Tuesday, October 15, 2019

"Will the Supreme Court Rein in 'Excessive Fines' and Forfeitures?: Don’t Rely on Timbs v. Indiana"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Nora Demleitner now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019), last term buoyed the hopes of those who saw it as a powerful signal to states and municipalities to rein in excessive fines, fees, and forfeitures.  Yet, the Court seems disinclined to fill the term “proportionality” with robust meaning or wrestle with Eighth Amendment challenges to fines and fees.  Those steps would be required for the Excessive Fines Clause to function as an effective backstop against revenue-raising and increasingly abusive local and state practices.  In the end, state courts and state legislative changes may more likely address effectively the essential question of what is excessive and restrain criminal justice actors from imposing ever heavier financial burdens on those caught up in the system.

This article first sets out the Supreme Court’s decision in Timbs in light of the incorporation debate and prior case law in the area.  Next it turns to the underlying but unaddressed contours of “excessive” in the context of fines and forfeitures.  The article then provides a broader look at forfeiture, including the interplay between state and federal law enforcement in the area.  Finally, the piece addresses state and local fines and fees, which will now be subject to Eighth Amendment analysis.  The Court, however, rejected the first opportunity to take up such a challenge.  At least for now, litigants may be more successful in reining in abusive fines and forfeitures in state legislatures and state courts.

October 15, 2019 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Lots more cert denials and Rehaif GVRs in second SCOTUS order list of OT19

The Supreme Court this morning has released this relatively short order list, although the list of cases in which certiorari has been denied still runs about 10 pages.  The order list, like the one last week, starts with a list of cases in which "certiorari is granted, [t]he judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded" to the relevant Court of Appeals."  But all the Supreme Court's GVR work this week — six cases to be exact — relates to its mens rea ruling in Rehaif v. US, No. 17-9560 (S. Ct. June 21, 2019) (available here; discussed here).   In his Rehaif dissent, Justice Alito fretted that "great many convictions will be subject to challenge...."  Indeed.

October 15, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 14, 2019

"There Are Way Too Many Prosecutors in the Federal Judiciary: It’s time for a moratorium."

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new Slate commentary authored by Clark Neily discussing this notable recent report he did with the Cato Institute.  Here are excerpts from the Slate piece:

It’s no secret that federal judges do not, by and large, look like the rest of us.  They are whiter than average, more male, and more likely to have attended elite schools and worked at big law firms.  But there’s another quirk of the judiciary that hasn’t gotten nearly the attention it deserves: the wild imbalance between judges who used to represent the government in court and judges who used to challenge the government in court.

According to conventional wisdom, the surest way to become a federal judge is to first be a prosecutor.  But is that really true?  Until now, no one had ever examined the professional background of every sitting federal judge to see whether former prosecutors are in fact overrepresented on the federal bench.  So we at the Cato Institute did, and they are — massively.  But our study didn’t just look at former prosecutors.  We also broadened our scope to compare judges who served as courtroom advocates for the government in any capacity — criminal or civil — versus the judges who cut their teeth litigating against the government as public defenders, other criminal defense attorneys, and public interest lawyers.

Focusing just on former prosecutors versus former criminal defense attorneys (including but not limited to public defenders), the ratio on the federal bench is 4 to 1. Expanding the scope to include all former courtroom advocates for the government (but not other kinds of government lawyers, such as agency heads and general counsels), and comparing that to former public defenders, private criminal defense attorneys, and public interest lawyers, the ratio jumps to an astonishing 7 to 1. President Donald Trump’s judicial nominees, many of whom are committed originalists and supporters of constitutionally limited government, reflect these same ratios....

Of course, the fact that someone worked as a prosecutor, a defense attorney, or a public interest lawyer doesn’t necessarily mean they will be biased in that direction while serving as a judge.  Still, most of us have a strong intuition that a person’s prior professional experiences are likely to influence not only their worldview but also their approach to particular cases.  That’s why prosecutors routinely use their peremptory strikes to remove defense attorneys from the jury pool in criminal cases — and defense attorneys do the same thing to prosecutors.  It’s nothing personal; they simply recognize, as we all do, that experience inevitably informs judgment.

Given the government’s vast resources, nearly every court case pitting a lone citizen against the state represents a David-versus-Goliath fight for justice.  To further stack the deck with judges who are far more likely to have earned their spurs representing Goliath than David is unfair to individual litigants and a bad look for the justice system as a whole.

Fortunately, the solution is simple: a temporary moratorium on nominating former prosecutors to the bench and a strong preference for lawyers with substantial experience representing individuals against the government in criminal and civil cases.  If that proposal seems extreme, consider the image of a federal judiciary in which former public defenders outnumbered prosecutors 4 to 1.  Notwithstanding the transformative effect that would have on our deeply dysfunctional criminal justice system, not to mention the Bill of Rights, it’s probably not a good idea.  But neither is it wise to continue doing nothing while the imbalance runs the other way.  It is perfectly understandable that current government officials wish to stock the courts with former government advocates.  But it’s a bad deal for the rest of us and a doubtful way to ensure equal justice under law.

October 14, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, October 12, 2019

Deep dive into the deep human realities surrounding DC second look laws and policies

A helpful reader alerted me to this great extended article from the Washington City Paper about second look sentencing players and practices in DC. The piece, which I recommend in full, is headlined "How to End a Sentence: Juvenile sentencing reforms have sparked a face-off between the D.C. Council and U.S. Attorney over who should be released, and when."  Here are excerpts:

The [Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act] IRAA allows people who committed violent crimes before they turned 18 to ask a judge for a reduced sentence, as long as they’ve served at least 15 years. A D.C. Council bill introduced in February, the Second Look Amendment Act, would expand the law to include people who committed crimes before their 25th birthdays. An estimated 70 people have asked for a new sentence, and the bill could expand the number of eligible offenders to more than 500, the USAO believes.

This legislation comes as so-called “second look laws” are gaining momentum across the country and follow the precedent set by multiple U.S. Supreme Court rulings curtailing harsh sentences for juveniles. The high court’s decisions rely on a growing body of research showing brain development continues into a person’s mid-20s.

The Model Penal Code, a project of the American Law Institute that provides a template for criminal justice policy makers, suggests that offenders of all ages receive a second look after serving 15 years in prison. The latest version, revised in 2017, explains that America relies on the heavy use of lengthy prison sentences more than any other Western democracy. The U.S. has the highest incarceration rate in the world, despite two decades of falling crime rates.

D.C. Superior Court Judge Ronna Beck agrees that long sentences deserve another look. “I wish there were an opportunity for judges to be able to review everyone’s sentence after a significant period of time,” Beck said during Flowers’ resentencing. “Many people will not qualify for the sentence reduction that you did, but I think that it would be beneficial to our system to be able to have a review like this so that when people have really transformed their lives, as you seem to have done, that there was an opportunity to adjust a sentence that was imposed many, many decades earlier.”

A majority of the D.C. Council supports the Second Look Amendment Act—as does Mayor Muriel Bowser’s administration and Attorney General Karl Racine. But [Jessie] Liu, the Trump-appointed U.S. Attorney, is not a fan. Her office has encountered few IRAA petitions that it likes. Since the original law took effect in 2017, federal prosecutors, who have jurisdiction over felony crimes in D.C., have opposed nearly every request for resentencing.

They’ve argued that offenders are too dangerous to be released, their crimes are too heinous, they haven’t accepted responsibility for their crimes, their release undermines “truth in sentencing,” and that, although prison records showing a dedication to education are admirable, they are to be expected.

At a recent hearing for Mustafa Zulu, a man who spent 20 years in solitary confinement starting when he was 20, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jocelyn Bond argued that Zulu’s “very very impressive” list of educational courses and accomplishments does not outweigh his sins in and out of prison. “Education is not a panacea for violence,” Bond said. “It does not fix someone’s character … It doesn’t change someone’s underlying violent character.”

In September, as part of its campaign opposing the Second Look Amendment Act, the U.S. Attorney’s Office hosted a meeting for the public and a group of advisory neighborhood commissioners. Liu stood against the wall while representatives from her office made their case against the bill, emphasizing the impact on victims and concerns that the Council is expanding the law too quickly without sufficient evidence that those released won’t commit new crimes.

During the meeting, John Hill, a deputy chief and career prosecutor, cited data from the Bureau of Prisons showing a recidivism rate of about 35 percent among people released from 2009 to 2015 who would be eligible under the Second Look Amendment Act. Hill ignored City Paper’s request for the underlying data, and the USAO has refused to release it. Hill also presented incorrect data on D.C.’s incarceration rate, which the office later corrected in a tweet.

Nazgol Ghandnoosh, a senior researcher for The Sentencing Project, a nonprofit organization that promotes criminal justice reform, points out that the BOP’s definition of recidivism includes technical parole violations for missing a meeting or smoking weed. “A recidivism measure that separates these factors from new offenses gives people a better sense of public safety risk,” Ghandnoosh says.

Sarah McClellan, chief of the USAO’s victim witness assistance unit, explained at the September meeting that the new law reactivates trauma for victims and their families, many of whom have spoken passionately in opposition to offenders’ release.  At least two advisory neighborhood commissioners have published editorials opposing the second look bill, including Darrell Gaston, whose 15-year-old godson, Gerald Watson, was gunned down earlier this year. Malik Holston, 16, is charged with first-degree murder in Watson’s death.

October 12, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, October 11, 2019

Terrific ABA review of SCOTUS criminal work during Oct 2018 Term

Download (6)LawProf Rory Little regularly prepares for the American Bar Association an end-of-Term review of the Supreme Court's work in criminal cases.  A decade worth of this terrific work is available at this link, and just recently added there is this 48-page accounting of the October 2018 Term.  The whole document is terrific, and here is the start of the first section under the heading "Brief Overview of the 2018-19 Term, Criminal Cases" (emphasis in original):  

As far as criminal cases go, there are two “big stories” from the past Term, one descriptive and the other substantive impact of the Term’s “big” cases. Let’s do the descriptive first.

This was the first Term in which two new Justices appointed by President Trump served together. Justice Gorsuch was appointed at the end of the Term before last, so this was his second full Term. Justice Kavanaugh served almost all of this Term; his confirmation was slightly delayed (as you may recall), so he actually first took the bench on Monday, October 8, the second week of the Term.  Still, the big question was, how would these two new Justices affect the Court?

What we now know is that, contrary to the general picture of the prior Term, the Justices divided in a remarkably large number of different variations.  Overall, there were 67 argued cases, plus 5 summary reversals, for a total of 72. I count 26 of the 72 as “criminal law and related,” or 24 of the 67 argued.  Of the 72, there were 20 decisions decided by a 5-4 vote -- and of these, there were 10 different variations of which Justices made up the five. This is an unusually high number. It seems that the current Justices are still trying to find their way, and (happily) are not cemented to always-predictable results.  I count 10 of the 5-4 decisions as criminal; in five of those the “liberal” bloc prevailed. If we think of the four liberal Justices as Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, the question becomes: who was the fifth Justice? Interestingly, it was Gorsuch in three, Roberts in one, and Alito in one. (Kavanaugh was not the fifth vote in any 5-4 liberal criminal win, but he did write the strong majority opinion in Flowers, see below, a pro-defendant Batson death penalty decision.)

Justice Gorsuch’s pro-defense votes in at least four cases (Davis and Haymond, plus dissents in Gamble and Mitchell) indicate that he continues the “libertarian” streak that his predecessor Justice Scalia sometimes exhibited.  At the same time, Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Bucklew, a death penalty case in which he boldly wrote that “last-minute stays should be the extreme exception,” demonstrates a strong pro-government position on capital punishment. Interestingly, despite their common appointment source, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh did not always agree (they had only a 56-70% overall agreement rate), and were on opposite sides in six or more criminal cases. Is there a lesson here? Wait and see, is my advice.

Substantively, because 23 of the 67 argued cases (or 25 of the 72 total) were criminal lawor-related decisions, we can see that over a third of the docket is “criminal.” This is about normal for the Supreme Court’s docket. With 25 criminal-and-related decisions, of which I’d say 17 were “pure criminal,” there is a lot to digest (as the following 38 pages demonstrate).  Only a few highlights can be summarized here.

What was the “biggest” criminal law decision of the Term?  Of course it depends on your interests, and perhaps your ideology.  Certainly the Gamble case, affirming the “separate sovereigns” exception to the Sixth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause despite calls for overruling it, was big news.  Meanwhile, the Timbs decision makes it clear that the Eighth Amendment’s “no Excessive Fines” Clause applies fully to the States. (In a similar vein, next Term the Court will decide whether the Sixth Amendment’s unanimous jury requirement is similarly “incorporated,” in Ramos v. Louisiana). Meanwhile, the Fourth Amendment decision in Mitchell suggests that a majority is ready to broaden the concept of “exigent circumstances” as a categorical exception.  And finally, the Haymond decision extends Apprendi to the revocation of supervised release, which Justice Alito in dissent calls “revolutionary;” and the decision in Rehaif demonstrates a strong commitment to requiring mens rea for every factual element of an offense (in that case, knowledge that one belongs to a class of persons prohibited from possessing firearms).

October 11, 2019 in Recommended reading, Religion, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, October 10, 2019

Marshall Project reviews where 2020 Democratic Prez candidates stand on various criminal justice reform issues

The folks at The Marshall Project has put together this attractive and handy guide reporting and organizing all the position of the 2020 Democrats on criminal justice. I recommend the resource, and here are the issues on which positions are assembled:

How would you reform the bail system?

Should people in prison have the right to vote while they are incarcerated?

Should marijuana be legalized nationwide?

Should sentencing include mandatory minimums?

Do you support the death penalty?

Do you support decriminalizing illegal border crossings?

October 10, 2019 in Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 09, 2019

Another notable (but ultimately disappointing) ruling about sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(1)(A) after FIRST STEP Act

As regular readers know, in prior posts I have made much of a key provision of the FIRST STEP Act which now allows federal courts to directly reduce sentences under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) without awaiting a motion by the Bureau of Prisons.  I see this provision as such a big deal because I think, if applied appropriately and robustly, this provision could and should enable many hundreds (and perhaps many thousands) of federal prisoners to have excessive prison sentences reduced.

But in order for § 3582(c)(1)(A) to have a significant impact, federal judges will need to fully embrace and give full effect to their new authority to "reduce the term of imprisonment" whenever and wherever they find that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."  I have flagged here and here and here some notable examples of judges finding notable reasons sufficient to reduce a sentence.  But now I have to note a notable new ruling in which a notable judge seems to conclude there are "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to warrant a sentencing reduction, but then still decides not to grant a reduction for reasons that do not seem justified by the provisions of § 3582(c)(1)(A).

This new ruling comes in US v. Brown, No. 4:05-CR-00227-1, 2019 WL 4942051 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 8, 2019), and it is authored by Senior District Judge Robert Pratt.  Notably, Judge Pratt was the district judge in the Gall case who gave full effect to the Booker ruling and whose non-incarcerative decision there was ultimately vindicated by SCOTUS.  In this new Brown case, Judge Pratt writes an extended, thoughtful opinion about compassionate release and the changes to § 3582(c)(1)(A) brought by the FIRST STEP Act.  In so doing, Judge Pratt states that "much about Defendant's situation is extraordinary and compelling" and yet still "the Court concludes it cannot exercise its discretion to grant release at this time."

The Brown opinion explains the basis on which Daniel Brown claims his situation is "extraordinary and compelling": (a) his behavior for a dozen years in prison was "exemplary," (b) he "suffered a botched surgery while incarcerated" (though he can still care for himself in prison) (c) "his daughter is without a parent" (though an adult who cares for herself) and (d) "he faces a sentence far longer than he would ever receive under modern law."  This last point is a function of Brown having received an extra 300 months (25 years!) because of stacked 924(c) gun counts that would no longer stack now after the FIRST STEP Act.  On this point, Judge Pratt further notes that the judge who originally sentenced Brown "concluded the additional 300 months' imprisonment from the second § 924(c) count was 'far greater than was necessary to achieve the ends of justice'."  And for good measure, as Judge Pratt notes, Brown's "co-defendant, who eventually ran his own drug operation, was released in April 2018."

This all sure seems to me to be "extraordinary and compelling reasons [that] warrant a reduction" under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and Judge Pratt essentially says as much.  But, disappointingly, after making a strong factual record on Brown's behalf, Judge Pratt declines any reduction of Brown's original 510-month sentence with this reasoning: 

In this case, compassionate release nevertheless is premature because even if the First Step Act applied retroactively, Defendant would still be in prison.  With a lone § 924(c) count, Defendant still faced 210 months in prison.  ECF No. 118.  Even rounding up to the nearest month and including good conduct credits, Defendant has served 167 months. That is a long stretch by any measure, and perhaps more than appropriate for Defendant's crimes.  Regardless, because Defendant would still be in prison under modern law, any sentencing disparity created by § 924(c) stacking does not, at least yet, provide an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release.  Thus, despite discretion to consider a broad range of factors, the Court declines to grant Defendant's motion at this juncture.

This reasoning seems deeply misguided to me: Daniel Brown has not moved in this case for the First Step Act to be applied retroactively, because (disappointingly) Congress has not provided for the Act to be applied retroactively.  Rather, Brown has moved for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) because Congress has provided for judges to be able to "reduce [his] term of imprisonment" if and whenever a judge finds "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."  Judge Pratt suggests Brown has made such a showing and he even suggests that Brown has already served more time than is appropriate for his crimes.  But, still, Judge Pratt refuses to use the legal tool available to him to reduce Brown's sentence, and so Brown is now still slated to serve nearly another 30 years in prison(!) that neither Congress nor any judge views as in any way justified by any sound sentencing purposes.

Critically, though 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is often called a "compassionate release" provision, there is no requirement in the statute that a judge order a sentencing reduction in the form of a "time served" sentence.  All the statute says is that a judge is authorized to "reduce the term of imprisonment ... after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."  If Judge Pratt's concern was that section 3553(a) factors did not justify reducing Brown's sentence below 210 months, he still could have granted him relief by reducing his sentence from 510 to 210 months.

Because Judge Pratt used terms like "not yet" and "at this juncture" and "at this time," I am hopeful that Judge Pratt could and would entertain a renewed § 3582(c)(1) from Brown in four years when he has served 210 months of imprisonment.  Notably, there is no clear law right now about whether and when there are limits on how many times a defendant can bring a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A).  But since I think the law clearly supports granting his motion now, I am disappointed Judge Pratt did not exercise his discretion in this case in a manner similar to how he did in Gall.

A few prior related posts on § 3582(c)(1)(A) after FIRST STEP Act:

UPDATE:  I was able to secure a copy of the ruling in Brown, which can be accessed here: Download Brown Compassionate release

ANOTHER UPDATEA month after this ruling, another District Judge in Nebraska considering similar facts granted a reduction in sentencing in US v. Urkevich, No. 8:03CR37, 2019 WL 6037391 (D. Neb. Nov. 14, 2019). That ruling is discussed in this post: Another District Court finds statutory sentence reform among "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for reducing sentence by 40 years under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

October 9, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Might as well face it, "we're addicted to jail"

156aa1d654fcab80912437f490d1ce5eWith apologies to Robert Palmer, this recent Hill commentary by David Oscar Markus has me wanting to riff on a rock classic:

Whoa, you like to think that we're a nation that's free, oh yeah
It's closer to the truth to say we can't let people be
You know you're gonna have to face it, we're addicted to jail

The last phrase of my tortured lyric here is the headline of the Hill commentary that should be read in full.  Here are its closing flourishes:

We issue jail sentences like candy, to address every known problem that we have.  Drug problem — jail.  Using your family member’s address to get your child into a better school — jail.  Paying college athletes — jail.  The United States jails more people than any other country in the world.  We have higher incarceration rates than Russia, Iran, and Iraq — by a lot.  We tolerate innocent people sitting in jail when we only suspect that they might have done something wrong, as one man did for 82 days when he brought honey into the United States.  82 days.

Even though oversleeping doesn’t seem to be a rampant problem, the judge in Deandre [Somerville]’s case admitted that he was trying to solve a broader jury “misconduct” issue with jail.  This is not how it should be.  The jail solution has become much worse than the diseases it was trying to cure. So what do we do about it?

One easy fix — appoint more criminal defense lawyers and civil lawyers to the bench and fewer prosecutors. According to the Cato Institute, former prosecutors are “vastly overrepresented” throughout the judiciary.  As to federal judges alone, the ratio of former prosecutors versus former criminal defense lawyers is four to one (and if you include lawyers who worked for the government on the civil side, the ratio is seven to one).  A criminal case or a civil rights case has a 50 percent chance to be heard by a former prosecutor and only a six percent chance to be heard by a judge who has handled a case against the government.  Cato explains the unfairness of this with a simple example — we would never allow four of the seven referees of a Ohio State-Michigan football game to be alumni of Michigan.  Ohio State fans would never tolerate it.  And yet, there are no criminal defense lawyers on the Supreme Court and there hasn’t been one for more than 25 years.

In many cases, former prosecutors have never represented a person sentenced to jail.  They have never visited a client in jail.  They have never explained to a family — while the family cried — that their loved one is going to be taken from them.  As prosecutors, they have only put a lot of people in jail.  And so, as judges, this addiction to jail continues, even for someone like Deandre, who ends up serving a jail sentence because he overslept.

We have many problems in this great country, and our addiction to jail is high on the list.

October 9, 2019 in Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, October 08, 2019

US Attorney in college admission scandal makes plain how trial penalty works even for celebrity actresses

In various settings, we often hear expression of concern that celebrity criminal defendants may receive a different form of justice than us regular folk.  But this recent article reporting comments by the US Attorney in charge of the college admission prosecutions, headlined "Lori Loughlin faces 'substantially higher' prison sentence than Felicity Huffman if convicted, U.S. attorney confirms," provides a useful and usefully candid reminder that celebrity defendants are subject to being penalized for exercising their trial rights just like all other defendants. Here are excerpts from the piece (with two sentences emphasized):

Andrew Lelling, whose office is prosecuting the Operation Varsity Blues case, gave a rare interview over the weekend praising "classy" Felicity Huffman ahead of prison. He also confirmed that Lori Loughlin faces a "substantially higher" amount of time behind bars if convicted.

The Boston prosecutor, who was appointed U.S. attorney by President Trump in 2017, was asked why he proposed a prison sentence of only one-month for Huffman, who pleaded guilty to one charge of fraud conspiracy. During an interview with On the Record on WCVB Channel 5, Lelling called Huffman "probably the least culpable of the defendants who we've charged in that case."

"One of the things we looked at was money involved. She spent about $15,000 to have her daughter get a fake SAT score," he explained. "She took responsibility almost immediately.  She was contrite, did not try to minimize her conduct. I think she handled it in a very classy way and so, at the end of the day, we thought the one-month was proportional."

Ultimately, Huffman was sentenced to 14 days in prison, 250 hours of community service and a fine of $30,000. "I think the two weeks she actually got was also reasonable, we were happy with that," Lelling said. "I think it was a thoughtful sentence."

Lelling said a person receiving a lesser sentence after pleading guilty is "almost always" the outcome. "If people take responsibility for their conduct and they take responsibility for their conduct early on, then it will probably go better for them," he shared.  "What I value in the Felicity Huffman sentence is that I think it sent a clear message to the other parents involved that there really is a good chance that if you're convicted of the offense, you are going to go to prison for some period of time because the least culpable defendant who took responsibility right away, even she got prison."

Lelling was asked specifically about Lori Loughlin and her husband, Mossimo Giannulli, who are accused of paying around $500,000 to get their daughters into USC as crew recruits, even though neither rowed. He confirmed what legal experts speculated to Yahoo Entertainment last month — that Loughlin will spend more time in prison than Huffman if convicted.

"If she's convicted... we would probably ask for a higher sentence for her than we did for Felicity Huffman," Lelling said. "I can't tell you exactly what that would be. The longer the case goes, let's say she goes through to trial, if it is after trial, certainly, we would ask for something substantially higher. If she resolved it before trial, something lower than that."

Loughlin and Giannulli are some of the parents implicated in the college admissions scandal that are fighting the charges against them. They pleaded not guilty to two charges: conspiracy to commit money laundering; and conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and honest services mail and wire fraud.  They were hit with an additional charge when they didn't agree to a plea deal....

Loughlin, Giannulli and the other parents fighting federal charges are due back in court in January.

I do not want to unduly bash US Attorney Lelling for his candor here, especially because I think he merits praise for a lot of his work in these cases (and especially for only seeking a month in prison for Felicity Huffman).  Moreover, he does a reasonable job giving a reasonable spin to the best arguments for a "plea discount" at sentencing when he talks of the importance of being contrite and of the sentencing value of having defendants "take responsibility for their conduct early on." 

But I find it grating when US Attorney Lelling says his office will see a "substantially higher" sentence the "longer the case goes" for Lori Loughlin; it suggests that more is at work here than just rewarding remorse for those who are contrite.  Of course, to those familiar with the day-to-day realities of the criminal justice system, there is no surprise to seeing that potential exercise trial rights coming with a potentially significant sentencing price.  In the end, US Attorney Lelling is just being candid and honest about how the system really works for both celebrity and non-celebrity defendants.  But the fact that the trial penalty is so common and impacts more than just commoners still does not make it any less distasteful.

October 8, 2019 in Celebrity sentencings, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (9)

Reviewing SCOTUS arguments on insanity defense and non-unanimous juries

As noted in this recent post, yesterday the Supreme Court kicked off its new Term with oral arguments in two very interesting criminal justice cases: Kahler v. Kansas on whether the Constitution permits a state to abolish the insanity defense, and Ramos v. Louisiana on whether the 14th Amendment fully incorporates for states the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict.  Here are the oral argument transcripts in Kahler and in Ramos.

Based on various reviews of the arguments, it sounds as though the defendant is likely to prevail in Ramos and perhaps not in Kahler.  Here is a round-up of some reviews:

From the AP, "Court seems ready to require unanimous juries as term opens"

From SCOTUSblog, "Argument analysis: Justices open new term with questions and concerns about insanity defense"

From SCOTUSblog, "Argument analysis: Justices weigh constitutionality of non-unanimous jury rule"

From Slate, "The Supreme Court Looks Poised to Outlaw Split Jury Verdicts"

From USA Today, "Supreme Court, trying to remain above the partisan fray, opens 2019 term with a debate about insanity"

October 8, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 07, 2019

Series of state court stays slows down Texas machinery of death

Texas has completed seven executions in 2019 through the end of September, and it had four more executions scheduled for October. But, as of late last week, state courts in Texas have halted the executions of three of the condemned prisoners who were facing October execution dates. Here are links to press reports on these three stays:

From the Texas Tribune, "Texas court halts the execution of Stephen Barbee to consider U.S. Supreme Court precedent: The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued a stay in Barbee's case. He was scheduled to be executed Oct. 2."

From the Texas Tribune, "Judge halts execution for man convicted of killing two Henderson County deputies: Randall Mays was scheduled to be executed Oct. 16, but the judge removed the death warrant amid questions that Mays may not be mentally competent to be put to death."

From the Dallas Morning News, "Texas Seven's Randy Halprin has execution stayed after attorneys allege judge was anti-Semite: Halprin, one of seven men who escaped from the John B. Connally Unit on Dec. 13, 2000, was scheduled to die Thursday for his role in the slaying of Irving police officer Aubrey Hawkins." 

Because Texas has five more executions already scheduled for the rest of 2019, the state is still likely on pace for another double-digit execution year. But it now seems likely that the state will have fewer executions than the 13 it had last year, and it is now possible that the US as a whole will end up with fewer total executions in 2019 than occurred in 2018.

October 7, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Another update on Chicago "stash-house sting" litigation showcasing feds ugly drug war tactics

Via a series of posts last year, I was able to report updates from Alison Siegler, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the University of Chicago Law School's Federal Criminal Justice Clinic, concerning the extraordinary litigation her clinic has done in response to so-called "stash house stings" in which federal agents lure defendants into seeking to rob a (non-existent) drug stash-house.  In this 2017 post, I highlighted this lengthy Chicago Tribune article, headlined "ATF sting operation accused of using racial bias in finding targets, with majority being minorities," on this topic. 

I now see that the Chicago Tribune has this new lengthy article, headlined "Convicted in a controversial stash house sting operation, Leslie Mayfield is struggling to rebuild his life after prison." which focuses on one stash-house defendant while also telling the broader stories of these cases.  I recommend the new Tribune article in full, and here are excerpts:

Leslie Mayfield wasn’t used to entering a courtroom except in shackles.  Over the years, through his trial for conspiring to rob a drug stash house, his sentencing to a decades-long prison term and his long-shot fight to overturn his conviction on entrapment grounds, Mayfield had always been escorted into court by deputy U.S. marshals from a lockup in back....

But recently, he took a seat in U.S. District Judge Edmond Chang’s courtroom gallery, whispering to his attorney that it all felt strange as he waited for his name to be called....  Reviewing reports on Mayfield’s progress, Chang noted that since his release from prison, he’d found a job, reconnected with his family and maintained a strong motive to stay straight.  Then the judge made the transformation official, agreeing that Mayfield, 51, no longer needed court supervision.

The ruling marked a quiet milestone in the widely criticized sting operations in which the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives used informants to lure unsuspecting targets into a scheme to rob drug stash houses — an undercover ruse concocted by the government.

For years, the stings were considered a smashing success, touted as a law enforcement tool to remove dangerous criminals from the streets.  But the practice came under fire in 2014 when attorneys for the University of Chicago Law School mounted a legal challenge on behalf of nearly four dozen Chicago-area defendants alleging the stings disproportionately targeted African Americans and Hispanics.

Both the ATF and the U.S. attorney’s office staunchly defended the operations in court, saying they followed rigorous guidelines to ensure the stings were lawful.  While the legal effort to prove racial discrimination fell short, the tactics drew sharp rebukes from many judges.  Prosecutors began quietly dismissing the more serious charges, and over the next year or so, most of the defendants — including Mayfield — were sentenced to time served.

As the first to be cleared of all court supervision, Mayfield could be viewed as a success story, but he’s struggled in many ways.  Like so many ex-cons, Mayfield is learning how hard it can be to rebuild his life after prison. He also continues to fight guilt over the plight of his brother and cousin — both of whom he recruited into the scheme and are still serving decadeslong prison sentences....

The outlines of each stash house sting followed the same basic pattern: ATF informants identified people they believed would commit a drug-related robbery.  If the target met certain criteria — including a violent criminal background — agents approved the sting.

The elaborate operations included a fake stash house location, fictitious amounts of money and drugs, and other made-up details of a robbery plot.  An undercover agent posing as a disgruntled drug dealer followed a script aimed at convincing the target to agree on secret recordings to take part in the robbery, pledge to bring guns — and use them if necessary.

Since agents claimed that massive quantities of drugs were involved, the prosecutions often carried eye-popping sentences, sometimes even life behind bars.  Nearly all the targets, though, turned out to be African American or Hispanic — many of whom had minimal criminal histories....

Mayfield was convicted at trial in 2010 and handed a 27-year sentence.  His brother, with only a nonviolent drug conviction in his past, and his cousin both were given 25-year prison terms.

In 2014, the University of Chicago’s Federal Criminal Justice Clinic led an effort to have charges against 43 defendants dismissed on grounds that the cases were racially biased.  In a landmark hearing in December 2017, nine federal judges overseeing the cases heard testimony from dueling experts on policing who came to dramatically different conclusions.

The U.S. attorney’s office denied that the stings disproportionately affected minorities, arguing that targets were selected by their propensity for violence, not race.  For instance, while out on bond, two men facing stash house-related indictments were charged in separate shootings, including the wounding of a Chicago police officer.

But many judges overseeing the cases had clear concerns that the ends did not justify the means.  In a decision that wasn’t binding but served as a guide for other judges, then-U.S. District Chief Judge Ruben Castillo said the stings shared an ugly racial component and should “be relegated to the dark corridors of our past.”

While Castillo stopped short of dismissing the case before him, his 2018 ruling had a ripple effect.  At the urging of Castillo and other judges, the U.S. attorney’s office began offering plea deals and dropping counts that involved stiff mandatory minimum sentences.

The results were startling. While many of the 43 defendants faced mandatory sentences of 15 to 35 years in prison if convicted, 32 instead were released with sentences of time served after pleading guilty to lesser charges.  Most of the others received prison terms that were significantly below federal sentencing guidelines.

While the cases hadn’t been thrown out of court, Alison Siegler, the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic’s founder, noted in an April report to the 7th Circuit Bar Association that "the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the ATF have entirely stopped bringing stash house cases in Chicago, even as those cases continue to be prosecuted elsewhere in the country.”

Some prior related posts:

October 7, 2019 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

So many cert denials, and lots of Davis and Rehaif GVRs, in first big SCOTUS order list of OT19

The Supreme Court this morning has released this 78-page order list that resolves lots and lots of the cases that pile up at the Court during its summer recess.  The list of cases in which certiorari has been denied runs dozens of pages, and I was a bit surprised that this order list does not have any statements from any Justices about any of these denials.  (In all likelihood, any cases the Justices thought debatable have been relisted for possible comment in later order lists.)

The order list start with a long list of cases in which "certiorari is granted, [t]he judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded" to the relevant Court of Appeals." The vase majority of the GVRs cite the Supreme Court's work in US v. Davis, No. 18-431 (S. Ct. June 24, 2019) (available here; discussed here) and Rehaif v. US, No. 17-9560 (S. Ct. June 21, 2019) (available here; discussed here).  These GVRs are not surprising, as I wondered aloud in this post back in June about the likely mess and challenge that Davis and Rehaif  surely presented for lower courts.  As is their custom, the Justices are eager to send cases back to the lower courts to start the clean up effort.

October 7, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, October 06, 2019

Lots of SCOTUS previews as a new Term starts with a criminal bang

Tomorrow morning is the first Monday in October, which means the start of Supreme Court oral arguments kicking off a new Term for the Court. This ABA Journal piece, headlined "SCOTUS opens new term with criminal law cases addressing insanity defense and unanimous juries," highlights how the Term start with extra intrigue for criminal justice fans. This piece starts this way:

The U.S. Supreme Court has several blockbuster cases in its new term — on gay and transgender rights, federal immigration enforcement and gun regulation. But before it gets to any of those, the court on the first day of the term will take up two criminal law cases raising significant questions, even though only a handful of states are affected by each.

In Kahler v. Kansas, the first case up for argument on Oct. 7, the question is whether the U.S. Constitution permits a state to abolish the insanity defense. Only four states besides Kansas—Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Utah—do not recognize that defense.

In Ramos v. Louisiana, the justices will consider whether the 14th Amendment fully incorporates against the states the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict.

“Both of these cases speak to a larger lesson,” says Brian W. Stull, a senior staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union. “The court, with justices on the left, center, and right, has been vigilant in insisting at a minimum on the common-law protections that defendants enjoyed at time of the founding.”

SCOTUSblog has these previews of Kahler and Ramos:

Bloomberg Law has this preview article looking at a number of the criminal cases for the term under the headline "Bridgegate, D.C. Sniper Feature in Packed SCOTUS Criminal Term."  Here is how it starts:

An action-packed U.S. Supreme Court term kicks off Oct. 7, and the criminal docket has a little something for everyone—the insanity defense, the D.C. sniper, the death penalty, the Fourth Amendment, and the New Jersey corruption saga known as “Bridgegate.”

These disputes and others mark the latest crime and punishment tests for the Roberts Court, which, after Justice Brett Kavanaugh replaced Justice Anthony Kennedy, is on more solid conservative footing.

But criminal cases can scramble the usual 5-4 line-ups, and in Kavanaugh’s first full term — Justice Neil Gorsuch’s third — court watchers are eager to see how the justices tackle these weighty questions.

October 6, 2019 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, October 05, 2019

Making a righteous call for Prez candidates to walk the walk, and not just talk the talk, on criminal justice reform

This new USA Today commentary, authored by four criminal justice reform advocates who have all been previously incarcerated, astutely stresses that candidates for political office can and should do more than just talk about criminal justice reform in order to show real commitment on justice reform. Authored by Daryl Atkinson, Norris Henderson, DeAnna Hoskins and Vivian Nixon, I recommend the piece in full. Here are extended excerpts:

An examination of the criminal justice reform proposals of the Democratic presidential candidates shows similarities in policy priorities. Most, if not all, favor ending cash bail, prohibiting private companies from operating prisons, legalizing marijuana and reducing or eliminating mandatory minimum sentences.

Yet, nagging questions remain: Who is fully committed to fixing these problems? In other words, which candidate will take action when they stop campaigning and start governing?

It’s important to examine more than policy positions and take a look at candidates in their entirety.  Some have prioritized criminal justice reform throughout their careers. Others have announced policies during this campaign that are at odds with their legislative votes.  Others still have made controversial decisions while they worked within the criminal justice system. But most have not been heavily involved in the movement to end mass incarceration....

At long last, the American public has started to recognize the harmful impact of tough-on-crime policies.  It is no longer a risk for Democrats to say that mass incarceration must end — a testament to the tireless work and dedication of thousands of advocates and practitioners, many of whom have a criminal record or have returned to their communities after incarceration.  It also is not politically audacious to issue position papers on eliminating mandatory minimum sentences or providing better services for people reentering society.  In this day and age, the fact that we cannot punish our way into public safety has been definitively concluded.

But those running for the highest office in the country must go above and beyond these safe ideas if they want to show that they’re committed to more than just political rhetoric.  After all, even the current president has claimed to be a criminal justice reformer.  To set themselves apart from politics as usual, candidates must speak directly to the constituencies that have the most at stake on every issue, including mass incarceration.

There are plenty of criminal justice reform groups out there just like ours, and activists are waiting for the opportunity to talk to candidates about policy. Democrats have given time to groups that deal with gun-control issues and that are led by survivors of mass shootings and family members who have lost loved ones.  Beto O'Rourke of Texas met with a little over a dozen veterans in South Carolina to talk about issues that affect them.  Sen. Elizabeth Warren spent time in Philadelphia taking questions from teachers....

We are formerly incarcerated.  But we are citizens.  We vote.  And, we are influencers in progressive movements that address mass incarceration and related issues.  Candidates who commit to direct engagement with us will send a message of hope to energize an army of supporters whose numbers have unfortunately and regrettably grown way too big.

October 5, 2019 in Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, October 04, 2019

Napa Valley winemaker gets five months of imprisonment, the longest sentence so far in college admissions scandal

As reported in this Los Angeles Times piece, "Agustin Huneeus Jr., a prominent Napa Valley winemaker until his arrest in the college admissions scandal, was sentenced Friday to five months in prison for paying to rig his daughter’s school entrance exam and trying to sneak her into USC as a bogus athlete."  Here is more:

The sentence is the latest handed down against a slew of wealthy, influential parents who opted to plead guilty to charges that they conspired with William “Rick” Singer, a college admissions consultant at the center of the scam, to fabricate test scores and bypass the admissions process at elite schools.  Singer, too, has pleaded guilty to several felonies and is cooperating with prosecutors in their cases against his alleged accomplices.  He awaits sentencing.

With her decision, U.S. District Judge Indira Talwani dealt more harshly with Huneeus than she did with other parents sentenced so far, but stopped well short of the 15-month sentence that federal prosecutors had said was an appropriate penalty.  Lawyers for Huneeus, meanwhile, had conceded before his sentencing that the 53-year-old father of three should not avoid prison altogether, but asked Talwani for just two months behind bars.  Huneeus, they said, already had been punished badly by the loss of his company and public humiliation. Along with incarceration, Talwani ordered Huneeus to pay a $100,000 fine and serve 500 hours of community service.

Huneeus hurriedly stepped down in March as chief executive of Huneeus Vinters, a company his parents built, after being named as one of the dozens of parents charged in the scam. He pleaded guilty soon after, admitting he paid $100,000 to buy into the admissions scheme and was primed to pony up another $200,000 before authorities went public with their case.

Prosecutors had argued in court filings that even in a case marked by the greed and entitlement of exceptionally rich and privileged families, Huneeus stood out for his brazen, unabashed foray into the scam and his efforts to avail himself of all of Singer’s illegal offerings.  “Huneeus’s crime was calculated and carefully planned,” wrote Assistant U.S. Atty. Justin O’Connell in a memo to Talwani.  “From the outset … Huneeus wanted to know exactly how the fraud worked, proposed ways to make it more effective, and demanded Singer’s attention. He did all this while acknowledging to Singer that what they were doing was wrong, that the scheme could ‘blow up in [his] face.’”

Of the 11 parents who have pleaded guilty in the case, O’Connell underscored that only Huneeus paid Singer both to inflate his daughter’s SAT score and secure her a spot at USC by allegedly bribing members of the school’s athletic department....

In arguing for a light sentence, lawyers for Huneeus emphasized in a court filing that Huneeus’ daughter did not enroll at USC and, so, did not end up taking a spot at the selective school from a more deserving applicant.  But after watching Talwani in recent weeks rebuff defense attorneys for other parents who argued their clients should be spared time in prison altogether, Huneeus’ defense team accepted he was destined for incarceration and tried instead to mitigate the punishment by underscoring Huneeus’ clean track record and reputation for fairness and kindness among people who worked for him.

Until his downfall, Huneeus ran his family’s company, which owns several brands of wine and made news in 2016 when it sold one of its popular labels for a reported $285 million to another company. He relinquished control of the company in the days after his arrest over concerns his legal troubles could put the company’s license to produce wine in jeopardy.

Huneeus himself struck a tone of contrition in a letter to the judge, saying he accepted responsibility for his crime.  “I am looking forward to my sentencing so I can start to put this behind me.  I want to pay my dues and feel clean again. This has been the most consequential experience I have ever had to overcome and it is self-inflicted,” he wrote.

On the same day Huneeus learned his fate, California Gov. Gavin Newsom signed three bills in response to the college admissions scandal, including a mandate that any “admission by exception” to the state’s many public campuses be approved by multiple university administrators....  Newsom also gave his signature to a measure that prevents those found guilty in the admissions scandal from getting tax deductions for payments they made to Singer, which he often funneled through a sham charity.  The third measure approved by Newsom requires the California State University and University of California systems, as well as independent universities, to report to the Legislature whether they provide any form of preferential treatment in admissions to applicants on the basis of their relationships to donors or alumni.

Prior related posts:

October 4, 2019 in Celebrity sentencings, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS gets back to work with short order list granting review in new cases, including a federal criminal statutory/constitutional matter

The US Supreme Court this morning released this short order list, in which the Justices grant certiorari review in five cases (through two sets are consolidated). Criminal justice fans may be most interest in the granted case of US v. Sineneng-Smith, which SCOTUSblog summarizes this way:

Issue: Whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), is facially unconstitutional.

But the grants sure to get the most attention today and for months to come emerge from Louisiana cases that now bring the issue of abortion back to the Court:

Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit’s decision upholding Louisiana’s law requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital conflicts with the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.

October 4, 2019 in Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 03, 2019

"The Eighth Amendment Power to Discriminate"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Kathryn Miller now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

For the last half-century, Supreme Court doctrine has required that capital jurors consider facts and characteristics particular to individual defendants when determining their sentences.  While liberal justices have long touted this individualized sentencing requirement as a safeguard against unfair death sentences, in practice the results have been disappointing.  The expansive discretion that the requirement confers on overwhelmingly white juries has resulted in outcomes that are just as arbitrary and racially discriminatory as those that existed in the years before the temporary abolition of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia.

While an examination of individualized sentencing is overdue, the solution is not to jettison the requirement, but instead to permit states to channel juror discretion.  This Article is the first to contend that states may achieve the goals of individualized sentencing, not by expanding juror discretion to consider mitigation evidence, but, counterintuitively, by narrowing it.  It proposes that states employ specific jury instructions that (1) require jurors to consider certain types of evidence as legally mitigating, (2) address the historically racist application of the death penalty, and (3) permit unfettered discretion solely in the direction of leniency.  Channeling and redirecting discretion will minimize racist and arbitrary outcomes and realize true individualized sentencing.

October 3, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

US District Judge rejects feds lawsuit to enjoin operation of proposed safe injection site for opioid users in Philadelphia

As reported in this NPR piece, a federal judge "has ruled that a Philadelphia nonprofit group's plan to open the first site in the U.S. where people can use illegal opioids under medical supervision does not violate federal drug laws, delivering a major setback to Justice Department lawyers who launched a legal challenge to block the facility." Here is more about the important ruling:

U.S. District Judge Gerald McHugh ruled Wednesday that Safehouse's plan to allow people to bring in their own drugs and use them in a medical facility to help combat fatal overdoses does not violate the Controlled Substances Act. "The ultimate goal of Safehouse's proposed operation is to reduce drug use, not facilitate it," McHugh wrote in his opinion, which represents the first legal decision about whether supervised injection sites can be legally permissible under U.S. law.

The decision means that the country's first supervised injection site, or what advocates call an "overdose prevention site," can go forward. Justice Department prosecutors had sued to block the site, calling the proposal "in-your-face illegal activity."

While local officials from New York to San Francisco praised the decision, the federal government is expected to appeal. "The Department of Justice remains committed to preventing illegal drug injection sites from opening," said Bill McSwain, U.S. Attorney for the eastern district of Pennsylvania. "Today's opinion is merely the first step in a much longer legal process that will play out. This case is obviously far from over."

Most studies show that the supervised injection sites can drive down fatal overdoses. These sites are credited with restricting the spread of infectious diseases. And advocates say the facilities help move more people into treatment. The American Medical Association has endorsed launching supervised injection site pilot programs.

Ronda Goldfein, who is Safehouse's vice president and secretary, said winning judicial approval is a major feat for advocates of the proposed site, which also has the backing of top city officials and former Pennsylvania governor Ed Rendell. "Philadelphia is being devastated. We've lost about three people a day" to opioid overdoses, Goldfein said. "And we say we had to do something better and we couldn't sit back and let that death toll rise. And the court agreed with us."...

Supervised injection sites exist in Canada and Europe, but no such site has gotten legal permission to open in the U.S. Cities like New York, Denver and Seattle have been publicly debating similar proposals, but many were waiting for the outcome of the court battle in Philadelphia. Attorneys general from Washington, D.C., and seven states including Michigan, New Mexico and Oregon, in addition to city leaders in five cities, urged the court before the decision to rule in favor of Safehouse.

Legal hurdles are not Safehouse's only obstacles. The facility is planning to launch in the Philadelphia neighborhood of Kensington, which has been ravaged by the opioid crisis, but some neighbors have resisted welcoming an injection site into their community. Community activist Amanda Fury said the court decision will not change the hardened battle lines over this issue there. "I've never been in the business of trying to change people's minds on this," said Fury, who supports the measure but admits that residents are divided....

In court, meanwhile, prosecutors have contended that the plan violated a provision of the Controlled Substances Act that makes it illegal to own a property where drugs are being used — known as "the crack house statute." But backers of Safehouse argued the law was outdated and not written to prevent the opening of a medical facility aimed at saving lives in the midst of the opioid crisis....

On Wednesday, in a move that surprised observers, McHugh agreed. He wrote that there "is no support for the view that Congress meant to criminalize projects such as that proposed by Safehouse." McHugh rejected federal prosecutor's view that this was an open-and-shut case of a proposal clearly violating federal drug statutes. Instead, he noted that the purpose of Safehouse is not to provide a place for people to engage in unlawful activity. "Viewed objectively, what Safehouse proposes is far closer to the harm reduction strategies expressly endorsed by Congress," McHugh wrote.

The full opinion in US v. Safehouse is available at this link, and it makes for a very interesting read. These part of the opinion's introduction highlights how notions of judicial modesty in application of criminal law moved Judge McHugh:

As discussed below, courts must exercise extreme care in discerning the objective sought by Congress in enacting a statute.  That said, having reviewed materials I consider appropriate in discerning what Congress sought to address in enacting § 856(a)(2), there is no support for the view that Congress meant to criminalize projects such as that proposed by Safehouse.  Although the language, taken to its broadest extent, can certainly be interpreted to apply to Safehouse’s proposed safe injection site, to attribute such meaning to the legislators who adopted the language is illusory.  Safe injection sites were not considered by Congress and could not have been, because their use as a possible harm reduction strategy among opioid users had not yet entered public discourse.  Particularly in the area of criminal law, it is the province of Congress to determine what is worthy of sanction.  A line of authority dating back to Chief Justice John Marshall cautions courts against claiming power that properly rests with the legislative branch.  A responsible use of judicial power under those circumstances is to decline to expand the scope of criminal liability under the statute and allow Congress to address the issue.

The US Deputy Attorney General released this statement following this ruling, which states "The Department is disappointed in the Court’s ruling and will take all available steps to pursue further judicial review. Any attempt to open illicit drug injection sites in other jurisdictions while this case is pending will continue to be met with immediate action by the Department."

October 3, 2019 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 02, 2019

"An Ode to the Categorical Approach"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper just posted to SSRN and authored by Amit Jain and Phillip Warren. Here is its abstract:

In United States v. Davis, a narrow majority of the U.S. Supreme Court adhered to the so-called “categorical approach” for determining which criminal convictions trigger additional federal penalties. But this approach, which requires courts to consider an individual’s crimes as defined by law instead of the facts of the person’s conduct, has increasingly come under fire.  An ever-louder chorus of jurists argues that the approach is unworkable and allows individuals with criminal records to escape harsh consequences that can include decades of added incarceration, registration as a “sex offender,” or mandatory deportation.

These complaints are overstated.  The categorical approach — a time-weathered component of American jurisprudence for over a century — is far from the nonsensical nightmare its naysayers portray it to be.  Although the aforementioned federal penalties compromise the states’ historic role in defining and prosecuting crimes, in a world where such penalties exist, the categorical approach respects statutory text, avoids administrative challenges, protects Sixth Amendment rights, advances fair notice, and promotes uniformity.  In addition, the approach offers an under-recognized federalist counterweight to the undue expansion of federal and state criminal law.  In particular, it gives state leaders a unique, subtle incentive to ensure that the most serious crimes focus on the most serious conduct, lest these crimes cease to qualify as predicates for federal penalties.

Given that federal law attaches drastic consequences to crimes that states, localities, tribes, and territories have already punished, the categorical approach is good federalist policy.  Until and unless these added consequences are abolished, courts should continue to apply the approach, and the Court’s fealty to categorical analysis is cause for celebration.

October 2, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Texas jury imposes 10 year prison term on Amber Guyger for murdering Botham Jean

As reported in this prior post, yesterday a Dallas County jury convicted Amber Guyger of murdering Botham Jean in his apartment last year in a high-profile case that has made headlines for many months.  Today the case made another headline when, as reported here, the jury returned its sentence: "Amber Guyger sentenced to 10 years for murdering neighbor Botham Jean."  Here are some of the jury sentencing details:

Amber Guyger, the former Dallas police officer convicted of murder for fatally shooting her unarmed neighbor in his apartment, was sentenced Wednesday to 10 years in prison. Guyger, 31, learned her fate after a sentencing hearing that included emotional testimony from the family of victim Botham Jean and revelations that she shared racist and offensive texts and social media posts.

Prosecutors had asked jurors to sentence Guyger to at least 28 years — symbolic because Jean would have turned 28 last Sunday.

Guyger did not testify during her sentencing, but has the opportunity to appeal the conviction in the unique case that has gripped the city of Dallas and shattered the idea that law-abiding citizens can be safe in their own homes.

The jury was allowed to consider whether Jean's death was the result of "sudden passion," which meant Guyger acted in the heat of the moment. It carried a lesser sentence of two to 20 years behind bars....

During the sentencing hearing Wednesday, Guyger's mother, Karen Guyger, 66, testified and said that her then-boyfriend had molested Guyger when she was 6. She said she reported it to the police and he was arrested. NBC News was unable to immediately learn the outcome of the case.

Karen Guyger added that her daughter was distraught after killing Jean. "She feels very bad about it," Karen Guyger said through tears.

Dallas County prosecutors built a case through Guyger's police disciplinary records, texts and social media posts to speak to her character and argue she is undeserving of a lenient sentence.

Jurors were shown three Pinterest posts that Guyger had saved to her account and commented on. They included the picture of a military sniper with text that read: "Stay low, go fast; kill first, die last; one shot, one kill; no luck, all skill." In another Pinterest post, Guyger commented under a picture of a Minion from the movie "Despicable Me": "People are so ungrateful. No one ever thanks me for having the patience not to kill them," the comment read.

New texts were also shown to jurors between Guyger and her married work partner, Officer Martin Rivera, with whom she had been having an affair. Prosecutors had revealed their sexually explicit texts during the trial, although the defense downplayed them, saying the two were already "ramping down" their relationship by the time the shooting occurred. Rivera texted in March 2018 to Guyger: "Damn I was at this area with 5 different black officers !!! Not racist but damn." She responded: "Not racist but just have a different way of working and it shows."

Guyger texted with another officer last year about the Martin Luther King Jr. parade in Dallas. "When does this end lol," the officer wrote to Guyger. "When MLK is dead … oh wait …," she joked.

Two days before Guyger fatally shot Jean, she texted with someone who had adopted a German Shepherd. The dog's owner wrote of the animal: "Although she may be racist." Guyger responded, "It's okay .. I'm the same," and later added: "I hate everything and everyone but y'all."

During the sentencing phase, defense attorney Toby Shook asked the jury to think about how Guyger helped others as an officer, and largely glossed over the derogatory texts that prosecutors had introduced earlier. "Through these horrible series of events, she went into his apartment by mistake," Shook said. "She pulled that trigger in an instant — an instant she will regret for the rest of her life. ... She didn't go there seeking to kill him."...

The jury, made up of mostly women and people of color, deliberated for about five hours to convict Guyger and has been sequestered during the trial, which began Sept. 23. Guyger was taken into custody at the end of the first day of the sentencing phase, which started after the verdict was read Tuesday. She was booked into the Dallas County jail.

Prior related post:

October 2, 2019 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (10)

"Creating Model Legislative Relief For People With Past Convictions"

Download (26)The title of this post is the title of this notable recent report from the folks at the Alliance for Safety and Justice.  I highly recommend the report in full, and here is part of its executive summary:

Across the United States, popular support for criminal justice reform is at an all-time high. More and more Americans of all walks of life agree that the “tough-on-crime” era resulted in bloated, costly and ineffective corrections practices.  Today, everyday people and public officials across the political spectrum support a balanced approach to public safety — one that emphasizes crime prevention and rehabilitation to stop the cycle of crime.

As states re-examine their crime policies, it is critical to also review the lifetime impacts of criminal records in preventing full rehabilitation for millions of Americans.  Meaningful rehabilitation provides people that complete their sentences and remain crime-free redemption and full re-integration into the economy, our communities and civic society. Despite growing support for rehabilitation as a primary goal of corrections, few Americans will ever become rehabilitated because criminal records prevent inclusion.

More than 70 million Americans have a criminal record.  Long after they’ve paid their debts to society, many will find themselves caught in a labyrinth of legal prohibitions and barriers that have little to do with public safety.  These restrictions place undue burdens on millions of people and impose an invisible, life-long sentence that can make it difficult to get back to work, find housing, or support their families. These barriers can also make it harder—not easier—to stay out of the cycle of crime.

As a nation, we’ve only begun to grapple with the impacts of these barriers on our society.  These restrictions prevent, millions of people with past convictions from getting work, which in turn may lead to families in living in unstable housing or contribute to homelessness, and to millions of children growing up with parents that cannot fully contribute to their families, or our economy.

Some states have taken steps to limit the debilitating impacts of criminal records on economic productivity and family stability after a person’s time is served.  But most current law, policies and processes fall short of bringing widespread relief....

This brief offers guidelines for legislation that would begin to make rehabilitation meaningful and provide relief for people with past convictions so they can contribute to the economy and society as a whole....

The first step for policymakers interested in moving toward a more evidence-based, safety-centered legal model for removing the barriers imposed by past arrests or convictions is to ask key questions about how current laws, policies and practices are working.

October 2, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

After murder conviction, Texas jury on to sentencing phase in trial of Amber Guyger for killing Botham Jean

As reported in this Dallas Morning News piece, headlined "Amber Guyger convicted of murder for killing Botham Jean; sentencing phase to continue Wednesday," a high-profile trial resulted in the murder verdict and then immediately shifted into a jury sentencing phase. Here are the basics:

A Dallas County jury on Tuesday convicted Amber Guyger of murdering Botham Jean in his apartment last year, in a trial that renewed international outrage over white police officers killing unarmed black men.

Jean's mother raised her arms in exultation as cheers broke out in the hallway outside the courtroom when the verdict was announced shortly after 10:30 a.m., following five hours of deliberation by the jury....

Guyger was booked into the Dallas County jail for the night about 4:45 p.m., not long after court recessed for the day. Testimony in the punishment phase of Guyger's trial will continue at 9:30 a.m. Wednesday. In Texas, murder carries a sentence of five to 99 years or life in prison. She isn't eligible for probation.

Guyger, 31, fatally shot 26-year-old Jean in his apartment last year. She was off-duty but still in uniform when she shot Jean with her service weapon. She had said she mistook his apartment for her own and thought Jean was a burglar. She is the first Dallas officer convicted of murder since the 1970s.

Jurors deliberated for three hours Monday after the prosecution and Guyger's defense presented closing arguments. They quickly delivered a verdict after two more hours Tuesday morning....

About 2:30 p.m., Allison Jean took the stand [at the start of the penalty phase], telling the jury how her middle child, Botham, was the "glue" between his older sister, Allisa, and younger brother, Brandt, who are separated by a 20-year age difference. "Botham was also this take charge type of person, so he was always giving advice both to Allisa and to Brandt," she said.

Sobbing at times, the proud mother talked about Botham Jean's many interests, from rugby to a lifelong love for singing. Several jurors turned their chairs toward Allison Jean as she testified. When she grew emotional, one juror turned his head away and stared at the wall for a few minutes. Then, he looked back at Jean.

Guyger stared straight ahead throughout the testimony Tuesday afternoon. She didn't appear to look at the witness stand or at pictures displayed on three large screens in the courtroom of Jean smiling with family members and friends.

Prosecutor LaQuita Long showed the jury photos of Botham Jean growing up, including a photo with him and his grandmother at his high school graduation. In the photo, he's beaming, holding a trophy that his mother said was given to the top student for discipline and academic excellence....

[Allisa] Findley, Botham Jean's older sister, also testified, telling jurors how her family has been changed forever since her brother died. She bowed her head as videos of her brother singing at a worship service played on the screen overhead.

Because I have not been able to follow the trial closely, I am hesitant to even guess what kind of sentence the jury will now bring back in this case. I am tempted to predict it will be a sentence somewhat closer to the statutory minimum of 5 years than to the statutory maximum of 99 years, but one never quite knows with juries.

October 2, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, October 01, 2019

Missouri Gov denies clemency request to Russell Bucklew hours before his potentially "gruesome" execution... which went forward seemingly without difficulty

As reported in this CNN article, headlined "A man set to be executed tonight could suffer a 'gruesome' death because of his rare disease, activists say," the last person in Missouri who could have readily stopped a high-profile execution has decided to allow it to go forward tonight.  Here are the details:

Missouri's governor has refused to stop what activists say would be "one of the most gruesome" executions in US history.

Russell Bucklew, 51, is scheduled to die by lethal injection at 6 p.m. (7 p.m. ET) Tuesday. He was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping and first-degree burglary in 1997.

Gov. Mike Parson turned down a clemency request, said his press office, without providing additional detail.

Bucklew suffers from a rare blood vessel disorder called cavernous hemangioma.  The disease can cause tumors in the head and regular bleeding from the mouth, nose, eyes and ears.  An execution by lethal injection could cause prolonged suffocation and excruciating pain, Bucklew's attorneys have said.  Bucklew argued the state should consider death by lethal gas as an alternative.

In April, the Supreme Court ruled against Bucklew in a 5-4 decision, which means plans for the lethal injection can proceed.  Justice Neil Gorsuch said the Eighth Amendment "does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain" in carrying out executions....

But the American Civil Liberties Union said executing Bucklew would violate the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  "What makes (Bucklew's) execution different is that he has a medical condition that would make it one of the most gruesome in U.S. history," the ACLU wrote.  It said Bucklew's tumors "will likely rupture during the lethal injection process, causing him to hemorrhage, choke, and suffocate in his own blood."...

Bucklew was convicted of fatally shooting his ex-girlfriend's presumed new boyfriend, Michael Sanders, and firing at Sanders' son before kidnapping Stephanie Ray Pruitt.  After raping his ex-girlfriend, court documents state, Bucklew was involved in a gunfight in which he and a Missouri state trooper were injured.

UPDATE: This AP article reports that the execution of Russell Bucklew went forward in the state of Missouri this evening and seemingly was not gruesome at all:

A Missouri man was executed Tuesday for killing a man during a violent 1996 crime spree, despite concerns the inmate's rare medical condition would cause a gruesome lethal injection. Russell Bucklew was executed at the state prison in Bonne Terre. It was Missouri's first execution since January 2017....

Bucklew looked around and twitched his feet beneath the sheet as he lay on the gurney just before the lethal injection. He suddenly took a deep breath and all movement stopped. He showed no outward signs of distress.

Cheryl Pilate, one of Bucklew's attorney's, said several steps were taken to try to ensure that he didn't suffer, including sedating him prior to the execution and elevating the gurney to help prevent him from choking. "We believe the significant efforts that went into making this a less horrible process were beneficial," Pilate said.

October 1, 2019 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Clemency and Pardons, Death Penalty Reforms, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, September 30, 2019

Hopeful that the Democratic Prez hopefuls might engineer a clemency revival

Long-time readers know I have lamented under-use of Presidential clemency powers for the 15+ years I have been blogging (e.g., consider this 2004 post lamenting "Bush's stingy pardon practice").  In 2010, I wrote this law review article lamenting Prez Obama's poor early clemency track record and urging him to make structural changes to the federal clemency system.  To his credit, Prez Obama upped his clemency game in the tail end of his second Term, but he failed to engineer any systemic changes to a problematic process.  And Prez Trump, after an (overly) interesting early start to clemency work, has failed to vindicate his big talk last summer about big clemency plans.

Against this backdrop, I cannot help but get a little excited by this little CBS News article headlined "Clemency debate takes shape in 2020 Democratic race — advocates say it hasn't gone far enough."  Here are excerpts: 

Advocates for criminal justice reform argue 2020 candidates aren't spending enough time discussing clemency.  Inmates are behind bars who shouldn't be, they say, and the next president has the power to change that without Congress.

Senator Cory Booker brought attention to the issue at the Democratic presidential debate earlier this month, saying if he were elected president, he would commute the sentences of roughly 17,000 non-violent drug offenders on his first day.

Booker first proposed the idea in June to reduce sentences for those who would have received less time if guidelines under the First Step Act — passed in December 2018 — had been in effect.  "If 87 members of the United States Senate say these sentences are way too long — and we changed it — but we didn't make it retroactive, we could literally point to the people that are in jail unjustly right now," Booker said at the debate in Houston....

A petition historically goes through multiple rounds of approval within the Department of Justice and the White House before reaching the president's desk.  It's a lengthy process that can be easily stalled.

Experts argue there are political forces at play that can taint the process since the majority of the system is housed under the attorney general's purview.  "The DOJ is comprised of the people that put these people behind bars in the first place," said Joe Luppino-Esposito, the director of Rule of Law initiatives at the Due Process Institute.  "It's a little odd the clemency process happens within the same department."

However, at least six Democratic hopefuls — Booker, Mayor Pete Buttigieg, Senator Kamala Harris, Senator Amy Klobuchar, Senator Bernie Sanders and Senator Elizabeth Warren — say they would address these issues through an independent commission, which could both speed up and depoliticize the process....

Klobuchar was the first candidate to introduce the idea. Her plan establishes a bipartisan advisory board to review petitions and make recommendations to the president. "For the first time, we have candidates proposing changing the process," said Mark Osler, a professor at the University of St. Thomas. "They'd be smart to take a look at it very closely at this point."...

The Obama administration attempted to streamline the process by introducing specific eligibility criteria, however, an internal report by the Department of Justice last year found the initiative was "poorly implemented." ...

Presidents and governors are often wary about the risk of being criticized if someone with a commuted sentence goes on to commit a highly-publicized crime.  Many attribute this to the "tough on crime" climate ushered in after the Willie Horton campaign ad during the 1988 election.  In 2012, former Republican nominee Mitt Romney boasted that he granted zero pardons while he served as governor of Massachusetts.

I won't get too excited about all this clemency reform talk unless and until we actually have a would-be reformer in a place to walk the clemency reform walk. But it is still encouraging to see how the political discourse has evolved in recent years, and perhaps an evolution of the actual law will not be too far behind.

September 30, 2019 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Noticing Justice Sotomayor's persistent voice as SCOTUS turns away capital cases

Adam Liptak has this new New York Times piece headlined "In Death Penalty Cases, Sotomayor Is Alone in ‘Bearing Witness’." Here are brief excerpts:

The terse Supreme Court rulings arrived in the evening, in time to allow an execution later that night.  There were three rulings in the last month or so, at 5:52 p.m., at 7:01 p.m. and at 10:13 p.m. They were bland and formulaic, saying only that the court had denied an “application for stay of execution of sentence of death.”  The inmates who had filed the applications were put to death within hours.

In all three cases, only one member of the court bothered to write an opinion, to give a hint about what was at stake.  That was Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who maintains a sort of vigil in the capital cases other justices treat as routine.  She described shortcomings in the trials the inmates had received and oddities in the laws the courts below had applied....

There is a precedent for Justice Sotomayor’s attention to capital cases, said Jordan M. Steiker, a law professor at the University of Texas....  “Justice Sotomayor is carrying forward the tradition of Justices Brennan and Marshall,” Professor Steiker said, referring to Justices William J. Brennan Jr. and Thurgood Marshall, who came to adopt a practice of dissenting in every death penalty case....

Justice Sotomayor’s sustained attention to the capital justice system, Professor Steiker said, was part of an effort to speak to many audiences. “She recognizes the institutional limits of the court in correcting every injustice or every misreading of federal law, yet she wants to communicate the wrongness of those injustices and misreadings despite the court’s inability to intervene,” Professor Steiker said. “Justice Sotomayor is speaking to institutional actors — judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers — to make clear that the court, or least some portion of it, is keenly aware of problems that it is not presently able to correct.

September 30, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, September 29, 2019

Pennsylvania Supreme Court opts to dodge broadside challenge to state's death penalty

As noted in this post from July, Philly DA Larry Krasner filed a notable state court brief urging the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to declare state's death penalty unconstitutional.  But, as set forth in this brief order released on Friday, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided to "decline[] to exercise its extraordinary King’s Bench jurisdiction," and so the applications were "DENIED on this basis." This local article provides some more context and reactions:

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court on Thursday rejected a petition by two death row inmates to find the state’s death penalty unconstitutional, a request that some advocates had hoped would lead to a historic ruling.  In its one-page order, the court left the door open for individual review of death penalty cases. “Discrete review of properly presented claims will proceed in the individual cases, subject to the jurisdictional limits of the post-conviction courts,” its ruling said.

The Supreme Court case centered on a petition filed by federal defenders in August 2018 on behalf of two inmates, Jermont Cox of Philadelphia and Kevin Marinelli of Northumberland County, but had the potential to affect the approximately 130 others on death row.

Shawn Nolan, chief of the capital habeas unit at the Federal Community Defender Office in Philadelphia, which represents Cox and Marinelli, said in a statement Friday: “We are disappointed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to hear this important case at this time.  As noted by the order of the court, we will continue to litigate the unconstitutionality of Pennsylvania’s capital punishment system in individual cases.  There is overwhelming evidence that Pennsylvania’s death penalty system is broken — unfair, inaccurate, and unlawful under the constitution of the commonwealth.”...

On Sept. 11, the seven justices heard the appeal arguments in the cases of Cox and Marinelli.  During that hearing, Tim Kane, an assistant federal defender, argued that the death-penalty system is unreliable and thus violates the state constitution’s ban on cruel punishment.

The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, which represents the state in Cox’s appeal, also contended that the death penalty, as applied, has been unreliable and is thus unconstitutional.  Paul George, assistant supervisor of the Philadelphia district attorney’s law division, referred to a recent study by his office that found that 112 of 155 death penalty sentences — or 72% — from 40 years through 2017 were overturned.  Most were overturned because the defendants had ineffective counsel, he said.

George, like Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner, is a former criminal defense attorney who has opposed the death penalty.  Krasner, who took office in January 2018, had campaigned on “never” seeking the death penalty. In practice, the District Attorney’s Office under Krasner has agreed or signaled a willingness to vacate the death penalty for more than one-third of the 45 inmates from Philadelphia on death row in May, an Inquirer analysis showed.  Under Krasner and George’s leadership, the office has not asked for the death penalty in any cases that have come up for resentencing....

The Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office, which represents the state in Marinelli’s case, has taken a different stance from the District Attorney’s Office. Ronald Eisenberg, senior appellate counsel in the Attorney General’s Office, argued before the justices that there was no immediate need for the high court to take up its so-called King’s Bench power to review the matter, and suggested that other avenues exist to address issues regarding lawyers determined to be ineffective in capital cases....

The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association issued a statement Friday afternoon supporting the order. “The extraordinary relief sought by petitioners was the wrong mechanism for this type of challenge, and it was properly denied,” the statement said. “The appeals process in Pennsylvania exists to ensure this rare punishment is applied properly — and that process will continue to be utilized by individuals sentenced to death.  While no prosecutor takes joy in seeking the death penalty, we believe today’s ruling is the right result for the citizens of this commonwealth.”

In the state legislature, Sen. Sharif Street and Rep. Chris Rabb, both Philadelphia Democrats, are among lawmakers who in April announced a plan to introduce legislation to end the state’s death penalty, saying it is unsuccessful as a crime deterrent, costly, and flawed. Sen. Katie Muth, a Democrat who represents parts of Montgomery, Chester, and Berks Counties, is a prime joint sponsor of the proposed Senate bill. Her legislative director, Sonia Kikeri, said Friday that Muth hopes to introduce the bill in the fall session.

Republican Rep. Francis X. Ryan of Lebanon County, who considers himself one of the most conservative members in the state House, is a prime joint sponsor of Rabb’s bipartisan effort. “I do think it needs to be abolished,” Ryan said Friday. Rabb said in a separate interview that they would plan to introduce their bill “when we have a few more co-sponsors on both sides of the aisle.... We have our work cut out for us if we want to introduce it by the end of this year.” He said they would have until November 2020 to introduce a bill in the current legislative session.

Cox was convicted of three separate drug-related murders in Philadelphia in 1992 and ordered to die for one of them. Marinelli was sentenced to death for a 1994 killing in Northumberland County.  Pennsylvania’s death penalty has been used three times since it was reinstated by the state in 1978.  The last person executed by the state was the Philadelphia basement torture killer Gary Heidnik, in 1999.

Gov. Tom Wolf in 2015 imposed a moratorium on the death penalty in Pennsylvania.

Prior related posts:

September 29, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, September 27, 2019

SCOTUSblog online symposium previews "Bridgegate" political corruption case

Though there are other cases to be argued earlier in the coming Supreme Court Term that are sure to be of interest to sentencing fans, I suspect more than a few folks in the white-collar bar are especially excited for Kelly v. United States, a high-profile political fraud case on the SCOTUS docket this Term.  I know the great folks at SCOTUSblog are focused on this case, as they put together an online symposium this week with a lot of leading white-collar crime voices.  Here are the links, with all recommended reading:

September 27, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, September 26, 2019

Senators Durbin and Grassley introduce "Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2019"

I am so very pleased to be able to blog about a new effort to prohibit the ugly practice of using "acquitted conduct" in the federal sentencing system.  Specifically, as detailed in this press release, "U.S. Senators Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) and Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), the lead sponsors of the landmark First Step Act, today introduced the bipartisan Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2019, which would end the unjust practice of judges increasing sentences based on conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted by a jury."  Here is more from the release:

Along with Durbin and Grassley, the legislation is also cosponsored by Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Cory Booker (D-NJ), and Mike Lee (R-UT).

Our criminal justice system rests on the Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees of due process and the right to a jury trial for the criminally accused.  These principles require the government to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.  Under the Constitution, defendants may be convicted only for conduct proven beyond a reasonable doubt.   However, at sentencing, courts may enhance sentences if they find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant committed other crimes.  The difference in those standards of proof means that a sentencing court can effectively nullify a jury’s verdict by considering acquitted conduct.

One prominent example of this unjust practice is the 2005 case of Antwuan Ball, who, along with his co-defendants, was convicted of distributing a few grams of crack cocaine, but acquitted of conspiring to distribute drugs.   Despite this, the sentencing judge held Mr. Ball responsible for the conspiracy, nearly quadrupling his sentence to 19 years.  Mr. Ball asked the Supreme Court to consider his case, but the Court denied the petition for the writ of certiorari.  Justice Scalia wrote a blistering dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Thomas, noting that “not only did no jury convict these defendants of the offense the sentencing judge thought them guilty of, but a jury acquitted them of that offense.”  Scalia decried the practice, writing that, “this has gone on long enough.”

The Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act would end this practice by:

  • Amending 18 U.S.C. § 3661 to preclude a court of the United States from considering, except for purposes of mitigating a sentence, acquitted conduct at sentencing, and
  • Defining “acquitted conduct” to include acts for which a person was criminally charged and adjudicated not guilty after trial in a Federal, State, Tribal, or Juvenile court, or acts underlying a criminal charge or juvenile information dismissed upon a motion for acquittal.

Long-time readers know I have been a long-time opponent of federal courts' use of acquitted conduct at sentencing (e.g., here is a post from 11 years ago on the issue, which itself links to more than a half-dozen prior posts on the topic).  I have also been involved in preparing briefs assailing the use of acquitted conduct in a number of circuit courts, and I was especially proud of this amicus brief that I prepared in support of certiorari in the Antwaun Ball case reference above.  So, I am fully supportive of legislative efforts to preclude the use of acquitted conduct at federal sentencing.

Thankfully, lots of other folks are also supportive of legislative efforts to preclude the use of acquitted conduct at federal sentencing, as revealed by these new policy group postings:

From Americans for Tax Reform, "ATR Joins Coalition Supporting the Prohibition of Punishing Acquitted Conduct"

From the Cato Institute, "Addressing the Gross Injustice of Acquitted Conduct Sentencing"

From FreedomWorks, "Support the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act, S. 2566"

From the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, "Nation’s Criminal Defense Bar Lauds Newly Introduced 'Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2019'"

September 26, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, September 24, 2019

Tennessee AG seeking to make his state even more like Texas with respect to capital punishment

This new AP article, headlined "Tennessee Seeks Execution Dates for 9 Death Row Inmates," explains why the Volunteer State is on a path to become the new Texas in the arena of capital punishment thanks in part to efforts by the state's Attorney General.  Here are the basics:

Tennessee's attorney general has asked the state Supreme Court to set execution dates for nine death row prisoners, bucking a national movement away from capital punishment. Attorney General Herbert Slatery quietly filed the request on Friday with no explanation, and the state Supreme Court later posted it on its website on Tuesday.

"The Tennessee Constitution guarantees victims of crime the right to a 'prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction of sentence,'" Slatery said in a statement Tuesday in response to a request for comment from The Associated Press.

Slatery's motion came the same day he publicly announced he would challenge a Nashville Criminal Court's decision to commute the death sentence of black inmate Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman's to life in prison after concerns were raised that racism tainted the jury selection pool.  Slatery argued in his appeal that the court's order "circumvented established legal procedures."

Assistant Federal Public Defender Kelley Henry said she was surprised by the request when she received it in the mail on Monday. Seven of the nine men included in Slatery's motion are represented by the public defender's office.  "Each case is unique and represents a number of fundamental constitutional problems including innocence, racism, and severe mental illness," Henry wrote in a statement on Tuesday. "We will oppose the appointed attorney general's request."

In Tennessee, the attorney general can request execution dates once juries have delivered death sentences and inmates have exhausted their three-tier appeals process in state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court.  The state Supreme Court then schedules the executions. It has not yet scheduled the nine Slatery requested but has scheduled two others for the coming months.

Tennessee has executed five people since it resumed executions about a year ago. The state was second only to Texas in the number of executions it carried out in 2018, the fourth consecutive year in which there have been fewer than 30 executions nationwide. Tennessee executed three people last year; Texas put to death 13....

In Tennessee, executions are carried out through lethal injection unless the drugs are unavailable, in which case the electric chair is used. Additionally, death row inmates who were convicted of crimes before January 1999 can choose the electric chair or lethal injection.  Tennessee put 56-year-old Stephen West to death by electric chair last month. West was convicted of the 1986 kidnappings and stabbing deaths of a mother and her 15-year-old daughter. He also was convicted of raping the teen.

September 24, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Prez Trump has reportedly soured on politics of criminal justice reform after FIRST STEP Act achievement

This lengthy new Politico piece portends some dark clouds for federal criminal justice reform efforts in the months and perhaps years ahead. The full headline summarizes the essential: "Trump snubs Jared Kushner’s signature accomplishment; The president thinks criminal justice reform is a political loser, and hasn't been shy about saying so."  Here are some extended excerpts:

When President Donald Trump huddled with campaign aides in the late spring to discuss his bid for reelection, White House senior adviser Jared Kushner told his father-in-law he should highlight last year’s historic passage of the First Step Act — a sweeping criminal justice reform bill that eluded previous administrations and has earned celebrity support.

Kushner reiterated the positive selling points of that bill during the Oval Office meeting as Trump campaign officials and White House aides ticked through the president’s achievements, wondering which would resonate most with his adoring base.  But Trump wasn’t interested and told Kushner he didn’t think his core voters would care much about a bipartisan deal for which he’s since accused Democrats of trying to steal credit. “It was clear he thinks it’s a total dud,” said a person familiar with the meeting. “He made it abundantly clear he doesn’t think it’s worth talking about.”

Kushner, whose own father spent more than a year in federal prison, worked closely with Democratic and Republican senators to get the criminal justice reform bill over the finish line last year — often telling his tough-on-crime boss it was worth expending political capital to seize a rare opportunity to overcome the deeply partisan divide on Capitol Hill and solidify his image as a pragmatic deal-maker.

But now, Trump “is telling people he’s mad” at how criminal justice reform has panned out, according to a person close to the president. “He’s really mad that he did it.  He’s saying that he’s furious at Jared because Jared is telling him he’s going to get all these votes of all these felons.”

Indeed, for months, the president has glossed over his son-in-law’s signature legislative achievement at his campaign rallies. If he brings up criminal justice reform, it’s almost always to mock his predecessors for their inability to get it done. Otherwise, as he did at his three most recent campaign events, he skips it entirely, indulging in long-winded rants about unresolved issues like trade and immigration instead of plugging one of the few bipartisan triumphs of his administration.

The subject’s notable absence from Trump’s 2020 stump speech offers a raw look at the president’s political instincts, which strongly veer toward partisan fights and away from the soaring appeals to national unity of past White House incumbents. And it lacks appeal to his base of rural and older white voters, who often respond better to hard-line rhetoric on the topic of law and order.

The nub of the issue for Trump, say White House officials, congressional aides and friends of the president, who were granted anonymity to speak candidly on the matter, is that he no longer sees criminal justice reform as a résumé booster heading into 2020.  He brings it up at official events, in response to reporters, and to religious groups — and it was a key part of Trump’s State of the Union address in January, when he welcomed home the first inmate to be released under the First Step Act — but it’s far from a permanent fixture of his reelection campaign.

“It would be difficult to say it’s a change of heart. I don’t think his heart was ever really in it,” said one White House official, adding that some Trump aides questioned why the president — who once declared himself “the law and order candidate” — endorsed the First Step Act in the first place....  In response to this story, a White House official said, “This false premise is another convoluted contradictory, media-manufactured joke. The president is clearly proud of all of his record-setting accomplishments — including the landmark bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform that data shows will save money, reduce crime and make communities safer.”

During the Oval Office meeting this spring, Trump complained that Democratic co-sponsors of the First Step Act skipped the bill signing at the White House last December (Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island was the only Democrat to attend) and have refused to give him credit for passing prison reform when his immediate predecessor couldn’t, according to two people with knowledge of the meeting.  He’s said as much publicly in recent days, tweeting earlier this month: “I got it done with a group of Senators & others who would never have gone for it. Obama couldn’t come close.”

The tweet came after NBC’s Lester Holt omitted any mention of Trump’s role in advancing criminal justice reform during a televised town hall on the network. The president felt the televised special was disingenuous and thought singer John Legend, who participated in it, “paraded himself out like he was the great savior of criminal justice reform,” according to a senior administration official....

“He’s been telling Jared, ‘I got nothing from that,’” a person close to the White House said of criminal justice reform, adding that the president feels duped by claims that his popularity has grown and that he is frustrated with Kushner’s attempts to “jawbone” the issue into every speech he delivers.  “Jared has got all these stats like ‘every rapist in Florida is now going to vote Republican,’” quipped the person close to Trump.  “Trump doesn’t believe it and he’s mad Jared sold him this thing,” the same person said. (The First Step Act gives only certain nonviolent offenders a chance to shorten their sentences, and excludes sex offenders from early release.)

Kushner has claimed publicly that more nonviolent ex-felons in Florida, where they recently became eligible to vote, are registering as Republicans than as Democrats. In a rare television appearance in April, he told Fox News’ Laura Ingraham that he found that statistic “very pleasing” and one “that will surprise a lot of people when they see the new coalition that President Trump is building.”  But it is unclear how Kushner and his team procured such data. As of March, more than 2,000 formerly incarcerated felons had registered to vote in Florida, according to a study by the Brennan Center for Justice, which did not disclose the new registrants’ party affiliations. An aide to Kushner did not provide details on the source of the data in time for publication.

Some Trump allies argue that Kushner, who continues to monitor implementation of the First Step Act, is unlikely to persuade media personalities and Democratic lawmakers who support either to credit Trump with working across the aisle to get the measure passed.

“Van Jones was happy with Trump for a day. That’s all Trump got,” said the person close to Trump, referring to the liberal CNN pundit and former Obama adviser, who once described the First Step Act as “a Christmas miracle.”  Jones did attend a White House summit on prison reform this April — months after the bill passed — and recently met with Kushner to discuss its impact.  Jones, who co-founded the bipartisan criminal justice reform nonprofit #cut50, noted that he’s continued to sing Trump’s praises on the topic, including in a recent interview with CNN in which he celebrated Trump’s role in signing the First Step Act into law.... “There’s always been a bunch of people in the building, they didn’t like it before, during or after, and they’ve always been able to leak out anonymous bullshit quotes that then very quickly have egg on their faces because Trump does something else positive in this direction or throws in another line in a speech,” said Jones, who confirmed that Trump has been frustrated with the lack of credit he’s received....

Some Trump allies worry that the more the president talks about criminal justice reform, the more vulnerable he becomes if a prisoner released early under the restructured sentencing guidelines is ever accused of committing another crime.  When Republicans battled over criminal justice reform last fall, a small group of conservative senators who ultimately opposed the bill warned Trump of the dire consequences he could face if an inmate who won early release became a repeat offender.  “You let people out of jail early, commute sentences, something bad happens because of this effort [and] it’s going to be one more egg on their face — or even worse, blood on their hands,” said a former Senate Republican staffer.

Another GOP aide pointed to a negative ad campaign Republican gubernatorial candidate Eddie Rispone recently launched against Louisiana Gov. John Bel Edwards over his support for statewide sentencing reform. The ad accuses Edwards of putting “dangerous” and “violent” ex-felons “back on our streets where they robbed, attacked, [and] murdered.” A person familiar with the ad buy said it was prompted by the September arrest of a Louisiana man on burglary charges who was released early last year as part of a parole reform bill passed by the state Legislature in 2016. “Any smart political person would not go out bragging that they let criminals out of jail,” the GOP aide said.

This reporting is quite interesting, but not really all that surprising in light of Prez Trump's personal and political history. It also has me wondering whether Attorney General William Barr, who seems to be in good with Prez Trump and does not seem inclined to be a big fan of the FIRST STEP Act, might be having some influence on how the Prez thinks about these issues. Most fundamentally, this story serves as yet another reminder of just how fragile political support for criminal justice reform can be and how critical it can be to get reform work done whenever a window of opportunity is open.

September 24, 2019 in Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, September 23, 2019

Highlighting (just some of) the many challenges of gathering good criminal justice data

This new Los Angeles Times editorial, headlined "Police, prosecutors and courts are keeping California’s criminal justice data a secret," provide a useful reminder of an evergreen reality — namely that good criminal justice data is ever elusive.  Here are excerpts:

A quick flip through the statute books could leave the false impression that California has the nation’s most transparent criminal justice system, the most comprehensively compiled and carefully analyzed crime data, the most penetrating public access — even without a new bill on its way to Gov. Gavin Newsom’s desk.

Since the 1950s, California law has required the state Department of Justice to collect names, numbers and other key facts from every state and local agency dealing in any way with crime, criminals or “juvenile delinquents.”  In the 1970s, lawmakers set standards for sorting and sharing justice data among courts, police, prosecutors, jails and prisons.  In 2016, a new law required the state attorney general to post basic criminal statistics online....

Yet retrieving useful information about California’s justice system is nearly impossible.  More than half of all arrest records fail to show whether the suspect ultimately was convicted, so police can’t tell whether the person they just stopped has a serious felony record.  Innocent people might sit in jail while courts or probation departments try to track down complete rap sheets that really ought to be available with a couple keystrokes.  Violent felons may be left free to buy guns despite being legally barred from doing so. Potential employers can’t tell the difference between a job applicant with a criminal past and one who was once mistakenly arrested.

Meanwhile, inadequate numbers and other data leave the public with no idea whether criminal justice reforms or other new laws are working as they were intended, or whether their courts, cops, prosecutors, probation departments and public defenders are working efficiently and effectively.

How can a state that requires so much information-gathering be so in the dark about its justice system?  In part, it comes down to lack of resources and lack of technological know-how.  Some courts and county agencies (barely) meet their legal requirements by sending paper records to the Justice Department, which then must transcribe the documents into its own data system.  Other agencies have some tech savvy but use systems or software that are incompatible with one another or are no longer supported by the companies that developed them.  And standards for collecting data vary around the state, so all that carefully compiled information has limited utility....

One problem that sets California apart is scale.  The state is huge, and so are the numbers of arrests, dismissals, convictions, sentences, probation orders.  It takes money and expertise to manage all those records.  But it may also be that criminal justice agencies have little enthusiasm for opening their operations to public scrutiny. For example, until recently the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation prohibited researchers from publishing findings that officials believed might reflect poorly on the department, according to an April 2019 report by the Stanford Criminal Justice Center and Measures for Justice (an organization seeking to improve justice data collection practices).

The same may be true of other agencies.  A district attorney, for example, has a political incentive to jealously guard data about conviction rates, reversals on appeal and the like.  Judges are wary of being graded on how swiftly cases move through their courts or how many African American defendants, for example, are convicted in their courtrooms, and how long their sentences are compared with convictions and sentences for white defendants.

Assembly Bill 1331, whose fate now rests with Newsom, would close some of the current gaps in criminal history records by tightening reporting requirements for law enforcement agencies and courts.  It would require release of anonymized information to research agencies, which would then be able to sift through data to discover trends or biases.  It would promote better and faster sharing of information among public agencies.

It’s a step forward, and it deserves Newsom’s signature.  But like all those older laws on California’s books, it won’t solve the state’s criminal justice information problem without serious buy-in by courts, police and other participants in the system.  They will have to more fully embrace — on their own or through public and political pressure — their role in producing useful data.

September 23, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, September 22, 2019

"Justice sometimes needs a do-over"

The title of this post is the headline of this Washington Post commentary authored by James Forman Jr. Here are excerpts:

The D.C. Council is considering the Second Look Amendment Act, which builds on the Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act of 2016 (IRAA).  That law allows people convicted of serious crimes before they turned 18 to ask judges to review their sentences after they have served 15 years.  The proposed law expands eligibility for sentence review to all those who committed crimes before age 25 and have served at least 15 years in prison....

The core idea behind this is that everybody — including people in prison — grows and matures with time. Social science research shows that most people who commit violent crimes do so while they are young....

Of course, some people in prison remain a threat.  That’s why D.C.’s Second Look Amendment Act would not give judges carte blanche to shorten every sentence that comes before them.  Instead, the law instructs them to consider a long list of factors, including evidence of maturity and rehabilitation, medical and mental health reports, prison disciplinary records, victim impact statements and the views of the U.S. attorney’s office.

The Second Look Amendment Act offers a promising corrective to the harsh — and ineffective — practices once commonplace in courthouses across America.  But while the law has the support of the majority of the city’s elected officials, the unelected U.S. attorney is leading a campaign to scuttle it.

I’m not surprised by this opposition.... But I am disappointed by the office’s willingness to mislead the public in making its case.  Consider one of its central criticisms of IRAA and the Second Look Amendment Act: It says that the laws eliminate a judge’s ability to consider the nature of the crime when deciding whether to reduce a sentence.  In fact, the laws do nothing of the kind.  Though a change to IRAA this year removed “the nature and circumstances of the offense” from a list of factors that judges must consider, nothing in the law prevents judges from engaging in such consideration, and several provisions still in force effectively require them to do just that.

Don’t take my word for it.  The U.S. attorney’s office has made this very point in court.  Last month, when prosecutors opposed a sentence reduction in the case of United States v. Momolu Stewart, the U.S. attorney’s office told the judge that he must consider the defendant’s crime because it is “essential context for evaluating other factors that remain relevant under the IRAA.” It appears that the U.S. attorney’s office wants to have it both ways. In court, prosecutors tell judges they are logically bound to consider the crime, while in the press and community meetings, they frighten voters by telling them that the law doesn’t allow that.

The Second Look Amendment Act gives the D.C. Council a chance to restore a measure of fairness to a criminal system often lacking it.  Standing up to the U.S. attorney’s office may not be easy, but the D.C. Council did so when it rejected that office’s scare tactics and eliminated mandatory minimums for drug offenses in the 1990s. That decision now is universally admired.  If the council is willing to embrace reason over fearmongering again, I am confident the Second Look Amendment Act will be recognized as another proud accomplishment.

September 22, 2019 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, September 21, 2019

Honoring the second annual "National Expungement Week"

NEW2019_Flyer_No_Citiesv1_Square1080Today begins, as detailed here, the second annual "National Expungement Week" running until September 28.  I have been excited and proud to play a small role in these important activities by helping identify law students to participate in a local record sealing clinic.  (Applicable law in Ohio allows for only a very few types of criminal convictions to be expunged, but a much larger number of convictions are subject to sealing.) 

Notably, Columbus is not shown among the more than two dozen localities listed here as having expungement week events; I suspect and sincerely hope  there may be many other places with expungement-related activities taking place this week.  This Forbes article, headlined "Second Annual National Expungement Week (N.E.W.) Helps People Clear Criminal Records," provides these additional details:

A coalition of more than three dozen organizations working at the intersection of the cannabis industry, racial equity, and reparative justice, led by Equity First Alliance and Cage-Free Repair, conceived the week to highlight the need to fully integrate those disenfranchised by the war on drugs within their respective communities.

Events to be featured throughout the week include free clinics to help remove, seal, or reclassify eligible convictions from criminal records (depending on local legislation), as well as provide expungement education workshops and complimentary services.

N.E.W. events have inspired teams of attorneys, organizers, and activists nationwide to continue to increase expungement opportunities where possible, with over 40 events scheduled to take place throughout the week.

Cities featuring participating events have nearly doubled from 16 in 2018 to 30, including major hubs such as Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, DC.

And this Rolling Stone article, headlined "Seth Rogen Details How to Clear Your Criminal Record in New PSA," highlights a notable celebrity contributing to the effort.

Long-time readers should recall my old article, titled "Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement Practices," which includes discussion of various legal and practical barriers that can often unduly limit the ability of individuals to break away from the collateral consequences of long-ago minor criminal convictions.  I call this article "old" because, though published less than 18 months ago, there has been dramatic improvement in the efforts of marijuana reform states to foster the erasure of past marijuana convictions.

That said, my old article still includes a new and novel proposal: the creation of new criminal justice institution, a Commission on Justice Restoration, to be funded by the taxes, fees and other revenues generated by marijuana reforms and to be tasked with proactively working on policies and practices designed to minimize and ameliorate undue collateral consequences for people with criminal convictions.  Special private-actor programming in the form of "National Expungement Week" can do great things, but the undue burdens of a criminal convictions are fundamentally a public problem in need of a public institutional solution.

September 21, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Jury Sentencing in the United States: The Antithesis of the Rule of Law"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by MaryAnn Grover now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

The well-documented randomness and arbitrariness that plagues capital sentencing stems from the wide discretion granted to sentencing actors, namely jurors.  However, this wide discretion exists in the non-capital sentencing context as well.  Accordingly, arbitrary sentences are not confined to the capital sentencing context. Instead these arbitrary sentences result from structural choices designed to insulate jurors from the impact of their decisions.

This article explores how the statutory jury sentencing schemes used in the six states that retain jury sentencing contribute significantly to the arbitrary nature of sentences imposed.  This article further provides practical ways in which jurors could be made to feel responsible for the sentences they impose, leading them to impose less arbitrary sentences.

September 21, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 20, 2019

Kentucky Supreme Court hears arguments to preclude death penalty for defendants under age 21

As reported in this local article, the Kentucky Supreme Court heard a notable death penalty case yesterday.  Here are the details:

Kentucky could become the first death penalty state to put additional age restrictions on capital punishment.  Currently, 18 is the legal age allowed in the United States.  However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky could ban the death penalty for defendants who committed a crime between the ages of 18 and 21.

On Thursday, the Court heard the arguments surrounding two high profile murders out of Lexington.

In the first case, Efrain Diaz Jr. and Justin Smith are charged with the death of UK student Jonathan Krueger. Police say Krueger and a friend were walking home on East Maxwell St. in 2015 when Diaz, Smith, and Roman Gonzalez approached them.  Police say the three were armed and one of them shot and killed Krueger.  Gonzalez was 17-years-old at the time, so the death penalty cannot be applied to him. However, Diaz was 20-years-old at the time and Smith was 18.

In the second case, Travis Bredhold is accused of allegedly robbing and killing gas station attendant Mukeshbhai Patel in 2013.  Bredhold was 18-years-old at the time.

If things stand as they currently do, Bredhold, Diaz, and Smith will not face the death penalty. In Fayette County Circuit Court, Judge Ernesto Scorsone ruled the death penalty is unconstitutional for people in that age range because new science shows their brains are still developing and they lack the maturity to assess risks and control their impulses.

The defendants' lawyer, who wants the Supreme Court of Kentucky to uphold Scorsone's ruling, used the science argument in court today.  "In 2005, we thought the problem with juvenile misbehavior was simply that the brakes were defective," said defense lawyer Timothy Arnold.  "Now, we know they have their foot on the gas and they are flooring it between the ages of 18 and 20."

The Attorney General's Office argued against that, hoping to convince the Court to overturn the Scorsone's ruling. "Judge Ernesto Scorsone of the Fayette Circuit Court abused his power when he decided that 18 to 20 year olds were exempt from the death penalty," said assistant state attorney general Matthew Krygiel.

The Attorney General's Office argued that the Supreme Court of the United States set the age for capital punishment at 18 and that should be followed.  Krygiel reiterated that 18 is the legal age of an adult in the United States. "Being 18 years old, you can enlist in the Army," said Krygiel. "They give you an assault rifle and send you halfway across the world, and after some basic training on the rules of engagement, you're going to decide whether or not to pull a trigger and shoot somebody."

However, the defense lawyer believes the Kentucky Supreme Court has the power to revisit the age limit. Arnold argued that given the new science available, 18 to 21 year olds should not have capital punishment as a penalty option. "To be clear, nobody's proposing throwing a parade for anybody," said Arnold.  "What we are saying is simply that they're not eligible for the death penalty.  They'll still be eligible for life without parole or any other penalty that would be applicable to somebody who committed a serious crime. The death penalty is reserved for the worst of the worst, and science shows that they're not that."

Prior related post:

September 20, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, September 19, 2019

"Timbs v. Indiana: Toward the Regulation of Mercenary Criminal Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this new article forthcoming in the Federal Sentencing Reporter authored by Wayne Logan and now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

In Timbs v. Indiana, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore regulates state and local governments.  The unanimous result, wedding liberal and conservative Justices alike, was backed by an ideologically diverse group of amici, including the ACLU, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Cato Institute.  The government practice giving rise to the litigation — civil asset forfeiture — has been subject to widespread criticism, fueled by troubling accounts of what has come to be known as “policing for profit.”  Reaction to Timbs ran the gamut from regarding it as “huge” to being a decision having little impact.  As I discuss in this symposium contribution, Timbs is important both because it provides a new federal constitutional basis to regulate government targeting of criminal defendants for revenue generation and signals the Court’s broader recognition of the problematic nature of the widespread practice.

September 19, 2019 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Prez candidate Beto O'Rourke proposes "Drug War Justice Grants" funding by marijuana tax revenues

As reported in this Hill piece,"President hopeful Beto O'Rourke on Thursday unveiled a plan to legalize marijuana and end the war on drugs." Here are the basics:

The former Texas congressman would grant clemency to those currently serving sentences for marijuana possession, establish a model for marijuana legalization and give grants to those affected by the war on drugs to help them benefit from the new industry.

The “Drug War Justice Grants” would be given to those formerly incarcerated for nonviolent marijuana offenses in state and federal prison. Licenses to produce, distribute, or sell marijuana would be funneled to minority-owned businesses and fees would be waived for low-income individuals who had previously been convicted of related offenses.

“We need to not only end the prohibition on marijuana, but also repair the damage done to the communities of color disproportionately locked up in our criminal justice system or locked out of opportunity because of the War on Drugs,” O'Rourke said in a statement.

This page on the O'Rourke campaign website provides some background and details, and here are excerpts focused on criminal justice matters:

In January 2009, Beto O’Rourke, one of the youngest members of the El Paso City Council, introduced a longshot resolution calling for an “honest, open national debate” on ending the prohibition of marijuana.... To Beto’s surprise, the resolution passed unanimously. But the mayor vetoed the resolution later that day....

In 2011, Beto published the book Dealing Death and Drugs: The Big Business of Dope in the U.S. and Mexico: An Argument for Ending the Prohibition of Marijuana. Long before the legalization of marijuana was overwhelmingly popular with the American public, Beto laid out his case for ending the decades-long prohibition on marijuana and repairing the damage done to the communities of color that are disproportionately impacted....

The War on Drugs has been catastrophic for communities of color, and our policy toward marijuana has been particularly egregious. Despite similar rates of use, African-Americans are almost 4 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than white people. Yet, a 2017 survey of marijuana business owners in states allowing them found that only 19% identified as non-white. These statistics tell the story of marijuana laws in our country, where certain communities have been subjected to over-policing and criminalization while others are being presented lucrative business opportunities. Beto is committed to rewriting this story and rectifying the harm caused by decades of unjust marijuana policy.

As President, Beto will:

Legalize Marijuana...

Use clemency power to release those currently serving sentences for marijuana possession and establish a review board to determine whether others currently serving sentences related to marijuana should be released;

Expunge the records of those who have been convicted for possession and prevent the conviction from precluding these individuals from accessing housing, employment, education, and federal benefits, or from having their driver’s licenses suspended;...

Remove cannabis-related charges as grounds for deportation or denial of citizenship. The Trump Administration has explicitly targeted those with marijuana possession convictions for deportation, even though marijuana has been legalized in 11 states and the District of Columbia.

Invest revenue from the marijuana industry in communities impacted by the War on Drugs through “Drug War Justice Grants” and Equitable Licensing Programs....

To guarantee that opportunities to profit from a regulated marijuana market are made available to communities disproportionately impacted by the War on Drugs, Beto will:

Call for a federal tax on the marijuana industry, revenue from which will be used to:

Provide a monthly “Drug War Justice Grant” to those formerly incarcerated for nonviolent marijuana offenses in state and federal prison for a period based on time served. The grants will be funded completely by the tax on the marijuana industry.

Fund substance use treatment programs.

Support re-entry services for those who have been incarcerated for possession.

Invest in communities disproportionately impacted by marijuana arrests, including investments in housing and employment support, substance use and mental health treatment, peer and recovery support services, life skills training, victims’ services.

Support those disproportionately impacted by marijuana arrests, including those who have been convicted of marijuana possession themselves in participating in the marijuana businesses by providing technical assistance, industry-specific training, access to interest free/low-interest loans, and access to investment financing and legal services.

Ensure those most impacted by the War on Drugs are the ones benefiting from the economic activity related to marijuna.

As President, Beto will tie federal funding for criminal justice systems to requirements that states or local governments:

Waive licensing fees for producing, distributing, or selling marijuana for low-income individuals who have been convicted of marijuana offenses.

September 19, 2019 in Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, Drug Offense Sentencing, Pot Prohibition Issues, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 18, 2019

Without discussion of 3553(a) factors, Eleventh Circuit needs just one sentence to declare 120 years (LWOP) imprisonment for child porn offenses reasonable

Earlier this month in this post, I flagged the Sixth Circuit panel ruling in US v. Boucher, No. 18-5683 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (available here), which concluded that a month-long sentence was unreasonably short after an intricate multi-page analysis of § 3553(a) factors.  The detailed circuit analysis especially faulted the district court's consideration of personal factors and the failure "to address the risk of sentence disparities."  In my post about the Boucher ruling, I noted that I favor reviewing courts conducting robust and searching forms of reasonableness review, but I  lamented the fact that circuit courts often seem much more interested in seriously questioning 30-day sentences when federal prosecutors appeal than in questioning 30-year sentences when federal defendants appeal.  

Interestingly, today I was alerted to a new Eleventh Circuit panel ruling in which it is not a 30-year sentences, but actually a 120-year sentence(!), that gets short shrift in the reasonableness review process.  Specifically, in US v. Kirby, No. 18-11253 (11th Cir. Sept. 17, 2019) (available here), the defendant was convicted after trial of three counts of producing child pornography and two counts of possessing child porn.   As described by the Eleventh Circuit panel, the defendant had a large (but not enormous) number of child porn images and he created (but did not distribute) many images of his "thirteen-year-old stepdaughter, either captured by hidden cameras in bathrooms or taken while Kirby was assisting his stepdaughter with stretches due to a sports injury [and also had one] pornographic image of a friend of [his] stepdaughter."  This is serious criminal behavior, but the district court responded (based it seems on a maxed-out guideline range of life) by maxing out all the counts to the statutory maximum and running the terms consecutively to arrive at sentence of 1440 months (120 years) of imprisonment.

In addition to making a technical challenge to how the guideline range of life was used by the district court, the defendant here contended that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.  After discussing the technical issues for a number of pages, here is the full substance of the Kirby panel's response to the reasonableness claim:

As an initial matter, Kirby’s argument is largely predicated on the erroneous conclusion that the district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence.  Regardless, the sentence was not unreasonable.  Before imposing the longest sentence that it could, the district court thoroughly discussed Kirby’s particularly heinous conduct and direct participation in the creation of child pornography, his breach of public trust as a police officer, and his total failure to take responsibility for his actions.

Without seeing the full factual record or the parties' briefs, I am disinclined to assert that the substantive judgment of reasonableness here was obviously wrong.  But where is the circuit concern in this case for the district court's consideration of personal factors and the failure to address the risk of sentence disparities?   And what does strike me as obviously wrong is the obvious fact that there is such a contrast in the amount of attention and deliberation given to the reasonableness claims in cases like Boucher and Kirby.  As long as reviewing courts (and so many others) are so much more likely to worry so much more about undue leniency than about undue severity, over-incarceration will still define our criminal justice systems.

September 18, 2019 in Booker in the Circuits, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, September 17, 2019

"Tinkering With the Machinery of Death: Lessons From a Failure of Judicial Activism"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Kent Scheidegger now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on capital sentencing is a mess.  That may be the only proposition that draws a consensus in this sharply divisive area.  Critics and supporters of capital punishment agree that the system created by the Court fails to achieve its goals, although for different reasons.  The entire body of case law is an exercise in judicial activism.  That is, it consists of the decisions by the Supreme Court creating rules that shifting majorities believed were good policy at the time, unsupported by any demonstrable connection to the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment. 

I contend that the worst aspect of this body of case law — both in constitutional illegitimacy and in harmful effects — is the rule of Lockett v. Ohio that the defendant must be allowed to introduce and have considered virtually unlimited evidence in mitigation. The Court’s inability to agree with itself from one year to the next on what this rule means has caused many wrongful reversals of well-deserved sentences.  The unlimited potential it creates for attacking the competence of defense counsel continues to cause massive delay and expense, and all for evidence of limited probative value.  This is a massive failure of judicial activism. I propose that the Court prune back the rule to only the circumstances of the crime, youth, and lack of a criminal record and return the question of the admissibility of all other mitigation to the people and the democratic process.

September 17, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, September 15, 2019

Federal officials reportedly considered using fentanyl for executions when restating machinery of death

As reported in this post from July, federal officials have scheduled as series of executions starting in December of this year and have announced the creation of a new "Federal Execution Protocol Addendum, which ... replaces the three-drug procedure previously used in federal executions with a single drug — pentobarbital."  But according to this new Reuters report, another notable drug was considered by federal officials as they worked to restart the federal machinery of death:

The U.S. Department of Justice examined using fentanyl in lethal injections as it prepared last year to resume executing condemned prisoners, a then untested use of the powerful, addictive opioid that has helped fuel a national crisis of overdose deaths.

The department revealed it had contemplated using the drug in a court filing last month, which has not been previously reported. In the end, it decided against adopting the drug for executions.  Attorney General William Barr announced in July his department instead would use pentobarbital, a barbiturate, when it resumes federal executions later this year, ending a de facto moratorium on the punishment put in place by the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama.

But the special consideration given to the possibilities of fentanyl, even as federal agents were focused on seizing illegal imports of the synthetic opioid, show how much has changed since the federal government last carried out an execution nearly 20 years ago.  Many pharmaceutical companies have since put tight controls on their distribution channels to stop their drugs being used in executions.

As old supply chains vanished, many states, and the federal government in turn, have been forced to tinker with their lethal recipes.  They have experimented with different drugs, in some cases leading to grisly “botched” executions in which the condemned prisoners have visibly suffered prolonged, excruciating deaths, viewed by some as a breach of the constitutional ban on “cruel and unusual” punishments.

In 2017, Nebraska and Nevada announced they would use fentanyl, which is 100 times more powerful than morphine, in new multi-drug execution protocols.

By 2018, the U.S. Justice Department was also examining the “use of fentanyl as part of a lethal injection protocol,” according to a three-page internal memorandum from March 2018 by the director of the department’s Bureau of Prisons.

The Justice Department revealed the memo’s existence in an August court filing after a federal judge ordered it to produce a complete “administrative record” showing how it arrived at the new pentobarbital execution protocol announced in July.

The full contents of the memo are not public. It is not known why the department decided to examine fentanyl, what supply channels were considered or why it ultimately rejected fentanyl as a protocol.  The government’s court filing shows the only other named drug examined as the subject of a department memo was pentobarbital, the drug it now says it wants to use in December and January to kill five of the 61 prisoners awaiting execution on federal death row....

Doctors can prescribe fentanyl for treating severe pain.  In recent years, illegal fentanyl has become a common additive in bootleg pain pills and other street drugs, contributing to the tens of thousands of opioid overdose deaths in the country each year.  Even tiny quantities can slow or stop a person’s breathing.

Earlier this year, an Ohio lawmaker proposed using some of the illegal fentanyl seized from drug traffickers to execute condemned inmates....

In August 2018, Carey Dean Moore became the first person in the United States to be executed using a protocol that included fentanyl.  Nebraska prison officials injected him with fentanyl and three other drugs. Moore took 23 minutes to die. Witnesses said that before succumbing, Moore breathed heavily and coughed and that his face turned red, then purple.

Prior recent related posts:

September 15, 2019 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

California Gov Newsom commutes 21 sentences to make offenders eligible for parole

In his first year in office, California Gov Newsom has not been afraid to use his clemency power in various ways. This local article highlights his latest work in this arena, starting this way: "Gov. Gavin Newsom is commuting the sentences of 21 violent offenders incarcerated in California prisons, including four men who have convictions related to homicides in Sacramento County, the governor’s office announced Friday." Here is more:

Jacoby Felix, Crystal Jones, Andrew Crater and Luis Alberto Velez were convicted of separate murders in the 1990s. All four, now granted commutations by Newsom, were convicted in Sacramento County and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

The clemency action was announced Friday in a statement from the governor’s office, which describes the crimes committed by those four men and 17 other state prisoners, and explains the reasoning for commuting their sentences.

“The Governor carefully reviewed each application and considered a number of factors, including the circumstances of the crime and the sentence imposed, the applicant’s conduct while in prison and the applicant’s self-development efforts since the offense, including whether they have made use of available rehabilitative programs and addressed treatment needs,” a statement from Newsom’s office said.

Youth offender status was another important factor considered, with 15 of the 21 total commutations involving inmates convicted before the age of 26. The four Sacramento County grantees were all between ages 18 and 26 at the time of their crimes....

Newsom’s commutations would make each offender eligible for suitability hearings with the state Board of Parole Hearings.

The commutations can be upheld or rejected by the California Supreme Court. The court blocked 10 clemency actions by former Gov. Jerry Brown in his final weeks in office, marking the first time since 1930 that a California governor’s commutation requests had been denied.

But Velez and Jones’ cases have already been reviewed and recommended by both the Board of Parole Hearings and the California Supreme Court, according to Friday’s news release. Those advance reviews are required by law for any commutation case involving an applicant with multiple felony convictions.

Velez, Felix and Crater would be eligible for parole suitability hearings in 2020. Jones would be eligible in approximately 2023 after serving 25 years of his life sentence.

Also included in Newsom’s commutations are Marcus McJimpson, who has served 31 years of two life terms for a 1988 Fresno County double murder, and 80-year-old Doris Roldan, who has been imprisoned since 1981 for the first-degree murder of her husband. Roldan of Los Angeles County – who now uses a wheelchair, as noted in the governor’s statement – was recommended for clemency by her warden.

The Gov's office has this overview statement about all the commutations and detailed discussions of each case appears in gubernatorial clemency certificates available here.

Prior related post about Gov Newsom's clemency work:

September 15, 2019 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, September 12, 2019

"The Democrats’ Shameful Legacy on Crime"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new New Republic piece by Marie Gottschalk.  It carries this subheadline: "Bill Clinton isn't the only one who deserves blame for turning America into a carceral state."  Here are excerpts:

For decades, a growing number of Democrats had been trying to reposition themselves as the party of law enforcement and to lure white voters away from the GOP.  With Senator Joe Biden of Delaware, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, urging Clinton to seize control of the issue by “upping the ante,” Democrats and Republicans engaged in a bidding war to see who could be the toughest and meanest sheriff in town.

The $30 billion law [known as the 1994 Crime Bill], passed 25 years ago this month, was the capstone of their efforts.  It included some modest funding for crime prevention programs, such as “midnight basketball,” but its main thrust was a vast array of punitive measures.  The crime bill funded 100,000 new police officers, established a federal three-strikes law, authorized more than $12 billion to prod states to lengthen time served and build new prisons, banned certain assault weapons, created dozens of new death penalty offenses, and ended federal educational Pell grants for inmates.  The crime bill did not significantly lower crime rates; it did, however, help transform the United States into the world’s warden, incarcerating more of its residents than any other country.

The United States has now begun a long overdue national reckoning about the bill — four years ago, Hillary Clinton faced questions about her and Bill Clinton’s complicity in mass incarceration, and Biden has also had to answer for his leading role in engineering the punitive turn taken by the Democratic Party.  But this reckoning still falls far short, partly because deep misunderstandings persist about the wider impact of the bill and other get-tough measures that built the carceral state over the last five decades.

While the Clintons and Biden are guilty as charged, they had many accomplices, some of whom were not the usual suspects.  For years, House and Senate Democrats had been pushing new legislation to curb domestic violence, but it did not come up for a floor vote until the Senate incorporated the measure into the crime bill in fall 1993.  To its credit, the Violence Against Women Act heightened public awareness of sexual assault and domestic violence and provided states and communities with important new resources for crisis centers, shelters, hotlines, and prevention programs.  But VAWA also emphasized law enforcement remedies and included measures that raised serious civil rights concerns — all with the help of many national and local organizations working against rape and domestic violence.  Many of these groups have since had second thoughts about “carceral feminism.”

During her presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton claimed that the crime bill was passed with strong support from African Americans who were clamoring for tough measures to halt rising crime rates.  In reality, African Americans were deeply divided over the legislation and other criminal justice issues.  These divisions have only widened in the 25 years since then, as a new generation of “post-racial” black politicians sought to appeal to white and African American voters by castigating young black men and women as addicts, drug dealers, and common street criminals.  (In one notable example from 2011, then-Mayor Michael Nutter of Philadelphia chastised black fathers as “sperm donors” and “doggone hoodie-wearing teens.”)  With the rise of Black Lives Matter, however, these and other activists are at last calling attention to the ways in which mass incarceration constitutes a new system of social control, one with disturbing parallels to the old Jim Crow era.

This stark reality is now a leading public issue, as it should be.  But it overshadows the deepening impact of the carceral state on other demographic groups.  The incarceration rate for white Americans — about 633 per 100,000 residents — appears relatively low compared to the rates for African Americans (3,044 per 100,000) and Hispanics (1,305 per 100,000), but it is more than ten times the national incarceration rates of certain Western European countries.  All told, half of all adults in the United States — or about 113 million people — have seen an immediate family member go to jail or prison for at least one night.

September 12, 2019 in Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

Council on Criminal Justice produces papers on "The 1994 Crime Bill: Legacy and Lessons"

Via email, I learned the Council on Criminal Justice has a great new set of developing papers and resources taking a close look at the 1994 Crime Bill.  The materials are assembled on this page, and here are highlights:

On September 13, the Crime Bill turns 25.  After a quarter century, it’s as controversial as ever — and as important to understand.

What did the Crime Bill actually do? What does the research say about the impact it had on crime and justice? What lessons does it offer policymakers today?

To help answer these critical questions, the Council commissioned analyses from some of the nation’s most respected crime experts.  Papers examining the major provisions of the bill will be released over the coming months.

Overview and Reflections - Richard Rosenfeld 

Part One: Impacts on Prison Populations - William Sabol 

September 12, 2019 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, September 11, 2019

After Sixth Circuit panel approves (resoundingly) Ohio's execution protocol, will state now seek to restart its machinery of death?

As reported in this post from February, Ohio Gov Mike DeWine put a long list of scheduled executions on hold after a lower court had ruled that "it is certain or very likely" that the state's reliance on the drug midazolam in its eceuction protocol "cannot reduce consciousness to the level at which a condemned inmate will not experience the severe pain associated with injection of the paralytic drug or potassium chloride."  Ironically, the Ohio death row defendant, Warren Keith Henness, appealed the district court's decision because it ultimately denied his request for a stay of execution. 

That appeal has not been resolved by  a Sixth Circuit panel in In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, No. 19-3064 (6th Cir. Sept 11, 2019) (available here), and the panel opinion seem almost to be urging Ohio to get it machinery of death up and running again.  Here are extended excepts providing context for, and content from, this short ruling:

In Glossip, the Supreme Court held that, to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of an Eighth Amendment challenge to a state’s method of execution, the plaintiff must: (1) show that the intended method of execution is “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,” and (2) “identify an alternative [method] that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain.” Id. at 2737 (citations, brackets, internal quotations, and original emphasis omitted).

Applying this framework, the district court found that Henness met his burden on Glossip’s first prong but failed to propose a viable alternative method of execution as required by the second. We review each prong separately....

We disagree [with the district court's conclusion on the first Glossip prong].  As an initial matter, neither pulmonary edema nor the symptoms associated with it qualify as the type of serious pain prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  Consider: midazolam may cause Henness to suffocate.  But the Eighth Amendment only prohibits forms of punishment that seek to intensify an inmate’s death by “superadd[ing]” feelings of “terror, pain, or disgrace.”  Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1124 (2019) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with this understanding, the Supreme Court recently reasoned that the fact that an inmate sentenced to death by hanging might slowly suffocate to death is not constitutionally problematic.  Id.  Because suffocation does not qualify as “severe pain and needless suffering,” it follows that Ohio’s use of midazolam — which could cause pulmonary edema, i.e., suffocation — is not constitutionally inappropriate.  The district court therefore clearly erred in concluding to the contrary.

Further, the district court erred in finding that Henness met his burden of proving that midazolam is incapable of suppressing his consciousness enough to prevent him from experiencing — at a constitutionally problematic level — the pain caused by the combination of the paralytic agent and potassium chloride.  Indeed, though we have concluded that the combination of those two substances “would cause severe pain to a person who is fully conscious,” we have also recognized that midazolam is capable of altering an inmate’s ability to subjectively experience pain.  See Fears, 860 F.3d at 886, 888 (noting that “experts . . . agree[] that midazolam is sometimes used alone for intubation”). That said, the relevant inquiry is whether an inmate injected with 500 milligrams of midazolam would subjectively experience unconstitutionally severe pain — an inquiry that Henness has failed to prove should be answered in his favor.  To be sure, the bulk of Henness’s evidence focuses on the fact that midazolam is incapable of rendering an inmate insensate to pain.  But “the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a prisoner a painless death,” so it is immaterial whether the inmate will experience some pain — as noted, the question is whether the level of pain the inmate subjectively experiences is constitutionally excessive.  See Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1124.  And the fact that midazolam may not prevent an inmate from experiencing pain is irrelevant to whether the pain the inmate might experience is unconstitutional. Without evidence showing that a person deeply sedated by a 500 milligram dose of midazolam is still “sure or very likely” to experience an unconstitutionally high level of pain, Henness has not met his burden on this prong, and the district court clearly erred in concluding otherwise....

But even if we were to agree with Henness that Ohio’s method of execution is very likely to cause either of the types of severe pain identified by Henness and the district court, we would still find that Henness has failed to carry his burden under Glossip’s second prong.  This is because Henness’s proposed alternative method — death by secobarbital — is not a viable alternative.  As an initial matter, the record demonstrates that death by secobarbital is not “feasible” because secobarbital can, in some instances, take days to cause death and Henness has failed to propose any procedures detailing how an execution team might deal with such a prolonged execution.  Setting that deficiency aside, Henness’s proposal still fails.  As the Supreme Court recently explained, a state may decline to utilize an alternative method of execution — even if it is otherwise feasible and capable of being readily implemented — so long as the state has a legitimate reason for doing so, and “choosing not to be the first [state] to experiment with a new method of execution is a legitimate reason to reject it.” Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1128-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It follows that, because no other state uses secobarbital to carry out an execution, Ohio may decline to implement it.

As a final point, we note that Henness’s last-minute motion to dismiss on mootness and ripeness grounds is without merit. Contrary to his contentions, Ohio has said that it intends to resume executions with this protocol if we approve. See, e.g., Andrew J. Tobias, Gov. Mike DeWine Freezes All Ohio Executions While New Method Developed, Cleveland.com (February 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/2HUL-HBUG (last accessed August 9, 2019). Thus, his challenge is not moot.  And his challenge is ripe — notwithstanding the fact that his execution has been delayed.

In other words, it seems that the Sixth Circuit panel here clearly credits the death row defendant's contention that Ohio's use of midazolam in its lethal injection protocol "may cause Henness to suffocate" and seems to credit the claim that he "will experience some pain."  But, according to the panel, it is fully constitution circa 2019 for the state to opt to "slowly suffocate to death" a condemned defendant as long as that defendant is not "sure or very likely to experience an unconstitutionally high level of pain."  

I am certain that the defendant here will now appeal this matter to the en banc Sixth Circuit and also the Supreme Court, but I will be surprised if this appeal gets heard in full again.  (I will predict here that at least a few Sixth Circuit judges will dissent if and when the full circuit does not take up the case.)  Consequently, I think the fate of Warren Keith Henness and a long list of condemned with execution dates in Ohio now turns on what whether and when Governor DeWine is prepared to order the state's machinery of death to become operational again.

A few (of many) prior recent related posts:

September 11, 2019 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, September 10, 2019

Previewing another dynamic SCOTUS criminal justice docket

Though we are still nearly a month away from the first Monday in October, it is not too early to start gearing up for what may be another dynamic and interesting Supreme Court Term for criminal justice fans.  Wonderfully, Rory Little has already put together this lengthy preview post at SCOTUSblog under the heading "Overview of the court’s criminal docket for OT 19 — sizeable and significant."  I highly recommend Rory's post in full, and I can excerpt here his intro and conclusion along with a few sentencing-related highlights (with links from the original):

The Supreme Court has already granted review in 50 cases for the term that opens on Monday, October 7.  More will be granted when the court returns for its “long conference” (following the summer recess) on October 1.  By my broad definition (which includes immigration and civil-related-to-criminal cases), 20 of the 50 cases already granted (40%) involve criminal-law or related issues. After consolidations, this represents 16 hours of argument — and 10 of those hours will occur in the first two months.  From this end of the telescope, the cases look important, and a few will certainly have broad impact.

Monday, October 7, will open with two very significant criminal-case arguments, one before and one after lunch (with a patent case sandwiched in the middle).

First, the justices will consider whether a state may (as Kansas has) constitutionally eliminate any defense of insanity to criminal charges.  This presents both due process and Eighth Amendment questions, and involves intricate mental gymnastics regarding the difference(s) between insanity and a permissible defense of lacking criminal mens rea....  After lunch, the court will address the likely far easier question whether the “unanimous verdict” requirement for criminal jury trials under the Sixth Amendment necessarily applies to all the states under the 14th Amendment’s incorporation doctrine....

On October 16, in Mathena v. Malvo, the court will consider the life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence imposed on the juvenile “D.C. sniper,” Lee Malvo, who with an adult partner (since executed) shot and killed 10 people in the Washington, D.C., area in 2002.  The constitutionality of LWOP sentences for juveniles under the Eighth Amendment has bedeviled the court twice previously: Such sentences have been declared unconstitutional when mandatory, but not when discretionary.  This case will examine what exactly that means.  The year-old retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who authored the most recent decision on the issue, makes the outcome difficult to predict....

[A]t least one death-penalty case is almost always on the court’s annual docket.  OT 19 is no exception. In McKinney v. Arizona the justices will address questions revolving around the use and evaluation of mitigating evidence in capital cases....

In Shular v. United States, the justices will once again confront the much-critiqued “categorical approach” to evaluating which state offenses count as predicates for enhanced federal sentencing.

Somewhat refreshingly, the court granted review on a typewritten pro se prisoner petition for certiorari in Banister v. Davis, a habeas case.  Once the court requested a response from Texas, Banister enlisted a former assistant solicitor general and clerk to Justice Sonia Sotomayor to represent him, and the case, although dry, will be significant to the habeas bar....

The Supreme Court’s docket is a bit of an optical illusion: it always looks very different at the start from the way it is perceived by the following July.  Big cases argued in October are decided by early spring and by then are overshadowed by new grants of review, which we now perceive, “if foreseen at all, … dimly.” So stay tuned.  The sense of imminence and uncertainty is one reason the court and its machinations provide such an irresistible attraction!

September 10, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"A Fair Fight: Achieving Indigent Defense Resource Parity"

DefenderParityCoverThe title of this post is the title of this notable new report authored by Bryan Furst, who serves as counsel and the George A. Katz Fellow with the Brennan Center's Justice Program. Here are excerpts from the report's start:

Many of the issues that affect our criminal justice system today — overly long sentences, racial bias, wrongful convictions — are exacerbated by overwhelmed indigent defense systems.  In this moment of bipartisan support for reform, creating resource parity between prosecutors and indigent defenders could help achieve transformative change and lend needed credibility to our criminal justice system....

A functioning adversarial legal system requires two adequately resourced opposing sides.  But American prosecutors, while sometimes under-resourced themselves, are the most powerful actors in the U.S. legal system.  In addition to better funding, there are numerous structural advantages a prosecutor holds that worsen the resource disparity.  For example, harsh mandatory minimums and widespread pretrial incarceration create conditions in which people have essentially no choice but to accept whatever plea deal the prosecutor offers.

Historically, improving the resource disparity for defenders has been politically difficult because of the cost and the fear of looking “soft on crime.”  This might not be as true today, when 71 percent of voters think it is important to reduce the prison population and 66 percent support the use of government tax dollars to provide indigent defense.

In addition, the fiscal costs of indigent defense reform are not nearly as high when one accounts for the savings it can bring.  Issues exacerbated by defender resource disparity — pretrial incarceration, overly long sentences, wrongful convictions — are extremely expensive.  The Prison Policy Initiative estimates that the United States spends $80.7 billion on corrections each year, while pretrial detention alone costs $13.6 billion.  From 1991 to 2016, Texas paid out over $93 million to wrongfully convicted people.

Providing better indigent defense does not always mean spending more money.  State indigent defense systems are often structured in extremely inefficient ways that cost states more than necessary and lead to worse outcomes for people accused of crimes.  Restructuring for those jurisdictions may require an up-front investment but can lead to savings in the long term.

At the heart of defender resource disparity is the chronic underfunding of indigent defense — a phenomenon that is widespread and well-documented.  But fixing the problem will require more than simply increasing funding, and the question demands thinking broadly about the many issues that drive it.  This report identifies five key challenges that contribute to defender resource disparity:

  • Improperly structured indigent defense systems
  • Unsustainable workloads
  • Defender-prosecutor salary disparity
  • Insufficient support staff
  • Disparate federal funding as compared to law enforcement

Many of the solutions presented in this analysis will improve resource parity, requiring increased up-front spending.  Some will produce savings in the long term through cost sharing between indigent defense offices or reduced levels of incarceration, while others, such as mandating open discovery, will cost almost nothing to implement.

This analysis identifies various characteristics of the justice systems that contribute to defender resource disparity and presents solutions to move toward parity.  It seeks to build upon and elevate the work of many others in the multi-decade effort to realize the right to counsel in this country — one of many necessary reforms required to dismantle the systems of mass incarceration.

September 10, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, September 09, 2019

Sixth Circuit finds 30-day sentence given to Senator Rand Paul's attacker "substantively unreasonable"

To my knowledge, a full 15 years after Booker created the reasonableness standard of appellate review for federal sentencing, I believe there are still only a handful of cases in which circuit courts have declared a sentence to be "substantively unreasonable" upon a defendant's appeal claiming it included a prison term that was too long.  But today a Sixth Circuit panel manages to declare yet again, upon an appeal by the government, that a sentence is "substantively unreasonable" because the term of incarceration was too short.  And this ruling in US v. Boucher, No. 18-5683 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (available here), comes in quite the high-profile setting.  Here is how it begins:

Senator Rand Paul was mowing his lawn when he stopped to gather a few limbs in his path.  Without warning, Rene Boucher — Paul’s next-door neighbor, whom he had not spoken with in years — raced toward Paul and attacked him from behind.  The impact broke six of Paul’s ribs, caused long-lasting damage to his lung, and led to several bouts of pneumonia.  Boucher later pleaded guilty to assaulting a member of Congress in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 351(e). Although his Guidelines sentencing range was 21 to 27 months in prison, the district court sentenced him to 30 days’ imprisonment.  On appeal, the Government argues that Boucher’s sentence was substantively unreasonable.  We agree and therefore VACATE his sentence and REMAND for resentencing.

I have largely stopped following circuit reasonableness rulings because they so often seemed void of real content or character.  This Boucher ruling has some considerable content and character, as it runs a full 16 pages and concludes this way:

In a mine-run case like this one, we apply “closer review” to any variance from the Guidelines. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 351).  And our review here reveals no compelling justification for Boucher’s well-below-Guidelines sentence.  Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.  Boucher may or may not be entitled to a downward variance after the district court reweighs the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and it is the district court’s right to make that decision in the first instance.  See United States v. Johnson, 239 F. App’x 986, 993 (6th Cir. 2007) (“This Court takes no position on what an appropriate sentence in this case might be and notes that on remand the district court still retains ample discretion to grant a variance. . . . The narrow reason for remand here is that the extreme nature of the deviation, without a correspondingly compelling justification, resulted in a substantively unreasonable sentence.”).  We therefore VACATE Boucher’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing.

I have long hoped for a mre robust and searching form of reasonableness review, but I continue to find that courts are much more interested in seriously questioning 30-day sentences when prosecutors appeal than in questioning 30-year sentences when defendants appeal.  And so it goes in incarceration nation.

September 9, 2019 in Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Feds recommending incarceration terms from 1 to 15 months for parents involved college bribery scandal

Late Friday night, sentencing memoranda were filed in the run up to highest-profile scheduled sentencings of a number of the parents involved in the college bribery scandal.  This ABC News report overviews the basics:

Federal prosecutors are recommending some period of incarceration for the parents in the college admissions scandal.... The government's sentencing memorandum refers to the college admissions scandal as "a kind of Rorschach test for middle class angst about college admissions." The government says some period of incarceration is the only meaningful sanction for these crimes.

Court documents showed prosecutors recommended jail time ranging from one month to 15 months for the defendants named in the memo.  Of the local parents who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud and honest services mail fraud, Napa Vinyard Owner Agustin Huneeus is facing the longest sentencing recommendation at 15 months. Huneeus paid Rick Singer $300,000 participate in both the college entrance exam cheating scheme and the college recruitment scheme for his daughter.

Next is Marjorie Klapper of Menlo Park with a recommended sentence of four months. Klapper paid Singer $15,000 to participate in the college entrance exam cheating scheme for her son. Peter Sartorio of Menlo Park is facing a recommendation of just one month.  Sartorio agreed to pay Singer $15,000 to participate in the college entrance exam cheating scheme for his daughter.  Actress Felicity Huffman is also facing a one-month recommended sentence. 

The government says they considered the amount of the bribe, whether someone was a repeat player, an active or passive participant in the scheme and whether or not they involved their children.

I had been hoping that the US Attorney's Office in Massachusetts, which has this useful webpage with indictments, plea agreements and other documents publicly available, would also post the government's full sentencing memorandum. So far, all that is posted is a listing of the "Government Sentencing Recommendation" in each case. 

Of course, the defendant receiving the most attention in the press is actress Felicity Huffman, and here is a partial round-up of stories focused on the sentencing recommendations in her case and related matters:

Prior related posts:

September 9, 2019 in Celebrity sentencings, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Senator Kamala Harris releases her plan "to fundamentally transform our criminal justice system"

Via this lengthy new section of her campaign website, Senator Kamala Harris has now joined the ranks of the most prominent candidates for the 2020 Democratic Presidential nomination, in particular Joe BidenCory BookerPete Buttigeig, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, by releasing a detailed agenda for criminal justice reform.  As is always the case, the full plan set forth by Senator Harris, which is titled "Kamala’s Plan To Transform The Criminal Justice System And Re-Envision Public Safety In America," merits a full read.  In this space I can only flag the introduction and a few notable sentencing elements (with formatting and links not preserved):

Reforming our criminal justice system is as complex and pressing an endeavor as any other in our lifetime. It is the civil rights issue of our time, and there is perhaps no one more uniquely suited to taking on this issue than Kamala Harris....

At its best, the system serves to hold serious wrongdoers accountable and achieve justice for crime survivors, while helping to build safer and healthier communities.  At its worst, decades of failed policies have created an unjust, unequal, and vastly expansive system that disproportionately harms communities of color and criminalizes individuals just because they are poor. It is long past time to re-envision public safety by strengthening and supporting our communities and drastically limiting the number of people we expose to our criminal justice system.  As president, Kamala will fundamentally transform how we approach public safety....

As president, there are four main levers that Kamala can exercise to change criminal justice policy.  She can: (1) work with Congress and use her executive authority to change law and policy on the federal level; (2) investigate state and local actors through the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division; (3) empower and incentivize behavior on the state and local level through federal funding; and (4) use her voice as president to advocate for change. And as president, Kamala will exercise every one of these levers to increase public safety, reduce our outsized criminal justice system, and make it fairer and more equitable for all....

End Mass Incarceration and Invest Resources into Evidence and Community-Based Programs that Reduce Crime and Help Build Safe and Healthy Communities

Ending Mass Incarceration. ... Make significant federal investments in policies that would end mass incarceration and especially into evidence-based, non-carceral social supports and programs at the state and local level to improve public safety and reduce violence.  This includes investing in jobs and job training, housing, transportation, food security, education, medical and mental health care, including trauma recovery.

End the “War on Drugs” – One-fifth of the incarcerated population – or 456,000 people – is serving time for a drug charge while another 1.15 million are on probation and parole for drug-related offenses. This is especially the case on the federal level, where nearly half of the prison population are there for drug crimes. So it is past time to end the failed war on drugs, and it begins with legalizing marijuana. Marijuana arrests account for over 50% of all drug arrests. Of the 8.2 million marijuana arrests between 2001 and 2010, 88% were for simple marijuana possession. Worse, despite roughly equal usage rates, Black people are about four times more likely than White people to be arrested for marijuana. Black Americans also make up nearly 30% of all drug-related arrests, despite accounting for only 12.5% of substance users.

Legalizing marijuana. Support states in legalizing marijuana; legalize marijuana on the federal level, expunge convictions, and reinvest in the community....

Sentencing Reforms. Significant reforms must be made with respect to the criminal justice system’s sentencing schemes, including:

  • End mandatory minimums on federal level and incentivize states to do the same.  As a Senator, Kamala is a cosponsor of the Justice Safety Valve Act, which would eliminate all mandatory minimums by letting judges issue sentences below the mandatory minimum.
  • Reform clemency process to form clemency/sentencing review units and significantly increase use of clemency. The clemency process needs to be removed from the Department of Justice where there are inherent conflicts of interest. Specifically, DOJ should not determine whether individuals convicted by their own colleagues should be shortened or commuted.
  • For those who have been sentenced to long prison terms (i.e., 20 years or more), the sentencing review unit would provide for an assessment as to whether it is appropriate and serves the interests of justice for the incarcerated individual to be released or have their sentence shortened after having served 10 years.
  • End federal crack and powder cocaine disparity (reduce from 18:1 to 1:1).

National Criminal Justice Commission. The last time this nation seriously examined the criminal justice system was in 1967 when President Lyndon Johnson created the Katzenbach Commission.  That commission was fueled largely by people’s concern about crime. It’s time for a new national criminal justice commission, fueled by bipartisan support for major criminal justice reforms.  Kamala would form a commission with diverse stakeholders, whose goals would include studying the federal and state criminal justice systems, and providing recommendations within one year.  Her administration would then take action based on those recommendations.  In its 360 degree assessment of the system, pressing issues that need to be addressed include (but are not limited to):

  • Studying individuals incarcerated for violent offenses to provide recommendations via evidence-based findings. Politicians often talk about ending mass incarceration. However, one cannot truly reform the system without studying the effects of how best to hold individuals convicted of violent offenses accountable. While a significant part of the federal system involves those convicted of nonviolent drug offenses, at the state level, more than half of those convicted are there for violent offenses. Moreover, studies show that merely imposing excessively long sentences does not improve results of preventing individuals from re-offending. So what are the best ways to hold violent offenders accountable and prevent re-offending? The commission would study this issue and provide recommendations based on evidence-based findings.
  • Redefining the metrics and data we use to measure success in our criminal justice system. People in the system use terminology such as “recidivism” even though there is no good definition of what that means. And people use data such as rearrests, when that is not an accurate measure of “recidivism” and perpetuates racial disparities, as communities of color are often more heavily policed. Our system needs to have a shared set of metrics and data collection that accurately measures what success means and informs our policymaking.

Reform community supervision.

  • Invest money in states to shorten the length of probation and other forms of community supervision where appropriate and where it serves the interests of justice;
  • Invest money in states to end jail time for technical violations of community-based supervision (reforming parole).

End the use of private prisons. Less than 10 percent of our prison population is held in private facilities, but it is nevertheless still necessary to end the profit motive that drives these private prisons, as it is inhumane to profit off of imprisonment and allow a system that continues to create incentives that are contrary to the goal of helping people rehabilitate themselves and return to the community. Kamala also believes we must end private detention centers for undocumented immigrants....

Invest money in states/localities to end juvenile incarceration in favor of restorative justice programs and wrap-around services, except for the most serious crimes.

End life sentences of children and offer opportunities for sentence reduction to young people convicted of crimes.

  • For example, fight to end de facto life without parole sentences by allowing youth sentenced to more than 20 years in prison for crimes committed before their 18th birthday to petition the original sentencing court for review of their sentence after they have served 10 years.
  • End the transfer of children to adult prisons;
  • End solitary confinement for children;

Make significant federal investment for innovative Back-on-Track programs that provide in-custody and out-of-custody education and comprehensive services to individuals convicted of crimes to reduce recidivism by equipping them with the tools they need to reenter society successfully.

Education, job training, and treatment. Mandate that federal prisons provide educational and vocational training, and mental health and addiction treatment in custody, including diagnosis and treatment of trauma. 

Reentry educational course. Mandate federal prisons to provide a reentry educational course that provides, among other things, information on acquiring identification and their options with respect to housing, education, treatment, and other assistance programs. Invest federal money into this program and incentivize states to provide the same reentry educational course.

Create an advisory board of directly impacted individuals to make recommendations for successful re-entry.

Expungement & Sealing

  • Automatic expungement and sealing of offenses that are not serious or violent after 5 years
  • Ban the box, i.e., remove questions about an individual’s conviction histories until after conditional offers have been made. Individuals reentering society should have a meaningful opportunity to obtain a job and reintegrate into the community.
  • Restore voting rights for all who have served their sentence.
  • End federal bans on formerly-incarcerated individuals (as well as those arrested and not incarcerated) access to public housing, student loans, SNAP, and professional work licenses....

Prosecutorial Accountability Provide explicit authority to the U.S Department of Justice to conduct pattern and practice investigations of prosecutorial offices that commit systematic misconduct. Invest federal funds in data collection and data analysis for greater transparency and accountability. Require federal prosecutors to provide data on their charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing decisions. Provide funding to incentivize state prosecutors to participate in a national reporting program. Invest federal funds to assess prosecutorial priorities. The FBI invests millions of dollars into developing a threat assessment system that helps them set priorities. The same should be done with prosecutors so that they prioritize cases that do the most to promote public safety and justice.

Support for Public Defenders Support for public defenders to instill greater trust and equity in the justice system. Kamala believes we must support our public defender systems, which are straining to uphold the constitutional right to counsel for indigent defendants as required by the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Gideon v. Wainwright decision. Her EQUAL Defense Act would create a $250 million grant program to fund public defenders. To receive grants, states and localities must impose workload limits, achieve pay parity between public defenders and prosecutors within 5 years, and collect data on public defender workloads. Increases funding for public defender training. Increases student loan repayment program. Her legislation has been endorsed by Jon Rapping of Gideon’s Promise.

Humane Treatment of Prisoners

  • End the death penalty. Kamala believes the death penalty is immoral, discriminatory, ineffective, and a gross misuse of taxpayer dollars. As San Francisco District Attorney, Kamala declined to seek the death penalty in the prosecution of an individual accused of killing a police officer, despite facing relentless political pressure to do so. End solitary confinement.
  • End solitary confinement, but ensure alternative therapeutic and rehabilitative mechanisms are available to protect the safety of individuals in prisons and of prison staff.
  • End the profiting off of incarceration. Specifically, prohibit prisons from making a profit from charging exorbitant rates for prisoners for telecommunications and commissary/food and supplies in prison.
  • Keeping Families Intact. Ripping families apart creates lasting harm and undermines the goal of building safer and healthier communities. We should strive to maintain family connections. Make it easier for family to visit prisoners
  • The FIRST STEP Act instituted a requirement to allow for federal prisoners to be placed within 500 miles of their post-release residency where possible. Kamala would reduce that distance even more and invest money in states to do the same. Restore parental rights for returning citizens in a timely manner Dignity for Incarcerated Women Act, which Kamala cosponsors would: Require videoconference access free of charge; Provide parenting classes for prisoners who are primary caretaker parents; and Institute a pilot program to allow overnight visits from family members.

A few of many prior recent related posts:

September 9, 2019 in Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)