Thursday, October 08, 2020

"Decarceration and Default Mental States"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Benjamin Levin now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

This Essay, presented at “Guilty Minds: A Virtual Conference on Mens Rea and Criminal Justice Reform” at ASU’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, examines the politics of federal mens rea reform legislation.  I argue that current mens rea policy debates reflect an overly narrow vision of criminal justice reform.  Therefore, I suggest an alternative frame through which to view mens rea reform efforts — a frame that resonates with radical structural critiques that have gained ground among activists and academics.

Common arguments for and against mens rea reform reflect a belief that the problem with the criminal system is one of miscalibration: To the reform proponents, criminal law, incarceration, and the institutions of the U.S. criminal system are necessary for dealing with “real criminals,” but overcriminalization, strict liability crimes, and sloppily drafted statutes cause undeserving and “otherwise law-abiding” people to suffer.  To reform opponents, the criminal system might be flawed (see, e.g., the War on Drugs, racial disparities, police violence, etc.), but that doesn’t mean it is illegitimate or without important uses.  The brutalities of the system’s treatment of marginalized people don’t indicate an irredeemable system; rather, prosecutors could right the balance by shifting their attention to the wealthy and “white collar” offenders, and lawmakers and judges could grease the wheels of these prosecutions by reducing the burden on prosecutors to prove mens rea elements.  Arguments from opponents and proponents offer little to commentators who see the problems with the criminal system as deeper or more intractable — problems of structure, rather than scope.

Ultimately, therefore, I offer a different frame for mens rea reform and for understanding the stakes of the debate that might resonate with more radical critics.  I suggest that mens rea reform can be analogized to the rule of lenity and the libertarian or anti-statist aspects of the Bill of Rights — these rules are not solely focused on sorting the guilty and the innocent; rather, I suggest, they can be viewed as “anti-criminalization” rules, directives to put a thumb on the scale in favor of defendants and against the state, state violence, and criminal punishment.  Framed in this way, I argue that mens rea reform should be appealing to commentators concerned about mass incarceration, state violence, and the sweeping reach of criminal law and its enforcement.  Perhaps more provocatively, I also argue that mens rea reform could be understood as consistent with more radical calls for abolition or dismantling of the carceral state.

October 8, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 07, 2020

Notable perspectives from the Prairie State on "Principles to Build a More Equitable Criminal Justice System"

I just noticed, and found quite notable, this new press release from yesterday coming from the Illinois Governor's office.  The document is fully titled "Gov. Pritzker Proposes Principles to Build a More Equitable Criminal Justice System: Criminal Justice Reform Principles Aim to Modernize Criminal Code, End Cycles of Recidivism, and Increase Police Accountability."  I'd recommend the lengthy document in full, and here is the statement of "seven principles for an equitable criminal justice system" that are at the heart of the document (with bolding in the original):

The seven principles for an equitable criminal justice system are the following:

• End the use of the cash bail system and limit pretrial detention to only those who are a threat to public safety. The governor remains committed to ending a system that disproportionately forces low-income families and people of color into a disruptive cycle of unearned detention and instability.  The cash bail system would be replaced by a risk assessment to determine the likelihood of a defendant's appearance at trial and if there is a threat to public safety posed by a defendant's pre-trial release.
 
• Modernize sentencing laws on theft and drug offenses and use a public health approach to address mental health and addiction. Illinois will decrease unnecessary admissions into prison, match modernized sentencing standards across the country, and limit criminal justice system involvement for non-violent offenders who need and would benefit from a public health intervention. 
 
• Reduce excessive lengths of stay in prison by providing pathways for people to earn opportunities for rehabilitation. The state will increase access to sentence credit and time-limited supervised release while limiting penalty enhancements and short-term commitments that disproportionately trap low-income families and people of color in generational cycles of incarceration.
 
• Prioritize rehabilitation and reduce the risk of recidivism by increasing access to housing and healthcare for returning residents.  The state is committed to expanding opportunities, supports, and services for people who are exiting the prison system so that they are set up to succeed upon return to their communities, and which will save taxpayers money by reducing the number of people trapped in a cycle of recidivism. 
 
• Increase police accountability and transparency for police officers and police departments. Illinois will set the standard for the nation in professionalizing and setting statewide standards for police officers.  We will advocate for licensing of police officers, strengthen the role of the State Police Merit Board, work alongside police departments to ensure compliance and proper use of body-worn cameras, create a state-level avenue to investigate systemic police misconduct, and remove barriers for civilians to report officer misconduct, like the signed affidavit requirement.
 
• Update and strengthen statewide standards for use of force by police officers. Illinois is committed to modernizing the legal standard for use of force and implementing common sense policies and trainings that are consistent with best practices and will improve police-community relations.  This includes requiring police officers to apply first aid after using force, prohibiting no-knock search warrants, requiring the use of de-escalation techniques, and requiring officers  to intervene and report when excessive force is used by another officer. 
 
• Improve interactions with police by decriminalizing minor non-violent offenses, improving police response to crowd control, and increasing language and disability access.  By decriminalizing minor non-violent offenses, creating policies and trainings for police response to non-violent crimes and protests, and increasing language and disability access for civilians, Illinois will establish a framework to improve community safety and trust.  

October 7, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, October 03, 2020

"#MeToo and Mass Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new piece on SSRN authored by Aya Gruber.  Here is its abstract:

This Symposium Guest Editor’s Note is an adapted version of the Introduction to The Feminist War on Crime: The Unexpected Role of Women’s Liberation in Mass Incarceration (UC Press 2020).  The book examines how American feminists, in the quest to secure women’s protection from domestic violence and rape, often acted as soldiers in the war on crime by emphasizing white female victimhood, expanding the power of police and prosecutors, touting incarceration, and diverting resources toward law enforcement and away from marginalized communities.  Today, despite deep concerns over racist policing and mass incarceration, many feminists continue to assert that gender crime law is not tough enough.  This punitive impulse, I argue, is dangerous and counterproductive, and should be abandoned.  History reveals that feminists' carceral approach often exacerbated social inequalities by expanding and underwriting the repressive criminal system, that harmed defendants, victims, and their families and communities.

This essay begins with the feminist defense attorney dilemma I felt as a law student, when I trained to represent marginalized people against state prosecutorial power but did so with a dread of defending horrific rapists and batterers. Later, as a public defender, I represented clients like Jamal, an accused abuser whose story is related in detail, and I saw firsthand the costs of the tough-on-crime machine that carceral feminism built.  The essay then moves to the present day, with a discussion of the #MeToo movement and campus rape reform.  I counsel contemporary feminists that their noble fight against sexual misconduct can easily collapse into simple crime-control politics and urge them to articulate their complex beliefs about gender and violence without relying on penal discourses and institutions that are steeped in hypermasculinity and gratuitous violence.

October 3, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, September 26, 2020

"The Perils of 'Old' and 'New' in Sentencing Reform"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new essay authored by Jessica Eaglin now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The introduction of actuarial risk assessment tools into the sentencing process is a controversial, but popular trend in the states.  While tools' proliferation is debated from numerous angles, scholarship tends to emphasize why this reform is new or old, and focus on whether and how this trend may improve or undermine sentencing law and policy.  This Essay suggests that the institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments into the sentencing process in response to social and political critiques of criminal administration is both a new and old idea.  It situates the proliferation of actuarial risk assessments in the context of technical guidelines created to structure and regulate judicial sentencing discretion in the 1980s and beyond.  It then examines debates about two conceptual issues — selective incapacitation and equality — to highlight that technical sentencing reforms raise recurring questions at sentencing, even as social perspectives on resolving those questions are shifting.

Rather than using the "old" nature of these issues as evidence that actuarial risk assessments should proliferate, however, this Essay urges critical reflection on the turn toward the technical in the present day, in the face of mass incarceration.  It urges scholars to dispense of the "old" and "new" concept when reflecting on whether and why actuarial risk assessments are proliferating in the states.  It also encourages scholars to draw on the expansive methodological approaches applied to study of sentencing guidelines when considering this reform going forward.

September 26, 2020 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, State Sentencing Guidelines, Technocorrections, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 23, 2020

"The Unified Theory of Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this new revised book chapter authored by Thom Brooks now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Most of the history of the philosophy of punishment is about our making choice of which theory to support and defend against all the rest.  Over time, there have been several attempts aiming to bring two or more theories together in new hybrid formulations.  This penal pluralism can be too quickly dismissed as conceptually contradictory.  At face value, there is a clear and undeniable clash between, say, supporting retributivism and consequentialist views like deterrence or rehabilitation.

For example, the punishments that retributivism might support as ‘deserved’ may lack or run counter to what might cause some desired effect.  Traditionally, the way this clash has been handled most frequently — as seen in Chapter 5 — is to say the justification for deciding who to punish is governed by one goal (e.g., typically retributivist desert) and the amount of punishment distributed to any deserving person is determined by a second, different goal (e.g., usually deterrence).  In giving each goal a different space, they avoid confrontation.  However, what this formula gains in practicability it loses in showing any theoretical coherence.  As we have seen, if desert is so important to justify punishment, why is it irrelevant to setting its amount?  And what necessary connection exists between them holding the two together as one integrated theory? For these reasons, critics have claimed that hybrid theories are unstable at best and incoherent at worst.  Given the way most are formulated, it is easy to agree — but yet it would be a serious mistake to write off the possibility and plausibility of hybrid theories if they might overcome those concerns.

This newly rewritten chapter for this second edition introduces and defends a new hybrid theory: the unified theory of punishment.  Instead of taking a side between retributivist and other positions, the unified theory is an attempt to show how multiple penal goals can be brought together coherently in a single framework, or what might be called a ‘grand unifying theory’ of punishment succeeding where others have failed.  I will argue that not only is the unified theory possible, but that it is most compelling and best able to address the complexity of criminal cases and deliver multiple benefits in a measure and evidenced way, providing a new way of expanding restorative practices as well.

The structure of this chapter is as follows.  First, it begins examining penal pluralism as found in sentencing guidelines, but lacking any framework for how different penal purposes can be coherently applied in any consistent way.  Second, I will provide an overview of philosophers starting primarily with Hegel who first attempted to create a new unified theory.  Thirdly, I will next formulate my own model for how a unified theory might work.  Key to this model is our ability to evidence whether its overarching aim — of protecting and maintaining rights — is fulfilled in a significant change in my thinking.  The chapter then considers several possible objections.

September 23, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 22, 2020

"Virtual Reality: Prospective Catalyst for Restorative Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this new article now on SSRN authored by Kate Bloch. Here is its abstract:

A 2018 U.S. Department of Justice report assessing data from 30 states found that 83% of individuals released from state prisons in 2005 were rearrested within nine years.  When a revolving door ushers five of six individuals back into custody and decimates communities, more effective approaches to criminal justice demand attention.  In countries around the world, restorative justice has been emerging as a promising candidate.  It generally involves an interactive process in which stakeholders identify and grapple with harms caused by the crime. 

But many environments lack the resources to invoke its benefits.  While restorative justice takes various forms, the crux of each variant involves perspective taking — seeing the harm and its consequences through the eyes of those who experienced it.  Cognitive science research suggests that the emerging technology of virtual reality provides an innovative and often especially compelling approach to perspective taking.  Embodying an avatar offers the opportunity to experience the world as another and could make virtual perspective-taking encounters a valuable introduction for subsequent in-person encounters or offer a perspective-taking opportunity when in-person encounters are not practical or prudent.  This analysis explores how virtual reality could become a catalyst for restorative justice.

September 22, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 21, 2020

"Wage Theft Criminalization"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Benjamin Levin now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Over the past decade, workers’ rights activists and legal scholars have embraced the language of “wage theft” in describing the abuses of the contemporary workplace.  The phrase invokes a certain moral clarity: theft is wrong.  The phrase is not merely a rhetorical flourish. Increasingly, it has a specific content for activists, politicians, advocates, and academics: wage theft speaks the language of criminal law, and wage theft is a crime that should be punished.  Harshly.  Self-proclaimed “progressive prosecutors” have made wage theft cases a priority, and left-leaning politicians in the United States and abroad have begun to propose more criminal statutes to reach wage theft.

In this Article, I examine the drive to criminalize wage theft.  In the literature on workers’ rights, “wage theft” has been accepted uncritically as a distinct problem.  But the literature fails to grapple with what makes wage theft clearly distinguishable from other abusive practices endemic to capitalism.  For scholars concerned about worker power and economic inequality, does classifying one class of conduct “wage theft” actually serve to legitimate the other injustices of the labor market?

Further, the literature on wage theft has failed to reckon with the stakes of using criminal law and incarceration as the tools to remedy workplace violations.  Absent from the discourse on wage theft is any engagement with one of the most vital contemporary movements to confront structural inequality: the fight to end mass incarceration.  Despite insistence from proponents of wage theft criminalization that their focus is on society’s most marginalized, particularly poor people of color, these advocates have turned to a criminal system that is widely viewed as inimical to the interests of those same marginalized populations.  Moreover, in calling for criminal prosecution, many commentators have embraced the same actors and institutions that have decimated poor communities and constructed a hyper-policed population.  By resituating wage theft within the literature on mass incarceration, I examine the limitations of using criminalization to redress economic injustices.  I frame pro-criminalization arguments within the growing literature and activist discourse on decarceration and abolition, examining why criminalization of wage theft is and might be particularly problematic.

September 21, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 16, 2020

"Toward Shared Safety: The First-Ever National Survey of America’s Safety Gaps"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new report from the Alliance for Safety and Justice.  Here is how the report's Executive Summary gets started:

Toward Shared Safety: The First-Ever National Survey of America’s Safety Gaps is a first-of-its-kind national study of Americans’ unmet safety needs and public safety policy preferences.  In a moment of unprecedented change — and growing consensus on the need for new approaches to public safety — this report aims to fill critical gaps in information, to help point decision-makers toward a new set of safety solutions that can better serve vulnerable Americans, improve public safety and stop the cycle of crime.

Despite dramatic increases in safety and justice spending over the last several decades, few of those expenditures are informed by the needs of Americans lacking safety or consistently aligned with Americans’ policy preferences.  As concerns about spending and criminal justice grow, there’s never been a more important time to ask some fundamental questions about safety.  What are the gaps in safety that people impacted by crime, violence and criminal justice experience?  What are the priority safety investments that matter the most to Americans of all walks of life?

In June of 2020, over 4,000 Americans were surveyed about their experiences with safety and attitudes about safety policy.  In particular, the survey engaged with people vulnerable to the cycle of crime, including crime victims, people experiencing mental health or substance abuse challenges, and those living with past convictions, as well as voters of all backgrounds, regardless of experience.

As the report details, there is remarkable alignment between gaps in safety that vulnerable people face and the public safety policy preferences that most all Americans support  — policy preferences that would address those very gaps.  Broad consensus exists at the neighborhood level and across different demographics: public safety policies and investments should prioritize violence prevention, recovery, mental health, reentry and the most effective strategies to stop the cycle of crime, more than incarceration.  It’s time for federal, state and local expenditures to match these urgently needed and popularly supported priorities.  It’s time for Shared Safety.

September 16, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, September 13, 2020

"Revisiting Hate Crimes Enhancements in the Shadow of Mass Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Shirin Sinnar and Beth A. Colgan.  Here is its abstract:

Although civil rights advocates have largely supported hate crimes laws over the last four decades, growing concern over mass incarceration is now leading some to question the focus on enhancing prison sentences.  This Essay explores two alternatives to the traditional sentence enhancement model that might retain the expressive message of hate crimes laws — to convey society’s particular condemnation of crimes of bias — while relying less heavily on police and prisons: the reformation of victim compensation programs to help victims and targeted communities and the application of restorative justice processes to hate crimes.  Each of these alternatives presents complications, but both offer sufficient potential to justify further exploration.

September 13, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 11, 2020

"Have Problem Solving Courts Changed the Practice of Law?"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Cynthia Alkon now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Drug courts started thirty years ago in the United States.  The introduction of these courts brought high hopes that they would refocus our criminal legal system to therapeutic and rehabilitative methods while moving away from an otherwise largely punitive and punishment-oriented approach.  Has this happened?  Has the problem-solving court movement brought widespread change to how criminal cases are processed and how criminal lawyers, both prosecutors and defense lawyers, approach the practice of law?  Have these courts actually been a “monumental change?”  The simple answer is no.  These courts have changed how some defendants are treated some of the time.  But, the numbers impacted by these courts, even as the number of these courts has grown dramatically, remains small.  And, the rehabilitative approach within these courts has not led to changes in how other courts work within the larger criminal legal system. Problem-solving courts have remained, for the most part, in their own silo while other courts have continued business as usual focusing on punishment, not rehabilitation.

This article will start with a discussion of mass incarceration and offer some reasons why problem-solving courts did not prevent, or lessen, mass incarceration.  Next this article will discuss how problem-solving courts work, focusing on the roles of the professionals, the judges and lawyers, within these courts.  This article will then consider the impact, or lack of impact that these courts have had on how the larger criminal legal system works.  Finally, this article will suggest five key things that problem-solving courts do that would result in “monumental change” if more widely adopted by mainstream criminal courts.

September 11, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 10, 2020

"Punishment, Rewards and the (Relative) Importance of Desert"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Gustavo A. Beade now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Philosophers and legal theorists have long been interested in the idea of desert.  In this work I intend to demonstrate that the importance of desert is, at times, overrated, leading thinkers to adopt rather extreme positions.  I believe that the concept of desert is important in some cases, but desert is by no means central to our thinking of punishment and reward, nor should it be.  Even though the concept of desert is generally addressed in matters regarding retribution, I will argue that this concept should not be the basis upon which we build our constructs of punishment and reward.  Rather, we should consider the impact that luck has on our lives.  If we do so, those considerations would change our perception of the concept of desert.

September 10, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, September 02, 2020

Notable exploration of criminal justice structures for "emerging adults"

This morning I received an email altering me to a big new report on an interesting modern topic that is focused on a population and a region especially near to me heart.  Here is the text of the email, which provides a link to the nearly 100-page report and a useful overview of its coverage:

Today, Juvenile Law Center released “Rethinking Justice for Emerging Adults: Spotlight on the Great Lakes Region,” a report on criminal justice reforms for young people between the ages of 18 and 24.  The report, funded by a grant from the Joyce Foundation, cites new research which shows that these “emerging adults” share many of the same characteristics as teens in the juvenile justice system, yet they are treated very differently.  Emerging adults also represent a disproportionate share of the justice-involved population, accounting for a third of all criminal arrests nationwide.  They also experience the worst racial disparities in incarceration and arrest rates of any age group.

“Racism permeates our criminal justice system at every stage and available data suggests racial and ethnic disparities are worst for those in the emerging adult population,” said Katrina L. Goodjoint, Staff Attorney at Juvenile Law Center and co-author of the report. “In Illinois, 9.4 Black emerging adults are arrested per every white emerging adult. Eliminating mass incarceration and reducing racial disparities necessarily require reforming the justice system’s punitive treatment of emerging adults.”

Juvenile Law Center’s report highlights the need for a new, developmentally appropriate approach to criminal justice involvement for this population.  The report includes research showing that many areas of the law — from new federal tobacco regulations to extended access to health insurance under the Affordable Care Act — already recognize and make accommodations for the developmental characteristics of emerging adulthood.  Justice systems around the country have also begun to do the same.  The report describes some of the new initiatives targeted at this population, including:

  • raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction
  • youthful offender statutes
  • diversion programs, young adult courts, and other specialized criminal justice programs for emerging adults
  • modifications to mandatory sentences and other harsh penalties
  • expungement of records
  • expanded access to supports and services outside the criminal justice system.

“People do not magically transform from children to adults on their 18th birthdays,” said Karen U. Lindell, Senior Attorney at Juvenile Law Center and one of the report’s authors. “Other areas of the law have long recognized that fact — limiting young adults’ abilities to engage in risky activities, like drinking or purchasing firearms, and offering them additional support, like greater health insurance coverage and special education services.  Yet the criminal justice system is just beginning to acknowledge the distinctive needs and characteristics of emerging adults.”

The report released today focuses on the laws and policies affecting emerging adults in six Great Lakes region states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin. For each of these states, the report provides a comprehensive overview of the current legal landscape for emerging adults, including available data on justice-involved emerging adults, relevant criminal and juvenile justice statutes, existing criminal justice programs, and other systems serving emerging adults in the state.  By providing an in-depth analysis of the current legal landscape, this report lays the foundation for meaningful criminal justice reform for emerging adults — both in the Great Lakes region and throughout the country.

September 2, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 31, 2020

"What We Got Wrong in the War on Drugs"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper now available via SSRN authored by Mark Osler. Here is its abstract:

The War on Drugs is effectively over.  Drugs won.  This essay addresses some of the mistakes we made in that futile effort.  Allowing racism to motivate action and impede reform was a primary error.  So was failing to understand that narcotics crime is simply different than other types of criminalized behavior in several fundamental ways. 

In whole, we largely addressed the narcotics trade as a moral failing rather than a market — and never got around to recognizing the size and shape of that market or to using market forces to control it.  Ronald Reagan compared the War on Drugs to the Battle of Verdun, and he was right: fortunes were spent, many lives were lost, and nothing really changed.

August 31, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, August 30, 2020

"The Price of Criminal Law Skepticism: Ten Functions of the Criminal Law"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Douglas Husak now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

A growing trend in philosophical commentary about penal justice is what I loosely call criminal law skepticism.  The scholarship I have in mind does not simply urge caution or a more judicious use of the criminal law to address social problems.  Instead, its thrust is more sweeping and radical; it presents reasons to doubt that the criminal law as presently constituted should continue to exist at all. 

I make no concerted effort to categorize the several varieties or motivations for this trend; their forms and underlying rationales are diverse and frequently humane.  No single argument can refute them all.  Instead, I respond by describing the price that might be incurred if these skeptics were to achieve their objective.  I list ten valuable functions served by the criminal law as it currently exists, several of which are too seldom appreciated in philosophical commentary.  No case for criminal law skepticism is complete unless efforts are made to explain how alternatives to the criminal law can achieve these functions or afford to dispense with them.

August 30, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 21, 2020

Justice or injustice?: Golden State Killer gets LWOP for at least 13 murders and dozens of rapes after deal to avoid death penalty

As reported in this NBC News piece, a "former police officer known as the Golden State Killer for his crime spree across California in the 1970s and '80s was sentenced Friday to consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole."  Here is more about the crimes and punishment:

Joseph DeAngelo, 74, who had eluded authorities for decades, pleaded guilty in June to 13 counts of first-degree murder and 13 rape-related charges in a deal that spared him the death penalty.  He also publicly admitted to dozens more sexual assaults for which the statute of limitations had expired. Sacramento County Superior Court Judge Michael Bowman said Friday in a rare sentencing statement that DeAngelo would "meet his death confined behind the walls of state penitentiary."

"The court is not saying DeAngelo does not deserve to have the death penalty imposed," Bowman said, but given the age of the defendant and victims, a life sentence made more sense. Bowman said he hopes "survivors will find some resolution" after DeAngelo is permanently placed behind bars.

DeAngelo on Friday made a short statement in court addressing victims and their families. "I’ve listened to all your statements. Each one of them. And I’m truly sorry to everyone I’ve hurt. Thank you your honor," he said.

Prosecutors said DeAngelo admitted to harming 87 victims in 53 separate crimes spanning 11 California counties. As part of the plea agreement, he was required to register as a sex offender and pay restitution to the victims or their families, as well as any fees or fines. Assistant Chief Deputy District Attorney Thien Ho has said the scope of DeAngelo's crime spree is "simply staggering, encompassing 13 known murders and almost 50 rapes between 1975 and 1986."

DeAngelo's crime spree started while he was working as a police officer in Exeter, a northern California community in the San Joaquin Valley near the foothills of the Sierra Nevada. Over the years, his crimes morphed from stalking properties to serial rape and murder. DeAngelo went on to marry and raise his own family, escaping investigators' efforts to find him for decades, before he was arrested in Sacramento County in 2018. It is believed to be the first high-profile case to have been cracked with genetic genealogy. Authorities said they used "discarded DNA" to confirm that DeAngelo was the man generations of authorities and citizen sleuths had searched for....

Some of DeAngelo's victims are in their 80s and 90s. Some are dead. But those who were willing and able spent the week addressing DeAngelo in court in anticipation of his sentencing. Phyllis Henneman said she was 22 years old and "young and carefree" when her life changed forever in June 1976. She was home alone with her sister while their dad was out of town when DeAngelo attacked.

"Joseph DeAngelo, henceforth called 'the devil incarnate,' broke into my home, blindfolded me, tied me up, threatened my life with a knife and raped me," she said, describing DeAngelo's modus operandi, which also included tying up partners and spending hours in homes, leaving his victims wondering what terror would come next. "Life as I knew it irrevocably changed that day," she said in the statement read by her sister, Karen Veilleux. But DeAngelo's arrest and upcoming sentencing meant "his victims and their families are now free."

A recent HBO documentary, "I'll Be Gone in the Dark," detailed the gruesome attacks and the desperate effort to find the killer, even as the years wore on. The documentary is based on crime writer Michelle McNamara's book of the same name, in which she recounted her own obsessive effort to uncover the identity of the Golden State Killer and conviction that genetic genealogy would help her do it. McNamara, the wife of comedian Patton Oswalt, died in 2016, two years before DeAngelo's arrest. Bowman on Friday thanked McNamara by name, along with law enforcement, other citizen detectives and DeAngelo's victims for their "dogged persistence" in their quest to bring him to justice.

August 21, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, August 14, 2020

Republican Georgia legislator looking to use fiscal argument to bolster death penalty abolition

In this post around the start of the pandemic, I wondered aloud "Might COVID-19 ultimately bring an end to the death penalty in the United States?".  One point I made in that post was that, amidst economic difficulties, the death penalty might seem an even more problematic use of limited government time and resources.  As I put it in that post: "I think there will be very strong arguments that this punishment is a kind of 'legal luxury' that we really cannot and ought not invest resources in while we try to rebuild after COVID-19."  

I returned to that post this morning upon seeing this new local press piece from Georgia headlined "Georgia GOP lawmaker makes budget argument to abolish death penalty."  Here are excerpts:

A Georgia Republican says he thinks the state House of Representatives is just a dozen votes shy of advancing a bill that would abolish the death penalty. Rep. Brett Harrell of Snellville said Thursday that he thinks highlighting the cost of capital punishment may help win over the support needed, at least in the one chamber.  Harrell, who chairs the influential House Ways and Means Committee, said he intends to push for the funding needed to pay for an analysis of how much Georgia spends to execute people.

“I think this conservative concerns about the death penalty focus is important and to focus on those fiscal costs will be important to us to gain those last few votes necessary to move the issue forward in Georgia,” he said.

The Gwinnett County lawmaker took part in a virtual discussion Thursday that was organized by Conservatives Concerned about the Death Penalty, a national group that argues capital punishment is inconsistent with conservative principles.  He appeared along with two Republicans from Ohio and Wyoming. Hannah Cox, the group’s senior national manager, called the death penalty a “failed big government program that fails to measure up to our values of limiting government, adhering to fiscal responsibility and protecting the sanctity of human life.”  She said most of the costs stem from the intensive trials required for a capital murder case – and not, as most assume, the lengthy appellate process.

She said the squeeze on state budgets due to the COVID-19 pandemic has brought renewed scrutiny to the cost.  Georgia just recently cut 10% from its budget, partly because of declining revenues due to the viral outbreak.

Harrell sponsored a bipartisan bill last year that would have ended the death penalty in Georgia, requiring instead life in prison without parole for those sitting on death row.  The bill never cleared a committee.  Georgia is among the 25 states that have the death penalty.

Now, he’s sharpening his fiscal line of attack, calling the death penalty an “incredibly expensive proposition.” He pointed to an example in the 1990s that left local officials jailed for a day in Lincoln County when they refused to foot the bill for a second capital murder trial after the courts overturned a death sentence. At the time, the case had already cost the rural county about $100,000; the county’s entire budget was $2.2 million.

“Evidence suggests – study after study – that it is not an actual deterrent to crime and we have alternatives, such as life without parole,” Harrell said. “As someone who is fiscally conservative and prefers a small government consistent with efficient implementation of government, the death penalty fails on all those measures.”

He also noted that Georgia has exonerated six people since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976. “Someone who is also a social conservative and someone who is pro-life should also see the death penalty as very problematic in that the likelihood is very great that innocent have been executed as well,” Harrell said.

Because many of my criticisms of many aspects of the criminal justice system are situated in the concern that it does not involve "efficient implementation of government," I am always drawn to these kinds of arguments.  And, as mentioned before, I think the misused resources arguments against the death penalty are especially strong during a time of national crisis when monies would seem better spent seeking to help those in need rather than in trying to secure and preserve a death sentence that likely never will be carried out.

August 14, 2020 in Death Penalty Reforms, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, August 08, 2020

"Beyond Unreasonable"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by John Inazu and now posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The concept of “reasonableness” permeates the law: the “reasonable person” determines the outcome of torts and contracts disputes, the criminal burden of proof requires factfinders to conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt;” claims of self-defense succeed or fail on reasonableness determinations.  But as any first-year law student can attest, the line between reasonable and unreasonable isn’t always clear.  Nor is that the only ambiguity. In the realm of the unreasonable, many of us intuit that some actions are not only unreasonable but beyond the pale — we might say they are beyond unreasonable.  Playing football, summiting Nanga Parbat, and attempting Russian roulette all risk serious injury or death, but most people do not view them the same.  These distinctions raise vexing questions: what is it that makes us feel differently about these activities?  Mere unfamiliarity?  Moral condemnation?  Relative utility?  Or something else altogether?  Moreover, who exactly is the “we” forming these judgments?

This Article explores the vague lines that separate our sense of reasonable, unreasonable, and beyond unreasonable — the reasonableness lines.  Part I examines the general characteristics of these lines.  Part II explores their significance in law, and Part III considers their application in four discrete areas of law: tax policy for medical expenses, criminal punishment, speech restrictions, and tort liability for inherently dangerous sports.  The Article ends by summarizing the implications of the reasonableness lines for our culture and for ourselves.

August 8, 2020 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, August 02, 2020

"Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Missing Literature"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Alex Raskolnikov and recently posted to SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

This review of the criminal deterrence literature focuses on the questions that are largely missing from many recent, excellent, comprehensive reviews of that literature, and from the literature itself.  By “missing” I mean, first, questions that criminal deterrence scholars have ignored either completely or to a large extent.  These questions range from fundamental (the distributional analysis of the criminal justice system), to those hidden in plain sight (economic analysis of misdemeanors), to those that are well-know yet mostly overlooked (the role of positive incentives, offender’s mental state, and celerity of punishment).  I also use “missing” to refer to the areas where substantial relevant knowledge exists but is largely disregarded within the criminal deterrence research program.  The empirical analysis of environmental and tax compliance are two stark examples.  Finally, I stretch “missing” to describe topics that have been both studied and reviewed, but where substantial challenges remain.  These include the theoretical explanation for the role of offense history, the proper accounting for the offender’s gains, the estimation of the costs of various crimes, and the cost-benefit analysis of crime-reduction policies.

Among the literature’s missing pieces, several stand out both on their own and because they combine to produce a highly unfortunate result.  First, the literature makes only a minor effort to estimate the cost of crime, and essentially no effort to estimate the cost of white-collar offenses.  Combined with no centralized reporting of white-collar crimes and, therefore, no empirical analysis of them, the literature adds to the impression — not supported by the available evidence — that street crime is a great social problem while white-collar crime is a minor one.  Second, the literature fails to treat misdemeanors (and misdemeanor enforcement) as an independent subject of study.  This creates an impression — also unjustified — that thirteen million or so misdemeanor charges a year — and countless millions of stops, frisks, and interrogations that lead to no charges — all heavily skewed by race and class — are not a major social problem either. Third, the literature is only starting to develop a benefit-cost analysis of various crime-reducing strategies.  This analysis almost exclusively considers measures reflected in the optimal deterrence model and, therefore, internal to the criminal justice system.  This creates an impression — almost surely false — that deterrence is the only means of reducing future crime. Finally, the literature ignores distributional analysis altogether, even though the burdens of crime and the criminal justice system vary dramatically, predictably, and disturbingly by race and income.  By disregarding this variation, the literature may be reinforcing it. 

For all these reasons, the criminal deterrence literature may well be contributing to the overwhelming, singular focus of American society and law enforcement on the forceful deterrence of street crime. Addressing the missing pieces would enrich the literature, expand its appeal and policy-relevance, and enable academics to contribute to the effort of setting the US criminal justice system on the path of long-overdue structural reforms.

August 2, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, July 31, 2020

Big new ACLU and HRW report details "How Probation and Parole Feed Mass Incarceration in the United States"

The quoted portion of the title of this post is part of the title of this huge new report by Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union fully titled "Revoked: How Probation and Parole Feed Mass Incarceration in the United States." This important 200+ page report includes these passages in its "summary":

Probation, parole, and other forms of supervision are marketed as alternatives to incarceration in the United States. Supervision, it is claimed, will keep people out of prison and help them get back on their feet.

Throughout the past 50 years, the use of probation (a sentence often imposed just after conviction) and parole (served after incarceration) has soared alongside jail and prison populations. As of 2016, the last year for which supervision data is available, 2.2 million people were incarcerated in United States jails and prisons, but more than twice as many, 4.5 million people — or one in every 55 — were under supervision.  Supervision rates vary vastly by state, from one in every 168 people in New Hampshire, to one in every 18 in Georgia.

Over the past several decades,arbitrary and overly harsh supervision regimes have led people back into US jails and prisons — feeding mass incarceration.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), in the late 1970s, 16 percent of US state and federal prison admissions stemmed from violations of parole and some types of probation.  This number climbed to a high of 36 percent in 2008, and, in 2018, the last year for which data is available, was 28 percent.  A different set of data for the previous year from the Council of State Governments, which includes all types of probation violations — but is limited to state prison populations — shows that 45 percent of all US state prison admissions stemmed from probation and parole violations.  These figures do not include people locked up for supervision violations in jails, for which there is little nationwide data.  Black and brown people are both disproportionately subjected to supervision and incarcerated for violations.

This report documents how and why supervision winds up landing many people in jail and prison — feeding mass incarceration rather than curtailing it.  The extent of the problem varies among states, and in recent years multiple jurisdictions have enacted reforms to limit incarceration for supervision violations.  This report focuses on three states where our initial research indicated that — despite some reforms — the issue remains particularly acute: Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

Drawing on data provided by or obtained from these states, presented here for the first time, and interviews with 164 people incarcerated for supervision violations, family members, government officials, practitioners, advocates, and experts, we document the tripwires in these states leading to incarceration.  These include burdensome conditions imposed without providing resources; violations for minor slip-ups; lengthy incarceration while alleged violations are adjudicated; flawed procedures; and disproportionately harsh sentences for violations.  The report shows that, nationwide,most people locked up for supervision violations were not convicted of new offenses — rather, they were incarcerated for breaking the rules of their supervision, such as for using drugs or alcohol, failing to report address changes, or not following the rules of supervision-mandated programs.  Of those who were incarcerated for new offenses, in our focus states, many were for conduct like possessing drugs; public order offenses such as disorderly conduct or resisting arrest; misdemeanor assaultive conduct; or shoplifting....

The root causes of these violations, the report documents, are often a lack of resources and services, unmet health needs, and racial bias.The report also draws attention to marked racial disparities in who is subjected to supervision and how authorities enforce it. In practice, supervision in many parts of the US has become a system to control and warehouse people who are struggling with an array of economic and health-related challenges, without offering meaningful solutions to those underlying problems.

July 31, 2020 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

"The Prisoner and the Polity"

The title of this post is the title of this new article now available via SSRN authored by Avlana Eisenberg. Here is its abstract:

All punishment comes to an end.  Most periods of imprisonment are term limited, and ninety-five percent of prisoners will eventually leave prison.  Though it is tempting to think of the “end” in concrete, factual terms — for example, as the moment when the prisoner is released — this concept also has normative dimensions.  Core to the notion of term-limited imprisonment is the “principle of return”: the idea that, when the prisoner has completed his or her time, that person is entitled to return to society.  Yet, for the principle of return to be meaningful, it must include the idea of a fair chance of reestablishing oneself in the community.  The “practices of incarceration” — including the prison environment and prison programs — are thus critically important because they can either facilitate or impede a prisoner’s reentry into society.  However, apart from the question of whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual as defined by the Eighth Amendment, these practices of incarceration have largely avoided scholarly scrutiny.

This Article uses the case study of higher education programs in prison to expose the interdependence between the practices of incarceration and the principle of return.  Drawing on original interviews with key stakeholders, it investigates how the features of higher education programs reflect and reinforce core beliefs about the goals of punishment and the state’s responsibility towards those it incarcerates.  The Article critically examines the dominant harm-prevention justification for prison higher education, and the desert-based objection to it, finding that both are inadequate for failing to take into account the principle of return.

This Article espouses an alternative approach that would recognize the ongoing relationship between prisoner and polity and devise incarceration practices accordingly.  Building on insights from communitarian theory, this approach, which foregrounds the prisoner’s status in the polity, uncovers pervasive “us-versus-them” narratives in the prison context. The first such narrative is between prisoners and those members of the polity who view prisoners, falsely, as having forfeited their claims to membership in civil society.  This view of prisoners, as members of a permanent and lower caste, is in direct conflict with the principle of return, which mandates that prisoners have at least a plausible hope of basic reintegration into society and that they avoid further harm — what might be termed “punishment-plus.”  The Article also scrutinizes a second, more localized “us-versus-them” narrative between prisoners and correctional officers, which arises from their similar backgrounds and the common deprivation experienced by members of both groups.

Finally, the Article recommends institutional design changes to mitigate “us-versus-them” dynamics: empowering stakeholders, for example, by affording correctional officers educational opportunities that would help professionalize their role and ease their resentment towards prisoners; and increasing exposure and empathy between incarcerated and non-incarcerated populations, such as by piloting a program that would employ recent college graduates to teach in prison.  These and other proposed reforms would refocus the conversation around imprisonment to account for the central role of incarceration practices in revitalizing the principle of return, as well as the inextricable connection between prisoner and polity.

July 31, 2020 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, July 28, 2020

At resentencing, Senator Rand Paul's attacker gets additional 13 months (eight to be served in federal prison, six in home confinement)

This local article, headline "KY man who tackled U.S. Sen. Rand Paul sentenced to another 13 months confinement," provides some details from a high-profile resentencing that took place yesterday and included a number of interesting elements:

The neighbor who lost his temper and attacked Republican U.S. Sen. Rand Paul in 2017, breaking six of his ribs, has been sentenced to an additional 13 months confinement.  A federal judge initially sentenced Rene Boucher to 30 days in jail for the November 2017 attack, along with 100 hours of community service and a $10,000 fine.

During a video hearing Monday, U.S. District Judge Matthew F. Leitman handed down the new sentence against Boucher — eight months in prison and six months on home confinement.  However, Leitman gave Boucher credit for the 30 days he already served, so he will have seven more months behind bars.

Prosecutors had appealed the initial sentence for Boucher, arguing it was unreasonably light, and won the right to try to get a longer sentence.  That led to Monday’s hearing.  The new sentence for Boucher still wasn’t as long as the government wanted.  Assistant U.S. Attorney Brad Shepard objected to the sentence, which could lead to yet another appeal by the government for stiffer sentence for Boucher.

The attack made national news because of Paul’s position, but prosecutors have acknowledged it had nothing to do with politics.  Rather, Boucher, who lived next door to Paul in a gated community in Bowling Green, attacked Paul because he got angry over Paul stacking limbs and other yard waste near their shared property line, according to the court record....

Police first charged Boucher with misdemeanor assault in state court, but the federal government stepped in and prosecuted him under a law barring assaults on members of Congress.  Under advisory guidelines, Boucher faced a potential sentence of 21 to 27 months. Federal judges can impost sentences below those guidelines.

In handing down a lower sentence, U.S. District Judge Marianne O. Battani cited Boucher’s military service, his involvement in his church and her belief that the attack was out of character for Boucher.  However, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Battani didn’t give sufficient weight to the seriousness of Paul’s injuries or the need for deterrence, and didn’t sufficiently address the issue of the big difference in Boucher’s sentence and others involving federal assault cases.

Shepard renewed a call for a 21-month sentence for Boucher because of the severity of Paul’s injuries.  The punishment also should to be tough enough deter similar attacks, Shepard said.  “The court I think needs to send the message . . . that we cannot continue as a society to resort to violence,” Shepard said.

Paul and his wife, Kelly, submitted written statements about the attack the first time Boucher was sentenced, but spoke in person during the video hearing Monday.  Paul said he’d never had cross words with Boucher and so had no idea he was unhappy before Boucher blindsided him.  Paul described the intense pain and his struggles to breathe after the attack, as well as the history of physical problems since, including bouts with pneumonia, night sweats and fever; coughing up blood; surgery to remove part of his scarred lung; and still more surgery to drain infected fluid.  Paul said his lung capacity will likely be reduced the rest of his life, and he has chronic pain.  “I don’t know what a night without pain is like, or a day without pain,” Paul said....

Boucher’s attorney, Matthew J. Baker, said Boucher is “profoundly sorry” for the attack, but argued against any additional time for Boucher, a physician.  Baker said Boucher’s initial sentence was appropriate, and that he had faced additional punishment by way of a judgment of more than $600,000 in a state civil lawsuit Paul filed against him over the attack.  That judgment included $375,000 in punitive damages, which by definition are to punish a defendant....

Lietman said it was heartbreaking to hear Paul and his wife describe the fallout from the attack. But the judge said he was choosing a sentence below the guideline range for several reasons, including Boucher’s long record of work with his church, his eight years as a U.S. Army doctor, the fact that the attack was out of character, and the damage to his reputation from the crime.  Leitman said $375,000 punitive damage award in state court also figured into his decision. “That’s a lot of punishment,” he said.

Leitman did not set a date for Boucher to begin the sentence.

I would be surprised if the feds go through with another appeal, and I would be even more surprised if they would prevail on a second appeal.  The Sixth Circuit panel opinion reversing the initial 30-day sentence made much of the original "dramatic downward variance" from a guideline minimum of 21 months, and Judge Lietman seems to have addressed some of the panel's chief concerns when imposing a longer sentence closer to the bottom of the advisory range.  And Judge Lietman's reliance on the civil punishment from the sizable punitive damage award would seem to be a distinctive additional factor supporting the reasonableness of a sentence below the guideline range.

Prior related posts:

July 28, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 24, 2020

Never-ending New Jersey drunk driving case highlights fundamental reason why sentencing is so dang hard

9889228-0-image-a-67_1550300070445I am fond of saying "sentencing is dang hard."  (A version of a speech I gave with this title appears in the February 2020 issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter and also is available here via SSRN.)  An appellate ruling this  week in a high-profile New Jersey case has me recalling this point; this local press piece, headlined "Amy Locane will be sentenced for a fourth time on fatal 2010 DWI charge," provides part of the backstory (with a little emphasis added):

A state appellate court ruled Wednesday that actress Amy Locane, convicted in connection with a fatal drunken driving accident a decade ago in Montgomery, must be sentenced for a fourth time because the first three times were either illegal sentences or sentences imposed outside the state's criminal code.

In a 41-page decision, the appellate court ruled that the latest sentence in the case, handed down by Superior Court Judge Kevin Shanahan in February 2019, was "illogical" based on an "unauthorized sentencing theory" that weighed on what he called "the yin and yang" of the case's facts....

James Wronko, Locane's attorney, said he will ask the state Supreme Court to review the decision. "I don't know what society gains by putting the mother of two back in jail," Wronko said.

Shanahan sentenced Locane to five years in prison, but stayed the sentence because he did not consider her a flight risk. The Somerset County Prosecutor's Office argued the sentence should not be stayed and appealed the judge's decision.

Locane previously had been sentenced to three years in state prison on charges of vehicular homicide and assault by auto in connection with the death of Helene Seeman in the crash.  Her husband, Fred, was severely injured in the crash as the couple were turning into their driveway of their weekend home at 9 p.m. on June 27, 2010.  Locane is an actress who starred with Johnny Depp in “Cry-Baby” and was a featured actress on the TV series “Melrose Place.”...

The Somerset County Prosecutor's Office first appealed the the three-year sentence that was handed down by retired Superior Court Judge Robert Reed who presided over the trial.  Locane served 85 percent of that sentence at the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women in Hunterdon County.  She also successfully completed the conditions of her parole a year ago, Wronko said.  "She's led an exemplary life since her release," Wronko said....

In handing down the five-year sentence, Shanahan said that imposing a higher sentence "would have been an exercise in bad judgment, just like all the others."  Shanahan also said that he was not bound by previous Appellate Court rulings in the case.

"Clearly, changes in (Locane's) personal circumstances warrant divergence," the Appellate Court wrote in the decision, "but it is rudimentary that a trial judge is bound by our prior decision. (Shanahan) ignored the prior findings, while seemingly giving them lip service."

So, in a sad drunk driving case involving a fatal result, New Jersey courts have now been trying and failing to figure out Amy Locane's "right" sentence for now a full decade.  In that time, the defendant has served out a three-year ("wrong") prison sentence (and also paid $1.5 million of a nearly $5 million civil settlement).  I can only speculate about how many (mostly taxpayer) resources have been expended in all these court proceedings trying to get to the "right" sentence, and I wonder whether the surviving victims are really eager to start another decade of wrangling over finding the "right" sentence.

Of course, I keep putting "right" in quotes when discussing this matter because there obviously is no clear right sentence in this case (or most cases).  Sentencing is so dang hard in part because it lacks a clear right/wrong metric no matter what sentencing philosophies one is inclined to adopt.  Moreover, this case especially spotlights the fundamental challenge balancing aggravating offense factors (especially a victim's death) with mitigating offender factors (addiction and lack of criminal history).  The latest appellate opinion (available here) showcases how sentencing judges here have generally focused on the offender, while the appellate judges have focused on the offense (at p. 36):

In this case, the focus has repeatedly shifted away from the crime defendant committed to her individual characteristics at the expense of imposing a just sentence reflective of her offense and the harm she caused.  That she was struggling with addiction did not authorize the court to close its eyes to the harm she inflicted on the victims, the victims' family, and the community.  That harm will never dissipate.  The loss of a loved one, and serious physical injury to another, can never be compensated.

Ironically, another round of resentencing strikes me as a fool's errand in part because I agree with this court's sentiment that the harm caused by Amy Locane "will never dissipate" and "can never be compensated."  Because there is no way the law through any form of punishment can make this kind of harm go away, I struggle to see what is likely to be achieved when the state uses more taxpayer resources to  try, yet again, to add still more years to Locane's sentence.

Notably, there is no mention in this latest appellate opinion of just what the victims of this now-long-ago offense might now want.  I hope for their sake that starting another decade of wrangling over Locane's sentence does not rub salt into their wounds.  I also wonder if some kind of restorative justice efforts have been tried or might now be started to enable the victims and the defendant here to get some measure of peace and resolution that the New Jersey courts have been unable so far to provide.

Prior related post:

July 24, 2020 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Sunday, July 19, 2020

Perspectives from A to Z on how to reform incarceration nation

Though there is still plenty more to say about how the coronavirus is continuing to course through our nation's jails and prisons, I was pleased to see this week a number of new commentaries discussing prison and criminal justice reform more generally.  Notably, this round-up of pieces include works from sources that start with A and that start with Z, so here is a collection of pieces that all seem worth a midsummer read from A to Z:

From America: The Jesuit Review, "Religious ideals shaped the broken U.S. prison system. Can they also fix it?"

From Fast Company, "Here’s How We Get to a World Where We Don’t Need Prisons at All"

From The Morning Call, "We need justice system that values people"

From Salon, "Abolishing the whole prison-industrial complex"

From the Washington Times, "Keeping families together must be a priority for the criminal justice system"

From ZDNet, "Can technologists help end mass incarceration?: Data-driven approaches to criminal justice often backfire. Here's one way to do it right."

July 19, 2020 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 17, 2020

"A Vision for the Modern Prosecutor"

The title of this post is the title of this intriguing new five-page document produced by the Executive Session of the Institute for Innovation in Prosecution at John Jay College. Here is the piece's introduction and some key elements:

In the wake of unprecedented and overdue attention on the criminal legal system and its role in our Nation’s legacy of racial injustice, as elected prosecutors and members of the Institute for Innovation in Prosecution’s Executive Session on the Role of the Prosecutor, we believe that it is possible to describe and call for an emerging vision for the role of a modern prosecutor.  In doing so, we find it necessary to contrast this vision with a description of the traditional ways that prosecutors have carried out their responsibilities.  In this paper we describe this contrast between traditional practice and a vision of the future by comparing their conceptions of justice, modes of operation, culture, accountability, and metrics. In making these contrasts, we celebrate the power and potential of the current wave of prosecutorial reform that we are witnessing around the country. We have high hopes that this movement will support the broader re-examination of our society’s response to crime and aspiration for justice.

Conceptions of Justice

Traditionally: Prosecutors have defined their role principally as part of a larger criminal justice system that operates with a primary focus on case processing....

We believe the future of prosecution requires that: Prosecutors explicitly set aside this notion of the criminal justice system as a case processing apparatus.... 

 

Modes of Operation

Traditionally: Prosecutors have been largely reactive....

We believe the future of prosecution requires that: Prosecutors no longer regard themselves as recipients of other actors’ cases or as limited by existing system options with respect to dispositions of those cases....

 

Culture

Traditionally: Prosecutors have been acculturated to consider themselves to be the “us,” and the “good guys,” in an “us vs. them” and “good vs. bad” world....

We believe the future of prosecution requires that: Prosecutors recognize the complexity of the people with whom they engage and of the matters to which they attend....

 

Accountability and Metrics

Traditionally: Prosecutors have relied on internal, narrow, and often ill-defined standards for judging their performance....

We believe the future of prosecution requires that: Prosecutors develop broad, explicit and transparent standards and expectations for their actions and outcomes....

Prosecutors must make violence and violence prevention a top priority.

July 17, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, July 15, 2020

"Reforming Federal Sentencing: A Call for Equality-Infused Menschlichkeit"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Nora V. Demleitner now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

This piece, which serves as an Introduction to the Symposium Issue of the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice, addresses both questions of pedagogy and federal sentencing. It starts by highlighting the value of a symposium on federal sentencing as a teaching, research, and advocacy tool before it turns to sentencing reform specifically.

Federal sentencing remains a highly contested area because it raises stark questions of equality and equitable treatment.  Sentencing has long been unfair to minority defendants, African Americans in particular, though the guidelines have in part mitigated racial disparities.  Still the injustices perpetuated through federal sentencing have reinforced larger racial biases and contributed to ongoing racial stereotyping.

Empirical research and today’s technology can help both decrease race-based differentials and bring about shorter and more rehabilitation-focused sentencing, as long as we have the will to follow their lead.  Ultimately, we need to bring compassion, mercy, and Menschlichkeit to sentencing. Criminal defendants are not the “other” but “of us.”  Those values need to be part of our legal experience and of legal education lest law become merely an exercise in logic or ideology.

July 15, 2020 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, June 26, 2020

"How to have less crime with less punishment"

The title of this post is the headline of this new Hill commentary authored by Benjamin van Rooij and Adam Fine.  Here are excerpts:

For too long, America has been under the illusion that punishment is an effective medicine against crime.  This has led to the largest prison population in the world, a system of mass incarceration that has destroyed families and neighborhoods caught in circles of arrests, imprisonment, probation, and legal discrimination.  And with very little to show for it. It did not help win the War on Drugs or prevent the current opioid epidemic, nor did it play a significant role in the crime declines in cities like New York.  The criminal justice system does not even help to prevent crime through incapacitation, by locking offenders out of society, as this, in the most positive estimate, reduces crime by only 0.4 percent.

So, the idea that we can only get law and order through punishment is simply flawed. Surely, there should not be impunity, and punishment is definitely part of any law and order mix. But, it should just not be its chief focus. There are much better ways to prevent crime....

If we simply make crime harder, we need less police and less punishment.  There is a clear road ahead here. If you want to reduce homicide and many forms of gang violence, and many suicides while you’re at it, just ban guns, or at least severely restrict access to them.  Just consider how none of America’s top-ten mass shootings occurred during the federal ban on assault rifles.  And this has the added advantage that we deescalate police work, as cops have less reason to be afraid and less reason to act like soldiers in war zones.

Next, we can ensure that people do not have to resort to crime in the first place.  We clearly know that when there is less poverty, there is less crime, and when people get to finish their education, again, less crime. So let’s fight crime by fighting poverty and investing in education.  And for those who do resort to crime, we can turn to our next layer of defense: treatment.  Perhaps the most surprising thing we learned when we looked through decades of research was that rehabilitation programs that provide cognitive therapy, aggression training and substance abuse treatment actually work very well.  They are shown to reduce crime between 18-60 percent.

Finally, we can also have less crime if more people think the law is legitimate.  In fact, the way we perceive the criminal justice system is directly related to our willingness to engage in crime.  If people feel that the legal system treats them with respect, that it listens to their concerns, and that it acts impartially and neutrally, they will be less likely to commit a crime.  We must make our legal system fair and just because in doing so, we not only end the racism and brutality that have existed for so long, but we also fight crime.

This is just the tip of the iceberg: there are many insights about how to reduce crime based on scientific evidence. Yet most of these are ignored in our politics and in our public media.  Why do we rely on scientists to fight the coronavirus, but fail to heed their findings when addressing crime and public safety?

We have simply fooled ourselves in believing that punishment and tough-on-crime are the keys.  We have given in to our punishment reflex. It’s time to overcome our gut feelings, follow the evidence, and build a criminal justice system that starts to deliver the justice and safety it so direly owes us all.

June 26, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, June 23, 2020

Senators Durbin and Grassley introduce new bill to make modest, but still important, reforms to federal elderly home release and compassionate release

As reported in this new press release, "U.S. Senators Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Chuck Grassley (R-IA), authors of the bipartisan First Step Act, landmark criminal justice reform legislation, introduced new, bipartisan legislation to reform the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program and compassionate release from federal prisons. "  The release provides some notable contextual data and well some details of the bill's particulars:

Sadly, more than 80 federal prisoners with pre-existing medical conditions that made them more vulnerable to COVID-19 have died as a result of the virus, more than half of whom were over 60 years old.  Elderly offenders, the fastest-growing portion of the prison population, have much lower rates of recidivism and are much more expensive to incarcerate due to their health care needs. 

Since enactment of the First Step Act, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has opposed the vast majority of compassionate release petitions.  In 2019, 1,735 requests for release were initiated by or on behalf of prisoners, of which 1,501 were denied by wardens and 226 of which were forwarded to the BOP Director.  Of these 226, BOP approved only 55 and denied 171.  Since March of this year, only about 500 inmates have been granted compassionate release in the midst of the pandemic, nearly all of them by court order over the objections of the Department of Justice and BOP.  BOP has reportedly refused to approve any compassionate releases based on vulnerability to COVID-19.

“At the end of 2018, Congress came together to pass one of the most important criminal justice reform laws in a generation.  Now we have an obligation to ensure that this law is properly implemented,” Durbin said.  “My legislation with Senator Grassley would help ensure that the most vulnerable prisoners are quickly released or transferred to home confinement for the remainder of their sentence – just as the First Step Act intended.  This is especially critical during the COVID-19 pandemic to protect against the spread of this deadly virus.  I’m hopeful that this commonsense, bipartisan legislation will pass swiftly through the House and Senate and will be signed into law.”

“In the middle of a pandemic the federal government ought to be doing everything it can to protect the inmates in its care.  We already established important home confinement and early release programs in 2018, which are especially important right now as older inmates face very serious risks because of the virus.  Our bill will clarify and expand those programs we wrote into the First Step Act, so we can better protect these vulnerable populations,” Grassley said.

Specifically, the COVID-19 Safer Detention Act would reform the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program and compassionate release by:

  • Clarifying that the percentage of time served required for the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program should be calculated based on an inmate’s sentence, including reductions for good time credits (H.R. 4018, which passed the House by voice vote);
  • Expanding the eligibility criteria for the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program to include nonviolent offenders who have served at least 50 percent of their term of imprisonment;
  • Clarifying that elderly nonviolent D.C. Code offenders in BOP custody are eligible for the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program and that federal prisoners sentenced before November 1, 1987 are eligible for compassionate release;
  • Subjecting elderly home detention eligibility decisions to judicial review (based on the First Step Act’s compassionate release provision); and
  • Providing that, during the period of the pandemic, COVID-19 vulnerability is a basis for compassionate release and shortening the period prisoners must wait for judicial review for elderly home detention and compassionate release from 30 to 10 days.

The following organizations support the COVID-19 Safer Detention Act:  Aleph Institute, Americans for Tax Reform and Digital Liberty, Drug Policy Alliance, Due Process Institute, FAMM, Federal Public and Community Defenders, FreedomWorks, Justice Action Network, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), Right on Crime, Sentencing Project, Taking Action For Good, Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF), and Tzedek Association.

A section-by-section of the legislation is available here.

Bill text is available here.

I have placed in bold the provisions of this new bill that strike me as particularly noteworthy and that could prove most consequential. In short form, this bill would seem to authorize (though not require) judges to move most persons over the age of 60 from federal prison into home confinement as soon as they approach serving about half of their initially imposed prison sentence.  Sound like a great idea to me, and it also sounds like another version of another kind of "parole light" proposal of the sort I discussed a few years ago in this article

June 23, 2020 in Impact of the coronavirus on criminal justice, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, June 20, 2020

"The Categorical Imperative as a Decarceral Agenda"

The title of this post is the title of this new essay authored by Jessica Eaglin recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Despite recent modest reductions in state prison populations, Franklin Zimring argues in his forthcoming book that mass incarceration remains persistent and intractable.  As a path forward, Zimring urges states to adopt pragmatic, structural reforms that incentivize the reduction of prison populations through a “categorical imperative,” meaning, by identifying subcategories of offenders best suited for diversion from prison sentences at the state level.  This decarceral method is at odds with popular sentencing reforms in the states.

By exploring the tensions between reform trends in practice and Zimring’s proscription, this Essay illuminates a deeper concern with sentencing reforms in the era of mass incarceration.  Reforms focused on categorizing offenders can obscure and sustain policymakers’ persistent tendency to frame social problems as matters of crime and punishment. Recognizing this shortcoming upfront has important implications for scholars and policymakers alike when contemplating the methodologies that should inform sentencing reforms going forward.

June 20, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 17, 2020

"Restorative Justice From Prosecutors' Perspective"

The title of this post is the title of this new article now available via SSRN and authored by Lara Bazelon and Bruce Green. Here is its abstract:

Restorative justice processes have been promoted as an alternative to criminal adjudication for many years outside the United States and, in recent years, in the United States as well.  In the United States, restorative justice processes are used in some jurisdictions in cases involving juvenile offenders or low-level, nonviolent offenses by adults, but they have rarely been used in cases of adult felony offenders charged with serious violent crimes.  Whether restorative justice processes will be used more broadly depends largely on whether prosecutors become receptive to their use.

A handful of newly elected “progressive prosecutors” have expressed interest in applying restorative justice processes in these and other kinds of felony cases involving adult defendants.  But conventional prosecutors generally remain uninterested in or hostile to restorative justice, even though most accept problem-solving courts and other alternatives to prosecution and incarceration.  This Article explores why mainstream U.S. prosecutors are disposed against restorative justice and suggest how their concerns might best be addressed by restorative justice proponents.

June 17, 2020 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, June 11, 2020

"The Corrective Justice Theory of Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Jacob Bronsther recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The American penal system is racist, degrading, and inefficient.  Nonetheless, we cannot give up on punishment entirely, for social peace and cooperation depend on the deterrent threat of the criminal sanction.  The question — central to determining the degree to which punishment is justified — is why society’s need for general deterrence is an offender’s problem.  Why is it his responsibility to scare off would-be future offenders?  His past offense does not magically render him accountable for the actions of total strangers.  Existing theories of criminal justice are unable to answer this question.

This Article fills the lacuna — justifying state punishment, but, more importantly, establishing its moral limits — with the help of tort law principles.  It argues that deterrent punishment can be justified as a means of rectifying an offender’s contribution to “criminality” — not merely the perceived, but the objective threat of crime in society. Criminality chills the exercise of our rights, forces us to take expensive precautions, and exposes us to unreasonable risks of harm.  By having increased the level of criminality in the past, an offender owes a duty of repair to society as a whole, a duty of “corrective justice” in the language of tort theorists.  He can fulfill this duty by decreasing the threat of crime in the future.  In this way, deterrent punishment does not merely sacrifice him to limit the problem of future crime, for which he has no personal responsibility.  Rather, it forces him to fulfill his own duty of repair.

This novel theory — the corrective justice theory of punishment — entails three sentencing principles.  First, punishment must in fact deter crime and must be the most efficient means of doing so.  Second, however efficient it may be, punishment must not harm an offender more than is required to repair his criminality contribution.  Third, even if it is both efficient and reparative, punishment must not harm an offender to a degree that is entirely out of proportion to the harm prevented by doing so.  The Article demonstrates how these three principles, in combination, demand a radical reduction in American sentencing scales.  The Article thus concludes that the corrective justice view presents stable moral ground for the decarceral movement in America.

June 11, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 08, 2020

New Federal Defenders fact sheet highlights flaws in recent USSC report on incarceration lengths and recividism

This post from late April flagged this notable report by the US Sentencing Commission, titled "Length of Incarceration and Recidivism," which reported, inter alia, that the "Commission consistently found that incarceration lengths of more than 120 months had a deterrent effect."  The empiricism of this report was quickly questioned by two academics with empirical props, Jennifer Doleac and John Pfaff, and now the Sentencing Resource Counsel of the Federal Public and Community Defenders have produced this lengthy fact-sheet and this two-pager detailing problems with this USSC's report.

The nine-page "fact sheet" from the defenders is titled "Flawed U.S. Sentencing Commission Report Misstates Current Knowledge," and here is its initial "Summary":

In April 2020, the U. S. Sentencing Commission issued a report entitled “Length of Incarceration and Recidivism.”  In its report, the Commission claimed that “incarceration lengths of more than 120 months had a deterrent effect.” No effect was found for sentences 60 months or less, while sentences between 60 and 120 months yielded inconsistent results.

None of the findings in this report should be used by judges, legislators, or the Commission to make decisions of any kind.  The report badly misrepresents the research literature (Section I), uses a weak methodology for inferring causation (Section II), and fails properly to control for defendants’ criminal history (Section IV).  The report states its findings in a misleading form prone to misinterpretation and exaggeration (Section III).  The anomalous pattern of findings fits no theory of deterrence (Section VI), and no previous study has found the same pattern.  Further, it is unlikely the report’s findings would replicate or withstand tests for robustness, but because the Commission will not release data underlying the report, independent evaluation is impossible (Section IX). 

As a bipartisan agency, charged with being a “clearinghouse” for information on the effectiveness of sentencing practices, the Commission should issue accurate reports on the current state of knowledge regarding important policy questions. This report fails to meet that standard.

Prior related post:

June 8, 2020 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, June 03, 2020

"Retributive Expungement"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Brian Murray now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Expungement relief was introduced in the mid-twentieth century to reward and incentivize rehabilitation for arrestees and ex-offenders and to protect their privacy.  Recently, many states have broadened their expungement remedies, and those remedies remain useful given the negative effects of public criminal records on reentry.  But recent scholarship has suggested an “uptake gap,” meaning many who are eligible never obtain relief.  Despite broadening eligibility, petitioners face substantial obstacles to filing, pre-hearing hurdles, waiting periods, and difficult standards of review without the assistance of counsel.  And even when expungement is granted, the recipients are basically left on their own to guarantee the efficacy of the remedy.  Some of these attributes of expungement were originally conceived as features, designed to ensure only the most rehabilitated received relief, allowing the state to continue to pursue public safety objectives with public criminal records.  But the cold reality of expungement procedure leaves many petitioners facing insurmountable obstacles that amplify the effects of the punishment originally imposed.

In exploring this reality, this Article illustrates that expungement procedure is stuck in a rehabilitative and privacy-centric paradigm.  While this framework inspired the creation of expungement remedies and recent reforms, it also has justified onerous procedural obstacles and the placing of the burden of persuasion on the petitioner rather than the state.  Outside of automated expungement, which is still relatively rare and restricted to only certain types of petitions, most expungement regimes in substance or through procedure invert what should be the state’s burden to justify retention of criminal records that enable extra punishment by state and private actors.  An alternative theoretical basis for expungement is necessary to convince policymakers and decision-makers of the need for broader substantive and procedural reform.

This Article suggests a different paradigm: retributive based expungement.  It proposes that incorporating retributive constraints that already underlie the criminal system can benefit petitioners.  Plenty of arrestees do not deserve stigma and ex-offenders have done their time, meaning punitive stigma from public criminal records can amount to unwarranted punishment.  A retributive-minded expungement procedure would all but guarantee expungement in the case of arrests, where the desert basis is questionable, and would place the burden of proof on the state for convictions once desert has been satisfied.  As such, this approach can supplement the case for broader eligibility, automated expungement, and favorable pre-hearing procedures that limit the uptake gap.  It also has legal and political viability given that many states already maintain retributivist constraints on sentencing and given that huge swaths of the public perceive desert as a crucial component of any criminal justice issue.  In fact, some states are already moving in this direction and can serve as a model for the rest of the country.  In short, retributivist constraints can trim procedural overgrowth to supplement substantive reforms that already recognize the disproportionate effects of a public criminal record.

June 3, 2020 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, May 31, 2020

"Unconstitutional Incarceration: Applying Strict Scrutiny to Criminal Sentences"

The title of this post is the title of this new Yale Law Journal note authored by Salil Dudani.  Here is its abstract:

The deprivation of a fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny, and freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental right.  Indeed, the right to be free from physical restraint lies at the very core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.  In the contexts of pretrial detention and civil commitment, courts hold that due process prohibits unnecessary incarceration and requires the government to prove the necessity of incarceration in each individual case.  Without explanation, courts do not apply these same principles to criminal sentences, which just as surely infringe on physical liberty.  This Note argues that they should: there is no good reason to exempt sentences of confinement from the fundamental due-process right to freedom from physical restraint.  If the government cannot prove that a criminal sentence is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, the sentence is unconstitutional, even when it is purportedly required by a statute establishing a “mandatory minimum sentence” for the crime of conviction.  The Note discusses how courts should implement this scrutiny and suggests that state courts should lead the way in doing so.

May 31, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, May 19, 2020

"The Paradox of Recidivism"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting-looking new article authored by Christopher Lewis and just posted to SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

The idea that we should respond more severely to repeated wrongdoing than we do to first-time misconduct is one of our most deeply held moral principles, and one of the most deeply entrenched principles in the criminal law and sentencing policy. Prior convictions trigger, on average, a six-fold increase in the length of punishment in U.S. states that use sentencing guidelines.  And three-strikes, habitual offender, and career criminal laws mandate extremely harsh penalties for repeat offending.  Most of the people we lock up in the U.S. — especially those who are Black or Latino, and poor — have at least one prior conviction. The “recidivist sentencing premium” is thus one of the main determinants of race- and class-based disparity in our prisons, and of the overall size of our incarcerated population.

This article shows, counterintuitively, that given the current law and policy of collateral consequences, and the social conditions they engender, judges and sentencing commissions have moral reason to do exactly the opposite of what they currently do: impose a recidivist sentencing discount, rather than a premium. Prior convictions should be treated as a presumptive mitigating factor, rather than an aggravating one.  This thesis goes against the grain of criminal law and policy dating back as far as we know it, virtually the entire scholarly literature, and millenia of social tradition.  But this article shows that it follows from a number of quite ordinary normative and empirical premises. The conclusion might be politically unpalatable, but it is morally unavoidable.

May 19, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 15, 2020

"Deep Disadvantage, Blameworthiness, and Sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Michael Tonry just recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Arguments in favor of a “social adversity” or “rotten social background” defense are substantially stronger than those against.  People disagree in principle whether an affirmative defense of deep disadvantage, paralleling the insanity defense, should be recognized and whether judges should routinely mitigate the severity of sentences imposed on deeply disadvantaged offenders.  The defense should be recognized. It would be unlikely often to result in acquittals but it would strengthen many defendants’ positions in plea negotiations. Mitigation of punishment should be routine.  Few credible arguments can be made that a deeply disadvantaged background is not a material characteristic that should be taken into account in sentencing.  Unfortunately, informal mitigation of punishments is not enough. The severity and rigidity of American sentencing laws often deny judges the necessary authority.  The moral challenges presented by deeply disadvantaged offenders cannot adequately be addressed without creation of a new affirmative defense.

May 15, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 13, 2020

"The First Step Act and the Brutal Timidity of Criminal Law Reform"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new piece authored by Mark Osler and just posted to SSRN.  The title and author make me especially excited to have this new read, and here is its abstract:

It took decades to partially correct the egregiously wrong 100-1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine in federal law. Marijuana is still a Schedule I narcotic, despite universal condemnation of that categorization.  Even when we get it, criminal law reform comes achingly slowly and with brutal timidity, at a stunning cost in lives and freedom.  This article explores the grim history of this dynamic in the modern United States, explores the causes, and suggests solutions. It will appear in the New England Law Journal with responses from a variety of legal analysts.

May 13, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 29, 2020

"Length of Incarceration and Recidivism"

The title of this post is the title of of this notable new report just released today by the US Sentencing Commission.  Here is a basic summary and key findings from this USSC webpage:

Summary

Length of Incarceration and Recidivism is the seventh publication in the Commission’s recent series on recidivism. This study examines the relationship between length of incarceration and recidivism, specifically exploring three potential relationships that may exist: incarceration as having a deterrent effect, a criminogenic effect, or no effect on recidivism. (Published April 29, 2020)

Report Findings
  • The Commission consistently found that incarceration lengths of more than 120 months had a deterrent effect.
    • Each of the research designs estimated that offenders incarcerated for more than 120 months were less likely to recidivate eight years after release. In the two models with the larger sample sizes, offenders incarcerated for more than 120 months were approximately 30 percent less likely to recidivate relative to a comparison group receiving less incarceration. In the third model, offenders incarcerated for more than 120 months were approximately 45 percent less likely to recidivate relative to a comparison group receiving less incarceration.
  • In two models, the deterrent effect extended to incarceration lengths of more than 60 months.
    • Specifically, offenders incarcerated for more than 60 months up to 120 months were approximately 17 percent less likely to recidivate relative to a comparison group sentenced to a shorter period of incarceration.
  • For incarceration lengths of 60 months or less, the Commission did not find any statistically significant criminogenic or deterrent effect.
    • When focusing on the shortest period of incarceration studied (12 to 24 months), the research designs yielded varying results, neither of which were statistically significant nor sufficiently reliable to make evidence-based conclusions.

April 29, 2020 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 06, 2020

Exciting new (COVID-free) reduction of LWOP sentence, based in part on "sentencing disparity," using § 3582(c)(1)(A) in US v. Millan

In this post a few weeks ago, just before the COVID-19 outbreak became the urgent basis for lots of sentence reductions under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), I flagged a number of new positive rulings granting sentencing reductions using 3582(c)(1)(A) on various grounds.  I am now pleased to be able spotlight another great ruling that adds to the list of reasons (other than COVID) that have now served as the basis for a sentence reduction, even of a life sentence. 

I must disclose that this new ruling, in US v. Millan, No. 91-CR-685 (LAP) (SDNY April 6, 2020) (download below), is especially meaningful to me because I had the honor of helping Harlan Protass a bit with the motion papers.  But I think all those working on sentence reduction motions will find value in the 45-page Millan opinion's discussion of the factors that justified reducing Eric Millan's sentence from LWOP to time served of 28 years.  I recommend the opinion in full, and the opening and closing paragraphs highlight the essentials:

Before the Court is Eric Millan’s motion, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), for an Order reducing his life sentence (of which he has already served more than 28 years) to time served.1 The Government opposed the motion, and the parties filed additional letters. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted....

Mr. Millan’s extraordinary rehabilitation, together with his remorse and contrition, his conduct as model prisoner and man of extraordinary character, his leadership in the religious community at FCI Fairton, his dedication to work with at-risk youth and suicide prevention, and the support of BOP staff at FCI Fairton, including their opinion that if released, Mr. Millan would be a productive member of society and no danger to others, and the sentencing disparity that would result from further incarceration all constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying a reduction in sentence.  Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), Eric Millan’s motion for a reduction of sentence is granted, and his life sentence is reduced to time served.

Download US v. Millan 91-CR-685 (LAP). Order Granting Compassionate Release

As the title of this post highlights, I think it is especially notable and important that the court stressed "the sentencing disparity that would result from further incarceration" as one of the bases for finding that this case involved "extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying a reduction in sentence."  Many persons who are serving the most extreme federal sentences have often been subject to a mandatory minimum term or a trial penalty or some other case-processing sentencing reality that has resulted in a much longer sentence for one defendant than has been served by a number of similarly situated defendants.  Given that Congress stressed to judges in § 3553(a)(6) "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct," this kind of application of § 3582(c)(1)(A) seems to be a sound and sensible way to remedy problematic sentencing disparities in appropriate cases like Eric Millan's.

UPDATE: I learned this afternoon of another (COVID-free) sentence reduction ruling today in US v. Decator, No. CCB-95-0202 (D. Md. April 6, 2020) (download below).  Here is how this opinion starts and some key passages:

Kittrell Decator is a federal prisoner who is serving a 633-month sentence for convictions stemming from his participation in several armed bank robberies in the early 1990s. To date, Decator has served over 25 years of his sentence. Now pending is Decator’s motion for sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (the “compassionate release” statute). The government opposes the motion, and Decator has replied. For the reasons explained below, the motion will be granted and Decator’s sentence reduced to time served....

Multiple district courts have reasoned that “the First Step Act’s change in how sentences should be calculated when multiple § 924(c) charges are included in the same indictment constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” See United States v. Owens, No. 97-CR-2546-CAB, ECF 93 at 4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2020) (collecting cases). The court agrees with this reasoning. The fact that Decator, if sentenced today for the same conduct, would likely receive a dramatically lower sentence than the one he is currently serving, constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason justifying potential sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)....

The court acknowledges that Decator’s offenses were indeed serious. While no one was physically injured, Decator’s actions caused psychological pain to his victims. The court believes that the 25-plus years in prison Decator has already served reflect the seriousness of his conduct and demonstrate the need for deterrence, public safety, and respect for the law. But Decator’s continued incarceration would be both disproportionate to the seriousness of his offense and to what Congress now deems appropriate for this kind of conduct.

Download Decator Decision

April 6, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, March 21, 2020

"Communicating Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Marah Stith McLeod just posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Does it matter whether convicted offenders understand why they are being punished? In the death penalty context, the Supreme Court has said yes; a prisoner who cannot understand the state’s reasons for imposing a death sentence may not be executed.  Outside the capital context, the answer is less clear.  This Article focuses on why and how states should help all offenders make sense of their sanctions, whether imposed for retribution, for deterrence, for incapacitation, or for rehabilitation.

Judges today sometimes try to explain sentences to criminal offenders so that they know the purposes of their suffering. But judges are busy, defendants are not always interested, and the law often treats such explanations as unimportant or even unwise.  Legislatures, moreover, rarely convey the purposes of statutory penalties, plea bargaining obscures the reasons for punishment, and the experience of punishment does not always reflect its social aims.

Scholars and critics of American criminal justice tend to pay little attention to these deficits.  Perhaps explaining individual sentences seems unimportant compared to the larger effort to humanize and rationalize penal policy.  In fact, however, the two are intertwined.

Communicating the reasons for punishment humanizes offenders by engaging with them as reasoning beings worthy of society’s continued concern — not as unreasoning animals simply to be harnessed or caged. The process of articulating punishment goals also can rationalize sentencing by reducing error, bias, and excess.

We can build a legal culture that respects offenders and advances punishment rationality by communicating the reasons for criminal sanctions. Legislatures can clarify the purposes of statutory penalties, prosecutors can explain how sanctions based on plea deals serve legitimate goals, judges can spell out the social objectives of sentences in terms that offenders can understand, and prison and probation authorities can convey sentencing rationales during the experience of punishment itself.

I had the honor and pleasure of reading an earlier draft of this paper as part of an AALS event, and upon first read I considered this piece a very important contribution to the literature.  A few months later, amidst a global pandemic, I think it even more important to consider how decisions in the criminal justice system communicate that offenders are still "worthy of society’s continued concern."

March 21, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, March 08, 2020

"The Janus Face of Imprisonment: Contrasting Judicial Conceptions of Imprisonment Purposes in the European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of the United States"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Netanel Dagan now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

This paper considers how the Supreme Court of the United States (SC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) apply, interpret and frame abstract imprisonment purposes, and how they view their relevance to prison conditions, while discussing the constitutionality of prison conditions.  The paper argues that the SC and the ECtHR view, conceptualise and interpret the purposes of imprisonment differently.  Regarding the purposes of retribution and rehabilitation specifically, the analysis presented in the paper exposes a ‘Janus face’, meaning that each purpose can, and is, interpreted in two different, and almost contrasting ways. 

The paper offers three themes regarding the conceptualisation of imprisonment purposes by the SC and the ECtHR: First, the relationship between the purposes of sentencing and imprisonment along the penal continuum, and the role of rehabilitation in a prison regime: should sentencing purposes be relatively static during their implementation in prison, meaning that retributive-oriented sentencing purposes should be pursued (SC), or should they conversely progress with the passage of time, from retribution to resocialization as the primary purpose of imprisonment (ECtHR).  Second, the meaning of retributivism in regard to prison conditions: should prisoners pay a debt to society by suffering in restrictive prison conditions (SC), or is retributivism achieved by atonement and by finding ways to compensate or repair harms caused by crime (ECtHR).  Third, the way in which prison rehabilitation is framed and understood: should prison rehabilitation be seen as a risk management tool aimed purely at lowering recidivism (SC), or as a moral concept grounded in a prisoner’s ability to change his life and belief in personal responsibility for one’s actions (ECtHR).  Possible theoretical implications and general policy implications are considered in the paper.

March 8, 2020 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, February 27, 2020

"Sentencing is Dang Hard... And So..."

The title of this post is the (silly?) title that I gave to a speech I delivered a few years ago when having the honor to receive the 2018 Richard P. Kern Memorial Award from the National Association of Sentencing Commissions. A cleaned-up version of the speech appears now in the February 2020 issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter, and I have posted the text here via SSRN. Here is the short piece's abstract:

This essay, adapted from a speech upon receipt of the 2018 Richard P. Kern Memorial Award from the National Association of Sentencing Commissions, details why sentencing is “dang hard” and explores implications of that reality.  The essay argues that the challenges of sentencing not only demand that all jurisdictions have a sentencing commission as an essential permanent agency, but also call for these commissions always to think big and to strive to work deep and wide to study all facets of modern criminal justice systems.  The essay also contends that sentencing errors may be quite common and that, even if we manage to get sentencing “right” at the outset, changes in society and in individuals can make even “right” sentences wrong over time.  Sensible humility about the likelihood of sentencing errors further suggests, for example: at the rule-making stage, having sentencing laws include sunset provisions and having sentencing commissions review and audit major guidelines and related sentencing practices on a regular basis; at the case-specific stage, having far more robust substantive appellate review of sentences and more robust mechanisms for parole and judicial reconsideration and clemency, and even developing more creative means to apply and revise different forms of punishment as time passes and new information is gathered.

February 27, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 24, 2020

"Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Benjamin Levin. Here is its abstract:

As criminal justice reform has attracted greater public support, a new brand of district attorney candidate has arrived: the “progressive prosecutors.”  Commentators increasingly have keyed on “progressive prosecutors” as offering a promising avenue for structural change, deserving of significant political capital and academic attention.  This Essay asks an unanswered threshold question: what exactly is a “progressive prosecutor”?  Is that a meaningful category at all, and if so, who is entitled to claim the mantle?  In this Essay, I argue that “progressive prosecutor” means many different things to many different people.  These differences in turn reveal important fault lines in academic and public perceptions of the criminal system and its flaws.

This disagreement or definitional slippage matters, not just for semantic clarity.  Some commentators hail the progressive prosecutor as a new champion of fixing the criminal legal system, while others express skepticism about the transformative potential of even the most progressive DAs.  To the extent that there are fundamental disagreements, then it is critically important to surface them. If resources are being devoted to advancing a progressive prosecutor movement, how unified is that movement?  And, do all the voices pushing for a new approach to prosecution actually agree on what that approach should entail?

In an effort to answer these questions and clarify the terms of debate on progressive prosecutors, this Essay offers a typology of progressive prosecutors.  Rather than mapping all of the candidates and elected officials who have sought or received the mantle, I offer four ideal types: (1) the progressive who prosecutes; (2) the proceduralist prosecutor; (3) the prosecutorical progressive; and (4) the anti-carceral prosecutor.  Each ideal type reflects a different vision of what’s wrong with the criminal system and whether (or to what extent) prosecutors might help in righting those wrongs.

February 24, 2020 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, February 23, 2020

"Can algorithms help judges make fair decisions?"

The question in the title of this post is the headline of this lengthy recent public radio piece.  Here are some excerpts from a lengthy article worth the time to read in full:

[I]n 2010, the [Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing] worked on an algorithm, a formula, that would allow a computer to predict how likely a person was to commit another crime and recommend when judges should get more information about a case. The goal was to make sentencing more consistent, reduce prison populations, and lead to less crime.

Mark Bergstrom, executive director of the Commission on Sentencing, said compared to judges, an algorithm can process lots of data. “When we started our project, we didn’t look at a handful of cases, we looked at over 200,000 cases to try to see what factors sort of related to positive and negative outcomes. And that’s information that judges didn’t have or didn’t have in a … structured … way.”

The formula will look for patterns based on age, gender, what crime someone is being convicted of, prior convictions and for which crimes, and whether the offender has a juvenile record. It cannot take race into account, or county, which is seen as a proxy for race.

The judge will still make the ultimate decision on sentencing. The algorithm will be rolled out this year, and evaluated after 12 months. It took 10 years to create because it was so controversial.

For one thing, critics were afraid that a tool built from criminal justice data would still discriminate against people of color. Pennsylvania is more than 80% white. Almost half the prison population is black....

There is research on what a risk assessment algorithm will do: Virginia started using one in the early 2000s. Megan Stevenson, assistant professor of law at George Mason University, studied the effects: The number of people in prison did not go down, recidivism did not go down, and black people were slightly more likely to be incarcerated compared to white people, all else being equal.

“The impacts of a risk assessment tool don’t just depend on the statistical properties of the algorithm,” Stevenson said. “They depend on how human beings respond to the algorithm, when they choose to follow it, when they choose to ignore it.”

For example: When young people committed a crime, the risk assessment tool said those people are likely to commit more crime, sentence them harshly. But judges systematically said no. Were the judges wrong? On one hand, it’s well documented that criminals tend to do more crime when they’re young and less when they’re older. Statistically, young age is a strong predictor of future crime. But Stevenson said there is more to a sentencing decision than risk of future crime.

February 23, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, February 21, 2020

Enjoy full day of "The Controlled Substances Act at 50 Years" via livestream

CSA at 50_socialBlogging will be light over the next few days as I am in the midst of helping to conduct this amazing conference which started last night at the Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.  I have had the pleasure and honor of working with the amazing team at The Ohio State University's Drug Enforcement and Policy Center (@OSULawDEPC), along with the also amazing team at ASU's Academy for Justice (@Academy4Justice), to put together amazing and diverse array of panels and workshops on all sorts of topics relating to the past, present and future of the CSA's development, implementation and enforcement.

The basic agenda for the event can be found at this page, and last night  started with an amazing keynote by the amazing Keith Humphreys, Stanford University, Esther Ting Memorial Professor on "Federal Policy and the Dual Nature of Drugs," followed by an amazing response to keynote by Peter Reuter, University of Maryland, Professor of Public Policy and Criminology asking "Do Drug Problems have more influence on Drug Policy than vice versa?".

I am especially pleased and excited by this list of speakers who are participating, and today begins a series of terrific panels. and I can provide this link with its own links to the livestream for each of the panels. I think every part of the conference will be amazing, and I hope folks can make the time to tune in.

February 21, 2020 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, February 17, 2020

Spirited (but problematic?) advocacy for Bernie Madoff to receive compassionate relief

The New York Times has this notable new opinion piece authored by headlined "Let Bernie Madoff, and Many More, Out of Prison: Compassionate release has to apply to unsympathetic prisoners, if we mean what we say about ending mass incarceration."  I think the spirit of this piece is quite sound, but I am not entirely sold on all of its particulars.  Here are excerpts (with a few lines emphasized for comments to follow):

Recently, Mr. Madoff re-entered the news, as he filed for compassionate release from federal prison.  He is entering the final stages of kidney disease and has less than 18 months to live. The Bureau of Prisons denied his petition, as it does to 94 percent of those filed by incarcerated people.  But the reforms provided in the First Step Act of 2018 allow him to file an appeal with the sentencing court.

Even some who claim to detest the ravages of mass incarceration argue that Mr. Madoff should be denied compassionate release.  He is as close to the financial equivalent of a serial killer as one might encounter.  Still, there is a good argument to be made for compassionate release.  It has little to do with Bernie Madoff, though, and how we feel about his horrendous actions.

If our societal goal is to reduce incarceration, we are going to have to confront the inconvenient truth that retribution cannot be our only penological aim, and justice for victims has to be much more extensive than the incarceration of those who have caused them harm.  We desperately need to shift our cultural impulse to punish harshly and degradingly, and for long periods.

The visceral, retributive reactions to Mr. Madoff’s petition, including from liberals who claim to want to end mass incarceration, reveal the obstacles to transformational criminal justice reform.  The truth is, there is only a small number of entirely “sympathetic” people in prisons who could be released without any scruples by the public or affront to their victims.  Those incarcerated for violent offenses compose a vast majority of our prison population, in spite of a false narrative that most people are in there for nonviolent drug offenses.  The pain and harm experienced by their victims is real, and that’s also true for Mr. Madoff’s victims.  But criminal justice policy cannot be constructed in response to our feelings about individual, high-profile cases — the so-called worst of the worst. 

This “worst of the worst” argument, for example, has long undergirded the death penalty, which still stands in 30 states despite its racial and class biases and other flaws that have led hundreds of innocent people to death row.  It is also part of why the Democratic presidential candidates, with the exception of Bernie Sanders, don’t support the enfranchisement of those in prison.  But creating a separate category for Mr. Madoff, sex offenders or those “others” in the criminal justice system will not help end mass incarceration.  There will always be another high-profile case that can impede the implementation of more humane policies.

Those on the left who press for criminal justice reform emphasize “empathy” in their attempts to reframe the conversation about people who have committed crimes. Conservatives use the word “redemption.”  These words carry a profound responsibility: What do they mean for sympathetic and unsympathetic prisoners?  There are 200,000 people over the age of 55 incarcerated in the United States.  The question of compassionate release for Mr. Madoff affects not only him but these others and their victims as well.

Mr. Madoff lost both his sons while incarcerated (one died of cancer) and was unable to attend their funerals; is a social pariah, almost universally condemned; and has spent 11 years in federal prison.  This is not to say he deserves sympathy, but he has been punished.  In Norway, where Anders Breivik was sentenced to 21 years in prison for a horrific mass murder, 11 years would be considered harsh enough.  Our American punitiveness has distorted our sense of what is an adequate sentence for serious offenses.

When considering compassionate release, we also have to ask: Has the person been rehabilitated?  Does the punishment serve legitimate penological objectives (like deterrence and public safety) other than retribution?  (Something to consider, for instance: The number of Ponzi schemes prosecuted went up, not down after Mr. Madoff’s incarceration.)

Criminal justice reform will fall far short of the dramatic institutional changes needed if the dominant impulse continues to be retribution, and if high-profile cases continue to drive policy.  Compassionate release for those who are aging, terminally ill and dying should be assumed after they’ve served at least 10 years.  It was the offenders’ worst impulses that led them to commit their crimes.  Our justice system should appeal to our higher ethical ambitions.

I agree fully that "retribution cannot be our only penological aim, and justice for victims has to be much more extensive than the incarceration of those who have caused them harm." I also agree fully that criminal justice policy should not "be constructed in response to our feelings about individual, high-profile cases — the so-called worst of the worst" and that we should be troubled if "high-profile cases continue to drive policy." And whether a person has been rehabilitated also seem to me to be an important consideration here.  But I am not sure granting compassionate relief to Bernie Madoff furthers these interests, and I worry it could undermine them.

For starters, it is critical at this stage to realize that we are not really dealing with a "policy" matter, as the FIRST STEP Act altered the policy for compassionate relief and did so in a way that included Bernie Madoff and all other federal prisoners.  Though the FIRST STEP Act has some "worst of the worst" carve-outs in other parts of the Act, but its new process for pursuing compassionate relief applies to all federal prisoners (which is one reason I think it is such an important and valuable part of the Act).  in other words, in this context there is no need to worry about creating any "separate category for Mr. Madoff, sex offenders or those 'others' in the criminal justice system."  If a federal judge decided to deny Madoff compassionate relief, after considering all the facts of Madoff's case and all the factors of 3553(a), that judge will be adjudicating and resolving a single case, not creating any broad "criminal justice policy."

As to the facts of Madoff's case, I have seen little evidence that Madoff has been truly remorseful or rehabilitated.  In fact, this 2016 ABC News article reports that "Madoff has done little to express his remorse or regret to the estimated 20,000 investors in his scheme, many of whom lost their life savings in the $64 billion fraud.  Other than a brief reference to his victims during his sentencing hearing, Madoff has spent a lot of his time behind bars in an effort to rehabilitate his own image and actually shift the blame to the investors for expecting unrealistic returns which he claims is why he set up his fraud."   And though surely Madoff's victims may not speak in one voice on these matters, I suspect many are open to a vision of "justice ... much more extensive than the incarceration," but are concerned that they have not seen any other form of extensive justice achieved here (though a whole lot of assets have been recovered after a decade of work).  Madoff not only committed arguably the worst white-collar offense in US history, but it seems he has not really done all that much to try to make amends.

Though I may be getting too nitpicky here, I wanted to comment on this piece because I found one particular sentence to be particularly disturbing: "The truth is, there is only a small number of entirely “sympathetic” people in prisons who could be released without any scruples by the public or affront to their victims."  The truth is, there are tens of thousands, probably hundreds of thousands, of entirely "sympathetic" people in US prisons who could be released without any scruples by the public or affront to their victims.  Just a quick look at "The Whole Pie" of incarceration shows over 275,000 persons imprisoned for drug offenses and another 200,000 in for "public order" offenses.  Not all of these the underlying crimes were victimless, but even if only one of every ten of these prisoners are "sympathetic," that still gets us to nearly 50,000 sympathetic prisons to consider for release.  Mass incarceration is so very troubling in part because there really are quite a large number of sympathetic cases, and I am particularly eager for there to be continued efforts to give voice to, and get relief for, the huge number of sympathetic folks wasting time (and taxpayer resources) in unduly lengthy prison terms.

This piece rightly notes "there are 200,000 people over the age of 55 incarcerated in the United States" and it is rightly concerned that "compassionate release for Mr. Madoff affects not only him but these others and their victims as well."  But these data and my fears tethered to Madoff's failure to demonstrate remorse run the argument the other way in my view: though I hope there would not be a backlash were Madoff to receive compassionate relief, I worry he could become the poster child for restricting this important relief mechanism for tens of thousands of other prisoners who would seem a lot more sympathetic.  That said, I do like imagining a (realistic?) future in which a decision to release Madoff prompts many more federal judges to grant compassionate release to many more federal prisoners.

Prior related post:

February 17, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, February 16, 2020

As Virginia and other states consider expanding parole, might the federal system do the same in a SECOND STEP Act?

In this 2017 Federal Probation article, titled "Reflecting on Parole's Abolition in the Federal Sentencing System," I imagined various ways modern federal sentencing reform might have been less problematic if some form of parole had been retained in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.  I also noted how the legislation that became the FIRST STEP Act served as a kind of "parole light" while also explaining why I thought reformers "troubled by the punitive policies that the SRA helped usher into the federal system ought to think about talking up the concept of federal parole anew."

This not-so-old-but-already-dated article came to mind as I saw this piece from the New York Times this week under the full headline "‘It Didn’t Work:’ States That Ended Parole for Violent Crimes Are Thinking Again; Virginia, newly dominated by Democrats, may broaden parole for the first time in a generation. Others states are watching."  Here are excerpts:

After Zenas Barnes was convicted of three robberies in the 1990s, he accepted a plea deal that stunned even veteran lawyers for its severity: 150 years in state prison. Mr. Barnes, who was 21 at the time, said that he had not realized when he took the deal that the Virginia Legislature had, only months before, abolished the most common type of parole, meaning that there was a good chance he would die in prison.

Twenty-five years later, the State Legislature, newly dominated by Democrats, is poised to broaden parole for the first time in a generation.  The move would give Mr. Barnes and thousands of other prisoners convicted of violent crimes a chance for parole, which allows inmates to be released early.

Watching closely are lawmakers across the nation, including in California, New York, Illinois and Pennsylvania.  Like Virginia those states decades ago virtually eliminated discretionary parole, granted by appointed boards on a conditional basis, during an era of surging violent crime and the imposition of progressively harsher punishments.

“We thought we were fighting crime, and it didn’t work,” said David Marsden, a Democratic state senator in Virginia, who has previously introduced bills to restore parole but was blocked by Republican majorities.  “But more recently, we’ve stopped trying to teach lessons and started trying to solve problems.  People are now more likely to believe that people deserve a second chance.”...

Even in Virginia, where Democrats won majorities in both chambers of the Legislature in November, and which also has a Democratic governor, Ralph Northam, the question of expanding parole remains politically perilous.  This month, Democrats shelved a bill that would have restored the possibility of parole for nearly 17,000 inmates — more than half the state’s prison population.  Instead, Democrats have focused on more modest efforts to restore parole to older inmates.

“The prevailing attitude of policymakers is we’ve come to the limit because they don’t want to release violent offenders,” said Marc Mauer, executive director of the Sentencing Project, a nonprofit that advocates shorter sentences and other policy changes to the criminal justice system.  There is no significant difference in violent crime rates between states that allow parole and those that do not, according to federal data.  But Mr. Mauer said many people associate parolees with recidivism and violence, and their crimes often garner significant public attention.

Republican lawmakers have warned that restoring parole would make Virginia — which has the fourth lowest violent crime rate of any state — more dangerous.  “When parole is granted, it will result in violent criminals being released into our communities,” said Robert Bell, a Republican member of the House of Delegates.  Mr. Bell added that parole “will force victims of violent crimes and their families to relive the worst day of their lives over and over again.”...

Both chambers of the Virginia Legislature have already approved a bill that would make hundreds of prison inmates eligible for parole because they were convicted by juries that were not informed by courts that defendants were no longer eligible for parole after the practice was abolished in 1995.  Governor Northam has said he will support it.

Mr. Northam has also said he supports a bill that would grant parole eligibility to prisoners who are older than 50, a group that may number in the thousands.  He has not yet said whether he would sign a measure that would restore the possibility of parole to thousands of inmates who have served 20 years or more of their sentences.  Both bills are expected to be passed by both chambers of the Legislature.  The governor has not taken a position on the shelved bill that would have restored the possibility of parole for more than half the state’s prison population.

I think it wise for any parole reform, at the state or federal level, to move forward incrementally.  Given the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment rulings, jurisdictions ought to have general parole mechanism that are available to all young offenders sentenced to very long prison terms.  Likewise, public safety concerns would be minimized if and when parole eligibility is at least initially focused upon defendants imprisoned for long periods for non-violent offenses (especially for first offenses and for offenses without victims).

Notably, the federal prison system likely has many more defendants imprisoned for long periods for non-violent offenses than do state systems because, according to federal prison data, roughly 40% of federal prisoners are incarcerated for drug offenses and nearly half are serving terms of 10 years or longer.  In other words, I think the federal system would be one in which it would be ideal to develop a new modern (and initially modest) system of parole.

Notably, as reported in this post back in November, at a Senate Judiciary oversight hearing with the head of the federal Bureau of Prisons, Senator Lindsay Graham raised the idea of "reinstituting parole in the federal system."  I am sorry we have not yet seen any follow-up on this idea from Senator Graham or others, but I am encouraged that parole appears to no longer be a dirty word in various criminal justice reform conversations.  And, as the title of this post indicates, I think it would be a great idea to include in any SECOND STEP federal reform proposals to follow up the "parole light" elements in the FIRST STEP Act.

February 16, 2020 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, February 12, 2020

"Remorse and Judging"

The title of this post is the title of this new book chapter authored by Susan Bandes now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

This chapter focuses on the judicial evaluation of remorse.  It is an article of faith that judges can and should evaluate remorse when determining sentence.  Although the dynamics of this evaluation are understudied, the existing literature helps illuminate the assumptions judges employ and the dangers and limitations of those assumptions.  Judges rely on evaluation of demeanor and body language and on allocution, and their interpretations are rife with implicit assumptions and unstated rules about what counts as remorse. 

Many of these assumptions (for example the link between remorse and decreased recidivism and the possibility of assessing remorse from demeanor) lack evidentiary support. These assumptions and implicit rules vary widely from judge to judge.  They often fail to account for the influence of race, ethnicity, gender and social class on the expression and evaluation of remorse.  Moreover, they put a premium on the willingness to plead guilty, and to do so at the earliest possible opportunity.  The chapter draws upon the few existing empirical studies on the topic and identifies areas that require further study.

February 12, 2020 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, February 10, 2020

"The Peter Parker Problem"

Standard_incredibleThe title of this post is the title of this new article authored by W. David Ball now available via SSRN.  Here is the piece's abstract:

Sandy Mayson, in her article "Dangerous Defendants," points out the ways in which pretrial detention violates the parity principle-treating those of like risk alike.  There is no justification for the preventative detention of arrestees that would not also apply to those of a similar risk level at large.  In other words, merely having an arrestee in custody does not logically change our analysis of the risk they present or what we should do with them.

But what if these views are psychological, not actuarial?  What if different decisions about these populations (and the differences in how we view them) are not based in different assessments of risk, but about the psychological heuristics we use to analyze them?  In this paper, I explore the possibility that counterfactuals — the "if only I had" scenarios that create an alternative universe where tragedy is avoided — drive decisionmaking without our being aware of it.  The human tendency to desire certainty and simplicity may help explain why our default seems to be to keep someone locked up, "just in case" — and why this desire is resistant to information and argument.

This Article adds an important dimension to the ongoing debates about whether judicial discretion or actuarial tools should govern pretrial release.  Judicial discretion may be biased towards incapacitation by operating on the "gut level" of psychology — even if these decisions result in suboptimality from a cost-benefit perspective.  It adds an additional perspective to the existing literature on the political economy of headline-grabbing crimes (the "Willie Horton" effect). 

The insights from pretrial release also apply more generally to a host of similar problems, including parole release, executive clemency, diversion programs, and removal of children from potentially abusive parents, and suggest that policymakers and reformers be cognizant of the way in which current criminal justice thinking is short-sighted, overly reactive, and biased towards incapacitation.  By applying theories of the counterfactual proposed by Roese and other behavioral psychologists to regret-minimization problems, the Article provides an explanation for why, even when regulations change, judicial decisions to release may remain low.  It suggests that experimental research specifically targeting judicial counterfactual thinking should take place.

February 10, 2020 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, February 05, 2020

"Lost in Translation: 'Risks,' 'Needs,' and 'Evidence' in Implementing the First Step Act"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper now available via SSRN authored by Jennifer Skeem and John Monahan.  Here is its abstract:

In this article, we focus on two highly problematic issues in the manner in which the First Step Act of 2018 is being implemented by the Bureau of Prisons: (1) an uncritical separation of “dynamic risks” and “criminogenic needs” and (2) a spurious reliance on “evidence-based” interventions to reduce recidivism risk.  We argue that if the Act is to live up to its promise of being a game-changing development in efforts to reduce crime while simultaneously shrinking mass incarceration, “needs assessment” must be subject to vastly increased empirical attention, variable and causal risk factors must be identified and validly assessed, and interventions to reduce risk must be rigorously evaluated both for their fidelity of implementation and impact on recidivism.  Rather than further proliferating programs that ostensibly reduce risk, we believe that serious consideration should be given to the Bureau of Prisons offering one signature, well-established cognitive-behavioral program that can simultaneously address multiple risk factors for moderate and high-risk prisoners.

February 5, 2020 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 03, 2020

"What Would a World Without Prisons Be Like?"

The question in the title of this post is the title of this recent piece from The New Yorker.  Of course, the question does not lend itself to an easy answer, and this piece includes a 20+-minute podcast to dig deeper.  Here is how the segment is previewed:

Mass incarceration is now widely regarded as a prejudiced and deeply harmful set of policies.  Bipartisan support exists for some degree of criminal-justice reform, and, in some circles, the idea of prison abolition is also gaining traction.  Kai Wright, the host of the WNYC podcast “The United States of Anxiety,” spoke about the movement with Paul Butler, a law professor and former federal prosecutor who saw firsthand the damage that prosecution causes, and sujatha baliga, a MacArthur Foundation fellow and a survivor of sexual violence who leads the Restorative Justice Project at the nonprofit Impact Justice.

“Prison abolition doesn’t mean that everybody who’s locked up gets to come home tomorrow,” Butler explains.  Instead, activists envision a gradual process of “decarceration,” and the creation of alternative forms of justice and harm reduction.  “Abolition, to my mind, isn’t just about ending the prisons,” baliga adds. “It’s about ending binary processes which pit us as ‘us, them,’ ‘right, wrong’; somebody has to be lying, somebody’s telling the truth. That is not the way that we get to healing.”

February 3, 2020 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (2)