Sentencing Law and Policy

Notable Seventh Circuit discussion of how a combination of factors can amount to "extraordinary and compelling reasons"

A helpful colleague made sure I did not miss a short ruling authored by Judge Frank Easterbrook for the Seventh Circuit concerning factors in support of motions for compassionate release. The ruling in US v. Vaughn, No. 22-2427 (7th Cir. March 15, 2023) (available here), is worth reading in full, and this is part of the discussion that seems especially notable:

Vaughn maintains that his arguments collectively identify “extraordinary and compelling reasons” even if none of them does so independently. At least two circuits have held that it is permissible to consider reasons jointly as well as severally. United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 28 (1st Cir. 2022); United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1048 (10th Cir. 2021). But one has gone the other way, remarking: “[W]hy would combining unrelated factors, each individually insufficient to justify a sentence reduction, amount to more than the sum of their individual parts?” United States v. McKinnie, 24 F.4th 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2022). See also United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048, 1066 (6th Cir. 2022).

The Sixth Circuit’s rhetorical question has some intuitive appeal. Often 0 + 0 = 0. But not always. One persistent error in legal analysis is to ask whether a piece of evidence “by itself” passes some threshold — to put evidence in compartments and ask whether each compartment suffices. But when one court of appeals asked whether Fact A showed probable cause for an arrest, then whether Fact B did so, whether Fact C did so, and so forth, the Supreme Court reversed in a sharp opinion reminding all judges that evidence should not be compartmentalized.

[T]he [court of appeals] viewed each fact “in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances.”  This was “mistaken in light of our precedents.”  The “totality of the circumstances” requires courts to consider “the whole picture.”  Our precedents recognize that the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts — especially when the parts are viewed in isolation. Instead of considering the facts as a whole, the [court of appeals] took them one by one. … The totality-of-the-circumstances test “precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.”

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, we have held that in employment-discrimination cases a district court must consider the evidence as a whole, rather than sorting facts into boxes and asking whether each suffices.... Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2016).

If we conceive of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” as those differentiating one prisoner’s situation from 99% of other prisoners, it is easy to see how Circumstance X could be true of only 10% of prisoners, Circumstance Y of 10%, and Circumstance Z of 10% — each insufficient to meet the threshold, but if they are independent then collectively enough to place the applicant among only 0.1% of all federal prisoners.  We do not say here that 99% is the threshold for “extraordinary and compelling reasons”; in the absence of guidance from the Sentencing Commission, identifying the threshold is committed to the discretion of district judges, with deferential appellate review.  See United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020).  Our point, rather, is that no matter how the threshold is defined, a combination of factors may move any given prisoner past it, even if one factor alone does not.  This leads us to disagree with the Sixth Circuit’s approach.

This does not help Vaughn in the end, however, because the discretion to evaluate multiple circumstances resides principally in the district courts.

New CRS piece reviews circuit split over justifications for revoking supervised release

A helpful reader alerted me to this notable new "Legal Sidebar" from the Congressional Research Service.  As suggested by the title, "Can Retribution Justify the Revocation of Supervised Release? Courts Disagree," the piece details a jurisprudential divide among the circuits for the justification for supervised release revocation.  Here is how the five-page report begins:

What are the legitimate reasons that a government may subject an individual to criminal punishment?  Western penological theory and American legal history generally identify four principled bases for criminal punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.  The Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) requires federal courts to impose an initial sentence that reflects these purposes of punishment.

The SRA also authorizes federal courts to sentence defendants to supervised release, encompassing a set of conditions that the defendant must comply with upon release from prison for a period of time (or, for some offenses, for up to life).  A defendant’s compliance with these conditions is “supervised” or monitored by a federal probation officer.  If a defendant violates a condition, the court may revoke the supervised release and send the defendant back to prison, among other things.  The SRA lists deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation among the factors that a judge must consider in making these revocation determinations.  The SRA does not, however, expressly include retribution as one such factor.

The federal appeals courts disagree as to whether, and to what extent, retribution may justify the revocation of supervised release in light of this statutory omission.  On one side of the divide, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that federal courts may consider retribution in making revocation decisions.  On the other side, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that courts either may not consider retribution in these decisions at all or may consider it only to a limited degree.

This Sidebar summarizes the four purposes of punishment, including retribution; offers an overview of supervised release; and summarizes the aforementioned split.  The Sidebar concludes with congressional considerations.

New Mexico seemingly poised to be latest state to elimination juvenile LWOP (after new press report about lost juve LWOPers)

This local press piece, headlined "Proposal to end juvenile life sentences in New Mexico on its way to governor," reports on notable new legislative developments in Land of Enchantment.  Here are some details:

In the early-morning hours Monday, the state House signed off on legislation that would abolish the possibility of a life sentence without parole for someone who committed a serious crime before they turned 18.  It would ensure that juveniles sent to prison would get a parole hearing 15 to 25 years into their sentence, depending on the severity of the underlying conviction.  Release wouldn’t be guaranteed, just a parole hearing.

The proposal picked up more support this year among legislators — following the failure of a similar proposal last year — and is now on its way to the desk of Gov. Michelle Lujan Grisham.  “A lot of meaningful work has happened in people’s hearts this year,” Long said in an interview.

She was in the gallery as the House took up debate on the proposal about 11pm Sunday and adopted the measure at 2:15am Monday, the last approval necessary to send it to the governor.  The House passed the bill on an 37-25 vote.  “Children are works in progress,” said House Majority Leader Gail Chasey, D-Albuquerque, “and we need sentencing options that leave room for their potential to experience positive transformations.”

Republican lawmakers blasted the proposal. Some crimes, they said, are so heinous that a parole hearing shouldn’t even be possible.  Rep. Stefani Lord, R-Sandia Park, said the hearings will reopen trauma for families.  “I don’t see how this is good for grieving parents or our community,” she said....

In the Senate, six Republicans support the bill. But the House vote was along party lines, with Democrats in favor and Republicans opposed. A year ago, the proposal died in the House without reaching the floor for a vote by the full chamber.

This year’s proposal makes changes intended to address the opposition. It establishes a tiered schedule of parole hearings based on the severity of the crime, rather than calling for hearings at 15 years across the board. And this year lawmakers have encountered plenty of advocates in person, including parents speaking about their own children and young adults sharing stories of redemption....

About 75 people would be affected by the bill, according to the American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico, making them eligible for parole earlier than they would otherwise....  If approved by the governor, New Mexico would become the 27th state to end juvenile life sentences without parole, according to the Sentencing Project, an advocacy group.

Interestingly, ProPublica has this notable recent piece about juvenile LWOPers in New Mexico headlined "New Mexico Has Lost Track of Juveniles Locked Up for Life. We Found Nearly Two Dozen."  Here are short excerpts from the lengthy piece:

Gov. Michelle Lujan Grisham’s office has indicated that she will likely sign the legislation, if it is passed, by early April; it would go into effect this summer. In the meantime, officials in her administration could not answer basic questions about the number of prisoners affected and were unclear about which office is responsible for maintaining that information.

Carmelina Hart, spokesperson for the corrections department, initially sent ProPublica the names of 13 people in New Mexico’s prison system who were sentenced to life as children, which she said was the extent of the cohort. But a disclaimer below the list read, “Due to inconsistencies and mistakes over decades of data entry, as well as ensuing attempts of varying success to fix previous inaccuracies over that time, it is virtually impossible to conclude that all of these data are entirely correct.”...

Hart emphasized that the agency does have records of every person serving in its facilities, and that if the bill becomes law, NMCD will take the appropriate steps to ensure that it is in compliance....

One subset of New Mexico’s juvenile lifers who seem to have been disproportionately forgotten are those serving their time in out-of-state prisons.  Jerry Torres and Juan Meraz, for example, are both in the custody of the New Mexico Corrections Department for crimes they committed as juveniles in the state, yet they are locked up in Arizona — in a for-profit prison operated by the company CoreCivic.

The Sentencing Project launches a "Second Look Network"

Regular readers should know that I am a big fan of second-look sentencing mechanisms, so I am also now a fan of a new "network" that I learned about via email today.  Here is a portion of the email (with links from the original):

The Sentencing Project is excited to announce the launch of the Second Look Network! The Second Look Network is a coalition of attorneys and post-sentence advocates across the country working on behalf of incarcerated individuals seeking relief from lengthy or unfair sentences.

The Network will facilitate the exchange of ideas and information between its members, and provide various opportunities for collaboration on effective litigation and mitigation strategies, host training sessions, and provide connections to experts and local policy efforts.  The Network will also provide communications and media support to its members. With support from Arnold Ventures, we are proud to create such a space to fill this need for the litigation community. 

To help build and maintain this Network, The Sentencing Project has welcomed a Director and Program Manager to our team.

Becky Feldman, Second Look Network Director

Becky is a post-conviction defense attorney and came to The Sentencing Project with 17 years of litigation and reentry experience on behalf of incarcerated people serving life sentences in Maryland prisons. 

Leyda Pereyra, Program Manager

Leyda is a social justice, equity and human rights advocate. Previously, Leyda served as an operational strategist and consultant to various campaigns that centered on health equity, economic empowerment, research and public policy through culturally responsive social justice frameworks.

We welcome you to learn more about the Network here. We also invite you to review the membership criteria, and, if applicable, apply to join us as we build this community.

I have written a whole lot about a broad array of second-look ideas and related issues in a a number of article through the years.  Here is a sampling of some of my major second-look related writings:

• "Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences"
• "Reflecting on Parole's Abolition in the Federal Sentencing System"
• "Encouraging (and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to be Second-Look Sentencers"
• "Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement Practices"
• "Turning Hope-and-Change Talk Into Clemency Action for Non-Violent Drug Offenders"
• "Exploring the Theory, Policy and Practice of Fixing Broken Sentencing Guidelines"
• "The Enduring (and Again Timely) Wisdom of the Original MPC Sentencing Provisions"

RFK's assassin, Sirhan Sirhan, denied parole after 17th California parole board hearing

As reported in this New York Times article, a "California panel on Wednesday denied parole for Sirhan B. Sirhan, the man convicted in the 1968 assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy, in its first review of the case since Gov. Gavin Newsom decided last year that Mr. Sirhan, 78, should not be released." Here is more:

The parole board’s latest decision, which followed a hearing via videoconference from the state prison in San Diego, where Mr. Sirhan has been held, was the second time in three years that Mr. Sirhan’s release had been considered.  He has spent more than a half-century behind bars for shooting Mr. Kennedy, then a candidate for president, inside the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles at the end of a campaign appearance in 1968.  At the time, Mr. Sirhan was 24.

His lawyers have argued that he is not a danger to the public and should be released.  In 2021, a panel of the parole board agreed. But after an extraordinary chain of events, the governor overruled the panel last year, charging that Mr. Sirhan had not yet been rehabilitated.

On Wednesday, after Mr. Sirhan’s 17th parole hearing, the new recommendation was made by a commissioner and a deputy commissioner who were not part of the review panel in 2021. Governor Newsom had no comment....

By 2021, California law required the parole board, when making a determination on releasing an inmate, to consider the inmate’s advanced age and his relative youth at the time a crime was committed.  After 15 prior denials, a panel of commissioners granted him parole that year.  They noted then that Mr. Sirhan had improved himself by taking classes in prison. Two of Mr. Kennedy’s sons had also urged leniency.

But most of the family was adamant that Mr. Sirhan remain behind bars and pleaded with Mr. Newsom to exercise his power under California law to reject the panel’s recommendation.  In January 2022, after more than four months of review, the Democratic governor — who has long spoken of Mr. Kennedy as a role model — granted that plea.

“After decades in prison, he has failed to address the deficiencies that led him to assassinate Senator Kennedy,” the governor wrote last year. “Mr. Sirhan lacks the insight that would prevent him from making the same types of dangerous decisions he made in the past.”

Mr. Sirhan’s lawyer, Angela Berry, has since asked a Los Angeles Superior Court judge to reverse Mr. Newsom’s 2022 parole denial. With that petition pending, she said on Wednesday that she believed the panel’s latest decision had been influenced by the governor’s rejection last year.

Prior related posts:

• Notably high-profile cases now the focus of parole decision-making 
• RFK killer. Sirhan Sirhan, recommended for parole after decades of denials 
• "If Democrats don't think Robert Kennedy’s assassin deserves parole, do they really support criminal justice reform?" 
• California Gov Newsom reverse parole grant to Sirhan Sirhan, RFK's assassin 

An interesting (and dubitante) SCOTUS argument in Dubin

I flagged in this post from last November the Supreme Court's cert grant in Dubin v. United States, which concerns the reach of the federal criminal law that adds a mandatory two-year prison term for using another person’s identity in the process of committing another crime.  That statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, is titled "Aggravated identity theft," but the statutory language would seem to cover a whole lot more conduct than what most think of as identify theft.  In fact, the government seem to be claiming that waiter who adds for himself an unauthorized $1 tip when swiping a patron's credit card would be guilty of credit card fraud and an additional two-year mandatory prison term under § 1028A.  

This matter was argued before the Supreme Court yesterday and the lengthy argument had all sorts of interesting elements.  (The transcript, running over 100 pages, is available here; the audio is available here.)  As detailed in the pieces linked below, it seems nearly all the Justices believe there have to be some limiting principles for application of this statute.  But while the Justices seem to generally doubt the government's broad statutory reading, it is unclear what part of the statutory text may provide real limits and on what terms.  Stay tuned:

From Bloomberg Law, "Justices Appear Ready to Limit Breadth of Identity Theft Law"

From the New York Times, "Supreme Court Seems Skeptical of Broad Sweep of Identity Theft Law"

From SCOTUSblog, "Justices lean toward narrow reading of aggravated identity theft"

From Security Boulevard, "Supreme Court: Does BIlling Fraud Violate Federal ID Theft Statutes?"

"Revocation at the Founding"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Jacob Schuman and now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The Supreme Court is divided over the constitutional law of community supervision.  The justices disagree about the nature of liberty under supervision, the rights that apply when the government revokes supervision as punishment for violations, and the relationship between parole, probation, and supervised release.  These divisions came to a head in 2019’s United States v. Haymond, where the justices split 4-1-4 on whether the right to a jury trial applies to revocation of supervised release.  Their dispute focused on the original understanding of the jury right at the time the Constitution was ratified.

This Article aims to settle the debate over the law of revocation at the Founding. In the late 18th-century United States, there was a close legal analogue to modern community supervision: the recognizance to keep the peace or for good behavior.  Like probation, parole, and supervised release, the recognizance was a term of conditional liberty imposed as part of the punishment for a crime, providing surveillance and reporting on the defendant’s behavior, and with violations punishable by imprisonment.  Given these similarities, the best way to determine if the original understanding of the jury right would apply to revocation of community supervision is to ask whether the common law required a jury for punishing violations of a recognizance.

Fortunately, Founding Era legal authorities make the answer to that question clear: Yes, at the time the Constitution was ratified, punishing recognizance violations required a jury trial.  This requirement only disappeared during the 19th century with the development of probation and parole, which changed the structure of community supervision from an additional penalty into a delayed punishment.  Because supervised release is structured as a penalty, not a delay, the original understanding of the jury right would apply to revocation of supervised release, even if not to probation or parole.  The law of revocation at the Founding preserves lost constitutional rights that deserve modern reconsideration and renewal.

SCOTUS grants certiorari to review reach of FIRST STEP Act's expansion of statutory safety valve

As predicted in this post a couple days ago, sentencing fans now get to turn their attention to the Supreme Court for the next chapter of a fascinating FIRST STEP Act statutory interpretation issue.  Specifically, in this morning's SCOTUS order list, one of the two cases receiving certiorari grants was Pulsifer v. United States.  Here is the (lengthy) question presented as set forth in the defendant's cert petition:

The “safety valve” provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)–(5).  Congress amended the first set of criteria, in § 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he “does not have — (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).

The question presented is whether the “and” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means “and,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the “and” means “or,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).

Notably, as regular readers know, the circuit split on this issue has deepened to include two more circuits on both sides of the debate.  Federal criminal justice practitioners and sentencing fans certainly will be following this case closely because its resolution will impact thousands of drug defendants sentenced in federal courts every year. But statutory construction gurus (and isn't that everyone) will also surely be interest in the debates this case can present about textualism, plain meaning and the rule of lenity. Stay tuned.

Cruising around some early commentary on Cruz v. Arizona

Perhaps in part because the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet issued that many notable opinions, and perhaps in part because every capital case that leads to an interesting 5-4 split ruling garners attention, there has been a good bit of early commentary regarding this past week's decision in Cruz v. Arizona, No. 21–846 (S. Ct. Feb 22, 2023) (available here), on behalf of a death row defendant. Here is a sampling:

At Crime & Consequences from Kent Scheidegger, "Supreme Court Reinstates Review of Arizona Murderer’s Case"

At Esquire from Charles P. Pierce, "Terrible Ideas Keep Inching Closer to Reality, Thanks to Supreme Court Conservatives"

At The Hill from Austin Sarat, "Supreme Court delivers rare victory for death row inmate: the chance to spend rest of his life behind bars"

At SCOTUSblog from Alexis Hoag-Fordjour, "In rare win for people on death row, justices chide Arizona for ignoring Supreme Court precedent"

At Slate from Leah Litman, "The Supreme Court Did Something Rare: Enforced a Precedent Conservatives Hate"

At the Washington Post from Ruth Markus, "The justices halt an execution — and reveal themselves in the process"

Split over reading of the FIRST-STEP-amended safety valve provision appears ready for SCOTUS review

In this post a couple of days ago, which discussed the latest notable circuit opinion interpreting the language Congress used in the FIRST STEP Act to expand the statutory safety valve enabling more federal drug defendants to be sentenced below mandatory minimum terms, I suggested it was only a matter of time before SCOTUS takes up the statutory interpretation dispute that has deeply divided lower courts.  And this new Relist Watch post by John Elwood at SCOTUSblog suggest it may actually be only a matter of days before cert is granted on this issue:

The Supreme Court will meet this Friday to consider whether to grant review in a group of around 95 petitions and motions. They will be considering eight cases for the second time....

Under the “safety-valve” provision of federal sentencing law, a defendant convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes can obtain relief from statutory mandatory minimum sentences if, among other things, her criminal history satisfies criteria in 18 U.S.C § 3553(f)(1): she “does not have — (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.”

Pulsifer v. United States and Palomares v. United States present the question of how that provision should be read: whether a defendant is ineligible for relief from the mandatory minimum if her criminal history runs afoul of any one of the disqualifying criteria in subsections (A), (B), or (C), or is ineligible only if her criminal history runs afoul of all three disqualifying criteria, subsections (A), (B), and (C).  The government agrees that the circuits are divided and review is warranted, and recommends that the court take Pulsifer, which it says is the better vehicle.  Counsel for Palomares and Pulsifer trade barbs in their reply briefs about which is the better vehicle.  Probably at least one will get the grant.

I share the view that, if the Justice Department is advocating for review, we ought to expect a grant on one of these cases perhaps as early as Monday.  My understanding is that a grant now would set the case up for Fall 2023 argument and likely no decision from SCOTUS until early 2024. 

US Sentencing Commission to begin series of public hearings on its proposed guideline amendments

For sentencing fans looking for binge-worthy viewing and reading, the United States Sentencing Commission is on the verge of starting a series of public hearings concerning  its many proposed amendments to the US Sentencing Guidelines.  The hearing, which start Thursday morning at 9am EST, will be live-streamed at this link.  That link details that the hearing is scheduled to run all day on February 23 and for half the day on February 24 and during these two days "the Commission [will] receive testimony on proposed amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines related to Compassionate Release, Sex Abuse of a Ward, and Acquitted Conduct."

I count a full 25 witnesses scheduled for Thursday's hearing which is just considering guideline amendment for compassionate release.  Nearly all the written testimony for these witnesses can be found linked within the USSC's hearing schedule.  I doubt I will get a chance to review more than a few of the statements, and I welcome readers helping to flag written testimony that seems particularly notable.  There are "only" 12 witnesses scheduled for Friday's hearing covering sex abuse of a ward, and acquitted conduct.  A quick review of the seven statements concerning acquitted conduct reveal a wide variety of opinions from a wide variety of witnesses.

And if that's not enough for sentencing fans, the Commission today also noticed here its plans for a second two-day public hearing on Tuesday, March 7 and Wednesday, March 8.  As the notice explains, the "purpose of the public hearing is for the Commission to receive testimony on proposed amendments related to Firearms, Fake Pills and the First Step Act-Drug Offenses, Circuit Conflicts, Career Offender, and Criminal History."

US Supreme Court, in 5-4 ruling, rejects Arizona's claim of proper state-ground basis to uphold death sentence

In an interesting little ruling in a state capital case, the US Supreme Court this morning in Cruz v. Arizona, No. 21–846 (S. Ct. Feb 22, 2023) (available here), rejected an effort by Arizona to preserve a state death sentence on procedural grounds.  The Court's opinion was authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson. Here is how the Court's opinion starts and ends:

Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz, a defendant sentenced to death, argued at trial and on direct appeal that his due process rights had been violated by the trial court’s failure to permit him to inform the jury that a life sentence in Arizona would be without parole. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161–162 (1994) (plurality opinion); id., at 178 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Those courts rejected Cruz’s Simmons argument, believing, incorrectly, that Arizona’s sentencing and parole scheme did not trigger application of Simmons. See State v. Cruz, 218 Ariz. 149, 160, 181 P.3d 196, 207 (2008).

After the Arizona Supreme Court repeated that mistake in a series of cases, this Court summarily reversed the Arizona Supreme Court in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613 (2016) (per curiam), and held that it was fundamental error to conclude that Simmons “did not apply” in Arizona. 578 U.S., at 615.

Relying on Lynch, Cruz filed a motion for state postconviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). That Rule permits a defendant to bring a successive petition if “there has been a significant change in the law that, if applicable to the defendant’s case, would probably overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence.” Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.1(g) (Cum. Supp. 2022); see also ibid. (Cum. Supp. 2017).

The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after concluding that Lynch was not a “significant change in the law.” 251 Ariz. 203, 207, 487 P. 3d 991, 995 (2021). The Arizona Supreme Court reached this conclusion despite having repeatedly held that an overruling of precedent is a significant change in the law.  See id., at 206, 487 P. 3d, at 994 (The “‘archetype of such a change occurs when an appellate court overrules previously binding case law’”).

The Court granted certiorari to address whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding that Lynch was not a significant change in the law for purposes of Rule 32.1(g) is an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment.  It is not....

In exceptional cases where a state-court judgment rests on a novel and unforeseeable state-court procedural decision lacking fair or substantial support in prior state law, that decision is not adequate to preclude review of a federal question.  The Arizona Supreme Court applied Rule 32.1(g) in a manner that abruptly departed from and directly conflicted with its prior interpretations of that Rule.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The  dissent was authored by Justice Barrett and joined by Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch.  It ends this way:

The Court makes a case for why the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own precedent is wrong.  If I were on the Arizona Supreme Court, I might agree.  But that call is not within our bailiwick.  Our job is to determine whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision is defensible, and we owe the utmost deference to the state court in making that judgment.  Cases of inadequacy are extremely rare, and this is not one.  I respectfully dissent.

A glass-half-empty look at federal compassionate release data since FIRST STEP Act

Extrapolating based on the latest data from the US Sentencing Commission, since passage of the FIRST STEP Act in December 2018, nearly 5000 persons have secured a reduced term of imprisonment for "extraordinary and compelling reasons" pursuant to so-called "compassionate release" motions under 3582(c)(1)(A).  This number, which amounts to an average of roughly 100 sentence reduction grants per month, is a 50-times increase from the average of two such reductions per month in the year before the FIRST STEP Act made it possible for prisoners to get their motions directly to courts.  (COVID is a big part of this story: USSC data show many hundreds of grants each month during the second half of 2020 and first part of 2021; grants have average closer to 50 per month through 2022.)

But while sentence reductions grants are much more common since passage of the FIRST STEP Act, they are still not common.  After all, roughly 400,000 persons have served federal prison sentences over the last five years, so only just over 1% of all federal prisoners have secured relief under 3582(c)(1)(A).  And this new NPR piece, headlined "Frail people are left to die in prison as judges fail to act on a law to free them," stresses data detailing how many are not securing relief.  Here are excerpts:

[D]ata from the U.S. Sentencing Commission shows judges rejected more than 80% of compassionate release requests filed from October 2019 through September 2022. Judges made rulings without guidance from the sentencing commission, an independent agency that develops sentencing policies for the courts.

The commission was delayed for more than three years because Congress did not confirm Trump's nominees and President Joe Biden's appointees were not confirmed until August.  As a result, academic researchers, attorneys, and advocates for prison reform said the law has been applied unevenly across the country. 

Later this week, the federal sentencing commission is poised to hold an open meeting in Washington, D.C. to discuss the problem. They'll be reviewing newly proposed guidelines that include, among other things, a provision that would give consideration to people housed in a correctional facility who are at risk from an infectious disease or public health emergency....

The First Step Act brought fresh attention to compassionate release, which had rarely been used in the decades after it was authorized by Congress in the 1980s.  The new law allowed people in prison to file motions for compassionate release directly with federal courts.  Before, only the director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons could petition the court on behalf of a sick prisoner, which rarely happened....

The number of applications for compassionate release began soaring in March 2020, when the World Health Organization declared a pandemic emergency.  Even as COVID devastated prisons, judges repeatedly denied most requests....  Data suggests decisions in federal courts varied widely by geography.  For example, the 2nd Circuit (Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) granted 27% of requests, compared with about 16% nationally.  The 5th Circuit (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) approved about 10 %. Judges in the 11th Circuit (Alabama, Florida, and Georgia) approved roughly 11% of requests. In one Alabama district, only six of 141 motions were granted — or about 4% — the sentencing commission data shows....

Sentencing commission officials did not make leaders available to answer questions about whether a lack of guidance from the panel kept sick and dying people behind bars.  The new sentencing commission chair, Carlton Reeves, said during a public hearing in October that setting new guidelines for compassionate release is a top priority.

Interestingly this NPR piece, though seemingly about denials of sentence reductions, focuses on a drug offender with stage 4 cancer who did secure compassionate release last year.  I cannot help but wonder if the reporter was not quite able to find a compelling case in which a sentence reduction was denied for a "frail [person] left to die in prison," though I am sure there are such cases.

Brief dissent from the denial of cert on plea ineffectiveness from Justice Jackson

This morning's Supreme Court order list, which comes after the Justices were off for nearly a month, had no cert grants and had lots and lots and lots of cert denials.  One of those denials, in Davis v. United States, No. 22–5364, prompted this short dissent authored by Justice Jackson and joined by Justice Sotomayor.  Here are excerpts:

Our criminal justice system today is “for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). Against this backdrop, this Court has recognized that the loss of an opportunity for a favorable plea offer due to an attorney’s deficient performance can violate the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. Id., at 169–170; see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012). Petitioner Quartavious Davis alleged, and the Eleventh Circuit did not dispute, that he satisfied the first prong of the Strickland ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard because his attorney failed to initiate plea negotiations with the Government. The question presented, then, is how can a defendant like Davis show “prejudice” as a result of this failure?...

The District Court concluded that Davis’s allegations in his 28 U. S. C. §2255 motion were insufficient, even if true, because he had not alleged “that a plea offer was made but not communicated to [him].”... Moreover, under the circumstances presented here, it was exceedingly likely that Davis would have prevailed with respect to the prejudice prong if the Eleventh Circuit had not applied that threshold requirement.  Davis’s allegations established that a favorable plea agreement was a strong possibility, even though no offer actually materialized, because each of Davis’s five codefendants had lawyers who negotiated favorable plea agreements with respect to the same series of armed robberies.  And while Davis (who was 18 or 19 years old at the time the crimes were committed) received a sentence of approximately 160 years of imprisonment after his attorney took him to trial, all of Davis’s codefendants received sentences of less than 40 years of imprisonment due to plea agreements that enabled the District Court to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum. T he District Court’s statements at sentencing were also noteworthy: The judge specifically asserted that, while he thought the appropriate sentence for Davis was 40 years, he was bound by the consecutive mandatory minimums.

The Eleventh Circuit gave short shrift to these alleged facts, and others, which suggest that Davis was harmed by his counsel’s failure to initiate plea negotiations because it applied a bright-line rule that prejudice cannot be shown in the absence of a plea offer.  This petition presents the Court with a clear opportunity to resolve a Circuit split regarding whether having an actual plea offer is an indispensable prerequisite to making the necessary showing of prejudice.  I would grant certiorari to resolve that issue.

Some notable SCOTUS sentencing stories from the relist watch

After an extended hiatus, the Supreme Court gets back in action next week.  In turn, John Elwood is back to keeping up with the cert pool through his terrific SCOTUSblog posts providing "Relist Watch."  And this week's "Relist Watch" installment has a couple of stories that all sentencing fans will find interesting:

The Supreme Court will meet this Friday for the first time in nearly a month to consider whether to grant review in new cases....

One other curious thing about our last installment’s relists: There were five petitions challenging the constitutionality of sentencing criminal defendants based on conduct the jury acquitted them of committing.  Those cases are just sitting there on the court’s docket, with no further action by the Supreme Court since it distributed them for the Jan. 20 conference.  The court generally doesn’t announce what it’s doing with pending petitions, so we have no choice but to speculate here.  But near as we can tell, the court appears to be holding those cases to see whether the U.S. Sentencing Commission acts on a pending proposal to place restrictions on federal courts’ consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing.  One of the five petitioners, Dayonta McClinton (whom I represent), argues that the Sentencing Commission’s proposal is woefully inadequate to resolve the issue, but it still may explain the court’s inaction.  Things may become clearer down the road.

That brings us to new business. There are 423 petitions and motions pending on the Supreme Court’s docket for this Friday’s conference. Two of those cases are newly relisted....

The second new relist, Davis v. United States, is far more conventional.  Petitioner Quartavious Davis was sentenced to 159 years of imprisonment for a series of seven Hobbs Act robberies he committed over a two-month period when he was 18 and 19 years old.  Although Davis went to trial, his five co-defendants all pleaded guilty and received much shorter sentences.  Davis argues that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to pursue and negotiate a plea agreement with the government, and by failing to render adequate advice to him regarding whether to plead guilty or go to trial.  Davis contends he would have pleaded guilty if he had been advised properly.  Although the court of appeals concluded Davis could not show prejudice absent an allegation that the government had offered him a plea deal, Davis contends it was enough to show that his similarly situated co-defendants were able to negotiate plea agreements, suggesting that there is no reason the government would not have been willing to extend Davis the same benefits. 

Is it really so hard to make sense of AG Garland's federal capital punishment administration?

The question in the title of this post is my reaction to this lengthy new Washington Post article headlined "Justice Department standards on federal death penalty called confusing."  Here are excerpts (with a few points highlighted for commentary to follow):

The Justice Department’s disparate approaches in a pair of mass-killing cases is generating accusations that the Biden administration has failed to press for the elimination of capital punishment and is not applying clear standards in judging who, if anyone, should face the death penalty.

On Monday, federal prosecutors will begin the death penalty phase in the trial of Sayfullo Saipov, who was convicted last month on murder and terrorism charges for fatally hitting eight pedestrians with a truck on a New York City bike path in 2017.  That comes days after the Justice Department announced an agreement allowing Patrick Crusius, who pleaded guilty to killing 23 people and injuring 22 while targeting Mexicans during a mass shooting rampage at a Walmart in El Paso in 2019, to avoid the death penalty.  He faces life in prison....

Analysts said the Justice Department’s decisions in those cases and several others make it difficult to detect a consistent policy more than two years into the Biden presidency.  As a candidate, Biden made promises to push for legislation banning capital punishment over concerns about how federal executions are carried out and how prosecutors have disproportionately targeted racial minorities and the poor.

Biden has said little about the issue since taking office. Attorney General Merrick Garland has deauthorized 25 death penalty cases that were started under previous administrations, and the Justice Department has not authorized any new capital cases since he took over in 2021.

The Justice Department in 2021 and 2022 continued to back capital convictions in the face of appeals from Dylann Roof, a White man who fatally shot nine Black parishioners in Charleston, S.C., in 2015, and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who orchestrated, along with his older brother, a bombing that killed three at the Boston Marathon in 2013. Federal courts upheld both of their death penalty sentences.

Meantime, seven federal capital cases, including Saipov’s, remain active, Justice officials said.  Among them is the government’s prosecution of Robert Bowers, who is set to stand trial in April on charges related to the mass shooting that slaughtered 11 people at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh in 2018.

“It’s really hard to say what’s going on,” said Monica Foster, a federal public defender representing Jairo Saenz, an MS-13 gang member who, along with his brother Alexi, are facing capital charges in connection with seven killings in Long Island in 2016.  Federal prosecutors announced in 2020 that they would seek the death penalty for both men; Foster, who recently took over Jairo Saenz’s defense, said she intends in March to ask Garland to withdraw the death penalty — a formal Justice Department process known as a deauthorization request.  Lawyers for Alexi Saenz said they, too, will seek deauthorization....

“They clearly are willing to walk back prior authorizations, so then it’s just a question of when?” said Nathan Williams, a former federal prosecutor who helped oversee Roof’s conviction in 2015.  “What’s distinguishing those cases, the ones they dismissed the notice on, from the cases of Bowers or Roof or Tsarnaev?  My guess is that they are less egregious cases. But then on the more egregious ones, are we seeing a general policy or a reflection of individual decisions on cases?”

The answer could have a direct bearing on another high-profile case, as the Justice Department is still deliberating over whether to pursue a capital case against Payton Gendron, a White man who faces 27 hate-crime and gun-related offenses in the fatal shooting of 10 Black people in a Buffalo grocery store last year.  Gendron live-streamed his attack and is alleged to have written a 180-page manifesto spouting white supremacist conspiracy theories and anti-Black and anti-Jewish rhetoric, while laying out plans for the assault.

“I was more than a little surprised when I saw what happened” in the Saipov bike path case, said Terrence Conners, a lawyer who represents victims’ families in the Gendron case.  The families have expressed split opinions over whether Gendron should face capital punishment. “The expressed policy of the Biden administration and the policy of Merrick Garland has been anti-death penalty,” Connors said. “With the horrible events in Buffalo and the racial animus and the predetermination [from Gendron], it may be a case that changes their minds.”

The Justice Department has long-standing policies governing how decisions on capital cases are made. The process, which typically takes more than a year, includes recommendations from a capital case committee in Washington, U.S. attorneys and the department’s Civil Rights Division, along with input from victims’ families, defense attorneys and community leaders.... Administration officials cautioned that because Garland has not authorized any new death penalty cases, it does not mean he is firmly opposed to doing so.  The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing active legal cases....

Cassie Stubbs, director of the ACLU’s Capital Punishment Project, suggested Garland might be distinguishing between honoring decisions in capital cases made by prior administrations, while staking out his own legacy in not approving any new cases under his watch....

In announcing Crusius’s plea deal in El Paso, under which he faces 90 consecutive life sentences, assistant U.S. Attorney Ian Hanna acknowledged that the defendant has schizoaffective disorder, a signal that the government viewed the disability as a mitigating factor against capital punishment.

Crusius’s legal team had hired an outside expert, who made the diagnosis, and the Justice Department agreed with the findings, in part because the expert was someone that federal authorities also have consulted on cases and trusted, according to a federal government official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss private deliberations. The Justice Department’s position in the Crusius case stands in contrast to the decision made by El Paso’s district attorney’s office, which is seeking the death penalty in the state’s murder case against Crusius, of Allen, Tex.

Twenty-three states have abolished the death penalty, while three — Oregon, Pennsylvania and California — have a moratorium against it. The number of state executions has fallen from 60 in 2005 to 18 in 2022, according to the Death Penalty Information Center. Texas has executed 581 people since 1977, nearly five times more than Oklahoma, the state with the second-most executions.

The lines I have emphasized from these excerpts make it not "confusing" for me to make sense of the current administration's approach to capital punishment.  For starters, two years in, AG Garland has not authorized any new federal capital cases. But, showing respect for the fact that Congress has not repealed the death penalty, he also has not announced that he would never seek a federal capital charge.  So why not seek capital punishment for Patrick Crusius?  In addition to the fact the mental health issues, the feds could be confident that a capital prosecution could be pursued, perhaps a lot more efficiently, by state prosecutors in Texas, a state with a considerable capital track record. (The Buffalo mass shooting, in a state without the death penalty, presents a harder question and it will be interesting to see AG Garland's capital decision there.)

Next, for ongoing cases, it makes perfect sense that AG Garland, exercising his prosecutorial discretion, would "deauthorize" capital prosecution in the "less egregious" cases but not in the "more egregious" cases.  I am not familiar with all the facts in all recent federal capital cases, but the idea that federal capital cases would keep moving forward in the most horrific mass killings and would not in less extreme cases seems entirely in keeping with a view of the death penalty being reserved for "the very worst of the worst."  Moreover, in mass killing cases, there are likely a greater number of victims and victims' family members who may express a strong interest in having the federal capital cases continued.

Of course, capital punishment abolitionists are always going to be grumpy when any capital case continues and capital punishment advocates are often going to be troubled when certain capital cases are not aggressively pursued.  But, the fact that AG Garland is taking a cautious case-by-case approach to capital cases does not make his standards inherently confusing or unprincipled.  Indeed, considering each case carefully on its own merits seems absolutely essential to the effective administration of justice in capital and non-capital cases.

Maine momentum for restoring parole as part of broader focus on rehabilitation

This local article, headlined "Maine legislators push to reestablish parole, citing disparities in criminal justice system," reports on some interesting criminal justice reform developments in the Pine Tree State.  Here are excerpts (with links from the original):

With the release of a comprehensive 240-page report, the return of parole to Maine’s correctional system seems more likely, though still far from a sure thing.

The Maine Legislature’s parole study commission convened last year issued its final report on Jan. 30 that includes an ambitious set of recommendations, though not all received unanimous support.

The commission was an outgrowth of a 2021 bill, LD 842, from then-Rep. Jeff Evangelos (I-Friendship), who proposed reinstating parole opportunities for all those incarcerated in state institutions. 

Maine’s Legislature first established a system of parole in 1913, allowing for an incarcerated person’s sentencing period to be reevaluated by corrections officers after serving a minimum length of time.  Parole was abolished in Maine in 1976.

A unanimous recommendation came for expansion of the existing early release program, which allows inmates with 30 months or fewer of their sentence to serve the remainder in home confinement.... 

Evangelos convinced commissioners to include reinstatement of a weekend furlough program.  “It would allow fathers to get to know their kids, and mothers to hold their children, sometimes for the first time,” he said.

Also gaining strong support was a new Criminal Law Revision Commission, which once made frequent suggestions for legal changes, but lapsed in 2005.

On the critical vote for parole, the commissioners divided 7-2 in favor, with Corrections Commissioner Randall Liberty and Sen. Scott Cyrway (R-Winslow) opposed.  The co-chairs, Sen. Craig Hickman (D-Winthrop) and Rep. Charlotte Warren (D-Hallowell) voted in the majority.  Of the four legislators on the commission, only Hickman is still serving in the same position.  The others were term-limited....

[T]he report concluded that its work “focused primarily on issues surrounding the reestablishment of parole, but parole is only one piece of a much larger conversation . . . The work of this commission is a beginning, not an end.”

The Judiciary Committee that received the report can introduce legislation to adopt its findings. Advocates have already submitted their own bill, LD 178, sponsored by Sen. Pinny Beebe-Center (D-Rockland), a concept draft.

Evangelos said the bill’s language will eventually include full implementation of the commission’s findings, including hearing eligibility for all inmates, and specific victim’s rights provisions.  He’s optimistic about passage of a strong bill, pointing to support from Rep. Billy Bob Faulkingham (R-Winterport), the House minority leader.  “We heard from supporters all over the country,” Evangelos said. “Of the dozens of people who testified, only two were opposed. People want a system that recognizes rehabilitation, and provides hope.”     

"Public support for second look sentencing: Is there a Shawshank redemption effect?"

The title of this post is the title of this new article by multiple authors just published in Criminology & Public Policy.  Here is its abstract

Research Summary

Washington, DC has implemented second look sentencing.  After serving a minimum of 15 years in prison, those convicted of a serious offense committed while under the age of 25 years can petition a judge to take a “second look” and potentially release them from incarceration.  To examine both global and specific support for second look sentencing, we embedded experiments in a 2021 MTurk survey and in a follow-up 2022 YouGov survey.  Two key findings emerged.  First, regardless of whether a crime was committed under 18 years or under 25 years of age, a majority of the public supported second look sentencing.  Opposition to the policy was low, even for petitioners convicted of murder.  Second, as revealed by vignette ratings, respondents were more likely to support release when a petitioner “signaled” their reform (e.g., completed a rehabilitation program, received a recommendation from the warden) and had the support of the victim (or their family).

Policy Implications

The critique of mass imprisonment has broadened from a focus on the level of incarceration to the inordinate length of sentences being served by some prisoners.  Policies are being proposed to reconsider these long sentences and to provide opportunities for earned release.  Second look sentencing in DC is one of these reforms.  Our research suggests that many members of the public believe in a “Shawshank redemption” effect — that those committing serious crimes as a teenager or young adult can mature into a “different person” and warrant a second look, with the possibility of early release if they have earned it.  A key issue is likely to be how much weight is accorded to the preference of victims or their families in any release decision.

Notable new grant of sentence reduction for California medical marijuana operator given nearly 22 years in federal prison back in 2008

I was pleased to learn late last night about a notable new ruling out of a federal district court in US  v. Scarmazzo, No. 1:06-cr-000342 DAD (E.D. Ca. Feb 2, 2023) (available for download below).  The case involves Luke Scarmazzo, a California medical marijuana dispensary operator who was federally prosecuted in the mid-2000s and was sentenced to 262 months in federal prison back in 2008.  As detailed in the 29-page opinion posted below, the federal district judge decision to reduce his sentence to time served (already more than 14 years).  The who sentence merits a full read for a host of reasons, and here are just a few key concluding passages: 

Having considered the parties’ briefing and reviewed the relevant case law, the undersigned’s current view is as follows.  This court clearly has the authority to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence in granting compassionate release.  Halvon 26 F.4th at 570. However, where, as here, the minimum mandatory sentence is still authorized by Congressionally enacted federal law that has not been subsequently subject to even non-retroactive amendment, the district court should not grant compassionate release based solely upon its conclusion that the originally imposed mandatory minimum sentence was unduly harsh.  See Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 574. Nonetheless, this court has broad discretion to consider the harshness of the sentence in light of the current landscape in combination with other factors in determining whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances warrant the granting of compassionate release in a given case. Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2396; Chen, 48 F.4th at 1095; Aruda, 993 F.3d at 802; Jones, 980 F.3d at 1111....

When considering the unique confluence of all of these circumstances — changes in the legal landscape with respect to federal enforcement of laws relating to distribution of marijuana in California; the significant disparity in the sentence actually served by co-defendant Montes and the 14+ years already served in prison by defendant Scarmazzo; defendant’s good behavior, meaningful employment, volunteer work, pursuit of educational opportunities during his imprisonment; defendant’s solid release plans including job offers and family support; the lack of danger posed to the community were he to be released; and defendant Scarmazzo’s difficult family circumstances that have developed during his imprisonment — the court is persuaded that the granting of the requested relief is appropriate at this point and is supported by both extraordinary and compelling circumstances and consideration of the sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Download CR opinion in Scarmazzo case

Fifth Circuit panel declares unconstitutional federal prohibition on firearm possession for someone subject to domestic violence restraining order

A Fifth Circuit panel handed down today another big post-Bruen ruling declaring that the Second Amendment renders unconstitutional a federal prohibition on firearm possession for certain disfavored individuals.  The ruling today in US v. Rahimi, No. 21-11001 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 2023) (available here), gets started this way:

The question presented in this case is not whether prohibiting the possession of firearms by someone subject to a domestic violence restraining order is a laudable policy goal.  The question is whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), a specific statute that does so, is constitutional under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution.  In the light of N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), it is not.

Zackey Rahimi levies a facial challenge to § 922(g)(8). The district court and a prior panel upheld the statute, applying this court’s pre-Bruen precedent. See United States v. Rahimi, No. 21-11011, 2022 WL 2070392 at *1 n.1 (5th Cir. June 8, 2022).  Rahimi filed a petition for rehearing en banc; while the petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Bruen.  The prior panel withdrew its opinion and requested supplemental briefing on the impact of that case on this one.  Considering the issue afresh, we conclude that Bruen requires us to re-evaluate our Second Amendment jurisprudence and that under Bruen, § 922(g)(8) fails to pass constitutional muster. We therefore reverse the district court’s ruling to the contrary and vacate Rahimi’s conviction.

Here are a few of many notable passages from the opinion:

Under the Government’s reading, Congress could remove “unordinary” or “irresponsible” or “nonlaw abiding” people — however expediently defined — from the scope of the Second Amendment. Could speeders be stripped of their right to keep and bear arms? Political nonconformists? People who do not recycle or drive an electric vehicle? One easily gets the point: Neither Heller nor Bruen countenances such a malleable scope of the Second Amendment’s protections; to the contrary, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.  Rahimi, while hardly a model citizen, is nonetheless part of the political community entitled to the Second Amendment’s guarantees, all other things equal....

The Government fails to demonstrate that § 922(g)(8)’s restriction of the Second Amendment right fits within our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.  The Government’s proffered analogues falter under one or both of the metrics the Supreme Court articulated in Bruen as the baseline for measuring “relevantly similar” analogues: “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” Id.  As a result, § 922(g)(8) falls outside the class of firearm regulations countenanced by the Second Amendment.

Some (of many) prior recent related posts:

• By 6-3 vote, SCOTUS expands Second Amendment rights by striking down NY public-carry licensing requirements 
• Are all broad felon-in-possession criminal gun statutes now constitutionally suspect after Bruen? 
• Spotlighting notable (and constitutionally suspect?) aspects of federal firearm prohibition enforcement 
• District Court declares § 922(n), which criminalizes a person under indictment from receiving a firearm, to be unconstitutional
• Notable new district court opinion strikes down federal serial number law but upholds felon possession ban applying Bruen
• Federal judge orders briefing on whether to appoint historian to resolve challenge to federal felon gun possession ban after Bruen
• Justice Department tells federal district judge "it is unnecessary ... to appoint an historian to assist" in resolving defendant's Second Amendment claim 
• New district court opinion "holds that § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional under Bruen's framework"
• Another district court finds § 922(n), which criminalizes a person under indictment from receiving a firearm, to be unconstitutional
• Third Circuit panel upholds constitutionality § 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession gun prohibition after Bruen 
• En banc Third Circuit to reconsider constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession gun prohibition after Bruen 

UPDATE: This AP article about the Rahimi ruling provides a bit more context concerning the decision and also includes an official reaction from US Attorney General:

The U.S. Justice Department Thursday night issued the following statement from Attorney General Merrick B. Garland following the decision: “Nearly 30 years ago, Congress determined that a person who is subject to a court order that restrains him or her from threatening an intimate partner or child cannot lawfully possess a firearm.  Whether analyzed through the lens of Supreme Court precedent, or of the text, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment, that statute is constitutional.  Accordingly, the Department will seek further review of the Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision.”

Seeking "further review," I suspect, will involve the Department of Justice first requesting en banc consideration of this panel decision in the Fifth Circuit.  If that does not happen, I would expect DOJ would then seek Supreme Court review.  Interestingly, were SCOTUS to take up this case (or any similar ones) anytime in 2023, we could reasonably expect another major Second Amendment ruling in the run up to the 2024 election.

Effective coverage of compassionate release challenges at the state level

Since the First Step Act made it much easier for federal prisoners to get their motions for sentence reductions before judges, discussion and debate (and litigation) over the federal approach to so-called compassionate release has been robust.   And, on-going consideration by the US Sentencing Commission of changes to its guidelines for these sentence reductions ensures that the federal debate will remain robust for the foreseeable future.

But, helpfully, the folks at Bolts have been doing the important work of making sure we do not lose sight of how these sorts of issues play out in state prisons systems.  Most recently, Bolts published an extended piece on these topics focused on Oregon, and it has published prior pieces focused on California and New York.  Here are the extended headlines of these pieces, along with links:

By Piper French, "In Oregon’s Prisons, Terminally Ill People Are Left with Little Recourse: Proposed legislation would ease the extraordinarily difficult road that incarcerated Oregonians face in securing compassionate release."

By Piper French, "California Passes Bill to Expand Prison Releases for Terminally Ill People: Few people leave prison under California’s compassionate release program, but a new measure could allow more incarcerated people to live out their final days at home."

By Victoria Law, "Prison Officials Routinely Deny Hearings to Terminally Ill New Yorkers: The frequent refusal to send medical parole cases to the state board has frustrated advocates and raises questions about the murky criteria preventing most sick people from making their case."

Justice Gorsuch dissents from denial of cert in "civil" tax case involving Excessive Fines challenge

The new SCOTUS order list released this morning appears to relist again (re-relist?) the set of acquitted conduct cases that I have been following closely (some background here and here).  In addition to that notable news, the order list also including an intriguing short dissent from the denial of cert in Toth v. US, a case involving a woman who failed to disclose a foreign bank account being "assessed a civil penalty of $2.1 million — half of the balance of Ms. Toth’s account — plus another $1 million in late fees and interest."   The First Circuit turned back an Excessive Fines challenge, and Justice Gorsuch explained why he found this troublesome (with some cites removed): 

It held that the Constitution’s protection against excessive fines did not apply to Ms. Toth’s case because the IRS’s assessment against her was “not tied to any criminal sanction” and served a “remedial” purpose.

This decision is difficult to reconcile with our precedents. We have recognized that the Excessive Fines Clause “traces its venerable lineage” to Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 4–5).  We have held that “[p]rotection against excessive punitive economic sanctions” is “‘fundamental’” and “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7).  And all that would mean little if the government could evade constitutional scrutiny under the Clause’s terms by the simple expedient of fixing a “civil” label on the fines it imposes and declining to pursue any related “criminal” case.  Far from permitting that kind of maneuver, this Court has warned the Constitution guards against it.  See Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 610 (1993) (“[T]he question is not, as the United States would have it, whether [a monetary penalty] is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment.”)....

Nor is a statutory penalty beneath constitutional notice because it serves a “remedial” purpose. Really, the notion of “nonpunitive penalties” is “a contradiction in terms.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321, 346 (1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Just take this case.  The government did not calculate Ms. Toth’s penalty with reference to any losses or expenses it had incurred.  The government imposed its penalty to punish her and, in that way, deter others.  Even supposing, however, that Ms. Toth’s penalty bore both punitive and compensatory purposes, it would still merit constitutional review.  Under our cases a fine that serves even “in part to punish” is subject to analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause.  Austin, 509 U. S., at 610 (emphasis added).

Ms. Toth and her amici identify still more reasons to worry about the First Circuit’s decision.  They say it clashes with the approach many other courts have taken in similar cases.  Pet. for Cert. 18–25 (collecting cases).  They observe that it incentivizes governments to impose exorbitant civil penalties as a means of raising revenue. Id., at 25–30.  And they contend that it is difficult to square with the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment.  Brief for Professor Beth A. Colgan as Amicus Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 4–13.  For all these reasons, taking up this case would have been well worth our time.  As things stand, one can only hope that other lower courts will not repeat its mistakes.

Fourth Circuit panel finds district court abused its discretion when denying compassionate release to elderly drug offender

I just came across a notable ruling from last week by a Fourth Circuit panel in US v. Malone, No. 21-6242 (4th Cir. Jan. 5, 2023) (available here). In this case, the circuit court panel concludes that "the district court abused its discretion by failing to properly assess the following factors which would warrant Malone’s compassionate release: his ailing health, advanced age, and relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors." Here is one key paragraph from the opinion (emphasis in the original):

[W]e conclude that the district court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that the relevant § 3553(a) factors clearly favor release.  Having a Category I criminal history, Malone acknowledged the seriousness of his offense in prior motions to the court and has now served over fourteen years of his sentence.  While in prison, he participated in multiple classes and was also placed in a low-level prison camp.  His new extraordinary and compelling health-related circumstances have condemned him to a life filled with limitations.  Due to these circumstances, his potential for recidivism is low to none and he does not pose a threat to others or the community at large.  To affirm the district court’s denial would not only be a great disservice to Malone, but to any defendant with failing health seeking autonomy in their twilight.  There is a reason this is called compassionate release, after all.

Outgoing Pennsylvania Gov included high-profile artist in final batch of record-setting clemency grants

Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf has only a few more days in office, and he is closing out a tenure that has been record setting in the use of clemency authority.  This local article discusses that record as well as the high-profile clemency recipent in the last batch of grants:

Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf has pardoned Philadelphia rapper Meek Mill of his possession of drugs and weapons charges from 2008....

Wolf has issued more than twice the amount of pardons granted by any of his predecessors, with at least a quarter of them targeting non-violent marijuana offenses, his administration announced Thursday.

Wolf, a Democrat, signed his final 369 pardons this week, for a total of 2,540 since he took office in 2015. He surpassed Democratic Gov. Ed Rendell's record of 1,122 granted pardons. Of the pardons, 395 were part of the expedited review process for nonviolent marijuana-related offenses. Another 232 were part of the PA Marijuana Pardon Project, which accepted applications through the month of September.

"I have taken this process very seriously - reviewing and giving careful thought to each and every one of these 2,540 pardons and the lives they will impact," Wolf said in a statement. "Every single one of the Pennsylvanians who made it through the process truly deserves their second chance, and it's been my honor to grant it."

A pardon grants total forgiveness of the related criminal conviction and allows for expungement.

En banc Third Circuit to reconsider constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession gun prohibition after Bruen

In this post two months ago, I noted the lengthy per curiam Third Circuit panel opinion in Range v. Garland, No. 21-2835 (3d Cir. Nov. 16, 2022) (available here), which concluded that a person convicted of state welfare fraud was "outside the class of people traditionally entitled to Second Amendment rights" and upheld felon disarmament under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against a Second Amendment challenge.  This Range opinion was the first big circuit opinion addressing felon gun dispossession under federal law after the landmark Supreme Court Bruen ruling changes Second Amendment jurisprudence. 

But Second Amendment law is Range free: via this order entered this past Friday, the full Third Circuit decided that this panel opinion in Range is to be vacated as the case will be reheard en banc (with oral argument scheduled for February 15, 2023).  I do not know enough about the particulars of all the Third Circuit judges to make confident predictions about how Range will be resolved after en banc reconsideration.  But, generally speaking, full circuits do not take up issues en banc when most of the judges are generally content with the panel outcome.  Consequently, I can confidently predict this case is one worth watching closely and one that might make for some notable new Second Amendment law.

Some (of many) prior recent related posts:

• By 6-3 vote, SCOTUS expands Second Amendment rights by striking down NY public-carry licensing requirements 
• Are all broad felon-in-possession criminal gun statutes now constitutionally suspect after Bruen? 
• Spotlighting notable (and constitutionally suspect?) aspects of federal firearm prohibition enforcement 
• District Court declares § 922(n), which criminalizes a person under indictment from receiving a firearm, to be unconstitutional
• Notable new district court opinion strikes down federal serial number law but upholds felon possession ban applying Bruen
• Federal judge orders briefing on whether to appoint historian to resolve challenge to federal felon gun possession ban after Bruen
• New district court opinion "holds that § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional under Bruen's framework"
• Another district court finds § 922(n), which criminalizes a person under indictment from receiving a firearm, to be unconstitutional
• Third Circuit panel upholds constitutionality § 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession gun prohibition after Bruen 
• Justice Department tells federal district judge "it is unnecessary ... to appoint an historian to assist" in resolving defendant's Second Amendment claim 

Oregon Supreme Court gives retroactive effect to Ramos Sixth Amendment jury unanimity rule (two months after Louisiana Supreme Court refused to do so)

An opinion from the Oregon Supreme Court on this last working day of 2022 provides a notable bookend to the echoes of the Supreme Court's 2020 Ramos holding that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury reach a unanimous guilty verdict to convict a defendant of a crime.  This local article reports on the basics and its import: 

Hundreds of felony convictions became invalid Friday after the Oregon Supreme Court struck down all non-unanimous jury verdicts reached before the practice was banned two years ago.

The retroactive ruling applies to all split-jury convictions reached during the 86-year stretch when Oregon was one of only two states, alongside Louisiana, to allow such verdicts.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Pro Tempore Richard Baldwin described the authorization of 10-2 and 11-1 jury verdicts in 1934 as a “self-inflicted injury” that was intended to minimize the voice of nonwhite jurors.

“We must understand that the passage of our non-unanimous jury-verdict law has not only caused great harm to people of color,” Baldwin wrote. “That unchecked bigotry also undermined the fundamental Sixth Amendment rights of all Oregonians for nearly a century.”

Voters approved Oregon’s non-unanimous jury system after a jury handed down a light sentence in a 1933 gangland murder trial, spurring racist and xenophobic newspaper coverage that blamed the compromise verdict on immigrant jurors, The Oregonian/OregonLive previously reported.

The U.S. Supreme Court outlawed divided verdicts in its landmark Ramos v. Louisiana decision in April 2020, but the order only applied to open cases and convictions that were actively being appealed when the ruling came down.

The ruling left the door open for states to make their own laws applying it retroactively. The Oregon legislature did not take that action, but people convicted by split juries began pursuing a retroactive ruling at the Oregon Appeals Court last year.

The Oregon Department of Justice says the Ramos ruling vacated more than 470 convictions with active appeals, meaning that prosecutors were required to essentially reboot each case from the beginning and either pursue a new trial, cut a plea deal or dismiss the charges.

The new state Supreme Court ruling means county district attorneys will have to make a similar decision for cases where the defendant had already exhausted a final appeal.

There are approximately 300 people, mostly in state prison, with exhausted appeals who have filed new litigation because they were convicted by a non-unanimous jury before the Ramos decision, according to Aliza Kaplan, a Lewis & Clark law professor and leader of the Criminal Justice Reform Clinic.

The full opinions from the Oregon Supreme Court in Watkins v. Ackley are available here.

Notably, Louisiana was the only other state with a history of non-unanimous criminal jury verdicts, and a couple of months ago its state Supreme Court decided against giving retroactive effect to Ramos (as this local press piece details).  The full opinion from the Louisiana Supreme Court in Louisiana v. Reddick are available here.

"Remorse, Relational Legal Consciousness, and the Reproduction of Carceral Logic"

The title of this post is the title of this paper authored by Kathryne M. Young and Hannah Chimowitz now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

One in seven people in prison in the US is serving a life sentence, and most of these “lifers” will someday be eligible for discretionary parole.  But little is known about a key aspect of parole decision-making: remorse assessments. Because remorse is a complex emotion that arises from past wrongdoing and unfolds over time, assessing the sincerity of another person’s remorse is neither a simple task of lie detection, nor of determining emotional authenticity. Instead, remorse involves numerous elements, including the relationship between a person’s past and present motivations, beliefs, and affective states.

To understand how parole board members make sense of remorse, we draw on in-depth interviews with parole commissioners in California, the state with the largest proportion of parole-eligible lifers.  We find that commissioners’ remorse assessments hinge on their perceptions of lifers’ relationships to law and carceral logic.  In this way, relational legal consciousness — specifically, second-order legal consciousness — functions as a stand-in for the impossible task of knowing another person’s heart or mind.  We distinguish relational from second-order legal consciousness and argue that understanding how they operate at parole hearings reveals the larger import of relational legal consciousness as a mechanism via which existing power relations are produced and reproduced, bridging the legal consciousness and law and emotion literatures.

Fingers crossed that SCOTUS might review acquitted conduct sentencing enhancements

Regular reader may vaguely recall some of my prior posts about the McClinton case before the US Supreme Court raising issues about the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing.  As I have detailed in posts months ago (and linked below), over the summer I had the pleasure of working with great lawyers at Squire Patton Boggs to file an amicus brief on the acquitted conduct issue in support of petitioner Dayonta McClinton.  (I blogged here about McClinton's case after the Seventh Circuit affirmed his 19-year sentence that was based heavily on the judge's determination that McClinton was to be held responsible for a murder even after a jury had acquitted him of that killing.  As detailed in this SCOTUS docket sheet, a number of notable interest groups have also filed amicus briefs in support of cert in this case.)

After various delays, it appears that this case will finally be considered at next week's SCOTUS conference.  And that reality likely account for this new AP article headlined "Supreme Court asked to bar punishment for acquitted conduct."  Here are excerpts:

A jury convicted Dayonta McClinton of robbing a CVS pharmacy but acquitted him of murder. A judge gave McClinton an extra 13 years in prison for the killing anyway. In courtrooms across America, defendants get additional prison time for crimes that juries found they didn’t commit.

The Supreme Court is being asked, again, to put an end to the practice. It’s possible that the newest member of the court and a former federal public defender, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, could hold a pivotal vote. McClinton’s case and three others just like it are scheduled to be discussed when the justices next meet in private on Jan. 6.

Sentencing a defendant for what’s called “acquitted conduct” has gone on for years, based on a Supreme Court decision from the late 1990s. And the justices have turned down numerous appeals asking them to declare that the Constitution forbids it.

The closest the court came to taking up the issue was in 2014, when Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg provided three of the four votes necessary to hear an appeal.... Scalia and Ginsburg have since died, and Thomas remains on the court. But two other justices, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, have voiced concerns while serving as appeals court judges.

I am hopeful, but still more than a bit pessimistic, about the possibility of 2023 being the year for SCOTUS to take up acquitted conduct sentencing.  If enough Justices are sincerely committed to orignalist principles, perhaps this issue will get to the Court's docket this coming year.  But I am certainly not holding my breath. 

A few recent of many, many prior related posts:

• "Acquitted Conduct Should Not Be Considered At Sentencing"
• A reminder of why "acquitted conduct" sentencing enhancements should be seen as a constitutional abomination 
• Judge Kavanaugh in 2009: "I think acquitted conduct should be barred from the guidelines calculation."
• Split Michigan Supreme Court finds due process precludes use of acquitted conduct at sentencing 
• "Acquitted. Then Sentenced."
• NJ Supreme Court holds, as a matter of state constitutional law, that "fundamental fairness" precludes sentence enhancement based on acquitted conduct 
• Can anyone estimate how many (thousands of) federal prison years have been based on acquitted conduct sentencing? 
• Might SCOTUS finally be ready to take up acquitted conduct sentencing enhancements?
• Hoping and pushing for SCOTUS finally taking up acquitted conduct sentencing enhancements 

Another round of holiday season clemency news

In this post a few days ago, I noted a few press stories about clemency grants from a few states.  At that time, I stated that it was somewhat surprising and quite disappointing that there were not more executive officials making more use of their clemency pens in this holiday season.  But it now seems I was a bit premature in my accounting, as now I see a few more state clemency stories in the news:

From California, "Newsom grants 10 pardons, including for drug crimes"

From Colorado, "Colorado governor commutes 4 inmates’ sentences, pardons 20 people, including state trooper who guarded Capitol"

From Massachusetts, "Whitmer grants 22 clemency requests, including 4 pardons"

From New York, "Hochul Grants Clemency to 13, Including a Domestic Violence Victim"

From Tennessee, "Gov. Lee Grants Executive Clemency to 16 Individuals"

From Texas, "Governor Abbott Grants Clemency To Two Texans Recommended By Texas Board Of Pardons And Paroles"

As I mentioned before, because I know of some clemency work that has not been covered in press pieces, I am sure there are more stories of seasonal grace than just what is covered in these press accounts.  Still, I view it as a real shame that we do not see many more clemency accounts from many more state during this time of year. 

En banc Sixth Circuit clings to anti-textual limits on what factors can be consider in § 3582(c)(1)(a) motions

The Supreme Court's ruling in Concepcion v. US, No. 20-1650 (S. Ct. June 27, 2022) (available here), seemed to be a fairly clear direction to circuit court that it was not their job to make up non-textual limits to how district courts exercised sentencing discretion.  Here are just some of the key quotes, first discussed in this post, from the Supreme Court's opinion in Concepcion: 

It is only when Congress or the Constitution limits the scope of information that a district court may consider in deciding whether, and to what extent, to modify a sentence, that a district court’s discretion to consider information is restrained....

Federal courts historically have exercised this broad discretion to consider all relevant information at an initial sentencing hearing, consistent with their responsibility to sentence the whole person before them.  That discretion also carries forward to later proceedings that may modify an original sentence.  Such discretion is bounded only when Congress or the Constitution expressly limits the type of information a district court may consider in modifying a sentence....

The only limitations on a court’s discretion to consider any relevant materials at an initial sentencing or in modifying that sentence are those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution....

Because Concepcion seemingly makes plain that the "only limitation" on "the type of information a district court may consider in modifying a sentence" are those limits in the Constitution or that Congress has expressly set forth, motions for sentence reductions pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(a) -- so-called compassionate release motions -- could certainly include consideration as a general matter all sorts of information about changes in laws and well as changes in fact that might justify a sentence reduction.  After all, Congress has only expressly provided in statutory text that one factor could not alone serve as the basis for sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(a):  "Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." 28 USC § 994(t).

But, today the en banc Sixth Circuit has decided to double-down on its anti-textual approach to § 3582(c)(1)(a) by stating another categorical limit on what can be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason under 3582 in US v. McCall, No. 21-3400 (6th Cir. Dec 22, 2022) (available here).  The majority opinion in the split en banc ruling start and ends this way: 

David McCall, a federal prisoner with a long drug-dealing career, pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015.  Five years into his 235-month sentence, McCall moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1).  Although he cited several “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction under that statute, the heart of his motion rested on our opinion in Havis.  Invoking that opinion, McCall argued that if he were sentenced today, he would receive a shorter sentence than he received in 2015.  The district court denied his motion, reasoning that a nonretroactive change in sentencing law could not amount to an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction. We agree and affirm....

Nonretroactive legal developments do not factor into the extraordinary and compelling analysis. Full stop.

As I noted when discussing a prior Sixth Circuit panel ruling to this effect, there is absolutely nothing in the text of § 3582(c)(1)(a) that supports the contention that nonretroactive legal developments cannot ever factor into or generally constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to allow a sentence reduction, either alone or in combination with other factors.  The majority here, presumably based on its own sense of policy, is seemingly eager to invent an extra-textual categorical limitation on the authority Congress gave to district courts to reduce sentences.  In other words, this is judicial lawmaking that is flagrantly disregarding both the statutory text enacted by Congress and the instructions of the Supreme Court in Concepcion.  Full Stop.

Isn't a 4% post-offense "faced legal scrutiny" rate worthy of praise ... even for Prez Trump's clemency grants?

This press report about an Oregon study of pandemic-related commutations notes that, among recipients who were released early, "18% were arrested within one year of their commutation, 8% were convicted of a new crime and 2% were reincarcerated."  The press report rightly indicated that these are relatively low rates based on a comparable cohort of individuals in Oregon.  

These Oregon commutations are not really a proper point of comparison, but I am not sure how best to make the point that it is to be expected that, among any significant cohort of clemency recipients, some number are likely to face some future legal difficulties.  But this new ABC News piece about Prez Trump's clemency recipients seeks to make a huge deal about a couple of handfuls of clemency recipients having since "faced legal scrutiny."  The piece is headlined "Trump-era pardon recipients are increasingly back in legal jeopardy," and here are excepts:

An ABC News analysis of the 238 people who were pardoned or had their sentences commuted during the Trump administration found at least ten who have since faced legal scrutiny -- either because they are under investigation, are charged with a crime, or are already convicted.  Legal experts call this recurring theme unprecedented -- but not entirely unexpected, given the former president's unorthodox approach to the pardon process....

Those pardoned by Trump during his term in office included dozens of friends and political allies.  The list included celebrities, lawmakers and former aides who had been convicted of crimes ranging from fraud to murder -- including four private military contractors who were in prison for murdering 17 Iraqi citizens, including two children, in a 2007 attack in Baghdad....

Recidivism rates from previous administrations' clemencies is opaque, as federal agencies don't keep tabs on clemency grantees after their release.  But in one study reviewing former President Barack Obama's 2014 clemency initiative, which led to sentence commutations for nearly 1,700 federal drug offenders, the independent and bipartisan U.S. Sentencing Commission found only three who had been rearrested by the end of 2017.  A Texas woman was rearrested on theft charges less than a year after earning an Obama commutation on her life sentence in 2016, and another Texan pleaded guilty to drug charges less than two years after earning a life sentence commutation under Obama's 2014 clemency initiative.

Based on news accounts and other available evidence, the number of clemency grantees who have gone on to commit additional crimes remains "incredibly low," Kupers said. For Trump-era pardons, however, experts said the numbers seem disproportionately high.

I am depressingly confident that more than three persons who received clemency from Prez Obama have "faced legal scrutiny" in recent years.  But I am even more confident that I do not want the media or others spending time developing questionable clemency "recidivism" statistics or otherwise engaging in partisan spit-fights about the rare clemency recipients who do not make good use of a second chance.  Rather, I wish ABC News and othe press outlets would spend a lot more time telling the encouraging stories of the hundred and throusands of clemency recipients who have made great use of their second chances. Focusing just on grants by Prez Trump, I am thinking about the great work being done in the arena of criminal justice reform by people like Alice Marie Johnson and Weldon Angelos and Amy Povah and David Safavian and Topeka Sam.  I am sure there so many more uplifting stories to tell about clemency recipients, but I am also sure the ghosts of Willie Hortonism still have not faded away.  

Lots of new data and a notable date from the US Sentencing Commission

The US Sentencing Commission yesterday published two new data reports: (1) this updated compassionate release data report and (2) this FY 2022 fourth quarter sentencing data.  There are lots of stories within all these data, though I still see the top stories to be those discussed here before: there are dramatic district variations in compassionate release grant rates and there are still relatively few "within guideline" sentences" being imposed by judges.

Specifically, on compassionate release, the three districts of Georgia show one notable example of variation: the Southern District of Georgia has granted only 8 out of 296 sentence reduction motions for a 2.7% grant rate; the Middle District of Georgia has granted only 4 out of 265 sentence reduction motions for a 1.5% grant rate; but the Northern District of Georgia has granted 80 out of 174 sentence reduction motions for a 46% grant rate.  On original sentencing more generally, this most recent USSC data show that, for all of FY 22, only 42% of all federal sentences have been imposed "Within Guideline Range" (and the number is under 28% for "Drug Trafficking" cases).

For various reasons and in various ways, all these data in some sense reflect the consequences of the US Sentencing Commission having to function without a quorum and being unable to amend any guidelines for nearly five years.  But, of course, we now have a fully loaded Commission, and the Commissions are clearly hard at work on guidelines reforms.  We know that because the Commission has now officially announced that it will have a public meeting on January 12, 2023, and that announcement notes the meeting agenda is to include "Possible Vote to Publish Proposed Guideline Amendments and Issues for Comment."

Some holiday season news and notes about clemency (and the absence thereof)

The holiday season, especially because it is also lame-duck season, often brings some notable executive clemency stories.  Last week's decision by outgoing Oregon Gov to commute the state's whole death row is a notable example (details here).   But a quick news search reveals only a few other stories from from a few other states about some lower-profile seasonable clemency efforts:

From Arkansas, "Governor Asa Hutchinson Announces Intent to Grant Executive Clemency"

From Massachusetts, "Baker recommends another round of pardons"

From North Carolina, "NC Gov. Roy Cooper commutes six people’s sentences and pardons four others"

Because I know of some clemency work that has not been covered in press pieces, I am sure there are more stories of seasonal grace that just in these three states.  Still, I find it somewhat surprising and quite disappointing that there are not more executive officials making more use of their clemency pens.  And, as some recent commentary pieces highlight, I am not the only one hoping to see more clemency action:

Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler at the NY Daily News, "Biden’s cowardice on clemency"

From Reuven Blau at The City, "For ‘Clemency Season,’ Prisoner Advocates Want Hochul to Keep Promise All Year: Last December, the governor said she would change the way pardons and clemency applications were handled. But little has changed since."

From Chris Geidner at Bolts, "Landmark Push for Clemency in Oregon and Nevada Show Split Paths on Death Penalty"

From Eva Santiago at amNY, "Clemency is one way to improve safety which no one wants to talk about"

State judge blocks plans of Nevada Pardon Board to discuss possible commutation of all state death sentences

As reported in this local article, a "Carson City District Court judge Monday ruled the state Board of Parsons may not consider commuting every death sentence in Nevada at its Tuesday meeting." The six page ruling is available at this link, and the first sentence of the last paragraph of the opinion states: "The Board's planned action, should it be permitted to occur, will violate the Nevada Revised Statutes, the Nevada Administrative Code, and the Nevada Constituion." Here is more about the ruling and the context from the press report:

Judge James Wilson issued a writ of prohibition against the board and Gov. Steve Sisolak — who asked the board to consider the commutations — after the Washoe County district attorney’s office filed an emergency petition on Friday seeking to block the move.

Wilson ruled that the board had not properly notify the families of murder victims of its intent to commute the death sentences of the 57 people currently on death row, that those inmates had not exhausted all of their appeals and that they had not applied to the board to lessen their sentences. In addition, the board is required to consider each case individually, and cannot grant “categorical” clemencies, Wilson ruled.

“The Board’s proposed action would violate the Nevada Constitution by failing to provide (victim’s families) with reasonable notice of these public proceedings, so that they may exercise their constitutional right to be reasonably heard regarding the proposed commutation of 57 death sentences,” Wilson wrote. “Each victim is entitled to be treated with fairness, respect, dignity and the right to be reasonably heard at any hearings involving the commutation of sentence.”

In addition, the law requires a consideration of each individual case on its merits, which would be impossible at Tuesday’s meeting, Wilson wrote. “Equally evident in the plain meaning of the statutory and administrative code is the Board’s obligation to make an individualized determination in each clemency matter,” Wilson wrote. “Even if individual applications had been submitted for each of the 57 persons on death row, the type of individualized determination that is mandated by (state law) and (administrative regulations) cannot be reasonably accomplished at a single meeting of the Board.”

Finally, Wilson wrote, the board can’t do a mass commutation. State law “does not permit the Board to grant ‘categorial’ exemptions, as this would amount to the Board creating statutory exceptions to a form of punishment specifically provided for by the legislature. It is not the Board’s prerogative to amend statutes.”...

The controversy began last week, when Sisolak urged the board to consider commuting every death sentence in the state. The board, which decides clemency cases in Nevada, is made up of the governor, the attorney general and all seven members of the Nevada Supreme Court. That prompted the Washoe County district attorney’s office to file a motion to block the move on Friday....

Meanwhile, Gov.-elect Joe Lombardo, a career police officer who currently serves as the sheriff of Clark County, hailed the ruling: “I’m thankful to Judge James Wilson for upholding the law, and I’m grateful that he protected the voter-approved constitutional rights of crime victims and their families.  I’m relieved that justice has prevailed through Marsy’s Law,” Lombardo said in a statement.  Marsy’s Law was a 2018 voter-approved constitutional amendment that provided rights to crime victims, including to have a notice of all hearings, to attend those hearings and to speak about the proceedings.

In addition to Washoe County, the Clark County district attorney’s office asked the Nevada Supreme Court to block Tuesday’s hearings, making similar arguments to its counterpart in Washoe County. Not only that, but Jennifer Otremba, the mother of 15-year-old murder victim Alyssa Otremba, filed a similar petition with the Supreme Court on Monday, arguing that changing the board’s agenda without giving notice to victims’ families violated Marsy’s Law.  “The Pardons Board’s rushed effort to commute all capital sentences without the mandated notice and application has not only robbed Jennifer of her right to participate, it has also deprived the Pardons Board of jurisdiction to proceed,” Otremba’s petition said.

Otremba has addressed the Legislature multiple times in recent years as an opponent of abolishing the death penalty.  Her daughter’s killer, Javier Righetti, was sentenced to die for raping and stabbing the teenager more than 80 times in 2011, during the girl’s first week at Arbor View High School.

Bills to repeal the death penalty have been repeatedly introduced in the Legislature, but none have ever passed.  In 2021, a repeal bill passed the Assembly but died in the state Senate. Sisolak at the time said he was generally opposed to capital punishment, but wanted exceptions for especially heinous crimes such as the mass shooting that took place on 1 October in Las Vegas.

US Attorney General Garland releases new federal charging guidelines that include instructions to treat crack like powder cocaine

I thought the increasing prospects for statutory sentencing reforms from Congress might be the big federal sentencing news of this week, but this new Washington Post piece suggests that even bigger news is coming from the Department of Justice.   Here are the (incomplete) details from the first press piece:

Attorney General Merrick Garland on Friday instructed federal prosecutors to end sentencing disparities in cases involving the distribution of crack and powder cocaine after decades of law enforcement policy disproportionately treating crack offenders more punitively.  Garland’s move effectively seeks to eliminate the significant difference in the amount of powder cocaine relative to crack cocaine that is required to be in a suspect’s possession to trigger mandatory minimum federal sentences if convicted.

Critics of the longtime policy have said it is a relic of the Washington’s misguided war-on-drugs era that targeted Black and Brown communities, resulted in overpopulated prisons and strained federal and local resources at the expense of more effective strategies. Proponents of treating crack dealers more punitively have said that form of the drug is faster acting and capable of producing more intense highs. Under current federal policy, possession of 28 grams of crack cocaine would trigger a mandatory minimum prison sentence of five years, compared to 500 grams of powder cocaine.

Garland’s memo to the nation’s U.S. attorneys directs prosecutors to charge “pertinent statutory quantities that apply to powder cocaine” when pursuing crack cases and to “advocate for a sentence consistent with powder cocaine rather than crack cocaine.” The move, long sought by civil rights advocates, comes as the Equal Act, a legislative bill that would eliminate the disparity, has been stalled in the Senate amid objections from some Republicans after passing the House last year with bipartisan support.

Joe Biden, then a U.S. senator from Delaware, crafted the 1986 crime bill that initially set a 100-to-1 ratio between powder and crack cocaine to trigger mandatory minimum sentences. The Fair Sentencing Act 0f 2010 reduced the ratio to 18-to-1. The Biden administration endorsed the Equal Act last year....

Garland’s memo cited Justice Department testimony last year to the Senate Judiciary Committee that such a disparity “is simply not supported by science, as there are no significant pharmacological differences between the drugs: they are two forms of the same drug, with powder readily convertible into crack cocaine.”

During his confirmation hearing in February 2021, Garland told Sen. Cory Booker (D-N.J.), a co-sponsor of the Equal Act, that the inequitable sentencing in crack and powder cocaine cases had a “disparate impact on communities of color.” “There’s no justification for this, and we should end this,” Garland said at the time. He also said that powder cocaine “is as dangerous with respect to crime rates as crack cocaine, both of which have now been unfortunately overtaken by fentanyl and the opioids. But both of those are bad problems [and] equalizing penalties for crack and powder should have no difference with respect to our ability to fight violent crime.”

Garland aides said the new guidelines, which will take effect within 30 days, are part of a broader set of changes the attorney general is making to the Justice Department’s charging policies.  The department under Garland continues to support the passage of the Equal Act, aides said; unlike a legislative change to federal policy, they noted, Garland’s memo would not retroactively apply to previous convictions.

Jim Pasco, executive director of the National Fraternal Order of Police, said in an interview that he supported Garland’s directive. Though the group has opposed eliminating the sentencing disparity in the past, and it did not take a position on the Equal Act, Pasco said the police union’s views have evolved “as there’s been more clarity around the science.” Pasco said the Biden administration has supported police with additional resources to fight a rise in violent crime, and the union does not believe the policy changes on cocaine sentencing will adversely affect the efforts of law enforcement.

Garland’s action could face blowback from Republicans who have championed a bill that would reduce the sentencing disparity but not eliminate it entirely. In April, Sens. Charles E. Grassley (Iowa), Mike Lee (Utah), Roger Wicker (Miss.) and Lindsey O. Graham (S.C.) proposed legislation that would reduce the ratio of powder-to-crack cocaine that would trigger mandatory minimum sentences to 2.5-to-1. Unlike the Equal Act, however, that bill would achieve greater parity in part by increasing penalties for powder cocaine users.

Aggravatingly, as of 2pm EST, the new AG Garland crack charging memo is not available on the Justice Department's website.  I am very eager to see thsi memo, as well as whatever else appears in the "broader set of changes the attorney general is making to the Justice Department’s charging policies" before commenting at length.  But I will start by noting that federal law does provide at least one possible means for Garland’s memo to retroactively apply to some previous crack convictions: AG Garland could have prosecutors bring, and vocally and consistently support, motions for sentence reductions under 3582(c)(1)(A) for crack offenders who are still serving unduly long and unfair crack sentences based in the unjust disparity.

UPDATE:  A helpful reader made sure to get me copies of these new charging memos from AG Garland.  Here they are (with commentary to follow in coming days):

Download Attorney General Memorandum - General Department Policies Regarding Charging Pleas and Sentencing

Download Attorney General Memorandum - Additional Department Policies Regarding Charges Pleas and Sentencing in Drug Cases

District Court finds sexual assault by guard and assistance prosecuting perpetrator provide basis for sentence reduction under 3582(c)(1)(A)

A helpful reader alerted me to a notable new opinion from a federal district court in US v. Brice, No. 13-cr-206-2 (ED Pa. Dec. 15, 2022) (available fore download below), which finds “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warranting a sentence reduction in the defendant's sexual assault by a federal corrections officer and her assistance to prosecutors in bringing that officer to justice.  Here is hope the Brice opinion gets started as a key passage: 

This case presents a difficult question under the First Step Act for compassionate release and involves balancing the disturbing conduct underlying Defendant Rashidah Brice’s conviction with the extraordinary and compelling events that occurred after sentence was imposed.  For reasons explained below, I will partially grant Brice’s motion and reduce her sentence by 30 months but will not order her release as she has requested.  Although Brice’s circumstances are extraordinary and compelling and warrant a reduction from her original sentence, due to the serious and violent nature of her crimes and their effect on the victims, I find that releasing Brice now would not be consistent with the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)....

It is entirely appropriate for me to consider how Brice responded to suffering abuse at the hands of her prison guards. The “broad discretion” federal courts have “to consider all relevant information” at a “proceeding[] that may modify an original sentence” is “bounded only when Congress or the Constitution expressly limits the type of information a district court may consider in modifying a sentence.”  Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2398 (2022). That Brice reacted to her trauma by agreeing to assist in the prosecution of her assailant supports a finding that Brice’s disproportionate suffering while in custody “warrant[s] . . . a reduction” in her sentence and that these circumstances are extraordinary and compelling.  Despite facing tremendous adversity both in her personal life before prison and at the hands of a prison guard, Brice responded by preventing more inmates from being abused, including cooperating in an investigation regarding individuals who had authority over her and could have retaliated against her.  I also note that Congress and the Department of Justice have determined that “[p]rison rape often goes unreported,” 34 U.S.C. § 30301(6), and “retaliation for reporting instances of sexual abuse and for cooperating with sexual abuse investigations is a serious concern in correctional facilities.” Department of Justice, National Standards To Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 F.R. 37106-01 (June 20, 2012).

Download BRICE sentence reduction opinion

The helpful reader who brought this ruling to my attention indicated this may be "the first time a federal court has concluded that either of these circumstances warrants compassionate release." The reader also rightly stated that this decision "is particularly timely, as Congress and Department of Justice leadership have been pressing the Bureau of Prisons to seek compassionate release for women abused behind bars."

"Do Prison Conditions Change How Much Punishment A Sentence Carries Out? Lessons From Federal Sentence Reduction Rulings During the COVID-19 Pandemic"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now available via SSRN authored by Skylar Albertson. Here is its abstract:

A set of motions filed during the COVID-19 pandemic challenged federal judges to consider whether they should always view the duration of imprisonment — as contrasted with prison conditions — as the sole determinant of how much punishment a sentence carries out.  Under 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), federal judges may “reduce” already imposed terms of imprisonment upon finding that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant reductions.  Prior to 2019, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) effectively controlled the scope of a catch-all subcategory of “Other Reasons” justifying sentence reductions.  The BOP used this authority almost exclusively for people who were in the final stages of terminal illness.  The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) amended § 3582(c) in a manner that freed federal judges to decide for themselves what types of circumstances meet the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard.  The FSA also authorized people in federal custody to file motions on their own behalf, instead of permitting only the Director of the BOP to do so.

Roughly a year later, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted the increased use of lockdowns and other restrictions inside U.S. prisons.  Among the many thousands of people who moved for sentence reductions, several hundred argued that imprisonment with these new restrictions amounted to a greater punishment than pre-pandemic imprisonment.  This Article explores the lessons that the decisions adjudicating these motions offer for the design of sentencing laws — including second looks — as well as efforts to increase transparency surrounding life inside prisons.

Outgoing Oregon Gov commutes all 17 of state's remaining death sentences to LWOP

As detailed in this local article, "Gov. Kate Brown announced on Tuesday afternoon that she would commute the sentences of all 17 individuals on Oregon’s death row to life in prison without the possibility of parole, the latest in her end-of-term string of clemency decisions."  Here is more:

“I have long believed that justice is not advanced by taking a life, and the state should not be in the business of executing people — even if a terrible crime placed them in prison,” Brown said in a statement sent out in a press release.  “This is a value that many Oregonians share,” Brown said.  The governor also directed the Department of Corrections to dismantle the state’s death chamber.

Oregon has not executed anyone on death row for a quarter century and Brown continued the moratorium that former Gov. John Kitzhaber put in place in 2011.  Governor-elect Tina Kotek, who like Brown and Kitzhaber is a Democrat, is personally opposed to the death penalty based on her religious beliefs and said during the campaign that she would continue the moratorium.

Voters have gone back and forth on the death penalty over the years, abolishing and reinstating it repeatedly.  Voters’ most recent decision on the death penalty was in 1984, when they inserted it into the state Constitution....

In 2019, the Legislature passed a bill that limited the crimes that qualified for the death penalty by narrowing the definition of aggravated murder to killing two or more people as an act of organized terrorism; intentionally and with premeditation kilIing a child younger than 14; killing another person while locked up in jail or prison for a previous murder; or killing a police, correctional or probation officer....

Brown said in her statement Tuesday that commuting the sentences of people currently serving on Oregon’s death row was consistent with what she described as lawmakers’ “near abolition” of capital punishment.  “Unlike previous commutations I’ve granted to individuals who have demonstrated extraordinary growth and rehabilitation, this commutation is not based on any rehabilitative efforts by the individuals on death row,” Brown said.  “Instead, it reflects the recognition that the death penalty is immoral. It is an irreversible punishment that does not allow for correction; is wasteful of taxpayer dollars; does not make communities safer; and cannot be and never has been administered fairly and equitably.”

Twelve of the seventeen people on death row are white, three are Latino, one is American Indian or Alaska Native and one is Black, according to the governor’s office....

Rosemary Brewer, executive director of the Oregon Crime Victims Law Center, said it was her understanding that staff at the Oregon Department of Justice Crime Victim and Survivor Services Division had been working all day Tuesday to notify family members and had reached all of the families impacted by the death row commutations.  A spokesperson for the governor confirmed that the DOJ division handled notification. However, Brewer said the governor should have given families more advance notice of her decision.

“I think the victims should have been told about this so they had some time to prepare for it,” Brewer said.  “These are horrific cases that left completely devastated families.  They’re preparing for the holidays and all of a sudden, they see in the (newspaper) that the person who traumatized — devastated — their families had their death sentence commuted.”...

Advocates including the Oregon Justice Resource Center pushed for the governor to commute all death row sentences for years.  On Tuesday, the center’s executive director Bobbin Singh said in a statement that Brown “has made the right choice for Oregon in commuting these death sentences and dismantling the death chamber.”...

Brown’s clemency actions, which included early release for people deemed at risk of serious health impacts from COVID-19 and inmates who helped fight Oregon’s catastrophic 2020 wildfires, have freed roughly 1,000 people from state prisons.  The Oregonian/OregonLive asked Brown’s spokespeople on Friday for the total number of people for whom the governor had issued pardons and commuted sentences.  On Tuesday, press secretary Liz Merah responded that the governor has commuted the sentences of a total of 1,189 incarcerated people.

The governor also pardoned approximately 45,000 people this year for their marijuana possession convictions, although that did not result in anyone being freed from prison because no one in Oregon was incarcerated for simple possession of an ounce or less of marijuana. And she issued 77 other pardons for crimes that the governor’s office did not identify.

Oregon Senate Republican Leader Tim Knopp, R-Bend, released a statement late Tuesday asking whether the people of Oregon had voted to end the death penalty.  “I don’t recall that happening,” he said.  “This is another example of the Governor and the Democrats not abiding by the wishes of Oregonians.  Even in the final days of her term, Brown continues to disrespect victims of the most violent crimes.”

The official press release from Gov. Brown's office, titled "Governor Kate Brown Commutes Oregon's Death Row," is available at this link.

"No Sense of Decency"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Kathryn Miller now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

For nearly seventy years, the Court has assessed Eighth Amendment claims by evaluating “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”  In this Article, I examine the evolving standards of decency test, which has long been a punching bag for critics on both the right and the left.  Criticism of the doctrine has been fierce, but largely academic until recent years.  Some fault the test for being too majoritarian, while others argue that it provides few constraints on the Justices’ discretion, permitting their personal predilections to rule the day.  For many, the test is seen as a lightning rod over constitutional interpretation, as its very language embodies living constitutionalism and seems to reject originalism.

Now an evaluation of the possible replacements for the “evolving standards of decency” test takes on greater urgency. Appellate court judges have begun to press the Court to replace or reconsider the test.  Three Justices have signaled their willingness to overrule the test, and at least two more are likely to join them.  Given that stare decisis does not appear to be a formidable constraint on the current Court, the time has come to grapple with a new reality for the Eighth Amendment.

This Article begins with a comprehensive evaluation of the tests that both originalist and non-originalist scholars have proposed as replacements.  It contends that none of the proposed tests eliminate the shortcomings of the evolving standards of decency tests, then concludes that originalism is an unsuitable methodology for interpreting the Eighth Amendment.  The Article then proposes a new test — grounded in the structural harms of the modern criminal punishment system — that constrains judicial discretion in line with the constitutional values of antisubordination and human dignity.  This new test addresses the flaws of the evolving standards of decency test without rendering Eighth Amendment jurisprudence a dead letter.

Ohio Supreme Court splits over ineffectiveness of counsel who "failed to explain neonaticide" at sentencing

The Ohio Supreme Court today issued an notable split decision that ultimately rules that a notable defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel when sentenced to life without parole in a sad case of neonaticide.  The ruling in State v. Weaver, Slip Op. No. 2022-Ohio-4371 (Oh. Dec. 8, 2023) (available here) is very well summarized at the start of this official court summary:

The Supreme Court of Ohio has ordered a new sentencing hearing for a former college student sentenced to life in prison for the murder of her newborn baby in the bathroom of her sorority house.  In 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Emile Weaver received ineffective assistance of counsel when her lawyer failed to explain neonaticide, which is the murder of an infant within 24 hours of birth, at her sentencing hearing and how neonaticide is “not considered a premeditated act” but rather an act “within the context of extreme panic.”

The decision reversed the Fifth District Court of Appeals, which found the Muskingum County Common Pleas Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Weaver’s claim that her counsel was ineffective.  Weaver filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that her lawyer failed to present a complete explanation of neonaticide during sentencing which could have led to a less severe punishment.  The same judge who sentenced Weaver to life in prison without the possibility of parole denied her petition.  The trial judge discredited an expert witness who tried to explain Weaver’s condition.

Writing for the Court majority, Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor stated that the trial judge demonstrated an arbitrary and unreasonable attitude toward the evidence of neonaticide and pregnancy-negation syndrome. “Not only did the trial court misunderstand the evidence pertaining to neonaticide and pregnancy-negation syndrome, but it demonstrated a willful refusal to consider such evidence,” Chief Justice O’Connor wrote.

The Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions that another trial judge conduct the sentencing.  Justices Michael P. Donnelly, Melody Stewart, and Jennifer Brunner joined the chief justice’s opinion.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice R. Patrick DeWine wrote that Weaver’s lawyer was not ineffective for failing to explain why she would commit neonaticide.  He noted that Weaver’s defense at trial was that she did not kill her baby, but rather that the baby died of natural causes.  Expecting the defense to explain how Weaver suffered from pregnancy negation would undermine the argument that she did not kill the baby, he concluded.  Justices Sharon L. Kennedy and Patrick F. Fischer joined Justice DeWine’s opinion.

Here are the basic details of the crimes as decribed by in the majority opinion:

In the fall of 2014, Weaver returned as a sophomore to Muskingum University in New Concord, Ohio, where she lived in a campus sorority house.  After Weaver visited a wellness center to obtain birth control, the center reached out to her to let her know that she was pregnant, but Weaver testified that she had never looked at or read the message from the center.  Weaver also testified that she did not “completely” believe that she was pregnant, because she did not show the normal signs of pregnancy — specifically, she did not (1) gain weight, (2) have morning sickness or exhaustion, or (3) stop menstruating.  Throughout her pregnancy, Weaver consistently denied that she was pregnant when either her sorority sisters or other people asked, and she never told her mother.  At trial, Weaver explained that she had lied about her pregnancy because she was scared, “felt like [she] had no one,” and was “worried about * * * getting in trouble.”  Weaver did, however, discuss her pregnancy with her boyfriend — whom she had a “rocky relationship” with — and he encouraged her not to tell anyone.  Weaver described him as “controlling and judgmental,” as well as “abusive.”

On April 22, 2015, believing that she was having a bowel movement, Weaver went to the sorority-house bathroom.  Shortly thereafter, she realized that she was in labor and silently, without assistance, delivered the baby into the toilet. Later that day, two sorority members discovered the baby in a trash bag lying next to the sorority house.

En banc Eleventh Circuit now gives broad reading to FIRST-STEP-amended mandatory-minimum safety valve provision

Last year in posts here and here, I spotlighted a significant Ninth Circuit ruling in US v. Lopez, No. 19-50305 (9th Cir. May 21, 2021) (available here), which interpreted the FIRST-STEP-amended statutory safety valve to enable more federal drug defendants to benefit from its authorization for below mandatory-minimum sentences.  But, as I noted in this post, days earlier in US v. Garcon, No. 19-14650 (11th Cir. May 18, 2021) (available here), an Eleventh Circuit panel reach an opposite interpretation of this statutory language.  The Garcon ruling went en banc, and today resulted in this set of opinions running 85 pages with an array of opinions from a court split 7-5.  Writing for six judges, Chief Judge (and former USSC Acting Chair) Bill Pryor start the opinion for the Eleventh Circuit this way:

The question presented in this appeal of a grant of safety-valve relief is whether, in the First Step Act, the word “and” means “and.” The Act empowers a court to grant a criminal defendant relief from a mandatory minimum sentence, but that relief is available only if “the defendant does not have” “more than 4 criminal history points,” “a prior 3-point offense[,] . . . and . . . a prior 2-point violent offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). Julian Garcon, who pleaded guilty to attempting to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, has a prior 3-point offense but does not have more than 4 criminal history points or a prior 2-point violent offense. The district court concluded that Garcon remained eligible for relief under the Act because he did not have all three characteristics. We agree. Because the conjunctive “and” joins together the enumerated characteristics, a defendant must have all three before he is ineligible for relief.  We affirm.

Sobering numbers from "mass" marijuana pardon efforts in Pennsylvania

In this post over at my marijuana blog a few months ago, I flagged the announcement of outgoing Pennsylvania Gov Tom Wolf to create a large-scale project, called the Pennsylvania Marijuana Pardon Project, to enable people with certain low-level convictions to submit an application online for an official pardon from the state.  Subsequent reports about this effort noted that many thousands of people had submitted pardon applications.  But this new local article, headlined "Thousands applied, but fewer than 250 qualified for Wolf’s marijuana pardon," spotlights how the devil is often in the details in this arena:

When announcing the marijuana pardon project earlier this year, Gov. Tom Wolf said it had the potential to help thousands of Pennsylvanians clear their records. But it has fallen well short of that goal. More than 3,500 people applied for the program, aimed at wiping out low-level marijuana convictions in a one-time mass act of clemency. Fewer than 250, however, will have an opportunity to clear their record later this month.

On Thursday, the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons voted whether to move forward on more than 2,600 applications from the project. Of those, 231 were approved and will go for a final vote by the board on December 16. Any of the cases that make it through that round, will go on to Wolf to grant the pardon. Another 2,002 applications were denied Thursday because they did not meet the requirements of the project and 434 were held under advisement, meaning the board can vote on them at a later date.

The program only applied to people who were convicted of possession of a small amount of marijuana and excluded anyone who had any additional criminal convictions on their record. Advocates said the narrowness of the program was a significant concern for how effective the program could be.

“Often cannabis consumers get multiple convictions when they are arrested that first time,” said Chris Goldstein, NORML’s Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware regional organizer. “They get a paraphernalia charge, and they get a possession charge all at once. You would have to essentially lead a police-free life other than that one marijuana encounter to qualify.”

Goldstein said the fact that program had a very short window for people to apply also likely limited its impact. Wolf announced the program on September 1 and people had until September 30 to apply....

Goldstein said more than 13,000 people were arrested for possession of a small amount of marijuana in 2021. About 10 percent of those people wind up with a conviction for the offense. Most others are either dismissed or plead out to a lower level crime.

More than 1,150 people were sentenced in 2018 with possession of a small amount of marijuana as the highest charge in their case, according to the latest year of data available from the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission.

While Goldstein said he was disappointed that only a fraction of the people affected will receive a pardon through the program, clemency for those people will mean less barriers to housing, employment and hopefully improve their lives. “I’m sure to the 231 people who went through this process, got approved, do qualify, when they get the pardon certificate in their hands, it will matter in their lives,” he said. “They had a reason they wanted this pardon. Whether they wanted it for their own person justice, to clear their own name, or they needed it as answer to their record, those pardons will matter.”

Elaboration of dissent from SCOTUS denial of stay before Missouri execution

I flagged in this post the notable pre-execution litigation in Missouri before the execution of Kevin Johnson on Tuesday evening.  A helpful colleague made sure I did not miss this four-page opinion, released yesterday and authored by Justic Jackson and joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the Supreme Court's denial of the application for a stay.  Here is how it begins and a key paragraph within:

We denied Kevin Johnson’s application for an emergency stay of his execution on November 29, 2022, and the State of Missouri has carried out that penalty.  Now, one day later, I write to explain my vote to grant his stay request.  For the reasons that follow, in my view, there was a likelihood that Johnson would have succeeded on the merits of his federal due process claim, and it was clear that he would (and obviously did) suffer irreparable harm absent a stay.  I also believe that the equities weighed in Johnson’s favor....

In short, a State cannot provide a process for postconviction review (like that outlined in §547.031) and then arbitrarily refuse to follow the prescribed procedures.  But that appears to be what happened in this case, insofar as §547.031 was properly invoked through the filing of a motion to vacate but the Missouri Supreme Court determined that the reviewing court did not need to hold the mandatory hearing that allows for the presentation of evidence related to that motion, because, regardless, there was insufficient evidence to sustain the motion.  In my view, this reading of §547.031 was so fundamentally flawed, and so at odds with basic due process principles, that Johnson was likely to succeed in establishing that the procedures afforded in connection with the §547.03 motion amounted to a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

Prior related posts:

• Missouri Supreme Court considering [UPDATE: rejects] special prosecutor's motion to vacate death sentence due to "racist prosecution techniques" 
• Missouri completes execution after SCOTUS rejects final stay appeal 

Has anyone tracked how often district judges recuse from resentencing?

The question in the title of this post in prompted by this interesting recusal order brought to my attention by Howard Bashman (and blogged here at How Appealing).  In the 24-page order, U.S. District Judge Larry Alan Burns explains why he has decided to recuse from two resentencings after Ninth Circuit opinions ruled that two drug offenders had to be given "minor role" reductions under the federal sentencing guidelines.  Here is part of the opinion's concluding section (with a few cites removed):

Where the question embodies the kind of discretion traditionally exercised by a sentencing court — i.e., making findings concerning a defendant’s role in an offense and level of culpability — the judgment is entitled to substantial deference.  Substantial deference is especially appropriate when factual nuances may closely guide the legal decision to be made, or where the legal result depends heavily on an understanding of the significance of case-specific details that have been gained through experience with trials and sentencings.  Buford, 532 U.S. at 64–65.  This is precisely the kind of determination that must be made in resentencing Sandra and Jesus Rodriguez.

The Mandates arrived at the judgment that two practiced drug traffickers, who consciously and intentionally joined plans to import bulk quantities of methamphetamine and heroin into the United States, and who were promised thousands of dollars in payment for their participation, qualify as “minor participants” in the offense of simple drug importation.  My twenty-five years of grounded, trial-level experience handling border drug smuggling cases opposes the logic and impact of that conclusion....

In this Order, I have attempted to explain why I continue to believe and would find that the Rodriguez defendants are “average” border drug smugglers — no better, no worse. But my explanation and probable findings — even if not expressly precluded by the law of the case and the rule of mandate — are most certainly inconsistent with the expansive “spirit” of the Mandates, which unsubtly bespeaks the desired conclusion of the court of appeals.  The Ninth Circuit has said that in situations like this, where the original sentencing judge on remand would “have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous,” the judge should recuse.  United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162,1165 (9th Cir. 1979).  Because I find myself unable to brush aside my insights, experience, and long-held conclusions about what “average” border drug smugglers know and how they operate, I respectfully recuse from further involvement in these cases.

Howard Bashman says he "suspect that this sort of recusal happens quite rarely," and I suspect he is right.  But the real rarity here is likely the lengthy explanation of the reasoning behind the recusal, and I wonder if somewhat lower-key resentencing recusals might be a bit more common.

Following Prez Biden's lead, Oregon Gov pardons over 47,000 marijuana possession convictions

As reported in this local artcle, around "45,000 people previously convicted of marijuana possession in Oregon will be pardoned and $14 million in fines forgiven, the Governor's Office announced Monday."  Here is more:

Gov. Kate Brown is pardoning the 47,144 convictions for possession of one ounce or less of marijuana going back several decades. Criminal convictions, even for possessing small amounts of marijuana that would be legal now, can be barriers to employment, housing and education.

“No one deserves to be forever saddled with the impacts of a conviction for simple possession of marijuana — a crime that is no longer on the books in Oregon,” Brown said in a statement Monday. “Oregonians should never face housing insecurity, employment barriers, and educational obstacles as a result of doing something that is now completely legal, and has been for years. My pardon will remove these hardships." She noted that while all Oregonians use marijuana at similar rates, Black and Latino people have been arrested, prosecuted and convicted of marijuana possession at disproportionate rates.

Officials with the American Civil Liberties Union applauded Brown’s action on Monday, saying her move followed an important step by President Joe Biden last month to pardon thousands of people nationwide of federal convictions for marijuana possession. Officials with the ACLU of Oregon said Brown is the first governor take this action on pardoning. Sandy Chung, executive director of ACLU of Oregon, said they were grateful for Brown's use of clemency to address the state's outdated and racially-biased practices, including policies from the failed "War on Drugs."...

According to the Governor's Office, the pardon applies to electronically available Oregon convictions for possession of one ounce or less of marijuana in pre-2016 cases in which the person was 21 years of age or older, where this was the only charge, and where there were no victims. This pardon does not apply to any other offense related to marijuana or other controlled substances. More information can be found online.

Following Brown's pardon, the Oregon Judicial Department will ensure that all court records associated with the pardoned offenses are sealed. About $14 million in unpaid court fines and fees associated with the pardoned convictions will be forgiven. The pardoned marijuana convictions will no longer show up on background checks of public court records, but the conviction may show up on background checks conducted by law enforcement officials or licensing authorities as a pardoned conviction....

Jessica Maravilla, policy director of ACLU of Oregon, said by eliminating $14 million in fines and fees, Brown is breaking down a massive barrier many have to housing, schooling and jobs. "For low-income communities and people of color, they can result in continued entanglement in the criminal legal system," she said. "The Governor’s forgiveness of $14,000,000 in fines and fees is a significant step in addressing unjust systemic burdens created by prior convictions — especially, in this case, for a crime that no longer exists.”

The official statement from Gov Brown's office is available at this link.

Tennessee Supreme Court finds state's uniquely harsh automatic life sentences unconstitutional for juvenile offenders

On Friday of last week, as summarized at this court webpage, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued a set of notable opinions addressing the constitutionality of the state's automatic life sentencing scheme for juveniles.  Here is, from the court website, links to: "the court's opinion in Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker, authored by Justice Sharon G. Lee and joined by Special Justice William C. Koch, Jr., the separate opinion concurring in the judgment authored by Justice Holly Kirby, and the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Jeff Bivins and joined by Chief Justice Roger Page."  Together, all the opinions run more than 50+ dense pages; they are all worth a read and cannot be easily summarized in a blog post.  But I can provide a poor-man's account (and also link to this local press coverage).

As explained in these opinions, Tennessee law requires a minimum term of 51 years in prison before parole consideration for murderers even for juveniles.  As the opinion for the court explains:  "Compared to the other forty-nine states, Tennessee is a clear outlier in its sentencing of juvenile homicide offenders.  So much so that Tennessee’s life sentence when automatically imposed on a juvenile is the harshest of any sentence in the country.  No one, including the dissent, disputes that a juvenile offender serving a life sentence in Tennessee is incarcerated longer than juvenile offenders serving life sentences in other states."

And so, decides the majority:

Tennessee is out of step with the rest of the country in the severity of sentences imposed on juvenile homicide offenders.  Automatically imposing a fifty-one-year-minimum life sentence on a juvenile offender without regard to the juvenile’s age and attendant circumstances can, for some juveniles, offend contemporary standards of decency....

Tennessee’s automatic life sentence when imposed on juvenile homicide offenders is an outlier when compared with the other forty-nine states, it lacks individualized sentencing which serves as a bulwark against disproportionate punishment, and it goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish legitimate penological objectives.  For these reasons, we hold that Tennessee’s automatic life sentence with a minimum of fifty-one years when imposed on juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment.

As for the remedy:

We exercise judicial restraint when remedying the unconstitutionality of the current statutory scheme for sentencing juvenile homicide offenders.  Rather than creating a new sentencing scheme or resentencing Mr. Booker, we apply the sentencing policy adopted by the General Assembly in its previous enactment of section 40-35-501.... Under this unrepealed statute, Mr. Booker remains sentenced to a sixty-year prison term and is eligible for, although not guaranteed, supervised release on parole after serving between twenty-five and thirty-six years.  Thus, at the appropriate time, Mr. Booker will receive an individualized parole hearing in which his age, rehabilitation, and other circumstances will be considered.

The dissenting opinion starts this way:

I respectfully dissent from the result reached by a majority of the Court today.  Quite frankly, I find the policy adopted as a result of the plurality opinion of Justice Lee and the concurring opinion of Justice Kirby to be sound.  However, it is just that.  It is a policy decision by which the majority today has pushed aside appropriate confines of judicial restraint and applied an evolving standards of decency/independent judgment analysis that impermissibly moves the Court into an area reserved to the legislative branch under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.

Nebraska Supreme Court upholds constitutionality of judges imposing death sentences after jury fact-finding

I just recently saw an interesting and lengthy new ruling from the Nebraska Supreme Court rejecting an array of procedural challenges to the state's capital sentencing scheme. Here is how the unanimous 60+ page opinon in State v. Trail, 312 Neb. 843 (Neb. Nov. 10, 2022) (available here), gets started:

The defendant was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree and criminal conspiracy to commit first degree murder.  He was also convicted, pursuant to a plea, of improper disposal of human skeletal remains.  A three-judge panel sentenced the defendant to death.  The defendant asserts on appeal that the three-judge panel erred in determining the sentence of death was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Alternatively, he argues Nebraska’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it allows a panel of judges rather than a jury to make findings of whether the aggravating circumstances justify the death penalty and whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which approach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circumstances. The defendant also challenges the constitutionality of death qualifying the potential jurors, arguing that it creates a conviction-prone jury.  Finally, the defendant challenges the denial of his pretrial motion to sever the conspiracy and murder charges, the court’s release of the victim’s mother from sequestration after she testified, the denial of his motion for a mistrial after a verbal outburst and act of self-harm in front of the jury, and the denial of a motion for a new trial after evidence was submitted allegedly demonstrating the selfharm would not have occurred but for the alleged misconduct of jail staff.  We affirm.

Here are a few passages from near the end of this Trail opinion summarizing its constitutional conclusions:

In several cases, we have rejected the argument that because the right to a jury determination is limited to guilt or innocence of the crimes charged and the determination of the aggravating circumstances, Nebraska’s sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under the 6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and article I, §§ 3 and 6, of the Nebraska Constitution.  In State v. Gales, we explained that Apprendi and Ring do not stand for the proposition that a jury, rather than a judge or judges, must make the sentencing determinations listed under § 29-2522.  Rather, Apprendi and Ring affected only the narrow issue of whether there is a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine the existence of any aggravating circumstance upon which a capital sentence is based....  By leaving to the three-judge panel the ultimate lifeor-death decision upon making the selection decisions of whether the aggravating circumstances justify the death penalty and whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist that approach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circumstances, Nebraska’s sentencing scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial or article I, § 6, of the Nebraska Constitution.....

In State v. Mata, we rejected the defendant’s argument that a system wherein a three-judge panel weighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances without guidance from the jury is arbitrary and capricious under the 8th and 14th Amendments.  In State v. Hessler,  we rejected the defendant’s argument under the Eighth Amendment that a sentencing panel is not in as good of a position as the jury to assign a weight to the aggravating circumstances, to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances, or to determine the sentence. While Trail’s 8th Amendment arguments are somewhat different from those addressed in Mata and Hessler, he presents no reason to depart from our holdings in those cases that Nebraska’s statutory scheme, delegating to the three-judge panel determinations of whether the aggravating circumstances justify the death penalty and whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist that approach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circumstances, does not violate the 8th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution or article I, § 9, of the Nebraska Constitution.

Three Justices dissent from the denial of cert in Ohio capital case reversed by Sixth Circuit

This morning's Supreme Court order list is most notable for a 14-page dissent from the denial of cert in a capital case from Ohio, Shoop v. Cunningham.  The dissent was authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch.  Here is how it gets started:

In 2002, respondent Jeronique Cunningham concluded an armed robbery of his drug dealer with a spray of bullets that killed a teenager and a toddler.  An Ohio jury convicted him of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death.  Twenty years later, the Sixth Circuit ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the foreperson’s presence on the jury deprived Cunningham of due process — either because the foreperson received prejudicial outside information about Cunningham or because she was biased by an undisclosed relationship with the victims’ families.  In analyzing the first claim, the Sixth Circuit once again flouted the deferential standard of review demanded by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).  In analyzing the second claim, the Sixth Circuit applied an incorrect framework to justify a fishing expedition based on allegations with no admissible factual foundation.

To correct these manifest abuses of the Sixth Circuit’s habeas jurisdiction, I would grant Ohio’s petition and summarily reverse the judgment below.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent from denial of certiorari.

After getting 241-year sentence as juvenile, Bobby Bostic released on parole after 27 years in prison

In this post late last year, I provided an update on the case of Bobby Bostic, who had been sentenced in Missouri as a teenager in the 1990s to 241 years in prison.  Because MIssouri law was changed, Bostic was able to secure parole after serving over a quarter century behind bars.  And this past week, as reported in this lengthy local piece, Bostic was formally released on parole.  Here are excerpts from the piece with some legal context

Standing on the Missouri Capitol steps moments after being released from prison, Bobby Bostic said the first place he planned to visit was his mother’s grave in St. Louis — a city he’d last freely walked in 1995. “I’m a free man all because of you all who supported me,” Bostic, 43, said Wednesday morning while surrounded by friends and family donning matching sweatshirts that read “Bobby Bostic is Free.”

“While I cannot change what happened so many years ago,” he said, “I will mentor and teach young people to take a different path than I did when I was a young child myself.”

Bostic was imprisoned in 1995 for a crime he committed when he was 16, when he was an accomplice in two armed robberies in St. Louis.  Now-retired St. Louis judge Evelyn Baker sentenced Bostic to 241 years, with the first chance at parole being when Bostic turned 112.

Baker sentenced him to die in prison without giving him an official life sentence. “Your mandatory date to go in front of the parole board will be the year 2201,” Baker told Bostic at his sentencing date in 1997. “Nobody in this room is going to be alive in the year 2201.”

By sentencing him in this way, Bostic wasn’t protected under a 2010 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that mandated parole hearings for juveniles who’ve been sentenced to life without parole.  Bostic’s case fell into a legal loophole that existed in Missouri and only a few other states.  Missouri courts had held that this mandate didn’t apply to juveniles like Bostic, who received a sentence for multiple offenses that added up to life in prison.  All of Bostic’s legal remedies were exhausted by 2018, when his petitions to both the Missouri Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court were denied without comment.

But then in 2021, Republican Rep. Nick Schroer of O’Fallon successfully pushed legislation to allow juveniles who have been sentenced to 15 years or more to be eligible for parole after serving 15 years in prison.  Bostic is one of about 100 people who got a new chance at parole after the law passed....

Baker, who came to regret how she handled the case in 1995, became one of Bostic’s biggest allies, appearing as his advocate in front of the parole board last year.  “Bobby should’ve had a chance,” Baker said Wednesday, explaining that only after she sentenced him did she learn that teenagers’ brains aren’t fully developed.  “I had no awareness at that time that Bobby, by being certified to be tried as an adult, did not become an adult,” Baker said. “He was still a 16-year-old boy.”

On Dec. 12, 1995, Bostic and then 18-year-old Donald Hutson robbed a group of six people at gunpoint who were delivering Christmas gifts to a needy family in St. Louis, according to the ACLU’s 2017 petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.  During the robbery, two people were shot at.  One received a tetanus shot because the gunshot grazed his skin. The other testified that he was not injured at all.

After the robbery, Bostic and Hutson forced a woman into her car and drove off.  They robbed her and then, at Bostic’s insistence, let her go, the petition states.  Then, Bostic and Hutson threw their guns in the river and used the money to buy marijuana.  Bostic was pulled over by the police and ultimately charged with 18 felonies....

Bostic said he plans on taking things “one day at a time,” doing things he never had the chance to do — like learn to drive, use the internet and talk on a cell phone for the first time.  On Wednesday, he returned home to St. Louis. “It’s perfect because I know St. Louis,” he said, “But I’ve got to relearn it.”

Prior related posts:

• Retired Missouri judge now expressing regret about giving 16-year-old offender 241 years in prison for role in two armed robberies 
• After Missouri expands parole eligibility for certain juve offenders, Bobby Bostic secures parole 25 years after getting 241-year sentence 

SCOTUS takes up case to address reach of federal two-year mandatory minimum added prison term for identity theft

I missed late yesterday that the Supreme Court issued a tiny order list on Thursday that granted cert on a single new case.  This news is exciting for those of us interest in seeing a bit more criminal action on the SCOTUS docket, and this SCOTUSblog posting has the details:

The Supreme Court announced on Thursday afternoon that it will weigh in on what it means to commit identity theft. After holding their private conference a day early because Friday is a federal holiday, the justices released a one-sentence order list that added one new case to their merits docket for the 2022-23 term: Dubin v. United States.

The defendant in the case is David Dubin, who was convicted of Medicaid fraud.  As the dispute comes to the Supreme Court, Dubin is challenging a separate conviction under a federal law that makes it a crime to use another person’s identity in the process of committing another crime.  Federal prosecutors contend that Dubin’s use of his patient’s name on a false Medicaid claim violated the statute, adding an extra two years to his one-year sentence for fraud.

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit upheld Dubin’s conviction and sentence, and on rehearing a deeply divided full court affirmed that decision. Dubin appealed to the justices in June, and they agreed on Thursday to take up his case, which will likely be argued sometime early next year.

Here is how the question in the case is presented by the defendant in his cert petition:

The federal aggravated identity theft statute provides: “Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated [elsewhere in the statute], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).

The question presented is whether a person commits aggravated identity theft any time he mentions or otherwise recites someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense.