosecutor’s duty to justice.  A race-neutral or “colorblind” approach to prosecution ignores the ethical violations inherent in racialized prosecutorial storytelling. By contrast, a color-conscious approach offers prosecutors a path to address the systemic racism that pervades every aspect of the American criminal system—including the stories that prosecutors tell.

July 10, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 09, 2021

New Urban Instititute report reviews "Implementation of the First Step Act: The Risk and Needs Assessment System"

Julie Samuels and Emily Tiry of the Urban Institute have this notable new 23-page report about one aspect of FIRST STEP Act implementation.  Here is its abstract:

The December 2018 First Step Act sought to address many long-standing problems in the federal prison system.  This brief focuses on implementation of the act’s risk and needs assessment system, intended to incentivize people in federal prison to pursue recidivism reduction programming that can sometimes reduce their time behind bars.  We summarize that system’s key requirements and major takeaways so far; detail the progress and challenges encountered in developing and implementing the risk assessment tool, needs assessment process, and earned time credits; and offer recommendations for improvement including suggestions to expand eligibility for early release or transfer and to consider the equity of the risk assessment tool.  We conclude that the US Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) could take a more vigorous approach to implement the law and fully realize the potential of the risk and needs assessment system to reduce recidivism and time spent in federal prisons.

Are you listening, DOJ and Congress? We are getting closer to a full three years since the FIRST STEP Act became law, and its implementation remains shaky and lots more could be done to make this first step even more consequential and impactful.

July 9, 2021 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, July 08, 2021

AGAIN: You be the judge: what sentence for Michael Avenatti (and do the guidelines merit any respect)?

IA3T7J6NQRFSHDKM6SW26QQ5JAUP AGAIN:  I posted this discussion of a notable scheduled sentencing last month just before Michael Avenatti secured a short postponement.  This new Wall Street Journal article, headlined "Michael Avenatti Faces Sentencing for Trying to Extort Millions From Nike," provides an updated review of this high-profile federal sentencing now scheduled for today.  In addition to the prior posting, folks may want to check out the interesting comments from various folks that it generated last month.

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It has been a while since I have done a "you be the sentencing judge" post, but a high-profile fallen lawyer provides juicy grist for this mill.  Specifically, as two recent postings at Law & Crime highlight, Michael Avenatti's upcoming sentencing presents a notable set of facts and arguments for SDNY US District Judge Paul Gardephe:

Michael Avenatti Seeks Light Prison Sentence Because His ‘Epic Fall and Public Shaming’ Are Punishment Enough

Feds Seek ‘Very Substantial’ Prison Term for Disgraced Lawyer Michael Avenatti

Valuably, these two postings include the extended sentencing memoranda filed by the parties in this case, and the second posting summarizes the terms of the sentencing debate (with some of my emphasis added):

Scoffing at the one-time celebrity lawyer’s claim that his “epic fall and public shaming” should be taken into account at sentencing, federal prosecutors urged a judge to deal Michael Avenatti a “very substantial” prison sentence for attempting to extort Nike out of millions of dollars by threatening to expose their corruption scandal.

Quoting the probation office, prosecutors noted that Avenatti “often put himself forth as a champion for the Davids of the world, facing off with those Goliaths who would bully the small, the weak, the victimized.”

“And it was precisely this reputation, and the enormous influence that the defendant wielded on the national stage and across media platforms, that he weaponized,” Assistant U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky wrote in a 19-page sentencing brief on Wednesday night. “He used his skills as a lawyer and his power as a media figure not to benefit his client, but instead to threaten harm in an effort to extract millions of dollars from a victim, which, while sophisticated, [Avenatti] believed would be forced into acquiescing secretly to his demands.”

Once a fixture of the cable TV commentary rounds, Avenatti previously depicted his prosecution as another David-versus-Goliath fight, pitting him against the combined might of the Nike corporation and the Trump administration. Southern District of New York prosecutors rejected that, and a federal jury convicted him on all counts in February 2020.

Earlier this month, Avenatti’s defense attorneys Scott A. Srebnick and E. Danya Perry argued that a six-month maximum sentence would be enough for their client. They also said the court could take “judicial notice” that Avenatti’s well-documented “epic fall […] played out in front of the entire world.” Federal prosecutors found that sort of sentence would be far too light, and though they did not propose another number, their sentencing memorandum leaves a few clues into their thinking.

The probation office proposed an eight-year sentence, which dips below the 11.25-to-14-year guideline range.  “While the government, like the probation office, believes that a below-guidelines sentence would be sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the legitimate purposes of sentencing, the government asks this court to impose a very substantial sentence,” prosecutors wrote....

During the trial, prosecutors played a tape for jurors that they called a picture of extortion. “I’ll go take $10 billion off your client’s market cap,” Avenatti was seen warning attorneys for Nike in the videotape, referring to capitalization. As the jury found, Avenatti had been talking about confidential information he learned about Nike from his former client Gary Franklin, an amateur basketball coach.  Avenatti threatened to expose the embarrassing information relating to the corruption scandal unless the Nike paid $15 million—”not to Franklin, but directly to the [Avenatti] himself,” prosecutors noted. According to the memo, the deal represented 10 times more than Avenatti asked Nike to pay Franklin, and it would have resolved his client’s claims against Nike....

Franklin wrote separately to the U.S. District Judge Paul Gardephe harshly criticizing Avenatti. “Mr. Avenatti quickly abused that trust when he announced on Twitter, without my knowledge and without my consent, that he would be holding a press conference to discuss a scandal at Nike that ‘involved some of the biggest names in college basketball,'” Franklin wrote in a two-page victim impact statement. “I never imagined that Mr. Avenatti would proceed to post on Twitter details of the information I had relayed to him as part of our attorney-client privileged discussions, including the names of the players I coached.

Franklin is not alone among Avenatti’s spurned former clients. Avenatti continues to face another federal prosecution in New York accusing him of defrauding Stormy Daniels in a book deal, plus a case in California alleging tax offenses and other misconduct.

There are so many elements to both the Avenatti crime and his background that may (or many not) be considered important in his upcoming sentencing.  But, as my post title and emphasis seek to highlight, there is seemingly a consensus that the federal sentencing guidelines come nowhere close to recommending a proper sentence.  It is, of course, not especially surprising when a criminal defendant requests a sentence way below the applicable guideline range.  But here, notably, both the probation office and seemingly federal prosecutors also believe a proper sentence should be many years below the bottom of the applicable guideline range.

So I sincerely wonder, dear readers, what sentence you think would be, in the words of the prosecutors, "sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the legitimate purposes of sentencing"?  Do the guideline merit any respect in this analysis?

July 8, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (11)

Wednesday, July 07, 2021

ACLU sues Maricopa County prosecutors over expressly threatening "substantially harsher" plea offers for those who exercise court rights

As detailed in this ACLU press release, "the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Arizona filed a federal class action lawsuit challenging the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office (MCAO) policy of making plea offers 'substantially harsher' if people assert their rights to a preliminary hearing or a trial." Here is more about this notable lawsuit from the press release:

This "retaliation policy" coerces thousands of guilty pleas per year and violates the Constitution. Moreover, the retaliation policy applies regardless of the facts of any case, or even if the person might be innocent. Prosecutors also refuse to disclose any information beyond police reports — even if they have it — unless people give up their rights. In emails to public defenders, Maricopa County prosecutors openly acknowledge that one purpose of the policy is to avoid the work of reviewing evidence and preparing for trial.

MCAO enforces its retaliatory plea policy in the Early Disposition Courts (EDCs).  These EDCs were initially created to quickly move cases involving minor offenses or drug possession through the system, with the stated goal of helping people in need of drug treatment and other services avoid convictions.  It is during the EDC process that prosecutors threaten people with retaliation for exercising their rights and present people with a devastating choice — either waive your right to a probable cause hearing and accept the first guilty plea, all without access to the evidence against you, or MCAO will make any later plea “substantially harsher.”...

Plaintiffs include a 34-year-old man who felt threatened by MCAO’s retaliation policy and felt he had no choice but to waive his right to a preliminary hearing in order to get more discovery.  Another Plaintiff is a 61-year-old man with a substance use disorder who was charged with selling $20 worth of drugs.  Despite EDC’s stated purpose — to divert drug offenders away from incarceration and toward treatment — MCAO prosecutors are seeking to send him to prison for almost 10 years.  And the offer will get “substantially harsher” if he affirms his rights.  The complaint also details the story of a man who was actually innocent of his charges, but MCAO tried to pressure him into a guilty plea anyway.

This lawsuit, which seeks class certification and injunctive relief, is captioned Luckey v. Adel and the complaint can be found at this link.

July 7, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, July 06, 2021

"The Revelatory Nature of COVID-19 Compassionate Release in an Age of Mass Incarceration, Crime Victim Rights, and Mental Health Reform"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Jennifer Brobst now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

The crime victim rights movement and mass incarceration grew side-by-side in the United States, and in many ways they deal with similar questions about the purposes, benefits, and effectiveness of the criminal justice system.  The COVID-19 worldwide pandemic in 2020 tested the value attributed to retribution, rehabilitation, and other criminal justice goals in sentencing and incarceration.  Specifically, the First Step Act of 2018 enhanced discretionary compassionate release from prison due to illness and disability, requiring a post-sentencing balance of interests between perceived risks to the prisoner while in prison and risks to the public if release were granted.  Early COVID-19 compassionate release decisions reveal that courts continue to base early release decisions primarily on an assessment of public safety risk from crime, not community impact, crime victim impact, or even prisoner health.  In so doing, judges and prosecutors usurp and marginalize the role of the community and those most affected by crime.

July 6, 2021 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Victims' Rights At Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 05, 2021

Any hot takes on another lukewarm criminal justice Term from SCOTUS?

Last year as the Supreme Court's October 2019 Term was winding to a close, I pondered in this post whether "others sense that SCOTUS has become particularly (and problematically?) quiet on sentencing matters."  My main point back in summer 2020 was that, following a steady stream of major SCOTUS rulings for the better part of two decades, since 2015 there has been precious few truly memorable Supreme Court rulings in this arena.

Fast forward a year, a the rest of life still feels a lot more eventful than the Supreme Court's sentencing docket and even its broader criminal justice docket.  There were, arguably, more than the usual number of notable sentencing cases, particularly Jones v. Mississippi (Eighth Amendment juve senencing), Borden v. US (ACCA predicates) and  Terry v. US (crack resentencing after FIRST STEP).  But these cases were either applications of prior precedents and/or resolutions of relatively small statutory issues.  Though consequential for particular classes of defendants and somewhat revealing about the commitments of various Justices, none of these cases breaks significant new jurisprudential ground.  The one SCOTUS case this Term that clearly did break new jurisprudential ground, Edwards v. Vannoy (finding non-retroactive unanimous jury Ramos ruling), did so by formally eliminating a part of Teague retroactivity doctrine that had never actually been applied by SCOTUS in three decades.

That all said, my sentencing focus — and my eagerness for juicy cases to blog about — surely distorts my perspectives on any and every SCOTUS Term.  The Term just concluded did have a number of notable Fourth Amendment and immigration rulings that may be a lot more impactful than I realize.  And with three new younger Justices who will likely play a leading role in all SCOTUS doctrines for perhaps decades to come, every one of their votes and discussions in criminal cases could already be viewed as very important.  (Notably, this SCOTUSblog chart reviews the make-up of the entire SCOTUS OT20 docket; criminal law, immigration law, and search and seizure are among the largest categories in that accounting.)    

With that wind up, I would be eager to hear from readers (or Tweeters) with any hot takes on what still feels to me like another lukewarm criminal justice Term from SCOTUS. 

July 5, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, July 02, 2021

New Federal Sentencing Reporter issue considers "After Trump: The Future of the President’s Pardon Power"

M_fsr.2021.33.5.coverIt strikes me as a great bit of great timing, as we head into a weekend celebrating our great nation's declaration of independence from a monarchy, that the new issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter focused on the pardon power in the US Constitution is just now available online.  It is often said that the presidential pardon authority in Article II section 2 of the Constitution is the most "kingly" power given to our chief executive, and former Prez Donald Trump certainly seemed at times to bring a "mad King George" quality to his activities in this arena.  Notably, as explained in the intro to this June 2021 issue of FSR, the editors had some history and some expert help putting together a new issue on this always timely topic:

This Issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter shines a light on the state of clemency today, with an emphasis on the federal system and events of the Trump administration.  This Issue thus continues an FSR tradition of exploring federal clemency practices under each president, starting in 2001 after President Bill Clinton created controversies with final-day pardons.  Over the last twenty years, an array of commentators have analyzed the actions (and inactions) of four presidents, each of whom embraced quite different goals, perspectives, and strategies.  In addition to bringing thoughtful new perspectives to recent events, the articles assembled today by guest editor Margaret Love, the indefatigable advocate, scholar, and former Pardon Attorney, offer a roadmap to, in her words, “restore legitimacy to the pardon power and its usefulness to the presidency.”  The editors of FSR are — once again — deeply grateful for Ms. Love’s efforts and expertise.

Here are the great new original articles in this great new FSR issue:

July 2, 2021 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

In final order list of of SCOTUS OT20, Justices grant cert on 924(c) matter and spar over summary reversal in capital case

Though we are now two days into July 2021, the US Supreme Court has delivered this morning a last jolt of October 2020 Term action with this lengthy order list that has a little something for all SCOTUS fans.  For starters, there are nine grants of certiorari.  The only criminal law grant is yet another debate over what qualifies as a "crime of violence" under federal statutory law.  This time the issue concerns application of 924(c)'s added mandatory punishments for gun use in the case of United States v. Taylor20-1459, which formally presents this question:

Whether 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A)’s definition of “crime of violence” excludes attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a).

In addition, there are lots of GVRs and statements concerning cert dispositions on free speech, religion, takings and qualified immunity issues.  But nearly half of the 54-page order list is consumed with a per curiam summary reversal and dissent in the capital case of Dunn v. Reeves20-1084 (S. Ct.  July 2, 2021).  Here is how the 12-page majority opinion starts (with cites mostly removed):

Willie Johnson towed Matthew Reeves’ broken-down car back to the city after finding Reeves stranded on an Alabama dirt road.  In payment for this act of kindness, Reeves murdered Johnson, stole his money, and mocked his dying spasms.  Years after being convicted of murder and sentenced to death, Reeves sought state postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel should have hired an expert to develop sentencing-phase mitigation evidence of intellectual disability.  But despite having the burden to rebut the strong presumption that his attorneys made a legitimate strategic choice, Reeves did not call any of them to testify.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief, stressing that lack of evidence about counsel’s decisions impeded Reeves’ efforts to prove that they acted unreasonably.  On federal habeas review, the Eleventh Circuit held that this analysis was not only wrong, but indefensible.  In an unpublished, per curiam opinion that drew heavily on a dissent from denial of certiorari, the Eleventh Circuit reinterpreted the Alabama court’s lengthy opinion as imposing a simple per se prohibition on relief in all cases where a prisoner fails to question his counsel.  It was the Eleventh Circuit, however, that went astray in its “readiness to attribute error.” Federal habeas courts must defer to reasonable state-court decisions, 28 U.S.C. §2254(d), and the Alabama court’s treatment of the spotty record in this case was consistent with this Court’s recognition that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

Justice Sotomayor authored a 14-page dissent joined by Justice Kagan. (Justice Breyer also dissented, but without opinion.) Justice Sotomayor dissent ends this way:

Today’s decision continues a troubling trend in which this Court strains to reverse summarily any grants of relief to those facing execution. See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 592 U.S. ___ (2021) (emergency vacatur of stay and reversal); Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (per curiam) (summary vacatur); Dunn v. Ray, 586 U.S. ___ (2019) (emergency vacatur of stay).  This Court has shown no such interest in cases in which defendants seek relief based on compelling showings that their constitutional rights were violated.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Precythe, 593 U.S. ___ (2021) (denying certiorari); Whatley v. Warden, 593 U.S. ___ (2021) (same); Bernard v. United States, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (same). In Reeves’ case, this Court stops the lower court from granting Reeves’ petition by adopting an utterly implausible reading of the state court’s decision.  In essence, the Court turns “deference,” ante, at 7, into a rule that federal habeas relief is never available to those facing execution.  I respectfully dissent.

July 2, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Gun policy and sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 01, 2021

Encouraging(?) update on prospects for series of small federal sentencing reform bills

Politico has this new piece on the the prospects for (small) statutory sentencing reforms making their way through Congress soon.  Both the headline and contents of the article are generally encouraging, though one is always wise not to expect much from Congress these days.  The piece, headlined "As police reform talks sputter, bipartisan criminal justice bills advance," should be read in full by federal sentencing fans.  Here are a few highlights:

Democrats don't want to borrow a thing from Donald Trump’s four years in power, with perhaps one exception: bipartisan criminal justice reform.  As police reform talks edge closer to collapse and Democratic priorities from gun control to immigration stall, the Senate is chugging ahead on an overhaul of the U.S. criminal justice system that advanced under Trump.  Senate Judiciary Chair Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) described criminal justice reform as a “personal priority” for himself and his GOP counterpart, Iowa Sen. Chuck Grassley....

House Democratic Caucus Chair Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) said this week that he expects both chambers will "be moving a series of bipartisan criminal justice reform bills ... to deal with the mass incarceration epidemic that we have in America and the over-criminalization problem which both Democrats and Republicans recognize as a challenge that must be decisively tackled."

Whether Republicans back criminal justice reform to the extent that they did in 2018 remains to be seen. The First Step Act, which included sentencing as well as prison reform provisions, passed the Senate with 38 GOP votes but only after many conservatives got on board following a personal appeal from Trump.  A potentially stronger deterrent than a Democrat in the White House, for some Republicans weighing this year's bills, is the current increase in violent crime.  "A bigger issue is the big rise in crime in the last year,” Grassley said in an interview. “I think that’s the biggest impediment, not because Trump’s not president.”  Durbin countered that the package he is working on with Grassley, a trio of bills, focuses on non-violent crime....

So far, the Senate Judiciary Committee has approved three bills co-sponsored by Durbin and Grassley.  The first would give inmates the ability to petition for the sentencing changes established in 2018 to apply retroactively, among other provisions.  The second would prohibit a judge from considering any conduct for which a defendant was acquitted in sentencing. Finally, the third would expand eligibility for a program that allows elderly prisoners to serve out the remainder of their sentences at home.  That measure also includes a provision that would allow vulnerability to Covid-19 to qualify as a reason for compassionate release.

But criminal justice reform advocates are pushing for the inclusion of more provisions in a larger package, especially legislation that would eliminate the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenses. The Biden administration recently backed the bill, and Durbin's committee held a hearing on it last month that featured GOP Gov. Asa Hutchinson (Ark.), a former Drug Enforcement Administration chief, and Matthew Charles, the first person released from prison after the First Step Act passed in 2018.  The road to closing that crack-cocaine sentencing disparity, a longtime progressive cause, is a hard one....

Advocates are hoping to see further movement before Congress leaves for its scheduled August recess.  However, both Grassley and Durbin suggested that could be a heavy lift, given their limited days left in session and the intense focus on moving through both the bipartisan infrastructure deal and reconciliation.  Durbin said he is working to pass his bills by voice vote, but if that doesn’t work he will ask Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) for floor time.  Grassley predicted that some time in the fall would be more likely....

As Congress enters the second half of the year, proponents of criminal justice reform are confident that some type of legislation will get through, given the ideological range of groups pushing for change.  “Each member, both Republican and Democrat, have very much an interest in it based upon inequities that have happened because of past tough on crime legislation,” Grassley said. “But something that really helps is when you have a broad coalition of the most liberal and the most conservative interest groups in the United States working together for it.”

Because there are many moving parts to the legislative proposals in play, and especially because of partisan divisions along with the fraught politics of crime, I fear that there could be many speed bumps on the way to congressional approval of even the small sentencing reform proposals that have so far advanced through the Senate Judiciary Committee.  But if there are enough folks on both side of the political aisle who remain eager to get something done in this space, and especially if the Biden Administration might be prepared to prioritize these issues after infrastructure discussions are resolved, I will be hopeful that we could see one or maybe more federal sentencing reform bills become law in 2021.  But I should close by repeating what I said at the outset, namely that it is always wise not to expect much from Congress these days.

Some of many prior related posts:

July 1, 2021 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Latest online issue of NACDL's "The Champion" full of sentencing articles

April_2021I am pleased to see that the April 2021 issue of The Champion, a magazine/journal of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, is now online.  The cover calls this "The Sentencing Issue," and I have already had a chance to read a couple of the great pieces therein.  Here are some of the major article that can be found in this issue (which the brief descriptions provided on this NACDL page):

"Defense Lawyers Can ‘Rewrite’ the Sentencing Guidelines, One Case at a Time"

How can defense counsel obtain a sentence below the range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines? The common approaches can be enhanced by two things that defense lawyers seldom use: the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s data on actual sentences and precedents “hidden” from standard legal search engines.

"Formulating and Presenting Effective Sentencing Arguments When Representing Cooperators"

When representing a cooperator, some defense lawyers tend to cede to the government three critical assessments that must be determined: the value of the information the cooperator provides, the cooperator’s relative worth as compared to others similarly situated, and the extent of the departure due under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The authors describe the pitfalls lawyers should avoid when representing cooperators.

"The ‘3 Rs’ of Sentencing Storytelling"

Defense lawyers tell only three types of sentencing stories. These stories involve Revelation, Relativity, and Redemption. Understanding the “3 Rs” of sentencing storytelling will help the defense craft the strongest mitigation arguments and achieve better results for clients.

"The Perils of Parole and ‘Program Speak’: Understanding and Managing Culpability Statements in Post-Conviction Settings"

During parole board hearings, sometimes a client will use language indicating that he deserved a severe sentence for his crime. Clients learn this language while attending prison programs that subtly teach them to say what the parole board wants to hear. The client may use this language (“program speak”) even though he committed no crime. In doing this, however, the client may foreclose any future possibility of clearing his name. How can a defense lawyer mitigate such statements?

"Inside NACDL: NACDL’s Effort to Confront the Trial Penalty Gains Momentum"

NYSACDL Report Confirms Near Extinction of Trials in the Empire State. In March 2021, NACDL and NYSACDL released the trial penalty report. The report defines what practices are encompassed by the trial penalty, identifies the underlying causes, depicts it through profiles of individuals, and proposes concrete reforms to curtail the prevalence of the trial penalty.

July 1, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Hoping grandmothers and others on home confinement get compassionate consideration

In prior posts (some linked below), I have discussed the Office of Legal Counsel memo which interprets federal law to require that certain persons transferred to home confinement pursuant to the CARES Act be returned to federal prison when the pandemic ends.  There has been particular advocacy directed toward Prez Biden urging him to use his clemency powers to keep these persons from being returned to federal prison, and I have recently argued Congress could and should address this matter with a statutory fix.  But, critically, judges also might be able to grant relief on a case-by-case basis via sentence reduction motions under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

One person at risk of serving many more years in prison after success on home confinement, Gwen Levi, is getting particular attention because she seems like low-risk person who has already been re-incarcerated on the basis of a seemingly minor technical violation.  Here are just some of the stories discussing her plight:  

From The Root, " 76-Year-Old Black Woman Released From Prison Amid Pandemic, Sent Back for Missing Phone Calls While Taking a Class"

extraordinary and compelling reasonsFrom USA Today, "'Scared and confused': Elderly inmate sent home during COVID is back in prison after going to computer class"

From the Washington Post, "A grandmother didn’t answer her phone during a class. She was sent back to prison."

Upon hearing about this story, I expressed on Twitter my hope that Gwen Levi was pursuing a compassionate release motion.  Kevin Ring of FAMM informed me not only that she was, but also that he had submitted a letter in support of her effort to secure a sentence reduction.  Kevin recently sent me a copy of this letter and has allowed me to post it here:

Download ECF 2079 Kevin Ring letter in support of comp. release

Though I do not know all the facts surrounding the crimes and current circumstances of Gwen Levi and the 4000 other persons on home confinement at risk of going back into federal prison, I do know that these situations certainly seem to present "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to consider whether further prison time is needed.  

Some prior recent related posts:

July 1, 2021 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 30, 2021

Split Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturns Bill Cosby's convictions based on prior prosecutor's announcement of non-prosecution

In a high-profile setting, a split Pennsylvania Supreme Court has today ruled that it was a violate of due process for prosecutors to engage in what  one Justice describes as a "coercive bait-and-switch" concerning potential prosecution.  Because the defendant at issue is Bill Cosby, there is lots of media coverage of Pennsylvania v. Cosby, No. J-100-2020 (Pa. June 30, 2021) (all opinions available here).  The start of the majority opinion (which runs 79 pages) sets up the issue that is ultimately setting Bill Cosby free:

In 2005, Montgomery County District Attorney Bruce Castor learned that Andrea Constand had reported that William Cosby had sexually assaulted her in 2004 at his Cheltenham residence. Along with his top deputy prosecutor and experienced detectives, District Attorney Castor thoroughly investigated Constand’s claim.  In evaluating the likelihood of a successful prosecution of Cosby, the district attorney foresaw difficulties with Constand’s credibility as a witness based, in part, upon her decision not to file a complaint promptly.  D.A. Castor further determined that a prosecution would be frustrated because there was no corroborating forensic evidence and because testimony from other potential claimants against Cosby likely was inadmissible under governing laws of evidence.  The collective weight of these considerations led D.A. Castor to conclude that, unless Cosby confessed, “there was insufficient credible and admissible evidence upon which any charge against Mr. Cosby related to the Constand incident could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Seeking “some measure of justice” for Constand, D.A. Castor decided that the Commonwealth would decline to prosecute Cosby for the incident involving Constand, thereby allowing Cosby to be forced to testify in a subsequent civil action, under penalty of perjury, without the benefit of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Unable to invoke any right not to testify in the civil proceedings, Cosby relied upon the district attorney’s declination and proceeded to provide four sworn depositions.  During those depositions, Cosby made several incriminating statements.

D.A. Castor’s successors did not feel bound by his decision, and decided to prosecute Cosby notwithstanding that prior undertaking.  The fruits of Cosby’s reliance upon D.A. Castor’s decision — Cosby’s sworn inculpatory testimony — were then used by D.A. Castor’s successors against Cosby at Cosby’s criminal trial.  We granted allowance of appeal to determine whether D.A. Castor’s decision not to prosecute Cosby in exchange for his testimony must be enforced against the Commonwealth.

A few of many prior related posts:

June 30, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

The Sentencing Project releases "A New Lease on Life" looking at release mechanisms and recidivism realities

Images (3)The Sentencing Project today released this timely new report titled "A New Lease on Life" which starts with these "Findings and Recommendations":

A dramatic consequence of America’s investment in mass incarceration is life imprisonment.  Today there are more people serving life sentences alone than the entire prison population in 1970, the dawn of the mass incarceration era.  Though life sentences have always been allowable in the U.S., it is only in recent decades that these sentences have become normalized to such an extent that entire prisons are now filled or nearly filled with people serving life terms.

Despite a cultural tendency for Americans to view the U.S. crime and criminal legal system as “exceptional,” other countries have experienced ebbs and flows in crime rates but have not resorted to the levels of imprisonment, nor the lengths of prison sentences, that are commonplace in the U.S.  To the contrary, restoration of human dignity and the development of resilience are at the core of an evolved criminal legal system; systems elsewhere that emphasize the responsibility of government support to returning citizens serves as a model for the U.S.

In this report we set out to accomplish two tasks.  First, we examine reoffending rates among people released from prison after a violent crime conviction and review research on the topic, covering both domestic and international findings.  Second, we provide personal testimony from people who have left prison after a violent crime conviction.  Inviting impacted persons to share their transition experiences serves policymakers and practitioners in strengthening necessary support for successful and satisfying reentry from prison. This report focuses on the outcomes of a narrow segment of the prison population: people convicted of violent crimes, including those sentenced to life and virtual life sentences, who have been released to the community through parole or executive clemency.  People with violent crime convictions comprise half the overall state prison population in the U.S. They are depicted as the most dangerous if released, but ample evidence refutes this.

Findings

• We can safely release people from prison who have been convicted of violent crime much sooner than we typically do. Most people who commit homicide are unlikely to do so again and overall rates of violent offending of any type among people released from a life sentence are rare.

• Definitional limitations of the term “recidivism” obstruct a thorough understanding of the true incidence of violent offending among those released from prison, contributing to inaccurate estimates of reoffending.

• People exiting prison from long term confinement need stronger support around them. Many people exhibit a low crime risk but have high psychological, financial, and vocational demands that have been greatly exacerbated by their lengthy incarceration.

• People exiting prison after serving extreme sentences are eager to earn their release and demonstrate their capacity to contribute in positive ways to society. Prison staff and peers view lifers as a stabilizing force in the prison environment, often mentoring younger prisoners and serving as positive role models.

We make five recommendations that, if adopted, will advance our criminal legal system toward one that is fair, efficient, and humane.

1. Standardize definitions of recidivism. Authors of government reports and academic studies should take great care to standardize the definition of criminal recidivism so that practitioners, policymakers, the media, and other consumers of recidivism research do not carelessly interpret findings on reoffending statistics without digging into either the meaning or the accuracy of the statements.

2. Insist on responsible and accurate media coverage. Media consumers and producers alike must insist on accurate portrayals of crime despite the temptation to skew media coverage so that rare violent crime events appear as commonplace. Heavily skewed media coverage of rare violent crime events creates a misleading view of the frequency of violent crime. Add to this the overly simplistic assumption, allowed by inarticulate reporting, that people released from prison have caused upticks in violence.

3. Allow some level of risk. Reset the acceptable recidivism rate to allow for reasonable public safety risk. The public’s risk expectation is currently set at zero, meaning that no amount of recidivism is politically acceptable in a system that “works” even though such expectations are not attainable in any sphere of human endeavor or experience. But this expectation is largely based on highly tragic and sensationalized events that are falsely equated as the result of releasing people from prison. We have to balance our aspirations for a crime-free society with reasonable approaches to public safety and human rights considerations for both those who have caused harm and those who have been victimized by it.

4. Reform and accelerate prison release mechanisms. Decisionmakers considering whether to grant prison release rely too heavily on the crime of conviction as the predominant factor under consideration. This approach is neither fair nor accurate. It is unfair because it repunishes the individual for a crime for which they have already been sanctioned. Risk of criminal conduct, even violent criminal conduct, closely tracks aging such that as people age into adulthood there is a sharp decline in proclivity to engage in additional acts of violence.

5. Substantially improve housing support. Inability to secure housing after release from prison was mentioned frequently by people we interviewed for this report. Failure of the correctional system to ensure stable housing upon exit from decades-long prison sentences imposes unnecessary challenges. Though some released persons will be able to rely on nonprofit charity organizations, shelters, or family, the most vulnerable people will fall through the cracks. We have both a public safety and a humanitarian obligation to avoid this result.

June 30, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 29, 2021

Federal plea deal on civil rights charges reportedly in the works for Derek Chauvin

This new local press piece, headlined "Derek Chauvin Closing In On Federal Plea Deal, Sources Tell WCCO," reports on an unsurprising but still interesting development in the legal sagas around George Floyd's killing.  Here are the details:

Multiple sources tell WCCO that federal prosecutors are in talks with former Minneapolis Police officer Derek Chauvin about a possible plea deal.  They say Chauvin is close to reaching a deal, and that is what he was likely referring to when he made a cryptic comment to the family of George Floyd during his sentencing last week.

“Due to legal matters, I’m not able to give a full formal statement … I give my condolences to the Floyd family, there’s gonna be some other information in the future that will be of interest and I hope these will give you some peace of mind,” Chauvin said prior to his sentencing.

Sources suggest Chauvin was likely referring to a plea deal in the federal case against him.  As part of a possible plea deal Chauvin would have to publicly explain what he did to Floyd and why.  That was, of course, the question that Floyd’s brother poignantly asked of Chauvin at the sentencing....

Sources tell WCCO that, as part of the plea, Chauvin could get a 20- to 25-year sentence, which he would serve at the same time as the state sentence, and that he would serve his time in federal not state prison....

Former Hennepin County Chief Public Mary Moriarity says Chauvin has to be thinking about the swift guilty verdict in the state case, and that may be giving him more incentive to try to negotiate a plea deal.  “That is because, in federal court, there would be a substantial difference between what he would receive if he went to trial and was convicted versus what he would get if he pled guilty, and as they say take responsibility for his actions,” Moriarity said.

It’s important to remember an earlier plea deal involving the feds in late May 2020 collapsed at the 11th hour.  The U.S. Attorney’s Office declined to comment, and WCCO also did not hear back from Ben Crump, the Floyd family attorney, or Eric Nelson, the attorney for Chauvin.

It is, of course, entirely right that Chauvin is far more likely to get a lower sentence (and to be able to cap his sentencing exposure) if he enters into a federal plea deal rather than going to trial on pending federal civil rights charges.  But, unlike in the Minnesota system where there is a strong presumption of release after a defendant serves 2/3 of an imposed prison term, in the federal system the norm is service of at least 85% of imposed prison time.  So if Chauvin's federal deal led to the imposition, say, of "only" a 20-year term, he should still expect to serve a full 17 years, whereas his 22.5-year prison term in the state system could lead to his release in "only" 15 years.

That said, this "release math" is only one part of the equation for Chauvin and his lawyers as they consider a federal plea deal.  I suspect Chauvin, for a variety of reasons, would much rather spend his considerable time in the federal prison system than in state prison.  Also, it is interesting to speculate whether and how a federal plea could impact any appeals Chauvin has planned for his state convictions and sentence.  And, not to be overlooked, there are distinct "second look" or "early release" mechanisms in state and federal systems that could prove significant in the future (which, in turn, makes them relevant now for plea negotiations).

Prior related posts:

June 29, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, June 28, 2021

Lots of criminal justice sound (and fury, signifying nothing?) in latest SCOTUS order list

The Supreme Court is apparently not going to issue the final opinions of the Term today, but it did issue this lengthy order list which has a number of interesting elements for criminal justice fans.

For starters, there is this per curiam summary decision in Lombardo v. St. Louis, with the majority reversing the decision to grant summary judgment on an excessive force claim against St. Louis and police officers who killed a disruptive suspect in a holding cell.  Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, complains that the majority "unfairly interprets the Court of Appeals’ decision and evades the real issue that this case presents: whether the record supports summary judgment in favor of the defendant police officers and the city of St. Louis."

Though Lombardo makes precedent, I am even more intrigued by Justice Thomas's decision to pen this five-page statement respecting the denial of cert in a tax case, Standing Akimbo v. US,  in order to question whether the Raich decision upholding federal power to prohibit all marijuana activity is still good law. Here are excerpts:

Whatever the merits of Raich when it was decided, federal policies of the past 16 years have greatly undermined its reasoning. Once comprehensive, the Federal Government’s current approach is a half-in, half-out regime that simultaneously tolerates and forbids local use of marijuana. This contradictory and unstable state of affairs strains basic principles of federalism and conceals traps for the unwary....

This disjuncture between the Government’s recent laissez-faire policies on marijuana and the actual operation of specific laws is not limited to the tax context. Many marijuana-related businesses operate entirely in cash because federal law prohibits certain financial institutions from knowingly accepting deposits from or providing other bank services to businesses that violate federal law. Black & Galeazzi, Cannabis Banking: Proceed With Caution, American Bar Assn., Feb. 6, 2020.  Cash-based operations are understandably enticing to burglars and robbers. But, if marijuana-related businesses, in recognition of this, hire armed guards for protection, the owners and the guards might run afoul of a federal law that imposes harsh penalties for using a firearm in furtherance of a “drug trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A).  A marijuana user similarly can find himself a federal felon if he just possesses a firearm. §922(g)(3). Or petitioners and similar businesses may find themselves on the wrong side of a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. See, e.g., Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, 859 F. 3d 865, 876– 877 (CA10 2017) (permitting such a suit to proceed).

I could go on. Suffice it to say, the Federal Government’s current approach to marijuana bears little resemblance to the watertight nationwide prohibition that a closely divided Court found necessary to justify the Government’s blanket prohibition in Raich. If the Government is now content to allow States to act “as laboratories” “‘and try novel social and economic experiments,’”  Raich, 545 U.S., at 42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), then it might no longer have authority to intrude on “[t]he States’ core police powers . . . to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.” Ibid. A prohibition on intrastate use or cultivation of marijuana may no longer be necessary or proper to support the Federal Government’s piecemeal approach.

Last but not least, in this nine-page dissent from the denial of cert in Hernandez v. Peery, Justice Sotomayor explains at great length why the Ninth Circuit was wrong to refuse to issue a certificate of appealability in a habeas appeal involving a claimed denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

June 28, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Sunday, June 27, 2021

SCOTUSblog flags three notable new sentencing cert petitions

Last year around this time, I expressed my sense that it has been quite some time since the Supreme Court has taken up a really big and interesting sentencing case.  This post from near the end of last year's SCOTUS Term, titled "Do others sense that SCOTUS has become particularly (and problematically?) quiet on sentencing matters?", captured this zeitgeist.  In the year since, we have gotten a few notable sentencing rulings (on juve LWOP in Jones and on ACCA predicates in Borden, but these decisions are more clarifications than game-changers.

I review these broad realities not just because we are approaching the close of another SCOTUS Term, but also because SCOTUSblog has this new post spotlighting three new cert petitions that could each lead to a significant sentencing ruling.  Here some details from a post worth reading in full:

This week we highlight cert petitions that ask the Supreme Court to consider, among other things, the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing decisions, when a sentencing court must consider a defendant’s juvenile status as a mitigating factor, and compassionate release under the First Step Act.

According to the federal Sentencing Guidelines, a judge may adjust the recommended range of an offense based on a defendant’s “relevant conduct.” While the jury considers whether conduct is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, relevant conduct for sentencing purposes need only be proven to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence and can include acquitted conduct. In Osby v. United States, Erick Osby was indicted on seven charges; the jury convicted him of two and acquitted him of the other five. But because the judge considered his acquitted charges as relevant conduct, his sentence was the same as it could have been had he been convicted by the jury of all seven charges. Osby argues that adjusting a sentence based on acquitted conduct violates his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which guarantee due process under the law and the right to a jury trial.  While the Supreme Court has declined to address similar questions on this topic in the past, some of the justices have expressed their discontent with the practice of using acquitted conduct in sentencing decisions.  Osby asks the justices for their review to decide whether the practice is unconstitutional.

Next, in Sanders v. Radtke the justices are asked to consider the impact of juvenile status on sentencing decisions.  The petitioner, Rico Sanders, was convicted of multiple rape and assault charges at the age of 15 and sentenced to 140 years in prison with the possibility of parole at age 51. Sanders maintains that the Eighth Amendment and prior precedent required the sentencing court to consider his youth as a mitigating factor. He argues that the principle requiring sentencing courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor applies to life sentences with the possibility of parole in the same way it applies to life sentences without any possibility of parole. The petition further alleges that Sanders’ youth was used as an “aggravating factor” by the sentencing court, and he seeks the court’s review to clarify the circumstances under which a defendant’s youth must be considered as a mitigating factor.

Finally, Bryant v. United States presents a question regarding the compassionate-release provision of the federal criminal code, as amended by the First Step Act of 2018....  In 2019, Thomas Bryant filed a motion for compassionate release in district court. The government opposed his motion and argued that the reasons given in Bryant’s motion did not satisfy the criteria in the 2007 policy statement [by the USSC]. Further, the government argued that the 2007 policy statement was an “applicable” policy statement under the compassionate-release provision and that the district court was thus bound by it. The district court denied Bryant’s motion based on the reasons given by the government, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.  Bryant argues that the decision created a circuit split, in direct conflict with eight other circuits, over whether district courts are bound by the 2007 policy statement when deciding defendant-filed motions.  He seeks review to clarify what constitutes an “applicable” policy statement for defendant-filed motions under the First Step Act.

These three cases will not be fully briefed until later this summer, and so we likely will not know about possible grants until the Fall when SCOTUS returns to action for OT21.  If the Justices were to decide to take up even one of these issues, that would be a big sentencing deal.  I highly doubt the Court will take up all these issues, but I think the circuit split behind Bryant makes it a pretty likely grant and I hope some of the newer Justices might be eager to take up the issue in Osby.  After Jones, I think the Sanders case may be the longest shot (but, given recetn history, perhaps we should just assume the odds are long on all of these).

June 27, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, June 26, 2021

Noting efforts to limit LWOP for young adults older than 18

This recent AP piece, headlined "Cases challenge no-parole terms for young adult killers," reports on various efforts in various jurisdictions to extend limits on LWOP sentences for young persons older than 18.  Here are excerpts:

U.S. Supreme Court rulings and state laws in recent years have limited or banned the use of life sentences without the possibility of parole for people who commit crimes as juveniles because of the potential for change.  Now, research showing that the brain continues to develop after 18 is prompting some states to examine whether to extend such protections to young adults...

Washington state’s high court earlier this year abolished automatic life without parole sentences given to people for murders committed as 18- to 20-year-olds.  Courts in Washington can still sentence young adult offenders to life with no chance at parole, but only after first considering whether their youth justifies a lesser punishment.

A new Washington, D.C., law allows those under the age of 25 at the time of their crime to apply for a new sentence after 15 years, said Josh Rovner, who works on juvenile justice issues for The Sentencing Project.  And bills introduced in Connecticut and Illinois would get rid of life without parole sentences for people who commit crimes as young adults, Rovner said....

Boston’s progressive top prosecutor, Suffolk County District Attorney Rachael Rollins, agrees there needs to be a change — though not as drastic as defense attorneys would like. Even so, Rollins took the unusual step this year of signing a brief in the case against Robinson to push for an end to mandatory life without parole for those who committed killings between 18 and 20.

She argues in court documents that the studies the defense points to are flawed, and that while it is “undisputed” that the brain continues to develop into early adulthood, “there is an absence of direct evidence linking these anatomical changes to specific behaviors.”  Rollins said she will urge the Supreme Judicial Court to follow Washington State and rule that those young adults must get a special sentencing hearing to consider their youth before punishments can be handed down. She said they should be ordered to die in prison in only “extremely egregious” circumstances — if the judge finds them to be “irretrievably depraved.”

June 26, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 25, 2021

"Prosecution in Public, Prosecution in Private"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Lauren Ouziel now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Criminal procedure has long set a boundary between public and private in criminal enforcement: generally speaking, enforcement decisions at the post-charging stage are exposed to some degree of public view, while those at the pre-charging stage remain almost entirely secret.  The allocation of public and private is, at heart, an allocation of power — and the current allocation is a relic.  When private prosecutors were the mainstay of criminal enforcement, public court processes effectively constrained them.  But those processes do little to constrain the spaces where enforcement power today resides: in decisions by the servants of a state-run, professionalized enforcement apparatus on whether to investigate, to charge, or to decline charges.

This Article challenges criminal procedure’s centuries-old boundary between public and private in criminal enforcement. It argues that the justifications for the boundary are outdated and overstated, and the costs under-noticed.  The public/private boundary has served to skew enforcers’ incentives; impoverish insight into enforcement patterns and their causes; weaken traditional channels of accountability (judicial, electoral and internal); and erode public trust.  The Article reimagines a new boundary for our time, one that strengthens secrecy in some respects while relaxing it in others, and enables robust oversight of necessarily secret processes.  More fundamentally, the Article is a call to center the public/private boundary in accounts of power in the criminal process.

June 25, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 24, 2021

Will Derek Chauvin get more or less than 20 years for killing George Floyd?

The question in the title of this post reflects my view that 20 years seems like a reasonable "over/under" estimate for the sentence to be imposed by Minnesota Judge Peter Cahill on Derek Chauvin for murdering George Floyd.  I set this estimate influenced by some of the analysis and punditry from various sources in these preview pieces:

From the AP, "Derek Chauvin faces sentencing tomorrow in George Floyd’s murder — here’s what you need to know"

From CBS News, "Derek Chauvin will be sentenced Friday for the murder of George Floyd. Here's what to expect."

From NBC News, "Police who kill often receive lenient or no punishments. Derek Chauvin could be the exception."

From USA Today, "Derek Chauvin faces up to 30 years in prison in Friday sentencing for murder of George Floyd"

I believe that the sentencing is scheduled for Friday afternoon.  And I sincerely hope that there is general respect for the sentence imposed, whatever it proves to be.    

Prior related posts:

June 24, 2021 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5)

Terrific CCRC review of new RAND report on presidential pardons

In this post last week, I flagged this massive report produced by RAND Corporation titled "Statistical Analysis of Presidential Pardons."  Helpfully, Margaret Love over at the Collateral Consequence Resource Center has completed this terrific overview of the reports, and here are excerpts from her posting:

In a 224-page statistical analysis of how pardon petitions were evaluated by the Office of the Pardon Attorney (OPA) between 2001 and 2012, the RAND researchers “[did] not find statistically significant evidence that there are racial differences in the rates at which black and white petitioners receive [favorable] pardon recommendations.” (Note that sentence commutations were not a part of the RAND study.)  At the same time, there was also “no question that non-Hispanic white petitioners as a group were more likely to receive a pardon than did black petitioners.”  The apparent contradiction between these two statements can be explained by the fact that white applicants were statistically more likely to satisfy the formal standards that apply to OPA decisions about which cases to recommend for pardon, suggesting that either the formal standards need revision or the pool of applicants needs to be expanded, or both....

Finally, in what may be the most disturbing finding for the Biden Administration, the RAND report observes that OPA appears to be struggling to manage a growing case backlog despite having had its attorney staff augmented during the Obama years....

Since June 2018, in part because of President Trump’s deliberate neglect of the regular pardon process, the backlog of pending pardon petitions has grown to more than 3,000 cases, some of which have been pending for more than a decade, while the commutation caseload now exceeds 12,000 cases.  The RAND report expresses concern that this overwhelming caseload may increase the time it takes to process a pardon application, which it characterizes as already “long and drawn-out.”  Indeed, it suggests that an intractable backlog could continue to grow given the hundreds of thousands of individuals who are eligible to apply for pardon, particularly if they are “motivated to apply under the belief that a more receptive ear currently resides in the White House.”  The report does not suggest alternative ways of dealing with the caseload, such as shortcutting the investigative process or increasing administrative case closures, as much as conceding that such efficiency measures would have racially skewed results.

June 24, 2021 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

First person taken of Ohio death row based on new statute precluding capital punishment for those with "serious mentally illness"

In this post back in January, I reported on the new Ohio statute precluding the death penalty for those with "serious mentally illness."  Today I can report, with the help of this local article, that this law has now moved one person off Ohio's death row: "A Columbus man sentenced to death in 1999 for the murder of his ex-girlfriend and her father has become the first inmate in Ohio removed from death row under a new state law that bans the execution of the seriously mentally ill."  Here are more interesting details:

The death sentence of David L. Braden, 61, was vacated last week by a Franklin County judge, who resentenced him to life without parole.

The county prosecutor's office and the state public defender's office agreed that Braden, at the time of his crime, met the criteria for serious mental illness under the new Ohio law, which went into effect April 12.  Both sides prepared an order that was signed by Common Pleas Judge Colleen O'Donnell.

Ohio was the first state to create such a law, thus Braden is also the first death-row inmate in the nation "to be removed from death row because of a statutory prohibition against executing people with a serious mental illness," said Robert Dunham, executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center.

The Virginia legislature was close to approving a similar law late last year, Dunham said, but instead banned the death penalty in March, becoming the 23rd state to do so.

The Ohio law, House Bill 136, was overwhelmingly approved by the state House in June of last year and by the state Senate in December.  Gov. Mike DeWine signed the measure in January and it became law 90 days later.

The law designates certain mental illnesses, including schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, as qualifying disorders if the condition "significantly impaired the person's capacity to exercise rational judgment in relation to his or her conduct" or "to appreciate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness" of the conduct.  The law applies not only to current and future capital cases, but provides the possibility of postconviction relief for those already on death row who can establish that they qualified as seriously mentally ill at the time of their offense.

While prosecutors have the option to oppose such petitions and request a hearing before a judge, Janet Grubb, Franklin County first assistant prosecuting attorney, said a careful review of information from Braden's appellate attorneys made such a challenge unnecessary.  "We saw enough during the exchange of information to conclude that a reasonable fact-finder in our court would determine that this individual qualified under the statute," said Grubb, who signed the order on behalf of Prosecutor Gary Tyack's office.

Tyack, who was elected in November, had no involvement in the decision, Grubb said.  Because Tyack served on the 10th District Court of Appeals for one of Braden's appeals, he had a conflict of interest that required Grubb to serve as prosecutor on the matter.  "Gary was completely walled off" from discussions about Braden's petition, Grubb said.

Braden was 39 when he was convicted by a Franklin County jury in May 1999 of fatally shooting Denise Roberts, 44, and Ralph "Bud" Heimlich, 83, at the home they shared on Barthel Avenue on the East Side on Aug. 3, 1998.  Testimony established that Braden and Roberts were seen arguing in a parking lot outside her workplace earlier in the day.  A man matching his description was seen fleeing the victims' home after neighbors heard gunshots.

All of Braden's appeals over the years, including one heard by the Ohio Supreme Court, have been rejected, although a case in federal court was still pending. Kathryn Sandford, an assistant state public defender who has handled Braden's appeals since his conviction, said the federal case will be dismissed as a result of the agreed order signed by O'Donnell.

Sandford and Steve Brown, a fellow assistant state public defender, filed the petition outlining Braden's qualifications for the serious-mental-illness designation. They included the findings of a psychologist who determined that Braden suffered from "paranoid schizophrenia with delusions" before committing the murders.

Since the early to mid-1990s, they wrote, a brother and sister-in-law testified that Braden had made statements about being a prophet of God, while friends attested to his paranoia and alarming personality changes. Since the beginning of his incarceration, Braden has been treated with anti-psychotic medication to control his psychotic symptoms, according to his attorneys.

A psychologist testified during the sentencing phase of Braden's trial that he was mentally ill, but the jury recommended a death sentence, which was imposed by then-Common Pleas Judge Michael H. Watson....

As part of the prosecutor's office review of Braden's petition, it was required by a separate state law to contact the family of the victims to inform them of the request, Grubb said. "The survivor we met with understood the position we were in," she said. "I think she reluctantly accepted that this was something that made sense on multiple levels."

June 24, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Lovely lengthy account of "Restoring Justice"

The latest issue of Harvard Magazine has this lengthy feature article on restorative justice titled "Restoring Justice:Exploring an alternative to crime and punishment." The piece is worth making time to read in full, and here are some excerpts:

To date, 45 states have passed laws permitting the use of restorative justice in at least some criminal cases.  Programs typically function in one of three ways: as a form of diversion from the criminal process, allowing offenders — especially young or first-time offenders — to avoid charges and a conviction; as a form of alternative sentencing; or, in more serious cases, as a way to reduce a criminal sentence.  The program [Armand] Coleman and [Emmanual] Williams took part in was a fourth kind: initiated years after their convictions, it did not influence the men’s sentences or release dates, but its deeper purpose was the same — to help participants take responsibility for their wrongdoing and understand themselves better, and, to the extent possible, “make things right,” as Coleman put it....

In recent decades, numerous restorative-justice programs have sprung into existence.  A few operate entirely outside the legal system, without ever involving any authorities; others work with local police departments and district attorneys’ offices. Methodologies vary from place to place, too — making it more difficult to assess the effectiveness of the underlying concept: most analyses have focused on juvenile and first-time offenders.  But recent rigorous, randomized studies find that restorative justice typically does a modestly better job at reducing recidivism than the court system — resulting in anywhere from 7 percent to 45 percent fewer repeat arrests or convictions, depending on the study parameters. One 2015 analysis found that this effect was actually most pronounced for violent offenses and adult offenders.

Crime victims also consistently appear to be more satisfied after a restorative-justice process than after a traditional criminal one — sometimes dramatically so (in a 2017 study of its own work, Impact Justice found that 91 percent of victims said they’d recommend the process to a friend and 88 percent said the repair plan adopted by the group addressed their needs).  Surveys show that while people who have survived a crime want to feel safe, many of them also prefer rehabilitation for the perpetrators, rather than long periods of incarceration.  Researchers find that victims often perceive restorative dialogues to be fairer and more responsive to their needs and wishes.  One 2013 study of face-to-face meetings between victims and offenders found a marked decrease in victims’ post-traumatic stress symptoms and in their desire for revenge.  A multiyear randomized study in Australia found that victims of violent crime who went to court were five times more likely to believe they would be re-victimized by the offender, while those who went through a restorative process felt more secure and achieved a greater sense of closure.

Adriaan Lanni points to such findings in her argument in favor of restorative justice, but says even they fall short of the full picture. For several years, she has volunteered as a case coordinator for a Concord-based program, and has seen firsthand what happens in those conversations.  “I think you lose a lot if you just look at the quantitative analysis, like, ‘Give me the recidivism number,’” she says.  “It’s sort of a magical experience. I was skeptical about restorative justice until I started sitting in circles. But it’s really transformative, in a way that’s hard to measure.”

June 24, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 23, 2021

SCOTUS completes OT20 criminal docket with "it depends" Fourth Amendment ruling on misdemeanors and exigent circumstances

Astute law students often learn pretty quickly that "it depends" is often a pretty good answer to hard legal questions.  Consequently, I am not too surprised that the Supreme Court this morning, in deciding the last significant criminal case on its docket this Term, embraced its usual "it depends" approach — more formally a "case-by-case" analysis — to what can constitute exigent circumstances when police pursue a person suspect of a misdemeanor.  The Court's opinion in Lange v. California, No. 20–18 (S. Ct. June 23, 2021) (available here), starts this way:

The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires that police officers get a warrant before entering a home without permission. But an officer may make a warrantless entry when “the exigencies of the situation” create a compelling law enforcement need.  Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).  The question presented here is whether the pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect always — or more legally put, categorically — qualifies as an exigent circumstance.  We hold it does not.  A great many misdemeanor pursuits involve exigencies allowing warrantless entry.  But whether a given one does so turns on the particular facts of the case.

I will leave it to Fourth Amendment experts to parse this opinion, but I thought it notable (and useful to highlight) how the Court's majority opinion by Justice Kagan stresses the wide variety of crimes we label misdemeanors:

Key to resolving [this case] are two facts about misdemeanors: They vary widely, but they may be (in a word) “minor.” Welsh, 466 U.S., at 750.  In California and elsewhere, misdemeanors run the gamut of seriousness.  As the amicus notes, some involve violence.  California, for example, classifies as misdemeanors various forms of assault. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §241 (West Cum. Supp. 2021); Brief for Amicus Curiae 15a–16a.  And across the country, “many perpetrators of domestic violence are charged with misdemeanors,” despite “the harmfulness of their conduct.” Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 1).  So “a ‘felon’ is” not always “more dangerous than a misdemeanant.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985).  But calling an offense a misdemeanor usually limits prison time to one year. See 1 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure §1.8(c) (4th ed. Supp. 2020).  States thus tend to apply that label to less violent and less dangerous crimes.  In California, it is a misdemeanor to litter on a public beach. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §374.7(a) (2020).  And to “negligently cut” a plant “growing upon public land.” §384a(a)(2), (f ). And to “willfully disturb[] another person by loud and unreasonable noise.” §415(2).  And (last one) to “artificially color[] any live chicks [or] rabbits.” §599(b). In forbidding such conduct, California is no outlier.  Most States count as misdemeanors such offenses as traffic violations, public intoxication, and disorderly conduct.  See, e.g., Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §545.413(a), (d) (West 2011) (driving without a seatbelt); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 610, §90/1 (West 2018) (drinking alcohol in a railroad car); Ark. Code Ann. §5–71–207(a)(3), (b) (2016) (using obscene language likely to promote disorder). So the amicus’s (and concurrence’s) rule would cover lawbreakers of every type, including quite a few hard to think alarming.

June 23, 2021 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Notable education efforts prior to sentencing of minor participant in Capitol riot (who seems likely to get probation)

This local article, headlined "Indiana woman to plead guilty in Capitol riot wrote reports on 'Schindler's List,' more," provides the interesting backstory leading up the scheduled sentencing of one person prosecuted for involvement in the Capitol riot on January 6. Here are some details:

A Bloomfield woman will plead guilty this week for her role in the U.S. Capitol riot after appealing to the court that she has learned from her participation from movies and books such as "Schindler's List" and "Just Mercy."  Anna Morgan-Lloyd has agreed to plead guilty to one of her pending federal charges in the Jan. 6 insurrection in exchange for three years probation, $500 in restitution and community service.

The 49-year-old attended what initially began as a rally with her friend Dona Sue Bissey — also federally charged in the riot.  Bissey, whose case is still pending, is scheduled to appear in court July 19.

In a letter to the judge, Morgan-Lloyd apologized for entering the U.S. Capitol and said she feels “ashamed” about how the march that day turned violent.  She attached movie and book reports to her letter, summarizing “Schindler’s List” and “Just Mercy.” Her attorney recommended them, she said, to learn “what life is like for others in our country.”...

Bissey and Morgan-Lloyd referred to Jan. 6 as the “most exciting day” of their lives in Facebook posts, tagging one photo inside the Capitol building.  The FBI arrested the two women in late February, making them among six Hoosiers criminally charged in the aftermath of the insurrection.

Court records show the Acting U.S. Attorney has agreed to the plea, calling Morgan-Lloyd’s participation a serious violation of the law, but noted she did not engage in physical violence or destroy government property.  “To be clear, what the Defendant initially described as “the most exciting day of (her) life” was, in fact, a tragic day for our nation — a day of riotous violence, collective destruction, and criminal conduct by a frenzied and lawless mob,” Acting U.S. Attorney Channing Phillips wrote in court records.

The U.S. listed Morgan-Lloyd’s apparent remorse, no prior criminal history and cooperation with law enforcement after her arrest as some of the reasons for the government’s acceptance of the plea agreement.

This extended HuffPost piece, headlined "A Lawyer For Jan. 6 Defendants Is Giving Her Clients Remedial Lessons In American History," provides additional details on this defendant and the valuable efforts of her defense attorney to turn her prosecution into a "teachable moment."  I recommend this piece in full, and here is an excerpt: 

This week, Morgan-Lloyd will become the first of nearly 500 defendants arrested in connection with the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol to face sentencing. She wants a judge to know she’s changed, and her book report-style filings are meant to illustrate that growth. “I’ve lived a sheltered life and truly haven’t experienced life the way many have,” Morgan-Lloyd wrote to the judge. “I’ve learned that even though we live in a wonderful country things still need to improve. People of all colors should feel as safe as I do to walk down the street.”

The remedial social studies program that Morgan-Lloyd is following was created by her D.C.-based lawyer, H. Heather Shaner....  Shaner is one of many D.C. lawyers assigned to represent Capitol defendants who can’t afford their own attorneys, as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and as laid out in the Criminal Justice Act.

In addition to representing her clients in court, Shaner has seized an opportunity to try and educate them on the history their teachers glossed over.  Shaner regularly sends her clients who are incarcerated pretrial books to read: “They’re a captured audience, and it’s life-changing for a lot of them.”  But she decided to take an even more intensive approach with her Capitol clients, who were part of another ugly, historical event in American history.

“Reading books and then watching these shows is like a revelation,” Shaner told HuffPost. “I think that education is a very powerful tool ... So I gave them book lists and shows that they should watch.” In addition to Morgan-Lloyd, Shaner represents Capitol defendants Annie Howell, Jack Jesse Griffith (aka Juan Bibiano), Israel Tutrow and Landon Kenneth Copeland, a veteran with post-traumatic stress disorder who had a major episode during a virtual hearing in his case and cursed out everyone on the call. (Copeland, who was filmed assaulting officers at the Capitol on Jan. 6 and is facing the most serious accusations of any of Shaner’s Capitol clients, was ordered to undergo a competency evaluation and remains in custody.)

Shaner said her clients had poor educations and knew very little about the country.  Her two female clients took to the task with zeal, Shaner said, and got library cards for the first time in their lives.  “Both my women are like, ‘I never learned this in school. Why don’t I know about this?’” Shaner said.  (A couple of the male clients weren’t quite as eager students, she said. “The men are very much like ‘Oh, I’ll get to it.’”  But she said some of her male clients have been doing some self-education.)

Here are some links to some of the court filings discussed above:

Government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing

Defense's Memorandum in Support of Probationary Sentence

Anna Lloyd Statement (and reports here and here)

Prior related posts:

June 23, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (7)

Tuesday, June 22, 2021

"Dead Man Waiting: A brief profile of deaths in Texas prisons among people approved for parole release"

The title of this post is the title of this remarkable new report that provides a critical reminder the "being paroled" is a nuanced (and not-always-life -saving) reality in Texas.  Here is the report's abstract which also discusses its origin and authors:

A troubling number of people in Texas prisons and jails who have been approved for release on parole are dying in custody before they ever step foot outside prison gates, according to a new report from the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin. In a first-of-its-kind analysis, “Dead Man Waiting,” shows that while deaths among parole-approved people increased during the COVID period, this population was already dying in large numbers from other chronic health issues while awaiting release.  The findings in this report raise serious questions about the state’s parole system and why people who met the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP)’s stringent approval guidelines could end up dead before their release.  Researchers offer recommendations for safely releasing this population immediately after parole approval. This report was produced as part of the COVID, Corrections, and Oversight Project at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, with support from Arnold Ventures. The COVID, Corrections, and Oversight Project is led by Michele Deitch, Project Director, and Alycia Welch, Associate Director.

Here are just a few paragraphs from the first part of the short report:

There are more than 10,700 people in Texas prisons who have been approved for release on parole but remain in custody.  This number represents nearly one-tenth of the entire Texas prison population. Despite being approved for parole, some of these people will never walk out the prison gates because they die while waiting for release....

In any given month before COVID, people remained in Texas prisons for an average of 3 to 4 months after their parole approval before they were released.  During the COVID pandemic, the typical delay in release ranged from 5 to 11 months; the overall average was 6 months.

Between March 2020, when TDCJ locked down its facilities due to COVID, and March 2021, at least 42 people who were approved for release on parole died in Texas prisons. These are people who BPP determined are safe enough to be released by a certain date or pending the completion of a required program.  They met some of the nation’s most burdensome standards for parole approval and yet they still died behind bars while awaiting their release.

June 22, 2021 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 21, 2021

"Truth, Lies and The Paradox of Plea Bargaining"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Thea Johnson now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

This Article describes the regular use of lying during plea bargaining by criminal justice stakeholders, and the paradox it presents for those who care about creating a fairer criminal legal system . The paradox is this: lying at plea bargaining allows defendants the opportunity to negotiate fair resolutions to their cases in the face of a deeply unfair system, even as that lying makes way for — and sustains — the problematic system it seeks to avoid.

The Article lays out a taxonomy of lying at plea bargaining, organizing the types of lies into three categories: lies about facts, lies about law and lies about process.  The criminal justice system produces a litany of injustices. Implicitly authorized, systemic lying offers a means of dealing with these perceived injustices. But lying also obscures the system from public view, hiding and relieving pressure points via plea bargaining.

Unfortunately, what seems like the natural solution — to make the system more transparent and accountable — would likely harm individual defendants.  If lying at plea bargaining disappeared tomorrow, many defendants would suffer dire consequences, such as deportation for minor charges or being subjected to outrageous mandatory minimum sentences.  These defendants would lose their ability to avoid the injustices of the system.  And yet, lying at plea bargaining is the result of a series of interlocking, mandatory laws and rules that many stakeholders believe are deeply unfair and should be reformed.  Thus, lying at plea bargaining is both a means of avoiding injustice and a force prohibiting meaningful reformation of the laws and rules that produce such injustice.  To put it another way, the lies in the taxonomy are workarounds for a system so barbaric that lawyers are willing to lie to help defendants avoid the worst of it, but they also make that same system nearly impossible to reform.

Examining this paradox leads to the conclusion that conversations about reform must focus on total overhaul of the system, not piecemeal correction.  Something closer to abolition than alteration is the appropriate response to a system so entangled that lying is the only way to reach a just resolution.

June 21, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Lots of GVRs (especially to Fifth Circuit) on latest SCOTUS order list

In this prior post following the Supreme Court's important ruling in Borden v. US, No. 19–5410 (S. Ct. June 10, 2021) (available here), limiting applicable ACCA predicates, I asked "How many federal prisoners might now be serving illegal sentences after Borden?".  Though that question may never get a precise answer, today's Supreme Court order list has a bunch of Borden GVRs which showcases which circuits will be most busy with the Borden fallout.

Specifically, by my count, the Borden GVRs come from the Fifth Circuit (16 of them!), the Sixth Circuit (two), the Tenth Circuit (two), and the Eleventh Circuit (one).  There is also a very long list of cert denials in the order list, so I would guess that not everyone pressing an ACCA claim secured a GVR.  (And, of course, there are surely many folks serving Borden-iffy ACCA sentences who did not have pending cert petitions.)

As always, I welcome input on whether any of these GVRs or denials are surprising or noteworthy (or other Borden application news).  

Prior related posts:

June 21, 2021 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, June 20, 2021

Scouting the state judge who will sentence Derek Chauvin for murdering George Floyd

This new NBC News article, headlined "Derek Chauvin sentencing thrusts Minnesota Judge Peter Cahill back into spotlight," provides something of a scouting report on the judge who is scheduled to  sentence Derek Chauvin later this week.  Here are excerpts:

A Minnesota judge who, former colleagues and friends say, has no penchant for publicity will again find himself in the media spotlight this week when he sentences the former Minneapolis police officer convicted of murder in the death of George Floyd.

Judge Peter Cahill, who has served on the bench in Hennepin County for 14 years, could sentence Derek Chauvin to as little as probation, an outcome requested by his attorney, or more than the 30-year punishment favored by prosecutors.

In interviews, people who know Cahill and cases he has overseen say he is likely to land somewhere in the middle.  They said he is a fair judge, though there is no guarantee he will mete out a punishment that will make either side entirely happy.  "He's been both a prosecutor and a defense attorney," said Craig Cascarano, 72, a Minneapolis lawyer in private practice who met Cahill at the Hennepin County Public Defender's Office when Cahill was a law clerk.  "So he understands what it's like to do both jobs. And he tries very hard to do the right thing."...

Cahill will sentence Chauvin on Friday, about two months after he oversaw the trial that ended in his conviction on charges of second- and third-degree murder, as well as second-degree manslaughter.  Cahill has paved the way for Chauvin's punishment to be up to double the 15 years at the top of the range recommended under state guidelines, having ruled in May that there were four aggravating factors in Floyd's death....

From 2008, the year he was elected to the bench, through January, Cahill has sentenced six people convicted of second-degree murder to prison.  They received terms ranging from 12.5 years to 40 years.

In Cahill's most recent case of sentencing on unintentional second-degree murder — the most serious charge on which Chauvin was convicted — he handed down a punishment of 15 years.  In that case, Matthew Witt pleaded guilty in January 2020 to unintentional second-degree murder for beating his mother to death and to first-degree assault for violently attacking his father July 24, 2019, authorities said.  He received an additional seven years for the latter charge.

Prior related posts:

June 20, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 18, 2021

"Bargained Justice: Plea Bargaining and the Psychology of False Pleas and False Testimony"

The title of this post is the title of this new essay authored by Lucian Dervan now available via SSRN Here is its abstract:

Plea bargaining is an institution that has come to dominate the American criminal justice system.  While little psychological research was done in the decades following the 1970 Supreme Court decision that approved the practice of plea bargaining, many advances have been made in this field in the last decade.  We now know, for example, that a significant number of defendants will falsely plead guilty in return for the benefits of a bargain.  Further, we know that the presence of counsel can actually increase, not decrease, the prevalence of false pleas of guilty.  We also know that pretrial detention can drastically increase the rate of false pleas of guilty by the innocent.  Finally, we know that defendants will not only falsely plead guilty, but that they will also falsely testify against a co-defendant in return for the benefits of the deal.  This piece examines each of these findings and considers what this research means for the future of bargained justice. 

June 18, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 17, 2021

Local report on federal compassionate release in Rhode Island raises questions about US Sentencing Commission data

A helpful reader made sure I saw this new reporting about federal compassionate release practices from a local source in the Ocean State under the headline "Federal inmates seeking early release in RI approved 40% of the time in 2020."  Here are excerpts (with a little emphasis added):

More than one of every three federal inmates sentenced in Rhode Island who sought compassionate release last year was let go early from prison, according to data from the U.S. District Court in Rhode Island.

A new report from the U.S. Sentencing Commission found Rhode Island federal judges were second only to jurists in Oregon for districts granting compassionate release requests during 2020.  While data directly from federal court in Providence shows the Sentencing Commission undercounted denials during that time period, U.S. District Judge William Smith said he wasn’t surprised to learn Rhode Island was more likely than other districts to grant early release.  “I think we’ve been really, really aggressive and careful about compassionate release petitions that have come before us,” Smith said. “We’ve paid a lot of attention to them and I am really proud of the way we’ve handled them.”

A Target 12 review of data provided by the federal court found 78 inmates who were sentenced in Rhode Island requested an early release in 2020.  Of those requests, 45 were denied, 30 were granted, and three were withdrawn.

Smith said weighing whether they should grant an early release is a balancing test between the risk to an inmate, and a risk to the community.  “There were various points in the pandemic when some federal prisons were literally on fire with the virus,” Smith said.

He added that the judges were keenly aware that a denial of an early release could be tantamount to a death sentence at the height of the pandemic. “There were times when you would go to bed at night hoping you wouldn’t wake up in the morning to find someone you had under consideration for compassionate release was now on a ventilator in a hospital,” he said. “That was going on all across the country.”

Despite those concerns, the answer was still “no” more often than “yes.” “If [an inmate] is in for a very long period of time for a crime of violence – let’s say – that is much more difficult and probably don’t grant that one,” Smith said.

That was the case with inmates Gregory Floyd and Harry Burdick, who were convicted in the horrific June 2000 execution-style slaying of Jason Burgeson and Amy Scute at a golf course in Johnston. The couple was carjacked after leaving a club in Providence before being gunned down. Both Floyd and Burdick had their compassionate release requests denied.

A Target 12 review of the cases that were granted an early release found none of the inmates were serving time for crimes of violence.  The vast majority of the convictions – 19 of 30 – were primarily drugs cases, five were financial crime convictions, two were firearm possession cases, and one each of art theft, escape from prison, bank robbery, and a conviction of “transportation with intent to prostitute.”...

Thousands of inmates across the country [filed CR motions] as COVID-19 was ripping through congregate care facilities, including prisons. According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, more than 44,000 inmates contracted the virus and 238 of them died. Four BOP staff members also succumbed to the disease. “I am really proud to say as far as I know, not a single inmate from Rhode Island died of coronavirus in prison,” Smith said, adding just one inmate who was released committed a violation that sent them back to prison.

With the pandemic seemingly receding, 2021 has been a different story. Of the 23 inmates who have asked for compassionate release since January, just one has been granted. “The medical issues are not as chronic, not as severe, the prisons are in a much better shape in terms of controlling the virus,” Smith said. “Then the third piece is the vaccination rate has been rising.”...

But for those who refused to get the vaccine, especially out of personal preference, Smith said that wouldn’t likely help any of their future arguments for compassionate release on the basis of being at heightened risk of contracting the virus. “I think it is on them,” he said.

I lamented last week in this post that the US Sentencing Commission's data run on CR motions in 2020 provided no information about the persons in prison or the crimes that were resulting in grants and denials of sentence reductions.  It is thus quite valuable to see this local report detail that nearly two-thirds of persons getting sentence reductions were in drug cases and apparently none involved crime of violence.  It will be interesting to see if this pattern holds true if and when we get more details from more districts.

But while pleased for this additional data from Rhode Island, I am troubled to see that the US Sentencing Commission may be (drastically?) under-reporting denials of relief.  I do not want to assume anything hinky is going on, because there may be valid data collection question and challenges here explaining the discrepancy between the USSC data report and the data reported by the local news source.  For example, if a defendant is initially denied a motion for a sentence reduction, perhaps on procedural grounds, and then a month later prevails on such a motion, is this is coded as just one grant or is it one denial and one grant?

For all sort of reasons, I think it will prove very important to try to be very careful assembling accurate data here on all sorts of sentence reduction particulars.  The US Sentencing Commission, if and when it ever has Commissioners, will at some point need to modify various policy statements about these matters, and good data will be critical for the USSC and others advising the USSC to do their work in sound ways.

A few of many prior related posts:

June 17, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 16, 2021

"The False Hope of the Progressive-Prosecutor Movement"

The title of this post is the title of this recent notable Atlantic piece by Darcy Covert that is summarized via its subheadline: "Well-intentioned reformers can’t fix the criminal legal system. They have to start relinquishing power."  I recommend the piece in full, and here are some excerpts (links from the original):

[P]rogressive prosecutors’ approach won’t bring about meaningful change.  The progressive-prosecutor movement acknowledges (as research has shown) that prosecutors’ “breathtaking” power is a major source of America’s criminal-justice problems.  It asks its adherents to use that power for good, and trusts them to do so. But true reform won’t come from using that power for good; instead, prosecutors will need to have less of it in the first place.  It is unrealistic to expect that even reform-minded prosecutors (or anyone, for that matter) can and will dispense justice when they have virtually boundless power and almost unlimited discretion to use it against criminal defendants.  To transform the criminal legal system, prosecutors must stop resisting — and indeed start supporting — efforts by courts and legislatures to reduce their power....

Declining to prosecute minor offenses won’t end mass incarceration, when most individuals in prison are there for violent crimes.  Diversion programs, which offer treatment only to those willing to comply with onerous supervision requirements and face jail time if they slip up, won’t keep large portions of people affected by mental illness, addiction, and poverty out of the criminal legal system.  Studies show that — because of their position in this adversarial system — prosecutors are often unable to evaluate cases with the neutrality needed to systematically identify the innocent and decide how much punishment is necessary for the guilty.  Nor will gathering and publishing data address the disproportionate representation of people of color in the criminal legal system, because transparency is not a cure for the disparities that data show.

Here is a better prescription: If you are a prosecutor committed to transforming the criminal legal system, support the reallocation of power away from your office — by your office, and by the legislature and courts.

Expand the consideration of who should not face criminal punishment beyond those who commit only very low-level offenses.  For example, recognize that even more serious crime is driven by people’s circumstances, including mental illness and trauma, and support treatment rather than jail time for those cases.

Advocate for the reallocation of funds from your office’s budget to social services that keep people out of the criminal legal system entirely, and to the indigent defense system that advocates on behalf of those who are prosecuted.  A first step would be to push for budget increases for the public defenders who represent more than 80 percent of those charged with crimes in criminal courts.  They labor under crushing caseloads that often prevent them from being able to ensure that their clients are not wrongfully convicted or punished overly severely.

Lobby for more external limits on prosecutorial power, such as the elimination of mandatory minimum sentences and other laws that enable coercive plea bargaining.  Advocate for stronger equal-protection rights for defendants of color, including for state courts to recognize greater protections against racist jury selection and pretextual traffic stops, in which police use a minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop and search someone.

June 16, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 15, 2021

National Registry of Exonerations reports on "25,000 Years Lost to Wrongful Convictions"

I saw this notable new report from the folks at the National Registry of Exonerations titled "25,000 Years Lost to Wrongful Convictions."  here is part of the start of the report:

In 2018, the National Registry of Exonerations reported a grim milestone: Exonerated defendants had collectively served 20,000 years in prison for crimes they did not commit. Just three years later, in June 2021, we reached another: Time lost to false convictions exceeded 25,000 years.  The total now stands at 25,004 years, on average more than 8 years and 11 months in prison for each of the 2,795 exonerees in the Registry.  Innocent Black defendants served a majority of that time — a total of 14,525 years lost to unjust imprisonment.

The National Registry of Exonerations reports every known exoneration in the United States since 1989, a total of 2,795 as of June 1, 2021.  Dozens of defendants exonerated since our 2018 report served more than 25 years in prison for crimes they did not commit....  Not all of the exonerees who served many years for crimes they did not commit were convicted of violent crimes like murder or rape. Lawrence Martin spent nearly 19 years in California prisons for possession of a knife with a locking blade....

It is hard to fathom spending decades in prison, knowing all the while that you are innocent.  But even those who served relatively short sentences suffered tremendously.  People often refer to the time we have spent in 2020 and 2021 under COVID-19 restrictions as a “lost year.”  We’ve missed the ability to travel freely, socialize with friends, and see loved ones. For people wrongfully incarcerated, every year is a lost year.  To exonerees who served sentences of a year or two for crimes they did not commit, it must have felt like an eternity.  For those who served decades, the suffering is incomprehensible.

Unfortunately, the 2,795 exonerations we know about only begin to tell the story of wrongful convictions and the toll they take.  Many exonerations remain unknown to us, though we keep looking. The vast majority of false convictions go uncorrected and therefore are never counted.  Our calculation also does not include time lost to the thousands of people cleared in large-scale group exonerations, which arise when groups of defendants are cleared upon the discovery of a common pattern of systemic misconduct by a government official in the investigation and prosecution of their cases.  Finally, our calculations include only time spent in prison after the wrongful conviction and consequently do not capture the significant time lost in custody awaiting trial.  Put simply, while 25,000 years is a staggering number, it is a significant undercount of the true losses these falsely convicted men and women suffered.

June 15, 2021 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Justice Department files SCOTUS brief seeking to restore death sentence for Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

As repoted in this Hill piece, the "Biden administration on Monday urged the Supreme Court to reinstate the death penalty against the Boston Marathon bomber in an apparent break with the president's stated opposition to capital punishment."  Here are the details (with a link to the filing):

In a 48-page brief, the Department of Justice (DOJ) asked the justices to reverse a Boston-based federal appeals court that vacated the death sentence for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the lone surviving perpetrator of the 2013 attack.

“The jury carefully considered each of respondent’s crimes and determined that capital punishment was warranted for the horrors that he personally inflicted — setting down a shrapnel bomb in a crowd and detonating it, killing a child and a promising young student, and consigning several others to a lifetime of unimaginable suffering,” the DOJ’s brief reads.

Tsarnaev and his since-deceased brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, killed three people and injured 260 others in the 2013 bombing attack near the finish line of the annual event in downtown Boston....

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit last year vacated Tsarnaev’s death sentence. The court ruled that the trial court had failed to adequately gauge potential jury bias and the extent to which Tsarnaev may have been influenced by his brother.

Former President Trump in October appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The justices agreed in March to take up the dispute and are expected to hear arguments in the case next term.  The case was seen as an early challenge for Biden, the first U.S. president to publicly oppose the death penalty, and his administration’s response had been highly anticipated.

During the 2020 presidential campaign, Biden called for an end to capital punishmentBut on Monday, the DOJ made clear that Biden would maintain his predecessor’s support for reinstating capital punishment against Tsarnaev. “The court of appeals improperly vacated the capital sentences recommended by the jury in one of the most important terrorism prosecutions in our Nation’s history,” the DOJ’s brief reads. “This Court should reverse the decision below and put this case back on track toward a just conclusion.”

The White House and DOJ did not immediately respond when asked by The Hill if Biden had changed his stance on the death penalty.

Tsarnaev, 27, will serve out multiple life sentences in federal prison if his death sentence is not reinstated.  

A few prior recent related posts:

June 15, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

New plea deals sets possible new precedent for resolving low-level Capitol riot prosecutions with single misdemeanor with 6 month jail maximum

As reported in this Politico piece, headlined "Virginia couple pleads guilty in Capitol riot," the first set of pleas for low-level participating in the January 6 riots were entered in federal court yesterday.  Here are the details:

A Virginia couple on Monday became the third and fourth defendants to plead guilty in the sprawling investigation stemming from the Capitol riot in January.  However, Jessica and Joshua Bustle of Bristow, Va., became the first to plead guilty in federal court who faced only misdemeanor charges as a result of their actions at the Capitol as lawmakers were attempting to certify President Joe Biden’s electoral college victory.

Under a deal with prosecutors, the Bustles each pleaded guilty to one of the four misdemeanor charges they faced: parading, demonstrating or picketing in a Capitol building. They could get up to six months in jail and a fine of up to $5,000, but will be spared the potential of back-to-back sentences on multiple counts.

The arrangement could serve as a template for hundreds of other misdemeanor-only cases filed related to the Jan. 6 events.  Defense attorneys say it also suggests that prosecutors will not readily agree to more lenient resolutions in Capitol riot cases, such as deferring the case and dismissing it following a period of good behavior.

“There’s no guarantee what the sentence will be in this case,” Judge Thomas Hogan told the Bustles during the afternoon hearing, conducted by videoconference. “I can give a sentence that’s legal up to the maximum in the statute: six months.”

According to a complaint filed by an FBI agent in March, Jessica Bustle posted on her Facebook page on Jan. 6: “Pence is a traitor. We stormed the capital.  An unarmed peaceful woman down the hall from us was shot in the neck by cops.  It’s insane here….Pray for America!!!!”  In another post, Jessica Bustle — who said she’s opposed to taking the coronavirus vaccine — indicated she and her husband were attending a “health freedom” rally separate from then-President Donald Trump’s rally. They later decided to check out what was happening at the Capitol, she wrote.  “My husband and I just WALKED right in with tons of other people.” Bustle also wrote: “We need a Revolution.”...

The Bustles have also agreed to pay $500 apiece in restitution, Hogan said.  Both the Bustles' attorneys and a prosecutor said they were prepared to proceed with sentencing Monday, but the judge declined, saying he would set a sentencing date in 4 to 6 weeks.  “I’m not prepared to do sentencing today. I think we have to look at the case a little bit,” said Hogan, an appointee of former President Ronald Reagan. The judge said he wanted to ensure “consistency and comparability” of sentences among the Capitol riot defendants, none of whom have been sentenced thus far.

Many Capitol riot defendants face the four typical misdemeanor charges the Bustles faced plus a felony charge of obstruction of an official proceeding.  The latter charge carries a potential 20-year prison term. It is not clear how prosecutors have distinguished between nonviolent defendants who face only the misdemeanors and those who had the felony charge added on.

The first guilty pleas in the Capitol riot came in April from Jon Schaffer, a heavy-metal guitarist and self-described lifetime member of the Oath Keepers. He admitted to two felonies: obstruction and entering a Secret Service-restricted area while carrying a dangerous weapon.  Schaffer agreed to cooperate in the government’s ongoing conspiracy case against fellow Oath Keepers.  A total of 16 people are now charged in that case.

The second guilty plea was from a Florida man who went onto the Senate floor during the Jan. 6 unrest, Paul Hodgkins.  At a hearing earlier this month, he pleaded guilty to a felony obstruction charge.  Prosecutors agreed to drop the misdemeanor charges against him, but there was no cooperation element to the deal.  He is tentatively set for sentencing on July 19.

This Reuters piece about these latest pleas details a bit more some of the sentencing specifics around the two earlier pleas:

The first guilty plea came in April, when a founding member of the right-wing Oath Keepers, Jon Schaffer, pleaded guilty to two felony charges of obstructing the certification of the 2020 election and breaching a restricted building. Prosecutors are recommending a sentence of between 3-1/2 and 4-1/2 years of prison time for Schaffer, but his sentence will ultimately be decided by a District of Columbia judge.

A Florida man on June 2 became the second person to plead guilty to storming the Capitol. Paul Allard Hodgkins pleaded guilty to one felony count of obstructing an official proceeding. A judge said federal sentencing guidelines call for Hodgkins to receive sentence in the range of 15 to 21 months.

Prior related posts:

June 15, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 14, 2021

More good coverage of the not-so-good (but still not-so-bad) realities of federal compassionate release realities

As noted here, last Thursday the US Sentencing Commission released some fascinating (and bare bones) data on compassionate release motions in 2020 in this short data report.  In this post, I flagged coverage by the Marshall Project lamenting that the Bureau of Prisons approved so very few compassionate release applications.  I have since seen three more press piece noting ugly stories in the data:

I am quite pleased to see a a series of articles based on the new USSC data that rightly assail the BOP for being so adverse to supporting sentence reduction 3582(c)(1)(a) motions and that highlights broad variations in how compassionate release is functioning in different federal judicial districts.  But, those persistent problems notwithstanding, I hope nobody loses sight of what the FIRST STEP Act accomplished by allowing federal courts to directly reduce sentences without awaiting a motion by the BOP.  As of this writing, BOP reports on this data page that nearly 3500 federal defendants have now received "Compassionate Releases / Reduction in Sentences" since the FIRST STEP Act became law. (For point of reference, that is more than the total number of prisoners in New Hampshire and Vermont combined.)  

I am eager for more details from the US Sentencing Commission about who is and is not receiving sentence reductions because there are surely some uneven (and likely ugly) patterns to be found in all the data.  But the one pattern that is clear and should be appreciated is that judges are regularly using their new powers to reduce sentences that are excessive.  As I suggested in this recent post, new legal rulings and all sorts of other developments can and should continue to provide sound reasons for federal judges to keep reconsidering extreme past federal sentences.  I hope they continue to do so, and I hope we do not lose sight of a beautiful compassionate release forest even when we notice a some ugly trees.

A few of many prior related posts:

June 14, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS rules defendants must show plain error (and likely won't) when pressing Rehaif claims on appeal in felon-in-possession cases

The Supreme Court is busy clearing the criminal cases off its docket as the Term winds to a close; today first opinion is unanimously ruling in Greer v. US, No. 19–8709 (S. Ct. June 14, 2021) (available here), holding that "in felon-in-possession cases, a Rehaif error is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon."  Here is a bit more explanatory context from Justice Kavanaugh's opinion for the Court:

Federal law prohibits the possession of firearms by certain categories of individuals, including by those who have been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison.  See 18 U.S.C. §§922(g), 924(a)(2).  In Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), this Court clarified the mens rea requirement for firearms-possession offenses, including the felon-in-possession offense.  In felon-in-possession cases after Rehaif, the Government must prove not only that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but also that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.  See id., at ___ (slip op., at 11)....

In the two cases before us, all agree that Rehaif errors occurred during both defendants’ district court proceedings and that the errors were plain, thus satisfying the first two prongs of the plain-error test.  We address the third prong: whether the Rehaif errors affected the defendants’ “substantial rights.”  Greer has the burden of showing that, if the District Court had correctly instructed the jury on the mens rea element of a felon-in-possession offense, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S., at 83.  And Gary has the burden of showing that, if the District Court had correctly advised him of the mens rea element of the offense, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would not have pled guilty.

In a felon-in-possession case where the defendant was in fact a felon when he possessed firearms, the defendant faces an uphill climb in trying to satisfy the substantial-rights prong of the plain-error test based on an argument that he did not know he was a felon.  The reason is simple: If a person is a felon, he ordinarily knows he is a felon.  “Felony status is simply not the kind of thing that one forgets.”  963 F. 3d 420, 423 (CA4 2020) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en banc).  That simple truth is not lost upon juries.  Thus, absent a reason to conclude otherwise, a jury will usually find that a defendant knew he was a felon based on the fact that he was a felon.  A defendant considering whether to plead guilty would recognize as much and would likely factor that reality into the decision to plead guilty.  In short, if a defendant was in fact a felon, it will be difficult for him to carry the burden on plain-error review of showing a “reasonable probability” that, but for the Rehaif error, the outcome of the district court proceedings would have been different.

Of course, there may be cases in which a defendant who is a felon can make an adequate showing on appeal that he would have presented evidence in the district court that he did not in fact know he was a felon when he possessed firearms.  See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 10(e).  Indeed, at oral argument, the Government conceded that there are circumstances in which a defendant might make such a showing.  But if a defendant does not make such an argument or representation on appeal, the appellate court will have no reason to believe that the defendant would have presented such evidence to a jury, and thus no basis to conclude that there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome would have been different absent the Rehaif error.

Justice Sotomayor authors the only separate opinion which largely concurs with the majority though calls for one of the cases to be sent back to the lower court.  She also explains that she wants to "highlight two limits on today’s decision":

First, the Court’s analysis in Greer’s case does not extend to the distinct context of harmless-error review, which applies when defendants contemporaneously object at trial. Second, the knowledge-of-status element is an element just like any other.  The Government must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendants seeking relief based on Rehaif errors bear only the usual burden on plain-error review. 

June 14, 2021 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, June 13, 2021

Borden claims and the potential for 3582(c)(1)(a) motions to enable retroactivity

I asked a few days ago, in the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Borden v. US, No. 19–5410 (S. Ct. June 10, 2021) (available here), limiting applicable ACCA predicates, "How many federal prisoners might now be serving illegal sentences after Borden?".   After a little reflection and added research, I have come to suspect that maybe only a few hundred federal prisoners are now serving ACCA sentences based on a problematic reckless predicate, though surely a larger number may seek relief in federal courts.  So, after flagging the issue of how many federal prisoners might now be serving illegal sentences after Borden, in this post I want to discuss a bit  how current federal prisoners serving ACCA sentences might seek relief.

Notably, some of this ground has been plowed in the wake of the Supreme Court's 2015 ruling in Johnson finding ACCA's residual clause unconstitutionally vague.  An intricate federal habeas jurisprudence has followed as ACCA prisoners looked to bring their Johnson claims into federal court through 2255 and 2241 motions. See generally Prof Leah Litman's writings here and here and here and here and here.

Justice Kavanaugh is clearly concerned about another round of this litigation the aftermath of Borden, as the last footnote in his dissent frets about "the collateral review petitions that will likely inundate courts in the circuits that [had held] ACCA covers reckless offenses."  In that footnote, Justice Kavanaugh seems eager to note that prisoners may not get relief based on Borden because "many petitions may fall outside §2255’s 1-year statute of limitations."  But Justice Kavanaugh perhaps does not realize that, thanks to the FIRST STEP Act, prisoners with viable Borden claims could now bring 3582(c)(1)(a) motions for sentence reductions based on "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances.

Prof Litman had so much to write about after Johnson because the procedural rules and jurisprudence surrounding 2255 and 2241 motions are extraordinarily intricate and often limiting.  And those procedural rules needed to be sorted through for ACCA-sentenced folks making Johnson claims because there was no other means to directly pursue resentencing in court.  But, thank to the provision of the FIRST STEP Act allowing federal courts to directly reduce sentence without awaiting a motion by the Bureau of Prisons, prisoners now have another distinct means to seek relief through a 3582(c)(1)(a) motion for a sentence reduction.

Critically, because 3582(c)(1)(a) motions have only a minor "exhaustion" procedural requirement, prisoners bringing such motions will have an easier time to getting to court to have their claim considered on the substantive merits.  But the substantive merits of a 3582(c)(1)(a) motion will be different than if a Borden claim is pursued via 2255 and 2241 motions.  A judge will have to find that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant" a sentence reduction and then consider 3553(a) factors.  Because those with winning Borden claims have been sentenced to an illegal five years or more, I would think they certainly present an "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction.  How much the sentence should be reduced should be ten determined by consideration of the 3553(a) factors.

In other words, the FIRST STEP Act's procedural change to so-called "compassionate release" motions via 3582(c)(1)(a) now allows for rulings like Borden to be more efficiently given retroactive effect in federal courts.  Yet another lovely reasons to celebrate that Act. 

Prior related posts:

June 13, 2021 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)

Unanimous South Carolina Supreme Court decides sex offender registry is "unconstitutional absent any opportunity for judicial review to assess the risk of re-offending"

Last week, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued an interesting opinion about the state's sex offender registry in Powell v. Keel, No. 28033 (S.C. June 9, 2021) (available here), which concludes this way:

Although we find the State has a legitimate interest in requiring sex offender registration and such registration is constitutional, SORA's requirement that sex offenders must register for life without any opportunity for judicial review violates due process because it is arbitrary and cannot be deemed rationally related to the General Assembly's stated purpose of protecting the public from those with a high risk of re-offending.  Therefore, we hold SORA's lifetime registration requirement is unconstitutional absent any opportunity for judicial review to assess the risk of reoffending. We further hold subsection 23-3-490(E) permits dissemination of the State's sex offender registry information on the internet. We hereby reserve the effective date of this opinion for twelve (12) months from the date of filing to allow the General Assembly to correct the deficiency in the statute regarding judicial review.  Nonetheless, because the circuit court has already held a hearing in this case and determined Respondent no longer poses a risk sufficient to justify his continued registration as a sex offender, Appellants shall immediately remove Respondent from the sex offender registry.

June 13, 2021 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, June 12, 2021

"Progressive Algorithms"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Itay Ravid and Amit Haim available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Our criminal justice system is broken.  Problems of mass incarceration, racial disparities, and susceptibility to error are prevalent in all phases of the criminal process.  Recently, two dominant trends that aspire to tackle these fundamental problems have emerged in the criminal justice system: progressive prosecution — often defined as elected reform-minded prosecutors that advance systemic change in criminal justice — and algorithmic decision-making — characterized by the adoption of statistical modeling and computational methodology to predict outcomes in criminal contexts.

While there are growing bodies of literature on each of these two trends, thus far they have not been discussed in tandem.  This Article argues that scholarship on criminal justice reform must consider both developments and strive to reconcile them.  We argue that while both trends promise to address similar key flaws in the criminal justice system, they send diametrically opposed messages with respect to the role of humans in advancing criminal justice reform.  Progressive prosecution posits that humans are the solution, while algorithmic tools suggest humans are the problem.  This clash reflects both normative frictions and deep differences in the modus operandi of each of these paradigms.  Such tensions are not only theoretical but have immediate practical implications such that each approach tends to inhibit the advantages of the other with respect to bettering the criminal justice system.

We argue against disjointly embedding progressive agendas and algorithmic tools in criminal justice systems.  Instead, we offer a decision-making model which prioritizes principles of accountability, transparency, and democratization without neglecting the benefits of computational methods and technology.  Overall, this article offers a framework to start thinking through the inherent frictions between progressive prosecution and algorithmic decision-making and the potential ways to overcome them.  More broadly, the Article contributes to the discussions about the role of humans in advancing legal reforms in an era of pervading technology.

June 12, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Technocorrections, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Senate Judiciary Committee advances three criminal justice and sentencing reform bills

I noted in this post last month that the US Senate Judiciary Committee had  plans to take three criminal justice bill: the First Step Implementation Act, the COVID-19 Safer Detention Act, and the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act.  This Law360 piece from a few weeks ago reported that, "on a 14-8 vote, the Senate Judiciary Committee passed the COVID-19 Safer Detention Act of 2021."  And the other bill moved forward this past week, as reported in this press release from Senator Grassley:

[T]he Senate Judiciary Committee voted to advance two bipartisan criminal justice reform bills authored by U.S. Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee — the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021 and the First Step Implementation Act of 2021. These bills will build on the landmark First Step Act and continue Congress’s bipartisan efforts to make our criminal justice system fairer....

The bipartisan, bicameral Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021 would end the unjust practice of judges increasing sentences based on conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted by a jury.  Our criminal justice system rests on the Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees of due process and the right to a jury trial for the criminally accused.  These principles require the government to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.  Under the Constitution, defendants may be convicted only for conduct proven beyond a reasonable doubt.   However, at sentencing, courts may enhance sentences if they find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant committed other crimes.  The difference in those standards of proof means that a sentencing court can effectively nullify a jury’s verdict by considering acquitted conduct.  The legislation was passed out of Committee by a bipartisan vote of 16-6.  More information on the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021 can be found here.
 
The bipartisan, bicameral First Step Implementation Act would advance the goals of the landmark First Step Act (FSA), by, among other provisions, making eligible for retroactive review some of the FSA’s sentencing reforms. The FSA — authored by Durbin and Grassley and signed into law in 2018 — is bipartisan criminal justice reform legislation designed to make our justice system fairer and our communities safer by reforming sentencing laws and providing opportunities for those who are incarcerated to prepare to reenter society successfully.  The First Step Implementation Act was passed out of Committee by a bipartisan vote of 13-9.  More information on how the First Step Implementation Act of 2021 would further the goals of the FSA can be found here.

I have little sense of whether or when these bills might move through Congress and get to the desk of the President, but I am hope that congressional leadership sees that these bill are worth prioritizing because they have more bipartisan support that almost any other proposals these days.

Some prior related posts:

June 12, 2021 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 11, 2021

Another dive into the ugly BOP realities of federal compassionate release during the pandemic

The Marshall Project has this new piece on federal compassionate release with a full title that captures its essential themes: "31,000 Prisoners Sought Compassionate Release During COVID-19. The Bureau of Prisons Approved 36.  As the pandemic worsened inside federal prisons, officials granted fewer releases." Here are excerpts (with links from the original):

Tens of thousands of federal prisoners applied for compassionate release after the virus began sweeping through lockups. But new Bureau of Prisons data shows officials approved fewer of those applications during the pandemic than they did the year before.  While the BOP director greenlit 55 such requests in 2019, a new director who took over in early 2020 approved only 36 requests in the 13 months since the pandemic took hold in March 2020.  The downturn in approvals came even as the number of people seeking compassionate release skyrocketed from 1,735 in 2019 to nearly 31,000 after the virus hit, according to the new figures.

Because the numbers were compiled for members of Congress, BOP spokesman Scott Taylor said the agency would not answer any questions about the data, “out of respect and deference” to lawmakers.  But Shon Hopwood, a Georgetown law professor, called the bureau’s decrease in compassionate releases during the pandemic “mind-boggling.”...

Federal judges have stepped in to release thousands of people in the face of BOP inaction. And the bureau continues to face intense scrutiny and several lawsuits over its handling of COVID-19.  Since the first reported case last spring, more than 49,000 federal prisoners have fallen ill and 256 have died, according to corrections data tracked by The Marshall Project.  Thirty-five of those who died were waiting for a decision on their release requests....

People in federal prisons seeking release during the pandemic have two main ways to get out early.  One is home confinement, which allows low-risk prisoners to finish their sentences at home or in a halfway house.  They’re still considered in custody, and the decision to let them out is entirely up to the Bureau of Prisons.  As COVID shutdowns began last March, Congress expanded the eligibility criteria and then-Attorney General Bill Barr ordered prison officials to let more people go.  Since then, more than 23,700 people have been sent to home confinement — though several thousand of them may have to return to prison once the pandemic ends.

The other way to get out early is through compassionate release.  If a warden endorses a prisoner’s request, the case goes to BOP’s central office, which usually rejects it.  But if a warden denies a request or 30 days pass with no response, then the incarcerated person can ask a judge to reduce the sentence to time served.  The new data showed 3,221 people have been let out on compassionate release since the start of the pandemic — but 99% of those releases were granted by judges over the bureau’s objections.

Last fall, The Marshall Project published data showing that the Bureau of Prisons rejected or ignored more than 98% of compassionate release requests during the first three months of the pandemic.  Citing that reporting, federal lawmakers in December wrote to the agency to demand more data on both compassionate release and home confinement.

The updated figures outlined in the agency’s response to Congress in April showed that BOP wardens actually endorsed slightly fewer compassionate release requests as the pandemic progressed.  In the first three months, wardens approved 1.4% of release applications.  The central office rejected most of those, with Director Michael Carvajal ultimately approving just 0.1%.  By the end of April — more than a year into the pandemic, and after more than 200 prisoner deaths — wardens had approved 1.2% of applications, and Carvajal again accepted just 0.1%.

By comparison, federal judges approved 21% of compassionate release requests they considered in 2020, according to a recent report from the U.S. Sentencing Commission....

For the most part, the bureau has offered little insight into its reasons for denying compassionate release. According to the information BOP sent to Congress, wardens denied nearly 23,000 requests because the person “does not meet criteria.”  Roughly 3,200 people were denied because their cases were “not extraordinary and compelling,” while a little over 1,200 were rejected for not providing enough information or documentation.  Four people met the criteria but were denied due to “correctional concerns,” the agency said.

Of the 374 prisoners that wardens recommended for compassionate release during the pandemic, the agency’s central office rejected or did not respond to just over 90%, apparently without making any note as to why.  “The BOP does not track the specific reasons for approval or denial of a compassionate release request at the Central Office level, as there can be several reasons for a particular decision,” wrote General Counsel Ken Hyle.  Some of those reasons, he added, could be opposition from federal prosecutors, a lack of release plan or fear that letting someone out would “minimize the severity of the inmate’s offense.”

A few of many prior related posts:

June 11, 2021 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Split Indiana Supreme Court finally rules that forfeiture of Tyson Timbs' Land Rover driven to small drug deal was constitutionally excessive

Well over two years ago, as blogged here, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019), that the that Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment applies to the states and then said little else about how that limit on punishment was to be applied. Upon remand, as blogged here, the Indiana Supreme Court some months later issued a lengthy opinion explaining its approach to the Clause while remanding case to the state trial court to apply this approach. And yesterday, the case returned to the Indiana Supreme Court as Indiana v. Timbs, No. 20S-MI-289 (Ind. June 10, 2021) (available here), and resulted in a split opinion in favor of Tyson Timbs. Here is how the majority opinion starts:

We chronicle and confront, for the third time, the State’s quest to forfeit Tyson Timbs’s now-famous white Land Rover.  And, again, the same overarching question looms: would the forfeiture be constitutional?

Reminiscent of Captain Ahab’s chase of the white whale Moby Dick, this case has wound its way from the trial court all the way to the United States Supreme Court and back again.  During the voyage, several points have come to light. First, the vehicle’s forfeiture, due to its punitive nature, is subject to the Eighth Amendment’s protection against excessive fines.  Next, to stay within the limits of the Excessive Fines Clause, the forfeiture of Timbs’s vehicle must meet two requirements: instrumentality and proportionality. And, finally, the forfeiture falls within the instrumentality limit because the vehicle was the actual means by which Timbs committed the underlying drug offense.

But, until now, the proportionality inquiry remained unresolved — that is, was the harshness of the Land Rover’s forfeiture grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Timbs’s dealing crime and his culpability for the vehicle’s misuse?  The State not only urges us to answer that question in the negative, but it also requests that we wholly abandon the proportionality framework from State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 35–39 (Ind. 2019).  Today, we reject the State’s request to overturn precedent, as there is no compelling reason to deviate from stare decisis and the law of the case; and we conclude that Timbs met his burden to show gross disproportionality, rendering the Land Rover’s forfeiture unconstitutional.

Justice Slaughter concurs in the judgment with lengthy separate opinion that includes a notable baseball analogy while fretting that the "law we interpret for the public we serve demands more than our subjective 'totality' test can sustain."  And Justice Massa dissents with separate opinion that starts this way:

The Court offers a compelling case for letting the beleaguered Tyson Timbs keep his Land Rover after all these years.  And the opinion, much to its credit, goes the extra mile in its concluding paragraphs to note and predict that Timbs will be the rare heroin dealer able to show gross disproportionality when his car is forfeited.  Still, I respectfully dissent.

The forfeiture here was indeed harsh, perhaps even mildly disproportionate, given all the facts in mitigation.  But I part ways with the Court’s holding that it was grossly so.  Such a conclusion can only be sustained by finding the severity of the underlying felony to be “minimal,” as the Court holds today. I am skeptical that dealing in heroin can ever be a crime of minimal severity.  No narcotic has left a larger scar on our state and region in recent years, whether overly prescribed or purchased illicitly on the street.

June 11, 2021 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)